



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DIA/PAW-3  
18 Jul 95



Background Paper for the Senior Africa Director, NSC

SUBJECT: Possible Consequences of Lifting the Arms Embargo against Rwanda (U)

1. (S) PURPOSE: To provide information to Ms. Susan Rice, the Senior Africa Director, NSC concerning possible consequences of lifting the UN arms embargo against the government of Rwanda.

2. (U) POINTS OF MAJOR INTEREST:

a. (S/NF) Effect on Regional Arms Flows: Lifting the embargo against Kigali while maintaining it against the Rwanda Hutu insurgents would do little to change the current flow of arms into central Africa. DIA believes that the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) receives intermittent shipments of arms and munitions, ranging from small arms to artillery from various sources via Uganda which is sufficient to sustain its current level of operations. However, large and more sophisticated pieces of equipment have been difficult to obtain. The Hutu insurgents continue to receive small arms, machine guns, mortars, and explosives in sufficient quantities to sustain their insurgent operations despite increased international attention and the current arms embargo.

-- (S/NF) The RPA apparently has problems procuring various non-lethal military assistance such as communications equipment, trucks, night vision devices and conventional military training support essential for a conventional military because of the arms embargo. This hinders its ability to transition from an insurgent to a conventional army better able to combat the on going insurgency and thus improve security in Rwanda.

-- (S/NF) If the embargo were lifted the RPA would likely purchase light armored vehicles and military patrol boats. It would probably like to obtain helicopters, however, at present they are too expensive for the government. These weapons systems would increase the army's capability to interdict and respond to insurgent attacks through increased fire power and mobility. These systems are difficult to obtain clandestinely.

-- (S/NF) Currently, the majority of the RPA's weapons are either Eastern Bloc (China and North Korea) or captured from the former Rwanda Armed Forces (FAR) (primarily French). These sources were out of necessity rather than desire. The army seems to favor the west and would probably seek western sources for their needs. Again, they probably would not seek to replace small arms and artillery, but purchase equipment to meet its transition to a conventional force. To sustain its fleet of French built armored cars, the RPA needs repair parts. France is an unlikely source, however, South Africa's Eland armored car is similar to the French AML 90, thus a likely supplier of repair parts and light armored vehicles.

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E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

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-- (C/NF) Foreign military training and not high priced weapons appear to be Kigali's most important need. Furthermore, the government cannot afford massive quantities or high priced weapons. MG Kagame has proven himself as a shrewd and pragmatic leader who recognizes the constraints faced by the Rwanda government.

b. (C/NF) Impact on Arms flows to the Burundi Armed Forces (FAB): While the RPA and the FAB have increased official meetings and appear to be prepared to conduct joint operations, especially along the southwestern Rwanda/northwestern Burundi border, it is unlikely that the RPA would provide substantial materiel support directly to the FAB. Although both forces are dominated by Tutsis, recent [ ] indicate that the RPA high command has contempt for their Burundi counterparts and the latter's force as a whole. Recent [ ] indicates that the RPA has taken extensive defensive measures to protect its bases while the FAB has not.

-- (C/NF) The RPA's main motivating factor for cooperation with the FAB probably stems from the increasing threat from northwestern Burundi by Rwanda Hutu insurgents operating with Burundi Hutu insurgents. Kigali would rather ignore Burundi, although clearly events in either country impact on the other.

-- (C/NF) The Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) political program officially stresses a Rwandese identity over maintaining separate Hutu and Tutsi identities. This policy stems from many of the key RPF leaders having grown up in Uganda. Their Uganda experience, unlike that in Hutu dominated Rwanda and Tutsi dominated Burundi did not reenforce severe ethnic cleavages. That said, if the increasing Hutu insurgency threatens the security of Rwanda's southern border and it appeared that the Burundi Tutsi faced an all out ethnic conflict the RPA would likely assist the FAB with materiel support.

3. (C/NF) EXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS: The RPA has demonstrated that it is the most capable, disciplined and battle-hardened force in Central Africa. Therefore, little impact would occur to upset the current military balance with regard to conventional forces (Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi). What would likely occur is an increase in regional instability over the short term. The RPA with foreign assistance would accelerate its conversion to a professional conventional force better able to contain the regional insurgency. Insurgency in all likelihood will never go away, however, its destabilizing affect on Rwanda and the region as whole would diminish in the long term as result.

-- (C/NF) The most significant threat to regional stability comes from the Rwandan Hutu insurgents because not only do they destabilize Rwanda, but eastern Zaire and Burundi and possibly western Tanzania. Given the RPA's increased capability it would probably aggressively contain the insurgents through interdiction and cross-border strikes. The likelihood of the latter is great regardless of the status of the arms embargo. The difference would be a more professional and highly trained force better able to control itself unlike at

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

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
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
Kibeho and one less likely to generate massive panic amongst the Hutu refugee population. The professionalization and conventionalization of the RPA is just a small portion of an overall counterinsurgency plan involving all aspects of the Rwanda government.

COORDINATION: DIO/AFRICA.

PREPARED BY:



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