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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

POLICY GUIDANCE FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR

WEAPONS (NUWEP) (U)

JUNE 1982

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

2.1 JUN 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons (NUWEP 82)(U)

(S) Transmitted herewith is the Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons (NUWEP). This document implements and amplifies the policy contained in National Security Decision Directive 13, Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy. The policy contained herein will be used to guide all planning pertaining to the employment and acquisition of nuclear capable forces and associated command, control, communications and intelligence systems. This document supersedes the NUWEP dated October 1980.

(S) The fundamental objective of our nuclear weapons employment policy is to deter direct attack -- particularly nuclear attack -- on the United States and its allies. A credible deterrent requires sufficient nuclear force capabilities and plans for their employment to be able to attack effectively and selectively the full range of the Warsaw Pact military, leadership, and industrial-economic target structure. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders-in-chief of the unified and specified commands will ensure that the guidance contained herein is followed in developing the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and all nuclear contingency plans.

(U) The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy will have overall staff responsibility for actively monitoring the implementation and continuing review of this policy and supporting employment plans to ensure orderly progress. This responsibility should include, but is not limited to, review of plans and directives published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support development of the SIOP and nuclear contingency plans, and review of the SIOP revision reports and wargame analyses following their approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Further, I encourage the continued interaction of my staff with the nuclear planners -- particularly during the plan development phase -- to ensure the highest level of consistency between our nuclear weapons employment plans and the policy contained in this document.

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POLICY GUIDANCE FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

I. PURPOSE

(U) This document implements Presidential guidance and establishes policy within the Department of Defense for planning the employment of nuclear weapons. The policy contained herein will guide all planning pertaining to the employment and acquisition of nuclear capable forces and associated command, control, communications and intelligence (C^3I) systems.

(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff will ensure that the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and other nuclear weapons operations and contingency plans are consistent with, and supportive of, the policy statements contained herein.

II. OBJECTIVES

(U) Our nuclear forces support the national security objectives of preserving the United States as a free nation with our fundamental institutions and values intact and, in conjunction with our general purpose forces and those of our allies, deterring politico-military actions or threat of actions counter to our common interests. Planning for the employment of nuclear weapons will support these objectives.

A. Deterrence

(U) The tundamental objective of our policy for the employment of nuclear weapons is to deter direct attack--particularly nuclear attack--on the United States and its allies. Our nuclear forces are of crucial importance both in the prevention of nuclear attack and in protecting our national interests at any level of nuclear conflict. They also must support NATO strategy as expressed in MC-14-3. Deterrence is best achieved if our defense posture makes Soviet assessments of war outcomes, under any contingency, so uncertain and dangerous as to remove any incentive for initiating attack. Consequently, we must continue to make the prospect of nuclear war even more remote by remaining capable, in all plausible scenarios, of waging war successfully so that the Soviet Union (or any adversary) would perceive that it could not achieve its war aims and, should it initiate an attack, would suffer losses that were unacceptable. Further, while we do not desire to fight an extended nuclear conflict, our possession of such a capability is the best deterrence of that eventuality because it increases the potential costs and risks of an attack and denies the attacker the prospect of a quick or eventual victory.

B. Crisis Stability

(U) The need tor stable deterrence is most critical in a crisis situation when the Soviet Union may feel compelled to attack or threaten the United States and/or our allies. Therefore, in a crisis situation, it is particularly important that the United States not be under pressure to employ vulnerable forces nor that the Soviets be provided any incentive to initiate an attack.

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This requires that we reduce the vulnerabilities in our nuclear forces and C³I systems; improve our ability to obtain and react to warning (ambiguous as well as unambiguous) and to detect and assess a Soviet attack; and enhance our ability to respond appropriately and effectively as directed by the NCA. A critical part of the last requirement is the need for an effective continuity of government process. We also must improve our conventional and chemical capabilities so that we are not under pressure to resort to the early employment of nuclear weapons to counter non-nuclear aggression.

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C. Escalation Control

Should deterrence fail, the United States will seek early conflict (U) termination by attempting to control escalation while denying Soviet objectives. For this purpose, our nuclear weapons employment plans must provide the NCA with the ability to conduct military operations at various levels of conflict in ways that will be militarily effective and will maximize the chance of controlling the level and scope of conflict and destruction. Plans for the controlled use of nuclear weapons, in conjunction with political and other military actions, must strive to: (1) provide leverage for a negotiated termination of military actions; (2) neutralize or reverse an unfavorable military situation; (3) constrain the use of force consistent with the attack objective so as to minimize potential pressures on Soviet leaders to escalate the level of conflict; (4) diminish the Soviets' expectations of success by direct military actions and by evidencing our willingness and ability to respond in an appropriate but controlled manner; (5) convince the Soviets that their previously calculated risks and costs were in error, and that reconsideration of their objectives and early termination of the conflict are the most attractive alternatives; and (6) leave sufficient Soviet leadership and industrial-economic resources clearly at risk so as to provide Soviet leaders a strong incentive to seek conflict termination.

D. <u>War</u> Objectives

(S) The most critical military force employment objective of the United States in wartime is to defeat Soviet attempts to achieve their politicomilitary objectives and force them to seek earliest termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States.

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E. Protection and Coercion

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III. CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

(5) Our nuclear weapons employment policy requires forces and supporting C^{3I} systems with requisite capabilities to counter the growing Soviet threat and achieve our wartime objectives should deterrence fail. Our current nuclear forces and C^{3I} systems are limited with respect to survivability, endurance, capability, and flexibility. Plans to modernize our nuclear force capabilities represent a critically important step in reducing these deficiencies, and must be pursued coherently and aggressively. Further, we must obtain maximum effectiveness and utilization of our current nuclear force capabilities while also ensuring that our employment plans and planning capabilities evolve in parallel with the programmed improvements in our forces and C^{3I} systems.

A. Survivability

(TS) Adequate numbers of nuclear weapons systems and associated C³I capabilities must survive to achieve our employment objectives, even under conditions of a surprise Soviet attack without strategic warning. Force survivability must provide adequate assurance that unforeseen developments, either in the forces themselves or in Soviet offensive or defensive systems, will not jeopardize our ability to achieve our political/military objectives. Of the utmost importance is the need to maintain communications connectivity between the NCA, tactical warning and attack assessment sensors, military commanders, and force elements.*

B. Endurance

(8) Endurance of nuclear forces and supporting C³I systems strengthens our deterrent posture and improves our capability to employ nuclear weapons

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systems effectively should deterrence fail. Endurance is required in order to provide the NCA with the sustained capability of employing weapons in a controlled manner throughout and after a conflict, in keeping with the needs of the situation.

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While not every force and C³I element need have the same endurance, we must strive to take better advantage of the endurance capabilities of our current systems and to procure improved capabilities in the long term. Implicit in this requirement is the need for endurance of a viable employment planning capability equal to or greater than that of the forces and C³I systems themselves.

C. Capability

(8) Our nuclear forces must be capable of attacking effectively a wide range of targets and crippling the capability of the Soviet Union and its allies to conduct effective military operations. Because all of our nuclear forces and supporting $C^{3}I$ systems do not, and need not, possess equivalent capabilities, employment planning must recognize and fully incorporate those inherent attributes of individual nuclear force elements and $C^{3}I$ systems which are best suited to the achievement of specific conflict objectives. Our emphasis on improved capabilities shall focus on: (1) increased military effectiveness for forces and associated $C^{3}I$ systems; (2) a more effective capability for targeting Soviet military forces (to include troops, equipment and fixed facilities of continuing value) and associated $C^{3}I$ systems in the context of a rapidly changing conflict situation; and (3) the capacity to assess battle damage and the disposition of our remaining forces and those of our allies and our adversaries.

D. Flexibility

(8) Increased flexibility in nuclear force employment planning is significant because it permits more effective and selective utilization of such forces. While it would be highly desirable to have a near-real-time capability to develop employment plans, limitations in our forces and $C^{3}I$ systems will preclude this capability for the foreseeable future. Therefore, we will continue to be largely dependent upon the availability of a wide range of <u>preplanned</u> options to provide employment flexibility. However, since actual requirements in a conflict cannot be precisely projected, we must increase our ability to quickly adapt preplanned options to the conditions of the emerging conflict.

(S) For the near term, we must emphasize increasing our employment flexibility in support of theater conflict objectives. This offers us the greatest opportunity to deter or defeat Soviet aggression while controlling escalation. Therefore, we must continue to pursue aggressively the development of an adaptive planning process and capability which permits a more timely response to changes in the theater conflict, particularly movements of enemy force and control elements. This requires that we improve the interface between the employment of strategic, theater nuclear; and general purpose forces to provide greater flexibility in responding to the requirements of a rapidly changing conflict situation.

IV. PLANNING CONCEPTS

A. Preplanning and Review

(U) Preplanning of nuclear employment options permits consideration and balanced treatment of the key factors, enhances the efficiency and effectiveness of the planning process and the employed forces, provides for rapid and effective communication of NCA execution orders, and develops a more comprehensive ability for calculating the consequences of execution given specific scenarios.

(8) To the extent appropriate, employment plans will contain options for attacking coherent sets of objective-related targets. The employment plans developed should provide the NCA with a wide range of viable attack options consistent with employment planning capabilities, the operational characteristics of our weapons systems, the need to maintain a responsive decisionmaking and force execution process, and limitations in U.S. and Soviet attack assessment capabilities.

(U) Where only general plans can be prepared in advance, appropriate organizations and procedures must be established by all nuclear commandersin-chief (CINCs) to improve the capability for the rapid development, assessment, and execution of specifically adapted options in a conflict environment. This capability must be sufficiently comprehensive to allow rapid adaptation of plans to integrate the employment of strategic forces with theater nuclear and general purpose forces when preplanned response options are not judged suitable.

(U) Review by the NCA and senior defense advisors shall be conducted at least semi-annually to assess the scope and effectiveness of nuclear employment plans, promote understanding, and facilitate timely decisionmaking in crisis and conflict situations.

B. Force Planning

1. Force Readiness

(S) Force readiness planning shall provide the NCA with the capability to adjust nuclear force and supporting C³I system readiness levels consistent with the perceived threat and the need for timely and responsive force reaction. These force and C³I system readiness levels permit the NCA to signal increased military preparedness and national resolve; enhance the capability of our military forces to respond to aggression; and support the orderly reestablishment of lower readiness levels following relaxation of the crisis. Signalling national resolve by increased force readiness levels represents a highly visible military action and should be used with discretion in keeping with the severity of the crisis. Planning will ensure that increased readiness levels can be achieved quickly and maintained for varying but extended duration without increased risk of unintended escalation: Plans for returning to lower readiness levels shall not jeopardize or degrade our ability to respond to surprise attack or to return quickly to increased force readiness postures should the enemy attempt to deceive us through a false relaxation of tension.

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2. Force Postures

(S) Plans for the employment of nuclear forces shall be structured so as to take advantage of the flexibility and capability of the specific forces planned to be available at the time of execution. This requires different plans to be developed for our strategic forces in a day-to-day force readiness posture and a generated force readiness posture. Within each force readiness posture, separate plans also shall be prepared based upon projected pre-launch survivability estimates (i.e., damaged, partially damaged and undamaged) of the forces available if meaningful differences in employment flexibility and capability would result.

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3. Planning Flexibility

(S) For the near to mid term, we must depend largely on preplanned employment options to provide the employment flexibility we seek. However, we also must acquire the capability to adapt rapidly these preplanned options and force capabilities to the situation as it develops. This requires survivable and enduring employment planning staff elements which can meet planning/replanning requirements in an extended nuclear conflict. Such planning staffs shall support the overall needs of the NCA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the individual needs of the unified and specified commands (and, for CINCEUR, the major NATO Commanders). To the extent practical, the elements should employ compatible equipment, procedures and communications which ensure a redundant capability for planning the employment of theater and strategic nuclear weapon systems in a protracted conflict. Ultimately, such elements should serve as the foundation of a near-real-time adaptive planning capability and provide an increased dimension and measure of employment flexibility.

V. TARGETING OBJECTIVES


(c) Planning for strategic nuclear attack options will be in accordance with the overall objectives set forth below. Other nuclear plans will be guided by the political and military situation for which they are being prepared, in keeping with guidance provided to the nuclear CINCs by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this respect, operations plans and concept plans of the CINCs will include nuclear employment options appropriate to the theaters of operation of the unified and specified commands.

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(TS) The general target objectives in order of weapon allocation priority are provided below.

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
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
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
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
VI. ATTACK OPTION STRUCTURE

(U) Preplanned attack options shall be structured to permit denial of enemy objectives and achievement of United States objectives at the lowest possible level of conflict, consistent with potential conflict situations. The attack option structure shall consist of:



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
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IX. TARGETING CONSTRAINTS



X. EXERCISES

(U) Periodic exercises will be conducted to: evaluate the adequacy of our nuclear employment options, $C^{3}I$ systems, and procedures; increased readiness

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adaptive planning capabilities including movement/mobility of planning staffs familiarize senior officials with the objectives, capabilities, and limitations of our employment plans; and to stress the overall nuclear force employment process under simulated conflict conditions. Exercises for nuclear employment operations shall include interaction between the Department of Defense and other federal agencies, as appropriate. At least two exercises involving the National Command Authorities will be conducted each year to evaluate our capabilities and our employment doctrine.


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
XI. PLANNING ACTIONS

A. (U) Revisions of Employment Plans for the Near-Term

(U) The following near-term changes and improvements will be made to the existing plans:



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B. (U) <u>Revision of Employment Plans for the Long Term</u>

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(U) Much of the objective of enhancing employment flexibility described in this guidance will require improvements in survivability, endurance and capability of forces and $C^{3}I$ systems, as well as additional research leading to the improvement of target data bases, targeting concepts, and force effectiveness assessments.

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 $\{S\}$ The following efforts shall proceed at a deliberate pace to provide specific improvements, with full recognition of the practical limitations involved and the need to maintain the ability to execute effectively the full range of options:

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4. (U) More effective utilization in the employment plans of improvements in the endurance of U.S. nuclear capable forces and supporting C^3I .

XII. RELATION TO OTHER POLICY

A. Acquisition Policy

(S) Our nuclear force and $C^{3}I$ acquisition programs must directly support and be consistent with the nuclear weapons employment policy contained herein. In addition, our conventional force acquisition programs must consider the probability that these forces could be required to function in a combined nuclear/chemical/conventional environment. The criteria used in evaluating acquisition of future nuclear forces must recognize that each element of our force posture possesses unique, inherent attributes that are better for some conflict situations but are of lesser importance and value for others. Programs will be designed to provide:

1. (S) Greater survivability, endurance and military effectiveness, both in the forces and associated $C^{3}I$ structure.

2. (S) A subset of forces and supporting C³I that have a high probability of enduring survival in a nuclear war.

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4. (S) An improved damage assessment capability and the means of determining the disposition of remaining forces and weapon systems.

5. (S) Forces and capabilities which will contribute to crisis stability and are consistent with national strategic arms reductions objectives.

(S) Greater emphasis also will be placed on a multiplicity of nuclear systems and basing modes to strengthen deterrence and the overall warfighting capability of our forces. This multiplicity of nuclear systems and basing

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modes complicates Soviet defense and attack planning, strengthens mutual reinforcement among the nuclear and conventional force elements in our own attack planning and execution, and hedges against unforeseen degradation of individual elements of our nuclear forces.

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B. Declaratory Policy

(5) A major objective of declaratory policy is to enhance deterrence in the eyes of our enemies and allies by conveying our determination and capability to deny any adversary, particularly the Soviet Union, the prospect of successful military aggression. In this regard, authorized statements of certain elements of our nuclear weapons employment policy can be beneficial in shaping the opinions of the Soviet Union, our allies, and potential adversaries, although details must of necessity remain closely held. However, all such public statements should fully conform to the language in such authoritative public documents as the annual Defense Report of the Secretary of Defense and the Posture Statement of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(S) Public statements as to how we would respond to warning of a Soviet ballistic missile attack on the United States are of particular sensitivity and should be avoided as much as <u>possible</u>. If pressed by questions, for example in a Congressional hearing,

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But we may point out that an inherent capability of our strategic alert forces is the ability to launch rapidly upon receipt of an execution directive.

C. Nuclear Arms Reductions

(U) Equitable nuclear arms reduction agreements serve to diminish the risks of war and help to reduce the threat to our security and the security of our allies. Agreements that significantly reduce the level of nuclear armaments in a fair, balanced, and verifiable manner will be pursued vigorously by the United States. When arms control agreements go into effect that will substantially influence nuclear weapons inventories, our nuclear weapons employment policy and force acquisition planning will have to be adjusted to take account of the changed threat. Of particular importance would be a capability to provide for effective responses to potential Soviet violations and break-out. In turn, arms control initiatives must be evaluated on the basis of their contribution to our defense posture and must be supportive of those nuclear weapons employment and acquisition objectives that would be appropriate for the specific, proposed arms control regime.

XIII. CONTINUING POLICY REVIEW

(S) Past experience shows that whenever changes occur to nuclear employment policy, questions and issues arise from planners regarding points of interpretation, quantification of qualitative statements, technical issues, adequacy of nuclear forces to meet guidance objectives, and testing and exercising of plans developed during implementation. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy will have overall staff responsibility for actively monitoring the implementation and continuing review of this policy and supporting employment

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plans to ensure an orderly progress. His responsibility will include, but not be limited to: coordination of supporting studies and analyses, the review and comment on planning assumptions and reports, the annual assessment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and recommendations on revisions to employment policy.

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(8) The Joint Chiefs of Staff will submit to the Secretary of Defense for approval a proposal for each SIOP development cycle. Data should include, but not be limited to: (1) planning assumptions (postures and damage criteria for planning); (2) changes in size, composition or tasking

(3) new or revised options; (4) recommendations to adjust the number of weapons and (5) changes, if any, to priorities and objectives for weapon allocation or for collateral damage constraints.

(8) The Joint Chiefs of Staff also shall provide an annual assessment to the Secretary of Defense on the status and progress of the development of nuclear employment plans including, but not limited to,

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the degree of employment flexibility available, limiting factors in achieving flexibility, and the status of programs to provide improvements. An integral part of the assessment will be a statement on the expected capability of deployed forces and supporting C³I to accomplish the objectives defined in this guidance. The assessment will include: (1) an evaluation of the results of exercises and tests of the plans developed in support of this policy; (2) an evaluation of the ability of current plans to achieve the objectives specified; (3) fatality estimates (prompt and delayed) for each employment option; (4) the ability to constrain collateral damage and fatalities and the associated impact on achieving stated objectives; (5) intelligence data base gaps; (6) progress made toward developing and validating a concept for a responsive and flexible strategic force capability to supplement theater nuclear forces in achieving theater conflict objectives; (7) deficiencies in force employment that may exist and measures that should be taken to correct those deficiencies; (8). questions of interpretation and potential application of this and other guidance; and (9) recommendations on any suggested policy revisions.

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