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Presidential Directive/NSC-

T0:

The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense

ALSO: The Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

SLBM Commitment to NATO (PD-) (U

(†3) I have approved the joint Department of State and Department of Defense proposal to modify the US commitment of fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and to reaffirm the US commitment of missile warhead reentry vehicles (RVs) to NATO necessitated by the withdrawal of SSBNs from Rota, Spain required by the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and Spain. Specifically, the United States will offer to:

- -- Provide SACEUR with military authority for target assignment, alerting and missile release for 230 RVs from normally alert SSBNs and 170 RVs from normally nonalert SSBNs. In the case of the RVs from normally nonalert SSBNs, SACEUR's missile alerting and release authority becomes operative after the SSBNs have been directed to generate by proper US authorities, normally at the US equivalent of NATO Simple Alert. The US Director of Strategic Target Planning, in coordination with SACEUR, will perform the detailed targeting function for these 400 RVs based on a list of SACEUR-designated targets.
- -- Carry the 400 RVs provided to SACEUR, in NATO-pure missiles aboard any number of normally alert or normally nonalert SSBNs, as appropriate, located in SACLANT's or SACEUR's area of responsibility.
- Operate SSBNs in the Atlantic and Mediterranean when under national control. These SSBNs will be assigned to NATO in the annual US response to the NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire; designation of Major NATO Commander and availability categories will be as committed therein. Missiles (excluding the 400 RVs provided to SACEUR for target assignment, alerting and missile release) aboard the SSBNs assigned to SACEUR and SACLANT will be targeted in the SIOP by the US Director of Strategic Target Planning.

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- -- Operate SSBNs assigned to SACEUR in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Three such SSBNs will be on patrol in these areas at all times for the foreseeable future.
- -- Pass operational command of assigned Category A SSBNs to the appropriate NATO Commander, either SACEUR or SACLANT, when specifically directed by appropriate US authorities, normally after declaration of Reinforced Alert and upon completion of the strategic mission.

(S) It is to be understood that these commitments to NATO in no way infringe upon the current authority of the President of the United States. With regard to missile release either in the NATO context or as a unilateral national action. The approved nuclear weapons safety rules for the SSBN weapon system will remain in effect for those missiles assigned to NATO. The appropriate authorities aboard SSBNs which carry NATO-assigned missiles will be provided with the necessary command, control and communications documentation required for alerting and launch of missiles in accordance with NATO authorization procedures.

(NS) The Secretaries of State and Defense, or their designated representatives, shall proceed to consult with the NATO Allies about the need to revise our current commitment due to the withdrawal of fleet ballistic missile submarines from Rota. In presenting this matter to NATO, the following should be stressed regarding the offer:

- -- The United States will continue to conduct SSBN operations in the Mediterranean.
- -- The offer will in no way affect the commitment of 400 RVs to SACEUR, or SACEUR's targeting flexibility. The commitment of these RVs has been, and remains, independent of particular submarine operating areas.
- -- The total number of SSBNs assigned to NATO in the US response to the Defense Planning Questionnaire remains unchanged.
- -- There will be no diminution of US ability to cover SACEUR targets from deployed SSBNs.

(%) In making these approaches and discussing this offer, nothing shall be said to our NATO Allies which could be construed to imply that additional RVs may be offered to the Alliance in the future for targeting, alerting and missile release authority. Any such proposals shall be made only after approval by the President. Further, any revisions to this commitment will be made in conjunction with appropriate consultations with the Alliance.

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(e) This Presidential Directive supersedes NSDM 132 of September 13, 1971 and NSDM 328 of May 4, 1976.

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