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MEMORANDUM

July 31, 1980

TO ADMIN - James Falzone  
 CONS - Wilbur Hitchcock  
 DATT - Col Robert Pitt  
 ✓ ECON - Lewis Townsend  
 FAS - James Parker  
 FCS - George Kelly  
 ICA - Norman Ziff  
 MILGP - Capt Walter Beck  
 POL - Townsend Friedman  
 POL/R - V Harwood Blocker

FROM A/DCM - Robert D Cross

SUBJECT Staff Meeting, Monday, August 4, 1980

The attached is for review and discussion at the Monday, August 4th staff meeting. The meeting will take place at 9 15 am in the Political Section Conference Room

Attachment  
as stated

O/DCM SBoudreaux sb  
7/31/80

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~~SECRET~~ (ENTIRE TEXT)

SCOPE PAPER

AMBASSADOR WILLIAM G. BOWDLER'S  
VISIT TO ARGENTINA  
JULY 30 - AUGUST 4, 1980

I. OBJECTIVES

Your forthcoming visit to Argentina is expected to carry forward our strategy of a closer and broader dialogue with Argentina for the purpose of achieving a steady improvement in our relations leading to eventual full normalization.

Our principal broad objectives, approved by the President, in moving to improve our relations with Argentina are:

-- to foster Argentina's identification with the West and thus to contain Soviet political and economic influence;

-- to encourage further specific improvements in human rights practices;

-- to seek assistance on appropriate East-West issues (such as grain sales); and

-- to obtain progress on nonproliferation objectives, particularly full-scope safeguards and ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and foster increased sensitivity among Argentine leaders to global nonproliferation concerns.

We also want to encourage continued Argentine cooperation with the Papal mediation of Argentina's dispute with Chile over territorial limits in the Beagle Channel, a dispute that very nearly led to war between the two countries in late 1978. Finally, we wish to encourage Argentina to play a constructive role with respect to developments in Central America and on other Hemispheric issues.

Your specific objectives on this trip are as follows:

A. The Consultative Process. Continue the political and economic consultations, begun with General

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Goodpaster's visit to Argentina, to address:

-- an overview of bilateral relations including economic, military, human rights, and nuclear issues;

-- our interests in the Western Hemisphere, including our respective positions on Central America, the Caribbean, Bolivia, security of the American South Atlantic coast, and Law of the Sea;

-- East-West relations, including the situations in Afghanistan and Iran, and the status of U.S.-Soviet relations post Afghanistan.

B. Human Rights. Seek assurances that:

-- the GOA will accept an OASGA resolution which recognizes the role of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and which encompasses a call for further improvements by Argentina;

-- there will be no new disappearances, in Argentina and internationally, including persons alleged to be terrorists. (Each year there have been less disappearances; in 1978 there were over 500; last year a reported 44 and for this year a reported seven. You may not be able in this visit to get final assurances of complete halting of disappearances, but you should make the attempt.);

-- all persons suspected of terrorism or subversive activities, including unacknowledged detainees, will be processed through normal judicial channels and ensured due process. (We have not made a concentrated effort on this point before, although it is basic for the longer-term. You will be starting a greater emphasis on it, but may not be able to get specific assurances on this occasion.);

-- guarantees will be instituted and regulations enforced preventing the mistreatment of detainees. (The Argentines have recently issued new and helpful regulations on this point.);

-- there will be substantial progress in coming months in reducing the number of political prisoners held without charges under the Executive power through release, trial or exile (during his recent visit, Ambassador Smith was assured that half of these prisoners-

-1300 at the time--would be released or sentenced by the end of the year).

You should also urge and advance ideas on accounting for the disappeared. This issue is being addressed in UN fora and, while it should not be a central requirement for the improvement of our bilateral relations, it should remain an important US objective. You should urge the Argentines to cooperate with these multilateral efforts, particularly with the UN Human Rights Commission's new expert working group on disappeared persons and with other groups such as the Catholic Church.

C. Grains. Seek a public Argentine commitment to restrict grain sales to the Soviet Union to present levels.

D. Military Relations. Seek to expand and strengthen bilateral military ties through increased security consultations, possible reciprocal military visits, exchanges of views on global and hemispheric defense concerns and increased defense cooperation. Explore the possibility of a visit to the United States by a senior Argentine military officer.

E. Nuclear Relations Urge the Argentines to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as they earlier had promised the President, and stress our continued interest in nuclear cooperation.

*Where's II ?*

### III. U.S. ACTIONS

#### A. Immediate Steps

In response to the President's directive to improve relations with Argentina this year and in recognition of improvements already made in human rights, you are authorized to:

-- propose periodic policy and intelligence talks on global and hemispheric issues;

-- propose the first round of periodic security consultations, focusing on global defense issues and Soviet activities in the South Atlantic;

-- seek to forward negotiations on a bilateral income tax treaty;

-- forward negotiations on a consular convention;  
and

-- invite Argentina to send a guest instructor to the U.S. Army School of the Americas.

B. Possible Additional Measures

Depending on the nature of the Argentine response in the human rights and grains issues, you may wish to:

-- explore the possibility of an invitation to a senior Argentine military leader (such as the present CINC or Army Chief of Staff) to visit Washington this year; and

-- propose that the Agricultural Cooperation Agreement be signed following your visit.

C. The longer Term

The extent and nature of U.S.-Argentine bilateral relations over the longer term depends in large part on significant further Argentine progress on human rights. You should stress to the Argentines that the human rights issue forms the principle impediment to close, warm and friendly relations. Initiatives such as rescission of military sales and assistance restrictions and on our vote on Argentine loans in the international financial institutions depend upon significant further progress in addressing the most serious human rights abuses, particularly on disappearances and prisoner treatment. We would have to be able to certify to the Congress that there no longer is a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights in Argentina.

IV. TALKING POINTS FOR THE AGENDA

A. OVERVIEW OF BILATERAL RELATIONS

1. The Improving Trend. The tone and quality of our bilateral relationship with Argentina have improved markedly as a result of the visits of General Goodpaster in January, and of Deputy Secretary of Commerce Hodges and Ambassador Smith in March. We also took advantage of the private visits to the US of Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister Cavandoli in

April and of Economy Minister Martinez de Hoz in May to engage in bilateral discussions. Your visit will be an important contribution to strengthening and formalizing the consultative process.

The GOA continues to stress that it frequently is not consulted on important issues (the last complaint was over the Costa Rica II conference on Cuban refugees).

Key Points:

-- I see the trend in our relationship as one of steady improvement. Problems remain of course, but through increasing consultations many of these problems can be resolved.

-- The purpose of my mission is several fold. I hope to continue the useful discussions and consultations on global, hemispheric and bilateral issues initiated by General Goodpaster and to explore ways in which our military ties can be strengthened. I also want to address in some detail the problems that exist between us in an effort to resolve some of the differences.

-- We would like to establish a framework which would ensure that such close consultations on issues of interest to our two nations will continue on a timely basis. We look toward more regular talks in the broad policy area and periodic consultations on global and hemispheric security issues.

-- With regard to initiation of exchanges in the policy area, what are your ideas on how best to proceed? We are open to your suggestions as to the level of participation and the scope of the issues which might be addressed.

-- Secretary Muskie looks forward to continuing these discussions with Foreign Minister Pastor at the OAS and UN general assemblies later this year.

2. Economic Relations

In 1979 U.S. exports to Argentina rose over 140%, to an estimated \$1.7 billion; at the same time, Argentine exports to the U.S. rose to about \$650 million, an increase of about 21% over the previous year. While Argentina has expressed concern over this bilateral trade imbalance, present policies aimed at opening

up the economy to market forces by moving away from 30 years of protectionism are expected to continue. Overall, Argentina has a strong external balance of payments position and an improving investment climate. Gold and foreign exchange reserves stand at about \$10 billion. Outstanding trade issues will be taken up at the next meeting of the Argentine - U.S. Mixed Economic Commission, planned for October

Key Points:

✓ -- We believe that the large deficit in our bilateral trade is due in substantial part to the GOA policy of effectively allowing the peso to appreciate. The problem should, we hope, correct itself as Argentine domestic inflation is reduced.

-- Overall, as we see it, there are no major trade issues between us.

✓ -- We see the Argentine - U.S. Mixed Economic Commission, which will meet in Buenos Aires in October, as an essential element in our pattern of consultations.

-- We look forward to discussing at that time ongoing efforts to resolve bilateral trade issues and to expand our commercial relations.

✓ -- We now expect that the US delegation to the Mixed Economic Commission will be led by Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Richard Cooper.

3. Military Relations

The Argentines have increased the pressure on resuming and expanding contacts between our armed forces, and particularly with regard to resuming military sales. For our part, we have stressed that normalization of military relations remain our long-term objective, but there is no possibility of lifting the prohibition of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment against the sales of military equipment and training (FMS) at this time, pending further improvements in human rights. There are, however, a number of initiatives which we can take now in recognition of past human rights improvement and which you should propose.

Key Points

-- We want to improve military relations now,

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and I have several suggestions to make in that regard.

-- I propose that a meeting be held later this year between senior U.S. Defense and military officials and their Argentine counterparts to examine common global and hemispheric security concerns, particularly security of the South Atlantic. (The U.S. Delegation would be headed by the Chief of the Joint Staff, JCS.)

-- I hope these security consultations will lead to more regular exchanges of views on global and hemispheric defense concerns and increased defense cooperation.

-- I also would like to explore with you your views on the possibility and timing of a visit to the United States by a senior Argentine military officer.

-- We hope that Argentina will actively participate in the UNITAS XXI naval exercise. We appreciated the cooperation given to the exercise last year by the Argentine Navy, even though Argentina was unable to participate.

-- We see no possibility of persuading the Congress to lift the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment at this time.

#### 4. Human Rights

While we remain very concerned over the human rights situation in Argentina, we have recognized that there has been improvement in the past year. This improvement and the prospect for more rapid progress has facilitated the overall improvement in our relationships with Argentina. However, much remains to be done, and we have been forthright with the Argentines as to what we see as the priorities.

The recent meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission produced sharp clashes between the U.S. and Argentine delegations. Argentina lobbied strongly against the adoption of a general procedure by the Commission for dealing with the problem of disappearances world-wide because the GOA feared Argentina would become a principal target. The U.S. delegation, on the other hand, worked to strengthen the Working Group's recommendation on how the Commission should deal with complaints of human rights abuses in Argentina under confidential procedures. The incident still rankles with the Argentines and they likely will refer to the meeting as being

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out of step with the new tone of our relationship.

Key Points:

-- We are pleased at the considerable progress that has been made in the past year in restoring respect for basic human rights and due process of law.

-- However, we view the human rights situation in Argentina as still serious and the principal impediment to close, warm, and friendly relations.

-- There are many steps that we would like to implement now to strengthen relations, but are prevented from doing so by our concern for human rights.

-- We trust that progress will continue to be made in this important area, and that human rights problems in Argentina soon will be a thing of the past.

-- I would like to discuss in detail later on in my visit our views on human rights, specific areas of U.S. concern, and the prospects for improvement.

-- With regard to a return to full and friendly relations, we would hope soon to be in a position to move from opposition through abstention on votes in the multilateral development banks on loans to Argentina to a vote in favor of such loans.

-- We also would hope that conditions may soon prevail which would enable us to ask for the revocation or modification of current legislation prohibiting military supply or training relationships between us.

-- However, in both of these cases we would have to be able to go to the Congress and to the American people and attest that there no longer is a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. There would need to be significant further progress in addressing disappearances, releasing or charging prisoners held by the Executive, and eliminating prisoner mistreatment.

-- I also hope that our two countries will consult in advance on our positions in international fora. Of particular concern is the Argentine position on any OASGA resolution dealing with the IAHR report on human rights in Argentina.

## 5. Effect of East-West Issues

### Key Points:

-- The health of our bilateral relations are also tied to East-West issues.

-- Argentina's support of our stand on the Moscow Olympics, our common position on the Vietnam Food Aid project, acceptance of Cuban refugees from the U.S. and Peru, and support of the U.S. in opposing the move of the WHO office from Alexandria were very much appreciated and seen in the U.S. as placing Argentina firmly in the Western camp.

-- Other GOA actions, however, such as Argentina's public opposition to our grains restrictions, the recent signing of an Argentine-Soviet grains agreement, bilateral military exchanges, and the prospect of further Argentine-Soviet economic and nuclear agreements give the impression that Argentina is taking advantage of pragmatic opportunities to the disadvantage of Western interests.

-- How do you see the Argentine-Soviet relationship developing?

### B. GRAINS

The GOA last January gave us confidential assurances that it would seek to limit grain sales to the U.S.S.R. in response to the partial embargo called for by President Carter, despite its public posture of not interfering with normal market flows. Although exports to the Soviet Union have more than doubled, they remain within the parameters discussed. We want the Argentines to pledge publicly to continue their restrictions through the next crop year.

On July 10, Argentina signed a five year grain sales agreement with the Soviet Union specifying shipments of 4.5 MMT annually (excluding wheat). The agreement is consistent with the levels discussed with General Goodpaster but includes provisions calling for Argentine Grains Board intervention to ensure sales to the Soviets and exemption of Soviet shipments from third country embargoes.

### Key Points:

-- The timing of the Argentine-U.S S.R. agreement

was unfortunate in view of the continuing Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

-- Perceived Argentine non-cooperation in restricting grains sales is becoming an increasingly important issue in the U.S. media and Congress.

-- We hope Argentina will continue its confidential commitment to restrict grains sales to current levels.

-- We also seek a public Argentine statement to that effect.

-- We value any Argentine cooperation on this issue, but agreeing privately to continue the GOA restrictions without a public declaration would limit us to private expressions of appreciation. We might also have to respond to public pressure by criticizing publicly the GOA for its stand.

#### C. OLYMPICS

Although Argentina has supported the Moscow Summer Olympics boycott, it has not responded to our request that the GOA host some of the post Olympic games. It has also hesitated in sending athletes to these alternate games, perhaps because of intense Soviet pressure.

##### Key Points

-- We appreciate Argentina's support of the Olympics boycott.

-- We are puzzled that Argentina has not responded to our request to host some of the post-Olympic games.

-- We urge that Argentine teams fully participate in all of the alternate games being scheduled.

#### D. BEAGLE CHANNEL

Despite periodic bouts of pessimism on both sides, there has been a rash of intelligence reports in the last month indicating progress in the Vatican's mediation effort in the Beagle Channel dispute. Essentially, the reporting presents the Argentines as willing to give up the three disputed islands in the Channel in return for sovereignty over the Atlantic waters off the islands. President Videla is thought to want

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a solution to the dispute before his term in office expires in March 1981. Papal mediation of the dispute is expected to resume in September.

Key Points:

--We are pleased that Argentina and Chile agreed to submit the Beagle Channel dispute to Papal mediation.

--We hope that the mediation effort will lead to a peaceful resolution of the dispute.

-- How does the GOA see the negotiations developing.

E. HUMAN RIGHTS

1. General.

In connection with the Argentine initiative to host the OASGA, you said that you would like to see Argentina:

-- release or remand to civilian trial as many of the PEN prisoners as possible;

-- improve prison conditions for Executive detainees, leading to better consular access, visiting rights, food, access to reading material and opportunities for work.

-- cooperate with multilateral efforts to deal with the problem of missing persons, particularly with the UN's new Expert Working Group on Disappeared Persons.

-- accept a constructive GA resolution on the IAHC report recognizing 1) the role of the IAHC, and 2) the need for continuing improvements.

You also emphasized that we had received repeated assurances from the GOA that there would be no more disappearances. Additional disappearances between now and the Assembly would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for there to be a successful meeting and for the Secretary to attend.

Although the GOA has since indicated it would not be interested in hosting the OASGA, these human rights goals remain an important objective of your mission. You should seek credible GOA commitments

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for:

-- no more disappearances within Argentina or internationally;

-- a reduction of PEN prisoners to the hard core (about 300) by the end of the year; and

-- implementation of the recent prison reform regulations for political prisoners.

Key Points:

-- We are pleased at the progress that has been made in the past year in restoring respect for basic human rights and due process of law.

-- However, we view the human rights situation in Argentina as still serious and the principal impediment to close, warm, and friendly relations.

-- There are significant steps that we would like to implement now to strengthen relations, but are prevented from doing so by law and policy founded on our concern for human rights.

-- We want to be in a position to move from opposition by abstention on votes in the multilateral development banks on loans to Argentina to a vote in favor of such loans.

-- We also want to ask for the revocation or modification of the legislation prohibiting military supply or training relationships between us.

-- However, we would have to be able to go to the Congress and to the American people and attest that there no longer is a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. We could not do this with the present human rights conditions

-- I would hope that our two countries will consult in advance on issues in international fora which deal with human rights. The better we understand each other, the less likely there will be differences of substance or interpretation in our actions

2. Disappearances.

There have been three confirmed disappearances

within Argentina this year and four more that are unconfirmed. Moreover, Argentine intelligence services appear to be collaborating with the intelligence forces of other countries to eliminate or to return suspected Argentine terrorists to Argentina.

Key Points.

-- The question of continuing disappearances is our most important human rights concern.

-- We have received assurances in the past that disappearances have ceased, but they continue to occur. (Give your interlocutor a list of disappearances for 1980.)

-- The incident in Lima was particularly disturbing; it indicates that the syndrome of Argentine disappearances extends beyond Argentina's borders.

-- We seek from you a renewed commitment that disappearances within Argentina will cease.

-- We ask that the commitment extend to persons suspected of being terrorists.

-- We ask that these persons be processed through judicial channels.

3. PEN Prisoners.

There are about 1400 prisoners remaining under Executive detention (down from 8,000 in 1977). During his visit, Ambassador Gerard Smith received assurances that this figure would be reduced in half by the end of the year. On July 9, the GOA announced the release, provisional liberty, or exile of 218 prisoners under PEN.

There about 300 PEN prisoners who were found guilty of terrorism or other subversive acts before the return of Peron, but who were pardoned by Campora during his brief presidency. They cannot be tried or sentenced again. The GOA has indicated that these would be held indefinitely, since contravention of the amnesty could lead to a dangerous precedent should the military decide to amnesty those involved in the

disappearances. Some are probably dangerous. However, there are constitutional provisions in Argentina which could be used to resolve this dilemma: the right of option to exile. We should encourage the Argentines to use this solution to the problem in those cases where outright release cannot be accepted.

Key Points:

-- We were delighted to see the July 9 announcement of the release or right of option of 218 prisoners under the Executive Power.

-- What is your timetable for resolution of these cases?

-- (for the 300 Campora amnestied) Can't they be granted the "right of option" to depart Argentina?

-- Elimination of this category of prisoner would go a long way toward creating an atmosphere for further improvement in bilateral relations.

4. Prison Conditions.

Despite setbacks, there has been considerable progress in prisoner treatment since 1976. A Presidential directive issued in April 1979 standardized prisoner treatment and guaranteed rights of visitation, communication, exercise and work. However, a setback occurred when a confidential annex to the decree was issued which permitted continuation of a "three tier" system of prisoner classification with the "hard category" of prisoners still denied these basic privileges. Partially as a result of Red Cross efforts, another Presidential decree was issued on May 3, 1980, guaranteeing the rights of all prisoners in these categories. It remains to be seen how this new decree will be implemented.

Key Points.

-- We have heard of complaints that prisoners under Executive detention were not accorded all of the benefits of prison reforms under the 1979 Presidential directive. We hope the new decree will alleviate the conditions under which these prisoners live.

-- To what extent has the latest decree been implemented?

5. Judicial Guarantees.

While the courts are constitutionally independent,

the Junta in 1976 replaced all members of the Supreme Court and removed a number of judges in lower courts, though most judges were retained. The major problem involves due process, writs of habeas corpus have proved ineffective in determining the whereabouts of disappeared persons, military tribunals conduct their hearings in secret and defendants have access only to a military defense counsel who usually is not a lawyer. Some non-Governmental organizations have called for new trials for those convicted in military courts.

Under the Argentine Constitution, persons held by the Executive under state of siege powers have the "right of option" to depart the country. The GOA has applied this Constitutional right only selectively, denying many petitions without explanation. You should press for termination of the restrictions on this Constitutional right.

Although the sanctity of the home has traditionally been protected by Argentine law, security forces have often violated such sanctity during their anti-terrorist and anti-subversive operations.

Key Points:

-- Now that the terrorist threat is passed, to what extent does the GOA intend to remand security cases to the civilian courts for processing.

-- Use of civilian courts in these cases would be an important step toward restoration of judicial guarantees.

-- We remain disturbed by the continuing delays in carrying out the right of option program, by the very large and increasing number of refusals of permission to visit applicants in prison, as well as the large number of eventual denials of the right of option to persons holding U.S. certificates of eligibility.

6. Accounting for the Disappeared

This is the most difficult issue that the GOA will have to face. Some 6,000 to 15,000 Argentines "disappeared" during the course of the anti-terrorism

campaign conducted by the GOA. It is public knowledge in Argentina and abroad that most of these were taken by security forces, were tortured for whatever information they might be able to provide, and then were summarily executed. Although we cannot condone the GOA decision, domestic or foreign demands for an accounting will likely prolong the Argentine military's commitment to retain power as a means of forestalling inquiry into past patterns of behavior. The military viewpoint appears to be shared by most Argentine political leaders.

Although we are not making accounting for the disappeared a central requirement for improved relations, it remains an important U.S. objective. Therefore, it is in our interest, as it is in the interest of the GOA, that this issue be resolved. On the other hand, the GOA has flatly refused to consider the issue, believing that it would be the first step on the path toward Nuremberg.

It is unlikely that the military government will commit itself to, or has the information for, a complete accounting of the disappeared. However, a partial accounting on a case-by-case basis might be feasible. The best possibility would be for the GOA to find some mechanism -- either internally within the government or through the Catholic Church or other groups--for informing the families of certain disappeared persons of their fate.

Finally, during the process of returning the country to democratically elected civilian government, it is likely that the the GOA will consider a general amnesty for all of those who fought in the "dirty war", whether for the government or against it. This solution probably would be acceptable to most Argentines. It should be acceptable to us as well. (See Annex \_\_\_ for further analysis.)

Key Points:

-- We recognize that this is the most difficult human rights issue that faces the GOA and that it is basically an Argentine problem.

-- However, there are serious international and U.S. domestic pressures for an accounting.

-- The GOA itself might inform the families,

confidentially if necessary, in cases where information is readily available and after determining release of the information would not prejudice other GOA interests.

-- Perhaps the Government might also address this issue, again on a case-by-case basis, cooperating with the Catholic Church or international organizations such as the UNHCR's new five-member expert working group on disappearances.

-- The U.S. does not seek a determination of responsibility or punishment of those involved; rather, we seek an accounting which would relieve the suffering of the families involved.

-- What does the GOA propose to do to resolve this problem? (You should seek as a minimum a GOA commitment to at least reexamine the issue.)

#### G. NUCLEAR COOPERATION

We wish to stress to the GOA that the U.S. is interested in maintaining cooperation consistent with U.S. law and policies. We also wish to encourage forward movement on ratification and the waiver into force of Tlatelolco.

##### Key Points:

-- We remain interested in such bilateral cooperation as the GOA considers desirable; we would like to resolve the pending safeguards issue to make this possible.

-- We ask Argentina to ratify Tlatelolco in line with past commitments and public statements.

#### H. WESTERN HEMISPHERE

1. Political Relations in the Hemisphere
2. Central America
3. Caribbean
4. Bolivia

5. Security of the American South Atlantic Coast

I. EAST-WEST RELATIONS

1. Afghanistan

2. Iran

3. U.S.-Soviet Relations After Afghanistan

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TAGS: GORM, AR

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SUBJECT: 1980 GORM

22  
1. ~~(X)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

24  
2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF GORM STATEMENT FOR 1980:

26  
ARGENTINA

28  
U.S. INTERESTS:

30  
-- DEVELOPMENT OF A STABLE, COOPERATIVE AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IDENTIFIED WITH THE WEST.

32  
-- ARGENTINE OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

34  
-- ARGENTINE COOPERATION IN EAST-WEST ISSUES.

36  
-- NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION.

38  
-- REGIONAL PEACE AND SETTLEMENT OF TERRITORIAL DISPUTES.

40  
-- COOPERATION IN COLLECTIVE HEMISPHERE SECURITY.

42  
-- ACCESS TO ARGENTINE MARKETS AND PROTECTION OF U.S. INVESTMENTS.

44  
KEY POLICY ISSUES FACING THE U.S. IN THE NEXT TWO YEARS:

46  
-- HOW TO CARRY OUT THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE TO IMPROVE AND STRENGTHEN U.S.-ARGENTINE RELATIONS IN RECOGNITION OF THE IMPROVING TEND OF ARGENTINA'S HUMAN RIGHT PERFORMANCE, AND IN ORDER TO HELP DEFLECT ARGENTINA FROM CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND PROMOTE OTHER U.S. INTERESTS.

48  
-- HOW TO ACHIEVE A BALANCED APPROACH IN THE PURSUIT OF OUR POLICY INTERESTS IN ARGENTINA THAT WILL MAXIMIZE THE PROSPECTS OF ACHIEVING MULTIPLE U.S. GOALS.

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ALB			ADM		
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INL			OPRON		
FS			ARC		

6-VII  
8C HOW CAN THE US BEST MOVE THE GOA TO MAKE FURTHER  
10 HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS? WHAT IMPROVEMENTS OR COMMITMENTS  
12 ARE REQUIRED TO REMOVE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE SANCTIONS  
14 IMPOSED AGAINST ARGENTINA ON HUMAN RIGHTS GROUNDS?

16 -- HOW TO CONTAIN SOVIET EFFORTS TO INCREASE POLITICAL  
18 TIES WITH AND INFLUENCE OVER THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT,  
20 DISCOURAGE ARGENTINA FROM PLAYING OFF BOTH SIDES,  
22 AND GAIN ARGENTINE SUPPORT FOR U.S. INITIATIVES AGAINST  
24 GLOBAL SOVIET EXPANSIONISM AND ON BEHALF OF COLLECTIVE  
26 SECURITY.

28 -- HOW TO RESUME MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACT AND  
30 COOPERATION WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY OUR  
32 HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES.

34 -- WHAT FURTHER STEPS CAN BE TAKEN IN THE FIELD OF  
36 DIPLOMATIC NUCLEAR COOPERATION, AND HOW CAN WE GAIN  
38 ARGENTINE ACCEPTANCE OF FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AND  
40 RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY OF TLANTELOLCO?

42 -- WHAT ROLE SHOULD THE U.S. PLAY TO PROMOTE PEACEFUL  
44 RESOLUTION OF THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE WITH CHILE?

46 -- HOW CAN WE GAIN ARGENTINE SUPPORT FOR REGIONAL  
48 ARMS RESTRAINT?

50 GOALS AND OBJECTIVES:

52 -- STRENGTHEN U.S.-ARGENTINE BILATERAL RELATIONS  
54 CONSISTENT WITH OUR OTHER GOALS AND OBJECTIVES.

56 -- FOSTER ARGENTINA'S IDENTIFICATION WITH THE WEST  
58 AND CONTAIN SOVIET POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INFLUENCE.

60 -- ENCOURAGE A CONSTRUCTIVE ARGENTINE ROLE WITH RESPECT  
62 TO DEVELOPMENTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND IN OTHER  
64 HEMISPHERIC ISSUES.

66 -- PROMOTE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, HEALTHY, MODERATE  
68 POLITICAL PARTIES, TRADE UNION LIBERTIES, AND CONTINUED  
70 NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BASED ON A MORE OPEN,  
72 COMPETITIVE, SYSTEM WHICH WILL SUPPORT THE POLITICAL  
74 NORMALIZATION PROCESS.

76 -- SEEK A DEFINITE END TO THE USE OF TORTURE,  
78 "DISAPPEARANCE," AND OTHER OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED ABUSES;  
80 WORK FOR FAIR CIVILIAN TRIALS FOR NEW DETAINEES; RELEASE  
82 OR PAID OF PRISONERS HELD UNDER EXECUTIVE DETENTION;  
84 FULL RESTORATION OF HABEAS CORPUS AND OTHER JUDICIAL  
86 GUARANTEES; AND PROGRESS TOWARD ACCOUNTING FOR THE  
88 FATE OF THE DISAPPEARED.

92-21-7

3

SHIPMENTS TO THE USSR, IMPROVE THE ARGENTINE VOTING RECORD IN INTERNATIONAL FORA ON EAST-WEST ISSUES, DISCOURAGE ARGENTINE-SOVIET MILITARY TIES AND THWART OTHER SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO GAIN POLITICAL INFLUENCE AND PRESENCE IN ARGENTINA.

-- INCREASE US-ARGENTINE MILITARY CONSULTATIONS ON GLOBAL SECURITY ISSUES.

-- INCREASE BILATERAL MILITARY VISITS AND JOINT EXERCISES.

-- SEE ARGENTINE RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY

OF ILLINOIS, AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS; TO FACILITATE THESE OBJECTIVES, FOSTER INCREASED SENSITIVITY AMONG ARGENTINE LEADERS TO GLOBAL NONPROLIFERATION CONCERNS.

-- ENCOURAGE CONTINUED ARGENTINE COOPERATION WITH THE PAPAL MEDIATION OF THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE.

-- PROMOTE US-ARGENTINE SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION, PARTICULARLY IN ANTARCTICA.

-- INCREASE THE U.S. SHARE OF THE ARGENTINE MARKET.

-- OBTAIN A GREATER ARGENTINE ROLE IN MODERATING THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE.

-- CONCLUDE A BILATERAL INCOME TAX TREATY TO AVOID DOUBLE TAXATION.

-- CONCLUDE A BILATERAL CONSULAR CONVENTION.

-- STRENGTHEN DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION MEASURES (CONSISTENT WITH LEGAL DUE PROCESS).

EXPLANATION OF CHANGES FROM LAST GOALS AND OBJECTIVES STATEMENT:

-- THE MAJOR CHANGES IN POLICY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES ARE TO IMPROVE AND STRENGTHEN U.S.-ARGENTINE RELATIONS IN CONSONANCE WITH HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS, TO REFLECT THE IMPORTANCE OF STRENGTHENING ARGENTINA'S IDENTIFICATION WITH THE WEST AND OF CONTAINING AND DISCOURAGING THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

92. MOVEMENT TOWARD CLOSER POLITICAL TIES WITH THE SOVIET  
UNION; AND TO REMOVE FROM THE STATEMENT OBJECTIVES  
WHICH HAVE BEEN COMPLETED OR ARE NO LONGER FEASIBLE  
OR RELEVANT.

IN SEEKING TO ACHIEVE ESTABLISHED GOALS AND OBJECTIVES,  
THE AMBASSADOR AND THE COUNTRY TEAM WILL:

-- THROUGH BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS, CONSULTATIONS, MILITARY  
LIAISON, CONSULAR ACTIVITY, AND INFORMATION AND CULTURAL  
PROGRAMS, ACTIVELY PURSUE THE STRENGTHENING AND DEEPENING  
OF U.S.-ARGENTINE RELATIONS.

-- SEEK ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR U.S. OBJECTIVES  
IN INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL FORA,  
PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO EAST-WEST ISSUES.

-- PURSUE OUR POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH SUPPORT FOR  
A VISIT BY THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF INTER-AMERICAN  
AFFAIRS IN JULY, AND THE HOLDING OF A FIRST ROUND  
OF PERIODIC POLICY TALKS DURING THE VISIT.

-- DISSUADE ARGENTINA FROM SEEKING CLOSER RELATIONS  
WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

-- AS REQUIRED AND IN SUPPORT OF USDA EFFORTS, NEGOTIATE  
ON GRAINS RESTRICTIONS THE BEST AGREEMENT WE CAN OBTAIN.

-- FOSTER THROUGH FREQUENT CONTACTS WITH POLITICAL  
GROUPS, PARTIES AND LABOR UNIONS, AND THROUGH EMBASSY  
CULTURAL AND INFORMATION PROGRAMS, GOOD RELATIONS  
WITH THOSE GROUPS AND A GRADUAL RETURN TO DEMOCRACY,  
ENCOURAGING THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK  
FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PLURALISTIC, DEMOCRATIC  
SOCIETY.

-- CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE ON HUMAN RIGHTS WITH ARGENTINE  
LEADERS, THROUGH THE AMBASSADOR, THE VISIT BY THE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, AND  
OTHER RESIDENT AND VISITING U.S. OFFICIALS, EXPRESSING  
OUR CONTINUED CONCERN, POINTING OUT THE REMAINING  
PROBLEMS, AND SEEKING THEIR EARLY SOLUTION.

-- RECOGNIZE IN APPROPRIATE WAYS THAT THERE HAS BEEN  
CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS IN THE DECLINE OF DISAPPEARANCES  
AND IN THE NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS.

-- ENGAGE IN A DIALOGUE WITH THE NEW PRESIDENT-SELECT  
AIMED AT SEEKING A COMMITMENT FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS  
IMPROVEMENTS NECESSARY TO FULLY RESTORE NORMAL BILATERAL  
RELATIONS AND TO COOPERATE IN OTHER AREAS OF MUTUAL  
INTEREST.

-- MONITOR INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS CASES OF INTEREST

TO THE U.S.

CONTINUE CLOSE AND FREQUENT CONTACT WITH LEGITIMATE HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS TO PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS.

-- CONTINUE PROCESSING "RIGHT OF OPTION" CANDIDATES

FOR U.S. PAROLE PROGRAMS.

-- STRONGLY URGE ARGENTINE OFFICIALS TO COOPERATE WITH THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION'S NEW EXPERT GROUP ON DISAPPEARED PERSONS AND WITH OTHER GROUPS SUCH AS THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN ACCOUNTING FOR THE DISAPPEARED.

-- MAKE CLEAR TO THE GOA THAT OUR POSITION ON ARGENTINA IN INTERNATIONAL FCRA WILL BE GUIDED BY OUR GENERAL GOALS OF INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS AND PROMOTING IMPROVEMENTS IN ACTUAL PRACTICES, AS WELL AS A GOA COMMITMENT TO FURTHER HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS.

-- REBUILD MILITARY RELATIONS THROUGH INCREASED CONTACT AND CONSULTATIONS, STRESSING THAT FURTHER PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS WILL BE ESSENTIAL TOWARD REMOVING MILITARY SUPPLY PROSCRIPTIONS.

-- BEGIN PERIODIC CONSULTATIONS ON SECURITY, THE FIRST ROUND TO FOCUS ON SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.

-- INVITE AN ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES TEAM TO MAKE A RETURN VISIT TO WASHINGTON LATER IN THE YEAR TO DISCUSS OFFICIAL DEFENSE ISSUES.

-- FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WITH CONGRESS, CONSIDER WHETHER TO INVITE ARGENTINA TO SEND A GUEST INSTRUCTOR TO THE U.S. ARMY SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS.

-- KEEP UNDER REVIEW THE DESIRABILITY OF PROCEEDING WITH AN INVITATION TO A SENIOR ARGENTINE MILITARY LEADER (SUCH AS THE COMMANDER-IN CHIEF OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY OR THE ARMY CHIEF-OF-STAFF) TO VISIT WASHINGTON THIS YEAR, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ARGENTINE INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS AS WELL AS CONTINUED IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S.-ARGENTINE RELATIONS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5-5  
 -- PRESS FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A BILATERAL INCOME TAX TREATY.

-- PROMPTLY SEEK TO RESOLVE THROUGH NEGOTIATION THE REMAINING SAFEGUARDS ASSURANCE ISSUES TO PERMIT CONTINUED U.S. PARTICIPATION IN ARGENTINA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM TO THE EXTENT CONSISTENT WITH U.S. LAWS AND NONPROLIFERATION POLICIES.

-- CONTINUE TO URGENT RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY OF MONTREAL AND ARGENTINE ACCEPTANCE OF FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS.

-- NEGOTIATE AND CONCLUDE A CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE GOA.

-- ENCOURAGE THE ARGENTINE LABOR MOVEMENT TO JOIN ORIT (ORGANIZACION REGIONAL INTERAMERICANA DE TRABAJADORES).

-- SUPPORT CONTINUED AIFLD PRESENCE.

-- USE THE COUNTRY COMMERCIAL PLAN TO PROMOTE EXPORTS.

-- PREPARE FOR A MEETING OF THE MIXED ECONOMIC COMMISSION LATER IN THE YEAR.

-- SIGN THE PROPOSED U.S.-ARGENTINE AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT DURING AMBASSADOR BOWDLER'S VISIT, DEPENDING ON THE RESULTS OF HIS CONSULTATIONS.

-- ENCOURAGE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE. MUSKIE

BT  
 #5440

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# TELEGRAM

232025Z MAY 80

INDICATE  
 COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

FROM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12065  
EO ~~X1052~~  
TAGS  
SUBJECT

XDS-3 5/23/80 (CHAPLIN, MAXWELL) OR-M  
AMGT OGEN PEPR PFOR AR  
(C) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

ACTION SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 4297

REF. (A) STATE 128178; (B) 79 STATE 310299; (C) 78 STATE 287307;  
(D) 79 STATE 44983; (E) 79 STATE 96933

1. ~~X~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

--CONTRIBUTE TO THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERATE CIVILIAN DECISION-MAKERS IN THE FUTURE BY PROMOTING THROUGH USICA PROGRAMS AND UNOFFICIAL CONTACTS AN ENLIGHTENED DIALOGUE BY POLITICAL PARTIES AND TRADE UNION ELEMENTS ON GLOBAL ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SECURITY QUESTIONS.

--ENCOURAGE THE ARGENTINE LABOR MOVEMENT TO JOIN ORIT (ORGANIZACION REGIONAL INTER AMERICANA DE TRABAJADORES).

--SUPPORT CONTINUED AIFLD (AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR FREE LABOR DEVELOPMENT) PRESENCE.

--CONTINUE TO PRESS, BOTH THROUGH OFFICIAL ACTIONS, USICA PROGRAMS AND OTHER UNOFFICIAL CONTACTS, FOR

AMB  
CHARGE  
POL 3  
ECON  
POL/R  
FCA  
FAS  
CONS  
DAO  
DEA  
ICA  
SCI  
MILGRP  
CHRON

*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*

DRAFTED BY  
A/POLCOUNS.AGFREEMAN SB

DRAFTING DATE  
5/23/80

TEL EXT  
278

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY  
CHARGE MCHAPLIN

CLEARANCES

POL/R JDISTEFANO (IN DRAFT)  
CONS WHITCHCOCK (IN DRAFT)  
DEA MPOOLEY (IN DRAFT)  
ICA RCROSS (IN DRAFT)  
MILGRP CAPT.WBECK (IN DRAFT)

FAS JPARKER (IN DRAFT)  
DAO COL.RPITT, (IN DRAFT)  
ECON.JAMOTT (IN DRAFT)  
FCS GKELLY (IN DRAFT)  
SCI:CMEZNER (IN DRAFT)

- HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS, ESPECIALLY A DEFINITIVE END TO DISAPPEARANCES AND THE RELEASE OR TRIAL OF PEN (PODER EJECUTIVO NACIONAL) PRISONERS.
- EXPLORE WITH PRESIDENTIAL FRONT-RUNNER CANDIDATE BEFORE HE TAKES OFFICE THE FEASIBILITY OF THE GOA'S PROVIDING SOME INFORMATION ON THE FATE ~~FOR~~ OF THE DISAPPEARED THROUGH AN INTERMEDIARY SUCH AS THE CHURCH.
  - MONITOR INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS CASES OF INTEREST TO THE U.S.
  - MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH LEGITIMATE HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS AND WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF A BROAD RANGE OF POLITICAL GROUPINGS AND INTERESTS.
  - SUPPORT A GENERAL ENDORSEMENT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION'S REPORT ON ARGENTINA, COUPLING THIS WITH AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF IMPROVEMENTS MADE, AND CALL ON THE GOA TO GIVE THE REPORT SERIOUS CONSIDERATION.
  - IN RECOGNITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS GAINS, MAINTAIN A LOWER PROFILE ON ARGENTINE ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL FORA SUCH AS THE UNHRC (U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION), LETTING OTHERS TAKE THE LEAD WHEREVER POSSIBLE.
  - PROMOTE AT DECENT INTERVALS FURTHER EXCHANGES OF HIGH-RANKING VISITORS, DEPENDING ON CONTINUED HUMAN RIGHTS GAINS.
  - VOTE YES ON NON-BASIC HUMAN NEEDS IFI LOANS IF PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS IS SUSTAINED.

- MODIFY THE HUMPHREY-KENNEDY AMENDMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUSTAINED HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS.
- USE THE CURRENT IMPROVED TONE OF RELATIONS TO NEGOTIATE ON GRAINS THE BEST ARRANGEMENTS WE CAN.
- ENCOURAGE ARGENTINA TO NOT GO BEYOND CURRENT SCIENTIFIC FISHING AGREEMENT INTO A COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION THAT HAS ADVERSE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS.
- ENCOURAGE ARGENTINE PARTICIPATION IN CONSTRUCTIVE HEMISPHERIC AND REGIONAL SECURITY EFFORTS, INCLUDING UNITAS AND OCEAN VENTURE.
- ENCOURAGE A CONSTRUCTIVE ARGENTINE ROLE, SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. POSITIONS, IN INTERNATIONAL FORA.
- TO THE EXTENT FEASIBLE, CONSULT WITH ARGENTINA BEFORE TAKING MAJOR POLICY INITIATIVES THAT ~~WXXXX~~ AFFECT ITS VITAL INTERESTS.
- CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE ON GLOBAL AND REGIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION AS A WAY TO ENCOURAGE RATIFICATION OF TLATELOLCO.
- SETTLE THE ISSUE OF SAFEGUARDS ASSURANCES FOR THE SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR RESEARCH FUEL.
- UTILIZE EMBASSY CONTACTS AND INFORMATION AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS TO INCREASE OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE NATURE OF U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT POLICIES, ESPECIALLY IN THE AREAS OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION, THE SALE NEGOTIATIONS, AND REGIONAL

- ARMS CONTROL, AS EXEMPLIFIED IN THE AYACUCHO AND MEXICAN ARMS LIMITATION INITIATIVES.
- ENCOURAGE THE CONTINUED COMMITMENT OF THE POPE'S PERSONAL PRESTIGE AS THE BEST HOPE OF OBTAINING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE, OR AT LEAST AVOIDANCE OF HOSTILITIES.
- PROCEED WITH THE MEETING OF THE US-ARGENTINE MIXED ECONOMIC COMMISSION.
- PROMOTE US PARTICIPATION IN MAJOR INFRASTRUCTURAL AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL PROJECTS; USE THE COUNTRY COMMERCIAL PLAN TO PROMOTE EXPORTS; AND USE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK FINANCING TO ENHANCE COMPETITIVENESS OF US SUPPLIERS IN ARGENTINE MARKETS WHERE APPROPRIATE.
- CONCLUDE A TAX TREATY.
- REINFORCE A CONSTRUCTIVE ARGENTINE ROLE IN LIBERALIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE IN INTERNATIONAL FORA.
- COMPLETE A BILATERAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENT IN AGRICULTURAL SCIENCES.
- ENLARGE EXISTING AGREEMENTS IN THE AREA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, SUCH AS ALTERNATE ENERGY SOURCES, SPACE AND BIO-MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES.
- NEGOTIATE A CONSULAR CONVENTION WHEN AUTHORIZED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

CHAPLIN 

Declassified Case: LW- 8236 Date:  
11-02-2013

4299

232030Z MAY 80

# TELEGRAM

INDICATE  
 COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

12065  
EO ~~X100R~~  
TAGS  
SUBJECT

FROM  
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XDS-3 5/23/00 (CHAPLIN, MAXWELL) OR-M  
AMGT OGEN PEPR PFOR AR  
(C) U.S GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

ACTION

SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 4299

REF. (A) STATE 128178, (B) 79 STATE 310299, (C) 78 STATE 287307;  
(D) 79 STATE 44983, (E) 79 STATE 96933

AMB  
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ECON  
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FCS  
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DAO  
DEA  
ICA  
MILGRP  
CHRON  
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1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. U.S. INTERESTS
  - DEVELOPMENT OF A STABLE, COOPERATIVE AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT
  - ARGENTINE OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
  - ARGENTINE COOPERATION IN EAST-WEST ISSUES
  - NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION
  - REGIONAL PEACE AND SETTLEMENT OF TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
  - ARGENTINE COOPERATION IN COLLECTIVE HEMISPHERIC SECURITY
  - ACCESS TO ARGENTINE MARKETS AND PROTECTION OF U.S. INVESTMENTS
- 3 KEY POLICY ISSUES FACING THE U.S IN THE NEXT TWO YEARS
  - HOW TO FIX AN OVERALL BALANCED APPROACH TO THE PURSUIT

DRAFTED BY  
A/POLCOUNS AGFREEMAN SB

DRAFTING DATE  
5/23/80

TEL EXT  
278

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY  
CHARGE MCHAPLIN

CLEARANCES

POL/R JDI STEFANO (IN DRAFT)	FAS JPARKER (IN DRAFT)
CONS WHITCHCOCK (IN DRAFT)	DAO COL RPITT (IN DRAFT)
DEA MPOOLEY (IN DRAFT)	ECON JAMOTT (IN DRAFT)
ICA RCROSS (IN DRAFT)	FCS GKELLY (IN DRAFT)
MILGRP CAPT WBECK (IN DRAFT)	SCI CMETZNER (IN DRAFT)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 152(H)  
(Formerly FS 413(H))  
January 1975  
Dept of State





~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Classification

Page 4 of 4299  
MRN

--MOVEMENT TOWARD SETTLEMENT OF THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DIS-  
PUTE.

--US-ARGENTINE SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION, PARTICULARLY IN  
ANTARCTICA.

--INCREASE OF U.S. SHARE OF THE ARGENTINE MARKET.

--GREATER ARGENTINE ROLE IN MODERATING THE NORTH-SOUTH  
DIALOGUE.

--CONCLUSION OF A BILATERAL INCOME TAX TREATY TO AVOID  
DOUBLE TAXATION.

--CONCLUSION OF A CONSULAR CONVENTION.

--STRENGTHENED DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION MEASURES (CONSISTENT  
WITH LEGAL DUE PROCESS).

5 EXPLANATION OF CHANGES FROM LAST GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

--NO MAJOR CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE IN POLICY GOALS AND  
OBJECTIVES EXCEPT TO ACKNOWLEDGE HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS  
MADE, REFLECT THE URGENCY OF STRENGTHENING ARGENTINA'S  
IDENTIFICATION WITH THE WEST AND OF REVERSING THE  
MOVEMENT TOWARD CLOSER POLITICAL TIES WITH THE SOVIET  
UNION, AND TO REMOVE FROM THE STATEMENT OBJECTIVES  
WHICH HAVE BEEN COMPLETED OR ARE NO LONGER/RELEVANT  
FEASIBLE OR

CHAPLIN 

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Classification

OPTIONAL FORM 152a(H)  
(Formerly FS-413(H)a)  
January 1975  
Dept. of State

# TELEGRAM

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INDICATE  
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 CHARGE TO

FROM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ADMIN  
DEA  
CHRON

GDS 2/4/86 (HALLMAN, WILLIAM H.) OR-P  
GORM, PINT, PINS, MILI, SHUM, ETRD, SNAR, AR  
1980-82 GOALS AND OBJECTIVES. AMBASSADOR'S POLICY ASSESSMENT

SECSTATE WASHDC

AMEMBASSY ASUNCION  
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 1032

REF. A) 79 STATE 310299, B) 79 STATE 316945  
1. ( - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. A. SETTING. WE BASE OUR OUTLOOK FOR 1980-82 ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE PRESENT MILITARY GOVERNMENT WILL REMAIN IN PLACE AND CONTINUE TO DEVELOP THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL CAPACITIES. THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE TESTED SEVERELY IN ITS ECONOMIC AND LABOR POLICIES, AND IN THE LIMITATIONS UPON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IT WILL CONTINUE TO IMPOSE. IT HAS, NEVERTHELESS, BETTER THAN A 50 PERCENT CHANCE OF ENDURING.

3. CONTROL OF DOMESTIC INSTABILITY -- PERENNIAL WRECKER OF THIS RICH COUNTRY'S ASPIRATIONS -- WILL ENABLE ARGENTINA TO PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS. IT BECAME

→ ~~GR~~ ~~ERT~~  
1. 26  
2 file - Goals Objectives  
MEG

DRAFTED BY POLCOUNS WHHALLMAN JK

DRAFTING DATE 2/4/80

TEL EXT 278

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY DCM MCHAPLIN *me*

CLEARANCES

POL/R JDISTEFANO (IN DRAFT)  
ECOM JAMOTT (DRAFT)  
SCI CGMETZNER (IN DRAFT)  
ADMIN JRFALZONE (IN DRAFT)  
DEA MLEVINE (IN DRAFT)

CONS FHASSETT (IN DRAFT)  
USICA RDCROSS (IN DRAFT)  
DAO COL. RWPITT (IN DRAFT)  
MILGRP CAPT. WRBECK (IN DRAFT)

BA-9  
- 4-12-76

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EVIDENT THIS JANUARY THAT ARGENTINA'S IMPORTANCE IN AGRICULTURE COULD DEAL A BLOW TO THE UNITED STATES POLICY OF LIMITING GRAINS SHIPMENTS TO THE SOVIET UNION. ARGENTINA HAS WITHIN ITS GRASP THE TECHNICAL ABILITY TO TORPEDO U S. NON-PROLIFERATION GOALS. THE COUNTRY IS PRACTICALLY SELF SUFFICIENT IN PETROLEUM. INCONVENIENCED BY OUR ARMS CUTOFF, IT HAS SHOWN ITSELF ABLE TO BUY ELSEWHERE. TEN BILLION DOLLARS IN GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES ADD TO ARGENTINA'S CONFIDENCE. ARGENTINA'S NEW STRENGTH WILL CONFRONT US WITH TOUGH NEW POLICY PROBLEMS. ALTHOUGH ANXIOUS FOR UNITED STATES APPROVAL AND SUPPORT, ARGENTINA WILL BE LITTLE DEPENDENT ON US FOR ANYTHING ELSE.

4 RELATIONS ARE DEEPLY TROUBLED BECAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS YET WE DO NOT BELIEVE THIS WILL REMAIN THE PRINCIPAL ISSUE IN BILATERAL RELATIONS IN 1979 THERE WAS VAST IMPROVEMENT IN ARGENTINA HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVANCE. WE EXPECT THAT THIS WILL CONTINUE, BUT WE DO NOT PREDICT A PERFECT RECORD VERY HARSH METHODS WILL CONTINUE TO BE USED AGAINST PEOPLE LINKED WITH TERRORISM, BUT TARGETTING OF THESE WILL BE CAUTIOUS. HARASSMENT AND SKULDUGGERY, ALWAYS A HALLMARK OF ARGENTINE POLITICS, WILL BE USED BY SECURITY OPERATIVES AGAINST THOSE WHO OFFEND THEM. BUT THERE SEEMS NOW

NO PROSPECT OF A RETURN TO THE TERRIBLE DAYS OF 1976-1978.

5. THE POLICY DILEMMAS WE WILL FACE DURING 1980-82 WILL INVOLVE DEALING WITH A STRONGER, INDEPENDENT ARGENTINA AND RESPONDING TO THOSE GENUINE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS THAT ARE MADE. RESPONDING REASONABLY ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRONT WILL BE MADE DIFFICULT AS NEW DETAILS ABOUT EARLIER HORRIFIC ABUSES ARE REPORTED AND DISCUSSED.

6. B. BILATERAL ISSUES.

1) HUMAN RIGHTS. OUR EXISTING OBJECTIVES REMAIN TO INSIST THAT ARGENTINA LIVE UP TO ITS OFTEN STATED AIM OF ENDING SUCH UNCONSCIONABLE ACTS AS DISAPPEARANCES, TORTURE, SUMMARY EXECUTION, TO URGE CONTINUED REDUCTION OF PEN PRISONERS THROUGH OUTRIGHT RELEASE, RIGHT OF OPTION, OR JUDICIAL PROCEDURES, TO PUT ALL POLICE AND PUNITIVE ACTIONS STRICTLY WITHIN A CODE OF LAW, TO CONTINUE TOWARDS DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE COUNTRY THROUGH GREATER OPENNESS, CONSULTATION, AND REPRESENTATIVITY.

MODALITIES OF OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY POSE SIGNIFICANT NEW QUESTIONS. OUR VOICE MUST BE HEARD IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DIPLOMACY. OUR ATTEMPTS TO REINFORCE OUR WORDS WITH ACTION MUST BE GAUGED AGAINST ARGENTINA'S DIMINISHED NEED FOR OUR ARMS, OUR TECHNOLOGY, OUR MONEY.

A SPECIAL PROBLEM DERIVES FROM HOW WE AND ARGENTINA



ITSELF COPE WITH ITS SAD LEGACY THE REGIME APPEARS TOTALLY UNWILLING TO UNVEIL THE PAST, TO ATTEMPT RESTITUTION OR EVEN AMELIORATION -- WHATEVER ITS NEW RESOLVE REGARDING THE FUTURE. IT REFUSES STILL, FOR EXAMPLE, TO INFORM FAMILIES OF THE DISAPPEARED WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO THEIR RELATIVES.

THERE IS LITTLE WE CAN DO TO SWAY THIS, AND OUR OPEN INSISTENCE THAT THE REGIME CHANGE THIS ATTITUDE ADDS AN EXTRANEIOUS ISSUE THAT OF OUTSIDE PRESSURE. IN OUR PRIVATE DEALINGS HOWEVER WE MUST CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THE PROBLEM BE HUMANELY AND FAIRLY DEALT WITH.

2) NUCLEAR AFFAIRS. OUR NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH ARGENTINA -- AND WITH IT OUR ABILITY TO CONTAIN ARGENTINA AMONG RESPONSIBLE NUCLEAR POWERS -- HANGS IN THE BALANCE. PRESSURE OF RECENT U.S. LEGISLATION COUNTER TO ARGENTINA'S WILL (AND INCREASING ABILITY) TO MAINTAIN A COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR POLICY AND PROGRAMS HAS BROUGHT US TO THE POINT OF RUPTURE.

AGAIN, BASIC OBJECTIVES REMAIN. ARGENTINE RATIFICATION OF TLAPELOLCO, WAIVER OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION, FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS.

OUR PRESENT POLICIES SMACK OF COERCION THROUGH DENIAL. THIS PUSHES ARGENTINA TOWARD OTHER SUPPLIERS, INCLUDING SOVIET UNION. OUR NEW POLICIES MUST BE

AIMED TOWARD REBUILDING CONFIDENCE, RECOGNIZING ARGENTINA'S NUCLEAR LEADERSHIP IN SOUTH AMERICA, COMPLYING WITH EXISTING COMMITMENTS FOR URANIUM EXPORTS AND CONTINUING WITH SUCCESSFUL COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF LOW ENRICHED URANIUM FUELS.

TOWARD THIS WE MUST PURSUE HIGH LEVEL, CANDID CONVERSATIONS EXPANDED TO THE POLITICAL LEVEL, BEYOND THE NARROW BAND OF TECHNICAL PEOPLE WHO CONTROL ARGENTINA'S PROGRAM OUR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY MUST GAIN PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF ISSUES INVOLVED. THESE TALKS SHOULD INCLUDE TECHNOLOGIES ALLOWABLE UNDER THE U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION ACT AND AIM TOWARD AN AMENDED NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT. COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE ATTAINED WITH ARGENTINA'S CONVICTION OF THEIR GLOBAL NECESSITY, AND NOT WHILE ARGENTINA SEES THESE AS A CURIOUS U.S. IMPOSITION.

WE MUST TAKE ADVANTAGE OF BURGEONING NUCLEAR COOPERATION BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL, AS THIS DIMINISHES THEIR SUSPICION AND RIVALRY.

3) THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. ARGENTINA HAS RESPONDED TO OUR ARMS AND MILITARY TRAINING CUTOFF BY GOING TO OTHER SOURCES -- AND SOUNDING OUT THE SOVIET UNION. THIS HAS ERODED OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH A SEGMENT OF THE SOCIETY WHICH FREQUENTLY GOVERNS AND, WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT, WILL FREQUENTLY DO

SO IN THE FUTURE WE WILL NOT SEEK TO CHANGE RESTRICTIVE U.S. POLICY, WHICH HAS LARGER GOALS THAN PERMITTING ACCESS TO THE ARGENTINE MILITARY. UNTIL CHANGES IN HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES HERE PERMIT A RENEWED SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WE WILL EXPLOIT THE DESIRE OF THE ARGENTINE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT FOR TIES WITH US THROUGH JOINT EXERCISES LIKE UNITAS, PERSONNEL AND PROFESSIONAL EXCHANGES AND "AMPART" PROGRAMS. WHERE POSSIBLE WE WILL EXPAND PERMITTED PROGRAMS.

4) ECONOMIC-COMMERCIAL. RELATIONS ON THE ECONOMIC-COMMERCIAL FRONT ARE EXCELLENT -- ALTHOUGH THE BASES ON WHICH THEY STAND, THE LIBERAL ECONOMIC POLICIES OF ECONOMY MINISTER MARTINEZ DE HOZ, ARE UNDER FREQUENT ATTACK BY VIRTUALLY EVERY ARGENTINE SECTOR, HANKERING FOR PROTECTION AND PERQUISITES. THESE POLICIES INSURE INCREASING U.S. EXPORTS AND INVESTMENT -- UP FROM THE \$2 BILLION THE U.S. SOLD ARGENTINA LAST YEAR. PERIODIC CONSULTATIONS WILL BE NECESSARY ON AVIATION AND MERCHANT SHIPPING, WHERE WE HAVE DIFFERENCES WITH THE GOA.

5) LABOR. THERE COULD BE LABOR PROBLEMS IN THE NEXT TWO YEARS AS THIS GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC POLICIES AND NEW LABOR LAW BITE AGAINST WHAT HAS BEEN SOUTH AMERICA'S MOST POWERFUL LABOR MOVEMENT. TROUBLES WILL AUGMENT AS THE REGIME "DECOMPRESSES" AND ALLOWS

A GREATER MEASURE OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE.

THIS PRESENTS DILEMMA. THERE ARE MANY POINTS OF CONTACT BETWEEN U.S. AND ARGENTINE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, BILATERALLY AND IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH WE HAVE ENCOURAGED -- EVEN TO THE POINT OF HAVING A LOW KEY A.I.F.L.D. PRESENCE HERE. HOWEVER, THESE RELATIONSHIPS COULD DRAW US INTO ARGENTINE LABOR'S BATTLE FOR ITS RIGHTS -- AND PRIVILEGES. WE SHOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH GOA EFFORTS TOWARD GENUINE DEMOCRATIZATION, AND TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE FEASIBLE SHOULD USE OUR INFLUENCE SO THAT THE QUESTION OF ARGENTINE LABOR RIGHTS IS CHANNELED THROUGH THE I.L.O. AND HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DUE PROCESS NORMS OF THAT BODY. A.I.F.L.D. SHOULD LOOK TO CULTIVATING THE NEW GENERATION OF GRASS ROOTS LABOR LEADERS LIKELY TO EMERGE IN THE COMING YEARS.

6) NARCOTICS CONTROL. BETTER ENFORCEMENT IN BOLIVIA AND OTHER NARCOTICS SENDING COUNTRIES INCREASINGLY REDIRECTS PRODUCTS THROUGH ARGENTINA WE WILL ENCOURAGE ARGENTINA TO RECOGNIZE THIS, TO UNDERSTAND THAT TRAFFIC SPAWNS USE (NOT MUCH OF A PROBLEM NOW), AND TO TIGHTEN CONTROLS.

7. C. MULTILATERAL ISSUES.

-1) THE SOVIET LURE.

IN ARGENTINA, IDEOLOGY INCREASINGLY IS OVERCOME

BY COLD ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTERESTS. THERE ARE MANY REASONS FOR COOPERATIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE SOVIET UNION, ESPECIALLY ON THE TRADE-AID FRONT. FURTHER, THE U.S.S.R. IS EXPLOITING THE DOWNTURN IN U.S.-ARGENTINE RELATIONS. OUR GRAINS SHIPMENTS CONCERNS ARE ONLY THE LATEST SMBOL OF THE PROBLEM. THE U.S.S.R. IS A SIGNIFICANT ARGENTINE TRADE PARTNER. THE U.S.S.R HAS ASSISTED WITH EQUIPMENT AND MANPOWER IN HYDROELECTRIC PROJECTS, AND IS INCREASINGLY VIEWED AS AN AMIABLE DEFENSE AND NUCLEAR SUPPLIER. THE U.S.S.R. AND THE COUNTRIES IT INFLUENCES PROMISE SHELTER -- AND VOTES IN INTERNATIONAL FORA -- ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRONT. (ARGENTINA SUPPORTED CUBA'S CANDIDACY FOR THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL PRECISELY FOR THIS.)

2) MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY. ARGENTINA'S TENUOUS RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND WESTERN EUROPE, -- AGAIN, TRACEABLE TO ATTITUDES OF THOSE COUNTRIES TOWARD ARGENTINE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS -- HAVE ALSO REINFORCED GOA ADHERENCE TO THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. (THIS IS NOT A RELATIONSHIP THAT COMES NATURALLY TO THIS ELITIST MILITARY GOVERNMENT.) THIS ADHERENCE WILL CONTINE TO MAKE DIFFICULT OBTAINING ARGENTINE SUPPORT FOR U.S. VIEWS AT INTERNATIONAL FORA.

CASTRO

BA-9

Classification

OPTIONAL FORM 152 (H)  
(Formerly GS 4134-1)

January 1975  
Dept of State



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- BOLIVIA
- BRAZIL
- COSTA RICA
- DOMINICA
- DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
- ECUADOR
- EL SALVADOR
- HAITI
- HONDURAS
- PERU
- ST. LUCIA

GROUP C - TO BE RECEIVED BY JANUARY 31

- ARGENTINA
- BARBADOS
- CHILE
- COLOMBIA
- CUBA
- GUATEMALA
- GUYANA
- JAMAICA
- MEXICO
- NICARAGUA
- PANAMA

THIS SCHEDULE IS BASED ON WORKLOAD CONSIDERATIONS. WE HOPE POSTS WILL ADHERE CLOSELY TO IT.

3. NATURE OF SUBMISSION

AS INDICATED IN PARA 3 FETTEL, EACH AMBASSADOR OR PRINCIPAL OFFICER IS REQUESTED, IN CONSULTATION WITH HIS COUNTRY TEAM, TO PREPARE A PERSONAL 4-6 PAGE POLICY ASSESSMENT FOCUSED ON THE NEXT TWO YEARS, AND IDENTIFYING ISSUES THAT SHOULD BE GIVEN PRIORITY IN TIME AND RESOURCES.

THE SUBMISSION SHOULD BE ORGANIZED AS FOLLOWS:

A. SETTING. (1 PAGE) AN ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE OF OUR CURRENT RELATIONS WITH THE HOST COUNTRY, CONSIDERING ALL ASPECTS (E.G., POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY, ETC.). NOTE ANY SPECIAL FACTORS WHICH PARTICULARLY AFFECT OUR RELATIONS (E.G., ENERGY, HUMAN RIGHTS, SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS) AND RECENT TRENDS.

B. BILATERAL ISSUES: (3-4 PAGES) A DESCRIPTION OF THE MAJOR BILATERAL PROBLEMS WHICH WILL NEED TO BE ADDRESSED BETWEEN NOW AND THE END OF 1981. MAJOR POLICY OPTIONS

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MAY BE INCLUDED AS APPROPRIATE.

C. REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ISSUES. (1-3 PAGES) AN ASSESSMENT OF RELATIONS IN A REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CONTEXT, FOCUSSED ON TRENDS OR FACTORS WHICH MAY AFFECT MOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR U.S. GOALS AND INTERESTS OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS.

4. WE HAVE MADE EVERY EFFORT TO AVOID RIGID FORMATS TO FACILITATE THOUGHTFUL SUBMISSIONS REFLECTING FIELD VIEWS.

5. BUREAU WILL REVIEW AMBASSADOR'S POLICY ASSESSMENTS WHEN RECEIVED, AND DETERMINE WHETHER ISSUES RAISED WARRANT SEVENTH FLOOR DECISIONS OR INTERAGENCY REVIEW. YOU WILL BE KEPT INFORMED OF PROGRESS AND DECISIONS TAKEN.

6. FOR CAR POSTS: PER REF B, THE BUREAU PLANS TO UNDERTAKE COUNTRY POLICY REVIEWS OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS AND RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS IN EACH CARIBBEAN COUNTRY. THE INTER-AGENCY WORKING GROUP WILL PROCEED ACCORDING TO SCHEDULE IN REF B. THE POLICY ASSESSMENTS WILL SERVE AS THE INITIAL BASIS FOR DRAWING UP THE COUNTRY POLICY REVIEW PAPERS. SUBSEQUENTLY POSTS CAN UPDATE THEM AS NEEDED WHEN THE IG BEGINS ITS INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY REVIEWS. VANCE

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