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# DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)

History of the Office of Special Activities  
Chapter XVII

(PERIOD)

From Inception to 1969

## DO NOT DESTROY

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CHAPTER XVII. CHINESE  
PARTICIPATION IN U-2 PROGRAM



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## CHAPTER XVII. CHINESE PARTICIPATION IN THE U-2 PROGRAM

### Background

The original impetus for a Chinese Nationalist U-2 program came from the United States Air Force (SAC), who presented the following proposal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 December 1958:

"1. In October the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved, subject to CIA, Department of State, and White House concurrence, a proposal to provide U-2 aircraft to the Chinese Nationalist Government on a loan basis.

"2. Pursuant to this approval, it was directed that coordination be effected with the CIA and the Department of State by the Air Force. Approved memoranda for record reflecting this coordination with reservation are attached. Specific coordination of an overflight program by CIA and State was withheld pending evaluation of the political and military situation existing at the time the Chinats attain a capability in the U-2 aircraft. The CIA and State Department express the view that White House concurrence with this proposal should not be sought until such time as training is completed and a firm proposal to conduct overflight operations has been developed. The Air Force agrees with this position.

"3. It was further agreed with the CIA that the various security considerations with respect to this equipment and future operations would be worked out with Headquarters, Project CHALICE. In this regard, initial discussions have been held with CIA and arrangements have been made for them to review the security aspects of this program as it progresses.

"4. Accordingly, the USAF requests approval to approach General Wang Shu-ming, Chief, Chinese General Staff, early in January 1959 with the following proposal:

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"a. That three or four carefully selected pilots of the Chinese Nationalist Air Force be trained in the U-2 aircraft in the United States with training to commence on or about 1 March 1959.

"b. That the purpose of this training is to cut lead time in any overflight program we may mutually wish to undertake at some future date. Essentially, this should be considered as a follow-on to the RB-57D. Should aircraft become available for such a program they must be provided on a loan basis rather than through the MAP.

"c. That in a program of this nature the most stringent security measures must be employed to protect the capability of the aircraft and to this end:

"(1) Only the absolute minimum number of Chinese personnel will be made knowledgeable of this training program and these individuals will be given only the minimum information concerning equipment and future plans consistent with their need to know.

"(2) The Chinese personnel knowledgeable of this program will be controlled by an access list available to the USAF and the USAF will furnish to the Chinese a list of those USAF personnel competent to discuss this program.

"(3) Pilots selected for training must be excellent security risks as determined by the Chinese Nationalist Government.

"d. That pilots selected for training will meet the professional and physical qualifications established by the USAF.

"e. That the USAF reserves the right to discontinue this program at any time.

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"5. Upon approval of paragraph 4 above the USAF will:

"a. Arrange a meeting with General Wang Shu-ming to present this proposal.

"b. Coordinate this meeting with CINCPAC and advise him of final agreements reached." 1/

The JCS approved the proposal as outlined above, and the Air Force Office of Operations/Reconnaissance (AFOOP/R) began immediate preparations for a visit to Formosa by General Sutterlin and Colonel Clason B. Saunders to discuss the training of Chinese pilots with General "Tiger" Wang. At a Pentagon meeting on 19 January 1959, Colonel William Burke (Acting Chief, DPD), learned of the following Air Force plans:

"a. Unless there are Chinese objections, the only person contacted will be General Wang. He will be briefed on the U-2 and its photo capability.

"b. He will be requested to select pilots carefully who have outstanding records and who will be security checked. (Additionally, the Air Force security people will accomplish a check and will furnish CIA names of pilots selected so that CIA may assist in the security check.

"c. Colonel Clason Saunders is the project officer and will record names of all persons attending any meetings. He

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1/ Memorandum for Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 12 December 1958,  
Subject: U-2 Aircraft for the Chinat Government.

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agreed that should Chiang Ching-kuo become involved, discussions would be conducted without Chiang's interpreter.

"d. Pilots will be told only that they have been selected to be trained in high performance aircraft in the U.S. They will undergo a physical and psychological examination at Randolph Field similar to that conducted by the Lovelace Clinic. A SAC project officer would be with them throughout their stay in the U.S. and be part of a SAC team to be stationed at Okinawa later.

"e. The U.S. reserves the right to cancel the entire program at any time without being subject to any prior notification or discussion.

"f. The photo capability of the aircraft would be withheld from the pilots until they have completed checkout at Del Rio and are prepared to enter the photo phase of their training. (This is generally consistent with present SAC security procedures.)' 1/

In the discussion at the 19 January meeting the following CIA reservations were noted: (1) That concurrence by General Cabell in the SAC Chinat program was limited to phase one (training), and that phase two (the overflight operation) must be subsequently evaluated in the light of prevailing circumstances; (2) that the tactical use of the U-2 by Chinese pilots in Chinese-marked aircraft, based at Okinawa but staging from Taiwan or South Korea, might well destroy the present unclassified cover story of the U-2; and (3) processing of the photographic

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1/ CHAL-0531, 20 Jan 1959. Memo for Record by Col. Wm. Burke.

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take ought to be accomplished in Japan by the USAF rather than jointly with the Chinese on Taiwan (as was the case with the RB-57D activity). These reservations were agreed tentatively by the Air Force with further consideration to be given at the completion of the training phase. Meanwhile no commitments were to be made to the Chinese regarding phase two.

In May 1959, Colonel Saunders requested a review of the program, in light of the near completion of the training phase, prior to passing a requirement to SAC to develop an Operations Order for the Chinese activity. Development Projects Division then initiated a staff study in order to come up with conclusions and recommendations as to the Agency position vis-a-vis SAC/Chinat U-2 operations in the Far East.

Because there were logical reasons for using CIA cover, security, equipment, organization and management to accomplish the proposed overflights with Chinat pilots, it was recommended by DPD that CIA accept responsibility for using the trained pilots as part of the CHALICE Far East detachment and that the general approval of State and the White House be sought. General Cabell's concurrence with this recommendation was given with the proviso that the Air Force would first have

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to suggest this action on the part of CIA. At the time, hope was held for British approval of a series of Soviet overflights to satisfy the highest priority targets on the book and it was considered by some that the Chinat operation might "rock the boat". No action was taken between July and December 1959, although there were several working level discussions.

At the 2 December 1959 meeting of the Joint Chiefs, the subject was raised and Mr. Allen Dulles agreed to an Air Force request to settle the question of the use of the Chinat pilots. A CIA/USAF working group on 7 December 1959 came up with three alternatives: (a) to form a unit on Taiwan, with either CIA or SAC direction; (b) to put a SAC unit on Okinawa with Taiwan-based Chinat pilots to fly missions, staged from Taiwan or Korea; and (c) the CHALICE Detachment C to stage to Okinawa and use Chinat pilots based on Taiwan. On 28 December 1959 a meeting was held between Generals Cabell and LeMay to reach agreement on what should be done. General LeMay said that the Air Force reason for pressing the Chinat proposal was simply to get the greatest possible use from the U-2 in covering whatever priority targets were accessible before the aircraft became obsolete.

General Cabell believed the proposed operation to be unwise for the present and said (a) that until coverage had been obtained of top

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priority targets in the USSR, exposure of the U-2 under circumstances which could result in advance publicity or diplomatic action should be held to a minimum; (b) that he felt that such U-2 missions as might be authorized over denied areas could be flown with a slightly higher margin of safety by U.S. than by Chinat pilots; and (c) that we had reason to believe that permission might be obtained in the course of the next six or eight months for perhaps two or three additional missions against the USSR, provided nothing occurred to make the political climate less favorable.

General LeMay accepted these views and agreed to maintain the Chinat pilot proficiency by periodic refresher training in the ZI, avoiding the deploying of additional U-2's to the Far East and the exposure of the Detachment C operation to the Chinats.

Subsequent to the 1 May 1960 mishap, the cutting off of further overflights of the USSR by the U-2 brought the Chinat program again into focus. 50X1, E.O.13526 at a meeting held 6 May 1960 to discuss future MAAG plans for Taiwan, raised the possibility of two U-2's being assigned to the CAF in FY 1963. Both Admiral Smoot of Taiwan Defense Command and Ambassador Drumwright believed this would be too late to meet reconnaissance needs in the China area and pressed for more immediate action.

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General Chiang Ching-kuo (then head of the GRC's National Security Bureau) approached [ ] informally on 20 May 1960 (and officially on behalf of President Chiang Kai-shek on 23 May) with the suggestion that U-2 aircraft based in Japan be moved to Taiwan. He said the U.S. could be assured of complete security and cooperation from the GRC for any use of the U-2 which the U.S. desired. He recommended the incorporation of a U-2 unit as a compartmented element of the P2V program at Hsinchu Air Base, but was willing to accept any reasonable arrangement. The Far East Division at Headquarters was in accord with this proposal and it appeared at that time that there was no reason why it should not be implemented. On 18 June 1960, during a visit to Headquarters, [ ] passed to General Goodpaster the Chinat offer and the General informed the President. (Goodpaster told [ ] there was an unwritten rule for nobody to mention the U-2 to the President except Goodpaster, who always chose a propitious time to do so.)

White House Approval

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On 15 July 1960, Mr. Bissell presented a paper on "Future of the Agency's U-2 Capability" to the White House which proposed among other plans that "in early autumn two U-2's be turned over to the Chinese Nationalist Government (subject to repossession by the U.S.) to be

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utilized for reconnaissance over Communist China. These aircraft would carry Chinese Nationalist markings and be flown by Chinese Nationalist pilots. <sup>1/</sup> The President agreed to consider the proposal in the early fall.

On 19 August 1960, Mr. Bissell carried to General Goodpaster a formal proposal for a joint program with the GRC. Authorization was sought to take the matter up with the Chinese so as to inaugurate the program about 15 October 1960.

"The operation would be so arranged that in appearance there would be no greater U.S. involvement in this than in any other Chinat military activities that employ equipment of U.S. origin. The aircraft would carry Chinese markings and be flown by Chinese pilots. Americans would have to be used for maintenance and certain logistic support functions, but they would be the civilian employees of the aircraft manufacturer and of other private companies, which would furnish these services (as well as spares and other supplies) under contract to the Chinese Government.

"The agreement of the Chinese Government would be sought, however, to the exercise of operational control over U-2 activities in actuality by a small U.S. staff located with the unit in the role of a military advisory group. This arrangement would be strictly parallel to that already in effect for the control of CIA-furnished P2V's currently used in ELINT flights over the Mainland, which has been entirely acceptable to the Chinese and has been consistently honored by them. The U.S. field group would report to the existing CIA/USAF Project

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<sup>1/</sup> TS/CHAL-1088-60, page 3, para 6c.

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Headquarters in Washington and the same control procedures would be employed that have been in effect for U-2 operations in the past.

"Although it is not contemplated that the physical transfer of the planes would take place for two months, it would be desirable to discuss this matter with the Chinese in the near future. Not only would some time be required to obtain and ready the necessary facilities on Taiwan but it is believed this proposal would be welcome to the Chinese and would offset any disappointment the Generalissimo may feel at this time as a result of our unwillingness to guarantee full support of his proposed PEGASUS operations.

"The arrangements outlined above are satisfactory to the USAF. The proposal has been concurred in by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State." 1/

The proposal in principle for a Taiwan detachment was approved by State and by the President on 26 August 1960. CIA was authorized to enter into negotiations with the GRC but was instructed to avoid fixing any specific date for the movement of aircraft to Taiwan. On 8 September 1960 the Secretary of State restated his approval in terms of his desire for de facto U.S. control of U-2 overflights with Chinese pilots, and for prior consultation with State on each such overflight. Mr. Bissell gave assurance that this would be the case.

50X1, E.O.13526 Meanwhile on 13 September 1960, [ ] outlined to General Chiang Ching-kuo the U.S. proposal for a joint project. Within two hours the approval of the Gimo had been obtained to proceed. On

1/ CHAL-1145-60, 19 Aug 1960. "U-2's for Nationalist China".

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16 September General Chiang brought the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Air Force, General Ch'en Chia-shang into the picture and on 19 September General Ch'en designated Major General I Fu-en, Vice Chief of Staff, as the CAF representative in charge of the project and Colonel Huang Wei-cheng as his deputy.

A negotiating team was sent to Taiwan on 14 October 1960 to brief 50X1, E.O.13526 and hold discussions with the Chinese.

Mr. Bissell added the following note to the team's instructions with

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The negotiating team held discussions principally with General I Fu-en on the Chinese side concerning plans for the detachment. Tao Yuan was picked as the base site in preference to the less

1/ CHAL-1209-60, 13 Oct 1960. Memo to AC/DPD from DD/P.

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secure commingling with the Hsinchu group, and the principal initial cost was estimated at about \$50,000 for renovating a hangar. General I wanted the film take to be processed in the new laboratory furnished the CAF by the USAF, but the team made no commitment.

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The Chief of MAAG, General Kenneth O. Sanborn, also desired to stay completely out of the picture.

When the team returned to Headquarters, Mr. Bissell on 3 November 1960 met with General Goodpaster to advise him that the Agency urgently needed a decision on whether to proceed with the \$50,000 rehabilitation of the hangar. If this were done, the expectations of the Chinese would be solidified and their reactions would be more adverse if the plan should be cancelled later. On 8 November General Goodpaster informed Mr. Bissell that on the 4th he had discussed the request with the President and that approval had been granted for the project. Mr. Bissell did not construe this as permission to undertake forthwith overflights of denied areas, since the Secretary of State had specifically asked that every mission be cleared

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with the Department. Moreover, the proposal as presented to the White House had stated that the same control procedures would apply as in the past, i. e. , mission-by-mission approval.

Cover

In fabricating a cover story for TACKLE (the cryptonym given the Chinese U-2 program), the effort was made to dissociate the U.S. Government to the greatest extent possible while maintaining a normal pipeline for spare parts, engine overhaul, pilot training, etc., and ensuring medical care and PX/Commissary privileges for the U.S. personnel assigned to support the unit at Tao Yuan. A completely commercial cover would have entailed prohibitive costs for stocking, warehousing, and shipping spares, and for salaries high enough to compensate techreps who would have to live on the local economy. Arrangements were therefore made to establish the detachment on Taiwan consistent with the following cover story:

"Aircraft

"1. To eliminate the flavor of U.S. sponsorship in the transfer of operational aircraft, procurement of same will appear to have been accomplished through a direct purchase by and between the Government of the Republic of China and the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.

"2. To support a Lockheed sale of U-2 aircraft it will be necessary for Lockheed to first acquire such aircraft from the USAF.

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"3. To document the record, a backdated letter (1 April 1960) will be prepared by Mr. C. L. Johnson and addressed to the Air Materiel Command (Colonel Sidney Brewer) quoting a cost estimate for repairing two damaged USAF U-2 aircraft at approximately \$800,000 total.

"4. In anticipation of a negative response to proceed with repairs, the letter will further include a Lockheed proposal to purchase the damaged aircraft for salvage at a bid price of \$250,000 each.

"5. The AMC will accordingly reply by backdated letter accepting the Lockheed offer and will prepare necessary papers which will properly pass title as Class 26 items.

"6. The two U-2 aircraft will then purportedly be rebuilt and offered for sale to the GRC at \$1.2 million each.

"7. The following documents will be prepared and actions taken to support a purported sales transaction between Lockheed and the GRC:

"a. The C. L. Johnson organization supported by the Lockheed public relations office will be the purported sales negotiators.

"b. An appropriate bill of sale for airframe, engine, radio and navigation equipment etc. will be prepared.

"c. Appropriate export documents (matter of public record) normally associated with a sale of this type will be prepared.

"d. Arrangements will be made to ostensibly transfer funds from GRC to Lockheed as payment for items purchased.

"e. Documents required to reflect the handling of classified material will be placed on record with the Office of International Security, Headquarters, USAF.

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"Detachment Cover

"1. The U-2 aircraft will be appropriately marked upon arrival Taiwan with the insignia of the Chinese Air Force.

"2. The hangar and other facilities utilized at Tao Yuan Airdrome will have all the appearances of a normal CAF operational unit.

"3. Living quarters will be known as a joint CAF/USAF billeting facility and club. ?

"Personnel Cover

"1. All military personnel on duty with the Detachment will be assigned in true name to the 6213th Support Squadron, Taipei, with duty station at Detachment 5, Mobile Training Team, Tao Yuan Airdrome.

"2. While at Tao Yuan, all military personnel will utilize alias names and wear civilian clothes. All documentation necessary on base will be issued by the CAF.

"3. All contractor employees and CIA personnel will utilize the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation as their employer. Their presence in Taiwan (specifically Tao Yuan) will be in support of a contract in which they are performing services to the CAF. While at Tao Yuan, all personnel will be extended only those privileges normal to Americans working for the CAF.

"4. While off base, personnel will be permitted to designate their parent organization as the 6213th Support Squadron in order to obtain various privileges normally extended to Government civilians and contract employees.

"5. All travel documents utilized by civilians will be issued in such a manner as to support employment of such individuals by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.

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"6. A personal services contract between the GRC and Lockheed Aircraft Corporation will be prepared and included in the files of both parties.

"Materiel Support

"1. Ostensibly, spare parts and equipment necessary to support the Detachment will be furnished to the GRC by Lockheed under the provisions of a contract between the two parties.

"2. To conceal military delivery to the Detachment all items of support forwarded through normal Air Force channels from Warner Robins Air Force Base will be addressed to Detachment 5, Mobile Training Team, 6213th Support Squadron." 1/

Discussions were held with State Department officials in December 1960 in order to arrange for the export license required by Lockheed to sell and ship the aircraft to the GRC. Approval was obtained, and to tie up the export cover story, the Commissioner of Customs was requested to arrange for an officer at the Los Angeles port of exit to endorse the license to indicate departure of the aircraft on 10 December 1960, but not to describe the means of transport. (Means of transport for the original two and all subsequent U-2's to Taiwan has been either by USAF airlift or by ferry flight using U.S. pilots under covert contract to CIA.) This arrangement has

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1/ IDEA-0044, Att. #1, 16 November 1960. Memo for DD/P,  
Subject: Cover Story for TACKLE.

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been followed in the case of each aircraft transported with export licenses on the public record for seven U-2 aircraft:

<u>No. of Aircraft</u>	<u>Date of License</u>	<u>Date Shipped</u>
2	7 December 1960	10 December 1960
1	11 January 1963	5 May 1963
1	20 December 1963	27 December 1963
2	3 August 1964	4 September 1964
1	19 October 1965	7 April 1966

Of the ten aircraft losses suffered in training on Taiwan and in overflights of the Mainland, five have been publicized in the press, principally as a result of Chinese Communist protests. Thus on the books the GRC can still claim two documented U-2's (as of end of 1968).

Deployment of Detachment H

Immediately after Presidential approval was received, construction was begun at Tao Yuan Air Base. [ ] Project Engineer, was sent out to coordinate details with the Chinese. The contract for the hangar renovation was negotiated by General I Fu-en and the local contractor was required to work 24 hours a day. The CAF assigned a qualified construction engineer to inspect materials and supervise construction. The Chinese at that moment showed the greatest eagerness to get on with the project.

The Detachment's advance administrative party, headed by the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Denzil Poston, arrived at

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Tao Yuan on 14 November and began working out procedures and arrangements for the reception of the main body. The Communications and Security Staffs followed shortly and the Lockheed and other techreps arrived in time to receive the first U-2 in early December. The Detachment when fully manned numbered 26, exclusive of pilots and locally hired indigenous personnel.

During November 1960 an inspection of film storage and processing facilities at Tao Yuan was made by Mr. Ed Green of Eastman and Major Lewis Watson of Project Headquarters and recommendations were made for corrections and improvements to the CAF photo lab and for a training program for the Chinese technicians.

On 22 November 1960 a TALENT briefing was given by Commander Robert Neasham of PIC to the following key GRC personnel: President Chiang, General Chiang Ching-kuo, Major General S. K. Hu, Lieutenant General Ch'en Chia-shang and Major General I Fu-en. This briefing was reportedly a great success and definitely impressed the Chinese with the value of sophisticated film processing. It was considered that the question of processing the film in the CAF facility would not be pushed by the Chinese so long as they were able to process the tracker film locally, and provided duplicates of the principal

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photography were returned to them from the processing center within about 10 days of the mission.

The first contretemps with the Chinese was not long in developing.

On 29 December 1960,

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to General Cabell and Mr. Bissell as follows:

"... Have been notified by General I Fu-en that CAF could not continue with project until arrangements clarified.

"Situation partially reflects fact TACKLE project severely handicapped due absence formal agreement with GRC spelling out ground rules for cooperation. Agreement draft was promised many weeks ago and I urged we get agreement signed before first U-2 arrived so we would have some bargaining leverage.

"As situation is now, all working relations are based on the understandings between me and General I Fu-en and we are depending on his good will. Unfortunately TACKLE project officers are not very tactful or skillful in dealing with General I Fu-en and other Chinese used at Tao Yuan. Col. Poston is doing a good job technically but is no politician and finds difficulty adjusting to differences working on joint project with foreigners as compared to purely U.S. operations. Headquarters briefings evidently stressed not only U.S. independence TACKLE project but also unilateral conduct of operations. Impression gained by Chinats during earlier team briefings was that this is basically joint project subject to coordination with GRC although command resides in Washington. Complete independence of TACKLE project while operationally possible is not politically feasible. Chinese look inevitably to me as local sponsor of project and hold me responsible for basic policies. High level liaison with GRC should be conducted in accordance with guidance taking into account local factors and personalities. Believe Headquarters should make clear that policies of all kinds governing

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relations with GRC are subject [ ] control under general Headquarters directives. This does not imply any aloofness on part of Poston who appears ready and willing to cooperate any way possible but needs and should have Headquarters guidance. I will see Gen. I Fu-en as soon as possible and try to restore feeling of mutual confidence. Believe matter can be smoothed over if more tact is used in accepting principle we are guests on foreign air base and project-cleared Chinese VIP's have theoretical right to access to all installations. In practice this means only five or six people, mostly too busy to bother. Gen. I Fu-en will visit occasionally and should be shown signal center when not in operation and cryptographically secure. Confident he will agree to mark it restricted area and will himself not ask to visit after principle is established.

"With respect to advance clearance actual missions by GRC, feel it essential to work out secure procedures permitting notification CAF when mission alert arrives. We have done this on STPOLLY for years with no obstruction or interference with our control. Impossible fly off Chinese airbase without CA F concurrence.

"Strongly recommend Headquarters send out new draft agreement so we can iron out procedural understandings before first actual operation. This will prevent misunderstandings and insure U.S. control of essential elements of operation. There is complete good will on Chinese side but anxiety to be treated as partners in project. This is largely matter of face and prestige which costs us only time and effort in polite formalities. Taipei Station cannot get project established and running smoothly on any other basis." 1/

Project Headquarters' reaction to [ ] lecture on

Oriental etiquette was to suggest a visit by a high level Headquarters

1/ [ ] dated 29 December 1960.

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team to iron out any misunderstandings. [ ] said he would welcome the visit of Mr. James Q. Reber and Colonels Beerli and Songer of Project Headquarters Staff, and recommended that they make an effort to convince the Chinats that the U.S. side meant to deal honestly with them despite the unwillingness to conclude a formal signed agreement. He also recommended they take "a constructive, friendly approach to Gen. I Fu-en designed to indicate good will on the part of the U.S. and the intent to proceed on matters of mutual benefit with reasonable flexibility within terms of agreement as adjudicated among the Chinats, Detachment H and [ ] " 1/

Agreement with the Chinese: Memorandum of Understanding

In light of the very cordial and personal relationships between [ ] and top GRC officials, the principal role in the negotiations was assumed by him, based on a draft memorandum furnished by Headquarters. The Director had instructed, on advice of the General Counsel and with the approval of [ ] that the agreement should be in the form of an unsigned memorandum of understanding since (a) the Agency had no authority for signing an agreement on behalf of the U.S. with a foreign government, and (b) [ ] would have been very

1/ [ ] dated 16 January 1961.

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reluctant to trust such a sensitive document to Chinese security. Hence, the memorandum which was agreed by both sides on 25 January 1961 was couched in the most sterile terms possible, with one copy being retained [ ] and one by the CAF. (See Annex 107 for the text of the Memorandum of Understanding.)

Other arrangements agreed to verbally at that time were:

(1) General I Fu-en and [ ] were both to receive 24-hour alert on missions, and the "Go" message two hours prior to take-off, allowing time for cancellation for political or other reasons. (2) [ ]

[ ] was to dispense the pilot bonus (five pilots at \$300 each per month) which, being excessive by Chinese pay standards, was prorated as a monthly incentive bonus among the Chinese members of the 35th Squadron, with the balance being used to procure air conditioners, food freezers, PX-type goods, club furnishings and other such amenities which would redound to the benefit of the whole group. (In September 1964, at the request of [ ] the handling of this bonus was updated as follows: Since the number of pilots assigned varied from time to time with as few as two in some months, it was agreed to credit the account with a flat \$1800 monthly and pay out bonuses on the basis of \$NT3600 for pilots, \$NT1800 for air duty officers, \$NT1200

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for ground duty officers, \$NT900 for non-coms, and \$NT300 for enlisted men; housekeeping expenses \$NT10,000 monthly. This allows for up to six pilots and leaves a monthly cushion on the books of \$US95.) (3) When the question of polygraphing the pilots was raised, General I Fu-en demurred, saying there was no need for this since the pilots were all well known to him from their youth. (The matter was left to the discretion of [ ] who, using a "soft sell", impressed upon the Chinese the mutual value of the polygraph. With the eventual agreement of Chiang Ching-kuo, beginning with the first group in March 1961, all pilot candidates have without exception undergone the test.) (4) It was agreed (although reluctantly) by General I that one of the two U-2's would remain bare of insignia in case the U.S. should wish to use it unilaterally on an urgent basis. (Operation POLE CAT was in progress at the time, covering Laos and North Vietnam with staging from Cubi Point using Detachment G equipment and U.S. contract pilots.) The only GRC requirement was that China Mainland missions proceed as soon as possible with GRC pilots and that any unilateral U.S. missions not delay this. The Generalissimo gave [ ] assurance that GRC pilots could be used to cover Southeast Asia targets provided the mission involved combined China Mainland

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targets with the SEA targets.

On 21 January 1961, a U.S. reporter on Taiwan observed a U-2 aircraft at Tao Yuan and attempted to obtain a story from the local U.S. Public Information Officer, who truthfully replied that he had no information on the activity. It was agreed that this should be the standard U.S. response to any further inquiries. This position was maintained and it was not until the first loss over the Mainland in September 1962, resulting in a Chinese Communist propaganda blast, that the State Department was compelled to make known the granting of a license to Lockheed to export two U-2's to the GRC.

The commitment by General Chiang Ching-kuo concerning GRC replies to press inquires was [REDACTED] 50X1, E.O.13526

"If queries become persistent GRC would take note of them at Minister of Defense press briefing normally handled by Admiral Liu who not cleared for project and would merely say what he is ordered to. If no hard evidence available to querying newsmen, initial GRC position will be that GRC conducts many air reconnaissance flights with a variety of aircraft but details are classified information withheld in interest of national security. GRC will hold this line indefinitely unless circumstances bring hard evidence to public attention. In that case GRC will retreat to cover story... but releasing as few facts as necessary and each time in consultation with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 1/

[REDACTED] 50X1, E.O.13526

1/ [REDACTED] 50X1, E.O.13526 [REDACTED] dated 29 January 1961.

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Chinese Pilots and Training (See Annex 108 for Schedule of Pilots)

Reporting on the expected operational readiness date of Detachment H after his visit in January-February 1961, Colonel Beerli (Acting Chief, DPD) said that the five Chinese pilots originally trained by SAC at Del Rio were well qualified and were expected to have 100 hours each in the U-2 by the time overflight operations began. Although in early planning the consensus had been against any mingling of the U.S. contract pilots at Edwards Air Force Base with the Chinese pilots, at the time of the deployment of the two U-2's to Tao Yuan it was deemed acceptable from a security standpoint for contract pilot Erickson, under appropriate personal cover story and using an alias, to go to Tao Yuan to assist in the check-out of aircraft and in the refresher training of the Chinese pilots. (Subsequently most of the other contract U.S. pilots have in turn ferried aircraft to Taiwan and performed other assignments at Detachment H.)

On 19 March 1961, the first fatal accident of the program occurred when Major Chih Yao-hua crashed in U-2C #351 near Tao Yuan on a night training flight. The GRC kept the accident out of the press, and a replacement U-2 was ferried "black" from Edwards to cover the loss (without obtaining additional export documentation). It took some time

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to arrange delivery of the replacement and meanwhile training continued with the single remaining aircraft. In April 1961 the 35th Squadron, CAF, which had been set up by the Chinese as a counterpart to Detachment H, officially named the U-2 the "RH-35" (R for reconnaissance, H for high altitude, and 35 for the Squadron). It was also given the Chinese nickname of "Chien Hsing" (meaning "View the stars"). The balance of 1961 was occupied in currency flights and equipment checks, and waiting for approval to go. This came in January 1962 and a very busy and productive year ensued with only one loss and 17 successful overflights of the Mainland, all using the B camera and various electronic packages, with results of missions classified as eleven good and six fair.

At the end of 1962, two more CAF pilots were chosen for U-2 training to replace those lost. While they were training at Del Rio, Texas, the Detachment H Commanding Officer and the CAF recommended selecting two more pilots since of the three remaining at Tao Yuan, two were approaching minimal proficiency as a result of combat fatigue and apprehension due to long exposure to high risk missions. SAC was requested, and agreed, to take on the additional training. These two candidates were given their training by SAC at

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Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Tucson, Arizona, early in 1963 and returned to Tao Yuan. Retirements and further losses continued to thin the ranks of pilots and four more candidates were selected in 1964, two in 1965 and three in 1966, all being trained at Davis-Monthan.

In June 1966, OSA Director (Brigadier General Ledford) made the decision to establish a Chinese pilot training program at Edwards Air Force Base under the guidance of Detachment G. Project Headquarters Directive 50-10-25, issued on 17 June 1966, sets forth the procedures and guidelines for carrying out this program. (See Annex 109 for text.) This decision was reported to Headquarters, USAF, as follows:

"... Training of Chinese Air Force pilots in the U-2 will in the future, be conducted by Agency personnel at Detachment G, Edwards Air Force Base. The CAF has been requested to make two pilots available to begin training at Edwards approximately 1 September 1966.

"Our decision to train the CAF pilots at Edwards should not be construed as dissatisfaction with the training program at Davis-Monthan AFB; on the contrary we are well satisfied with results of the SAC training program and most appreciative of the additional burden that has been imposed on the 4080th. Our desire to conduct the training at Edwards was based on a number of reasons, not the least of which is a recognition of the diminishing assets of both SAC and the Agency. Additionally, we believe we can save time and perhaps produce a better

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U-2 pilot if the entire training program is conducted in aircraft equipped with the J-75 engine. " 1/

Since the training program's establishment at Detachment G, three increments of pilots, two each year in 1966, 1967 and 1968, have been trained at Edwards.

From the beginning of the TACKLE program, medical testing and evaluation of Chinese pilots, once they arrived in the United States, was accomplished at the Space Aviation Medical Center at Brooks Air Force Base, Texas. This was in accordance with procedures which apply generally to all foreign pilots brought to the United States for training at the invitation of the United States Air Force. Also the CAF Flight Surgeon assigned to the 35th Squadron received indoctrination in the United States along with his pilots in the intricacies of the pressure suit and all other pilot equipment. Detachment H, of course, has assigned qualified personal equipment specialists as well as technical representatives of the manufacturers whose duties are to assist with the pre-flight and post-flight procedures related to the pilot and his life support environment as well as to maintain and repair the related equipment.

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Brigadier General Don Flickinger, aeromedical adviser to OSA, reported to the Director of Special Activities in early 1967 that the previous three years had seen material improvement in the over-all aeromedical support and maintenance of CAF trainees. The same high standards for selecting, training and maintenance were required for these as for all other special project aircrews. He noted that the sequential procedures applied to TACKLE candidates were the same as those applied to the other OSA project pilots except that their annual medical evaluations were to be accomplished on Taiwan rather than at the Lovelace Clinic.

The procedures established for evaluation, training and support of the Chinese pilots include:

1. Preliminary screening:
  - a. Review of past medical and flying records by Flight Surgeon of 35th Squadron.
  - b. Personal interview and completion of medical history forms.
  - c. Evaluation and report on candidate's psychological fitness for the program.
2. Aeromedical survey and evaluation at Brooks AFB by Flight Surgeons in the SAM Flight Medical Section.
3. Psychological evaluation at Washington, D. C., by General Flickinger and contract psychologists.
4. Pressure suit measurement and indoctrination by expert from David Clark Company.

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5. Pressure suit fitting and altitude chamber indoctrination.
6. Survival and physical fitness training programs.
7. Operational crew maintenance and control procedures by 35th Squadron Flight Surgeon at Tao Yuan.
  - a. Supervision of pre-mission rest and diet.
  - b. Pre- and post-mission aeromedical examinations.
  - c. Post-mission debriefing on function of life support equipment.
8. Annual and semi-annual aeromedical and psychological evaluations by 35th Squadron Flight Surgeon and OSA medical and psychological personnel.

Death Benefits

While the original joint agreement setting up TACKLE made no mention of pilot death benefits, it had been made clear to General I Fu-en in early discussions that the Agency had no responsibility for any such payments. However, when the first fatal accident occurred in March 1961, [ ] felt that the CAF would expect the same payment granted in like cases under the P2V program. Project Headquarters acceded to [ ] recommendation and requested Detachment H to provide [ ] with \$4,000 for the family of Major Chih. It was noted that while this was setting a precedent of sorts, [ ] should point out to the CAF that the money was a gift of compassion and not based on any obligation under the terms of the joint agreement. These facts were explicitly stressed when the

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money was passed to General I Fu-en by [redacted]

[redacted] but the precedent had been set.

When the second fatality occurred in September 1962 and Lieutenant Colonel Ch'en Huai was lost on a mission over the Mainland, his death was commemorated by the building and furnishing of a school for Chinese Air Force dependents, towards which \$US2,500 was contributed by Detachment H (from Agency funds).

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In October 1963 Major Yeh was lost on a Mainland overflight and [redacted] pointed to the fact that there was no death benefit clause in the TACKLE agreement but the STSPIN C-123 pilots flying in Vietnam were accorded a \$5,000 coverage (double indemnity of \$10,000 for fatality under hazardous duty conditions). [redacted] recommended that the widow of Major Yeh be compensated in like manner. Project Headquarters replied:

"Do not feel we should align ourselves so strictly with C-123 program (as to make identical agreement re death benefits). Believe comparison TACKLE pilots with C-123 pilots not valid since compensation for latter in part is compensation for loss of identity in event of mishap over hostile territory. Public recognition of TACKLE pilots lost is partially compensating even though not monetarily. Headquarters feeling that generous compassionate gift to survivors highly desirable but any such benefit should not be made

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formal policy and payment expected by CAF. Detachment H authorized to furnish \$5,000 to [redacted] as payment to Yeh's widow." 1/

[redacted] replied that the GRC was granting the widow \$3,750 (which was three times normal death benefit approved by the GRC for special cases) and therefore the Detachment was asked to furnish only \$3,000. At the same time Headquarters was informed that General I would like to have a regular death benefit agreement comparable to that of the P2V program, which provided \$1,000 for each dependent survivor, i. e., wife, parents, and children under 16. On 14 November 1963 Project Headquarters notified [redacted] as follows:

"Concur gratuity ref be limited to \$3,000. Agree hereafter adopt policy as with STPOLLY ground rules, i. e. \$1,000 each dependent." 2/

In accordance with this policy, on 8 April 1964 the Detachment requested authorization of payment of \$3,000 (\$1,000 for each dependent) to survivors of Capt. Liang who was lost in a training accident on Taiwan on 22 March 1964. The same policy held good through the next five fatalities between 7 July 1964 and 21 June 1966.

- 1/ [redacted] 6 November 1963.  
2/ [redacted] 14 November 1963.

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In March 1967, General Hsu (Commander-in-Chief, CAF) brought up in a meeting with [ ] Detachment officers the fact that the widow of Major Yu (killed in a training crash 21 June 1966 near Naha, Okinawa) had learned that widows of C-123 crew members had been awarded \$10,000 (double indemnity payment for death under combat conditions). Under pressure from the CAF, [ ] Detachment H then made a complete review of death and disability provisions of all Agency/GRC air programs and in an attempt to bring TACKLE payments into balance with other agreements, submitted to Headquarters the following proposed text of Annex C to the operational agreement:

"Death and Disability Benefits

"1. The United States side agrees to pay certain benefits, described below, to Chinese Air Force participants in the operational squadron, hereinafter referred to as principals, or to their surviving bona fide dependents, in the event of permanent injury or death of a principal as a result of air crew duties, subject to the conditions stated below.

"2. Conditions of payment of death and disability benefits: As a condition precedent to payment under this annex to the operations agreement, disability as hereafter defined, or death, must have occurred to a principal as a direct result of the principal's official participation in air crew duties as mutually approved pursuant to the provisions of the operations agreement. Disability is defined as permanent injury or injuries resulting in partial or total physical impairment of a principal which prevents him from continuing in his present military status.

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"3. Benefits:

A. Death: In the event of the death of any principal while engaged in air crew duties, the United States will pay the sum of \$5,000 to the principal's dependents /be they five or less in number. An additional \$1,000 will \* be paid for each dependent in excess of five in number./ In the case of a principal without dependents on Taiwan, a sum of \$5,000 will be paid to the CAF to be deposited with their committee designated to settle cases of this type. In the event of death or missing as a direct result of performance under extra hazardous or combat conditions the amount to be paid to the individual's estate or designated beneficiary will be twice the amount shown above.

B. Disability:

(1) Total disability: When a principal is mutually determined to be totally disabled as a result of air crew duties, the United States will pay to such principal \$5,000 /if his dependents are five or less in number. An additional \$1,000 will be paid for each dependent in excess of five./ \*

(2) Partial disability: In the event of a partial disability there will be a payment in U.S. dollars by the United States to such individuals of a sum equal to the mutually determined percentage of disability multiplied by the sum which would be paid in the event of total disability as set forth in paragraph 3B(1), above.

"4. Dependency: Dependents are defined as those persons, adults or children, who at the time of death or disability of the principal, or within nine months thereof has been born, is alive and is available on Taiwan and is dependent on said principal for

\* Additions to text made

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dated 16 May 1967.



support. Dependent status of all personnel will be furnished by the Chinese Air Force to the United States at the time of assignment to said operational squadron, at which time mutual agreement will be reached concerning the dependency status of such dependents. Revisions to the dependent status will be furnished the United States by the CAF as changes occur." 1/

In addition, the following new subsistence pay scales for TACKLE were proposed:

Mission pilots	NT\$4400 per month (US\$110)
Officers	2200
NCO's	1200
Other Enlisted Men	720
Additions to list:	
Squadron C/O	1000 monthly, additional
Sr. Operations Officer	750 monthly, additional
Sr. Navigator	500 monthly, additional

The increases in the monthly stipends would total about US\$700, bringing the total monthly payroll to about US\$2,700.

Project Headquarters (OSA) replied on 19 May 1967, as follows:

"We agree your proposal to increase death and disability benefits in TACKLE agreement but feel, if possible, you should hold to \$5,000/\$10,000 insurance coverage as means of specifically limiting U.S. Government commitment under double indemnity clause. SOD agrees.

"Proposed text for Annex C of TACKLE agreement as outlined [redacted] acceptable except para 1, which should

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[redacted]

20 April 1967, para 4.

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clearly define Chinese Air Force participants and principals as mission pilots.

"Agree increase to payscales and you authorized to increase in accord with new scales proposed... effective 1 May 1967, with total monthly subsistence not to exceed US\$3,000 per month." 1/

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[redacted] then brought up the established precedent of basing benefits on the number of dependents, rather than awarding a standard sum in each case. (This had previously resulted in payments up to \$12,000 in several cases) Headquarters replied that, even though it was felt that the \$5,000/\$10,000 limits could have been administered without disagreements with the CAF, Headquarters would go along with upping the coverage to a flat \$6,000/\$12,000 basis and that this final decision was agreed by SOD and FE Division as well as OSA.

On 20 June 1967, [redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526 met with Generals Hsu and Yang and apprised them of the Agency's preparedness to make death and disability payments uniform, and at a higher level than had existed, and left with General Hsu a copy of the Annex as reproduced above except substituting the higher figures, \$6,000/\$12,000.

1/ [redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526 dated 19 May 1967.



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In the case of the tenth and most recent fatality in the TACKLE program, i. e., the loss of Capt. Huang as a result of a ground-to-air missile in the environs of Shanghai on 8 September 1967, authority was granted to pay US\$12,000 to the CAF for the survivors (double indemnity for combat death). This was the first and so far the only payment under the rates established in June 1967. A schedule of major accidents suffered by the TACKLE program will be found in Annex 110.

Detachment H Materiel Support

In order to establish an expeditious and secure system for technical and logistical support for Detachment H at Tao Yuan, arrangements were made through Headquarters USAF for the 13th Air Force's 6214th Tactical Group on Taiwan to satisfy the materiel needs of the Detachment (other than those peculiar to the primary mission aircraft). In the first instance, arrangements and procedures for DEN MOTHER (the unclassified Air Force name for this support project) were ad hoc and since the 6214th were unable to satisfy the initial requirements of the Detachment for setting up a supply section at the base, the bulk of even the normal Air Force supplies had to be shipped from the ZI depot until the unsatisfactory local situation could be remedied. A formal procedural letter establishing DEN MOTHER support to the Detachment was first

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published by 13th Air Force on 20 May 1963 and later revised on 25 August 1966 (see Annex 111).

The following observations made by Lieutenant Colonel Peter Economy of the OSA Headquarters Materiel Directorate (formerly Materiel Officer at Detachment H) are his recollections of the build-up period at Tao Yuan.

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By late 1960 the actual movement of assets into Tao Yuan Air Base (CAF) to support the newly activated Detachment H commenced. During this period the [redacted] dispatched four airmen and one officer for a 30-day TDY to help establish facilities inside a hangar that would accommodate the warehouse and supply office requirements.

During the first part of January 1961, two airmen and one officer were on board as permanent assignees to the Detachment's supply activity. Processing and recruiting of two additional supply personnel was underway at Headquarters.

It took only a short time for the Supply Officer to discern that several fallacies existed in the concept of logistics support that had been decreed for this detachment. For example, the cover story was (and continued to be) that the U-2 aircraft had been sold to the GRC by Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and that all the maintenance and support technicians were civilians under contract to the CAF. As a continuation of the cover story, the furniture, safes, vehicles, and other support equipment were to be provided to the Detachment from CAF "surplus" assets.

Needless to state, the equipment that was given to the Detachment from CAF resources was primarily in a state of salvage or in need of considerable repair and overhaul. In addition, all the administrative, housekeeping and "nuts and bolts" categories of supplies were intended to be procured from local



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markets or through the 6213th Support Squadron in Taipei. Physical inspection of the 6213th Supron supply facility revealed it to be nothing but a small room for issues and an adjoining room for minor warehousing functions. That supply activity, in turn, was supported by a base supply organization down-island in Tainan. The two airmen assigned there were hardpressed to meet even the most routine supply requests from Detachment H. For example, a drive shaft for a Detachment 6x6 truck took six months to obtain via the 6213th Supron supply system. The Detachment Supply Officer finally could wait no longer and purchased a similar item in two hours from a Chinese vendor.

As a consequence of this situation, new supply procedures were established with the Project Depot at Warner Robins Air Force Base, Georgia. A General Services Administration catalogue was obtained and hundreds of requisitions were prepared including such items as nails, hardware, pipe fittings, nuts, bolts, paper, pencils, etc. Every conceivable requirement was placed on order and by May 1961, the Detachment had attained a solid, self-sustaining posture in this area of logistics.

Concurrently, permission was obtained from Headquarters to requisition USAF sedans and trucks which were stripped of their blue paint and repainted black to conform with Chinese Air Force practice.

A system was devised by the Detachment supply personnel to support more effectively the upkeep and maintenance of the assigned U-2 aircraft and the mission cameras and electronic systems. Each maintenance shop was provided mobile carts containing the most-used items of hardware. These were further backed up with on-the-shelf quantities in the warehouse. In short, there was never any excuse for running short of supplies. An inventory was performed weekly to insure that quantities never dropped below prescribed levels. It is significant that during the period 1 January 1961 through 30 June 1962, not a single U-2 aircraft was ever grounded for the lack of a part or piece of hardware.

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The initial supplying of fuel for the U-2 aircraft was performed by airlift via C-124 transports from the States. Arrangements were subsequently made for delivery by ship to Keelung harbor, thence by rail to Tao Yuan. Quality of fuel was initially a frequent problem. However, this was corrected by insistence on more rigid quality controls at the plant and upon a system for sealing the 55-gallon drums with tamper-proof devices and caps.

In September 1961 a typhoon blew the roof off the Detachment's hangar. Fortunately no damage occurred to the aircraft or to other equipment, however many of the supplies in the warehouse were water-soaked and a long, tedious program of separating and drying out these assets had to be undertaken. The Supply Officer, with the necessary financial backing of Headquarters, was able to have a new roof placed on the hangar within 72 hours (a new record for that part of the world).

The Chief of Taipei Station at the time, Mr. Ray Cline, and General Chiang Ching-kuo, Chief of the National Security Bureau (the equivalent of CIA) had a very personal interest in Detachment H and at least once a month one or the other would visit the 35th Squadron or be host to a party for Detachment personnel. One of these occasions was on the completion, in early 1962, of the first overflight of denied territory by a CAF pilot (Major Ch'en). Upon his return from this successful mission, Major Ch'en was taken by the personnel van from shipside into the hangar where he was greeted profusely by both Mr. Cline and "CCK". He was escorted to the Detachment Commander's office where he was awarded a Chinese decoration, and given a chronograph wrist watch and a red envelope containing money, in the Chinese fashion. This particular flight was a tremendous morale booster for the entire organization and was reflected further in the festivities which were carried far into the night. Major Ch'en was lost the following September on another flight over the Mainland. He is remembered as being a confirmed Baptist and a frequent church-goer.

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The contrast between the facilities that existed in 1961 and those now in being at Tao Yuan is tremendous. Detachment H now has a swimming pool (authorized by the DD/S on 20 March 1963 at a cost not to exceed \$5,000), tennis court, library and clubroom, as well as a very ample dining facility. Recreation and motion picture equipment has been provided and continues to be put into good use. Transportation is no longer a problem (except for the traffic conditions on Taiwan roads) since the Detachment has plenty of sedans, station wagons, pickup trucks, jeeps and busses to satisfy all needs. Living quarters have all been renovated and are much more livable than those available in 1961-62. A new hangar with plenty of shop space and of modern, durable construction was built in 1964, at a cost of \$300,000, to replace the old CAF hangar.

In short, what was once envisioned as being only a TDY Detachment has turned out to be more permanent than anyone concerned with its establishment foresaw, as it now continues into its eighth year. (1968)

#### Operations

##### Delay in Obtaining Approval

In May 1961, in anticipation of a visit at Headquarters by General I Fu-en during which he would no doubt be pressing for an early beginning of TACKLE overflights of the Mainland, Mr. FitzGerald (then Chief, FE Division) gave the DDCI this background:

"One J-75 configured U-2, operationally equipped, is now assigned to the Detachment at Tao Yuan... Four CAF pilots qualified in the U-2 are presently assigned. The Detachment is now operationally ready to conduct photographic and electronic reconnaissance of selected targets in China. The targets have been mutually established by the CAF and CIA. The arrangements

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for processing the product of the overflight have been settled to the satisfaction of the U.S. Intelligence Community and the CAF. Because there has been no Headquarters approval, no overflights have been flown since the Detachment was established. /Note: The original approval had been obtained from President Eisenhower, who had now been succeeded by President Kennedy and as of that date a revalidation had not been received from highest authority. /

"Problems General I may raise: (1) When will the Detachment receive approval to conduct overflights? (We have not received policy approval; we do not know when it will be received.) (2) Will the Detachment receive a second J-75 configured U-2? (Yes, after our receipt of policy approval.) (3) Can additional CAF pilots be trained—at least one replacement? (This will be considered following receipt of policy approval.)" 1/

General I Fu-en was given the above answers and at the same time was queried on the matter of obvious Chinese Communist foreknowledge of P2V flights launched from Taiwan; he reported that he was making every effort to solve this very serious problem.

In July 1961 the "5412 Committee" discussed TACKLE in the sense of one mission over North Vietnam with no penetration of China. It was decided at the highest level that any such mission must be flown by a U.S. pilot. The Chief of Station, Taipei, was assured that this decision did not prejudice future consideration of TACKLE flights over

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1/ IDEA-0299, 19 May 1961. Memo to DDCI from Chief, FE Division.

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Communist China. On 21 September 1961, Mr. Cline cabled Headquarters that the delay in authorizing the TACKLE unit to begin overflight operations was beginning to affect the morale of the indigenous crews and support personnel. The CAF was also requesting relief on the monthly allocation for housekeeping and subsistence in the amount of US\$1,172.50. Mr. Cline recommended that as of Double Ten Day this be granted using money in escrow from the bonus fund. He added:

"When I was in Washington in July the President /Kennedy/ told me the U.S. probably would approve initiation of TACKLE operations in the fall. I understood this to mean after discussion of the Chinese representation issue at the United Nations. Trust Headquarters planning to raise subject officially again within a few weeks. Difficult to hold unit together and keep up morale so long as policy prevents operating." 1/

Mr. Bissell cabled back to Mr. Cline on 23 September 1961 as follows:

"I can well appreciate your concern re TACKLE and wish to state our efforts here have been met with frustrating results. TACKLE has been on the Special Group agenda and discussed no less than 12 times since January this year. Each time considerations interposed by State or general political events have precluded a go-ahead. Most recent plea was made 21 September. Strong Defense and COMOR support have been forthcoming in all these requests, however other political considerations have been overriding..." 2/

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dated 21 September 1961.

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dated 23 September 1961.

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Finally, on 4 October 1961, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board recommended that the Special Group reevaluate the proposal to conduct a limited number of U-2 photographic missions over selected areas of the China Mainland. This was now deemed vital in view of the increasing indications of the development by the Chinese Communists of nuclear and related military capabilities. The President approved the Board's recommendation and directed it be referred to the Special Group for implementation.

Meanwhile Detachment H acquired a new Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Robert C. Tomlinson, who arrived on board in November, 1961, following program indoctrination and check-out in the U-2 at Edwards. The group had by that time been deployed at Tao Yuan for a year.

First Missions Approved

On 5 January 1962 the Special Group met and approved three TACKLE missions, with the proviso that each mission receive specific Special Group approval prior to launch and that the GRC reaffirm that it would, in the event of a mishap, publicly acknowledge responsibility for such flights. The Special Group considered it possible that these first three approvals might hold good for a year, according to developments,

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but in fact the first three missions were flown in rapid succession: the first on 12 January 1962 over Shuang Ch'eng Tzu Missile Test Range; the second on 23 February 1962 over Lan Chou atomic energy complex; and a third on 13 March 1962 over Kunming.

Concurrent with the successful beginning of TACKLE, photo reconnaissance of the North Vietnam area continued to carry high national priority with a requirement of at least two sorties per month. It was determined that this requirement could be satisfied by Detachment H (using U.S. pilots) more economically than staging a detachment to other U.S. bases in the Far East. The decision took cognizance of the GRC's concurrence in principle of using Tao Yuan-assigned aircraft with U.S. pilots for unilateral U.S. operations, and of the GRC's offer of support to U.S. operations in the North Vietnam/Laos area. Mr. Cline was asked to assure the Chinese that this unilateral activity did not mean that GRC interests were being overlooked.

On 17 April 1962 because it was suspected that the aircraft fuel currently stored at Tao Yuan might fail to meet thermal stability specifications, a stand-down of further flights was ordered until analysis could be made of samples. Meanwhile 50,000 gallons were delivered on a priority basis and procedures were set up for immediate inspection

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and sample testing of all new deliveries, with regular inspection every thirty days. Missions were resumed on 15 June 1962.

At this time a Communist build-up across the Taiwan Straits was being watched and the USIB met on 22 June to consider measures to be taken. Under the requirements established, OSA ferried an additional J-75-equipped U-2 to Taiwan on 26 June, and placed Detachment H on alert, furnishing five canned missions for coastal coverage to be run when weather allowed. Plans were also made for U.S. contract pilots to be cross-trained in both J-75 and J-57 U-2's in order to make SAC and Agency aircraft and pilots interchangeably available for Cuban and other contingency coverage.

In July 1962, a reappraisal of the scope and significance of the Straits build-up was made and taking into consideration the small number of missions approved for TACKLE, the third U-2 which had been sent to Taiwan at USIB's behest was considered superfluous and returned to Edwards to provide adequate back-up there. Coverage of Cuba was moving higher on the priority list and Detachment G was supporting a staging party at Del Rio through the summer and fall of 1962.

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First TACKLE Mission Loss and Stand-Down

On 9 September 1962 the first operational loss over Mainland China occurred in the vicinity of Nanchang. A Radio Peking broadcast said that a US-made, high altitude reconnaissance U-2 plane of the Chiang Kai-shek gang which intruded into the airspace in East China on the morning of September 9 was shot down by the Air Force of the PLA. The GRC shortly afterwards released the following statement:

"One of our high altitude reconnaissance planes was missing on the morning of 9 September during a routine photo reconnaissance over bandit held areas. Our Government, in order to understand the bandit situation on the mainland, has purchased two U-2 high altitude reconnaissance planes from Lockheed Aircraft Manufacturing Company in July 1960. The two airplanes were shipped to Taiwan in December of the same year for operational use." 1/

In response to direct news media queries, the State Department in Washington then released this statement on the sale of the aircraft:

"In July 1960, Lockheed Aircraft and the Government of the Republic of China entered into a contract for the direct sale by Lockheed of two U-2 aircraft and an export license for the two aircraft was issued." 2/

An amplifying statement by a spokesman from the State Department indicated that there were no restrictions as to where the GRC could

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1/ GRC Ministry of Defense Press Release, 9 September 1962.

2/ 50X1, E.O.13526 9 September 1962.

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employ the planes, and since they were engaged in a continuing civil war with the Communists, it could be presumed that they would want to use reconnaissance aircraft to survey the positions of their enemies.

On 13 September 1962, President Kennedy in answer to questions at his press conference, pointed out that the sale of the U-2's had been licensed by the Eisenhower Administration and that there were no plans to sell any further ones or to grant any export licenses to the Chinese or to any other country.

While the cause of the first loss was not immediately known, speculation leaned to either materiel failure or a shoot-down by a SAM. The attitude of the remaining Chinese pilots was that this was a wartime loss and they were anxious to press on; Taiwan Station, after a reassessment of the situation, favored renewal of the program in two stages: (1) a shallow penetration or two over relatively safe areas; (2) after assessing propaganda and political effects, resume normal operations with maximum possible safety factors built into route planning. The Station also recommended replacing the lost U-2.

At this time the Cuban missile build-up was commanding full attention in Washington and therefore the stand-down of TACKLE flights extended on through October 1962. On 2 November approval

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was given to resume test and training flights provided any incident (actual or contrived by the opposition) be avoided by careful flight planning within specified coordinates. Operational missions began again on 5 December 1962 with coverage of North Korea, staging from Kunsan.

Consideration of the future of the U-2 program by the Special Group on 17 December 1962 resulted in the assumptions that for Fiscal Year 1963-64 photo reconnaissance of Mainland China would continue to be a requirement and that two aircraft would be the operating level at Detachment H.

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On 28 February 1963, a stand-down of operations was ordered due to faulty DC generators in the U-2's at Detachment H. The trouble was eventually traced to lack of quality control in subcontractor-furnished bearings. Four reworked generators were airlifted to Tao Yuan by courier as a temporary fix until new improved bearings could be obtained.

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Operations 1963

Operations were renewed at the end of March 1963 and fifteen successful overflights of priority targets on the Mainland were run between March and November 1963. A schedule of these and all other TACKLE missions is contained in Annex 112 hereto. In May 1963 an additional U-2 was delivered to Taiwan via C-124, properly documented as to sale and export license. As a result of the missile threat to the U-2, new electronic warning and countermeasure devices were being developed and tested. System XII, an airborne warning receiver against the SA-2 (Soviet surface-to-air missile) was delivered to Tao Yuan and tested during April and May 1963. Its use in overflights of SAM sites in South China later revealed changes in the FAN SONG radar characteristics, which lead to the modification of System XII to encompass these changes.

In May 1963 General I Fu-en visited the U. S. and was briefed in Washington on improvements anticipated in Systems IX and XII, the auto pilot, drift sight, and flight planning techniques, which appeared to satisfy his concern in these areas. He also visited the Chinese pilots currently in training at Del Rio.

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Second Mainland Loss

On 1 November 1963, after overflight of the Missile Test Range at Shuang Ch'eng Tzu, Mission GRC-184 went down near the Kiangsi/ Chekiang border. Radio Peking made its standard announcement that a US-made U-2 of the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang had been shot down by the the PLA. The GRC issued a brief press release similar to the last one, and asked U.S. agreement for the GRC to acknowledge, if queried, that an additional U-2 had been purchased in December 1962. Permission could not be obtained immediately from higher authority for public announcement of the issuance of the third export license. Headquarters did, however, sanction the GRC's "planting" an unofficial story which was published on 3 November 1963 in the Cheng Hsin Hsin Wen Pao (Taipei Chinese language daily) and which memorialized the heroism of the pilot and said he crashed due to engine trouble. A team of U.S. experts investigated the possibilities of contributing factors such as hypoxia, auto pilot failure, and even ingestion of contaminated food in flight. No positive findings resulted.

In the wake of the second loss, the question of installing jammers on TACKLE aircraft to avoid enemy air interception was raised with the Director (Mr. McCone) who said the President's Science

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Adviser (Dr. Wiesner) believed the opposition would sooner or later find a way of defeating any jamming equipment which could be devised if it were used repeatedly. He agreed, however, to put the question to the USIB. The Chairman of USIB directed the DD/S&T to obtain the necessary approval for the use of jammers in the TACKLE aircraft from the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Joint Chiefs were unwilling to approve the use of any existing equipment because of the risk of compromising it to the opposition.

On 14 November 1963, the recommendation to resume TACKLE overflights was put to the Special Group and approved in principle, and subsequently Mr. McCone addressed a letter to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in the interest of retrieving two Agency U-2's which had been on loan to SAC for coverage of Cuba, so that TACKLE could be supported. The assassination of the President on 22 November brought official Washington to a temporary standstill; however, on 30 November Mr. McCone saw President Johnson and, among other matters, received his reaffirmation of the 14 November approval. On 6 December the Special Group renewed its approval, with the State caveat that the contingency plan be brought up to date before any missions were run. Meanwhile an additional U-2 was documented

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for export and delivered to Tao Yuan at the end of December. On 9 January 1964, State having been satisfied as to contingency planning, the go-ahead was given. (See Annex 113 for Interdepartmental Cover Support Plan). Flights were to be made only after careful evaluation of the requirements from the intelligence point of view and with due recognition of the shrinking inventory of high-level reconnaissance aircraft which must not be used wastefully. Another hold-down developed then due to fuel control problems, which required a month to resolve.

Operations Resumed: Third Mainland Loss

After four and a half months of standing down, a mission over South China was run on 16 March 1964. (This was the first operational mission flown using the BIRDWATCHER.\* ) A week later U-2 #356 piloted by Capt. Liang on a long training flight went down in the sea off Taiwan. A replacement U-2 configured for inflight refueling (#359) was ferried to Taiwan in April "black" inasmuch as documentation was available from one lost previously but not publicized.

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\* BIRDWATCHER: An electronic system designed to transmit to a ground station functional information on the status of various aircraft systems during emergency flight conditions. The data transmitted is analyzed by the ground station to determine the cause and effects of the emergency situation.

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Overflights resumed with fair to excellent results on the next three missions. On 29 June a broadcast in Mandarin by Radio Peking beamed at Taiwan offered 8,000 taels of gold to any pilot "who flies over in a righteous revolt in a P2V or U-2 type aircraft". On 7 July Mission C-184C, staging from Cubi Point, was lost over Lung Chi, Fukien Province, after the pilot, at altitude had reported that System XII (the SAM warning) was on. New China News Agency reported from Peking that the U-2 was shot down by the Chinese Communist Air Force and gave no details of the location, or the fate of the pilot. The GRC released a short statement acknowledging the loss, "by accident".

An exhaustive study was made of all available data relating to Mission C-184C by OSA Intelligence and while being unable to establish a positive cause for the loss, the following conclusions were reached:

"Assumptions:

- a. That the pilot was physically alert and capable at the time he reported System XII on.
- b. That at the same time BIRDWATCHER was in commission.
- c. That at the time of the pilot's report the aircraft was at mission altitude.

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d. That the pilot did not defect.

"Conclusions:

That because only five minutes elapsed between the pilot's reporting a System XII on and the tracking of the aircraft ceased, and because neither the BIRDWATCHER nor the pilot apparently broadcast a signal indicating trouble, we conclude that whatever happened to the mission aircraft occurred abruptly and violently incapacitating the pilot and his aircraft almost instantly. The fact that the pilot reported System XII on and the aircraft was lost without any further indication beyond the pilot's report, we attribute the loss most likely to a direct hit from a SAM or secondarily from a MIG-21-launched IR missile.

"Recommendations:

- a. That action be reinitiated to obtain approval for installation of a suitable FAN SONG jammer in the U-2 (not the ALQ-19 or any shelf item now available because each has its limitations and can be 'read through' within a short time.)
- b. That no future overflights be permitted until the high PRF warning circuit of System XII is incorporated in BIRDWATCHER. This is now estimated to be installed in the field by 1 August 1964.
- c.

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The Chinese were fully convinced that the aircraft had been the victim of a SAM and General Chiang Ching-kuo indicated that he wanted

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1/ BYE 2765-64, 22 July 1964. Memo for AD/OSA from Intel/OSA.

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"to let some time go by" before resuming missions. At that time there was only one operationally ready pilot (who was understandably suffering from nerves and stomach disorder) with one other completing combat training at Tao Yuan and five in the pipeline. Headquarters had ample evidence that the GRC would only continue overflights with the installation of a better warning system or the use of an active jamming capability in the U-2. The Commander of Detachment H at that time, Col. Slater, who was just at that time finishing his tour, reported also an undercurrent of feeling among the Chinese that they were not getting as much advantage from the take as the U.S. This had previously been intimated from time to time.

During the stand-down then ensuing, an evaluation of the current position and future options, prepared for the Director's use in briefing USIB and the Special Group, pointed out that alternative ways of covering vital targets in South China were limited. Either wait for the GRC to resume TACKLE flights, or put a U.S. national (in uniform, or not) over South China. Reference was made to top CAF command's desire for a faster, higher-flying aircraft and better anti-missile equipment to face the improved techniques of the Chicoms in countering System XII. In the absence of an improved aircraft, use of a deceptive

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jammer (System XIII) was suggested. It was configured to the U-2 and could be produced for testing in four months from order. It did not duplicate any existing black boxes (which had been denied TACKLE by the JCS even though their capabilities and characteristics were well known to the Soviets).

Some time was required to bring the number of operationally ready TACKLE pilots to the optimum number (six), and operationally configured aircraft to three, and to complete construction at Takhli in Thailand (the ideally located point from which South China could be covered). The Thais had agreed to retrieval of Chinese pilots there even though the GRC had not yet agreed to this tactic.

The options open, then, appeared to be:

"a. Wait for the GRC to permit overflight of South China from Tao Yuan with CAF pilots...

"b. Fly Agency pilots from Tao Yuan...

"c. If 'a' does not come to pass and we choose not to offend the GRC on their home ground by employing 'b', deploy a detachment from Edwards AFB to Cubi Point or Takhli...

"d. If the GRC agrees to limited operations in... western South China, launch TACKLE missions from Tao Yuan and retrieve at Takhli after late September.

"e. If the GRC does not resume operations within a reasonable time, and if none of the above alternatives is

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acceptable, let SAC cover South China from Saigon with their J-57 equipment, mindful of its operating limitations, i. e., altitude and contrails." 1/

To further provide effective FAN SONG countermeasures the System XIII jammer was installed in the Detachment H U-2's. This electronic countermeasures system was developed from an old Navy ALQ-19 and enhanced to specifically counter the threat of the S-Band FAN SONG radar. Since System XIII involved the use of a travelling wave tube (TWT) and the U. S. military still considered this item to be beyond the Sino-Soviet state of the art, the Joint Chiefs would only permit activation of the system when the System XII indicated a FAN-SONG was on the air. Activation of System XIII was then manually effected whenever the pilot was alerted by System XII.

With this additional measure of protection, on 30 October the GRC approved a TACKLE overflight of Lanchou, which was successfully carried out on 31 October 1964.

#### Fourth Loss over Mainland

On 10 January 1965, Peking Radio claimed the shoot-down by their Air Force of a fourth U-2 over North China. This was Mission

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1/ BYE-3047-64 (Att.), 21 July 1964. Memo for DDCI from A/ADSA.

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C-025C\* (Maj. Chang Li-i pilot) carrying infra-red detection equipment over the Chicom nuclear reactor at Pao Tou, near where it disappeared. The GRC confirmed the incident calling the downing of the plane an "accident" and crediting the pilot with five previous missions over Mainland China. The U.S. defense and intelligence communities were referred to the cover support plan providing that all U.S. official sources deny any knowledge of the operation and refer inquiries to the sole spokesman for the U.S. Government, the Department of State.

Project officials were by this time fully convinced that the Chinese Communists had a smoothly functioning mobile SAM launching capability with launchers in all probability being hastily set up in previously surveyed sites on the basis of monitored overflight patterns and prevailing weather. While the GRC did not formally state their unwillingness to continue overflights at this point, the implication was that they would not be willing to resume full-scale operations until improved protection and flight procedures were put into effect.

U-2 #385 which was sent over on 30 March 1965 as a replacement for

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\* The loss of this mission was the cause of an Inspector General's investigation into the liaison procedures between OSA and NPIC during pre-mission flight planning. Foreknowledge by mission planners of new SAM sites (available in KH photography) might have saved the mission.

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the most recent loss was equipped with System IX-B, a repeater-jammer, and System XII-B, an improved version of the missile threat warning device.

#### 1965 Operations

In February 1965 COMOR had a list of more than a hundred targets in the South China/North Vietnam border region which required coverage on a priority basis. There were two ways of accomplishing this: either resume TACKLE operations which were standing down since the loss on 10 January, or remove restrictions which required the SAC group operating U-2's from Vietnam to remain below the 19th parallel. OSA felt that if the TACKLE group were assigned the job, JCS approval must be given to activate the System XIII jammer as soon as the aircraft penetrated hostile territory, rather than waiting until System XII became active. This would give the added protection desired by the GRC. Subsequently the JCS on 12 February 1965 (BYE 5111-65) approved use of System XIII from penetration to exit, which in part prompted the GRC to approve future overflights.

Also in February 1965, the Special Group approved resumption of TACKLE missions and between February and the end of the year 28 missions were flown, principally in response to COMOR requirements,

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with results classified as three excellent, sixteen good, four fair, and five poor (including three aborts before reaching target). Counter-measures systems (IX-B and XII-B) were used operationally beginning 17 April 1965. The new Delta III camera (NRO designation 112-B) was used first on 14 May 1965 and twice more during the year, with all other photographic missions employing the B camera.

A replacement U-2, #359, was ferried to Detachment H in May 1965 which was equipped with System XIII-A and the Oscar-Sierra System, Mark II. U-2 #352 was returned to Lockheed for the installation of Systems IX-B, XII-B, and XIII-A. Another exchange in June gave the Detachment three aircraft with all the latest available electronic counter-measures systems. Detachment H personnel were augmented with TDY personnel from Edwards to give dual operating capability from Tao Yuan and Takhli simultaneously during this intensively active period.

A visit to Headquarters was made in May 1965 by General Yang Shao-lien, then Chief of Staff of the CAF, accompanied by Col. Yang Shih-chu, Commander of the 35th Squadron. They held discussions with COMOR with regard to targets, and with Gen. Ledford and the OSA Staff. Two matters of concern were GRC desire for coverage of the Straits on a continuing basis due to aggressive signs noted on the part of the

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Chinese Communists, and the continuing requirement for improved defensive equipment for the U-2. The requirement for coverage of the Straits was acceded to as a quid pro quo in light of the GRC's continued support of the joint program, even though it was not a high priority target from the U.S. (COMOR) standpoint.

In August 1965, the Chinese Communists, during a display of captured Japanese war materials at the Chinese Peoples' Revolution Military Museum, commemorating the 20th Anniversary of the Japanese defeat, took the opportunity to place on display the remains of four aircraft, claimed to be US-built U-2 spy planes shot down over the China Mainland between 1962 and January 1965. (See picture overleaf.)

Through contacts with the British and French Intelligence Services OSA was able to obtain quite good photography of the exhibit; however, exhaustive study of these pictures and of intelligence reports from all sources has not allowed for any conclusive findings or decisions as to the four losses. (The fifth had not been added to the display as of April 1968.)

On 22 October 1965, U-2 #352 with pilot, Lt. Col. Wang Chengwen (Pete), was lost on a routine local training flight approximately twenty-five miles East-Northeast of Taipei. No trace of the pilot

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
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CHINA WAO 5-17A TIENTING 32 56 N 116 24 E  
U-2 PLANES SHOT DOWN AND ON EXHIBIT AT MILITARY MUSEUM.  
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or aircraft wreckage was found. The BIRDWATCHER indicated only that the autopilot was disengaged just prior to the start of an extremely rapid descent. The incident was covered by a GRC story concerning the explosion in flight of a B-57 in the same general vicinity. After a short stand-down for an investigation, missions resumed at a good rate through November.

#### Operations 1966

Only ten operational missions were flown by TACKLE in 1966 with two of these aborting before completion of coverage and six out of ten photographic results being classed as "poor". The year started badly with a training loss on 17 February when Capt. Wu Ts'ai-hsi attempted a flame-out landing at Taichung, overshot and crashed into a house half a mile south of the runway at the civil airport. The pilot and one occupant of the house were killed and four other occupants injured. There was no security compromise due to this accident, and no press statements were required since the type of aircraft could not be distinguished due to the force of the crash. Subsequent to this loss approval for the first operational mission of the year, flown on 28 March, was given very hesitantly and with misgivings by the GRC. On 1 April 1966, OSA cabled 50X1, E.O.13526

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[ ] suggesting that an invitation to General Yang for another visit to Washington might be timely since the beneficial effects of the previous year's visit had probably worn off. OSA desired to review with General Yang the latest developments in operational tactics, ECM systems, and other hardware, and the possibilities of the follow-on U-2R and future CAF capabilities. The net effect of such a visit was expected to be renewed confidence and understanding on both sides, especially with regard to obtaining GRC approvals.

The visit was arranged for the last week of April and during the course of it discussions were held on the U-2R, new electronic and photographic equipment being tested with approximate dates for delivery to Detachment H, training of further CAF pilots, and priority target lists. With regard to the difficulty in securing GRC approvals, especially those missions of less interest to them, General Yang suggested that in the event of weather deterioration, the mission be postponed rather than cancelled since GRC approval was good until the mission was either flown or cancelled. If cancelled and later re-alerted, this meant obtaining GRC approval again. (This of course represented only a very small segment of the over-all problem with relation to obtaining GRC approvals.)

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On target priorities, General Yang said he understood the U. S. order was South China first (in light of Vietnam activities), then Manchuria, East Coast and North Korea. The GRC primary interest was in the Taiwan Straits area with first priority including airfields and ports along the coast; second and third priorities were two lines of airfields roughly parallel to the coast and farther inland. Gen. Ledford assured Gen. Yang that the U. S. side would consider the Straits area of equal priority to South China, with weather being the determining factor between the two at the time of scheduling.

Gen. Yang was told of the intention to set up a training program for TACKLE pilots at Edwards, if security problems could be ironed out. (The GRC side had expressed some discontent with the handling of their pilots at Davis-Monthan.) Also a preliminary briefing was given on the proposed

50X1, E.O.13526

with the

intention of preparing the Chinese for a later request to fly the necessary supporting missions.

On the heels of the fairly successful meetings with Gen. Yang came the loss on 21 June 1966 of a high altitude training mission (U-2 #384, Maj. Yu Ch'ing-chang, pilot) which went down in the sea

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off the coast of Okinawa near Naha. The body of the pilot was recovered and the aircraft, which broke into three main sections, was recovered and later returned to Tao Yuan where an investigation was held with a board of experts sent out by Project Headquarters.

During the crisis hours following the crash, General Hsu, Commander-in-Chief of the CAF, and General Chiang Ching-kuo flatly refused to make a public statement on behalf of the GRC's responsibility for the aircraft, as agreed in the cover support plan. This placed the U.S. military authorities on Okinawa in an impossible situation vis-a-vis the local news media who continuously pressed them for a statement. The GRC authorities finally agreed on 22 June to a press statement by the U.S. Commander of the 313th Air Division on Okinawa, provided no mention was made of the type of aircraft. The text of the release as finally issued said:

"After investigating a report of an aircraft crash and determining that no U.S. aircraft were missing at the time, inquiries disclosed that a jet aircraft belonging to the Republic of China Air Force went down in the waters off Kerama Island late in the afternoon of June 21. The aircraft was on a routine training flight and the pilot was killed. USAF and other military agencies are assisting Republic of China authorities in recovery of wreckage and in investigation of the possible cause of the accident." 1/

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1/ OPCEN 1989 (OUT 24091) to State, 22 June 1966.

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cabled Headquarters after this

incident as follows:

"The existence of the GRC-approved support plan in Headquarters files unfortunately does not mean that this will govern GRC actions in practice... changing circumstances since January 1965 having brought the GRC so many losses and setbacks on many fronts that the GRC now seeks to walk away from its previously agreed position re the cover support plan. Every plane and ship loss is now a most serious psychological loss to the GRC, with the Gimo almost certainly the source of GRC pretense that it is not sustaining losses..." 1/

The finding of the investigation board that primary cause of the accident was engine failure, but that the pilot should have bailed out sooner, was presented to GRC officials at a meeting on 1 July 1966.

General Yang, speaking from prepared notes in Chinese and using an interpreter, made a number of points (which bore out the opinion of

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"We have during the last nine months experienced excessively high loss rate, i. e., three pilots and aircraft on training missions, which would lead to CAF conclusion that training standards and aircraft maintenance procedures are inadequate... In the minds of the CAF and particularly the pilots, training mission losses we have experienced are especially demoralizing and much more so than combat losses. The CAF would assign primary cause of the last three to mechanical failure, i. e., maintenance breakdown..." 2/

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General Yang concluded that no effort should be spared to improve quality of maintenance on aircraft and all associated equipment; that present training mission profiles should be reviewed for adequate margins of safety; and that better preparations must be made for every mission, training as well as operational. He asked that no more -17 engines be used in the program, and that improved communications equipment be installed as soon as possible (new IFF and ARC-51).

On 9 September 1966, in response to a request by the DD/S&T for an evaluation of the TACKLE program and its prospects for the future as a productive intelligence collection effort, a study was presented which reflected the coordinated views of OSI, OEL and OSA. An assessment of the feasibility of continued overflight of Communist China was made, considering principally the surface-to-air missile threat since fighter-interceptors had not yet posed a significant threat. The conclusions of the paper were essentially optimistic with regard to the viability of the program, while accepting the inherent fact of having to expect losses. It was recommended that the program be continued; however, that the current stand-down be continued to permit the installation and checking out of improved threat-warning displays and the obtaining of data on the true nature of the Chicom SAM threat. It was

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also recommended that satellite photographic and electronic coverage be obtained on a regular basis to support TACKLE operational requirements.

In early October 1966 when the unilateral decision of the U. S. to cancel the P2V project was made known to the GRC, the reaction which followed adversely affected all other joint activities. The Chinese philosophy is to look upon a given relationship between two people or two governments in its total context rather than to separate out the parts from the whole. Therefore TACKLE suffered not only from an operational stand-down but from very strained relations between the principals on either side. Thus 1966 ended on a very low note.

General Bacalis, who had become Director of Special Activities in August 1966, in a message to 50X1, E.O.13526 summed up the situation as follows:

"... Looking critically at calendar year 1966 I find that weather and maintenance stand-downs (following Kunming and Canton missile incidents, and aircraft accidents) accounted for much of the inactivity. However, during other periods when we could and should have been flying operational missions, GRC has repeatedly refused mission approval for varied reasons familiar to all. . . I am now of the opinion that we will in the future have to press the TACKLE issue with GRC and resolve any existing differences. . . In the face of mounting costs of the war in Vietnam, priorities will necessarily assert themselves and a non-productive TACKLE program could easily become a casualty despite our best efforts to defend it. . . I think you can say

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with reasonable certainty that the U. S. Government desires to retain TACKLE indefinitely as long as it is effective, profitable, and operable with acceptable risk... " 1/

New CAF/CIA TACKLE Agreement

50X1, E.O.13526

50X1, E.O.13526

In January 1967 [redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526 [redacted] notified Headquarters

that a new agreement was being drafted by the CAF for the TACKLE program, as insurance against U. S. unilateral action such as had ended the IUPOLLY program. The first draft of this proposed agreement passed to [redacted] on 17 February asked for a three-year agreement with no escape clause allowing for unilateral cancellation by either party. Negotiations continued for the next thirty days with the principal point of contention being the three-year guarantee. The Chinese were finally persuaded that the U. S. side would not agree to more than a one-year guaranteed program, and eventually such an agreement was accepted. The document was signed by [redacted]

[redacted] and the Chief of Staff of the CAF, Lieut. Gen. Yang Shao-lien, on 17 March 1967 (effective date 18 March) after previous concurrence of the DD/S&T, the DD/P and the General Counsel at Headquarters and Ambassador McConaughy at Taipei. It called for a three-year agreement which would continue in force

1/ [redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526 [redacted] 27 January 1967.

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without escape clause on either side for one year, with a three-month review period at the end of the first year to determine whether the program should continue. Should the program prove to be viable and productive beyond the first year, a review would not be necessary, but could be called at any future time by either side to consider the desirability of discontinuing the program. In the event either side wished to terminate the agreement after one year, a ninety-day phase-out period would be required to effect such unilateral cancelling of the program. (Text of current agreement is in Annex 114.)

Toward the end of the negotiations the GRC representatives seemed to have developed a sincere desire to obtain a signed agreement as quickly as possible. The increase in reports of widespread disorders on the Mainland during this period may have had some influence on the desire to reinstitute TACKLE overflights.

At the same time the agreement was being signed, Dr. Chamberlain, Director of Scientific Intelligence, DD/S&T, was briefing the Generalissimo and Madam Chiang on the latest intelligence on Chinese Communist nuclear activities. He gave the same briefing to General Chiang Ching-kuo the next day

50X1, E.O.13526

General Chiang appeared

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to be quite sobered by the information provided, and concurred in GRC support to the [50X1, E.O.13526] stressing his desire that proper training be given the pilots who would be involved.

[50X1, E.O.13526]

The latter

mission failed to acquire any valid information.)

#### Fifth Mainland Loss

Mission C297C, flown by Capt. Huang Jung-pei (Tommy), on 8 September 1967, was in response to a GRC requirement for coverage on an urgent basis of 17 Chinese Communist airfield targets. The route was designed to cover six of these targets. The mission aircraft penetrated the China coast approximately 45 nautical miles northeast of Shanghai and was tracked continuously until it disappeared at a point about six miles south of Chia Hsing Airfield and 70 miles southwest of Shanghai. After an exhaustive analysis of all available data, the conclusion was reached that a surface-to-air missile probably caused the destruction of the aircraft. There was no indication in the Radio Peking announcement of the downing of the aircraft as to the fate of the pilot.

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Damage assessments were collected at both Detachment G and Detachment H to cover the contingency of the pilot's having been taken alive. The Security Staff summation of these assessments noted that Capt. Huang knew of the interrelationship which existed between Detachments G and H as well as Ban Takhli; that the USAF/U.S. Government is involved in at least some of the activities' support; that Huang is aware of the identities of prominent military members of the project; that he is generally aware of some of the U-2's defensive and offensive systems and camera; that he is completely aware of the project's tactical doctrine and the U-2 handbook and finally that he is at least to some extent knowledgeable of the true names of Agency personnel, though not necessarily their true affiliation.

(An item credited to a 20 October dispatch from Canton was published in the 19 December issue of the Hong Kong Survey of China Mainland Press and stated that according to a reliable source, the U-2 plane reported to have been shot down on 8 September by the Chinese Communist Air Force was actually forced to land, intact, by three of their planes at a certain place in Kiangsu, "a great victory for the great thought of Mao Tse-tung". The office of the DD/I responsible for the monitoring of this source of information gave it a low credibility rating.)

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Action taken as a result of the most recent loss included modification of the Oscar Sierra and Systems 12B-1 and 13C to increase their effectiveness against the changing techniques for tracking and missile launching being employed by the Chinese Communists. TACKLE flights were suspended, awaiting these and other modifications, and flight plans in future were to be designed to keep mission aircraft a safe distance from known or probable missile sites.

The Deputy Director of Special Activities, Mr. Parangosky, and the Chief of the IDEALIST Operations Staff, Lt. Col. Vernon Morris, together with two Office of ELINT experts, visited Detachment H the latter part of October 1967 for the principal purpose of discussing with the Detachment and CAF officers the electronic warfare systems being redesigned or modified for use in the U-2. These included:

- a. Replacement of ELINT collection System 6 with 6A.
- b. Replacement of COMINT collection System 3 with System 21.
- c. Improvement of Oscar Sierra Mark II by Mark III.
- d. New systems in development: System 20, counter to MIG fighter threat, and System 22, infra-red and air-to-air missile jammer.

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In November 1967, the GRC expressed willingness to consider H camera missions, provided they were not within the range of surface-to-air missiles, and to fly the System XVII ELINT system (for collection of missile telemetry data) on normal training missions. They wished to await an effective demonstration of the OS Mark III before resuming mainland overflights.

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ANNEX 107



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25 January 1961

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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

This memorandum of understanding sets forth the responsibilities and agreed positions on Project RAZOR. [CIA cryptonym TACKLE]

1. You will provide the operational base and associated facilities for the component responsible for carrying out jointly agreed activities.

2. We will maintain a local operational component capable of planning operational activities of mutual benefit, training, providing maintenance, supplying spare parts and furnishing special equipment.

3. Two special instruments will be assigned, but we reserve the right to reassign or withdraw them temporarily or permanently upon giving due notice.

4. You will provide identification and serial numbers for the two instruments.

5. You will provide and maintain support equipment for maintaining operator proficiency.

6. You will assign the necessary number of trained personnel to the component to carry out agreed tasks. You will designate a representative to exercise control and supervision of these personnel. The number of personnel required and the duration of their employment in the component is subject to mutual agreement.

7. You will provide all subsistence, housing, pay, allowances, and special benefits for your personnel except as indicated in paragraph 8 below.

8. We will provide funds for incentive pay and subsistence benefits for your personnel assigned directly to the component, provided receipts are furnished indicating that expenditures are for purposes calculated to improve the overall performance of the operational component.

9. You will provide identification passes, documents and numbers needed to give component personnel and vehicles free entry and exit to the site.

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10. You will provide a guard force adequate for establishing perimeter security control of the component area.

11. Our operational component chief will assume responsibility for working out with your representative operational, communications and physical security procedures for issuance by appropriate authority on your side.

12. You will keep the number of persons knowledgeable of component activities to an absolute minimum and will certify as to their reliability, providing biographical information as requested.

13. You will assist us in affording a thorough security check, including a technical interview, of your primary operators on a semi-annual basis.

14. We will submit to you our target lists and accept your requirements for incorporation in a mutually agreed joint target list.

15. We will notify you approximately 24 hours in advance when actual missions are contemplated and the general target area selected.

16. Your personnel assigned to the component will participate in subsequent local operational planning of the mission and local "go-no-go" decisions. All operational activity by the component must be jointly agreed.

17. You will conduct pre-mission briefings and post mission discussions with the primary operators, providing us tape recordings, and collaborating with our personnel in the component to insure the briefings achieve our mutual purposes.

18. You will be solely responsible for settling all claims arising from damage to persons or property resulting from jointly approved operations.

19. In the event of accident involving the special instruments both parties have the right to conduct on-the-spot investigations.

20. Any new construction or renovation of existing structures and the installation of equipment must be jointly agreed.

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21. We will finance construction and renovation necessary for housing the component and its equipment.

22. Title to all permanent construction within the component site area passes to you when neither you nor we have further operational need for the area. In that event, however, we may remove all equipment and fixtures which we have installed.

23. Either side may withdraw personnel or facilities provided for the joint component upon due notice.

24. The product of the operations will be processed by us and copies returned promptly to you. All material will be titled: "Top Secret Special Handling Required".

25. Under certain circumstances the component site and facilities may be used for operations of interest solely to us, but such use will be subject to prior notification, including identification of the general objectives of the activity contemplated, and will be subject to your concurrence.

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ANNEX 108

SCHEDULE OF TACKLE PILOTS - As of April 1968

<u>Crypto</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Training</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
IMAGE-9	L/C Yang Shih-chu	Del Rio, 1959	Now C/O. 35th Squadron, CAF
10	Maj. Hua Hsi-chun	" "	Retired
11	L/C Wang Tai-yu	" "	Retired
12	Maj. Chih Yao-hua	" "	Killed 19 Mar 61/Training
13	Maj. Ch'en Huai (later L/C)	" "	Killed 8 Sept 62/Nanchang
14	L/C Lee Nan-ping (Terry)	" 1963	Killed 7 July 64/Lungchi
15	Maj. Yeh Ch'ang-ti	" "	Killed 1 Nov 63/Nanchang
16	Maj. Wang Shi-chueh (Johnny) (later L/C)	Davis-Monthan 1963	Retired
17	Capt. Liang Teh-pei	" " "	Killed 22 March 64/Training
18	Maj. Chang Li-i (Jack)	" " 1964	Killed 10 Jan 65/Pao Tou
19	Maj. Wang Cheng-wen (Pete)	" " 1964	Killed 22 Oct 65/Training
20	Capt. Wu Ts'ai-hsi (Charlie)	" " 1964	Killed 17 Feb 66/Training
21	Capt. Sheng Shih-li	" " 1964	Released from program
22	Capt. Chuang Jen-liang (Spike)	" " 1964-65	Retired
23	Maj. Yu Ch'ing-chang (Mickey)	" " 1964-65	Killed 21 June 66/Training
24	L/C Liu Chai-chung (Terry)	" " 1964-65	Retired
25	Maj. Chang Hsieh (Billy)	" " 1966	Currently at Tao Yuan
26	Capt. Fan Hung-ti (Andy)	" " 1966	Currently at Tao Yuan
27	Capt. Yang Erh-ping	" " 1966	Released from program
28	Capt. Chou(Tsou) Yen-ching(Eddie) Edwards, 1966	" " 1966	Currently at Tao Yuan
29	Capt. Huang Jung-pei (Tommy)	" " 1967	Killed 8 Sept 67/Shanghai
30	Maj. Hwang Chi-shang (Denny)	" " 1967	Currently at Tao Yuan
31	Capt. Lee Po-wei (David)	" " 1968	Currently at Tao Yuan
32	Maj. Wang Tao (Tom)	" " 1968	Currently in training
33	Maj. Shen Chung-li (Johnny)	" "	Currently in training



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PROJECT HEADQUARTERS  
DIRECTIVE 50-10-25

OPERATIONS  
TRAINING  
17 June 1966

ESTABLISHMENT OF A GRC U-2 PILOT  
TRAINING PROGRAM AT DETACHMENT G

1. PURPOSE:

The purpose of this directive is to establish the procedures and provide guidance for the training of Chinese pilots in U-2 aircraft, the security and cover arrangements, and the other supporting functions and details concerning training GRC pilots at Detachment G.

2. RESPONSIBILITY:

Detachment Commanders are responsible for insuring adherence to the provisions of this directive.

3. GENERAL:

This directive:

- a. Supersedes all previous procedures both written and verbal regarding the over-all cover plan for U.S. personnel involved in the TACKLE program.
- b. Establishes the procedures for US/GRC joint participation in cover arrangements to be used by US personnel in connection with the TACKLE program. (Att. I)
- c. Establishes the minimum training required before a Chinese pilot can be scheduled for operational missions. (Att II)
- d. Provides guidance to Detachment Commanders for the establishment of travel arrangements, physical examinations, personnel, equipment fitting, billeting arrangements, social and official contact procedures and associated support functions regarding the training of Chinat personnel at Edwards Air Force Base. (Att. III)

(Signed)

JACK C. LEDFORD  
Brig. Gen., USAF  
Director of Special Activities

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PROJECT HEADQUARTERS  
DIRECTIVE 50-10-25  
Attachment I

SECURITY

SECURITY/COVER PROGRAM  
FOR TRAINING GRC PILOTS AT DETACHMENT G

1. PURPOSE:

The purpose of this attachment is to provide cover and security instructions for the training of GRC pilots at Detachment G.

2. GENERAL:

The introduction of a GRC U-2 pilot training operation at Detachment G will necessitate a revamping of the entire cover rationale heretofore applied at Detachment H. In essence, the role of the United States Air Force as a supplier of services, support and advice will be surfaced while simultaneously maximum effort will continue to be given to hiding the involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency. In combination, all security/cover policies and procedures will seek to portray the TACKLE Program in this image: it is a unilateral GRC effort, totally managed and controlled by the GRC; in the interests of drawing upon the expertise of the United States Air Force, the GRC has entered into an agreement with the USAF to provide training, logistical and advisory support. Every effort must be made to preclude the identification of the Agency with the U-2 programs at Detachments G and H.

3. SECURITY/COVER PROGRAM AT DETACHMENT G DURING  
CHINESE PILOT TRAINING ACTIVITY:

a. The existing procedures governing the nomination, processing and use of invitational Air Force orders (resulting in the movement of the GRC pilots to the United States) will continue.

b. Upon their arrival on the West Coast, the GRC personnel will be handled by the Detachment G training Faculty including a permanently assigned Security Officer drawn from the Detachment G Security Staff.

c. All Detachment G military personnel exposed to the Chinese pilot trainees while at Edwards Air Force Base will represent themselves as military people using their true ranks and their true names.

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d. All Detachment G Agency civilians exposed to the Chinese pilot trainees while at Edwards Air Force Base will represent themselves as DAFC's and they will use aliases.

e. All contractor representatives exposed to the Chinese pilot trainees while at Edwards Air Force Base will represent themselves as LAC personnel and will use true names.

f. The Detachment G pilots will represent themselves as Lockheed flight test consultants. They will use the names they presently use while on TDY to Detachment H.

g. In general, the Security Officer member of the Detachment G Training Faculty will function as a case officer to respond to any situation with security overtones involving the GRC pilot trainees.

h. Detachment G will arrange suitable housing to accommodate the GRC personnel with every attempt made to avoid locating them in the Lancaster/Palmdale areas. During their stay in California, the GRC personnel should be kept as isolated as possible from other members of the Detachment and should not be exposed to activities at the Detachment not related to the training program.

i. Under no circumstances will Detachment G pilots, Detachment G Agency civilians or Headquarters personnel (either civilian or military) entertain GRC pilot trainees in their homes.

j. Every effort will be made to restrict the movement of the GRC pilot trainees within the confines of Detachment G to avoid exposure to the operational activities.

k. The British personnel at Detachment G will be briefed by the Chief, Detachment G Security Staff to avoid direct contact with the Chinese pilot trainees. In this regard, it will be necessary to schedule the British flying activity at times other than when the Chinese will be physically within the confines of the Detachment G area. Should an accidental, face-to-face encounter materialize between the Chinese and the British, the latter will identify themselves in aliases as flight maintenance pilots or supporting personnel with LAC.

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1. During the times Chinese pilot trainees are at Detachment G, visits by Agency representatives, particularly at the level of Dr. Wheelon, General Ledford and Mr. Cunningham should be kept to a minimum. When visits of the latter type are absolutely necessary, the Chinese representatives should be removed from the Base. All Headquarters visitors to Detachment G will use, in meeting the Chinese pilot trainees, the aliases assigned them in previous visits to Detachment H. In the absence of a previously assigned alias, the Detachment G Security Staff will assign the visitor an alias, identification of which will be forwarded to Detachment H to provide for subsequent use of the alias there. Civilian visitors from Headquarters will be identified as DAFC's; visitors who are military detailees from Headquarters will identify themselves as Air Force Officers and will use their actual ranks.

m. The military members of the Detachment G Training Faculty will dress in uniform when it is appropriate from a command standpoint.

4. SECURITY/COVER PROGRAM AT DETACHMENT H AS A RESULT OF CHINESE PILOT TRAINING ACTIVITY AT DETACHMENT G:

a. Just prior to the arrival of the first Detachment G trained Chinese pilots, all key GRC personnel at Detachment H will be briefed by Col. Yang, 35th CAF Squadron Commander, concerning the role of the USAF in the TACKLE Program. It is anticipated that those to be briefed will include the flight planners, supply officer, weather officer, security officer, flight surgeon, PE technicians, snack bar attendant and the like but exclude the guards, building maintenance crew of electricians, painters, plumbers, and char force, POL drivers, bus drivers and the like. In the briefing, Col. Yang will explain the need for the previous cover legends and other security cover arrangements, i. e., use of aliases, etc. He will stress that the military and Agency personnel assigned to Detachment H must continue under the dual cover role currently in effect, i. e., LAC at the hostel, all other elements and areas of the 35th Squadron Base and the town of Tao Yuan; 6213th Support Squadron, Detachment 5, M. T. T. at Taipei.

As is evident from the above, the sole change in the current cover legend will occur at the time all Chinese participants at the compound are briefed on US Government involvement in the TACKLE Program. All else remains as is.

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b. The military personnel assigned to Detachment H who have used aliases in the past will continue to use them. Those assigned subsequent to the effective date of this Directive will use true names.

c. The Agency civilian personnel assigned to Detachment H will represent themselves as DAFC's after the briefing mentioned in paragraph 4. a. Agency civilian personnel currently assigned to Detachment H will continue to use the names they now use, whether alias or true. Those assigned subsequent to the effective date of this Directive will use aliases, either assigned previously at Detachment H or Detachment G, or newly assigned by the Detachment H Security Staff. Agency contract employees will follow the guidelines of this paragraph.

d. The contractor representatives will represent themselves in true name as LAC employees.

e. Military personnel assigned to or visiting Detachment H will not, repeat not, wear uniforms at the base or in the town of Tao Yuan.

f. The present system of using first names at the Detachment will continue.

g. Once Detachment G personnel are identified to GRC personnel as military or civilian members of the Department of the Air Force, this representation will have to be maintained on into the future during deployments, operations, etc., wherein GRC personnel are working with Detachment G group. This would be particularly crucial in a BUS STOP\* type program. Again, neither military ranks nor uniforms are to be employed.

h. All Headquarters visitors to Detachment H will use, during the periods of their visits, the aliases assigned them in previous visits to Detachment H. In the absence of a previously assigned alias, the Detachment H Security Staff will assign the visitor an alias.

##### 5. OVERALL AVOIDANCE OF PUBLICITY:

a. The avoidance of publicity will be a major goal in the execution of this program.

\* Staging of missions from Ban Takhli.

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	<u>Desired</u>	<u>Minimum</u>
Sorties	15	15
Flying Hours	60	55
SFO	(As can be scheduled)	
GCA	(As can be scheduled)	

g. Operational Training

Upon return to their home detachment, the CAF pilots will be placed in Category III operational status and will be required to complete the requirements of Project Headquarters Directive 50-10-2 for upgrading to a Category I status.

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PROJECT HEADQUARTERS  
DIRECTIVE 50-10-25  
Attachment II

OPERATIONS

SYLLABUS FOR TRAINING  
GRC PILOTS IN U-2 AIRCRAFT AT  
DETACHMENT G

I. PURPOSE:

To provide Detachment Commanders with a syllabus for the training of GRC pilots in U-2 aircraft.

2. GENERAL:

a. Pre-flight training requirements:

(1) Prior to the instigation of any training for the GRC pilots at Detachment G, they will have been given:

- (a) Physical examinations
- (b) Pressure suit fittings
- (c) Altitude chamber indoctrination

b. T-33 familiarization

(1) Prior to first T-33 flight, pilots will be given instruction in:

- (a) Personal equipment
- (b) Emergency procedures
- (c) FAA and USAF filing and reporting procedures.

(2) A qualified American IP will accompany CAF pilots on all T-33 flights.

(3) Primary purpose of T-33 training is to indoctrinate CAF pilots in FAA enroute and approach procedures that they will encounter in U-2 flying. A secondary purpose is to evaluate instrument flying proficiency and provide additional instrument training as required.

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c. Ground Training (U-2)

- |                                                                   |          |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| (1) Aircraft and engine                                           | 20 hours |
| (a) Aircraft general                                              |          |
| (b) Engine                                                        |          |
| (c) Fuel System                                                   |          |
| (d) Hydraulic, oxygen and<br>pressurization systems               |          |
| (e) Electrical systems                                            |          |
| (f) Landing gear, brakes and<br>gust control                      |          |
| (2) Flight characteristics                                        | 6 hours  |
| (3) Cockpit check and aircraft<br>familiarization                 | 4 hours  |
| (4) FAA procedures                                                | 1 hour   |
| (5) Personal equipment                                            | 3 hours  |
| (6) Physiological aspects of<br>high altitude flying              | 1 hour   |
| (7) High altitude weather                                         | 1 hour   |
| (8) Mission planning procedures                                   | 1 hour   |
| (9) Pre-flight and in-flight log<br>procedures and cruise control | 3 hours  |
| (10) High altitude navigation                                     | 2 hours  |
| (11) Celestial navigation and sextant<br>indoctrination           | 4 hours  |
| (12) Photographic equipment and<br>indoctrination                 | 2 hours  |
| (13) Electronic systems indoctrination                            | 4 hours  |

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(14) Autopilot and compass	2 hours
(15) Tactical doctrine	12 hours
(16) Emergency procedures	4 hours minimum
TOTAL	<u>70 hours</u>

d. Simulated U-2 characteristics

(1) If a two-seat U-2 is available, it will be used to demonstrate flight characteristics to the student pilot.

(2) If the two-seat U-2 is unavailable, simulated U-2 characteristics will be demonstrated by a qualified U-2 instructor pilot in the U-3A aircraft.

(3) Simulated U-2 characteristics will be accomplished within the fourteen day period prior to the first solo flight in the U-2.

e. Pre-solo Proficiency Checks

Each student pilot will accomplish satisfactorily the following requirements prior to flying the U-2 aircraft:

- (a) Aircraft questionnaire
- (b) Emergency examination
- (c) Aircraft exterior inspection
- (d) Aircraft pre-take-off procedures
- (e) Aircraft emergency procedures (cockpit check)

f. Flight Training

Mission #1 \* Low altitude to include 2 + 00  
turns - approach to stalls  
with various flap settings -  
five take off and landings  
with pogos

Mission #2\* Same as #1 2 + 00

\* Note: Missions 1, 2, and 3 are to have a T-33 aircraft as chase for the air work maneuvers and a U-3 aircraft as chase for the traffic pattern maneuvers.

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Mission #3*	Low Altitude	2 + 00
Mission #4	Medium altitude 50 m w/suit shut down and restart 7 SFO 7 landings w/o pogos	3 + 00
Mission #5	At 65,000 D R Navigation w/camera 3 landings	4 + 30
Mission #6	Same as #5	4 + 30
Mission #7	At 70,000 Remainder same as #5	4 + 30
Mission #8	Low altitude 3 GCA - 3 SFO 3 touch and go	3 + 00
Mission #9	Same as #7 (70,000)	4 + 30
Mission #10	Same as #7	4 + 30
Mission #11	Same as #8	3 + 00
Mission #12	70,000 - Requirements same as #5 except only 2 touch and go	6 + 00
Mission #13	Maximum altitude Requirements same as #12	6 + 00
Mission #14	Low altitude	3 + 00
Mission #15	Maximum altitude simulated ops mission and standardi- zation check	7 + 30

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	<u>Desired</u>	<u>Minimum</u>
Sorties	15	15
Flying Hours	60	55
SFO	(As can be scheduled)	
GCA	(As can be scheduled)	

g. Operational Training

Upon return to their home detachment, the CAF pilots will be placed in Category III operational status and will be required to complete the requirements of Project Headquarters Directive 50-10-2 for upgrading to a Category I status.

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PROJECT HEADQUARTERS  
DIRECTIVE 50-10-25  
ATTACHMENT III

SUPPORT

SUPPORT FOR TRAINING OF GRC U-2 PILOTS AT  
DETACHMENT G

1. PURPOSE:

To provide guidance to Detachment Commanders in support details concerning training GRC pilots at Detachment G.

2. GENERAL:

a. Administration

(1) Project Headquarters will be responsible for the scheduling of GRC pilots for training, physicals and pressure suit fittings.

(2) Project Headquarters will be responsible for the issuance of invitational orders for the selected GRC pilots to come to the U. S.

(3) Detachment G Commander will be responsible for the appointment of a Detachment Project Officer whose tasks will include, but not be limited to:

(a) Escort for the new pilots from their arrival to their departure from the U. S.

(b) Escort for the GRC pilots through their physical examinations and pressure suit fitting appointments.

(c) Arranging for billeting, transportation and assistance for any personal matters concerning these pilots.

(d) The maintenance of all records (training payments, etc.) that might be required.

(e) Working closely with the Detachment Security Officer so as to preclude any conflict of interest in security of the project (if Project Officer is not a Security Officer).

BYE-2483-66  
Attachment III

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b. Support

While in the Edwards, California area, the GRC pilots are to:

- (1) Obtain a State of California driver's license.
- (2) Be provided a rental auto for their own use.

(3) Be provided adequate housing, the minimum standard being a private bedroom for each individual and sufficient kitchen equipment for them to cook their own meals. This housing may be provided in any area around Edwards Air Force Base excepting the cities of Lancaster and Palmdale, California.

c. Social and Recreational Activities

While in the Edwards California area, the GRC pilots are to be allowed to take advantage of all other recreational and social facilities within the State of California subject to the discretion of the Detachment G Commander or the Detachment Project Officer.

BYE-2483-66  
Attachment III  
Page 2

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ANNEX 110



MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS - TACKLE PROGRAM  
(Training and Operational)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Pilot</u>	<u>A/C No.</u>	<u>Type Msn/Result</u>
19 Mar 1961	Taiwan	Maj. Chih Yao-hua	351C	Training/Fatal
8 Sept 1962	Nanchang, China	L/C Ch'en Huai	378C	Operational/Fatal/Publicized
1 Nov 1963	Nanchang, China	Maj. Yeh Ch'ang-ti	355C	Operational/Fatal/Publicized
22 Mar 1964	Taiwan	Capt. Liang Teh-pei	356F	Training/Fatal
7 July 1964	Lungchi, China	L/C Lee Nan-ping	362G	Operational/Fatal/Publicized
14 Aug 1964	Idaho, U. S.	Capt. Sheng Shih-li	395A(SAC)	Training/Non-fatal
18 Dec 1964	Tucson, Arizona	Capt. Sheng Shih-li	379A(SAC)	Training/Non-fatal
10 Jan 1965	Pao Tou, China	Maj. Chang Li-i	358C	Operational/Fatal/Publicized
22 Oct 1965	Taiwan	L/C Wang Cheng-wen	352C	Training/Fatal
17 Feb 1966	Taiwan	Maj. Wu Ts'ai-hsi	372F	Training/Fatal
22 Mar 1966	Tucson, Arizona	Capt. Fan Hung-ti	363A(SAC)	Training/Non-fatal
21 June 1966	Naha, Okinawa	Maj. Yu Ch'ing-chang	384C	Training/Fatal/Publicized(not as U-2)
8 Sept 1967	Shanghai, China	Capt. Huang Jung-pei	373A	Operational/Fatal/Publicized

Training: U. S. 3 Non-fatal  
5 Fatal

Operational: Mainland 5 Fatal

ANNEX 111.



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Headquarters  
THIRTEENTH AIR FORCE  
United States Air Force  
APO 74, San Francisco, Calif.

Reply to

20 May 1963

Attn of: Office of Director of Special Operations

Subject: Procedures for Project DEN MOTHER

To: ATF 13 (P)

6214 Tactical Group            13 MDC

13 ODC                            13 ADC

1. Purpose: The purpose of this letter is to establish administrative, logistical and operational procedures involved in supporting Project DEN MOTHER.

2. General: DEN MOTHER is the unclassified nickname for a special project concerning the acquisition of Chinese Air Force/DEN MOTHER aircraft and related technical and logistic support which resulted from a commercial transaction between the Government of the Republic of China and an American aircraft corporation. The corporation has a group of technical representatives stationed on Taiwan to assist the Chinese Air Force. This group is known as Detachment 5 Mobile Training Team and is attached to the 6214th Tactical Group. Detachment 5 MTT duty location is with the 6213th Support Squadron. The 6214th Tactical Group is responsible for housekeeping support for Detachment 5 MTT. This detachment is on general orders as an Air Force organization.

3. Classification of project: The overall classification of this project is TOP SECRET and knowledge of the project is limited to personnel having a direct need to know in order to provide necessary housekeeping support to Detachment 5 MTT. All personnel briefed on the contents of this letter will sign briefing statements and will sign debriefing statements upon termination of their need to know. This project will not be discussed with personnel who are not DEN MOTHER cleared.

4. Reason for classification: The reason for the high classification and limited number of personnel involved is the need to protect and conceal USAF housekeeping support of a civilian organization involved in a commercial aircraft transaction with the Chinese Air Force.

TS-155923  
(130DX 3-5092C)

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5. Classification of correspondence:

a. All correspondence indicating, or linking together the fact that, Detachment 5 MTT personnel are actually technical representatives of an American aircraft corporation will be classified TOP SECRET and handled on an eyes only basis between DEN MOTHER cleared personnel.

b. All correspondence indicating, or linking together the fact that, Detachment 5 MTT is involved in Project DEN MOTHER will be classified TOP SECRET and handled on an eyes only basis between DEN MOTHER cleared personnel.

c. Correspondence indicating housekeeping support for Detachment 5 MTT in its role as an Air Force organization will normally be unclassified. EFTO protection will be provided electrical transmissions. If support provided is of a classified nature correspondence will be classified in accordance with AFR 205-1.

6. Limited need to know: Certain personnel who must assist in support procedures such as supply and accounting may be told if necessary that Project DEN MOTHER is a classified project holding a high priority and that USAF has directed full support be given this project. Permission must be obtained from the DEN MOTHER project officer if it is deemed necessary to issue the above statement in order to accomplish a particular task.

7. Security Control: Copies of all DEN MOTHER correspondence regardless of classification and communications channels will be provided the 13 AF DEN MOTHER project officer (Major Stanley J. Buinicky) for his master file. Correspondence other than that concerning routine supply matters will be coordinated with the DEN MOTHER project officer.

8. Handling procedures: Insofar as practical administrative and support transactions will be handled on a person to person basis, with a minimum of correspondence and staffing.

9. Logistics responsibilities:

a. 6214th Tactical Group is responsible for logistic support as follows:

(1) General purpose vehicles, equipment, and spares therefor (reimbursable if coded LP).



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(2) Housekeeping supplies and equipment (reimbursable if coded LP).

(3) Receipt, processing, and delivery to 6213th Support Squadron all cargo arriving at aerial or water ports. All water shipments will be made to the port of Keelung in Taiwan. The 6213th Support Squadron will remove all reference to DEN MOTHER on cargo received prior to releasing cargo to Detachment 5 MTT.

(4) Postal service.

(5) Issuance of BX and commissary permits.

(6) Provide airlift within its capability to meet requirements of Detachment 5 MTT. Requirements that cannot be met by 6214th Tactical Group will be submitted to Hqs Thirteenth Air Force, Attn: ODX.

(7) Budgeting and funding for all local purchase (LP) coded common items of supplies (reimbursable basis).

(8) Budgeting and funding all TDY requirements for 6214th Tactical Group in direct support of DEN MOTHER and for Detachment 5 MTT personnel (reimbursable basis).

(9) Maintaining a financial accounting for all supplies and equipment furnished to the special account (402) of the 6213th Support Squadron. This account will not be subject to audit.

(10) Process incoming and outgoing peculiar supplies and equipment for Detachment 5 MTT. This includes furnishing air movement designators.

(11) Provide spares to the 6213th Support Squadron for support of Detachment 5 MTT T-33 aircraft when Detachment 5 MTT states they cannot obtain from some other source.

(12) Provide POL products for Detachment 5 MTT. This will include products required for T-33 aircraft flown by Detachment 5 MTT personnel, unless Detachment 5 MTT can obtain aircraft POL products from some other source.

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b. Detachment 5 MTT, 6214th Tactical Group is responsible for their own logistic support as follows:

- (1) POL products, spares, equipment, and supplies peculiar to its mission.
- (2) Maintenance of all Detachment 5 MTT vehicles and equipment.
- (3) Funding for its own peculiar logistics support.
- (4) Return of all repairable peculiar spares and equipment to its own supply source. 6213th Support Squadron will process shipments for Detachment 5 MTT (see a(10) above).
- (5) Picking up supplies at Taipei Air Station (TAS) or at a point designated by Commander TAS.

c. Headquarters Thirteenth Air Force responsibility:

- (1) The DCS/M will coordinate with DM 6214th Tactical Group, and assist, where possible, in obtaining and shipping items not available on Taiwan.
- (2) The 13th AF Director of Budget will include "DEN MOTHER" fund requirements in his financial plan and revisions thereto. The financial plan will indicate that detailed justification for "DEN MOTHER" may be obtained from Hq PACAF.
- (3) Provide air lift assistance within capabilities and request airlift support from 315th Air Division when required.

10. Logistics procedures:

a. Detachment 5 MTT will requisition its common support items from the 6213th Support Squadron, its peculiar items through its own channels.

b. All supply and accounting documents of the 6213th Support Squadron and the 6214th Tactical Group will be unclassified. All incoming shipments should be made to AFB 5240, Mark for 6213 Support Squadron, "PROJECT DEN MOTHER."

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c. 6214th Tactical Group (AFB 5240) will maintain a special unit account (402) for the 6213th Support Squadron, which will in turn maintain a special jacket account for Detachment 5 MTT. This is for maintaining accountability and responsibility for property. This account will not be subject to audit.

d. Log support required for mission accomplishment will be expeditiously provided under 1-12 priority.

e. Log support requests which are not mission oriented; i. e., recreation equipment, office furniture, lounge furniture; should be provided from area resources under a lower priority and, normally, will be shipped via surface transportation.

f. All requisitions should be responsibility of DEN MOTHER project officers at 13AF, ATF-13(P) and 5AF to determine whether or not the item is available within the area before requisition is forwarded to the ZI.

11. Funding: Hq USAF has indicated that additional O&M support cost expended and estimated in support of Project DEN MOTHER will receive favorable action when forwarded for inclusion in this command's revisions to O&M financial plans. PACAF will be advised, utilizing SSO, of any cost which cannot be accommodated within present B/A and/or sub-allocation.

T. R. MILTON  
Major General, USAF  
Commander

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH AIR FORCE (PACAF)  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96274

25 Aug 66

Subject: Procedures for Project DEN MOTHER

To: 327th Air Division 6213 Support Squadron  
6214 Support Group 5th Mobile Training Team

1. Purpose: The purpose of this directive is to up-date administrative, logistical and operational procedures involved in supporting Project DEN MOTHER.

2. General: DEN MOTHER is the unclassified nickname for a special project concerning the acquisition of Chinese Air Force/DEN MOTHER aircraft and related technical and logistic support which resulted from a commercial transaction between the Government of the Republic of China and an American aircraft corporation. The corporation has a group of technical representatives stationed on Taiwan to assist the Chinese Air Force. This group is known as Detachment 5 Mobile Training Team and is attached to the 6214th Support Group. Detachment 5 MTT duty location is with the 6213th Support Squadron. The 6214th Support Group is responsible for housekeeping support for Detachment 5 MTT. The 6213th Support Squadron is responsible for administrative support, such as postal service, issuance of BX and Commissary permits, etc. Detachment 5 MTT is on general orders as an Air Force organization.

3. Classification of project: The overall classification of this project is TOP SECRET and knowledge of the project is limited to personnel having a direct need to know in order to provide necessary support to Detachment 5 MTT. All personnel briefed on the contents of this letter will sign briefing statements and will sign debriefing statements upon termination of their need to know. This project will not be discussed with personnel who are not DEN MOTHER cleared.

4. Reason for classification: The reason for the high classification and limited number of personnel involved is the need to protect and conceal USAF support of a civilian organization involved in a commercial aircraft transaction with the Chinese Air Force.

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5. Classification of correspondence:

a. All correspondence indicating, or linking together the fact that Detachment 5 MTT personnel are actually technical representatives of an American aircraft corporation will be classified TOP SECRET and handled on an eyes only basis between DEN MOTHER cleared personnel.

b. All correspondence indicating, or linking together the fact that Detachment 5 MTT is involved in Project DEN MOTHER will be classified TOP SECRET and handled on an eyes only basis between DEN MOTHER cleared personnel.

c. Correspondence indicating housekeeping support for Detachment 5 MTT in its role as an Air Force organization will normally be unclassified. EFTO protection will be provided electrical transmissions. If support provided is of a classified nature, correspondence will be classified in accordance with AFR 205-1.

6. Limited need to know: Certain personnel who must assist in support procedures such as supply and accounting may be told if necessary that Project DEN MOTHER is a classified project holding a high priority and that USAF has directed full support be given this project. Permission must be obtained from the DEN MOTHER project officer if it is deemed necessary to issue the above statement in order to accomplish a particular task.

7. Security Control: Copies of all DEN MOTHER correspondence regardless of classification and communications channels will be provided the 13 AF DEN MOTHER project officer (Lt. Col. William R. Stickman) for his master file. Correspondence other than that concerning routine supply matters will be coordinated with the DEN MOTHER project officer.

8. Handling procedures: Insofar as practical, administrative and support transactions will be handled on a person to person basis, with a minimum of correspondence and staffing.

9. Logistics responsibilities:

a. 6214th Support Group is responsible for logistic support as follows:

(1) Housekeeping supplies and equipment (reimbursable if coded LP).

(2) Budgeting and funding for all local purchase (LP) coded common items of supplies (reimbursable basis ).

(3) Maintaining a financial accounting for all supplies and equipment furnished to the special account of the 6213th Support Squadron. This account will not be subject to audit.

(4) Process outgoing peculiar supplies and equipment for Detachment 5 MTT. This includes furnishing air movement designators.

(5) Provide POL products for Detachment 5 MTT. This will include products required for aircraft flown by Detachment 5 MTT personnel, unless Detachment 5 MTT can obtain aircraft POL products from some other source.

b. Detachment 5 MTT is responsible for their own logistic support as follows:

(1) POL products, spares, equipment, and supplies peculiar to its mission.

(2) Maintenance of all Detachment 5 MTT vehicles and equipment.

(3) Funding for its own peculiar logistics support.

(4) Return of all repairable peculiar spares and equipment to its own supply source. 6213th Support Squadron will process shipments for Detachment 5 MTT (see a (4) above).

(5) Picking up supplies at Taipei Air Station (TAS) or at a point designated by Commander TAS.

c. Headquarters Thirteenth Air Force responsibility:

(1) The DM will coordinate with DM 6213th Support Group and assist, where possible, in obtaining and shipping items not available on Taiwan.



(2) The 13th AF Director of Budget will include "DEN MOTHER" fund requirements in his financial plan and revisions thereto. The financial plan will indicate that detailed justification for "DEN MOTHER" may be obtained from Hq PACAF.

(3) 13th AF will, within its capability at the time, attempt to provide logistics airlift support. Requests of this nature will be made only after all other sources have been exhausted.

10. Logistics Procedures:

a. Detachment 5 MTT will requisition its common support items from the 6214th Support Group; its peculiar items through its own channels.

b. 6214th Support Group (AFB 5240) will maintain a special unit account for the 6213th Support Squadron, which will in turn maintain a special jacket account for Detachment 5 MTT. This is for maintaining accountability and responsibility for property. This account will not be subject to audit.

c. Log support requests which are not mission oriented, i.e., recreation equipment, office furniture, lounge furniture will be provided from area resources in accordance with local Air Force supply procedure.

d. Resources of 327th AD, 5th AF and 13th AF will be screened to satisfy DEN MOTHER requirements prior to forwarding requisitions to the United States. Priority of source screening is 327th AD, 13th and then 5th AF.

e. All inquiries, requests, etc., to 13th AF regarding the DEN MOTHER Project will be directed to Lt. Col. W. R. Stickman. Appropriate communication channels will be utilized.

11. Funding: Hq USAF has indicated that additional O&M support cost expended and estimated in support of Project DEN MOTHER will receive favorable action when forwarded for inclusion in this command's revisions to O&M financial plans. PACAF will be advised, utilizing SSO, of any cost which cannot be accommodated within present B/A and/or sub-allocation.

JAMES W. WILSON, Lieutenant General, USAF  
Commander

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Certified to be an exact copy  
/s/

Date: 15 Dec 66

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Withheld under statutory authority of the  
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50  
U.S.C., section 403g)



ANNEX 112



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PROJECT TACKLE OVERFLIGHTS - 1962 - 1968

Date	Msn. No.	Target	Pilot	Comment
<u>1962:</u>				
12 January	GRC 100	Missile Test Range	Ch'en	B Camera - Good
23 February	GRC 102	Lanchou	Yang	B Camera - Good
13 March	GRC 104	Kunming	Hua	B Camera - Fair
26 March	GRC 106	Central China	Wang	B Camera - Good
15 June	GRC 112	Harbin	Yang	B Camera - Good
19 June	GRC 113	MTR	Wang	B Camera - Good
25 June	GRC 115	Straits/Taiwan	Ch'en	B Camera - Good
28 June	GRC 116	Straits/Taiwan	Yang	B Camera - Good
30 June	GRC 117	Nanchang, Straits	Hua	B Camera - Fair
5 July	GRC 119	Straits	Yang	B Camera - Fair
9 July	GRC 120	Straits	Ch'en	B Camera - Good
28 July	GRC 123	Straits	Wang	B Camera - Fair
11 August	GRC 125	Peiping, Manchuria	Hua	B Camera - Fair
8 September	GRC 126	South China	Yang	B Camera - Good
9 September	GRC 127	Nanchang	Ch'en	LOST
5 December	GRC 128	North Korea	Hua	B Camera - Good
25 December	GRC 134	Szechwan	Wang	B Camera - Good
28 December	GRC 136	South China (aborted)	Hua	B Camera - Fair
<u>1963:</u>				
20 January	GRC 138	Szechwan	Yang	B Camera - Good
28 March	GRC 144	MTR	Wang	B Camera - Good
30 March	GRC 146	Szechwan	Hua	B Camera - Good
3 April	GRC 147	South China	Yang	B Camera - Good
9 May	GRC 150	North Korea, Manchuria	Wang	B Camera - Fair

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Date	Msn No.	Target	Pilot	Comment
28 May	GRC 152	North Korea, Manchuria	Yang	B Camera - Fair
3 June	GRC 153	Lanchou	Hua	B Camera - Fair
4 June	GRC 154	Nanchang	Wang	B Camera - Good
12 June	GRC 156	Sian and Paotou	Hua	B Camera - Good
23 August	GRC 169	Manchuria	Lee	B Camera - Excellent
30 August	GRC 171	South China	Yeh	B Camera - Good
25 September	GRC 176	MTR, Koko Nor	Lee	B Camera - Excellent
26 September	GRC 178	Paotou, Peiping	Yeh	B Camera - Excellent
30 September	GRC 180	South China	Hua	B Camera - Good
6 October	GRC 181	North Korea	Wang	B Camera - Excellent
8 October	GRC 182	North Korea, Manchuria	Lee	B Camera - Good
1 November	GRC 184	MTR	Yeh	LOST

1964:

16 March	C024C	South China	Lee	B Camera - Good
26 June	C114C	Hainan	Lee	B Camera - Fair
5 July	C134C	Hainan (abort)	Lee	B Camera - Fair
7 July	C174C	Shanghai, Wuhu	Wang	B Camera - Excellent
7 July	C184C	Lungchi	Lee	LOST
31 October	C224C	Lanchou	Chang	B Camera - Good
7 November	C244C	North Korea, North China	Wang(Johnny)	B Camera - Good
15 November	C274C	South China	Wang(Johnny)	B Camera - Good
22 November	C284C	Lanchou (abort)	Chang	IR - Poor
25 November	C304C	Lanchou (abort)	Wang(Johnny)	IR - Fair
9 December	C324C	Manchuria	Wang(Pete)	B Camera - Good
19 December	C344C	Lanchou (abort)		IR - Poor
30 December	C374C	Szechwan	Chang	B Camera - Fair

1965:

8 January	C015C	Lanchou	Wang(Johnny)	IR - Good
10 January	C025C	Pao Tou	Chang	IR - LOST
19 February	C045C	South China	Wang(Pete)	B Camera - Good

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Date	Msn. No.	Target	Pilot	Comment
22 February	C055C	South China (abort)	Wang(Johnny)	B Camera - Fair
24 February	C065C	South China	Wang(Pete)	B Camera - Excellent
12 March	C105C	South China (abort)	Wu	B Camera - Poor
14 March	C115C	South China (fired on)	Wu	B Camera - Good
17 April	C215C	Hainan	Wang(Johnny)	B Camera - Poor
27 April	C225C	South China (abort)		B Camera - Good
30 April	C245C	East China Coastal	Wu	B Camera - Good
14 May	C285C	Ning Ming	Wang(Pete)	112B Camera - Fair
27 May	C335C	Canton, Leiyang	Wang(Johnny)	B Camera - Good
28 May	C325C	Swatow, Fuchow	Wu	B Camera - Good
2 July	C355C	South China	Wang(Johnny)	B Camera - Good
3 July	C365C	Straits	Wang(Pete)	B Camera - Fair
20 July	C395C	Hainan	Yu	B Camera - Good
21 July	C405C	Straits	Chuang	B Camera - Good
31 July	C425C	North Korea	Liu	B Camera - Good
24 August	C455C	Ning Ming	Wu	B Camera - Good
25 August	C465C	Hainan	Wang(Johnny)	112B Camera - Good
26 August	C475C	Straits	Wang(Pete)	B Camera - Good
5 September	C485C	North Vietnam, China/Laos	Liu	B Camera - Poor
18 September	C495C	Straits	Yu	B Camera - Excellent
16 October	C535C	North China, China Coast	Yu	112B Camera - Good
19 October	C555C	South China and Sub Search	Wu	B Camera - Good
20 October	C545C	Laos, Burma, SW China	Liu	B Camera - Fair
8 November	C565C	Southwest China	Liu	B Camera - Poor
14 November	C575C	Southwest China	Yu	B Camera - Poor
23 November	C595C	Southwest China	Yu	B Camera - Good
28 November	C605C	South China	Chuang	B Camera - Excellent
1966:				
28 March	C036C	Southwest China	Chuang	B Camera - Poor
7 April	C056C	Southwest China	Liu	B Camera - Poor
19 April	C076C	Shenyang, North China	Yu	112B Camera - Poor

Date	Msn. No.	Target	Pilot	Comment
4 May	C116C	Straits	Liu	B Camera - Poor
14 May	C126C	SW China, Kunming	Chuang	B Camera - Good
15 May	C136C	SW China (abort)	Liu	B Camera - Poor
3 August	C146C	Straits	Chuang	B Camera - Good
16 August	C156C	Hainan (abort)	Liu	B Camera - Poor
24 August	C176C	Canton	Chuang	B Camera - Fair
26 November	C216C	Straits	Liu	B Camera - Good
88				
1967:				
4 January	C027C	South China	Liu	B Camera - Excellent
28 March	C117C	Straits	Feng, FAN-26	B Camera - Poor
9 April	C147C	South China	Liu	B Camera - Excellent
13 April	C157C	Manchuria	Feng	B Camera - Good
7 May	C167C	[Redacted]	Chuang	Tracker - Excellent
16 May	C177C	Southwest China	Chang	B Camera - Excellent
25 May	C187C	South China	Feng	B Camera - Good
20 July	C237C	South China	Feng	B Camera-Good
10 August	C257C	Straits	Chou	B Camera - Fair
20 August	C267C	Straits	Chuang	H Camera - Good
26 August	C277C	South China	Feng	B Camera - Excellent
30 August	C287C	[Redacted]	Chang	Tracker - Poor
8 September	C297C	Shanghai	Huang	B Camera - LOST
13 December	C327C	Northeast China	Chuang	H Camera - Excellent
50X1, E.O.13526				
1968:				
5 January	C018C	Central China	Chang	H Camera - Good
16 March	C058C	Southwest China	Feng	B Camera - Good



ANNEX 113



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IDEALIST/TACKLE

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BYE 2086-65  
Copy 26

13 JAN 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Department of State - Mr. Hughes  
Executive Office of the President - Mr. Jessup  
Department of Defense - Dr. McMillan  
Department of Defense - Colonel Steakley  
Department of the Air Force - Colonel Geary  
Central Intelligence Agency - Dr. Wheelon

SUBJECT: Revision of Operation TACKLE Cover Support  
Plan

REFERENCE: BYE 2763-63, Rev. 1, dated 4 December 1963

1. Although the attached is a revised and updated version of the referenced document, no significant changes have been made in the substance of the cover support plan.

2. Request you review the attached plan and submit any revisions or comments to  SAL/OSA, CIA, (Ext. 7280) by COB on 18 January 1965.

Withheld under statutory authority of the  
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50  
U.S.C., section 403g)


(Signed) Jack C. Ledford

JACK C. LEDFORD  
Colonel USAF

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BYE 2086-65

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COVER SUPPORT TO OPERATION TACKLE

I. OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE:

The operational objective of this mission is high altitude photographic reconnaissance of top priority targets of intelligence and military interest within the Communist China mainland. The instrument to be used to accomplish the mission is the U-2 aircraft.

II. GENERAL OPERATIONAL COVER PLAN:

The mission will be conducted unilaterally by the CHINAT Air Force (CAF) ostensibly without prior knowledge or concurrence of the United States. The U-2 aircraft will carry Chinese Nationalist markings while on the flight and will be flown by a CAF pilot who will be briefed and provided mission instructions by his CAF superiors.

N. B. - U-2 aircraft have been documented as having been sold to the GRC by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Complete documentation of the sale is a matter of record, including sales agreement, bill of sale, export licenses, etc.

III. FOR PURPOSES OF THIS PLAN AND OPERATION THE FOLLOWING AREAS ARE CONSIDERED TO BE:

A. Friendly:

South Vietnam  
Thailand  
South Korea

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B. Hostile:

Communist China and all Communist controlled areas.

IV. POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES:

A. Public protest by Chinese Communists of successful overflight.

1. Both U. S. and GRC will deny knowledge of any such operation.
2. The GRC and the U. S. have already acknowledged the sale of two U-2's to the CHINATS in December of 1960. In the event of a query concerning the sale of additional U-2's by Lockheed to the GRC, the State Department (D/INR will designate a spokesman) will acknowledge that the U. S. Government has issued additional export licenses. Relevant dates may be cited if necessary. (See Para. V).
3. If a question is raised, no attempt should be made to conceal the fact that CHINAT pilots received initial U-2 training in the United States. This is standard procedure for training of foreign personnel in U. S. manufactured aircraft.
4. Action Department - Department of State (D/INR), Washington, D. C.

B. Aircraft comes down in friendly territory or in international waters. Incident becomes public knowledge.

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IDEALIST/TACKLE

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1. GRC states that while on routine training flight, U-2 developed mechanical trouble and had to land or ditch, as the case may be, in the nearest suitable area. The U. S. will say nothing unless specific inquiries are made. If asked, U. S. spokesman will deny all knowledge of the flight.
2. Queries about CHINAT possession of U-2 will be handled as in A-2 above.
3. Action Department - Department of State (D/INR), Washington, D. C.

C. Aircraft comes down over hostile territory. Chinese Communists blame Nationalists.

1. GRC acknowledges the U-2 was CHINAT aircraft on routine reconnaissance mission.
2. U. S. makes no unsolicited comment. If asked, U. S. spokesman will deny any knowledge of the CHINAT operation.
3. U. S. will handle queries about CHINAT possession of U-2 as outlined in A-2 above.
4. Action Department - Department of State (D/INR), Washington, D. C.

D. Aircraft comes down over hostile territory. Chinese Communists blame the U. S.

1. GRC immediately acknowledges the U-2 was a CHINAT aircraft on routine reconnaissance patrol;

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that they had originally purchased U-2's from the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in July 1960; and subsequently had acquired replacement aircraft by direct purchase from Lockheed. The GRC will further state that the U-2's are under the exclusive control of the GRC.

2. U. S. denies any knowledge of the operation; stating that the aircraft was completely under CHINAT control and not assigned to or operated by an American unit.
3. U. S. responds to queries relative to CHINAT possession of the U-2 as outlined in paragraph IV-A-2.
4. Action Department - Department of State (D/INR), Washington, D. C.

E. Press queries regarding replacement of aircraft lost over hostile territory.

1. If a question regarding additional U-2 sales arises as the consequence of the replacement of a lost aircraft (or supplementation of the existing aircraft) the answer will affirm the issuance of appropriate export licenses at the request of Lockheed and may cite the relevant dates if necessary.
2. Action Department - Department of State (D/INR), Washington, D. C.

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V. REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT:

A. Chronology:

1. Two U-2 aircraft were delivered to GRC in December of 1960. These were fully documented and licensed for export.
2. One of the original U-2's was destroyed as a result of a crash on landing on Taiwan on 19 March 1961. There was no publicity attending this incident at the time and another U-2 was substituted without further documentation.
3. The second of the original U-2's was lost over the mainland in September of 1962. At that time there were unsubstantiated references to the previous crash which was described as having occurred about a week prior to the second loss. These allusions, apparently, were based on rumor rather than evidence and were flatly denied by the GRC.
4. In May of 1963 another U-2 was delivered to the GRC with full documentation and under export license.
5. In October of 1963 another U-2 was lost over the mainland, leaving one remaining U-2 in the GRC inventory.
6. In January of 1964 another U-2 was documented and delivered to the GRC.

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ART 352

GRC U-2A LOST ON TRAINING MISSION OFF  
NE COAST FORMOSA, NO PRESS COVERAGE.

2-17-65

GRC U-2 (ART 372) LOST ON TRAINING MISSION  
AT TAI-CHUNG.



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7. In March of 1964 the GRC lost another U-2 on a training flight, however this incident received no publicity and a replacement aircraft was substituted without further documentation.
8. In July of 1964 another U-2 was lost over the mainland. This was the third publicized and acknowledged loss.
9. In September 1964 two additional U-2's, documented and licensed for export, were delivered to the GRC.
10. In January of 1965 another U-2 was lost over the mainland making the fourth publicized and acknowledged loss.
11. At the present time, the GRC has <sup>three</sup> two U-2's. Documentation and export licenses exist for both.
12. The current box score is as follows:

Six U-2's have been documented.

Four U-2's have been publicly lost.

Two U-2's remain in inventory. (THREE AS OF 22/6/65)

B. Response to Query:

1. If a query is received in a public forum or in such manner as to require an official answer, the granting of the export licenses will be frankly acknowledged. To refuse comment would suggest involvement of the U. S. Government in the GRC program.

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2. If the question is asked, "Has the U. S. Government approved the export to the GRC of U-2's additional to those approved in December of 1960?" the response should be essentially as follows:

"Yes, export licenses for the sale of additional U-2's by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation to the GRC have been granted. (Dates may be cited if necessary). This action is not inconsistent with our policy of permitting friendly and allied nations to purchase military equipment from U. S. manufacturers, as they deem it necessary to their national interests. In some instances the U. S. Government furnishes military aid to these nations and in other instances, as in this case, the friendly government negotiates directly with the manufacturer."

3. If the query is in the form of a question as to whether the U. S. will permit additional exports to replace the U-2's which have been lost by the GRC, this will be parried by stating that no application for export license for U-2's is pending and if one is received it will be considered on its merits and under the circumstances existing at that time, just as any export license for export of any military aircraft to allied and friendly nations would be considered.

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4. ACTION: The Department of State will be the responsible office for responding to any queries concerning sale of U-2's or granting of export licenses. The D/INR will designate a spokesman.

VI. COORDINATION OUTSIDE WASHINGTON (ACTION-CIA)

- A. Complete agreement on the handling of the cover story has been worked out with Chiang Kai-shek prior to the operation.
- B. Officials at Lockheed (C. L. Johnson or John Canaday) have been briefed on the handling of inquiries concerning sale of the U-2 to the CHINATS, and will refer all such queries to the Department of State for comment.

- VII. The following named individuals are being furnished a copy of this document for purposes of internal coordination with cleared personnel within their respective departments.

Mr. Thomas Hughes - Department of State  
Dr. Brockway McMillan - Department of Defense  
Col. Ralph D. Steakley - Department of Defense (JCS)  
Mr. Peter Jessup - Executive Office of the President  
Dr. Albert Wheelon - Central Intelligence Agency  
Col. Leo P. Geary - AFIGO-S, Special Projects, USAF

- VIII. It is recommended that each Agency maintain a list of all cleared personnel within their respective organizations who have been briefed on this cover plan.

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IX. The Central Intelligence Agency will notify each Agency of any change to this plan and in turn requests that any alterations be coordinated with the CIA prior to implementation:

Withheld under statutory authority of the  
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50  
U.S.C., section 403g)

CIA CONTACT:  Special Assistant for Liaison

OFFICE TELEPHONE: Code 143 or 351-7280

CIA CONTROL CENTER: Code 143 or 351-5771

HOME TELEPHONE: JA 8-4591

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Withheld under statutory authority of the  
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50  
U.S.C., section 403g)

SAL/OSA/[ ] (12 Jan 65)

Distribution:

- 1 - Mr. Thomas Hughes - Dept. of State
- 2 - Mr. Thomas Hughes - Dept. of State
- 3 - Dr. Brockway McMillan - Under Sec. of Air Force
- 4 - Dr. Brockway McMillan - Under Sec. of Air Force
- 5 - Col. Ralph D. Steakley - JCS
- 6 - Mr. Peter Jessup - Exec. Office of President
- 7 - Mr. Peter Jessup - Exec. Office of President
- 8 - Col. Leo P. Geary - AFIGO-S
- 9 - DD/S&T
- 10 - AD/OSA
- 11 - D/FA/OSA
- 12 - IDEA/OSA
- 13 - CC/OSA
- 14 - [ ] 50X1, E.O.13526 [ ]
- 15 - C. L. Johnson, Lockheed
- 16 - Detachment & //
- 17 - SAL/OSA (Chrono)
- 18 - RB/OSA
- 19 - 26 - SAL/OSA

*Col. Cole*

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ANNEX · 114



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UNITED STATES—CHINESE "PROJECT RAZOR" AGREEMENT

A. PURPOSE:

For the purpose of carrying out photo reconnaissance, airborne electronic collection, and other special airborne operations jointly agreed on against the Chinese Communist and other Asian countries, GRC will cooperate with U. S. side in "Project Razor" and provide the operational base and associated facilities for this project. The purpose of this agreement is to clarify the relationship and establish responsibilities of Chinese and American counterparts on "Project Razor". This agreement is drawn and agreed to by the CAF (for the GRC) and by USATG (for the U. S. ) to guide future operations.

B. EFFECTIVE PERIOD:

The effective period of this agreement is three (3) years. Joint review and negotiations shall be accomplished three (3) months prior to the expiration of this agreement to determine whether the agreement shall be continued. (If in the opinion of either party special new circumstances justify re-examination to determine whether the agreement should be continued, review and consultation may be conducted after twelve (12) months following the effective date of this agreement. If in these circumstances either party decides that the agreement should not continue and so notifies the other party the agreement would remain in effect for three (3) months from such time.)

C. SPECIAL INSTRUMENT AND EQUIPMENT:

1) The U. S. side is responsible for providing special instruments, maintenance, supplying spare parts and furnishing special equipment for the project.

2) Special instruments will use CAF marking and serial numbers when operational missions are launched and recovered on Taiwan, except when operational missions are flown by U. S. pilots.

3) The U. S. side retains the prerogative to remove special instruments, upon notifying the CAF, when required for other U. S. commitments. However, a minimum number of two (2) special instruments will normally be retained to satisfy the purpose of this agreement.

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4) Upon termination of this agreement, the special instruments, spare parts and special equipment for the project may be removed by the U. S. side.

D. BASE AND FACILITIES:

1) GRC will provide the operational base and associated facilities for the project.

2) Any new construction and renovation of existing structures and the installation of equipment must be jointly agreed. The U. S. will finance new construction and renovation costs relating to existing project structures.

3) Title to all permanent construction within the project site area passes to the CAF when neither the CAF nor the U. S. side have further use for the operational area. In that event, however, the U. S. side may remove all fixtures and supplies which it has installed.

4) Under certain circumstances the project site and facilities may be used for operations of interest solely to the U. S. side, but such use will be subject to prior notification, including identification of the general objectives of the activity contemplated, and subject to CAF concurrence.

E. OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

1) The U. S. side is responsible for operational training of CAF pilots of special instruments, and for providing assistance for training of other CAF personnel related to the project as required.

2) A mutually agreed joint target list will be established to satisfy requirements of both parties and may be revised when jointly agreed. The U. S. side will be responsible for planning operational missions based on the joint target list.

3) Operational missions may be requested by either party to be carried out only after mutually agreed on. It is agreed that a suitable number of missions will be flown to satisfy joint requirements.

4) Either party will notify the other party approximately thirty-six (36) hours in advance when operational missions are contemplated



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and route numbers (or general target area) selected. All operational missions must be approved by other party.

5) Personnel of both parties assigned to the component will jointly formulate local operational planning of the mission and participate in local "go-no-go" decisions. All operational activities must be mutually agreed.

6) CAF personnel assigned to the component will conduct pre-mission briefings and post-mission discussions with the primary operators, providing the U. S. side tape recordings and collaborating with U. S. personnel in the component to insure the briefings achieve mutual purpose.

7) The product of the photo operations will normally be processed by the CAF who will provide the U. S. side the original negative. In event of special requirements or circumstances, the U. S. side may process the photo product elsewhere providing the CAF with a duplicate negative. PI reports of each mission flown will be furnished to CAF by the U. S. side.

8) In the event of accident involving the special instruments both parties have the right to conduct on-the-spot investigations. CAF will be responsible for settling all claims arising from damage to persons or property (other than the special instruments) from jointly approved operations. The U. S. side will provide funds for such settlement.

F. PERSONNEL AND SECURITY CONTROL:

1) CAF will assign the necessary number of trained personnel to the component to carry out agreed tasks. These personnel are under control and supervision of the CAF representative. The number of personnel required and the duration of their employment in the component is subject to mutual agreement.

2) U. S. side will provide funds for incentive pay and subsistence benefits for CAF personnel assigned directly to the component. The CAF will be responsible for providing receipts indicating that expenditures are for purposes calculated to improve the over-all performance of the project.

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3) U. S. side will provide death and disability benefits for CAF special instruments pilots assigned to the component, when death or disability occurs to a principal while engaged in jointly agreed operational or training missions. Details of this subject will be developed in another agreement.

4) It is the responsibility of both parties to keep absolute secrecy for the project, and CAF will certify to the other party as to the assigned personnel's reliability, providing biographical information as requested. CAF personnel occupying sensitive project positions at the operating base will be afforded technical interviews as part of the security check process.

5) Operational component chiefs of both parties will jointly work out operational, communications, and security procedures for issuance by appropriate CAF authority.

6) CAF will provide identification passes, documents, and numbers needed to give component personnel and vehicles free entry and exit to the site. A guard force will be provided by CAF for establishing perimeter security control of the component area.

G. ADDITIONAL:

1) Any point not covered in this agreement may be developed by mutual agreement of designated representatives of both parties as an annex of this agreement.

2) This agreement shall become effective on the sixteenth\* of March, 1967.

(\* This date later changed by agreement to the eighteenth.)

(Signed)  
LT. GENERAL YANG SHAO-LIEN  
Chief of Staff, Chinese Air Force  
Representative of CAF

17 March 1967

(Signed)  
HAROLD P. FORD  
Director, United States  
Army Technical Group  
Representative of USATG

17 March 1967

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