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(TITLE OF PAPER)
History of the Office of Special Activities
Chapter XIII
(PERIOD)
From Inception to 1969

## DO NOT DESTROY

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CHAPTER XIII. BRITISH  
PARTICIPATION IN U-2 PROGRAM

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## CHAPTER XIII. BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE U-2 PROGRAM

Background

In a briefing paper for Director Allen Dulles in preparation for a White House meeting in May 1957, Mr. Bissell recommended that, if AQUATONE were to continue beyond 1957, in order to reduce the political hazards of overflights, certain modifications of operational concepts might be introduced. One of these was the use of non-U.S. pilots (possibly British) in order to heighten the possibility of plausible denial. Between 1957 and early 1958 the question of U. K. participation in the program was discussed with Sir Dick White, head of MI-6, and Air Vice Marshal William M. L. MacDonald, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Intelligence, on several occasions by Messrs. Dulles and Bissell, but only in the vaguest terms.

On 7 February 1958, Mr. Bissell cabled [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] outlining the current CIA/Air Force thinking on the nature and extent of a possible joint operation with the British. The main advantage for inviting UK participation at that time would be "to facilitate operations by them at times or under circumstances beyond the scope of authority accorded by U. S. political authorities." <sup>1/</sup> The Air Force and

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CIA were agreed that as a first step a number of British pilots should be given U-2 training in order to be prepared for future contingencies.

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[redacted] was asked to convey Headquarters thinking to AVM MacDonald, ACAS/I, and learn whether he was prepared to select three to five pilots and move ahead with their training (in advance of final policy decisions).

The Air Ministry responded affirmatively and recruiting of RAF pilots was begun.

At the end of April 1958, Mr. Bissell spent several days in London discussing with MI-6 and Air Ministry officials the prospects for obtaining UK political approval for flights against Soviet and Satellite targets. It was agreed that a joint list of priority targets with justification for their coverage should be worked up, and in July or August, when pilot training would be farther along, an approach would be made to the Prime Minister. The timing would be in accordance with the current political situation, e. g., whether or not a Summit Meeting was in progress.

Project OLDSTER

An Air Ministry contingent composed of Air Vice Marshal Beresford Lees, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Operations, and Group Captain Stewart Gordon Wise, who was to serve as project officer within the Air Ministry cell, arrived at Project Headquarters in mid-June 1958 for

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orientation on the program and to reach agreement on plans and procedures for carrying out the joint project. In preparation for these talks the Headquarters staff had drafted two plans: Plan A envisaged a small RAF contingent of ten to twelve to be integrated into Detachment B at Adana, being supported by Detachment B and running missions which would be operationally controlled from Project Headquarters. Plan B called for establishment of a separate detachment at a suitable UK base, with personnel to be approximately 40% RAF and 60% American, with an RAF commander. After a week of consultation, Plan A was agreed in principle with further refinement of details to be worked out jointly. (See Annex 77 for text of Plan A.)

By June 1958 additional action had taken place, including:

- a. The nomination, processing and beginning of training of the first four RAF pilots (Flight Lieutenants John Alonzo MacArthur, David E. B. Dowling, Michael Granville Bradley, and Squadron Leader Christopher Hugh Walker).
- b. The establishment of cable communications between Project Headquarters and the project cell in the Air Ministry, via London Station. (In July 1958 a direct channel was opened into the Air Ministry cell.)
- c. An exchange of visits between the requirements people and the photo interpretation experts on each side.

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The initial ground training and checkout of the first four pilots in the U-2 was accomplished in early July 1958 at Del Rio, Texas, where their training was supervised by the SAC Wing at Laughlin Air Force Base. On 10 July, Squadron Leader Walker was killed in a training accident and as a result one of the three additional RAF pilots chosen for training (who were still in England) withdrew from the program. Delays were encountered in processing additional RAF personnel, including particularly a flight surgeon, and in completion of training by the SAC Wing due principally to shortage of aircraft. This caused a slip in the planned readiness date of the unit to October 1958.

#### Political Approvals

While the Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Dermot Boyle, and all RAF personnel involved were eager to get ahead with the project, there were delays on the political side through the summer of 1958 due to the Greek/Turkish clash over Cyprus and the Jordanian situation. On 27 July 1958 50X1, E.O.13526 was told by Sir Patrick Dean (then Deputy Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, and Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee) that there was no Foreign Office objection to the idea of operations from Turkey. He said also that he believed chances were good for obtaining approval of the British Prime Minister

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for possibly five missions at a time with specific mission approval to be given by Sir Patrick himself. (This plan did not eventuate, much to the chagrin of all concerned.)

On 27 August 1958, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan gave his approval to British participation in the project with the understanding that operational missions would be flown by "civilian" pilots and without RAF markings on the aircraft; the ground organization would be integrated with that already established by the Americans; and it was to be clearly understood that the Prime Minister reserved judgment of the use to be made of the aircraft, and that no operational flights were to be made without his specific permission.

On the same day, President Eisenhower gave his approval in principle to the OLDSTER project provided the Secretary of State agreed. Later General Cabell briefed the Secretary of State on the status of British participation and said it was proposed to determine informally from the Turkish Government whether the few British personnel involved could be stationed with the American group at Adana. The Secretary advised that he had no objection to the British joining the project nor to the informal approach to the Turkish authorities. He asked whether or not proposed British flights would be cleared with the U.S. in advance.

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General Cabell replied that arrangements would be for the British to notify the U.S. in advance of any intended operation with control and mission planning being accomplished at CHALICE Headquarters Control Center. Thus the CHALICE staff would have the opportunity to block the operation if U.S. authorities so desired.

On 5 September 1958, 50X1, E.O.13526 wrote to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, AVM Sydney O. Bufton, RAF, as follows:

"The favorable policy decisions which have just been made at the top levels of both our Governments suggest that the moment is particularly appropriate for an analysis of the policy issues involved. . . The U.S. intended, when it initially fielded its units, to have a capability of performing 32 operational missions a month. Moreover, it was hoped that a substantial number of this maximum capability would occur. Within fourteen days, however, after commencement of the initial missions, the Soviets made a formal protest. . . which forcibly established the fact that the Soviet radar capability was extremely good (better than expected) and Soviet Government was attaching a sharper significance to deep penetration than anticipated. Consequently our highest political authorities insisted that the missions be reduced in number from the plan above and be undertaken only for reasons of real importance. The intelligence community then reviewed its requirements with a view to reducing targets to only those of highest priorities. And approval was to be requested only when the international situation seemed appropriate for deep penetrations and when a mission or missions would not cause major embarrassment to US/Soviet relations. It was assumed all missions would be detected. . . therefore the fundamental consideration on the political side regarding approval of any

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given mission is whether or not the world political situation is such that the possibility of a Soviet protest is tolerable or politically acceptable to the sponsor...

"At no time has there been in the U. S. any permanent prohibition against deep penetration missions and I am advised by Washington that the President has been extremely receptive to the efforts and results of the program over the many months that it has been reviewed and examined by him. He now, as we have told you, favors British participation essentially for the very reason for which it was proposed, namely that our joint efforts may well tend to spread confusion among the Soviets as to the sponsorship of such activities." 1/

On 11 September 1958 Prime Minister Adnan Menderes of Turkey was briefed on the plan to put the British unit at Adana with Detachment

B. Permission was received to bring in no more than 12 British technicians to work with the American unit. Briefing of the Prime Minister was accomplished by the [redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526

[redacted] with Chargé d'Affaires Carlos Hall, Col. Geary, and Messrs. Cunningham, and [redacted] of Project Security Staff also present. Subsequently Mr. Cunningham visited London for definitive discussions with the British and Messrs. [redacted]

[redacted] of Project Personnel and Security Staffs, respectively, joined the working party to add their specialized knowledge in

1/ Letter to AVM Sydney O. Bufton, 5 September 1958, from [redacted]

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the fields of the care and handling of "civilianized" pilots and the building of cover stories. Until the Headquarters group arrived in London, little progress had been made, due principally to the Air Ministry's inability to adapt to a clandestine program. Partially as a result of this, MI-6 entered the scene as the clandestine support element. Good progress was subsequently made on pilot contracts, cover and other administrative and security matters.

The CHALICE/OLDSTER Operational Plan, which was worked out jointly, was signed on 28 October 1958 by AVM Bufton and Group Captain Wise for the British side and Mr. James Cunningham for CIA. The text of this agreement, TS/CHAL-0397, is appended as Annex 78.

On 12 November 1958, Group Captain Thomas Leigh Bingham-Hall was nominated to replace Group Captain Wise as the senior officer in the OLDSTER Air Ministry cell. He was given the cover of Commanding Officer, Meteorological Experimental Research Unit, RAF Station, Watton, but maintained his office in London under the immediate jurisdiction of AVM John Grandy, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Operations. One week later the first group composed of three pilots and a flight surgeon joined Detachment B, and began the process of integrating into the group.

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On 2 December 1958, Acting Secretary of State Herter was briefed on OLDSTER and shown the target complex overlays which were to be presented for the British Prime Minister's approval. The Acting Secretary was in general agreement with these.

On 5 December 1958 the White House was informed through the Aide to the President, Gen. Goodpaster, of the status of plans for British participation in the CHALICE overflight program by memorandum from Mr. Bissell as follows:

"You are aware of the plans for British participation in Project CHALICE. Their pilots and other personnel are now in place with our detachment in Turkey. An exchange of letters has taken place between ACM Sir Dermot Boyle and General White requesting and agreeing to the loan of U-2's to the British Meteorological Office. In about a week two U-2's will be staged at the RAF Station at Watton and will fly a number of meteorological missions with British personnel. We believe this will establish our cover.

"The British plans are well advanced for operational use of the U-2. The Air Ministry has secured full concurrence of the Foreign Office in seeking authority to obtain coverage of a number of top priority areas in central Asia from Pakistan. This proposal has been presented to the Prime Minister and his decision is expected early next week. The betting in London appears to be that he will grant the authority requested subject to mission-by-mission review by the Foreign Office.

"I am calling these facts to your attention with some urgency for the following reason. It is agreed with London that we will be immediately notified by cable of the Prime Minister's decision so that appropriate persons in Washington can be advised of it. The Prime Minister has indicated, however, that

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in addition to this rather informal communication through our channel, he will address a personal communication to the President, unless his decision is wholly negative (in which case there would be no point in raising the issue). His communication will be delivered to the British Ambassador here who will be instructed to hand it to you for delivery to the President. Such a communication could reach you as early as the 9th or 10th. We would hope to have at least 24 hours warning of its impending arrival but our communication could conceivably be delayed.

"The Under Secretary of State has been briefed on this procedure and also on the specific proposal that has been presented to the Prime Minister by the Air Ministry and we plan to keep the State Department advised as to the Prime Minister's decision. I assume that if his decision is favorable, it will be necessary promptly to secure the views of the Secretary of State and thereafter to bring this matter to the President's attention. I might say that the requirements which the proposed missions would meet are agreed between the two intelligence communities so the operation would have the same strong support as if we were doing it on our own authority. Moreover, although any communication or action on our part should be undertaken within, say, a week, there is no need for a crash decision since the operation could not in any event begin before 15 January. Lastly, there would of course be an opportunity to review progress here, mission by mission, as well as in London, so there is no question of an irrevocable decision covering three or four sorties.

"Perhaps we should communicate on the 8th or 9th as to the procedure you would use in handling the communication from the Prime Minister should one be received." 1/

The Prime Minister gave his approval for the OLDSTER unit to stage from Pakistan on 10 December 1958 in the following letter to

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1/ IS/CHAL-0263, 5 December 1958. Memorandum for Gen. Goodpaster, from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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President Eisenhower which was delivered by the British Ambassador on 11 December 1958:

"... The staffs on both sides have now worked out an agreed procedure for clearance and I have now approved in principle a programme of British flights for the next three months, of which details will be available to you. I have ruled that within this programme each individual flight should be submitted to me for clearance before it is made...

"I would not propose normally to inform you direct if I should find it necessary for reasons of policy to cancel or postpone a particular flight in the present or subsequent programmes; United States authorities will, of course, be aware of any such decision through operational channels. But if at any time I feel it necessary to cancel or suspend the programme in whole or in part I would propose to inform you direct of such a decision. I hope that you would be prepared to give me a similar notification of any comparable decision which you may take." 1/

President Eisenhower replied to the Prime Minister as follows:

"I share your desire that the policies of our two Governments with respect to these activities should not be inconsistent. If we should feel at any time that operations you are planning would do disservice to our common interests, we will feel free to communicate our views to you. I hope you will feel equally free to do likewise. I think it should be understood, however, that British missions are carried out on your authority and are your responsibility just as our activities are authorized and controlled here in accordance with procedures I have established. In this sense, it could be said that we are carrying out two complementary programs rather than a joint one..." 2/

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1/ CHAL-0447, 10 December 1958.

2/ Reply to Prime Minister Macmillan (drafted for the President's signature by R. M. Bissell, Jr.).

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OLDSTER Operational Phase

One additional pilot and a navigator/flight planner joined the OLDSTER unit at Detachment B in January 1959. Two of the Detachment's U-2 aircraft were to be made available for their use. It had been decided by the DCI that title to the aircraft when being employed by the British for overflights must rest with the British Government. Only if this condition were met would the U.S. political authorities regard the operation as truly British, being undertaken with the authority of their own Prime Minister. Accordingly, arrangements were made to cover the transfer and the retrieval of the aircraft. Approval to stage British missions from Pakistan was obtained from General Ayub Khan, then Minister of Defense, and all appeared to be in readiness for British operations.

In January and February 1959, Air Ministry officials became concerned with the increase in vulnerability of the U-2 to possibly improved Soviet intercept capabilities. Exchanges of cables and a briefing of the British group on the latest intelligence and zoom climb test results cleared the air and improved the outlook of the OLDSTER pilots toward flying the U-2.

Then followed a series of delays including a visit to Russia by the British Prime Minister, several international meetings and other

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state visits throughout most of 1959. Meanwhile permission had been given for the British pilots to fly Middle East reconnaissance, and as a means of building cover, two meteorological research flights were staged from the RAF Base at Watton, England, with suitable publicity. On this staging the quick turn-around procedures developed at Detachment B were tested successfully, using a C-130 and a tent in a remote area of the field as an operating headquarters.

The first British overflight of Russia was finally approved and flown on 6 December 1959 from Peshawar, covering Kuybyshev and Kapustin Yar and using the B camera with excellent results. The second and only other Soviet mission was flown on 5 February 1960 covering Tyura Tam, Kazan and Ukraine, also using the B camera with excellent results.

As a security measure following the events of 1 May 1960, the entire RAF contingent was immediately withdrawn, debriefed and returned to normal duty. During the period of OLDSTER operations the following Headquarters-directed missions were accomplished:

USSR overflights	2
Peripheral Elint Missions	5
Middle East Photo Missions	17
Weather Flights	5
Total	<u>29</u>

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RAF Liaison Officer at Project Headquarters

During the discussions in London in May 1958, it was agreed that the British side would have one liaison officer stationed at Project Headquarters to represent the Air Ministry project group in both operational and administrative matters. The first assignee was Wing Commander Norman Mackie, and when news of his arrival on 28 June 1958 reached Project Headquarters, the question immediately arose as to where his desk should be; the Operations Control Center at that time was supporting the highly classified satellite program as well as CHALICE/OLDSTER. Mr. Bissell recommended that he sit in the Operations area, but not within the Control Center, and that he be briefed that there were other activities which were closed to him. If this arrangement should become too difficult to manage, he said, it might be best to cut the Wing Commander and one or two of his superiors in on the satellite activity rather than go in for elaborate compartmentation.

During the course of a visit to Project Headquarters by AVM Bufton and Group Captain Burnett, his deputy, at the time the OLDSTER unit became operational, the precise arrangements with regard to the liaison officer's responsibilities and privileged status were reviewed. He was to have local authority, on behalf of the Air Ministry OLDSTER cell,

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for approving mission plans for RAF pilots, and in order for him to discharge this responsibility, the current close working relationship within the operations structure was to be continued. Mr. Bissell explained to AVM Bufton that there were other projects of a highly sensitive nature which would be withheld from Mackie, although from day to day he might be exposed to some mention of them. Therefore it was requested that AVM Bufton approve the liaison officer's treating such information as privileged and not intended to be passed to his superiors in the Air Ministry. The AVM concurred and stated that Mackie would be told to treat any information gained as privileged and would be expected to behave as a "patriotic American" in these cases rather than as a British subject.

In a subsequent memorandum, Col. William Burke reported:

"On 11 December I reviewed this conversation with Wing Commander Mackie. He stated that he was aware of other projects; that he was relieved to hear of the AVM's feeling and position; that he felt he was occupying a privileged position and would not pass on to his Government information on projects other than CHALICE.

"My judgment, based on the frank and aboveboard character of W/C Mackie, as well as the close and unusually fine relationships which exist between him and the members of the staff, is that he will certainly honor this arrangement." 1/

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1/ TS/CHAL-0470, 12 December 1958. Memo for Record by Col. Burke.

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The RAF Liaison Officer maintained his office within the Project Operations Control Center from July 1958 throughout the life of OLDSTER. In the spring of 1961 when Mackie was relieved by Wing Commander J. C. (Bill) Blair, an internal review of the situation relating to continuing British participation brought forth the following recommendation by the DPD Executive Officer, Mr. John McMahon:

"Looking back to AQUATONE there were obvious advantages to be gained through the mutual participation of the British and United States in the project. Such cooperation could be greatly enhanced by the presence of an OLDSTER representative... within the AQUATONE organization... Since the time of AQUATONE, however, the Division has expanded to include air support for all Agency requirements and, of course, we ourselves have stepped into various exotic programs of our own... When the charter of this Division was extended to include all CIA air activities, we accepted the responsibility to protect from unauthorized individuals, both CIA and otherwise, information concerning the operations conducted under the auspices of the various Area Divisions. I question the willingness of the Area Divisions to jeopardize knowledge of their operations to a foreign national. I question that the advantages to be gained from Commander Blair's permanent presence in this Division outweigh the obvious disadvantages in the compromise of information." 1/

Despite this, and similar recommendations from Security, the RAF Liaison Officer was not excluded from occupying office space within the Operations area until the move was made to the new building at

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1/ DPD-1384/61, 3 March 1961. Memorandum for the Acting Chief, DPD-DD/P, from Executive Officer, DPD.

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Langley in February 1962. From that point through the balance of Wing Commander Blair's tour he required an escort in and out of the restricted area and was not given desk space there. Since the program never received approval from British political authorities for reconnaissance overflights subsequent to 1960, the task of liaison with Project Headquarters became something less than a full-time job. Subsequent to the departure of Blair, an RAF officer assigned to the British Joint Services Mission (Group Captain A. J. Moody) was given this chore as an added duty to his liaison with other U.S. agencies, principally the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

Continuation of British Participation: JACKSON (1961 to date)

Shortly after the withdrawal of the OLDSTER unit from Turkey in May 1960, AVM Bufton in a conversation with Mr. Allen Dulles, indicated interest on the part of the British in continuing to participate in the U-2 program. The Director at that time could not say what the future held for CHALICE, since a Presidential decision would be necessary to carry it on. Later when higher authorities agreed on a consolidation of CHALICE assets in the ZI, with a phased withdrawal of Detachment B from Turkey, the Air Ministry was so informed. The Headquarters feeling at this time was that there was little merit in

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British participation unless Foreign Office support were obtained for primary missions. Group Captain Bingham-Hall felt that the intelligence collection potential of a UK group operating from the ZI would be quite limited and he pressed to abolish his staff within the Air Ministry, retaining only a liaison officer in Washington. However, AVM Bufton, during September and October 1960, discussed continuation with the Foreign Office and on 11 October 1960 received political approval from the Foreign Secretary to retain the franchise. Project Headquarters expressed concern that approval had not been obtained from the Prime Minister himself, and were answered by AVM Bufton's cable as follows:

"Both Secretary of State for Air and the Foreign Secretary consider it reasonable and prudent to maintain overflight capability under the same rules that existed between us before and it is inconceivable that both Ministers would accept such arrangement without being sure of their ground. Even if you insisted that the PM be approached for his blessing it is extremely doubtful that he would say he was definitely going to agree to any further overflights or that he was not. He would merely, I am sure, support the decision of his Ministers to maintain a capability. There is no doubt that in due course he will be informed of the decision. . . I consider we should go ahead with our planning on the basis that before all the various arrangements are concluded the PM will be informed at an appropriate time. . ." 1/

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Two RAF pilots were chosen for the JACKSON program and reported for processing in December 1960 and for training at Del Rio in January 1961. Between January and June the pilots converted to the U-2 at Laughlin and in June moved to Edwards Air Force Base where, along with an RAF medical officer and a navigator/flight planner, they were integrated into Detachment G in accord with a memorandum of understanding signed on 25 May 1961 by AVM Bufton for the British side and Mr. James Cunningham for CIA (see Annex 79 for terms of this agreement). The JACKSON Operational Plan was drafted jointly over a period of several months during which time Bufton was replaced as Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Intelligence by AVM Alick Foord-Kelcey, who eventually signed the joint operational plan on behalf of the Air Ministry at the end of 1961. (See Annex 80 for the JACKSON Operational Plan.) At the same time Group Captain Harold A. C. Bird-Wilson replaced Bingham-Hall as head of the JACKSON cell in the Air Ministry.

Withheld under statutory authority of the  
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50  
U.S.C., section 403g)

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recommended that the RAF pilots be fully integrated into the air operations of Detachment G and be used for air sampling, ferry, overflight and peripheral missions, as well as other routine flying, with exceptions to be made on a mission-by-mission examination. However,

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during their first year at Edwards the British pilots (other than flying training and test flights) flew only three Headquarters-directed air sampling missions and one ferry mission to Midway Island. The British authorities did give an okay for use of their pilots on Cuban overflights without the necessity for mission-by-mission approval, but this offer was not taken up by CIA.

In April 1962, the Air Ministry in reviewing the question of use of their pilots in the joint IDEALIST/JACKSON program, sent the following message to Project Headquarters:

"The UK Government's original concept of JACKSON was that it preserved a capability for urgent intelligence collecting missions in the event of a major emergency. Contingency planning which has already been agreed to between us was regarded here as contributing to this capability. But as yet no emergency has actually materialised which has seemed to call for a U-2 operation. . .

"We recognise that you now have many projects on hand under your IDEALIST programme and that it is only a hindrance to you to have in the U-2 unit two RAF pilots who are unproductive. We are however most anxious to continue with our participation in the JACKSON project and within limits likely to be prescribed by political considerations we should like these pilots to be employed on tasks which will contribute effectively to the US/UK intelligence effort and my Secretary of State is ready to submit proposals to the Prime Minister with this end in view. . . " 1/

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Evolving from this effort to revitalize the program, a proposal to stage a JACKSON mission from Pakistan against the Sary Shagan Missile Test Range, employing System X, was put forward for approval. This operation (named ADVENTURE), after presentation to the British Foreign Minister on 10 July 1962, hung fire for a month with approval being expected momentarily; but before British approval could be obtained, the Director (then Mr. John A. McCone) called a halt to the plan in view of pressure from USAF to use the RB-57F for Sary Shagan surveillance. This somewhat disgruntled AVM Foord-Kelcey, since he was on the verge of presenting the proposal to the Prime Minister, and it was anticipated by Headquarters staff that the British would move to end their participation in the U-2 program. However, the Air Ministry still wished to maintain the capability in being and the agreement was reaffirmed late in 1962.

In May 1963 an exchange of messages between Air Chief Marshal Sir Wallace Kyle, Vice Chief of the Air Staff, and General Marshall S. Carter, DDCI, resulted in the extension for another year of the JACKSON Detachment at Edwards. The only activities during the following year involved replacements and training.

In September 1964 an exercise involving the ferrying of two U-2 aircraft via Plattsburg and RAF Wyton to a U. S. carrier in the

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Mediterranean, accompanied by a KC-135 carrying relief pilots and fuel, was being discussed via cable with the British. It did not develop beyond the talking stage either then, or when it was brought up in March 1965 at the time when trouble was again brewing in Cyprus.

In May 1965, Dr. Wheelon (then DDS&T) met with Group Captain Robert W. Oxspring and Group Captain Wise, who were currently responsible for JACKSON on the British side, for a discussion as to whether the project was still viable and warranted. He posed two questions:

(1) If the program continued, would this give equity for use of British airfields for staging? The British answer was that historically this request had been turned down by either the Commonwealth Relations Office or the Foreign Office. (2) Was there value to the British in having the U-2 and its advanced cameras available for their use? The British admitted that the system was better than their Canberra equipment, but that the RAF would find it difficult to operate the U-2 in any but a line RAF unit, which the British Government was reluctant to accept.

On 14 May 1965, Dr. Wheelon [ ] as follows:

"We will make an explicit decision to continue or discontinue the JACKSON program in the near future. I want you to inform me of any reactions the British may show in

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this area as well as informing me of any other matter bearing on this issue. . . " 1/

In a background memorandum on the subject "Continuation of the JACKSON Program", prepared for Dr. Wheelon's information on 9 June 1965, Mr. Cunningham recommended that if the current search by the British for effective employment of the JACKSON capability proved non-productive, the program should be allowed to expire at the completion of the tours of the current incumbents at Edwards Air Force Base. (See Annex 81 for full text of Mr. Cunningham's brief.)

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[redacted] replying to the DDS&T's [redacted] a full month later, gave the following summary of the current RAF position: The RAF would like to retain JACKSON capability for possible contingencies. Group Captain Wise had hinted that the availability of a better vehicle would give him a stronger position. At present the RAF up through the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Intelligence desired to let the current tour of the JACKSON group run its course to the spring of 1967 and then reevaluate. As an aside, it was mentioned that Group Captain Wise had referred to the U-2 as a "dirty airplane", a very hot item politically, which the UK Government would find it difficult to

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operate independently under the existing political circumstances.

In July 1965 the Air Ministry underwent a reorganization, becoming "Ministry of Defence for Air", and JACKSON affairs were placed under the cognizance of the Director of Operations (Bomber and Reconnaissance), Air Commodore Antony Wilkinson Heward, with Air Vice Marshal D. C. Smallwood assuming responsibility on behalf of the Air Staff for the JACKSON program the first of September 1965.

Throughout the summer of 1965 there were intermittent talks (begun in June by Air Commodore John Aiken, then Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Intelligence) with regard to the possible purchase by the British of new model U-2's. Dr. Wheelon in August 1965 sent the following message to the DDS&T Liaison Officer: 50X1, E.O.13526

"FYI we are not particularly anxious to sell U-2's to the U. K. We did discuss possibility with Aiken, Wise and others during their visit here. This originated with OSA and its desire to reestablish production line for U-2 and from this office as gambit to eliminate UK personnel from Edwards Detachment. If British come with strong proposal for purchase, we would have to make difficult policy decision here. Under circumstances I consider it desirable to play matter in low key and to leave all initiatives up to them." 1/

In September 1965 AVM Smallwood raised the question of use of British pilots for ferry flights outside the continental U. S. and said in

1/50X1, E.O.13526~~TOP SECRET~~

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a letter to Mr. Cunningham that although Hawaii was now the 50th State, he believed the terminology of "within the continental U.S." was stretching a point; he therefore requested notification in advance each time such use of British pilots was anticipated. (Up to the present, approvals of the few flights of this type have been received by return cable with no delays and no refusals.)

In October 1965, approval was given by the British Air Staff for a JACKSON mission from Darwin or Cocos Islands over targets in Java. Delays were encountered in obtaining the final approval from the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister, and with the subsequent favorable action of the Indonesian Army against the PKI (local Communist Party), the proposal was shelved in December 1965.

Air Commodore Heward made a visit to the U.S. in January 1966 visiting the group at Edwards and holding talks at Headquarters. At that time the British were making a decision on the use of the F-111 and while showing an interest in the new U-2 model, discussions were limited to possible joint reconnaissance in Southeast Asia (Indonesia) and Africa (Rhodesia), and the possibility of sending pilots through survival training at an RAF base north of Singapore.

Air Commodore R. L. Wade relieved Heward in February 1966 as Director of Operations (Bomber and Reconnaissance). In March 1966

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he wrote to Mr. Cunningham suggesting that all agreements concerning JACKSON, including use of pilots, cover stories, etc., be brought up to date. At the same time, Mr. Eugene Somers reported from London that Air Commodore Wade believed that the Labour Party, if it increased its majority in the current elections, would react more confidently to a proposal for JACKSON operations. Mr. Somers felt that Wade was dedicated to reactivation of the program.

In April 1966, Dr. Wheelon visited London and briefed a group of Air Staff officials including Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burnett, Air Marshal L. M. D. Hodges, and Air Commodores Wade and Aiken, on the performance capabilities expected from the U-2R. He explained the concept that the U.S. should give or sell several to countries such as India, Iran or Korea, which would render it more difficult for the opposition to associate the owner and the activity of these aircraft. The Vice Chief of the Air Staff stated that the RAF had studied the problem of purchase of U-2's over the past year or two and had arrived at a negative conclusion for two reasons: the political taint of the U-2, and the decision to buy F-111 aircraft.

This ended any further discussion of British procurement of U-2's. However, in October 1966 agreement was reached with the Air Staff that

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replacements for the RAF JACKSON contingent at Edwards would be furnished in the spring of 1967, and that a further meeting would be held in Washington in December 1966. The Minister of Defence, however, on 26 September 1966 ruled against any broadening of the project or instigation by Air Staff personnel of discussions with such in view.

An internal OSA review of the JACKSON program in October 1966 brought the following summation in a memorandum for the DD/SA from

[Redacted]

Special Assistant to the DSA:

"The previous staff studies... which have been undertaken periodically since 1960... essentially concluded that the program was, in fact, costing us very little and that in anticipation of unforeseeable contingencies (e.g. Middle East crisis), it was an asset which we should maintain. It also gave us a closer identity with the British, in an operational sense, which in retrospect was of dubious value. In this regard, nothing has changed as of this date, and if the prospects for the future are no more promising, I would firmly recommend that we terminate the JACKSON program. This would be without prejudice to some future reassessment with regard to British participation in the U-2R program when it becomes operational..." 1/

The joint meeting held in the OSA Control Center in December 1966 was held for the purpose of discussing the future of JACKSON with no

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1/IDEA-3375/66, Memorandum for the DDSA from SA/OSA dated 24 October 1966.

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commitments to be made pending referral to respective higher commands.

Those present included Air Commodores Wade and Aiken and Group Captain Moody on the British side, and the Director and Deputy Director of OSA and members of the OSA Operations Staff. The consensus of views arrived at during this meeting was as follows:

"a. Although there are existing intelligence requirements in the Far East (outside China/Vietnam, etc.), e.g. Indonesia, there is little likelihood for approval of operations in that area under existing circumstances.

"b. The most probable areas of possible mutual interest for use of the unique U-2 capability appears to be Africa and the volatile Middle East. The UK representatives in particular felt that political approval would be most probable for these areas. The US representatives shared this opinion strongly but were concerned about the lack of adequate bases in the area.

"c. Currently available, and politically acceptable bases for U-2 stagings for possible target coverage of Africa and for contingencies in the Middle East are severely limited. Ascension Island rangewise may have limited utility; Aldabra will not be available for from 2 to 3 years; politically feasible Akrotiri, Cyprus, might be available but probably only under emergency or crisis situations. El Aden, Liberia, was suggested as a possible contingency staging base but would pose major problems from a security standpoint. In fact, the only base in the UK pocket which showed a promising potential at the moment was on the island of Masira off the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia.

"d. The possibility of carrier launchings and recovery was discussed but with an admonition that such operations would probably entail prohibitive costs for other than highest priority or crisis requirements. Refueling operations would involve the same problem but to a lesser degree.

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"Wade and Aiken expressed desire to utilize JACKSON pilots in a productive manner at the earliest possible date. They affirmed that coverage of Africa and the Middle East could not be accomplished readily by any operational capability presently available to the UK." 1/

It was further agreed to meet again at the working level to formulate firm recommendations for respective higher headquarters.

At the end of 1966 there were two pilots, a flight planner and a flight surgeon at Edwards with the JACKSON unit, all due for rotation and replacement during 1967.

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1/ BYE-0394-66, Memo for DCI, Subject: Meeting with UK Representatives, 22 December 1966.

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CHAL-0164  
16 June 1958

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PROPOSED PROJECT CHALICE/KEEPER - PLAN A

1. Under this plan the KEEPER program would be conducted along the following lines:
  - a. A Royal Air Force contingent of approximately ten to twelve personnel would be assigned to Detachment B.
  - b. Possible operational bases for KEEPER missions will include but not necessarily be restricted to Adana, Turkey; Giebelstadt, Germany; Kinloss, Scotland; and Cyprus.
  - c. In order to accommodate the KEEPER augmentation at Detachment B, two additional U-2 and one additional T-33 aircraft will be provided at Detachment B.
  - d. KEEPER pilots will receive continuation and proficiency training at Detachment B.
2. Under this plan the RAF personnel assigned to Detachment B would include:
  - a. One Squadron Leader who will function as the British Detachment Commander and who will be an operational pilot.
  - b. Five other operational pilots - Squadron Leader/Flight Lieutenant.
  - c. An Adjutant who will serve as administrative officer and senior security officer.
  - d. Three to five other personnel as needed.
3. All KEEPER pilots will be under the operational control of the Commander, Detachment B with such control to be exercised through the Royal Air Force Detachment Commander. The Commander, Detachment B, will be responsible for maintaining the pilot proficiency of KEEPER pilots and for the training of all British personnel in their respective jobs. All staging operations will be under the command of the Commander, Detachment B or his designate.

(\* Changed from KEEPER to OLDSTER due to conflict with another British crypt.)

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4. A Concept of Operations to include method of target selection is attached as enclosure 1.

\* \* \* \* \*

Operational Concept for Joint CHALICE/KEEPER  
Program

A. Assumptions:

1. That the Royal Air Force KEEPER unit will be integrated within Detachment B.
2. That the KEEPER Unit will be supported by U. S. personnel on all operations.
3. That the KEEPER missions will be operationally controlled from CHALICE Headquarters in the same manner as normal CHALICE missions.

B. Target Selection:

1. Following discussions between British and U. S. Intelligence Requirements Officers, the Air Ministry will obtain authority to secure coverage of specified targets and areas, together with an indication of relative priorities. It will transmit such authority and priority indications in appropriate form to CHALICE Headquarters as guidance for mission planning.

C. Weather:

1. Weather for flight planning for KEEPER missions will be furnished by the Weather Central at Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska using the same system now established to support CHALICE operations. The weather for mission planning will be sent to the unit 12 hours prior to take-off. Additional weather information for flight briefing will be sent to the unit approximately four and one-half hours prior to take-off. Weather information will be furnished only to those echelons which are directly concerned with detailed flight planning.

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~~TOP SECRET~~D. Mission Planning:

1. KEEPER operational missions will be planned in the Control Center at CHALICE Headquarters. Direction and control of these missions will be effected and maintained through the normal HBJARGON message system already established.

2. All KEEPER flights will be planned and/or approved by the Royal Air Force liaison officer assigned to Headquarters CHALICE, prior to being dispatched. He will also maintain liaison with the Air Ministry and keep them advised of planning and status of proposed operations.

3. The British Air Ministry will obtain political approval for specific missions or geographical areas for coverage well in advance of contemplated operations. The Air Ministry will be made an informational addressee on the "Alert" message dispatched to the unit 24 hours prior to take-off and designating the general area of operation. Approximately two hours later another message will be dispatched to the Air Ministry only describing in as much detail as weather information at the time permits, the flight path and the targets to be covered. On the basis of this message the Air Ministry may direct modifications of the flight plan. Although the schedule will not permit changes of the flight plan at a later point in the cycle, the Air Ministry may at any time exercise its prerogative of disapproving the mission because of political considerations or late developments which might be prejudicial to the proposed operation. Notification of approval or disapproval should be dispatched at least five hours prior to take-off. The Air Ministry will also be an informational addressee of the detailed Mission Plan (HBJARGON 100-12 hours prior to take-off), the "Go-No-Go" message (three hours prior to take-off), and will also be advised by CHALICE Headquarters when a landing report on the aircraft has been received. Emergency procedures relating to last minute cancellation or recall of airborne missions will be in accordance with existing CHALICE arrangements.

4. Although the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee, in conjunction with its British counterpart, has responsibility for establishing target priority, the precedence for coverage of individual targets will be determined by the Operations Staff, including the Royal Air Force Liaison Officer, based on operational considerations.

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E. Unit Responsibility:

1. As in the case of CHALICE Detachment Commanders, the KEEPER Unit Commander will have authority to cancel or delay KEEPER missions because of equipment non-availability or malfunction, or because of inadequate terminal weather. All decisions concerning route weather will be the responsibility of CHALICE Headquarters and the Royal Air Force Liaison Officer assigned thereto.

F. Mission Take:

1. Exposed primary camera film from KEEPER operational missions will be sent to Eastman Kodak Company, Rochester, New York, for processing.
2. The 70mm tracker film will be processed at the Detachment. Route weather and aircraft track will be determined and reported to Headquarters CHALICE in accordance with established procedures. The tracker film will then be duplicated and one copy sent to London and one copy to Washington. Distribution of primary configuration photography will be in accordance with current agreements.
3. ELINT tapes will be duplicated at the Unit and the original sent to Washington for read-out. One copy will be sent to London and an additional "hostage" copy will be retained by the Unit pending safe arrival of the Washington and London copies.
4. Escort of all mission take, photographic or electronic, between the Detachment, the U.S. and the U.K. will be under CHALICE security cognizance.

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28 October 1958

## CHALICE/OLDSTER - OPERATIONAL PLAN

- Appendix A - Administrative Arrangements
- Appendix B - Notification and Clearance Procedure
- Appendix C - British Overt Cover Story

Task Organization: Headquarters CHALICE (Washington)  
Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry)  
CHALICE Det B (Adana, Turkey)

General Situation

1. It has been agreed between the U. S. and HMG that it would be of mutual benefit to their respective intelligence communities for British personnel to play a full part in the execution of CHALICE photographic and elint intelligence missions over and around the USSR and other denied territories. Such participation seems likely to broaden the scope of these operations and thereby enhance the intelligence information available to both the US and British Governments.

2. The British participation is to be known under the code name OLDSTER and will consist of selected pilots and control personnel working as a national team at the direction of HMG within the existing CHALICE organisation for the purpose of satisfying intelligence requirements agreed between approved representatives of the two Governments.

Mission

3. To establish a British reconnaissance capability within the existing command structure of CHALICE Det B for the purpose of undertaking elint and photographic intelligence missions as directed by Headquarters OLDSTER.

Execution4. Personnel

(a) Headquarters OLDSTER is to provide 5 RAF Officer Pilots and 1 RAF Medical Officer who will be represented on appointment to the unit as civilians for all purposes during service outside the U.K. The senior RAF pilot is to be designated British Detachment Commander.

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(b) Headquarters CHALICE is to arrange for the integration of RAF personnel into the command structure of CHALICE Det B.

(c) Additional administrative details are covered in Appendix A.

#### Logistics and Material

5. (a) Headquarters CHALICE is to provide two additional U-2 aircraft and one T-33 aircraft to Det B for use of OLDSTER personnel.

(b) The British Detachment is to be provided with the full logistic and maintenance support available to Det B.

#### Operational Planning

6. Operational control of all OLDSTER sorties is to be exercised by Headquarters OLDSTER through Headquarters CHALICE and the local USAF Commander in the field. On all operational matters, the British Detachment Commander will be responsible to the local USAF Commander but has the right of direct access to London on all policy and domestic matters concerning British personnel which may arise from time to time. The flight training programme and selection of RAF pilots for operational and training missions is to be the joint responsibility of CHALICE Det B Commander and the British Detachment Commander.

#### Mission Planning

7. (a) Headquarters CHALICE is to prepare provisional mission plans from an agreed list of targets and in the light of operational and political considerations. These will be submitted to Headquarters OLDSTER for consideration, evaluation and for provisional political approval in accordance with Appendix B.

(b) The Air Ministry are to keep the agreed target lists and priorities under constant review and to notify Headquarters CHALICE of any amendments through existing channels.

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(c) After consideration of provisional mission plans Headquarters OLDSTER is to notify provisional planning approval to Headquarters CHALICE. Thereafter control of proposed missions is to be in accordance with the Reports Control Manual (Ops Manual 55-1). The procedure for obtaining British political clearance is detailed at Appendix B.

(d) After notification of approval by Headquarters OLDSTER, the operational control of the mission is to pass to Headquarters CHALICE. Headquarters OLDSTER retains the right to cancel a mission up to time of takeoff and, in addition, the RAF Detachment Commander retains the right to cancel any British mission based on his judgment of local operational considerations.

#### Mission Take

8. Photographic and Elint take from all OLDSTER missions is to be processed under existing CHALICE arrangements, and the intelligence information disseminated to both the U.S. and British intelligence agencies under the existing procedures.

#### Security

9. It is mutually recognised that the protection of the U.S. and British Governments in the event of an incident is of paramount importance, and it is intended to build up a suitable British overt meteorological cover story with a classified cover story of air sampling similar to the existing cover provided for U.S. activity. To this end, Headquarters CHALICE agrees to make available to Headquarters OLDSTER one U-2 aircraft for meteorological missions from a selected RAF base in the U.K. The provision of this aircraft will be on an opportunity basis and at the rate of approximately two sorties per 90 days. The proposed cover story is detailed at Appendix C.

#### U-2 Operational Base in the U. K.

10. RAF Watton has been selected as the United Kingdom airfield for meteorological flights and for ferry flights to and from the U.S.A.

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11. In the event that a post or pre-strike base is required for USSR peripheral or overflights the operational base most suitable for U-2 aircraft operations in the U. K. is RAF Kinloss because of terminal weather, availability of hangar and proximity to the Northern targets which are of interest to intelligence agencies. In addition, the lack of air traffic in the area and its isolated location eases the security problem.

12. RAF Kinloss is at present undergoing major works services on the main runway and this work will not be completed at the earliest before March 1959.

13. After work is completed at RAF Kinloss, it can be used as a pre and post-strike base. The RAF will meet airlift requirements within the U. K. to support any staging operations.

14. Facilities required at RAF Kinloss will be limited and will be laid on for each specific operation as the situation requires.

Transit flights to and from the United Kingdom

15. Special instructions dealing with clearance of flights between the U. K. and Adana will be passed by Headquarters OLDSTER to RAF Watton and Headquarters Fighter Command.

Communications

16. (a) Command posts are:

- (i) Headquarters CHALICE
- (ii) Headquarters OLDSTER
- (iii) CHALICE Det B

(b) Headquarters CHALICE is to provide and/or arrange for communications in support of the CHALICE/OLDSTER project at bases other than in the U. K. and is to establish standards for traffic transit times in accordance with operational and administrative requirements.

Signed: Asst. Chief of the Air Staff (Intel.) J. O. Bufton (AVM)  
 Dep. Director Ops (Recce) D. G. Wise (Gp Capt)  
 C. I. A., James A. Cunningham, Jr.  
 28th October 1958.

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OLDSTER Operational  
Plan dated 28.10.58ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTSSection A - Personnel AdministrationTour of Duty

1. The anticipated tour of duty for RAF personnel with Detachment B is two years.

Personnel Records

2. All RAF personnel of Detachment B are to be established on the strength of AMU/SDL and all official records and documents will be retained at Headquarters OLDSTER. RAF personnel will be issued with a civilian flying log book in which entries to be made by the holder will conform to local security requirements and which will be certified by the USAF Detachment Commander. This book will be retained by the Detachment Operations Officer.

3. On completion of a tour on OLDSTER operations, entries in the civilian log books will be transferred to RAF log books and certified by Headquarters OLDSTER.

4. Forms 1369 (Annual Confidential Report) will be completed in respect of RAF personnel under arrangements to be made by Headquarters OLDSTER.

Leave of Absence

5. Privilege Leave and/or R&R absences from duty for RAF personnel will be approved by the British Detachment Commander in consultation with the Detachment B Commander and will be granted as operational requirements permit. The local USAF regulations on "off limits" areas and leave travel outside the country of assignment will be strictly observed by RAF personnel. Headquarters OLDSTER will be advised by cable of any annual leave proposed.

Order and Discipline

6. At all times when posing as civilians, RAF personnel are to conduct themselves in accordance with established and appropriate

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RAF regulations and with the local regulations of the USAF and Turkish authorities.

#### Casualty Procedure

7. The approved US casualty procedure is to be applied to all RAF personnel at Detachment B except that personal effects of the individual will be forwarded to Air Ministry London, marked "for the personal attention of ACAS(Ops)". All casualty reports and documents in respect of RAF personnel are to be copied to Headquarters OLDSTER.

#### Aircraft Accident Investigation

8. All aircraft accidents, regardless of type, involving RAF personnel are to be investigated in accordance with CHALICE Detachment procedures. Copies of such reports as well as related signals will be furnished to Headquarters OLDSTER.

#### Marriage

9. RAF personnel contemplating marriage are to immediately submit full particulars of the proposed spouse to the RAF Detachment Commander who will inform Headquarters OLDSTER for further instructions. It should be recognised that the continued utilization of an RAF officer on OLDSTER is contingent upon proper clearance of his spouse.

#### Travel Orders

10. RAF personnel, while in a duty status with Detachment B will travel from place to place on orders authorised by the USAF Detachment Commander. They will be shown as civilian employees of the British Meteorological Office on such orders, i. e. "Experimental Officer". The orders will further state that the individual's equivalent rank is that of Major.

#### Travel Notifications

11. Notification of movements of all personnel, including visitors is to be authorised by Headquarters OLDSTER, and forwarded to Detachment B with information copy to Headquarters CHALICE. Notification

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will include name, civil or military grade, as appropriate. It will also include purpose of travel, anticipated duration and clearance status of the individual. In the event of an individual proceeding to Detachment B for temporary duty whose access to specific locations or equipment should in any manner be restricted or curtailed, this information will be made a part of the ETA cable. Headquarters OLDSTER will be advised of proposed travel to the United Kingdom by OLDSTER personnel from Detachment B in advance.

#### Passports and International Immunization Records

12. Passports and official International Immunization Records will be provided for each individual by Headquarters OLDSTER prior to deployment to Detachment B. Upon arrival there these documents will be placed in the custody of the USAF Executive/Administrative Officer, Detachment B and will be released to the individual only for official travel or leave travel.

#### Section B - Registry

##### Registry

13. (a) The procedures for transmission of classified documents and personal mail to and from Headquarters OLDSTER and Detachment B will be as follows:-

(i) Classified documents originating in London will be appropriately marked, placed in double envelopes and delivered to the American Embassy, London, for despatch by diplomatic courier to Germany and thence by USAF arrangements by secure means to Detachment B. On arrival, the mail will be delivered unopened to the RAF Detachment Commander and a receipt obtained which will be returned to Headquarters OLDSTER in the reverse manner employed for outgoing material.

(ii) Classified documents being sent from Detachment B to Headquarters OLDSTER will be delivered to the USAF Detachment Executive/Administrative Officer, suitably marked for classification, and placed in double envelopes, as above.

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These will be transmitted to Headquarters OLDSTER through the reverse of the system set forth in paragraph 13(a)(i) above.

(iii) Personal mail will be handled in the same manner as in paragraph 13(a)(i) and (ii) above except that receipts will not be required. Mailing address for OLDSTER personnel at Detachment B will be:-

Room 7323, Air Ministry  
Whitehall Gardens  
London, S. W. 1.  
England

Headquarters OLDSTER will forward personal mail. On no account will personal mail be transmitted through civil postal channels to or from an OLDSTER individual at Detachment B or at any other location overseas.

#### Section C - Medical

##### Responsibilities of British Medical Officer

14. The RAF Detachment Surgeon is directly responsible for the care of all RAF personnel and their dependents. In addition, he will assist the USAF Detachment Surgeon whenever required and practicable. All RAF personnel or dependents requiring medical care will first be referred to him. Upon determination of the amount and type of care required, he will either perform such care as lies within his capabilities of equipment and supplies, or will seek the assistance and guidance of the USAF Detachment Surgeon if the cases are beyond his local scope. Such additional support medical facilities as are needed to offer complete and definitive care for RAF personnel and dependents will be arranged through the USAF Detachment Surgeon and/or CHALICE Headquarters, keeping Headquarters OLDSTER informed.

##### Hospital Services

15. Should it become necessary to hospitalize RAF personnel or dependents for minor ailments not requiring surgical care, the facilities of the Base Dispensary will be made available through the

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Detachment B USAF Surgeon. A small daily charge may be made to the patient for such service.

16. In the event major surgery or extended hospitalization is required, of a non-emergency nature, the patient will either be air evacuated to NATO Hospital Izmir, Turkey or to Lyneham Air Force Base England for onward movement to an RAF Hospital in UK at the discretion of the RAF Detachment Surgeon.

17. Emergency care for RAF personnel or dependents, including emergency surgery, will be provided either at the Detachment B location or the USAF Hospital, Ankara, Turkey. Following such emergency treatment, if the patient's diagnosis is favourable but requires extended hospitalization, he may be air evacuated either to the NATO Hospital, Izmir, Turkey, or to an RAF Hospital in England.

Physiological Training and Maintenance of Personal Equipment

18. The RAF Detachment Surgeon is directly responsible for the support of the mission in relation to all aspects of Physiological Training and maintenance of personal equipment, as well as other specialized equipment concerned with pilot performance. In the performance of this duty he will be assisted, as required, by the USAF Detachment Surgeon, the USAF Physiological Officer and USAF medical support personnel.

(a) Special areas of responsibility will be to advise the RAF Detachment Commander of the physical and mental condition of flying personnel within the confines of acceptable aeromedical practise, the care and proper utilization of all personnel and specialized equipment directly concerning the welfare of flying personnel. It shall be his sole responsibility to withdraw an RAF officer from flying status based on a medical opinion, and to reinstate him to flying status when he sees fit.

(b) In the physiological field, it shall be his further responsibility to maintain training of flying personnel commensurate with mission performance.

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19. The RAF Detachment Surgeon has the responsibility to maintain appropriate medical health records for all RAF personnel attached to the unit. Though not in themselves classified documents, they will be stored as such by the RAF Detachment Surgeon and must in no circumstances be shown to uncleared personnel. If essential, extracts may be produced in sterile form.

20. The RAF Detachment Surgeon shall see to the maintenance of immunization standards for RAF personnel and dependents in accordance with arrangements made previously between Headquarters CHALICE and Headquarters OLDSTER.

Section D - Pay and Allowances

21. The RAF OLDSTER personnel will be posted to the Air Ministry Special Duty List and their RAF pay and allowances will be paid through normal service channels. Whilst engaged in this project they will receive additional allowances from special funds and be provided with free accommodation. These allowances will be calculated in two parts:-

(a) A special living allowance whilst based at Adana, equivalent to the living allowances paid by H.Q. CHALICE to their own pilots.

(b) A supplementary allowance calculated to raise their net RAF pay in the same proportion as CHALICE pilots' pay compares with USAF pay.

22. Each officer's special allowances will be calculated individually. The supplementary allowance will be paid independently to his U.K. bank account. The living allowance in Turkey will be paid at Adana in U.S. dollars through H.Q. CHALICE from a fund which will be replenished periodically from London.

23. Prior to departure for Detachment B RAF personnel are to elect an amount to be paid to them monthly by the Detachment B Finance Officer. The requisite amounts to cover these monthly payments will be made available in U.S. dollars to the Detachment B Finance Officer, and authority will be given for British personnel to draw U.S. dollars to meet their requirements subject to satisfactory assurance of recovery from his RAF emoluments.

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24. The Finance Officer Detachment B is to account for all supplementary Agency funds and render monthly accounts.

25. The medical officer attached to the OLDSTER team at Adana will qualify for the special living allowance but not for the supplementary allowance.

#### Section E - Security

##### General

26. It is agreed that the RAF personnel of Detachment B will be subject to the existing security regulations detailed under the direction and control of the USAF Detachment B Commander and subject to policy guidance from Headquarters CHALICE and OLDSTER.

27. When operating from RAF bases, Detachment B Commander may enlist the aid of the RAF security services as authorized by Headquarters OLDSTER.

##### Security Responsibilities of the British Detachment B Commander

28. The British Detachment Commander is to be responsible to the Detachment B Commander for ensuring that RAF personnel conform to the security rules and regulations laid down by the Detachment B security authorities.

##### Handling of Classified Material

29. The handling of OLDSTER material for Detachment B, including storage, maintenance and movement, will be executed in accordance with the Security Custodial Responsibilities laid down by Headquarters CHALICE.

##### Security Investigation of RAF Personnel

30. All personnel cleared for access to OLDSTER information will have P.V.T. clearance--No OLDSTER clearances will be initiated without the personal authority of A.C.A.S.(I). This clearance will be passed to Headquarters CHALICE with full clearance particulars.

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31. All investigations concerning breaches of security which may arise at Adana or any staging area, involving RAF personnel are to be conducted by Detachment B Security Staff and co-ordinated with British Detachment Commander. All security information and documentation involving RAF personnel of Detachment B will be handled on a "Eyes Only" basis between -

Detachment B Commander

and

RAF Detachment Commander,  
Detachment B Senior Security Officer  
A. C. A. S. (I)  
A. C. A. S. (Ops)  
Headquarters CHALICE Security Officer

Security Violations

32. All security violations by RAF personnel of Detachment B will be recorded under arrangements to be made by the Detachment B Commander and the British Detachment Commander. If it is found that any individual is guilty of excessive and continuing security violations, the case will be referred to Headquarters OLDSTER.

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OLDSTER Operational  
Plan dated 28 Oct 1958NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE OF ELINT AND  
PENETRATION FLIGHTSPenetration Flights

1. Details of proposed penetration flights by British pilots including overlays setting out target complexes and proposed routes of missions over a three month period will be sent from Headquarters CHALICE to Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry) approximately fourteen days prior to start of a three month operational period.
2. Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry) will seek provisional political clearance using agreed British procedures from the Prime Minister for these missions.
3. Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry) will inform Headquarters CHALICE by signal of British provisional political clearance or otherwise to the proposed missions prior to the start of a three month period.
4. Following British provisional political clearance for proposed missions Headquarters CHALICE will be responsible for detailed planning as follows:-
  - (a) Producing an Operation Order for any staging operation that may be necessary. A copy of this order will be sent to Headquarters OLDSTER.
  - (b) Ensuring that the mission is conducted in accordance with established procedures.
  - (c) Observing and executing the following action prior to the actual mission:-
    - (i) Mission Forecast. This will be sent to Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry) on the Wednesday of each week. It will detail the proposed missions to be flown during the immediately following Monday to Sunday within the programme provisionally agreed (Para. 1 above).

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(ii) Operational Alert. This will be sent to reach Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry) no later than twenty-four hours in advance of planned take-off time. The message will contain operating details including target area and time of take-off.

(iii) Intention Message. This will be sent to reach Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry) not later than twenty-two hours prior to planned take-off time and will contain additional operating details including target and time of take-off.

(iv) Unit Mission Plan. This will be sent to reach Headquarters (Air Ministry) no later than twelve hours prior to planned take-off time. It will contain full details of specific mission including target, route, equipment and weather.

(v) Final OLDSTER Message. Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry) will despatch to Headquarters CHALICE at least five hours prior to estimated time of departure a message giving final British political approval or disapproval to the mission.

(vi) Go-No-Go Message. Headquarters CHALICE will send Headquarters OLDSTER a copy of their message to the operational unit giving approval or non-approval to the proposed mission. This message will be despatched to arrive at least three hours before the estimated time of take-off and after the receipt of the message in (v) above.

#### Elint Flights

5. No Elint flights are to be undertaken by British pilots without authority from Headquarters OLDSTER.

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OLDSTER Operational  
Plan dated 28th October,  
1958OLDSTER COVER STORYIntroduction

1. The American cover story for clandestine U-2 flights is linked to the overt and publicised operation of USAF U-2 weather squadrons operating for NASA. Because of this and of the special characteristics of the U-2 it is logical that a British cover story should also be related to high altitude weather research.
2. The validity of this approach is reinforced by the fact that there is a real Meteorological Office requirement for this kind of research work and it would be looked upon as a natural and desirable development in meteorological circles.
3. Arrangements are to be made for the Meteorological Office to have the occasional use of the U-2 aircraft as a result of an understanding between the USAF and the RAF. This fact would not be classified but would not be given undue publicity and all press releases are to be strictly controlled by the Air Ministry. Meteorological data concerning turbulence associated with jet streams, temperatures are to be collected. This would be done either by installing British meteorological equipment or by utilizing existing American met. instruments. Meteorological U-2 aircraft are to pay periodical visits to this country and based at an RAF airfield. Such flights will be of approximately ten days duration every three or four months.
4. Meteorological data obtained at heights above 55,000 feet is to be classified "Secret" and the information is to be divulged to only those people concerned with analysing such material on a strictly "need to know" basis. Data below 55,000 feet is unclassified, and freely available for publication by the Meteorological Office.
5. Covert operations for purposes of photographic or electronic reconnaissance will take place from suitable bases in the United Kingdom or overseas as dictated by operational requirements using CHALICE aircraft. The aircraft will be flown by RAF pilots from the UK and by the same pilots documented as meteorological officers when flying from overseas. The Medical Officer and any supporting administrative staff

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would similarly be described as civilian technicians when visiting overseas bases. Whilst penetration flights will not carry meteorological equipment, in the event of an incident they will nevertheless be described as meteorological research flights.

6. In the event of penetration flights leading to a protest by Soviet or Communist bloc countries, little difficulty is foreseen in producing a rebuttal. In the event of an incident involving a forced landing or destruction of a U-2 over denied territory various explanations can be given as described in Annex 1.

#### Political Approach and Documentation of OLDSTER Personnel in Turkey

7. The initial approach has already been made to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of Turkey, who have agreed to British participation. This participation was described by the Americans as technical assistance by civilian technicians and test pilots.

8. RAF personnel will enter Turkey with civilian British passports describing them as civilian employees of the Meteorological Office. They will carry civilian medical certificates and a supporting paper from the Meteorological Office signed on behalf of the Director General to this effect. Personnel will enter Turkey by civilian airline to Ankara and will then be transported to Adana by American service transport. Further journeys between Turkey and the United Kingdom and other operational bases will be made in USAF aircraft authorised by the Commander of the CHALICE Detachment. The final exit from Turkey will be made openly by civilian airline from Ankara. Whilst stationed in Turkey all British personnel will ensure that they have no documents or uniforms which could connect them with the Royal Air Force. The true nature of their visit to Turkey will only be known to CHALICE-cleared personnel. Selected personnel who have a need to know more than the unclassified story will be told that the British personnel are in Turkey for peripheral air sampling duties. The British Ambassador in Turkey will be informed of the presence of these personnel but not told the true story, and instructed to refer to London any enquiries he might get about these personnel before replying to the Turkish Government.

9. All correspondence including private mail for OLDSTER personnel will be routed through the special "cell" in the Air Ministry for onward transmission by American diplomatic courier to Turkey. Return

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correspondence from Turkey will be sent to the Air Ministry by American diplomatic courier for forwarding.

Political approach and documentation of British OLDSTER personnel operating in Pakistan

10. The Americans have operated from Pakistan twice before but have only told the Pakistan President that they were engaged in periphery Elint collection. A similar story has been told to the American Ambassador although the U.S. Air Attaché is fully briefed. It will be necessary for some approach to be made to the Pakistan President for British participation. M.I. 6 will approach the P.U.S. of the Commonwealth Relations Office who will be cleared for limited knowledge of OLDSTER operations, and he in turn will inform the British High Commissioner along similar lines to those told to the American Ambassador.

11. H.M. High Commissioner will be instructed to approach the Pakistan President and ask for permission for British participation in peripheral Elint collection in agreement with the American plan. The visit to the President will be arranged in conjunction with a similar visit by the American Ambassador.

12. When proceeding to Pakistan on temporary duty British OLDSTER personnel will travel from Adana under the auspices of the USAF and retain their civilian cover as Meteorological Technicians.

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Annex 1 to  
OLDSTER Operational  
Plan dated  
28th October, 1958

PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN THE EVENT OF A  
MISHAP OVER U.S.S.R. OR OTHER DENIED TERRITORY

1. The precise form of public statement in the event of a mishap could only be determined in the light of the mishap itself; the actual route being flown by the penetrating aircraft; and any statements made by the Soviet Government or any other Government.

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2. In general, if a penetrating U-2 aircraft became missing on a penetration flight it would be the intention of the U. K. to make this fact public and to initiate search and rescue operations. These operations would, of course, take place in an area appropriate to the point of penetration but would not, of course, involve operations over denied territory.

3. There are two points of principle which would be followed at all times. These are:-

(a) At no time would there be any admission to the fact that the penetrating aircraft had been involved in reconnaissance operations.

(b) In the event of the U-2 pilot falling into Soviet or other hands alive he will tell the truth about his operations. In these circumstances the U. K. would make it clear that any such statements were regarded in the same way as other past incidents which claimed to give 'free admissions' on points hostile to the Western cause, the germ warfare, and were made under duress of one kind or another.

4. There are two basic situations to be dealt with, one involving a deep penetration flight, and the other a shallow penetration flight.

#### Shallow Penetrations

5. In this situation any statement would be related to the fact that a U-2 aircraft was missing flown by a RAF pilot. The aircraft would be stated to have been engaged on a meteorological research flight as part of a programme at present being undertaken. Appropriate details would be made available of this programme and of the arrangements made, including details of the flight from the U. K. to enable RAF pilots to fly these aircraft.

6. Details would then be given of the particular flight on which the aircraft was engaged when it went missing. These details would not, of course, refer to any penetration activities but merely account for the fact that the aircraft was operating in the vicinity of the area at which the penetration was made.

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7. There would then be some speculation as to what had happened to the U-2 aircraft. This speculation might take one of the following forms:-

(a) That the aircraft was intercepted over international airspace and was either forced to land or was shot down over denied territory.

(b) That ground contact with the aircraft had been lost at a particular position, and that the pilot (flying in bad weather, hampered by loss of radio contact and loss of navigation system) may have wandered inadvertently over Soviet territory where he was later forced down, shot down or crashed.

8. Any statements on these lines would, of course, be accompanied by general guidance of previous incidents where Soviet or other Communist countries had shown themselves to react with excessive violence against inadvertent trespass within their airspace.

#### Deep Penetration

9. The general attitude would be very similar to that for shallow penetration, but it would be necessary to offer a specific explanation as to why the aircraft was so deep in Soviet or other territory. This explanation might take one of the following forms:-

(a) Contact with the U-2 aircraft had been lost at a particular time and particular place. It might be that the aircraft radio communication and navigation system had developed serious malfunction or had failed outright. The pilot might also have had oxygen trouble which, combined with the aircraft's complex navigation system might have resulted in this very grave deviation from the aircraft's planned course. It is possible that with the pilot suffering from lack of oxygen and with the aircraft on 'automatic pilot' this might have caused it to have reached the area stated by the Russians.

(b) That the radio contact with the U-2 aircraft had been lost at a particular time and at a particular place. It may have been that for reasons of pilot error or for technical reasons that the aircraft had, in fact, inadvertently violated Russian airspace. But

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under no circumstances could it be imagined that the aircraft could, on its own accord have reached the place stated by the Russians. Such a flight was not within its capability taking into account of time, the length of route it had previously flown.

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Attachment #1 to  
CHAL-0397

OPERATION OLDSTER PLAN

1. This note sets out additional arrangements to those discussed in the plan dated 28th October, 1958. These additional arrangements supersede or amend appropriate parts of the 28th October plan as necessary.
2. In order to strengthen the OLDSTER cover story it has been decided to form a Unit at RAF Watton. This Unit would be known as the Meteorological Experimental Unit (M. E. U.).
3. The establishment of M. E. U. would consist of a Commanding Officer (part-time from Headquarters OLDSTER), and OLDSTER personnel from Detachment B, and a senior N. C. O. (Administrative).
4. The M. E. U. would be overtly located at RAF Watton and would have its headquarters in a hangar. An area for the exclusive use of the M. E. U. at RAF Watton would be made available under appropriate security arrangements. It would be made known as necessary at RAF Watton that M. E. U. was involved in meteorological investigations but also had the task of atomic sampling and its activities in this respect were to be regarded as Secret.
5. The full task of M. E. U. would be known to the Commandant, Central Signals Establishment but to no other unindoctrinated personnel at R. A. F. Watton. A senior N. C. O. (Administrative) would be permanently available at the secure area occupied by the M. E. U. The secure area would be large enough to contain 2 U-2s and would also have in it permanently stores and equipment for these aircraft.

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6. Arrangements would be made for M.E.U. to be on the Air Ministry Special Duties List. No personnel or administrative matters would be handled by RAF Watton. These would be under the exclusive control of Headquarters OLDSTER.

7. OLDSTER communications equipment would be installed in the secure area. The secure area of M.E.U. would act as the operational base during detachment of U-2 aircraft for meteorological experimental flights and atomic sampling flights from the U.K.

8. M.E.U. would be wholly controlled and administered by the Air Ministry (Headquarters OLDSTER).

9. Every attempt will be made to give credence to the operational role of M.E.U. The frequent absences of the majority of its personnel will be explained by reference to:-

(a) The Unit's operational equipment is American and can only be made available from time to time as American commitments allow.

(b) Meteorological research is taking place on a worldwide basis and personnel of the Unit are, or may be employed from time to time in America, the Middle East, Europe or the Pacific.

10. The vital part of the requirement to give credence to the activities of M.E.U. will be actual meteorological flights from RAF Watton. Headquarters CHALICE will, in conjunction with Headquarters OLDSTER, make arrangements for these flights to take place as frequently as conditions will allow. These conditions will be affected by:-

(a) The requirement for CHALICE/OLDSTER operational flights.

(b) The availability of qualified technical personnel and equipment.

(c) The availability of USAF transport aircraft.

11. If political approval is given for penetration flights to be made from the United Kingdom, the RAF will make available transport aircraft for the logistic support within the United Kingdom of any OLDSTER detachment.

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ANNEX 79

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25 May 1961

## MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

SUBJECT: Integration of Project JACKSON Pilot Personnel into  
Project IDEALIST Detachment at Edwards Air Force  
Base, California

As a result of a meeting held in Washington the afternoon of  
19 May 1961, the following text is proposed for mutual agreement,  
covering principal arrangements required at the local level in  
Detachment G. Personnel at the meeting were AVM Sydney O. Bufton,  
RAF, ACAS/I; Air Commodore Roger Whelan, RAF, DDI (B);

[redacted] Devel-  
opment Projects Division; Wing Commander John C. Blair, RAF  
Liaison Officer to CIA; [redacted]  
[redacted] and Mr. James A. Cunningham, Jr., Acting Chief,  
Development Projects Division.

1. JACKSON pilots assigned to Detachment G, Edwards Air  
Force Base, will be documented under the notional cover of 6510th  
Air Support Group, Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC). This  
unit is analagous to a Headquarters and Services Squadron in a lesser  
command and is the only unit on the base reporting directly to the  
Base Commander, Brig. Gen. Carpenter, USAF.

2. Since some form of documentation is required locally, all  
assigned RAF personnel will be furnished appropriate pocketbook  
documentation, i. e., gate passes, club cards, drivers' licenses,  
PX and Commissary cards, etc., which will indicate their associa-  
tion with the 6510th Air Base Group. By special arrangement with  
AFFTC, RAF personnel will not, however, be carried on any morn-  
ing reports, manning documents, or published figures of the 6510th  
Air Base Group.

3. Living quarters for RAF personnel will be off base. While  
this in itself is a modest departure from the norm for officers serv-  
ing under an exchange arrangement, both parties to this agreement

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Withheld under statutory authority of the  
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50  
U.S.C., section 403g)

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feel that it is preferable in this instance, since it tends to reduce the opportunities for on-base exposure of RAF participation in Project JACKSON/IDEALIST. Civilian clothing will be worn at all times by RAF personnel. Although sufficient documentation as outlined in paragraph 2 above will be furnished each officer to permit him to freely utilize normal base support facilities, i. e., motion picture theaters, Officers' Clubs, PX and Commissary, it is specifically understood that RAF personnel, with the exception of the Flight Surgeon whose on-base bona fides have already been established, will not avail themselves of these facilities. In return for this it is understood that RAF personnel will be furnished a special allowance to compensate for the absence of such normal privileges.

4. If questioned, either on or off base, as to the nature of their assignment, RAF personnel will indicate that they are assigned to the 6510th Air Base Group. The sole exception to this is the Flight Surgeon, who will continue his administrative association with the special medical team at Edwards Air Force Base under the control of Brig. Gen. Don Flickinger, USAF, Assistant to the Commander for Bio-Astronautics, Air Research and Development Command. If questioned specifically as to their duties, they will respond that "they are on a classified assignment". At no time will RAF personnel admit their association with Detachment G, and if questioned about the identity of their commanding officer, they will give the name of Brig. Gen. Carpenter. Likewise, they will not volunteer information that will associate them with the U-2. If questioned as to whether or not they do in fact fly this aircraft, they will respond in the affirmative, admitting that they do this "in addition to flying various other types of aircraft".

5. In the event of a mishap, the initial reaction to inquiry will be to withhold the identity of the pilot until "notification to the next of kin". After twenty-four hours, which is the normal delay associated with such notification, the identity of the pilot will be released by the base Office of Information Services, with the following added statement: "At the time of the accident, this officer was detailed to Air Research and Development Command to familiarize himself with various aircraft in the USAF inventory. (RAF officer's name) was flying a U-2 aircraft, belonging to ARDC at the time the accident

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occurred. Normal accident investigation is being implemented to determine the cause of the crash."

6. It is understood that in the interest of both participants in this activity, Project JACKSON personnel will not frequent the Detachment G squadron area except while on official business. Open association with U. S. members of Detachment G on the base is not encouraged.

7. Both parties to this agreement are aware of the need for operational compartmentation at Detachment G. On occasion this may require that Project JACKSON personnel will be excluded from special areas where unilateral operations of U. S. interest only are in the process of being planned or conducted. Project JACKSON personnel will be briefed to this effect prior to arriving at Edwards Air Force Base by Wing Commander John C. Blair, RAF Liaison Officer to CIA.

8. Administrative guidance to RAF personnel in meeting normal requirements off the base such as State drivers' licenses, credit cards, documents relating to the purchase of personal items, etc., will be available within Detachment G. In all such instances the 6510th Air Support Group, AFFTC, will be shown as their place of assignment. Mail for Project JACKSON personnel, except for the Flight Surgeon, will not be received at a military address on the base but will be directed to their off base housing location.

It is realized that a document of this sort drawn up in advance of a new situation such as proposed for Project JACKSON personnel in the Detachment G environment cannot of necessity answer all situations which might develop. In any case not covered by this agreement and in those instances where an appropriate solution is not readily available within the Detachment G area itself, the problem will be referred in advance to Project IDEALIST Headquarters where it will be discussed between senior personnel of Project IDEALIST and the RAF Liaison Officer, hopefully leading to a mutually agreed position.

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It will be the responsibility of the RAF Liaison Officer to keep his headquarters advised of any major departure from this agreement which he feels may require additional coordination in London.

(Signed) JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR. 25 May 1961  
Acting Chief, DPD

(Signed) AVM SYDNEY O. BUFTON 25 May 1961  
Assistant Chief to the Air  
Staff for Intelligence  
Air Ministry

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ANNEX 80



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DDI(B)TS. 5013

18 May 1961

IDEALIST/JACKSON - OPERATIONAL PLAN

- APPENDIX 'A' Administrative Arrangements  
'B' Notification and Clearance Procedure  
'C' Cover story and arrangements for RAF  
personnel at Detachment G  
'D' RAF Liaison Officer/HQ IDEALIST/  
Responsibilities and duties

Task Organisation: Headquarters IDEALIST (Washington)  
Headquarters JACKSON (Air Ministry)  
IDEALIST Detachment G (Edwards AFB)

General Situation

1. It has been agreed between the United States and Her Majesty's Governments that it would be of mutual benefit for British nationals to undertake photographic and ELINT intelligence missions in concert with the IDEALIST organisation.

2. The British participation is to be known under the codename JACKSON and will consist of a flying detachment working as a national team under the direction of H. M. Government within the existing IDEALIST organisation.

Mission

3. To establish a British reconnaissance capability within the existing IDEALIST organisation for the purpose of undertaking photographic and ELINT intelligence missions as directed by Headquarters JACKSON.

Execution

4. Personnel

(a) Headquarters JACKSON is to provide two RAF officer pilots, one RAF navigation officer and one RAF medical officer. The senior RAF pilot is to be the British Detachment Commander.

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(b) Headquarters IDEALIST is to arrange for the integration of RAF personnel in the IDEALIST field organisation.

(c) Additional administrative detail is in Appendix 'A'.

#### Logistics and Material

5. (a) HQ IDEALIST is to provide U-2 aircraft and T-33 aircraft for the use of JACKSON personnel.

(b) The JACKSON detachment is to be provided with full logistic and maintenance support.

#### Operational Control

6. Operational control of all JACKSON sorties is to be exercised by Headquarters JACKSON through Headquarters IDEALIST and the local USAF commander in the field. On all operational matters, the British detachment commander will be responsible to the local USAF commander but he has the right of access to London through the RAF Liaison Officer established in IDEALIST HQ on all policy and domestic matters concerning British personnel which may arise from time to time. The flight training programme and selection of pilots for operational and training missions is to be the joint responsibility of the IDEALIST detachment commander and the British detachment commander.

#### Mission Planning

7. Mission planning is divided into:-

(a) Provisional mission plans to meet current intelligence requirements.

(b) Immediate planning to meet a sudden demand which may or may not already have been considered under (a) above.

8. To meet requirements in 7 (a):

(a) IDEALIST/JACKSON to prepare provisional mission plans from an agreed list of targets.

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(b) If a provisional mission plan reaches the point where British political approval is to be sought for its execution, HQ JACKSON is to notify HQ IDEALIST of provisional approval. If political approval is sought and obtained the control of the proposed mission is to be in accordance with the Reports Control Manual (Ops Manual 55-1). The procedure for the clearance of JACKSON operational flights is given in Appendix 'B'.

9. In the event of a sudden demand for a mission, IDEALIST HQ is to provide a detailed operational plan and when final political approval has been obtained is to control the mission in accordance with the Reports Control Manual.

#### Mission Take

10. Photographic and ELINT take from all JACKSON missions is to be processed under existing IDEALIST arrangements and the intelligence information disseminated to both the U.S. and British intelligence agencies under the existing procedures.

#### Security

11. It is mutually recognised that the protection of the U.S. and British Governments in the event of publicity in the U.S. (for instance, an accident) or in the event of an incident outside the U.S., is of paramount importance.

12. If any publicity is given in the U.S. to the British element, and especially to the pilots, which requires an answer or explanation from the British Government, the answer will be given that the RAF pilots are in the U.S. to fly various types of aircraft, including the U-2. Details of this cover story as well as the security measures to be adopted by the JACKSON detachment in the U.S. are given in Appendix 'C'.

13. Before any mission is undertaken outside the U.S., a cover story must be agreed between IDEALIST/JACKSON HQ. Any cover story will have to be related to the political situation at the time and to the overflight area or areas.

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Operational Base in the U.K.

14. Air Ministry is to maintain secure hangar facilities at RAF Watton for IDEALIST/JACKSON personnel and aircraft. These facilities are to include the screening of part of the hangar and suitably secured office and technical accommodation.

15. Special instructions for the reception and clearance of flights from RAF Watton are to be made as required by JACKSON HQ.

Communications

16. (a) Command Posts are:

- (i) Headquarters IDEALIST.
- (ii) Headquarters JACKSON.
- (iii) IDEALIST Detachment.

(b) Headquarters IDEALIST is to provide and/or arrange for communications in support of the IDEALIST/JACKSON project at bases other than in the U.K. and is to establish standards for traffic transit times in accordance with operational and administrative requirements.

(Signed)

A. Foord-Kelcey  
Air Vice-Marshal  
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff  
(Intelligence)

James A. Cunningham  
Development Project Division  
Central Intelligence Agency

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JACKSON Operational PlanADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTSSection A - Personnel AdministrationTour of Duty

1. The anticipated tour of duty for RAF personnel with the detachment is from two to two and a half years.

Personnel Records

2. All RAF personnel are to be held on Special Duties List No. 1005 (British Defense Staff Washington) and all official records and documents, apart from medical documents, will be retained in HQ JACKSON.

3. No entries are to be made in RAF log books of U-2 flying. Flying times are to be recorded separately and given monthly to HQ JACKSON for entering into log books in a suitable form on completion of tour.

4. Annual Confidential Reports will be completed in respect of RAF personnel under arrangements to be made by HQ JACKSON.

Leave of Absence

5. Privilege leave and R. and R. absences from duty for RAF personnel will be approved by the British Detachment Commander in consultation with the IDEALIST Detachment Commander and will be granted as operational requirements permit. The local USAF regulations on "off limits" areas and leave travel will be observed by RAF personnel. HQ JACKSON is to be advised of any annual leave proposed.

Order and Discipline

6. RAF personnel are at all times to conduct themselves in accordance with established and appropriate RAF regulations and with the local regulations of the USAF authorities.

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#### Casualty Procedure

7. The approved U.S. casualty procedure is to be applied to all RAF personnel at the Detachment except that personal effects of the individual will be forwarded to Air Ministry, London, marked "for the personal attention of A.C.A.S. (Ops)". All casualty reports and documents in respect of RAF personnel are to be copied to Headquarters JACKSON.

#### Aircraft Accident Investigation

8. All aircraft accidents, regardless of type, involving RAF personnel are to be investigated in accordance with IDEALIST Detachment procedures. Copies of such reports as well as related signals will be furnished to HQ JACKSON.

#### Marriage

9. RAF personnel contemplating marriage are to submit full particulars of the proposed wife to HQ JACKSON. The continued employment of a RAF officer on JACKSON depends upon proper clearance of his wife.

#### Travel Orders

10. RAF personnel, when on duty with the detachment, will travel from place to place on orders authorized by the USAF detachment commander. Whether they travel as RAF officers or as civilians will depend upon the circumstances of the time and will be decided before the operation by IDEALIST and JACKSON HQ.

#### Travel Notification

11. Any British visits to the detachment are to be cleared with IDEALIST HQ and the notification is to include name, civilian or military grade, purpose of travel, expected length of stay and clearance status. If the visitor should be denied access to any locations or equipment this is to be stated in the cable.

#### Passports and International Immunization Records

12. Passports and official International Immunization Records will be provided for each individual by HQ JACKSON as required.

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When travelling normally, only those forms showing the bearer to be a Royal Air Force officer are to be used.

Section B - Registry

Registry

13. The procedures for transmission of classified documents and personal mail to and from HQ JACKSON and the detachment will be as follows:-

(a) Classified documents originating in London will be appropriately marked, placed in double envelopes and delivered to the office of the IDEALIST representative in London for despatch by diplomatic bag to the U.S. On arrival at the detachment, the mail will be delivered unopened to the British detachment commander and a receipt obtained which will be returned to HQ JACKSON.

(b) Classified documents being sent from the detachment to HQ JACKSON will be given to the USAF detachment Executive/Administrative officer suitably marked for classification and placed in double envelopes. These will be sent to HQ JACKSON through the reverse of the system described in paragraph 13(a) above.

(c) Personal mail is not to be received at a military address on base but is to be directed to the off-base housing location.

Section C - Medical

Responsibilities of British Medical Officer

14. The RAF Detachment Surgeon is directly responsible for the care of all RAF personnel and their dependents. In addition, he will assist the USAF detachment surgeon whenever required and practicable. All RAF personnel or dependents requiring medical care will first be referred to him. Upon determination of the amount and type of care required, he will either perform such care as lies within his capabilities of equipment and supplies, or will seek the assistance and guidance of the USAF detachment surgeon if the cases are beyond his local scope. Such additional support facilities as are needed to offer complete and definite care for RAF personnel and dependents will be arranged through the USAF detachment surgeon and/or IDEALIST HQ.

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Hospital and Emergency Services

15. As far as possible, the three officers living in Lancaster are to be treated for minor ailments without associating them directly with the Base Dispensary. In an emergency it may be necessary to use the Base Hospital facilities but as far as is practicable this is to be avoided. For surgery or hospitalization, if time permits, arrangements will be made with IDEALIST HQ for treatment elsewhere. Costs for such treatment will be borne directly by Project IDEALIST.

Dental Treatment

16. Dental treatment will be arranged with a private practitioner, away from the base, with the approval of IDEALIST HQ. Costs for such treatment will be borne directly by Project IDEALIST.

Physiological Training and Maintenance of Personal Equipment

17. The RAF detachment surgeon is directly responsible for all aspects of Physiological Training and maintenance of personal equipment, as well as other specialised equipment concerned with pilot performance. In the performance of his duty he will be assisted, as required, by the USAF detachment surgeon, the USAF Physiological officer, and medical support personnel.

18. He is to advise the USAF detachment commander of the physical and mental condition of flying personnel within the confines of acceptable aeromedical practice and it is his sole responsibility to withdraw an officer from flying status based on a medical opinion and to reinstate him to flying status when he sees fit. He is to advise on the care and proper utilisation of all personal and specialised equipment directly concerning flying personnel. In the physiological field, it is to be his further responsibility to maintain training of flying personnel commensurate with mission performance.

19. He is responsible for maintaining appropriate medical health records for all RAF personnel attached to the unit. Though not in themselves classified documents they will be stored as such by the RAF detachment surgeon and must in no circumstances be shown to uncleared personnel. If essential, extracts may be produced in sterile form.

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20. He is to see to the maintenance of immunization standards for RAF personnel and dependents in accordance with arrangements made between HQ IDEALIST and JACKSON.

Section D - Pay and Allowances

21. RAF pay and allowances will be paid through normal service channels but while the pilots and the navigator are based at Edwards Air Force Base they will receive from special funds an allowance of 5 dollars a day each. This allowance is to compensate them for loss of privileges on the base and for daily travelling allowances.

22. Money will be paid into an account in Detachment G and the pilots and navigator can draw their entitlement from the Finance Officer as required.

23. HQ JACKSON is to be informed when the account has fallen to 500 dollars and a statement of account is to be forwarded every six months to HQ JACKSON.

24. This special allowance is not to be paid when JACKSON personnel are on leave.

25. JACKSON personnel are not to be told the source of this special allowance, are not to discuss the allowance except with HQ JACKSON and the RAF Liaison Officer HQ IDEALIST, and are not to show the allowance on income tax forms.

Section E - Security

General

26. RAF personnel will be subject to the existing security regulations detailed under the direction and control of the USAF detachment commander and subject to policy guidance from HQ IDEALIST and JACKSON.

27. When operating from RAF bases, the detachment commander may enlist the aid of RAF security services as authorised by HQ JACKSON.

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Responsibilities of the British Detachment Commander

28. The British detachment commander is to be responsible to the USAF commander for ensuring that RAF personnel conform to the security rules and regulations laid down by the detachment security authorities.

Handling Classified Material

29. The handling of JACKSON material for the detachment, including storage, maintenance and movement, will be executed in accordance with the Security Custodial Responsibilities laid down by HQ IDEALIST.

Security Investigation of RAF Personnel

30. All personnel cleared for access to JACKSON information will have P.V.(T) clearance and no JACKSON clearances will be initiated without the personal authorities of A.C.A.S.(I). Full JACKSON clearance particulars are to be passed to HQ IDEALIST.

31. All investigations concerning breaches of security which involve RAF personnel are to be conducted by the detachment security staff and co-ordinated with the British detachment commander. All security information and documentation involving RAF personnel of the detachment will be handled on an "eyes only" basis between:-

USAF Detachment Commander  
and  
RAF Detachment Commander  
Detachment Senior Security Officer  
A.C.A.S.(I)  
A.C.A.S.(Ops)  
HQ IDEALIST Security Officer

Security Violation

32. All security violations by RAF personnel will be recorded under arrangements to be made between the USAF and RAF detachment commanders. If it is found that any individual is guilty of excessive and continuing security violations the case will be referred to HQ JACKSON.

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Appendix 'B' to  
JACKSON Operational Plan

NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE OF PERIPHERAL  
AND PENETRATION FLIGHTS

1. HQ JACKSON will inform HQ IDEALIST by signal when provisional political approval is being sought for a mission. When provisional political approval has been obtained, and after both Headquarters have agreed the main outlines of the mission, HQ IDEALIST will be responsible for detailed planning as follows:-

(a) Producing an Operation Order for any staging operation that may be necessary. A copy of this order will be sent to HQ JACKSON.

(b) Ensuring that the mission is conducted in accordance with established procedure.

(c) Observing and executing the following action prior to the actual mission:-

(i) Mission Forecast. This will be sent to HQ JACKSON on the Wednesday of each week. It will give the proposed mission or missions to be flown during the immediately following Monday to Sunday within the programme provisionally agreed.

(ii) Operational Alert. This will be sent to reach HQ JACKSON no later than twenty-four hours in advance of planned take-off time. The message will contain operating details including target area and time of take-off.

(iii) Intention Message. This will be sent to reach HQ JACKSON not later than twenty-two hours prior to planned take-off time and will contain additional operating details.

(iv) Unit Mission Plan. This will be sent to reach HQ JACKSON no later than twelve hours prior to take-off time. It will contain full details of specific mission including target, route, equipment and weather.

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(v) Final JACKSON Message. HQ JACKSON will despatch to HQ IDEALIST at least five hours before estimated time of departure a message giving final British political approval or disapproval to the mission.

(vi) Go-No-Go Message. HQ IDEALIST will send HQ JACKSON a copy of their message to the detachment giving approval or non-approval to the mission. This message will be sent to arrive at least three hours before the estimated time of take-off and after the receipt of the final JACKSON message.

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Appendix 'C' to  
JACKSON Operational Plan

COVER STORY AND ARRANGEMENTS  
FOR RAF PERSONNEL AT DETACHMENT G

1. JACKSON pilots assigned to Detachment G, Edwards Air Force Base, will be documented under the notional cover of 6510th Air Support Group, Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC). This unit is analagous to a Headquarters and Services Squadron in a lesser command and is the only unit on the base reporting directly to the Base Commander.

2. Since some form of documentation is required locally, all assigned RAF personnel will be furnished appropriate pocketbook documentation; i. e., gate passes, club cards, driver's licenses, PX and Commissary cards, etc., which will indicate their association with the 6510th Air Base Group.

3. Living quarters for the two pilots and the navigator will be off base in the town of Lancaster which is 38 miles from Edwards. While this in itself is a modest departure from the normal for officers serving under an exchange arrangement, it is preferable in this instance because it tends to reduce the opportunities for on-base exposure of RAF participation in Project JACKSON/IDEALIST. Civilian clothing will be worn at all times by RAF personnel. Although sufficient documentation as outlined in paragraph 2 above will be furnished each officer to permit him to use normal base support facilities, i. e., motion picture theatres, Officers' Clubs, PX and Commissary, it is specifically understood that RAF personnel are not to use these facilities. In return for this the RAF personnel will be furnished a special allowance to compensate for the absence of such normal privileges.

4. If questioned, either on or off base, as to the nature of their assignment, RAF personnel will indicate that they are assigned to the 6510th Air Base Group. The sole exception to this is the Flight Surgeon, so long as he continues his administrative association with the special medical team at Edwards Air Force Base under provisions arranged by the Assistant to the Commander for Bio-Astronautics, Air Force Systems Command. If questioned specifically as to their duties, they will respond that "they are on a classified assignment". At no time will RAF personnel admit their association with Detachment G, and if questioned about the identity of their commanding officer, they will give the

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name of Major General Carpenter. Likewise, they will not volunteer information that will associate them with the U-2. If questioned as to whether or not they do in fact fly this aircraft, they will respond in the affirmative, admitting that they do this "in addition to flying various other types of aircraft".

5. In the event of a mishap, the initial reaction to inquiry will be to withhold the identity of the pilot until "notification to the next of kin". After twenty-four hours, which is the normal delay associated with such notification, the identity of the pilot will be released by the base Office of Information Services, with the following added statement: "At the time of the accident, this officer was detailed to Air Research and Development Command to familiarize himself with various aircraft in the USAF inventory. (RAF officer's name) was flying a U-2 aircraft, belonging to AFSC at the time the accident occurred. Normal accident investigation is being implemented to determine the cause of the crash."

6. Project JACKSON personnel will not frequent the Detachment G squadron area except while on official business. Open association with U.S. members of Detachment G on the base is not encouraged.

7. On occasions Project JACKSON personnel may be excluded from special areas where unilateral operations of U.S. interest only are in the process of being planned or conducted.

8. The Commander, British Defense Staff, Washington, the Commanding Officer, Edwards Air Force Base, and other selected officers, will be briefed as required to support a story that RAF officers are, under normal arrangements, flying various aircraft, including the U-2. If it is possible, however, no statement should be made by any of these officers until instructions have been received by either HQ IDEALIST or HQ JACKSON.

9. The medical officer of the British detachment will continue to live on the Main Base at Edwards, to wear uniform, and to maintain interest in various aspects of the medical work being undertaken on the Main Base.

Outside the United States

10. It is expected that members of the British detachment, when staging outside the U.S., will travel on USAF orders as British civilians

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and will be issued with the necessary documents and instructions to enable this to be done.

11. RAF pilots flying the U-2 outside the U.S. will retain their RAF identity under all circumstances. If they force-land in friendly, neutral or denied territory they will always give their name, rank and number. Any further information that may be freely volunteered after a forced landing will depend upon the territory involved and pilots will be briefed accordingly before each mission.

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Appendix 'D' to  
JACKSON Operational Plan

RAF LIAISON OFFICER/HQ IDEALIST  
RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES

The Royal Air Force officer (Wing Commander) assigned to Headquarters IDEALIST is the representative of the Air Ministry (Headquarters JACKSON), London, and is responsible for the following duties:-

(a) Act as liaison officer between HQ IDEALIST and HQ JACKSON for both operational and administrative matters concerned with the project.

(b) Advise HQ IDEALIST as regards RAF policy, methods, etc., which may be pertinent and required for information in connection with IDEALIST/JACKSON operations.

(c) Maintain liaison with HQ JACKSON and keep them advised of planning and status of proposed IDEALIST operations.

(d) In accordance with HQ IDEALIST/JACKSON policy and requirements, co-ordinate arrangements for JACKSON mission plans in conjunction with HQ IDEALIST Director of Operations.

(e) Monitor and supervise the JACKSON mission planning carried out by the HQ IDEALIST Operations Control Staff.

(f) Attend JACKSON mission briefings and in conjunction with the HQ IDEALIST Operations Staff make the necessary decisions concerning route and target weather.

(g) Be the final approving authority for all JACKSON flights. In the event of absence, this final authority may be given by the HQ IDEALIST Director of Operations but HQ JACKSON is to be advised accordingly.

(h) Co-ordinate any arrangements necessary for RAF/British visitors to HQ IDEALIST.

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BYEMAN

BYE-2628-65  
9 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Continuation of the JACKSON Program

1. You have asked for our thoughts on the question of the continuation of the so-called JACKSON Program. I believe that in order to evaluate its worth it would be helpful to spend a few moments looking briefly at the background of this effort:

a. The JACKSON Program began in early 1959 as the outgrowth of conversations between Allen Dulles and Sir Dick White in the early winter of 1958 in London. We had just gone through the Congressional elections in the fall of 1958 during which time, for political reasons, the U-2 project had been pretty thoroughly neutralized for several months prior to the election in order that no one "rock the boat" and perhaps endanger the Administration's hope of success at the polls. Having witnessed this same period of extended political sensitivity in the presidential contest of 1956, it was Mr. Dulles's view that a certain advantage might be gained by establishing a British U-2 capability with the thought that, because of the lesser frequency of British elections and the probability that they would not coincide with established U. S. elections, a way could be found to keep the U-2's flying from one side or the other fairly continuously.

b. The JACKSON Program matured during 1959 under the aegis of the RAF with nominal financial and documentation support from MI-6. An operational agreement was worked out in London, which today is still in effect, and Agency communications with the Air Ministry were established. A cell was created within the Air Ministry initially under ACAS(Ops), but prior to the first mission the cell was shifted to the area of ACAS(I), then presided over by the now Air Chief Marshal Bill MacDonald. In latter 1959 and 1960 until 1 May, a small detachment of four RAF pilots, a medical officer, and an operations officer/navigator was stationed within the U-2 detachment at Adana, Turkey, from which point some nineteen Middle East U-2 missions were flown as well as two from Pakistan over the Soviet Union. I feel that the system worked reasonably well, although at the time the British system of approvals seemed a bit tedious, since no less than

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eight senior Air Ministry and government officials, including the Prime Minister, had to sign off on each mission, as well as on any minor changes to the flight plan brought about by operational or weather conditions.

c. After 1 May 1960 the British withdrew rather rapidly from Adana, fearful that their whole position in the Middle East might be endangered by revelations which they expected would be made in August of that year at the time Gary Powers was brought to trial. Their fears, of course, did not materialize. However, the program lay dormant until early 1961 when it was revived by the then ACAS(I), Air Vice Marshal Sidney O. Bufton. Bufton was a close personal friend of the then DDCL, General Cabell, who supported the resumption of the program on what was, at best, a contingency basis. The number of pilots, however, was reduced to two since it was hard to see how any more could be supported in view of the diminished U-2 assets of the Agency. (At the time of the Powers incident, the Agency possessed fourteen U-2's. With the loss of Powers' plane a decision was made to return four of the remaining aircraft to USAF. These latter birds were subsequently recovered from USAF to replace losses.) Despite the best efforts of Sid Bufton there was a reluctance on the part of HMG to consider active commitments of the U-2's in areas where they might have been reasonably effective before the wholesale introduction of SA-2's in the Middle East. Following Bufton's departure his successor, Air Vice Marshal Foord-Kelcey, did little to advance the U-2 cause up through his retirement in 1964. There was a brief period in 1962 when it looked as though we were on the verge of obtaining an agreement from both governments to establish an RAF detachment in Pakistan to conduct the ELINT surveillance over Sary Shagan MTR with System X. I honestly believe the British were ready to give this project their best, but in August of that year Mr. McCone ordered a stand-down in any further planning in face of strong USAF representation on behalf of the RB-57F as a substitute vehicle for the Sary Shagan surveillance.

2. As you can see from the above, a factual box score would seem to indicate that the JACKSON Program was a losing proposition after 1 May 1960. In May of 1963 an attempt was made to interest the British in permitting us to use Cyprus as a base for U. S. U-2 flights against Israel and adjacent areas without notable success. We have found that in all instances where we have actively explored the possibility of using the JACKSON assets, that the Air Ministry and the

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Air Council have supported us to the political authorities. It has been the latter who have historically been bothered by the implications of losing an aircraft in the Powers' manner, where the pilot might be able to reveal his affiliation.

3. At the moment, the continuation of JACKSON is costing us little or nothing. There are two pilots, a navigator and a medical officer at Edwards Air Force Base for whose up-keep we are not responsible, but for whom we furnish flying time in U-2's and T-33's. MI-6 continues to pay the detachment a daily supplemental stipend and we have in the past afforded the RAF pilots, or at least some of them, carrier training although there is no carrier in the Royal Navy suitable for U-2 operations. Our communications link to the Air Ministry has permitted some useful exchanges on technical matters; i. e., during the Sino-Indian crises in 1962 when we were able to determine fairly accurately the capabilities of the Indian Air Force to conduct tactical reconnaissance against the Chicomps. It is only fair to say that if the matter of maintaining the link were put to a vote [redacted]

[redacted] would be the first to opt for its abandonment. In a rather intangible way this program furnishes the excuse for direct liaison with the Air Ministry on reconnaissance matters, but this alone is probably insufficient justification. There is today in 1965 one area of the world where the JACKSON Program might be effective, and that is in Southeast Asia against Indonesia in connection with the smouldering Malaysian crisis. Even though the British are on the receiving end of T-KH material, because of weather and geography this collection system cannot be maximally effective against either Borneo or Indonesia itself. The U-2's operating from Darwin or Cocos Island or both could do the job. If political sensitivities permitted, Singapore could also be a base of operation, as could the Philippines. There is, as yet, no competitor to the U-2 in terms of performance within the RAF inventory, and little prospect that they will achieve one. The British might well see fit to join us, if the occasion arose, in conducting reconnaissance from India over China. Such a suggestion was even made by Air Vice Marshal Foord-Kelcey to General Carter in 1963. It is conceivable that the Air Ministry at least might give serious thought to employing their pilots over China from Taklii, if we so desired, in view of the progressive deterioration of the international situation in Southeast Asia. I feel there is only a limited prospect in employing the U-2 in the Middle East under RAF auspices except, perhaps, in

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the less heavily defended areas of Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. I see little expectation that either the U.S. or the U.K. could mount a U-2 staging from Pakistan in the near term, and U.K. pilots operating against China from Taiwan are totally out of the question.

4. All of the above would seem to suggest that unless there is some prospect of melding the RAF capability eventually into the OXCART Program, the chances of effective employment of JACKSON are not too encouraging. The present re-examination of the U.K. position, which I hear from Harry Hean is going on in London, may suggest the possibility of further operations of one sort or another. If this search on their part proves non-productive it might be appropriate to think of allowing the program to expire at the completion of the tours of the present incumbents at Edwards, which would be in the late spring of 1967. Your thoughts on this topic would be appreciated.

(Signed)

JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR.  
Acting Assistant Director  
(Special Activities)

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