



DD *DeLoach*
Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 4678

PAGE 01 BUENOS 04420 071350Z

*file
Argentina
Terrorism*

56
ACTION SCCT-01

INFO OCT-01 ARA-06 ISO-00 SY-05 EB-07 COME-00 SS-15 NSC-05

CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 DODE-00 OPR-02 USSS-00 SP-02

DHA-02 L-03 H-02 OMB-01 PRS-01 PA-01 USIA-06 CCO-00

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039196

R 071245Z JUL 76
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6252

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 4420

F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ASCC, PNS, AR
SUBJECT: REPEATED THREATS TO CHRYSLER CORP. PERSONNEL

1. ON JULY 2, 1976, FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS FURNISHED TO THE LEGAL ATTACHE BY HERB LESHINSKY, MANAGING DIRECTOR, CHRYSLER CORP., BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA: DURING THE PAST WEEK, FOUR CHRYSLER EXECUTIVES RECEIVED THREATENING MIMEOGRAPHED LETTERS FROM THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION. THE MIMEOGRAPHED MESSAGE RECEIVED BY THE CHRYSLER EXECUTIVES INDICATES THAT THIS MESSAGE HAD BEEN DIRECTED TO 2000 INDIVIDUALS IN ARGENTINA. ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE TO MEET WITH LESHINSKY ON 7/5/76, AT WHICH TIME HE WILL PROVIDE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE.

2. LESHINSKY ADVISED THAT PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR BRAZIL ON CHRYSLER BUSINESS APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH AGO, INFORMATION HAD BEEN RECEIVED THAT A TERRORIST CELL HAD BEEN CAPTURED BY SECURITY FORCES, THUS APPARENTLY ABORTING THE PLAN. LESHINSKY INDICATED THAT THE KIDNAP PLAN WAS ASSIGNED A CODE NAME AND WAS EXTREMELY DETAILED. LESHINSKY INDICATED HE WOULD PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DURING THE 7/6/76 MEETING.

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BUENOS 04420 071350Z

3. LESHINSKY INDICATED THAT ON 6/30/76, CHRYSLER SPIRITED AN EXECUTIVE OUT OF THE COUNTRY, AGAINST WHOM SURVEILLANCE HAD BEEN DETECTED FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME. LESHINSKY INDICATED THAT CHRYSLER WAS NOT CERTAIN WHETHER THE SURVEILLANCE HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT BY TERRORISTS OR COMMON CRIMINALS.

4. RSO COMMENTS: HEADS OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS, BOTH US CITIZENS AND ARGENTINES, HAVE CONTINUALLY RECEIVED THREATS FROM TERRORISTS ELEMENTS. SUCH THREATS CANNOT BE TAKEN LIGHTLY SINCE PREVIOUS VICTIMS OF BOTH ASSASSINATIONS AND KIDNAPPINGS HAVE BEEN KNOWN TO RECEIVE REPEATED THREATS PRIOR THE INCIDENT OCCUR.
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PAGE 01 BUENOS 02738 271221Z

53
ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PH-24 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 L-03 CIAE-00
DUDE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 PA-01 USIA-06 PRS-01 SY-05
USSS-00 /060 W

006190

R 262112Z APR 76
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5395

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 2738

R.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, SHUM, ASEC, AR
SUBJECT: GENERAL VIDELA BEGINS TO CONTROL RIGHT-WING TERRORISM?
REF: BUENOS AIRES 2528

1. FOLLOWING VIDELA MEETING WITH SENIOR GENERALS IN WHICH HE MADE CLEAR HIS DESIRE THAT RIGHT-WING TERRORISM BE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL (REF A), LEGATT SOURCES REPORT THAT CORPS COMMANDERS, TAKING VIDELA'S ADMONITIONS TO HEART, CRACKED DOWN ON POLICE UNITS WHICH HAD BEEN CARRYING OUT EXTRALEGAL REPRISALS AGAINST SUSPECTED TERRORISTS. ARMY OFFICERS WENT SO FAR AS TO REMOVE FROM POLICE CONTROL THOSE ARRESTED TERRORISTS WHO SHOWED SIGNS OF MALTREATMENT, TRANSFERRING THEM TO MILITARY BASES WHERE THEY ARE NOW RECEIVING PROPER MEDICAL ATTENTION. IN ADDITION, MILITARY COMMANDERS ARE NOW ENGAGED IN PRODUCING ON PRIORITY BASIS COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF THOSE PERSONS WHO HAVE BEEN DETAINED ON POLITICAL, SUBVERSIVE OR CORRUPTION CHARGES SINCE COUP. WHILE UNDER PRESSURE FROM VIDELA TO PRODUCE LIST BY END OF THIS WEEK, IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT THERE MAY BE SOME SLIPPAGE AS MILITARY COMMANDERS TRY TO FIND OUT WHAT HAPPENED TO THOSE PERSONS ORIGINALLY LISTED AS ARRESTED BY POLICE BUT NOW UNACCOUNTED FOR.

2. ~~ON APRIL 23 A GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED THAT IN THE FUTURE THE PRESS COULD NOT, WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORIZATION FROM~~

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 BUENOS 02738 271221Z

~~THE GOVERNMENT, PUBLISH ACCOUNTS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS OR PUBLISH REPORTS ABOUT ROUTES FOUND AND PRESUMED TO BE THE WORK OF SOME TERRORIST ORGANIZATION. THE SPOKESMAN WHO RELEASED THIS INFORMATION NOTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT FELT ITSELF TO BE "IN A STATE OF WAR" AND WAS TAKING THIS ACTION TO DENY TERRORISTS PUBLICITY THEY NEED TO KEEP THEIR MOVEMENTS GOING. IT WAS NOT, HE EMPHASIZED, RELATED TO ANY BROADER ISSUE OF PRESS CENSORSHIP.~~

3. COMMENT: FACT THAT ARMY COMMANDERS HAVE MOVED TO CURB RIGHT-WING VIOLENCE AND HAVE GONE SO FAR AS TO ACT AGAINST POLICE SEEN AS VERY ENCOURAGING SIGN BY POLITICAL OBSERVERS. EMBASSY POLITICAL CONTACTS ACROSS BROAD SPECTRUM OF PARTIES CONTINUE TO VOICE THEIR "SURPRISE" THAT MILITARY ACTING IN SUCH MODERATE MANNER. WITH REGARD TO PRESS, REPORTING OF TERRORISM IS CAUSING CONCERN AS OBSERVERS WAIT TO SEE HOW THIS NEW ACTION WILL WORK OUT IN PRACTICE.
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Argentina
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43/44
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FR AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECRETARY WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0111
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CONFIDENTIAL COPY (TEXT PARA F AND PARA D)

E.O. 11652: ODS
CLASS: ASEC, PINS, RIA, AS
SUBJECT: EVASION TARGET PROFILE DIPLOMAT

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DIVISION

1. FOLLOWING THE DEPARTURE OF [REDACTED], A MAJOR HOSTAGE TO
LEADER, THE EXECUTIVE SEARCH COMMITTEE HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE
DANGER TO AMERICAN EMPLOYEES IS HIGHER NOW THAN IN THE PAST
FIVE YEARS. FURTHER, THAT THIS INCREASED THREAT WILL BE TEMPORARY,
BEING TO LAST ABOUT TWO OR THREE YEARS.

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3. THE FOLLOWING TEMPORARY (OR TO A FURTHER) ACTIONS HAVE BEEN RECOMMENDED AND ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY.

A. ALL AMERICANS ARE TO DRASTICALLY CHANGE THEIR DAILY ROUTINES.

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REF NO 207402 20200 1410312

THIS INCLUDES VARYING ARRIVAL AT JOBS BY AS MUCH AS FOUR HOURS.

B. WHEN NECESSARY, AMERICANS ARE TO GO THEIR WORK IN THEIR HOMES. THIS SHOULD ALLOW HALF-DAYS IN OFFICE ON YOUR ALTERNATE DATES OF NON-COMMUTING.

C. NON-ESSENTIAL WORK SHOULD BE DELAYED SO EMPLOYEES CAN STAY IN THEIR HOMES.

D. THREE EXTRA PATROL/ESCORT CARS WITH GUARDS ARE BEING PLACED TO PROVIDE FOLLOW-CARS AND ESCORT SERVICE. TWO WILL BE PLACED IN SUBURBAN AREA AND ONE IN FEDERAL DISTRICT. ALL EMPLOYEES WHO CAN WILL USE THESE VEHICLES TO EITHER FOLLOW THEIR VEHICLE FROM HOME TO MAJOR TRAFFIC FLOW AREA OR AS TRANSPORTATION FROM HOME TO VARIOUS POINTS FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION.

E. A SPECIAL CAR WITH ONE GUARD HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO POLITICAL COMMISSAR AND CONSUL GENERAL. THESE OFFICERS, LIVE NEAR EACH OTHER AND WILL COORDINATE USE OF THE VEHICLE SO THEY MAY VARY THEIR ROUTINE.

F. ONE GUARD WILL BE PROVIDED FOR TWO MILGROUP AND ONE CAR OFFICER UNDER SITUATIONS PLACE THEM IN GREATER DANGER THAN OTHERS. ONE CHIEF OFFICER BEING MOVED TO TEMPORARY QUARTERS.

G. ALL EMPLOYEES ARE INSTRUCTED TO CANCEL OR POSTPONE LARGE SOCIAL EVENTS.

H. COUNTRY TEAM MEETING SCHEDULED FOR JANUARY 14TH WILL BE HELD AT AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE.

I. AMBASSADOR WILL'S SCHEDULE IS HELD TO A MINIMUM. HIS PLANS HAD ALREADY INVOLVED TRIP TO U.S. JERKING EVENING OF JANUARY 14 AND RETURNING JANUARY 24TH.

J. ALL EMPLOYEES WHO CAN ARE URGED TO ADVANCE VACATION PLANS TO HAVE THEM OUT OF CITY OR AT LEAST IN THEIR HOMES DURING THIS PERIOD.

K. EMPLOYEES ARE INSTRUCTED TO REMAIN IN THEIR HOMES AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. SWIRE COMMITTEE DOES NOT FEEL DEPENDABLE

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REF ID: AUC-93 60737 141,317

ANY PARTICULARLY THREATENED, THEY ARE ENCOURAGED TO STAY IN THE AREA UNLESS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

THE ADMIN COLLECTOR IS TO ADVISE ALL RETIREES REGARDING THE COST OF EXTRA PROCEEDINGS SO EACH AGENCY MAY ADVISE TO THE EXTENT OF OBLIGATIONS ALREADY COMMITTED.

AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, THE MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE MISSION WILL NOT WEAR UNIFORMS.
JALL

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AIRGRAM

P760 075-2130

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| RS/R | REP | AF | ARA |
| EUR | FE | NEA | CU |
| INR | E | P | IO |
| AGR | COM | FRB | INT |
| LAB | TAR | TR | XMB |
| AIR | ARMY | NAVY | OSD |
| USIA | NSA | CIA | |

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Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files (28) FILE DESIGNATION

~~SECRET~~

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS ASEC, PINS, AR

INFO Amembassy Panama
Panama Pass RSS

FROM Amembassy, Buenos Aires DATE May 14, 1976

SUBJECT Security Watch Committee Meetings, Jan - Feb 1976

REF

SECRET

FLA

SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION

I. On January 12, 1976, a meeting of the Security Watch Committee was called by the A/DCM. Representatives from the following sections or agencies attended POL [redacted] DAO, MILGRP, ADMIN, SY and LEGATT

The RSO brought to the attention of the Committee the fact that a high ranking Montonero (Quieto) had been taken into custody and that this could affect the security posture of the Embassy staff. Other members of the Committee revealed that "Quieto" was in the hands of the military, that the Montoneros were on the alert for defensive purposes and could take action in order to obtain his release. There was a general agreement that the Committee could not identify the nature of the action which possibly would be forthcoming. The possibilities of kidnapping and random assassination were discussed. The RSO pointed out the possibility of an attack on the Residence for the purpose of holding it and the Ambassador until release of "Quieto" was secured. The fact that the garden wall of the grounds of the residence was susceptible to penetration by a group attack was brought to the Committee's attention.

| POST ROUTING | | | |
|--------------|--------|------|----------|
| TO | Action | Info | Initials |
| AMB/PO | | | |
| DCM | | | |
| POL | | | |
| ECON | | | |
| CONS | | | |
| ADM | | | |
| AID | | | |
| USIS | | | |
| FILE | | | |

Declassified Case: 17F 52966 Date: 11-02-2013

1976 MAY 21 PM 5 06

Action Taken

Date

Initials

FORM 10-64 DS 323

~~SECRET~~

For Department Use Only

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|----------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|---|
| Drafted by SY:GSBecket | Drafting Date 5-3-76 | Phone No 148 | Contents and Classification Approved by AMB RCHill |
| Clearances Staff (in draft) | | DCM MChaplin | |

The Committee agreed the possibility of kidnapping would be the greatest threat. Random assassination was considered a lower level threat. A possible attack on the Residence was considered unlikely because terrorists in this area have no history of such acts and because of the guard force which is present.

The fact that copies of the November 1975 issue of NACLA are known to be in Buenos Aires was brought before the Committee. This issue alleged that Embassy members belong to the CIA and identified individuals by name, some are still on the staff.

The following was the consensus of the Committee:

- A. an immediate danger exists for American staff members
- B. the threat level to staff members is at the highest it has been for several years.
- C. the threat profile of all staff members has increased across the board; therefore, all should take precautions.

Also discussed were the following points:

- A. Missions with a lesser protective program than the American Embassy could have a higher target profile.
- B. The U.S. position on kidnapping is clear, i.e. should a staff member be kidnapped the demands of the terrorists will not be met. Therefore, the taking of a diplomat from another country may appear to be more fruitful to the terrorists since negotiations could be possible.
- C. Concern was expressed with respect to military members wearing uniforms.
- D. The Committee agreed that a message should be sent advising the incoming U.S. Military, Inspector General's team it could be necessary to postpone their visit depending on the political climate. The team was to be advised at a later date.

The Committee agreed on the following measures to be recommended to the Ambassador:

- A. All Americans are to drastically change their daily routines. This includes varying arrival at work by as much as four hours.
- B. When possible, Americans are to do their work in their homes. This should allow half-days in office or even alternate dates of non-commuting.

- C. Non-essential work should be delayed so employees can stay in their homes
- D. Three extra patrol/escort cars with armed guards are required to provide follow-cars and escort service. Two will be placed in suburban area and one in Federal District. All employees who can will use these vehicles to either follow their vehicle from home to major traffic flow area or as transportation from home to varying points for public transportation.
- E. A special car with one guard to be assigned to political counselor and consul general. These officers live near each other and will coordinate use of the vehicle so they may vary their routine.
- F. Bodyguards to be provided for two Milgroup and [redacted] whose functions place them in greater danger than others. One Milgrp officer to be moved to temporary quarters.
- G. All employees to be instructed to cancel or postpone large social events.
- H. Country Team meeting scheduled for January 14 to be held at Ambassador's Residence.
- I. Ambassador Hill's scheduled should be held to a minimum. His plans already involved trip to U.S. beginning evening of January 14 and returning January 24.
- J. All employees who can should be urged to advance vacation plans to have them out of the city or at least in their homes during this period.
- K. Employees should be instructed to remain in their homes as much as possible.
- L. Admin Counselor is to advise all agencies asap the total cost of extra procedures so each agency may ask for funding to cover obligations already committed.
- M. As much as possible, the military members of the Mission should not wear uniforms.

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 NGA

The Ambassador joined the meeting and the above mentioned recommendations were presented. The Ambassador advised he would take the recommendations under consideration. He directed the Committee to reconvene on January 13, 1976 for his decision with respect to the recommendations. In addition, he queried the Committee concerning the advisability of approaching the Foreign Office with respect to the elevated

threat level The Committee advised against this because it could be hazardous to sources of some of the information supplied to the Committee [redacted]

[redacted] The meeting was adjourned

II. On January 13, 1976, the Committee was reconvened. In addition to those present on January 12, the Consul General joined the group, and was briefed on the Committee proceedings of January 12.

The Ambassador and Counselor for Political Affairs reported on a visit to the Papal Nuncio which included his opinion on and observations of the President of the GOA and his opinion of the threat as related to the "Quieto" matter.

The Ambassador advised the Committee that he approved the Security recommendations made on January 12 and that the Department was to be informed of the action being taken. In addition, he directed the Committee to consider the following and advise him of its recommendations:

- A. The upcoming visit of Major General Willis D. Crittenberger, DIA and related receptions.
- B. The target posture of the Legatt; [redacted] and the Labatt.
- C. The target posture of members of the military.

E025x1

The Ambassador departed the meeting. The Committee considered the above described points and made the following recommendations:

- A. The Crittenberger trip should continue as planned with the Security Office providing the necessary protection through Federal Police and contract guards.
- B. Labor Attache would work on a half-day broken schedule in the office, performing the remainder of his work away from the Chancery with no set hours.
- C. [redacted] who is due to commence leave on 1-25-76, would exercise a wide variation in his work hours and travel habits until that date.
- D. The Legal Attache advised the Committee he would be traveling out of country 80% of the time over the next several weeks. The Committee agreed this would be a reasonable variation of his schedule.
- E. Military personnel would not wear uniforms to their offices and would vary their working times and travel habits.

The RSO informed the Committee that one member of the Milgrp had requested permission to move his family into a hotel for the next two or three weeks. His request was based on the fact that he is an intelligence officer and has worn his uniform displaying the intelligence insignia. In addition, the GOA military headquarters where he works is not well protected and has been bombed. The Milgrp Commander recommended the move and the Committee supported the recommendation.

The Chairman, A/DCM, closed the meeting after informing the Committee he would advise the Ambassador of the above mentioned recommendations.

III. On January 15, 1976, a meeting of the Security Watch Committee was called by the Chargé d'Affaires. Representatives from the following sections and agencies attended: POL, [redacted] USIS, ADMIN, SY, LEGATT and DAO. In addition, Lt. Col. Jack Smith, Milgrp, was present.

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A general discussion took place concerning information given the Ambassador by an Argentine national that "Quieto" had been executed. Members of the Committee revealed that "Quieto" had been alive as of the evening of January 14, 1976. Based on the information furnished, it was the assumption of the Committee that "Quieto" had not been executed.

Two memorandums received by the Security Office from Lt. Col. Jack Smith, Milgrp, were made available to the Committee and are quoted below.

January 12: This date at approximately 10:15 hours, unknown male arrived at the headquarters of the U.S. Army Section located in the Comando in Jefe 250 Azopardo and inquired if that office (which is located on the second floor) needed additional security. The person acting as a receptionist, Enrique Bullrich, was suspicious of the inquiry. He asked if the man had identification and had proceeded upstairs through the MPs. The man replied that he had not but wanted to know only if the office wanted additional security. Bullrich directed the man downstairs to check in with the MPs and as the man departed he replied, "Well I really wanted the Chilean delegation".

January 15. At 9.35 hours this date the above mentioned departed his quarters at 316 Fernandez Sprio, Acassuso, in a Ford Falcon Station Wagon to go to Martinez. I drove my car East on Fernandez-Sprio and did not turn right on Lopez y Planes because that is a congested area and a dangerous point to enter Avenida Libertador. I proceeded one block further to Martin Coronado and began to turn right in order to approach Libertador. As I turned right, parked to my left and facing North (in the opposite direction from which my car was oriented) was a dark green Ford Falcon, dirty, new with a license plate which began with a C and occupied by three males. As soon as my car began to turn right the other car immediately began to proceed North. It appeared that the presence of my car caused the other car to leave. The three occupants of the car were young (between 20 and 26) with open shirts, long hair and obviously were not those normally encountered in this area. The bodyguard who accompanies me does not believe that they are private bodyguards and he further indicates from his experience in the zone that he did not recognize any of the faces. It was apparent to both my bodyguard and myself that these three people were located on that street for some other reason than simply to be waiting in a parked car. We called control on the radio and within two minutes two radio cars were in front of my house and the zone was reconned and subject automobile could not be found. Control inquired of several maids and people in the area and to their knowledge there is no privately employed custodia for any of the immediate inhabitants of the area.

In addition to the above, Colonel Smith advised that he had visited his newly acquired quarters approximately 25 times in 25 days. He stated that some of the trips to his quarters had been made from Army HQ while some were made from the Embassy and it was possible he could have been picked up and followed to the living quarters.

The Milgrp Commander recommended that Colonel Smith remain in his hotel until appropriate security measures (necessary door and window locks, etc.) were completely installed in the house. In addition, he recommended that a guard be placed on the quarters for a 24-hour period.

The Watch Committee concurred with the recommendations of the Commander of the Milgrp.

IV On January 19, 1976, the Watch Committee was convened with the following attending: A/DCM and representatives from ADMIN, ECON, DEA, POL, [redacted] DAO, MILGRP, CONS, and SY

E025x1

Milgrp representative advised that the IG inspection team apparently acting on the message from post, had cancelled its visit for January 26. The Committee was requested to consider the possibility of proposing to the inspection team that they reestablish their plans for a visit to Buenos Aires.

Recommendation Committee recommended that a message be sent requesting IG inspection team to reschedule their trip for Buenos Aires on January 26. In addition it was to be noted that if conditions worsened, the trip could be cancelled at any time.

RSO advised the Committee that it was known that the student directory at the Lincoln School had been used as a source of information for terrorist elements. This particular publication contains the name of the staff member and child, staff member's position at the Embassy, home address and home telephone number.

One Committee member advised that he thought possibly publications from such organizations as the American Women's Club, University Women's Group, etc could contain similar information. A suggestion was made that only phone numbers should be entered in these publications. RSO pointed out that a residence phone number published without the address provided little or no security. Published in Buenos Aires and already available are reverse listings and should an individual have the telephone number, the address can be extracted from the reverse directory. Another suggestion was made that all addresses and phone numbers of Embassy personnel be totally eliminated from the Lincoln School directory. Several members of the Committee objected to this, advising that it would make it difficult for their family and children to participate in such things as the scouting movement, little league baseball and other school related activities. Members of the Committee did agree that distribution of the publication could not be controlled since non-U.S. Embassy employees are provided copies of the directory.

Recommendation: The Committee recommended that the RSO contact the school administrator and request his support in

deleting from the directory everything except the student's name and his home telephone number. It was also recommended that any Embassy staff member could have this information deleted from the directory by sending a formal letter of request to the school.

It was suggested that the radio call sign list which reflects the call sign of all Embassy employees, employee's last name, address and telephone number, and department assigned, be reprinted and distributed to each American member of the Embassy by number in order to control the distribution.

Recommendation The Committee recommended that the above suggestion be adopted.

The meeting was closed by the Chairman.

V. On January 27, 1976 a Watch Committee meeting was called to order by the A/DCM with the following agencies or sections represented POL CONS, MILGRP. EO25x1

Milgrp Commander brought before the Committee the suggestion that Lt. Cols Smith and Gracy be permitted to move back into their homes from the hotels. Smith indicated that he had already returned to his home but that Gracy remained in the hotel.

Recommendation The Committee recommended that both members of the Milgrp return to their homes from the hotels.

Commander of the Milgrp brought before the Committee for consideration the bodyguards assigned to Lt. Cols. Smith and Gracy. It was pointed out that both these individuals occupy highly sensitive positions and spend much of their working day in the Argentine Army Annex which does not have very stringent security measures.

Recommendation. The Committee recommended that the bodyguards assigned to Cols Smith and Gracy be retained.

Special security measures which had been enacted as a result of the January 13th Security Watch Committee meeting were brought under discussion. The fact that these measures (i.e. 3 additional patrol cars for the purpose of providing escort services) had been established for a two week period was considered. The pros and cons of continuing the special measures or eliminating them were discussed.

The fact that no information had been received during the two week period which would indicate that the level of the threat had decreased was a factor brought to light

Recommendation: The Committee recommended that the special augmentation of the security element, three patrol cars, be continued for an additional week and that during this time an attempt would be made to assess the level of the threat

At this point the Ambassador joined the meeting. He presented to the Committee State cable #283548, subject - U.S. Policies During Abductions of Americans. He requested the Committee to consider the telegram and make any recommendations it felt necessary for inclusion in a message to the Department

The RSO indicated that he strongly believed that the Department should consider taking a position on U.S. companies paying ransom for kidnap victims. It was pointed out that the paying of such ransom has not only a national but a moral implication that the money paid to terrorists in countries such as Argentina is used to finance other terrorist actions, supplying arms and bringing about the deaths of countless other people.

The Consular General expressed his support of this opinion and further stated that he felt it would be appropriate for companies paying such ransom to be fined by the U.S. Government.

He further stated that consideration should be given to bringing about an IRS ruling which would preclude such companies from gaining any tax benefit from paying the ransom

Recommendation. The Committee recommended that the RSO prepare a proposal to be forwarded to the Department concerning the Department taking a position in opposition to American companies paying blackmail money in terrorist kidnappings

The meeting was adjourned

VI. On February 3, 1976 the Watch Committee was convened with the A/DCM as Chairman. Representatives of the following agencies or sections attended: POL [redacted] LEGATT, DEA, DAO, MILGRP, ADMIN and SY. E025x1

The initial item considered by the Committee was whether the extra security precautions, three patrol cars and bodyguards for Lt. Cols. Smith and Gracy, [redacted] Pol. Couns. Smith, Cons. Gen. Huey should be continued. The RSO explained that

a decision had to be made whether or not to retain these additional services permanently because the contract guard service had strained its resources to the limit in providing the service for the three week period. It was pointed out that should the additional services be required, an additional 21 men would have to be hired by the guard service. Should these additional people be hired and perform duties for one day, and subsequently be discharged, it would be necessary for the Embassy to pay for their services for a 4 month period, according to Argentine law.

Recommendation The Committee recommended that the three additional patrol cars be eliminated. In addition, it was recommended that bodyguards on Lt. Cols. Gracy and Smith, [redacted] Cons. Gen. Huey and Pol. Couns W. Smith be eliminated.

Committee members were informed that the Embassy had received a bomb threat and the meeting was adjourned.

VII On February 4, 1976 the Watch Committee was convened by the A/DCM. The following sections and agencies were represented POL [redacted] MILGRP, DAO, DEA, ADMIN and SY. E025x1

The Chairman, A/DCM, opened the meeting by making the following general recommendations.

- 1) Accept the principle that roving patrols can replace a system of a mixture of static guards and roving patrols with the understanding that individual agencies can pay for exceptions;
- 2) Direct contract guard service not to hire additional personnel,
- 3) Temporarily cancel additional roving patrols which were implemented 3 weeks ago for escort service,
- 4) Cancel static guards immediately on all dwellings in the suburbs except those specified by heads of agencies to the SY Office,
- 5) Direct the contract guard service to construct a mobile patrol service providing escort service and making every effort to use personnel who had been relieved from static guard duties. Individuals who could not make the transition would be terminated,
- 6) Cancel bodyguards on [redacted] and two MILGRP officers,
- 7) Maintain one bodyguard on the Cons. Gen. and the Chief of the political section

The question was raised before the Committee as to whether anything was available in writing whereby the Department or any other agency had directed a cutting back in security funds. The heads of the agencies present revealed such instructions had not been received from their headquarters in writing.

MILGRP Commander stated that until more information was produced indicating that such instructions had been received, it was his desire to retain the static guards and keep the present security system in force. He further stated that members of his unit had advised him that prior to departing for Buenos Aires, their respective military elements had promised them bodyguards and/or house guards. These individuals indicated that should such be removed, they would be requesting transfers from Buenos Aires for themselves and their dependents. He stated it was the general opinion that with the removal of the static guards security would be decreased.

The Chairman brought to the group's attention the fact that it should focus first on the dropping of the special measures, three mobile patrol cars and bodyguards, which had been initiated 3 weeks previously.

Recommendation The Committee recommended dropping the guard service which had been started 3 weeks previously (January 13). In addition, it recommended that the security system remain as it had been prior to the institution of the additional patrol cars and that static guards not be removed. The meeting was adjourned.

VIII. On February 12, 1976 the Security Watch Committee was convened by the A/DCM with the following agencies or sections present. CONS, USIS, ADMIN, DAO, MILGRP, GSO and SY. E025x1

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss a new contract guard system, total mobile force, which had been supplied to Committee members by memorandum dated February 10, 1976 (Attachment No. 1).

The general discussion considered such items as the cutback in response time to quarters by the increased mobile patrol, elimination of target visibility by removal of static guards,

the making available to staff members a mobile escort service to and from their quarters; the increasing frequency in which guard vehicles would pass in front of individual quarters, a more heavily armed force which could respond to problems at staff houses, and types of alarms that could be used between houses and mobile patrols. It was the opinion of the Committee that more information was needed on cost factors

Recommendation. The Committee recommended that Budget and Fiscal prepare more extensive cost factors of the recommended mobile system as they would pertain to specific agencies.

The RSO raised the question of consolidating Embassy personnel into staff housing for greater security. He pointed out that by using the staff housing method, employed successfully in other countries, the Security Office believed a greater degree of security could be obtained at much less cost. In addition, it was pointed out that the recommended mobile patrol system would reduce security costs approximately \$237,000 annually


Recommendation. The Committee recommended against staff housing as an improved security measure. In general, the Committee's position was that staff housing would not necessarily bring about improved security conditions.

IX. On February 18, 1976, the Security Watch Committee was convened by the A/DCM, presiding as Chairman. The following individuals and representatives of sections or agencies were present: Ambassador, DAO, ADMIN, MILGRP, LEGATT, [REDACTED] ECON, USIS, NCOIC, MSG, POL and SY.

E025x1

Initial item brought before the Committee was material found in a terrorist operational center which were believed to concern the American Embassy and its staff

- a) U.S. diplomatic list, current spring 1975, reflecting Embassy staff member and position,
- b) U.S. diplomatic list, believed current in 1967,
- c) list of GOA law enforcement personnel trained by AID, initially prepared in U.S. Embassy and reflecting updated material as recently as 18 months ago;
- d) photograph of Ambassador and Mrs. Hill talking with Foreign Minister Vignez,
- e) list of service stations used by U.S. MILGRP vehicles,
- f) copy of letter from U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Buenos Aires,

- g) list of license plates used by U S MILGRP cars prepared on Embassy stationery,
- h) call signs and address location used by Embassy prior to the spring of 1974,
- i) movements of an officer, A. Hollis, during a specific period in 1970;
- j)  E025x1
- k) a reprint of an article dealing with a U.S. Air Force group which had been stationed in Mendoza for a short period of time.

The LEGATT suggested that much of the material could have come from the holding up of an Embassy MILGRP security patrol car in the early 1970's. He stated that such had occurred and that such documents as the call signs were known to be in the patrol car at the time. In general, the Committee agreed that the material taken from the terrorist operation unit was out of date except for the 1975 diplomatic list. Examination of the photograph of this particular list revealed that the actual document copied apparently was the draft of the list which was published by the GOA Foreign Office. The consensus was that though the information was old, it would indicate a considerable effort was being made to collect information on Embassy personnel. This, coupled with the fact that the actual document confiscated by the police was a micro-film, lent credence to the fact that a distinct effort was being directed toward Embassy personnel.

One Committee member pointed out that he had information indicating that the terrorists were planning action against Embassy personnel to include the Chancery, Residence and our new construction site. Also, that it had been reported the terrorists considered the congestion of the present Chancery location is to their advantage.

Based on the information furnished, the RSO made the following suggestions to the Committee to improve security measures at the Chancery.

- a) a contract guard be posted on the present Chancery roof 24 hours a day
- b) the furniture be removed from the outer lobby/reception area and a gate, controlled by an electric lock, be installed in order to prevent visitors from surrounding the guard conducting examinations of parcels and individuals; the electric lock for this gate to be controlled by the receptionist,

- c) an electric lock be installed on the bulletproof glass doors which would be controlled by the Marine Guard who would not admit individuals until they had been cleared by the contract guard,
- d) return to use of the double door system at the vehicle entrance ramp to preclude entrance being gained to the Chancery,
- e) the Security Office be authorized to obtain the necessary personnel, scuba diver if necessary, to examine the cavities underneath the present Chancery To date ADMIN has been unable to obtain blueprints identifying the size and purpose of these cavities
- f) all individuals not currently on active duty with the USG and who could not furnish identification of such, be under escort while in the building and, if necessary, the present 3 escorts be increased to 5

A general discussion on these topics followed which resulted in the following recommendations

- a) a contract guard be placed on the roof of the Chancery and this position established as a 24 hour post,
- b) the furniture be removed from the outer lobby, access control barrier be constructed with electric lock controlled by receptionist, and electric lock controlled by MSG be placed on bulletproof doors,
- c) the Embassy return to the double door system in controlling vehicular entrance and exit,
- d) the necessary effort be made to examine the cavities under the Chancery, and
- e) that individuals, other than active duty USG employees, be under escort while in the building, and the present escort service not be increased unless such was found to be necessary

The next item brought before the Committee was a dinner-dance which had been planned by Ambassador and Mrs. Hill for all U.S. personnel on February 25, 1976

Recommendation. The Ambassador to be advised that the Committee recommended against holding the dinner-dance at this time.

X On February 25, 1976 the Security Watch Committee was convened by the A/DCM Representatives from the following agencies and sections attended MILGRP, [redacted] DAO, DEA, ADMIN, POL, ECON and SY

The Ambassador announced that the Department had proposed the assignment of Maxwell Chaplin as DCM in Buenos Aires The Ambassador advised that Mr Chaplin was expected to arrive at post on or about March 15 The Ambassador informed the Committee that his initial views concerning the proposed change in the security system had been made known to both the A/DCM and Acting Counselor for ADMIN. He requested that, if necessary, his views be presented to the group during the course of the discussion. The Ambassador departed the meeting following his comments

The initial topic taken under consideration was the proposed change in the contract security guard program as applied to the Embassy staff This program had previously been recommended by the Security Office (Attachment No 1 dated 2/10/76) In summary this proposal encompassed the converting of the present mobile patrol/static guard system to a total mobile force The recommendation proposed a four-car system in the suburbs, a three-car system in the Federal Capital and a supervisory car providing control of both elements The recommendation noted that if the static guards were completely deleted and the mobile patrol system installed, a savings of approximately \$237,000 would be realized in security expenditures The determination as to static guards on individual quarters was left to the individual agencies.

When the proposal was initially brought to the attention of the Watch Committee, the Committee requested a breakdown by agency of the shared administrative cost which would result from the activation of the mobile patrol system Added to the memorandum dated February 10, 1976 is the estimated specific cost per agency, as prepared by Budget and Fiscal This cost analysis was supplied to each member of the Committee.

The A/DCM stated he felt the Committee should note the fact that any elevation in security cost factors at the post could be received negatively by Washington and that the Department's response to such an action could result in a recommended drawdown of staff

Following the DCM's remarks, the Security Officer advised the Committee that in spite of budget considerations he had the responsibility of recommending to the Committee measures to provide protection for staff members. It was also pointed out that the security program is not uniform. For example, security efforts are heavier in the suburbs than in the Capital; the degree of security provided single staff members is a great deal less than that provided staff accompanied by dependents, and individual staff members have commented on these factors to the Security Officer.

The recommended revised system was taken under discussion by the Committee. [REDACTED] MILGRP representatives pointed out that the proposed system had been discussed with members of their groups. Their members felt that the static guards on individual residences should not be discontinued; that the profile of a residence which had a static guard would seriously be changed with his removal. In addition, it was noted that individual staff members accustomed to static guards would feel that their security was being reduced should these positions be deleted. Further, it was the opinion of MILGRP members that the static guard offered a greater degree of security since he was permanently located at the residence; was familiar with its occupants, servants and visitors; was cognizant of the neighbors, familiar with automobiles associated with the environment, and was on the outside of the house to give warning to the occupants in the event of a problem.

The Security Officer brought to the Committee's attention the fact that there was always a trade-off in a change of security procedures. It was explained that, based on existing records, the proposed patrol system could be expected to result in a patrol car passing in front of each house in the suburbs 26 or more times in any given 24 hour period. (Estimate based on current pattern which averages 14 times daily.) In addition, the Committee was advised that under the proposed system response time to any house to meet an emergency was estimated at approximately three minutes or less. (Estimate based on current data recording response time between points and reduced in proportion to the number of patrol cars.) It was pointed out that under the recommended system, armament of cars would be increased to provide a responding force with a greater weapon capability. The Committee was advised that the escort service of individuals leaving or returning to

quarters could be resumed under the recommendation. Historically, with respect to the U S community, kidnappings had normally taken place when an individual was leaving or returning to his quarters or place of business. It was the opinion of the Security Office that these were the most critical points in an individual's security. The point was also presented that in the case of the kidnapping and murder of Egan, the dissident group, upon arriving at Egan's home, had attempted to find and eliminate the static guard. Also brought before the Committee was the fact that should a commando type effort be made on a quarters in which dissident elements employed a group of 10-15 individuals, the static guard would be virtually useless from a defensive point of view.

[redacted] MILGRP members noted that they considered the escort service essential. [redacted] further stated that they had made use of the existing patrol for escort purposes and questioned that such service was not now available.

The Security Office advised that a review of the present patrol car logs revealed that patrol cars were being pulled out of their zones for 45 minutes or more in order to perform escort duties for single automobiles. It was further stated that approximately one-third of the individuals residing in the suburbs do not have static guards on their quarters and that the removal of any one of the three existing patrol cars reduces the security for all individuals concerned in order to provide protection for a single member. The Security Officer also stated that he could not support this policy and that escort service could not be provided under the existing system.

[redacted] MILGRP stated they would recommend increasing the patrol system in the suburbs in order to obtain escort service. The Committee was also advised that both units would observe the new patrol service in the suburbs and that if their staffs felt the patrol service was adequate, then a procedure for removing the static guards from the individual quarters and reducing the individual agency's cost would be placed in effect. The Security Office pointed out that the purpose of recommending the total mobile force was to reduce static guards, provide more uniform security, and make available an escort service. The Committee was advised that implementation of the recommended patrol system, without the reduction of static guards, would bring about an approximate \$80,000 increase in the annual security cost.

Recommendation The Committee unanimously approved the recommendation that the patrol service in the suburbs be increased from its present three to four cars with reinforced personnel as defined in Attachment 1, with no reduction in static guards at this time.

The recommendation of the Security Office pertaining to the revision of the system in the Federal Capital, as outlined in Attachment 1, was brought under discussion. The Security Office pointed out that within the Federal Capital there are 52 different residences of which 8 are individual dwellings. As contained in the recommendation, the Committee was advised that the present single patrol car, supported part-time by a supervisory car, be increased to a three car system. One patrol would operate north of the Spanish Monument located on Sarmiento Street, a second patrol car would operate south of the Monument. The third unit would be free lance, operating across both zones and providing support as needed. In addition, the Committee was advised that these cars would provide escort service to members traveling in automobiles, and transport service to staff members desiring to be carried to train stations, bus stops or subway stations. The recommendation was discussed in conjunction with the cost factor as outlined in Attachment 1. It was the general consensus of the Committee that escort service was not desired nor would be used by staff members residing in the Federal Capital. The Counselor for Political Affairs departed the meeting to discuss the escort provisions with secretaries employed in the Political Section. He returned to the meeting and advised the Committee that the secretaries in his section did not desire or see the need for an escort service.

The Security Officer pointed out the fact that 52 of the 87 dwellings used by the Embassy were located in the Federal Capital; that it was felt the Embassy should have a uniform protection plan for all personnel and that the recommended patrol service was believed to be necessary by the Security Office.

A general discussion ensued concerning the rapid response times of Federal Police in cases where they had been summoned. It was revealed that Federal Police had been able to respond almost immediately to any request for assistance and that such responses have been in three to five minutes. Members

of the Committee also pointed out that due to the dispersion of staff members within the Federal Capital (most live in apartment buildings located in the downtown areas), the increase of the patrol system in the Federal Capital did not in effect improve security conditions. It was further stated that the present patrol system was felt to be adequate for the Federal Capital and no increase in patrols was necessary

FO25x1

[redacted] pointed out to the Committee that he felt the Embassy should provide uniform protective security measures for the staff

Recommendation It was the recommendation of the Committee that the patrol system within the Federal Capital not be increased and that the present system being used be retained. [redacted] the Supervising Security Officer dissented on the recommendation and requested that this be contained in the minutes of the meeting

The Security Officer brought to the attention of the Committee the fact that both TCU and the C & R Section had been contacted concerning a 24-hour roof guard on top of the Chancery. The Committee was advised that neither objected to the guard post and felt that in light of the existing threat it would not pose an extensive problem with communication efforts or make such vulnerable to penetration.

Recommendation: The Committee unanimously recommended that the rooftop guard position be activated as soon as possible.

The Security Officer brought before the Committee the fact that the Commercial Library was operating in the heart of the Chancery and was open to the public. The Committee was advised that the Security Officer had been approached by other staff members questioning this practice and suggesting that individuals be permitted access to the Library on an appointment basis as opposed to individuals walking in off the street. The Counselor for Economic Affairs noted that before entering the Chancery individuals were examined for weapons -- including the inspection of pocketbooks, brief cases and other parcels -- and that all such individuals were escorted to and from the Library. It was also pointed out that an alarm had been provided between the Library and the Marine post to alert the MSG's in the event an incident occurred in the Library. It was the general consensus that

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Argentina
Admin

security measures in existence in the Chancery would preclude an incident occurring in the Commercial Library. However, the Counselor for Economic Affairs advised that he would check with the Commercial Attaché to see if the Library could be effectively run on an appointment basis or what other measures might be taken.

The Security Officer brought to the Committee's attention the fact that under present policies individuals who are retired from or in some other way are connected with the U.S. Government are being permitted free access to the building. The Security Office recommended that individuals -- other than staff members, dependents and members of the U.S. Government on active duty -- be escorted while inside the Chancery.

Recommendation: The Committee unanimously approved the recommendation.

E025x1

The Acting DCM, (PAO), [redacted]

[redacted] He stated that he was of the opinion that his present security measures, i.e. bodyguard, static guard on quarters, and general security at the Chancery, were adequate to meet his needs.

Recommendation: The Committee ^{was} concerned with the opinion of the PAO that his present security measures were reasonable and considered adequate to meet existing needs.

The meeting was adjourned.

[Signature]
HILL

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.8

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Encl No 1
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ A-67 from
Buenos Aires

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Members Security Watch Committee
See Distribution

DATE February 10, 1976

RSO George S Beckett

SUBJECT Contract Security Guard System

A Our present system employs both static guard posts and mobile patrols. Disregarding the Official Residence, the Residence of the DCM, new and old Chancery sites, Consulate and Lincoln Center, the protective program provides coverage of staff members living quarters. The heaviest portion of the effort is in the suburban area. Cost for this system exceeds \$643,162 annually.

1) For a 24 hour post the annual cost is \$22,298 40, 16 hour posts and 14 hour posts cost \$13,854 and \$12,894 60 respectively. While the annual cost appears to be excessive, the hourly cost for the 24, 16 and 14 hour posts are \$2 58, \$2 40 and \$2 54 respectively. Due to existing Argentine labor laws, social benefits to any employee amount to 80% of the basic salary which is added to the employer cost factor. In addition, existing laws require that if an employee is terminated, though he may have worked only one day, the employer is responsible for 4 months salary.

2) Located within the suburbs are 23 guard posts, one of which is the Lincoln School. The charge for the post at the school is an SAS expenditure. The remaining 22 posts are charged individually to the agency concerned. Located in both the suburbs and the Federal Capital is a 24-hour, 5-car patrol system. In the suburbs two of these cars have been designated individual patrol beats. One car operates within the following bounds: Avenida Eduardo Costa, General Alvear, Roque Saenz Peña and Juan Diaz de Solis. The second patrol's area is bound by Avenida Eduardo Costa, General Alvear, Juan Diaz de Solis and Capt J Bermudez. Attached as enclosures are the schedules of frequencies at which each car passed each domicile. These frequencies are actual and were extracted from the logs of the patrol cars. The domicile is identified as the objective. Also reflected in the attachment is the estimated response time to various domiciles from indicated locations which are the results of actual tests.

Contract Security Guard System

3) Supporting these 2 patrol elements is a sub-supervisory car which (unannounced) roams through the suburban and Federal Capital area checking guard posts and mobile units to ensure that they are performing correctly. In addition, this vehicle furnishes response to emergency conditions in support of the routine patrols.

4) In the Federal Capital, a third patrol element exists. This element furnishes similar support to the Federal Capital and responds to emergency situations. The fifth car is a car which does not operate on any fixed schedule but provides overall supervision of the system during different periods of each day. It does not function on a 24-hour basis.

5) In the past, certain members have made use of the patrol cars as escort vehicles. Since all moves of the patrol cars are recorded on the daily log of the car, a review of the log reflects the amount of time expended in supporting any given individual. Example: A staff member requested escort service (this does not include the period or trips which were made during the time the additional vehicles were working as escorts) from Libertador. He requested the vehicle to meet him at a specific location. The patrol vehicle proceeded to Libertador, picked up the staff member and escorted him to his residence. Lapsed time in waiting for this individual and performing the movement required 45 minutes. This removed the protective vehicle from its zone of responsibility for the 45 minutes, leaving the homes in that area without a roving patrol. Such services cannot be provided under the existing system.

B The Security Office is proposing the following for consideration by the Watch Committee as an alternate to the present system. The proposal amounts to a total mobile guard force (Static guards would only be provided an individual agency by request. Mobile force would be SAS.) The suburban area will be broken down into three individual patrol zones. Zone "A" will be bound by Avenida Eduardo Costa, Juan Diaz de Solis, Roque Saenz Peña, Pueyrredon and Gran Pueyrredon, Zone "B" Pueyrredon to Gran Pueyrredon, Juan Diaz de Solis, Avenida Eduardo Costa and General Pacheco, Zone "C" General Pacheco, Juan Diaz de Solis, Avenida Eduardo Costa and Capt J Bermudez.

1) Each zone will have assigned a permanent mobile patrol consisting of 2 men. The patrol will operate 24 hours a day. A supervisory/free zone patrol car will be permanently assigned to the 3 zones and will rove at will. This car will function as a supervisory element and will also provide backup in emergencies. The car will be manned with 3 individual

2) In the Federal Capital, 2 zones will be established. The area north of Sarmiento Avenue (parallel to the Zoo) will be one security area and south of Sarmiento will be a second. A patrol car consisting of 3 men will be assigned to each of these areas and will perform the same functions as the cars in the suburbs. A sixth car consisting of two men will perform the duty of an overall supervisory element over both the suburbs and the Capital. It will also act as a backup car during emergencies.

C Based on figures furnished by the contracting guard service, it is estimated that the cost of the recommended patrol service will be \$405,331.20 as opposed to the current system of static plus mobile guards at a cost of \$643,162.00. Assuming estimates and other factors are reasonably close to the operational figure, an obvious \$237,830.80 will be saved annually. The savings will occur primarily as the result of the reduction of personnel. The present system requires 102 people where the revised system will require approximately 69. Cost factors as indicated do not include any reduction in guard staffs of the facilities identified in paragraph A nor a reduction in the radio communication capability. The objectives of the recommendation are to bring about a more evenly distributed security system, providing a greater degree of protection and reduced cost. Of course, since the costs for the recommended system will be SAS chargeable, which will be computed on the number of individuals receiving the service, cost to each agency above this will increase with the assignment of private guards on individual quarters.

D With reference to the attachments, it is the estimate of both the contract guard service and the Security Office that patrol frequency time to quarters, should the recommended system be accepted, will be double of that indicated. In other words, if the patrol car is passing a given point 15 times in a 24-hour period, it can be expected that the same point will probably be passed 30 times in the same period. It is also felt that response times as indicated by the attachments will be cut in half.

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Buenos Aires A-67

Contract Security Guard System

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Encl No 1

E. The B & F Office has prepared a summary of projections of cost, using the present system, which has been attached for your information

F A Watch Committee meeting will be requested to discuss this proposal You will be notified by the DCM's office of the date of the meeting

Attachments

- 1 Mobile India
- 2 Mobile Golf
- 3 Memorandum Security Expenditures
FY 1974 and 1975

Distribution

- AMB
- DCM
- Cons Gen
- Couns Pol Aff
- Couns ECOM
- Couns ADMIN
- DAO
- LEGATT
- POL-R
- USIS
- DEA
- MLGRP
- GSO
- B & F

R90 GSBeckett mek
2/9 /76

ay 6/2/76 Saturday 7/2/76 Sunday 8/2/76 Encl No 1 Buenos Aires A

| No | 1400 to 2200 | 2200 to 0600 | Total 24 hs. | 0600 to 1100 | 1400 to 2200 | 2200 to 0600 | Total 24 hs. | 0600 to 1400 | 1400 to 2200 | 2200 to 0600 | Total 24 hs. | Observaciones |
|--------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|
| este objetivo no se recorre | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4 | 5 | 4 | 13 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 14 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 17 | |
| 7 | 3 | 6 | 16 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 20 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 20 | |
| 6 | 3 | 5 | 14 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 17 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 18 | |
| 6 | 3 | 5 | 14 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 18 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 18 | |
| 7 | 5 | 6 | 18 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 19 | 7 | 6 | 3 | 16 | |
| 5 | 6 | 4 | 15 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 17 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 16 | |
| 6 | 4 | 5 | 15 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 17 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 18 | |
| 5 | 6 | 6 | 17 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 16 | 6 | 7 | 4 | 17 | |
| 5 | 6 | 4 | 15 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 17 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 16 | |
| to parolling on this objective | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4 | 5 | 5 | 14 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 18 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 19 | |
| 6 | 3 | 5 | 14 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 18 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 20 | |
| 7 | 4 | 6 | 17 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 19 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 19 | |
| 8 | 5 | 4 | 17 | 9 | 6 | 6 | 21 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 20 | |
| 4 | 5 | 4 | 13 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 15 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 19 | |
| 3 | 5 | 4 | 12 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 16 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 20 | |
| 4 | 5 | 5 | 14 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 14 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 18 | |
| 4 | 4 | 6 | 14 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 13 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 20 | |
| 4 | 5 | 3 | 12 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 18 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 12 | |
| 3 | 5 | 4 | 12 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 12 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 18 | |
| 98 | 87 | 91 | 276 | 108 | 105 | 106 | 319 | 118 | 116 | 107 | 341 | |

Estimated time in minutes between objectives obeying traffic regulations

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----|----|----|------|----|----|----|------|--------|----|-------|
| 40 | 14 | 4' | de | 1.29 | 19 | 2' | de | 1.33 | 15 | 3' | 6/14 |
| 4 | 20 | 3' | " | 9 | 10 | 4' | " | 24 | Gaicho | 3' | " |
| 35 | 23 | 4' | " | 31 | 7 | 1' | " | 18 | 28 | 2' | 14/22 |
| 5 | 24 | 3' | " | 24 | 14 | 4' | " | 1.35 | 10 | 5' | " |
| 4 | 24 | 3' | " | 1.35 | 10 | 3' | " | 1.24 | 15 | 3' | 22/6 |
| | 19 | 2' | " | 14 | 24 | 3' | " | 39 | 19 | 3' | " |

Estimated time to/from objectives 10 and 19 are considered with railway barriers open

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MOBIL INDIA

| 6/2/76 | | | | Saturday 7/2/76 | | | | Sunday 8/2/76 | | | | Observaciones |
|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------|---------------|
| 0600 to 1400 | 1400 to 2200 | 2200 to 0600 | Total 24 hs | 0600 to 1400 | 1400 to 2200 | 2200 to 0600 | Total 24 hs | 0600 to 1400 | 1400 to 2200 | 2200 to 0600 | Total 24 hs | |
| 3 | 6 | 4 | 13 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 15 | 5 | 7 | 7 | 19 | |
| 5 | 6 | 5 | 16 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 17 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 16 | |
| 8 | 7 | 7 | 20 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 17 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 18 | |
| 6 | 7 | 6 | 19 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 18 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 16 | |
| 3 | 6 | 4 | 13 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 15 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 16 | |
| 2 | 7 | 5 | 14 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 16 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 21 | |
| 4 | 6 | 5 | 15 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 14 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 20 | |
| 5 | 6 | 4 | 15 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 14 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 15 | |
| 6 | 6 | 4 | 11 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 16 | 5 | 4 | 6 | 15 | |
| 4 | 5 | 7 | 19 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 17 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 19 | |
| 4 | 6 | 7 | 17 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 18 | 5 | 7 | 7 | 19 | |
| 4 | 6 | 5 | 15 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 16 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 16 | |
| 4 | 6 | 5 | 15 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 13 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 15 | |
| 4 | 6 | 6 | 15 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 17 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 16 | |
| 4 | 6 | 7 | 17 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 17 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 17 | |
| 6 | 7 | 5 | 18 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 15 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 14 | |
| 3 | 6 | 5 | 14 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 14 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 14 | |
| 4 | 6 | 5 | 15 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 17 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 16 | |
| 1, 74 | 111 | 96 | 281 | 79 | 101 | 106 | 286 | 102 | 96 | 104 | 302 | |

Estimated time in minutes between objectives obeying traffic regulations

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------|----|----|-------|----|-------|----|----|-------|----|----|----|-------|
| 27 | hasta | 30 | 2' | desde | 30 | hasta | 7 | 3' | desde | 8 | 26 | 3' | 6/14 |
| 45 | " | 20 | 5' | " | 8 | " | 27 | 3' | " | 10 | 26 | 3' | " |
| 25 | " | 30 | 5' | " | 31 | " | 25 | 5' | " | 21 | 26 | 3' | 14/21 |
| YPF | " | 30 | 6' | " | 21 | " | 28 | 3' | " | 30 | 44 | 4' | " |
| 20 | " | 25 | 4' | " | 40 | " | 44 | 3' | " | 45 | 20 | 5' | 22/6 |
| 10 | " | 26 | 3' | " | 30 | " | 31 | 1' | " | 30 | 9 | 4' | " |

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ESTIMATED SECURITY EXPENDITURES FOR FY 1976, AS OF FEBRUARY 7, 1976.

Buenos Aires A-67
FASTP AID FAS FAA ABC

| | TOTAL | STATE SHARED | STATE BASIC | USIA | LEGATT | DEFDAS | MILGRP | DEA | |
|------------------------------|-----------|--------------|-------------|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|----------|-------|
| <u>PATROL SERVICES</u> | | | | | | | | | |
| Houses/Emb Patrol | 100% | 11.6% | 25.6% | 7.0% | 4.6% | 16.3% | 25.6% | 9.3% | |
| Estimated FY 1976 cost | 43 | 5 | 11 | 3 | 2 | 7 | 11 | 4 | |
| Patrol Drivers | \$198,370 | \$23,011 | \$50,783 | \$13,886 | \$9,125 | \$32,334 | \$50,783 | \$18,448 | |
| Gas, oil, R/M Patrol Cars | \$20,430 | \$2,370 | \$5,230 | \$1,430 | \$940 | \$3,330 | \$5,230 | \$1,900 | |
| | 100% | 3.9% | 34.6% | 7.7% | 3.8% | 11.5% | 30.8% | 7.7% | |
| Provincial Police/Houses | 26 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 8 | 2 | |
| Estimated FY 1976 cost | \$24,000 | \$936 | \$8,304 | \$1,848 | \$912 | \$2,760 | \$7,392 | \$1,848 | |
| | 100% | 36.1% | 30.8% | 7.5% | 3.0% | 8.3% | 10.5% | 3.8% | |
| Radio Net S W Radios used by | 133 | 48 | 41 | 10 | 4 | 11 | 14 | 5 | |
| Rent | \$45,606 | \$16,464 | \$14,047 | \$3,420 | \$1,368 | \$3,785 | \$4,789 | \$1,733 | |
| Inst./Maint. | \$3,652 | \$1,318 | \$1,125 | \$274 | \$110 | \$303 | \$383 | 139 | |
| Radio Control Ctr. | \$45,792 | \$16,531 | \$14,104 | \$3,434 | \$1,374 | \$3,801 | \$4,808 | \$1,740 | |
| Thancery Sq. Ftg. Occupied | 100% | 35.1% | 25.0% | 16.1% | 1.8% | 8.0% | 3.7% | 4.2% | |
| Thancery Guards | \$10,894 | \$3,823 | \$2,723 | \$1,754 | \$196 | \$872 | \$403 | \$458 | |
| Escorts/Visitors | \$13,156 | \$4,618 | \$3,289 | \$2,118 | \$237 | \$1,052 | \$487 | \$553 | |
| Car Ramp Guards | \$10,893 | \$3,823 | \$2,723 | \$1,754 | \$196 | \$871 | \$403 | \$458 | |
| Consulate Guards | \$20,574 | | \$20,574 | | | | | | |
| Guards for: | | | | | | | | | |
| Ambassador's Residence | \$111,492 | | \$111,492 | | | | | | |
| DCM's Residence | \$22,298 | | \$22,298 | | | | | | |
| DCM's Personal | \$7,498 | | \$7,498 | | | | | | |
| DCM's Special Guard | \$11,100 | | \$11,100 | | | | | | |
| Meals for Police Guards | \$3,275 | | \$3,275 | | | | | | |
| Political Officer | \$24,517 | | \$24,517 | | | | | | |
| Labor Attache | \$13,858 | | \$13,858 | | | | | | |
| DEA Houses | \$114,682 | | \$114,682 | | | | | | |
| USIA | \$38,549 | | \$38,549 | | | | | | |
| MILGRP | \$57,245 | | \$57,245 | | | | | | |
| FASTP | \$103,726 | | \$103,726 | | | | | | |
| Lincoln School | \$2,000 | | \$2,000 | | | | | | |
| New Chancery | \$9,918 | | \$9,918 | | | | | | |
| Chauffeur's Bonus | \$37,582 | | \$37,582 | | | | | | |
| | \$862 | | \$862 | | | | | | |
| | \$951,969 | \$82,812 | \$355,384 | \$87,163 | \$14,458 | \$163,790 | \$178,404 | \$65,826 | \$978 |
| | | | | | | | | | \$455 |
| | | | | | | | | | \$70 |

EOIA (b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

PROPOSED ESTIMATED SECURITY EXPENDITURES FOR FY 1976, AS OF FEBRUARY 7, 1976

| | <u>TOTAL</u> | <u>SHARED</u> | <u>ST BASIC</u> | <u>USIA</u> | <u>LEGATT</u> | <u>DEFDAS</u> | <u>MILGRP</u> | <u>DEA</u> |
|-------------------------------|--------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|------------|
| <u>PROPOSED PATROL</u> | | | | | | | | |
| <u>Houses in suburbs</u> | 100% 35 | 6% 2 | 26% 9 | 6% 2 | 6% 2 | 17% 6 | 31% 11 | 8% 3 |
| <u>Estimated cost</u> | \$215,382 | \$12,923 | \$55,999 | \$12,923 | \$12,923 | \$36,615 | \$66,768 | \$17,231 |
| <u>residences in Fed Cap.</u> | 100% 52 | 25% 13 | 52% 27 | 9% 5 | 2% 1 | 2% 1 | 8% 4 | 2% 1 |
| <u>Estimated cost</u> | \$148,487 | \$37,121 | \$77,213 | \$13,364 | \$2,970 | \$2,970 | \$11,879 | \$2,970 |
| <u>Total Houses</u> | 87 | 15 | 36 | 7 | 3 | 7 | 15 | 4 |
| <u>Estimated cost</u> | \$363,869 | \$50,044 | \$133,212 | \$26,287 | \$15,893 | \$39,585 | \$78,647 | \$20,201 |

GAS NOT INCLUDED IN ABOVE COSTS (EMBASSY PAYS ALL FUEL, R/M costs present patrol)

PRESENT ESTIMATED SECURITY EXPENDITURES FOR FY 1976, AS OF FEBRUARY 7, 1976

| | <u>TOTAL</u> | <u>SHARED</u> | <u>ST BASIC</u> | <u>USIA</u> | <u>LEGATT</u> | <u>DEFDAS</u> | <u>MILGRP</u> | <u>DEA</u> |
|---------------------------------|--------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|------------|
| <u>BROWN PATROL COSTS</u> | | | | | | | | |
| <u>Houses</u> | 43 | 5 | 11 | 3 | 2 | 7 | 11 | 4 |
| <u>Estimated cost</u> | \$198,370 | \$23,011 | \$50,783 | \$13,886 | \$9,125 | \$32,334 | \$50,783 | \$18,448 |
| <u>PROVINCIAL POLICE COSTS</u> | | | | | | | | |
| <u>Houses</u> | 26 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 8 | 2 |
| <u>Estimated cost</u> | \$24,000 | \$936 | \$8,304 | \$1,848 | \$912 | \$2,760 | \$7,392 | \$1,848 |
| <u>Gas, oil, R/M for 5 cars</u> | \$20,430 | \$2,370 | \$5,230 | \$1,430 | \$940 | \$3,330 | \$5,230 | \$1,900 |
| <u>EST. COST PRESENT SYSTEM</u> | \$242,800 | \$26,317 | \$64,317 | \$17,164 | \$10,977 | \$38,424 | \$63,405 | \$22,196 |

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RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK//POLAD

RUSNAAA/CINCEUR//POLAD

RULPALJ/CINCSO//POLAD

RUCLMXA/AIR UNIVERSITY//STATE REP AND MR TUTTLE

RUEDARA/ARMY WAR COLLEGE//OPNS GROUP

PUEDASA/NAVY WAR COLLEGE//STATE DEPT REP

RUCIMAA/COMAC//POLAD

RUEKJCS/DIA

PUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT//ATTN MRS BECK DADS

RUEIHW/WHITE HOUSE//SIT ROOM CIEP ATTN MR DUNN

PUEOIAS/COMUSARMY FT MEADE//SPECIAL RESEARCH DET

RUCLA04/ADWC TYNDALL AFB FLA

RUEBJGA/COMDT COASTGUARD//POLAD

RUEBART/DIR NAVINVSERV

PUEHIA/USIA

PUCIP3A/HQ TAC//INOV

PUEBDSB/HQS DSA//CIS

Handwritten notes and signatures:
DD
RAK
JCS
EB
Ag. member
John
Alphonso
Security - Terrorism

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PAGE 2 RUCALIA 0376 ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

RUCSAAZ/SAC INDICATIONS CENTER

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PUEBWJA/IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION//R KRAMER

PUEADJU/HPIC//PB CABLES

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PULPAKA/CMR 193PD INF BDE//DINTEL ONLY

PULPHIO/24 COMPW HOWARD AFB CZ//IN

RUEBSKA/COMUSNAVSO//N 2 ONLY

RUTOPNA/CMR DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CEN//PHILADELPHIA

BT

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN. CITE CIA 874346.

E025x1

//SOUTH AMERICA: THE SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS OF SEVERAL SOUTH

H

AMERICA ' COUNTRIES MAY BE COOPERATING IN ACTIONS AGAINST POLITICAL
REFUGEES IN ARGENTINA.//

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PAGE 3 RUEAIIA 0376 ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

//EARLY THIS MONTH, ARMED MEN RANSACKED THE OFFICES OF THE ARGENTINE CATHOLIC COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND STOLE RECORDS CONTAINING INFORMATION ON THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS. ARGENTINE POLICE DID NOT INVESTIGATE THE CRIME AND DISMISSED IT AS A SIMPLE ROBBERY.//

//TWO DAYS LATER, 24 URUGUAYAN AND CHILEAN REFUGEES, MANY OF WHOM WERE THE SUBJECTS OF COMMISSION FILES, WERE KIDNAPED AND TORTURED FOR SEVERAL HOURS. SOME OF THE REFUGEES LATER IDENTIFIED THEIR INTERROGATORS AS SECURITY OFFICERS FROM CHILE AND URUGUAY. PRESUMABLY, A CHILEAN-URUGUAYAN OPERATION COULD NOT HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT THE COOPERATION OF THE ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES.//

//IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS, TWO PROMINENT URUGUAYAN POLITICAL EXILES AND A FORMER LEFTIST PRESIDENT OF BOLIVIA HAVE BEEN KILLED UNDER MYSTERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES IN ARGENTINA. ARGENTINE MINISTER OF ECONOMY MARTINEZ DE HOZ RECENTLY TOLD THE US AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES THAT ARGENTINA WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MURDER OF EX-PRESIDENT TOPRES AND SPECULATED--WITHOUT PROVIDING EVIDENCE--THAT LEFTIST EXTREMISTS HAD ELIMINATED "ONE OF THEIR OWN."//

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 4 RUEAIIA 0376 ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

//THERE ARE ALSO SEVERAL REPORTS THAT CHILEAN LEFTIST LEADER EDGARDO ENRIQUEZ, WHO WAS APRESTED BY ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES ON APRIL 10, WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TURNED OVER TO THE CHILEANS AND IS NOW DEAD. MEANWHILE, THE BRAZILIAN PRESS REPORTS THAT ARGENTINA HAS HANDED OVER TO CHILEAN AUTHORITIES A BRAZILIAN POLITICAL EXILE WANTED BY SANTIAGO.//

//THE ARGENTINE JUNTA HAS DENIED ALLEGATIONS THAT IT HAS VIOLATED "HUMAN RIGHTS" AND RECENTLY ISSUED AN OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE DECLARING THAT IT WOULD NOT REPATRIATE REFUGEES BY FORCE. DESPITE THIS AND SIMILAR DISCLAIMERS BY RESPECTED ARGENTINE LEADERS, US EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN BUENOS AIRES SUSPECT THE ACQUIESCENCE, AND PERHAPS THE DIRECT INVOLVEMENT, OF THE ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES IN MANY OF THESE INCIDENTS.//

//IN EARLY 1974, SECURITY OFFICIALS FROM ARGENTINA, CHILE, URUGUAY, PARAGUAY, AND BOLIVIA MET IN BUENOS AIRES TO PREPARE COORDINATED ACTIONS AGAINST SUBVERSIVE TARGETS. THEY AGREED TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC SECURITY LIAISON CHANNELS, TO EXCHANGE INTELLIGENCE

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 5 RUEAIIA 0876 ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

INFORMATION ON A REGULAR BASIS, AND TO FACILITATE THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT OF SECURITY OFFICERS ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS.//

//SINCE THEN, THERE HAVE BEEN A FEW REPORTS FROM WELL PLACED SOURCES INDICATING THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE CONDUCTED JOINT COUNTERSUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS WITH THE CHILEANS AND WITH THE URUGUAYANS. UNTIL RECENTLY, HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THIS COOPERATION WAS EXTENSIVE OR VERY EFFECTIVE. ~~(SECRET NOFORN)~~//

ARGENTINA: THE DRAFT TEXT OF ARGENTINA'S NEW FOREIGN INVESTMENTS LAW, WHICH WAS RELEASED LAST WEEK, OSTENSIBLY DOES AWAY WITH MOST OF THE ONEROUS RESTRICTIONS OF THE NOVEMBER 1973 LAW THAT HAD REDUCED DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT TO NEAR ZERO DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS.

THE NEW LAW WILL:

- GIVE FOREIGN INVESTORS THE SAME RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AS DOMESTIC INVESTORS.

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PAGE 6 RUEAIIA 0876 ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

- ELIMINATE THE RESTRICTION ON ACCESS BY FOREIGN FIRMS TO DOMESTIC CREDIT.

- REMOVE THE PROHIBITION AGAINST FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CERTAIN FIELDS.

- REDUCE THE NUMBER OF BUSINESSES IN WHICH PRIOR GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR INVESTMENT IS REQUIRED.

- LIBERALIZE PROVISIONS FOR REPATRIATING CAPITAL AND PROFITS.

- REDUCE TAXES ON PROFIT REMITTANCES.

THE NEW LAW SHOULD BRING IN MORE CAPITAL FROM PRIVATE FOREIGN SOURCES. BUSINESSMEN WILL PROBABLY RESPOND SLOWLY, HOWEVER, WAITING TO SEE WHETHER THE REGIME'S OTHER MEASURES IMPROVE THE OUTLOOK FOR STABILITY AND PROFITABLE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ XGDS-2.

BT

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*Buenos Aires 17/80*CONFIDENTIALA
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b [redacted] the RSO opened discussion on boating activities by staff members. Some discussion arose as to whether officers should fall under the prohibition of boating activities. Everyone agreed no patterns should be established in this matter. It was indicated that terrorists had attacked high ranking officials while they were on water trips and such should be remembered when accepting invitations from high ranking Argentine officials who may be under surveillance. The possibility of those Americans who might own boats falling into patterns was discussed. The risks of boating over horseback riding, golfing, etc. were discussed. There was general agreement that any stepped up terrorist activity could result in further risk.

RECOMMENDATION

A general notice on recreational activities and security procedures should be issued. Suggested it be divided into routine for work and routine for recreational diversions.

C General questions concerning travel were directed to the RSO. These were answered and the Committee was advised that travel restriction directives would be reissued at the beginning of the year. The matter of travel of official personnel from other Embassies was brought up. Despite the restriction of official travel it was noted that individuals from other embassies traveled here quite frequently under tourist visa. Since the Department, in response to an AFSA protest, has stated that we cannot prevent employees from coming here as tourists with regular passports, it was suggested that if people from other embassies traveled as tourists they should, for security reasons, avoid associating themselves with the Embassy. Thus, they ordinarily should not be allowed the privileges of commissary, services, etc. of the Embassy. The pros and cons of this practice were considered, we sometimes use other Embassies' services when traveling on leave.

RECOMMENDATION

A leaflet should be sent explaining the policy of the Embassy towards official personnel traveling in Argentina as tourists. This policy would be minimal contact with the Embassy in B A. They should conduct themselves as tourists. This does not include the requirements of Army Regulation 630-5, app B, 10-3.2 which require all military personnel visiting foreign countries to communicate with army attaché at the American Embassy in the country visited.

The nature of the leaders of the Montoneros in Buenos Aires raised the question of the possibility of the risk

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Buenos Aires 17 70

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

to American staff members. Since the whereabouts of this person and his condition are unknown it was suggested staff personnel be advised of the matter

RECOMMENDATION

That a security notice be issued immediately reiterating the necessity of caution because of this incident



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AIRGRAM

PP60112-0455

ARRA 5

| | | | |
|------|------|--------|-----|
| RS/R | REP | AF | ARA |
| EUR | FE | NIA | CU |
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| IAI | IAH | IR | XMB |
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Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files

FILE DESIGNATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO, Department of State, Washington DC

DEPT PASS ERDA, NSF, NRC

F O. 11652 GDS

TAGS PINs, SHUM, TPHY, AR

At 101

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FROM Amembassy BUENOS AIRES DATE July 20, 1976

SUBJECT Firing and Imprisonment of CNEA Employee- Antonio Misetich

REF Buenos Aires 3013

ARRA

Attached to this Airgram is a free translation of the text of an order issued by Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission President Carlos Castro Madero in the Misetich case

We have learned that Misetich did have some close connections with terrorist groups. His sister was reportedly married to a terrorist. In addition, when the Campora government in May 1973 dismissed long-time CNEA President Oscar Quhillalt, the terrorist group proposed Misetich to replace him, and he nearly made it. The moderates rather hurriedly rallied support for Iraclogorta, as a Peronist who was not an extremist, and, so we were told, managed to sell this to Campora, although it was a close call.

HILL

Declassified Case: NW 52966 Date: 11-02-2013

Jul 20 8 28 AM 1976

ARRA

SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION

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NSA 2

USIA

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Date Initials

FORM 10 64 DS 323

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

For Department Use Only

In Out

Drafted by DCI RIW/COX arb *[Signature]* Drafting Date 7/2/76 Phone No 377 Contents and Classification Approved by AMB/RCH/LL

Clearance POI W.Smith *[Signature]* A/DCM WBeal *[Signature]*

Environ

Area A 10'

TRILLIAN LAFON

No. 51-0 (M) - 5/12/76

In view of Law No. 21, 274 and

CONSIDERING

that this law authorizes under Article 2 the President of the National Atomic Energy Commission to drop personnel which are found to be involved in the causes stipulated therein,

that under Article 6 of this law, there is established, in addition, definite situations which can originate the dismissal of such personnel without resolving the right to receive indemnification for such action,

that review in this Institution (discloses) an employee who should be dismissed for being included in what is stipulated by Article 6, clause 6), of this law

Therefore

THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION RESOLVES

1. To dismiss as of April 19, 1976, Doctor Antonio-Anselmo MISETICH of the Department of Research, using the faculties authorized under Article 2 of Law 21,274 and because of being understood (guilty) of causes foreseen in Article 6, clause 6, of that law

2. In accordance with the causes which motivate the dismissal, the employee will have no right to receive indemnity based on the action taken in 1

3. It is established that the dismissal mentioned above, is made in accordance with the terms of Law 21,289

4. Done

4214

Declassified Case: 17W 52966 Date: 11-02-2012

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NOFORN 1153

FROM DN-2G

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POL

SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)

DIADIN 276-GA (AS OF: 1916 EDT 2 OCT 76)

ARGENTINA: ATTACK ON THE PRESIDENT. (U)

1. (U) A BOMB REPORTEDLY DETONATED IN A REVIEWING STAND ONLY MOMENTS AFTER ARGENTINE PRESIDENT AND ARMY COMMANDER JORGE VIDELA HAD LEFT. ELEMENTS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE APPARENT ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ARE UNKNOWN, BUT LEFTIST TERRORISTS WHO HAVE BEEN

GOVERNMENT ARE SUSPECT.

2. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ THE BOMBING WAS THE FIRST ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AGAINST VICELA SINCE HE CAME TO POWER IN MARCH AND FOLLOWS ON THE HEELS OF SEVERAL GOVERNMENT VICTORIES AGAINST LEFTIST GUERRILLAS IN THE FIELD. THE BLAST OCCURRED INSIDE A HEAVILY GUARDED ARMY INSTALLATION WEST OF BUENOS AIRES, AND REPRESENTS AN INCREASE IN THE TERRORISTS' ABILITY TO PENETRATE ARMY SECURITY. SIGNIFICANTLY, DURING THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH HE STATED THAT THE GUERRILLAS HAD LOST THE WAR BUT "MIGHT STILL PRODUCE SOME NOTORIOUS ACTS..."

3. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ THE ATTACK WILL LIKELY (80 PERCENT) SPARK CONTINUED ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS BY THE ARMY AND BY EXTRA-LEGAL EXTREMIST GROUPS. LAST WEEK ARMY AND SECURITY AGENTS CAPTURED A NUMBER OF LEFTIST LEADERS AND REPORTEDLY KILLED SEVERAL OTHERS. THIS ACTION FOLLOWED THE UNEXPLAINED DEATH OF SOME 30 TERRORISTS SUSPECTS BEING HELD BY FEDERAL SECURITY

PAGE 3 RUEKJCS 4574 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FORCES. SUCH HARSH MEASURES HAVE CAUSED CONTROVERSY AND DIVISION WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMY. MORE REPRISALS MAY INCREASE TENSION BETWEEN MODERATE AND RIGHTIST OFFICERS AND UNDERMINE THE MILITARY UNITY THAT IS VITAL IN ORDER TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE MYRIAD PROBLEMS CURRENTLY PRESSING THE GOVERNMENT.

PREPARED BY: [REDACTED] ALERT CENTER

FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC
424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

42110

PL

(000-21 DEC 85)

FOIA(b) (3) 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

RECEIVED SA: [REDACTED]

BE PROMPTLY UNDER CONTROL

LOTH WAY DE APPROVING WHEN GETTING INFORMATION WITH

VIN PROTECTING THAT FAVOR CAN BE KEPT IN TIME THE

CORSE IS SECURITY-FORCE PROTECTIONS ARE USED

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TO RUCRDIB/DIACRINTEL

AIG 7911

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NOFORN 6971

FROM DA-2G

SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)

DIADIN 329-11A (AS OF: 2100 EST 24 NOV 76)

ARGENTINA: SUBVERSIVE TOLL MOUNTS. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~

1. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ SECURITY FORCES CONTINUE TO TAKE A HEAVY TOLL OF SUBVERSIVES IN THEIR INTENSIVE ANTI-TERRORIST CAMPAIGN. SINCE THE FIRST OF NOVEMBER, 101 TERRORISTS HAVE BEEN KILLED.

2. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ THE LA PLATA AREA, SOME 60 KILOMETERS

PAGE 2 RUEKJCS 5170 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SOUTHEAST OF BUENOS AIRES, HAS BEEN THE SCENE OF UNSUALLY HEAVY FIREFIGHTS BETWEEN PROVINCIAL POLICE AND TERRORISTS SINCE THE 9 NOVEMBER BOMBING OF THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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File SY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976 586 993

INCIDENTS, 71 SUBVERSIVES HAVE BEEN KILLED WITHOUT A SINGLE LOSS AMONG THE SECURITY FORCES. WITH THE CONTINUING VIOLENCE, LA PLATA HAS PRACTICALLY BECOME AN ARMED CAMP WITH MOVING SQUADS OF POLICE AND ARMY UNITS CONTROLLING ALL ACCESS TO THE CITY AND CONDUCTING HOUSE TO-HOUSE CHECKS IN THEIR SEARCH FOR SUBVERSIVES AND WEAPONS.

3. ~~(S/NOPOR)~~ MEANWHILE, IN THE BUENOS AIRES AREA TERRORISTS APPARENTLY HAVE BEEN FORCED, AS A RESULT OF HEAVY SECURITY FORCE PRESSURES IN RECENT MONTHS, TO RESORT TO LOWER RISK, LOWER COST OPERATIONS AGAINST BUSINESSMEN AND PROFESSIONALS. IN THE LAST THREE MONTHS, NINE EXECUTIVES HAVE BEEN KILLED, WITH THE APPARENT MOTIVE BEING THE BUILDING UP OF SYMPATHETIC SUPPORT AMONG THE LABOR FORCE TO SUPPORT THE TERRORISTS.

PAGE 3 RUEKJCS 5170 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CAUSE.

4. ~~(S/NOPOR)~~ LEFTIST TERRORISTS HAVE SUFFERED EXTREMELY HEAVY LOSSES SINCE THE MILITARY TOOK OVER THE GOVERNMENT LAST MARCH, WITH MOST OF THEIR TOP LEADERS HAVING BEEN WIPED OUT. THEIR CHANGE IN TACTICS TO THOSE OF LOW RISK UNQUESTIONEDLY REFLECTS THEIR LOSSES AND INDICATES THEIR INABILITY TO OPENLY ENGAGE SECURITY FORCES AS THEY DID IN THE PAST. AS LONG AS THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT IS ABLE TO APPEASE LABOR COMPLAINTS OVER WAGES THROUGH INCREASES, AS OCCURRED IN RECENT WEEKS, IT IS NOT VERY LIKELY THAT THE TERRORISTS WILL MAKE ANY SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN PALLYING LABOR TO THEIR CAUSE. IF SECURITY-FORCE PROJECTIONS ARE TRUE, AND PROVIDING THAT LABOR CAN BE KEPT IN LINE, THE POINT MAY BE APPROACHING WHEN LEFTIST TERRORISM WILL BE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL.

PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]

(RDS-31 DEC 32)

FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

#5170

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 586 883

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RIG 7811
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~~SECRET~~ (S)
FROM 08-20

RE: RIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)

REF: 203-66 (AG OP: 1607 OCT 19 OCT 78)

ARGENTINAS: VIOLATED BY THE MONTONEROS. (S)

~~(S)~~ THE LEFTIST TERRORIST MONTONEROS CELEBRATED THE 31ST ANNIVERSARY OF JUAN PERON'S ASCENSION TO POWER -- 17 OCTOBER 1948 -- WITH NUMEROUS BOMBINGS THROUGHOUT BUENOS AIRES. ALTHOUGH NO DEATHS WERE REPORTED, THE EXPLOSIONS CAUSED CONSIDERABLE PROPERTY DAMAGE THROUGHOUT THE CAPITAL, INCLUDING THAT TO AN OFFICIAL US EMBASSY CAR.

2. ~~TO OPERATE~~ ~~UNOBTAIN~~ ~~THE~~ ~~MOST~~ ~~EFFICIENT~~ ~~ACT~~
 BY THE MONTENEGRO FOR SOMETIME THE MILITARY CLASH IN BUREAU
 OFFICE, WHICH RESULTED IN INQUIRIES TO SOME OF MILITARY PL-
 BOONEL, THEIR DEPENDENTS, AND GUESTS. EMPLOYERS IN THE
 CAPITAL, PRIVATE BARS AND BUTCHERS WERE HIT WITH EXPLOSIVES,
 AND THREATS OF BOMB IN DOWNOWN THEATRE'S EMPLOYED THOSE
 FACILITIES. AN INCENDIARY DEVICE THAT WAS TAKEN AT GR
 BELONGED TO A ONE OF THE US DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE CAUSED
 EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO THE VEHICLE BUT NO INJURY TO THE DRIVER.
 THE ATTACK, HOWEVER, WAS PROBABLY NOT AN INTENTIONAL, PRE-
 PLANNED OPERATION AGAINST THE EMBASSY BUT ONLY AN ACT OF
 OPPORTUNITY.

3. ~~CONTRARY~~ THE VIOLENCE IS A REMINDER THAT THE MONTENEGRO
 ARE STILL A VIABLE FORCE DESPITE A RECENT STATEMENT BY SOME
 MILITARY OFFICIALS THAT THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM WAS ALL
 BUT WON. THE INCIDENTS ALSO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE MONTENEGRO
 CAN STILL PENETRATE MILITARY SECURITY AND FOLLOW CLOSELY BY
 THE HEELS OF THE ATTEMPT ON PRESIDENT VIDELA'S LIFE EARLIER.

1/2 A

THIS MONTH, PROBABLY BY A MONTENEGRO MEMBER OF THE ARMY.

4. ~~CONTRARY~~ SINCE COMING TO POWER IN MARCH, THE MILITARY
 HAS MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN CURBING LEFTIST TERRORISM AND
 HAS ALL BUT WIPED OUT THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP).
 NOTWITHSTANDING, THE MONTENEGRO WILL MAINTAIN A CAPABILITY TO CON-
 DUCT ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THE MILITARY UNTIL SUCH TIME AS
 LEFTIST INFILTRATORS ARE WIPED OUT OF SERVICE BARRACKS AND THEIR
 NUMBERS HAVE BEEN REDUCED AS HAVE THOSE OF THE ERP. ON THE

OTHER HAND, THE NATURE OF THE ACTS -- COVERT WITHOUT ANY DIRECT
 COOPERATION WITH THE MILITARY OR POLICE FORCES -- PROBABLY
 REFLECT THE HEAVY PRESSURE THAT THE MILITARY IS APPLYING
 AGAINST THE MONTENEGRO. THE GROUP HAS SUFFERED LOSSES AND
 PROBABLY NO LONGER HAS THE CAPABILITY TO FIGHT SECURITY FORCES
 OPENLY. WITH THE BATTLE AGAINST THE ERP ALL BUT OVER, THE
 MILITARY WILL BE ABLE TO CONCENTRATE THEIR EFFORTS ON THE ER-
 ADICATION OF THIS, THE ONLY REMAINING SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST
 ELEMENT.

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PREPARED BY: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED UPON NOTIFICATION BY THE ORIGINATOR

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FROM DIA WASH DC 7809

FROM DIA-1B

Argentine politics

SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIND) (U)

DIAE IN 143-2A (AS OF: 0455 PDT 22 MAY 76)

ARGENTINE BRAIL MISSILES REPORTED IN HANDS OF ARGENTINE TERRORISTS. (C)

1. ~~(S/NOFORN/NOINTEL)~~ THREE SOURCES HAVE REPORTED THE INTRODUCTION OF FROM THREE TO 10 MAN-PORTABLE SOVIET SA-7/BRAIL MISSILES INTO ARGENTINA. BUT NONE ARE SURE OF THEIR OPERATIONAL STATUS. THE MISSILES ARE REPORTEDLY IN THE HANDS OF THE LEFTIST PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

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PAGE 2 RUEKJCS 5576 143111Z
(REF): IF SO, THEY WOULD PRESENT A GREATLY INCREASED THREAT TO COMMERCIAL AND MILITARY AVIATION.

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FROM DIA-1B

SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DID) (U)

DIAPIN 143-RA (AS OF: 0435 PDT 22 MAY 76)

ARGENTINA: BRAIL MISSILES REPORTED IN HANDS OF ARGENTINE TERRORISTS. (C)

1. ~~(S/DEFENSE/UNINTL)~~ THREE SOURCES HAVE REPORTED THE INTRODUCTION OF FROM THREE TO 30 MAN-PORTABLE SOVIET SA-7/BRAIL MISSILES INTO ARGENTINA. BUT NONE ARE SURE OF THEIR OPERATIONAL STATUS. THE MISSILES ARE REPORTEDLY IN THE HANDS OF THE LEFTIST PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

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PAGE 2 RUEKJCS 5976 143111Z

(REF): IF SO, THEY WOULD PRESENT A GREATLY INCREASED THREAT TO COMMERCIAL AND MILITARY AVIATION.

2. ~~(S//NOFORN//WHITTEL)~~

[REDACTED]

SA-7 SHIPMENTS CAME TO ARGENTINA PURSUANT TO CONTACTS MADE BY THE ERP. ONE UNCONFIRMED VERSION OF THE ARRIVAL OF THE GRAILS STATES THEY CAME VIA THE GUAYAN EMBASSY IN THE DIPLOMATIC MAIL. EARLIER REPORTING CLAIMED THAT CHILEAN OFFICIALS HAD DELIVERED A SHIPMENT TO THE ERP AT THE ARGENTINE-CHILEAN BORDER.

3. ~~(S//NOFORN//WHITTEL)~~ THROUGH ONE SOURCE CLAIMED NO PLANES HAVE BEEN DOWNED BY THE MISSILE, [REDACTED]

THE JANUARY 1979 SHOOTDOWN OF AN AIR FORCE TRANSPORT WAS BY A HEAT-SEEKING MISSILE, LIKELY THE SA-7. ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES HAVE DENIED THE TRUTH OF THIS REPORT, HOWEVER.

4. ~~(S//NOFORN//WHITTEL)~~ IN AN EFFORT TO COMBAT THE SA-7S THE AIR FORCE HAS PLACED INCENDIARY DEVICES ABOARD SIX

PAGE 3 NOVJGC 9576 ~~S O C P E T~~

OF ITS MIRAGE FIGHTERS TO LEAD THE HEAT SEEKING SA-7 MISSILE ASTRAY, AND SECURITY AT AIRPORTS NEAR THE CAPITAL IS REPORTED AT AN ALLTIME HIGH. THE SUCCESS OF THE SA-7 MISSILE HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED IN AFRICA AND VIETNAM, WHERE PLANES MAKING LOW-LEVEL RUNS AND TAKING OFF OR LANDING WERE MOST VULNERABLE. THEIR USE IN ARGENTINA, SERVICED BY INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES, ADDS A NEW DIMENSION TO TERRORISM THERE AND RAISES THE SPECTRE OF SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.

PREPARED BY: [REDACTED] ALERT CENTER

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SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (C)

DIADIN 148-17A (AS OF: 1745 EDT 24 MAY 76)

ARGENTINA: TERRORISTS REPORTEDLY HAVE SA-7/GRAIL MISSILES. (C)

THIS DIN REPLACES DIADIN 148-2A, DTG 221100Z MAY 76 CITE
NOVBER 7809, WHICH SHOULD BE DESTROYED.

1. ~~(S//NOFORN//UNINTEL)~~ SEVERAL SOURCES HAVE REPORTED THAT THE
LEFTIST PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ELPE) HAS RECEIVED FROM THREE
TO 52 SA-7/GRAIL SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES OVER THE LAST SEVERAL

PAGE 2 RUEKJCS 5747 C O N F I D E N T I A L

YEARS. IF SO, THIS WOULD BE A THREAT TO COMMERCIAL AND MILI-
TARY AVIATION.

~~(S//NOFORN//UNINTEL)~~ UNCLAS EMISSA

[REDACTED] GRAIL SHIPMENTS CAME TO ARGENTINA AS THE RESULT OF CONTACTS MADE BY THE ERP. ONE UNCONFIRMED VERSION IS THAT THE GRAILS WERE BROUGHT INTO THE COUNTRY BY THE CUBAN EMBASSY VIA DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS. EARLIER REPORTING CLAIMED THAT CHILEAN LEFTISTS HAD DELIVERED A SHIPMENT TO THE ERP AT THE ARGENTINE-CHILIAN BORDER.

3. ~~(S//NOFORN//NFINTL)~~ TO DATE, GRAIL MISSILES HAVE ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT BEEN USED AGAINST ANY ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT, ALTHOUGH SEVERAL PLANES HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN DESTROYED UNDER MYSTERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES. UNILE THIS SUGGESTS THAT THE MISSILE IS NOT IN ARGENTINA, THE LACK OF CONFIRMATION IS MULTIPLIED BY CONTINUING REPORTS OF THE WEAPON'S PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRY. AS A PRECAUTION, THE ARGENTINE AIR FORCE IS MAXIMIZING AIRPORT SECURITY -- ESPECIALLY AT INTERNATIONAL

PAGE 3 RUEKJCS 5747 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FACILITIES -- AND IS CLOSELY MONITORING DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS.

4. ~~(S//NOFORN//NFINTL)~~ IF THESE WEAPONS ARE OPERATIONAL AND IN THE HANDS OF TRAINED OPERATORS, CIVIL AND MILITARY AIRCRAFT COULD BE VULNERABLE TO ATTACK DURING LOW ALTITUDE FLIGHT, INCLUDING LANDINGS AND TAKEOFFS. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF INCREASED AIRFIELD SECURITY AND A STEPPED UP COUNTRY-WIDE SUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN IN WHICH A LARGE NUMBER OF LEFTISTS HAVE BEEN EITHER KILLED OR CAPTURED, THE THREAT TO AIRCRAFT IS ESTIMATED TO BE LOW (26 PERCENT).

PREPARED BY: [REDACTED] DIN-78

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