Declassified Case: NW 52970 Date: 10-24-2012

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BUENOS 05900 011523Z 7257
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03
NSAE-00 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00
INRE-00 MCT-02 SY-05 AID-05 /064 W
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FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6758
INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HTS IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USCOMSOLANT IMMEDIATE

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BUENOS AIRES 5900

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PINS ASEC AR
SUBJ: NAVY CHIEF OF STAFF'S RESIDENCE BOMBED

1. A POWERFUL BOMB EXPLODED AROUND 1230 AM AUGUST 1 IN THE APARTMENT BUILDING IN DOWNTOWN BUENOS AIRES WHERE NAVY CHIEF OF STAFF, VICE ADMIRAL ARMANDO LAMBRUSCHINI, MAINTAINS HIS PRIVATE RESIDENCE. LAMBRUSCHINI'S 15 YEAR OLD DAUGHTER WAS KILLED BUT THE ADMIRAL REPORTEDLY WAS NOT HURT.

2. A BOMB ALSO EXPLODED LAST NIGHT AT A POLICE ACADEMY.

3. THE BOMBING ATTACK ON THE ADMIRAL'S RESIDENCE CASTS A PALL OVER THIS WEEK'S CEREMONIES MARKING ARMY GENERAL VIOLA'S ACCESSION TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF-SHIP OF THE ARMY AND THE MILITARY JUNTA AND THE START, IN EFFECT, OF PRESIDENT VIDELA'S "SECOND TERM". ADMIRAL ALMBRUSCHINI IS SCHEDULED TO TAKE OVER AS NAVY COMMANDER AND JUNTA MEMBER WHEN ADMIRAL MASSERA RETIRES ON OR ABOUT SEPTEMBER 15.
CASTRO

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

0673

PAGE 01 HAVANA 02168 282059Z
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15
ICA-11 SY-05 MCT-02 AID-05 EB-08 TRSE-00 OMB-01
/101 W
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R 281946Z JUL 78
FM USINT HAVANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2651
INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

1) See Argentina
2) Cuba

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ HAVANA 2168

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PDEV PINS CU AR
SUBJ: CUBANS INVITE MONTONEROS TO WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL

1. ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR FRANCISCO MOLINA SALAS INFORMS US THAT CUBANS, THROUGH INTERNATIONAL PREPARATORY COMMITTEE OF WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL (WHICH THEY HEAVILY, IF NOT DECISIVELY, INFLUENCE), INVITED 50 MONTONEROS TO HAVANA FOR FESTIVAL (JULY 28-AUGUST 5). ACCORDING TO MOLINA SALAS, BOTH ARGENTINE COMMUNIST PARTY (BACKED BY SOVIETS) AND WORKING-LEVEL CUBANS RECOMMENDED AGAINST INVITATION, BUT FIDEL CASTRO HIMSELF PERSONALLY APPROVED.

2. MOLINA SALAS, AS SIGNAL TO CUBANS THAT HE IS AWARE, HAS ASKED MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (MINREX) FOR EXTRA POLICE PROTECTION FOR CHANCERY IN VIEW OF MONTONERO ARRIVAL. HE WILL ASLO SEEK APPOINTMENT SOON TO REGISTER COMPLAINT. LATEST INVITATION COMES AFTER SERIES OF INCIDENTS, COMPLAINED ABOUT BY ARTENTINES TO MINREX, IN WHICH HAVANA RESIDENT MONTONEROS HAVE PLACED FLOWERS ON SAN MARTIN MONUMENT HERE.

3. BEGIN COMMENT: IN HIS MAJOR ADDRESS ON JULY 26, FIDEL CASTRO REFERRED TO ARGENTINA AS ONE OF "INTIMATE ALLIES" OF US PRACTICING GENOCIDE AND TORTURE. POLITBURO MEMBER GUILLERMO GARCIA, AT YUGOSLAV PARTY CONGRESS AT END OF JUNE (SEE HAVANA 1803), ALSO SINGLED OUT ARGENTINA AS "PRO-IMPERIALIST TYRANNY". CUBAN MOVE TO INVITE MONTONEROS WOULD APPEAR TO ENCROACH ON PREVIOUSLY REPORTED CUBAN-ARGENTINE UNDERSTANDING THAT ERP AND MONTONERO TERRORISTS WOULD NOT BE SUPPORTED BY CUBA. (SEE 77 HAVANA 246.)

4. CUBAN IMPROVEMENT OF TIES WITH MONTONEROS STRIKES US AS QUITE RISKY IN VIEW OF IMPORTANCE OF LONG-TERM ARGENTINE COMMERCIAL CREDITS FOR CUBAA (SEE HAVANA 2119). PRESUMABLY, CUBANS HAVE APPRAISED ARGENTINE ECONOMIC CONDITION AS SUFFICIENTLY DESPERATE THAT GOA WILL OVERLOOK MONTONERO MOVE TO MAKE NEW LARGE SALES TO CUBA (SEE HAVANA 1073 AND A-26 DATED MAY 17, 1978). NONETHELESS, MONTONERO INCIDENT MIGHT PROVIDE INTERESTING LEVERAGE TO US, SHOULD WE BE LOOKING FOR ANY, TO PROMOTE SQUEEZE ON AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT TO CUBA FROM ARGENTINA.

5. MOLINA SALAS INTERPRETS CASTRO DECISION ON MONTONERO INVITATION AS EFFORT BY CUBAN LEADER TO DISPLAY HIS REVOLUTIONARY ZEAL AGAINST OPPOSITON OF MORE CONSERVATIVE SOVIETS AND ARGENTINE CP. WHILE UNABLE TO CONFIRM OR DENY THIS, ACTION CORRESPONDS WITH THE ULTRA-REVOLUTIONARY TONE, THE BROAD-BRUSH CONDEMNATION OF DISAGREEING STATES IN THEIR WORLD, AND GENERAL SECTARIANISM OF CASTRO'S JULY 26 REMARKS. THIS COMES AT SAME TIME THAT BREZHNEV, IN HIS MESSAGE TO PARTICIPANTS OF HAVANA YOUTH FESTIVAL, IS ACCENTUATING "UNITED FRONT" EFFORT IN WHICH "YOUTHS OF DIVERSE POLITICAL CONVICTIONS AND PHILOSOPHICAL POINTS OF VIEW" CAN "UNITE THEIR EFFORTS". END COMMENT.
LANE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FBIS 81

ARGENTINA: MONTES FAULTS U.S. UNDERSTANDING OF TERRORISM

PY041527Y PARIS AFP IN SPANISH 1220 GMT 4 JUL 78 PY

(BY VICTOR LAPEGNA)

(TEXT) BUENOS AIRES, 4 JULY--ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER OSCAR MONTES INDICATED TO AFP TODAY THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED STATES ARE HINDERED BY WASHINGTON'S LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM.

MONTES STATED THAT CURRENT DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN HIS COUNTRY AND THE UNITED STATES PERSIST BECAUSE SOME COUNTRIES HAVE FAILED TO UNDERSTAND THE DANGER OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, REFERRING GUARDEDLY BUT DIRECTLY TO THE UNITED STATES.

THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT THE OAS CONTINUES TO BE A USEFUL ORGANIZATION, AS LONG AS THE MEMBER-COUNTRIES HELP MAKE IT THE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR THE DISCUSSION OF INTER-AMERICAN PROBLEMS.

IN THIS REGARD MONTES INDICATED THAT THIS WILL BE POSSIBLE AS LONG AS IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT SUCH DISCUSSIONS MUST NOT AFFECT NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION, NOR IMPLY INTERFERENCE IN THE PROBLEMS OF ANY GIVEN COUNTRY.

MONTES SAID THAT "WE SHOULD BLAME OURSELVES IF THE OAS HAS FAILED TO SOLVE ANY OF THE SEVERE INTER-AMERICAN PROBLEMS IN THE LAST FEW YEARS."

WITH REGARD TO THE DIFFERENCE OF VIEWPOINTS TOWARD HIMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SOME LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, AMONG THEM ARGENTINA, MONTES INDICATED THAT KNOWLEDGE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND GUERRILLA WARFARE IS NECESSARY TO UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION OF THE CONTINENT.

MONTES ADDED THAT "AN UNDERSTANDING WILL BE REACHED ONLY WHEN ALL OAS MEMBERS BECOME FULLY AWARE OF THE DANGERS WHICH TERRORISM ENTAILS FOR ANY ORGANIZED SOCIETY, AND ONLY AFTER PUNISHMENTS FOR AGENTS AND PERPETRATORS OF TERRORISM ARE STUDIED AND APPLIED."

ON THE CODE OF BEHAVIOR FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES APPROVED BY AN OAS COMMITTEE AND VOTED AGAINST BY THE UNITED STATES, MONTES INDICATED THAT THE U.S. APPROVAL IS NOT NECESSARY. THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER INDICATED: THAT THESE COMPANIES MUST ABIDE BY THE INTERNAL RULES AND REGULATIONS OF EACH COUNTRY IS NOT ONLY IMPORTANT FOR THEIR ACTIVITIES, BUT COMPULSORY ON THE MERE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

AS TO A POSSIBLE VISIT BY HIM TO THE SOVIET UNION, MONTES SAID THAT IT IS BEING STUDIED, BUT ADDED THAT PRESIDENT VIDELA WOULD NOT MAKE A DECISION BEFORE THE RETURN OF NAVY COMMANDER IN CHIEF MASSERA FROM HIS VISIT TO ROMANIA. MASSERA IS SCHEDULED TO RETURN AT THE BEGINNING OF JULY. MASSERA'S ROMANIAN VISIT WAS THE FIRST TO A SOCIALIST COUNTRY BY A MEMBER OF THE MILITARY JUNTA, WHICH TOOK OVER POWER ON 24 MARCH 1976. THIS VISIT WAS PRECEDED BY THE ONE WHICH ECONOMY MINISTER JOSE ALFREDO MARTINEZ DE HOZ MADE TO THE PRC IN MAY.

WITH REGARD TO THE AFRICAN SITUATION, MONTES SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT IS CLOSELY FOLLOWING THE CUBAN INTERVENTION IN THIS CONTINENT, AN INTERVENTION WHICH ACCORDING TO MONTES WILL GIVE RISE TO SEVERE INTERNATIONAL DISTURBANCES.

IT IS EXPECTED THAT THIS VIEW WILL INFLUENCE ARGENTINA'S POSITION TOWARD CUBA'S PRESENCE AT THE COMING MEETING OF NONALINED COUNTRIES TO BE HELD IN BELGRADE, YUGOSLAVIA.

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF REACHING A DEFENSE AGREEMENT ON THE SOUTHERN ATLANTIC, MONTES STATED THAT THIS PROBLEM IS UNDER CONSTANT CONSIDERATION BY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, BUT HE CLARIFIED THAT NO BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL STUDIES ON SECURITY PLANS FOR THIS PART OF THE OCEAN HAVE BEEN DETERMINED.

ON THE DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL WITH REGARD TO THE HYDROELECTRIC UTILIZATION OF THE PARANA RIVER, MONTES STATED THAT HE FELT VERY OPTIMISTIC CONCERNING A SOLUTION, BECAUSE ARGENTINA'S POSITION IS AS USUAL IMBUED WITH A NEGOTIATING SPIRIT.

HOWEVER, WITH REGARD TO THE ARGENTINE-CHILEAN NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THEIR SOUTHERN BORDER, MONTES STATED THAT HE WAS ONLY RELATIVELY OPTIMISTIC. THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE REOPENED YESTERDAY BY THE BINATIONAL COMMISSION WHICH IS MEETING IN BUENOS AIRES. MONTES TOLD AFP THAT THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT WANTS TO SOLVE THE CONFLICT BY MEANS OF NEGOTIATIONS AND RECALLED THAT THERE ARE STILL 4 MONTHS LEFT FOR NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH IS WHY HE CONSIDERED HIS RELATIVE OPTIMISM JUSTIFIED.

4 JUL 1727Z WBJ/HMC

Declassified Case: NW# 52970 Date: 10-24-2012

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE Ø1 BUENOS Ø5ØØ6 Ø1 OF Ø2 3Ø2252Z 9685 BUENOS Ø5ØØ6 Ø1 OF Ø2 3Ø2252Z

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-Ø1 ISO-ØØ HA-Ø5 MCT-Ø1 CIAE-ØØ DODE-ØØ PM-Ø5
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FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6312
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 5ØØ6

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y FOR PARA 1 SUB PARA B LINE13 IMI 13

E.O. 11552 GDS
TAGS OTRA, PEPR, AR, US (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT WHAT KISSINGER TOLD THE ARGENTINES

REF: BUENOS AIRES 4937

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: IN HIS APPROACH TO THE KEY QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM, DR. KISSINGER AVOIDED THE PITFALLS OF OFFENDING HIS GOA HOST ON THE ONE HAND AND ON THE OTHER, OF EXPLICITLY CRITICIZING THE APPLI CATION OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY-- FACTS OF WHICH HE EVIDENTLY IS IN DISAGREEMENT. GOA OFFICIALS APPEAR PLEASED WITH THE VISIST ITSELF AND WITH WHAT HE HAD TO SAY, BUT THEY HAVE NOT EXPLOITED THE VISIT AS MUCH AS THEY COULD HAVE POLITICALLY. PERHAPS, THEY WERE NOT CERTAIN HOW IT WOULD COME OUT AND PREFERRED TO TAKE THE CAUTIOUS ROUTE, OR PERHAPS THEY WERE JUST BEING GOOD LATING HOSTS ENTRALLED TO HAVE A PRESTIGIOUS GUEST. THE WESTER ORIENTED FOREIGN AFFAIRS ELITE OF THE NEWLY ESTABLISHED COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS CERTAINLY WAS DELIGHTED WITH DR. KISSINGER'S SUBSTATIVE APPROACH. HE DEMONSTRATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE ESSENCE OF WHAT ARGENTINA WAS ALL ABOUT. THE INTELLIGENTSIA HE CAME INTO CONTACT WITH HAD DIFFICULTY ANSWERING SOME OF HIS MORE POINTED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MALFUNCTIONING OF THE ARGENTINE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN RECENT DECADES. END SUMMARY

1. FOLLOWING IS A SYNTHESIS OF OUR SENSE AND THAT OF THE LOCAL PRESS OF SOME SALIENT POINTS MADE BY DR. KISSINGER IN CONVERSATIONS WITH ARGENTINES DURING HIS STAY LAST WEEK, INCLUDING IN A "SOMOS" INTERVIEW (PUBLISHED JUNE 23), A MEETING WITH ARGENTINE INTELLECTUALS OF THE INSTITUTO DI TELLA, AN "OFF THE RECORD" COLLOQUY WITH INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REPORTERS, AN EXTEMPORANEOUS ADDRESS BEFORE THE NEWLY FORMED ARGENTINE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS AND A TAPED INTERVIEW FOR BERNARDO NEUSTADT'S TV PROGRAM.

A. BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY - HE IS A FIRM BELIEVER IN THE NEED FOR A BIPARTISAN US FOREIGN POLICY WHICH REFLECTS BASIC VALUES AND INTEREST AND NOT THE INDIVIDUAL IDIOSYNCRACIES OF POLITICIANS WHO CHANGE EVERY FOUR OR EIGHT YEARS. HE IS AN OLD FRIEND OF CYRUS VANCE, FOR WHOM HE HAS THE HIGHEST RESPECT AS REFLECTED BY THE FACT HE TOLD "TIME" MAGAZINE IN 1976 THAT VANCE WAS THE DEMOCRAT HE WOULD CHOOSE TO SUCCEED HIM AS SECRETARY OF STATE. (HE TOLD GOA OFFICIALS PRIVATELY THAT HE DID NOT COME TO ARGENTINA TO CRITICIZE US POLICY AND HE REPEATED THIS ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION WHEN QUESTION TOO CLOSELY BY REPORTERS ABOUT HIS PRESUMED DIFFERENCES WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OVER THE APPLICATION OF ITS HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY.)

B. TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS - TERRORISM IS AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM AND NOT STRICTLY AN ARGENTINE PHENOMENON, BECAUSE IT IS AIMED AT SYSTEMATICALLY DESTROYING LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT IN THE WESTERN WORLD. TERRORISTS ARE THE WORST VIOLATORS OF HUMAN RIGHTS; THEY ARE PRESENT-DAYFASCISTS WHO EMPLOY SLOGANS OF THE EXTREME LEFT. GOVERNMENTS WHICH FACE UP TO THE PROBLEM SQUARELY SHOULD BE SUPPORTED BECAUSE THEY ARE DEFENDING ALL OF US. BUT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR A GOVERNMENT TO KNOW WHEN IT HAS WON THE BATTLE IN ORDER NOT TO PROLONG THE EMERGENCY SITUATION UNNECESSARILY, WHICH COULD END IN COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE RESULTS. AT THAT POINT, CONDITIONS APPROPRIATE FOR WAR MUST BE CHANGED FOR CONDITIONS APPROPRIATE FOR PEACE. THE METHODS EMPLOYED TO COMBAT TERRORISM CAN CREATE PROBLEMS IN THE DEGREE THAT THEY DEPART FROM ESTABLISHED NORMS. WHAT IS AN APPROPRIATE METHOD CANNOT BE DETERMINED IN THE ABSTRACT; MUCH DEPENDS ON THE PARTICULAR CIRUMSTANCES IN A GIVEN CASE. (IN OTHER WORDS, COMMENTED "LA NACION", KISSINGER SAID "MORE OR LESS THE SAME AS DAVID NEWSOM A MONTH AGO.")

-- KISSINGER ALSO SAID THAT "A DISTINCTION SHOULD BE MADE BETWEEN TOTALITARIAN GOVERNMENTS WHICH ARE THE ANTI-THESIS OF DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENTS WHICH PROFESS THEIR INTENTIONS TO EVENTUALLY RESTORE DEMOCRACY. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO PURSUE A POLICY OF SINGLING OUT OUR ALLIES FOR PUNISHMENT BECAUSE OF THE WAY THEY HANDLE THEIR TERRORIST PROBLEMS WHEN THE TOTALITARIAN COUNTRIES ARE THE WORSE OFFENDERS AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS AND (HE SEEMED TO IMPLY) RESPONSIBLE FOR OR AT LEAST THE BENEFICIARIES OF TERRORISM.

-- IN ANSWER TO NEUSTADT'S COMMENT THAT THE USG SEEMED MORE PREOCCUPIED WITH THE WELFARE OF TERRIST ASSASSINS THAN THE ASSASSINATIONS THEY COMMIT, KISSINGER RESPONDED THAT IF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE KNEW MORE ABOUT WHAT ARGENTINA HAD SUFFERED OVER THE PAST 1Ø YEARS, THEY

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The Peronist Shadow Still Bedevils Argentina

Arg

By JUAN de ONIS

Juan de Onis is a correspondent for The New York Times based in Buenos Aires.

BUENOS AIRES — After eight years and thousands of deaths, political violence seems to burning itself out in Argentina, but political reconciliation remains an elusive goal.

Government forces have crippled the left-wing guerrillas whose assassinations, kidnappings and assaults on police and army garrisons helped bring down the elected Peronist government in 1976. Moderate officers, including President Jorge Rafael Videla, whose term was extended last week until 1981, now talk less about "annihilation" and more about "rehabilitation" and "dialogue" so as to rally civilian support for what seems likely to be a long period of military rule.

Many moderate figures of the Peronist party, labor movement and the centrist Radical Party are eager to begin a dialogue with the Government. Even Montonero guerrillas, breakaway Peronists whose surviving leaders are in exile, seem willing to talk. Adm. Emilio Massera, commander of the navy and the most politically imaginative member of the junta, visited Paris last month and met with several Peronist exiles. A few days later, a Montonero leader, Adriana Lesgart, wrote a letter to a Paris newspaper saying: "We do not rule out the possibility of an interview with him (Admiral Massera) because we want the war in Argentina to end."

With the exception of Admiral Massera, however, the "dialogue" is one-sided. Political party activity remains banned in Argentina. Ricardo Balbin, the Radical Party leader, was arrested and detained overnight last week when he showed up in a provincial town for a "meeting with friends," who happened to be members of his party.

The main obstacle to a dialogue comes from military hardliners who believe that it might encourage a return to the chaotic conditions that preceded the 1976 coup. Cuban-trained, Marxist guerrillas began their revolutionary campaign in 1970 with the kidnapping and murder of Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, a former military President and centrist politician who helped oust Juan Domingo Perón from the Presidency in 1955. But when the military called elections in 1973 and Mr. Perón returned to power after 18 years in exile, he rejected the radical reforms demanded by his young followers. Violence spread between left-wing and right-wing Peronists, with the bloodshed increasing after Mr. Perón's death in 1974 and the succession of his wife, Isabel Martinez de Perón.

Gen. Albano Harguindeguy, Minister of the Interior, who has rejected the Radical Party's offer to discuss the country's political future, alluded to the last years of the Peronist regime. He said the old guard Peronist and Radical leaders were responsible for the breakdown of internal order and responsible government and "have no place in the future."

Another obstacle to political reconciliation is the divided condition of the Peronists and, to a greater extent, other civilian political groups. When the armed forces took power, the Peronist party was in shambles. The bureaucracy was divided into cliques, and these were pitted against Peronist labor leaders, who sought to protect the interests of workers as prices rose as much as 54 percent a month.

The same divisions persist. Since her overthrow, Mrs. Perón has been in military custody awaiting trial on charges of misuse of public funds. But she is even less a rallying figure today than she was as President, and junta leaders are considering allowing her to take a trip for "medical treatment" to Europe.

The real strength of the Peronists is still the labor unions. The military Government has appointed administrators for the big unions, but the structure covering 2 million Argentinian workers has been maintained. Gen. Horacio Liendo, the Labor Minister, maintains regular contact with labor leaders, the great majority of whom are Peronists.

The union leaders keep insisting that their organizations be returned to the control of elected officials and that collective bargaining be restored. The military is undecided about labor policy. Some see a strong, organized labor structure under Peronist control as a safeguard against more radical infiltration of unions. Others are concerned that a powerful labor organization would pose a political threat to the Government and want unions to be limited to shop units.

Although strikes are prohibited, and "agitators" can be jailed for up to six years, there have been strikes since the military took power to protest low wages on state railroads, Buenos Aires subways and at automobile factories. The Government, fearful of widespread labor discontent, has made concessions in some cases, but labor leaders considered subversive have also disappeared or have been killed by right-wing paramilitary groups.

The Peronist labor leaders, who have little use for the party figures now on the sidelines, believe that the Government's attitude toward relaxing union restrictions will be the main test of the military's political intentions. "Without Perón, the workers do not have a charismatic leader, and their attention is dominated by wage and employment issues. This is where we feel the Government's willingness to enter a dialogue will be seen," said one Peronist union leader.



Diego Goldberg/Sygma

President Jorge Rafael Videla

APRIL 5, 1978

U.S. ANTITERRORIST GROUP CALLED 'REPRESSIVE'

PY060148Y Buenos Aires LA PRENSA in Spanish 5 Apr 78 p 6 PY

[Editorial: "United States and Terrorism"]

FBIS

[Text] The concern of the White House with the expansion and stepping up of terrorist actions throughout the world has been expressed in very different ways. Some times, at international forums, the United States has condemned the most notorious events of this kind and it has demanded the implementation of supranational measures aimed at preventing and punishing the most characteristic actions of subversion, especially hijacking of planes and the kidnaping of their passengers. Recently, U.S. officials did not hide their satisfaction at the operations carried out by Israeli, German and Egyptian commandos to rescue hostages from the terrorists.

The U.S. attitude in these cases must be recalled in noting the recent decision by President Carter to create a commando unit on permanent active duty to counteract hijacking and other terrorist deeds which may take place outside the United States. Pentagon spokesman Harold Brown explained that President Carter's order was aimed at "increasing the country's capabilities to fight terrorism," in view of the government's concern over the fact that the United States was not prepared to take care of terrorist actions in remote parts of the world by means of incursions such as the one carried out in Mogadiscio.

Thus one sees that U.S. concern over this matter is no longer restricted to international forums in which it had uselessly called for the implementation of supranational measures. This does not mean that the White House has decided to give up the course of negotiation and legal analysis of the status of subversion and terrorism. It is, however, quite clear that Washington has decided to use a new repressive method which has no precedent beyond the historic rescue operation carried by Israeli commandos at the Entebbe airport in Uganda. It is significant that this and later events of similar nature have led the U.S. Government to its recent decision.

It still remains to be seen how the U.S. Government plans to justify punitive intervention in another country--intervention which may also entail casualties and damage--in light of respect for other countries' sovereignty and respect for human rights harmed by the use of force in a procedure whose legal status is doubtful.

Declassified Case: NW 52970 Date: 10-24-2012

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Argentina

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 IO-13 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01
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AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
USMISSION GENEVA
USUN 757

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 3 BUENOS AIRES 2234

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SHUM, PINS, AR
SUBJECT: THE PROBLEM OF THOSE WHO DISAPPEARED

1. SUMMARY:
WITH THE PUBLICATION OF THE FINAL LISTS OF PRISONERS HELD BY THE EXECUTIVE UNDER THE STATE OF SEIGE POWER, MANY IN ARGENTINA AND ABROAD WILL HAVE TO FACE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT MISSSING FRIENDS AND RELATIVES MUST BE PRESUMED DEAD. THIS WILL CREATE SOME POLITICAL PRESSURES WITHIN ARGENTINA, BUT LIKELY WILL NOT HAVE A MAJOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPACT. IT WILL ALSO GENERATE PRESSURES AND CAMPAIGNS SEEKING TO FORCE THE GOA TO RENDER AN ACCOUNTING FOR THE MISSING. THIS SITUATION RAISES THE QUESTION FOR THE USG OF HOW TO REACT. THE EMBASSY RECOMMENDS THAT THE USG SHOULD CONCENTRATE ITS EFFORTS ON THE OPPORTUNITIES CREATED FOR CONTINUED PROGRESS TOWARD RETURN TO THE RULE OF LAW. WHILE NOT CONDONING OR PARDONING THE GOA FOR ITS PART IN THE DISAPPEARANCES, WE SHOULD AVOID ENDORSING DEMANDS FOR AN ACCOUNTING. END SUMMARY

2. CIVIL VIOLENCE, TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM IN ARGENTINA OVER THE PAST HALF-DOZEN YEARS HAVE PROBABLY TAKEN THOUSANDS OF LIVES. A GREAT MANY OF THOSE HAVE BEEN SHOT OR VICTIMS OF BOMB ATTACKS. THERE IS A LARGE CATEGORY, HOWEVER, GENERALLY DESCRIBED AS "THE DISAPPEARED". THE CONVENTIONAL GOVERNMENT EXPLANATION FOR THESE PERSONS WHO HAVE VANISHED WITHOUT A TRACE IS THAT THEY:

(1) HAVE GONE UNDERGROUND.
(2) WERE TERRORISTS WHO WERE KILLED BY THEIR COMPANIONS.
(3) HAVE FLED THE COUNTRY.
(4) HAD BEEN KILLED IN BATTLE AND BODIES WERE UNRECOGNIZABLE, OR
(5) WERE THE VICTIMS OF COUNTER-SUBVERSIVE EXCESSES.

WHILE WE KNOW THAT THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS IN THE FIRST FOUR CATEGORIES, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE MAJORITY FALL IN THE FIFTH. THESE INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN SEIZED BY ELEMENTS OF THE SECURITY FORCES AND HAVE BEEN SUMMARILY EXECUTED WHEN IT IS FOUND OR STRONGLY SUSPECTED THAT THEY HAVE SERIOUS INVOLVEMENT WITH TERRORISM.

3. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM:
AN ACCURATE NUMBER CAN NEVER BE ARRIVED AT. ORGANIZATIONS WHICH REGISTER REPORTS OF DISAPPEARANCES HAVE COLLECTED WIDELY VARYING NUMBER OF CASES. IT IS OUR ESTIMATE THAT AT LEAST SEVERAL THOUSAND WERE KILLED, AND WE DOUBT THAT IT WILL EVER BE POSSIBLE TO CONSTRUCT A MORE SPECIFIC FIGURE.

4. THE ISSUE MUST BE FACED. UNTIL NOW, THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAS SIMPLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT INDIVIDUALS HAVE DISAPPEARED AND CITED THE FIVE REASONS GIVEN ABOVE, DISMISSING THE MATTER. THE ISSUE OF DISAPPEARANCES WILL SHORTLY BECOME MORE ACUTE, WHEN FRIENDS AND NEXT-OF-KIN OF THE MISSING MUST FACE UP TO THE FACT THAT THEY ARE NOT BEING HELD BY THE GOVERNMENT. IN DECEMBER 1977 THE GOA BEGAN TO PUBLISH LISTS OF ALL THOSE BEING HELD UNDER THE EXECUTIVE'S STATE OF SEIGE DETENTION POWER ON GROUNDS OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY OR SUSPECTED ACTIVITY. AT THIS POINT, ALL BUT ABOUT 800 OF THE 3,700 PRISONERS IN THIS CATEGORY HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED BY THE GOA. WHEN THE NAMES OF THE REMAINING 800 HAS BEEN PUBLISHED, ALL THOSE MISSING WHOSE NAMES HAVE NOT TURNED UP ON THE LISTS (AS SOME 70 HAVE) WILL HAVE TO BE PRESUMED DEAD. THEIR FRIENDS CAN NO LONGER CLING TO THE HOPE THAT THEY WERE UNDER SECRET GOVERNMENT DETENTION.

5. COMPLETENESS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S LISTS:
IT IS INEVITABLE THAT SOME WILL CONTINUE TO CONTEND THAT THOUSANDS OF PRISONERS ARE BEING HELD IN SECRET PRISON CAMPS OR THAT FOR SPECIAL REASONS THE GOVERNMENT HAS DECLINED TO IDENTIFY SOME INDIVIDUALS IT IS HOLDING. THE EMBASSY DOUBTS THAT THIS COULD ACCOUNT FOR A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER. WE KNOW THAT THERE IS A SMALL NUMBER OF CAPTURED TERRORISTS WHO ARE COOPERATING WITH THE AUTHORITIES AGAINST THEIR FORMER COMRADES AND WHOSE NAMES ARE WITHHELD FOR THEIR PROTECTION. THERE MAY BE SMALL NUMBERS OF OTHER PRISONERS SECRETLY RETAINED FOR SPECIAL REASONS, BUT THERE IS NO INCENTIVE OR RATIONALE FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO IMPRISON SECRETLY SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF TERRORIST SUSPECTS.

CONFIDENTIAL

INFO OCT-01 IO-13 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15
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FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5075
INFO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
USMISSION GENEVA
USUN 758

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 3 BUENOS AIRES 2234

6. THE PROBLEM FOR THE GOA:
THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN MAINTAINING THE HOPE THAT DISAPPEARED RELATIVES MAY TURN UP WILL FEEL THEIR SENSE OF LOSS ACUTELY. THE ONE-ISSUE GROUPS, SUCH AS THE MOTHERS OF THE PLAZA DE MAYO, WILL CLAMOR FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO MAKE AN ACCOUNTING FOR THE MISSING. THE ISSUE WILL BE INCREASINGLY AND DRAMATICALLY REPORTED INTERNATIONALLY. HOWEVER, WE DOUBT THAT IT WILL ASSUME SIGNIFICANT DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROPORTIONS; HE GOVERNMENT RETAINS SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC SUPPORT AND THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZED OPPOSITION. THERE IS NO GENERAL PERVASIVE SENSE OF OUTRAGE ABOUT THOSE WHO HAVE DISAPPEARED, AND, INDEED, AMONG THOSE WHO HAVE NOT LOST RELATIVES--AND EVEN AMONG SOME WHO HAVE--A FREQUENT REACTION IS "GOOD RIDDANCE". THE ISSUE HAS SHOWN POLITICAL POTENTIAL, HOWEVER, IN THAT ADMIRAL MASSERA HAS MADE A FEW GESTURES AT EXPLOITING IT FOR HIS PERSONAL POLITICAL ADVANTAGE AND WHEN GREATER POLITICAL FREEDOM PERMITS, THE POLITICAL PARTIES WILL USE THE ISSUE AS A STICK WITH WHICH TO BEAT THE MILITARY REGIME.

7. THE GOA REACTION:
THE GOA HAS LONG SINCE DECIDED HOW TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF DISAPPEARANCES. IT HAS ESTABLISHED A FRAMEWORK TO EXPLAIN THE DISAPPEARANCES AND HAS NOT DENIED THAT WHEN THE LAST OF THE LISTS OF DETAINEES UNDER THE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY IS PUBLISHED, THOSE NOT LISTED CAN BE ASSUMED LOST INTO ONE OF THE FIVE CATEGORIES OF THE DISAPPEARED. THE GOA'S LEADERS HAVE DECIDED TO RIDE OUT THIS ISSUE. WE THINK THEY HAVE CONCLUDED THAT IT CAN BE DONE WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT DOMESTIC POLITICAL RISK. WE CAN EXPECT THE GOA SPOKESMEN IN THE UN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORA TO DEAL WITH THE DISAPPEARANCE PROBLEM BY CITING THE FIVE REASONS FOR DISAPPEARANCES WHENEVER THE SUBJECT IS RAISED. THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE LISTS OF DETAINEES, HOWEVER, TOGETHER WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGHT OF OPTION (VOLUNTARY EXILE) PROGRAM HAVE SET THE STAGE FOR FURTHER MODIFICATIONS OF THE GOA COUNTER-TERRORIST PRACTICES. THESE MOVES, MINIMAL THOUGH THEY BE, CREAT SOME MOMENTUM IN THE DIRECTION OF A RETURN TO DUE PROCESS AND NORMALITY. WE ALREADY SEE-AS IN THE CHURCH'S LETTER TO THE GOVERNMENT--GROWING PRESSURES TO CHARGE OR FREE THOSE HELD UNDER THE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY AND TO CEASE THE IRREGULAR DETENTION PRACTICES (ABDUCTION) REGULARLY USED BY THE SECURITY FORCES.

8. THE PROBLEM FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT:
WHEN EVENTS REQUIRE THAT THERE BE PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF MANY THOUSANDS OF PRESUMED DEAD IN ARGENTINA, THE USG WILL HAVE TO COMMENT ON THE SIUTATION IN DEALING WITH CONGRESS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS, AND PARTICULARLY FRIENDS AND RELATIVES OF THE MISSING. THE EMBASSY RECOMMENDS THAT THE US AVOID SUPPORTING DEMANDS THAT THE GOA ACCOUNT FOR THE MISSING. WE BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE FRUITLESS AND MIGHT DIVERT US FROM THE OPPORTUNITY THAT LIES IN THE CURRENT SITUATION. THE EFFORT WOULD BE FRUITLESS BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT THE GOA FEELS ITS CURRENT POSITION IS LESS RISKY THAN FUTURE PUBLICATION OF NECESSARILY INCOMPLETE LISTS OF THOSE EXECUTED BY THE SECURITY FORCES. EVEN IF IT SHOULD CHOOSE TO PUBLISH LISTS, THEIR OMISSIONS WOULD GENERATE FURTHER CONTROVERSY. THE GOA COUNTER-TERRORIST OPERATIONS WERE DELIVERATELY ORGANIZED WITH A HIGH DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE OF INDIVIDUAL UNITS, PARTICULARLY IN THE FIRST YEAR FOLLOWING THE REVOLUTION. THIS WAS DONE PARTLY TO COMPARTMENTALIZE THE OPERATIONS AND PROTECT THEM FROM TERRORIST PENETRATION, BUT IT WAS ALSO DONE SO THAT THE GOA MIGHT MAKE A PLAUSIBLE DENIAL OF ANY PARTICULAR OPERATION. WE SUSPECT THAT, EVEN IF THE GOVERNMENT HAS TRIED TO MAINTAIN SOME RECORDS OF EXECUTIONS, THE METHOD BY WHICH IT ORGANIZED ITS TROOPS ALMOST GUARANTEES THAT REPORTS WOULD BE UNRELIABLE. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO BEAR IN MIND THAT THE GOA HAS ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEATHS OF SOME OF THE PERSONS DISAPPEARED AND, CONSEQUENTLY, ADMITS A BURDEN OF GUILT, ALBEIT VASTLY UNDERSTATED. THE EMBASSY RECOMMENDS THAT IN CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF THOSE MISSING IN ARGENTINA, THE USG AVOID LANGUAGE THAT WOULD STIGMATIZE THIS GOVERNMENT AND INSTEAD FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVED OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA.

9. THE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE U.S.:
THE PUBLICATION OF THE LISTS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS IS IN A SENSE A WATERSHED EVENT. THE GOVERNMENT HAS DROPPED THE VEIL OF SECRECY FROM ONE IMPORTANT ASPECT OF ITS SECURITY PROGRAM. WITH THE WAR AGAINST SUBVERSION ACKNOWLEDGED AS WON BY ALL BUT A FEW HARDLINERS, IT SHOULD BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY THOSE ABDUCTION PRACTICES STILL USED BY THE SECURITY FORCES IN THEIR OPERATIONS. THE US RESPONSE SHOULD BE TO REINFORCE THE MOMENTUM TOWARD NORMALIZATION AND DUE PROCESS. IN THIS CONTEXT, PRESSING FOR

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FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5076
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AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
USMISSION GENEVA
USUN 759

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 3 OF 3 BUENOS AIRES 2234

AN ACCOUNTING OF THE MISSING WOULD BE A DIVERSION.

10. THE EMBASSY RECOMMENDS THAT ON AN EARLY CONVENIENT OCCASION A RANKING DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL COMMENT ON THE PUBLICATION OF THE DETENTION LISTS, THE RIGHT OF OPTION PROGRAM (AND, POSSIBLY THE DEUTSCH AND TIMERMAN RELEASES), STRESSING OUR HOPE THAT THEY ARE BUT EARLY STEPS TOWARD THE RULE OF LAW. THE PUBLIC STATEMENT SHOLD BE COMPLEMENTED BY HIGH-LEVEL PRIVATE DEMARCHES IN BOTH WASHINGTON AND BUENOS AIRES. THESE WOULD NOT THE PUBLIC STATEMENT BUT HEAVILY QUALIFY IT, AND OBSERVE THAT US PUBLIC OPINION, FOR ONE, WILL NOT TOLERATE MOVES FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN BILATERAL RELATIONS WHILE THE IRREGULAR ARREST PROCEDURES AND DETENTIONS WITHOUT CHARGE CONTINUE. AT THIS TIME IT SHOULD ALSO BE STRESSED THAT THE ISSUE OF THE DISAPPEARED WILL NEVER GO AWAY SO LONG AS THE GOA CONTINUES THOSE PRACTICES WHICH ARE DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH MANY DISAPPEARANCES. THE DEMARCHE COULD USEFULLY SET FORTH COME SPECIFIC REFORMS WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE USG TO ABSTAIN ON FURTHER IFI VOTES ON ARGENTINE LOANS. WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON THE ARREST PROCEDURES AT THIS STAGE, FOR THEY ARE THE MECHANISM FOR THE WORST ABUSES. WE SHOULD AVOID PRESSING FOR INDIVIDUAL RELEASES--A TACTIC WHICH THE GOA HAS SUCCESSFULLY USED TO BLUNT THE FORCE OF THE USG PRESSURES--AND SHOULD AVOID DEMANDING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE DISAPPEARED, SINCE THAT DOES NOTHING DIRECTLY TO ELIMINATE FURTHER ABUSES.

11. THE DEPARTMENT'S COMMENTS WOULD BE APPRECIATED.
CASTRO

Declassified Case: NW# 52970 Date: 10-24-2012

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Department of State

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 074011 7522
ORIGIN SY-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 ISO-00 COME-00 EB-08 CIAE-00 INR-10
NSAE-00 MCT-01 SCS-06 /041 R

Argentina

DRAFTED BY A/SY/OPS/FO/ARA:DLNESS:HH
APPROVED BY A/SY/OPS/FO - PHILIP J. HARRICK
A/SY/OPS/FO - MKDALTON
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: ASEC

SUBJECT: TERRORISM INVOLVING U.S. BUSINESS INTERESTS

1. WILLIAM FULTON, SECURITY COORDINATOR, AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY, INFORMED SY/FO OF A LETTER FROM THEIR B.A. PLANT MANAGER, KUNO H. WITTLINGER, WHO WROTE THAT ELEMENTS OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY HAD CONDUCTED A RAID ON A HOME IN THE FLORENCIA VERALA AREA OF B.A. ON MARCH 11. DURING THE CONFRONTATION, ONE UNIDENTIFIED MAN WAS KILLED AND A WOMAN, IDENTIFIED ONLY AS A SECRETARY IN AN UN-NAMED TERRORIST ORGANIZATION ESCAPED.

2. DURING A SEARCH OF THE PREMISES, THE MILITARY REPORTEDLY FOUND PLANS FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY AND THE ABBOTT CHEMICAL COMPANY. THE SCOPE OF THE PLANS WERE UNKNOWN BUT WITTLINGER INDICATED THAT THEY WERE TO BEGIN ON MARCH 11, THE DAY OF THE RAID.

3. WITTLINGER'S LETTER ALSO INDICATED THAT A PLANT INVENTORY DISCLOSED SOME 20 TONS OF A CAUSTIC AND ANOTHER CHEMICAL (NAOH) HAD DISAPPEARED. HE, AT THE TIME, WAS UNCERTAIN IF THE CHEMICALS HAD ACTUALLY DISAPPEARED THROUGH THEFT OR WHETHER THE DISCREPANCY WAS DUE TO CLERICAL ERROR. AN INTERNAL INVESTIGATION IS UNDERWAY.

4. FULTON SAID THAT THEIR EXECUTIVES HAVE TAKEN THE PRECAUTIONS OF VARYING THEIR HOURS AND CHANGING CARS BUT HE WOULD LIKE TO FIND OUT IF THE ARMY, IN FACT, DID DISCOVER PLANS FOR HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST THEIR PLANTS OR PERSONNEL. HE REMARKED THAT THE B.A. PLANT HAD RECENTLY DISCHARGED SOME 40 PEOPLE AND THAT NEARLY 20 MORE WOULD BE DISCHARGED.

5. PLEASE ATTEMPT TO CONFIRM THE INFORMATION AS GIVEN ABOVE AND, IF POSSIBLE, OBTAIN COPIES OF THE PURPORTED TERRORIST PLANS. FULTON PASSED THIS INFORMATION TO JOHN SCHWARTZ, CORPORATE SECURITY OFFICE, ABBOTT LABS, WHO HAS ALSO ASKED TO BE ADVISED IF ANY PLANS AGAINST ABBOTT ARE DISCLOSED. VANCE

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Declassified Case: NW 52970 Date: 10-24-2013

Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BUENOS 01316 221859Z 8802
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SY-05 MCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02
SS-15 USIA-06 /069 W
----------119185 230346Z /73

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FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4636

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Arg.

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: ASEC, PINS, PINT, AR
SUBJECT: TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

REF: RONDON/CHAPLIN TELCON, FEB. 17, 1978.

1. ON FEB. 16, A GROUP OF TERRORISTS, BELIEVED TO BE MONTONEROS, MACHINEGUNNED THE HOME OF DEFENSE MINISTER BRIG. GEN (R) JOSE M. KLIX IN THE CABALLITO DISTRICT OF BUENOS AIRES. THE TERRORISTS, USING A STOLEN PANEL TRUCK, DROVE PAST THE HOME OF THE MINISTER AT APPROXIMATELY 2:20 P.M. AND OPENED FIRE ON THE PREMISES WITH A FAL 7.62 AND A 9 MM PISTOL. ONE OF THE MINISTER'S BODYGUARDS WAS HIT IN THE LEG BY A RICOCHET AND REPORTEDLY A NEIGHBORHOOD CHILD WAS WOUNDED IN THE CROSSFIRE. THE DEFENSE MINISTER WAS NOT AT HOME AT THE TIME OF THE ATTACK. THE PANEL TRUCK USED IN THE ATTACK WAS RECOVERED LATER WHERE IT HAD BEEN ABANDONED. POLICE SOURCES STATED THIS ATTACK MAY HAVE BEEN PART OF A MONTONERO TRAINING MISSION.

2. ON THE SAME DATE, A BOMB WAS DETONATED IN A HOUSE BELONGING TO DR. RICARDO YOFRE, SUBSECRETARY TO PRESIDENT VIDELA. THE PREMISES IN QUESTION WERE STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND THE ENSUING EXPLOSION DID A GREAT DEAL OF DAMAGE. THERE WERE NO INJURIES. THIS WAS THE SECOND ATTACK DIRECTED AGAINST DR. JOFRE'S PROPERTY. LAST AUGUST, A BOMB WAS DETONATED IN THE ENTRANCE TO THE APARTMENT BUILDING WHERE HE RESIDES IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL. CASTRO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 17, 1978

To: ARA/ECA - Mr. Rondon
ECA - Mr. Zimmermann; Mr. Bumpus
EB - Mr. Blakeburn
HA - Mr. Jones

From: M/CT - Ambassador Isham HI.

The attached are M/CT comments on the draft Action Memorandum to the Secretary - RE - commercial sale of communications equipment to the Argentine police.

Attachment:

As stated.

Pro

M/CT sees the proposed sale as a test case of our ability to establish a reasonable relationship between our interest in protecting human rights and our interest in helping other governments combat terrorism. While it is true that police communications and computer equipment can be used in abuses of human rights, it is equally true that, lacking such equipment, law enforcement authorities cannot protect the innocent effectively against the increasingly sophisticated terrorist attacks we face today. Since 1972 the USG has taken the lead in strengthening international anti-terrorist policies and programs; this Administration is committed to work with the Congress on new legislation (Ribicoff bill) designed to make these efforts more effective; and the US public, according to the December Harris poll, remains deeply concerned about terrorism on both the international and domestic level.

Accordingly, M/CT favors the proposed commercial sale to Argentina on the grounds that it would:

-- demonstrate that, where legitimate law enforcement needs are present, in the context of an established terrorism threat, our commercial export licensing policies will support the acquisition of modern communications and computer equipment by national law enforcement agencies.

-- give practical effect to our reiterated pledges to work with other governments to combat terrorism, a commitment

which you renewed in your testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee.

-- show that our interest in the protection of human rights is a comprehensive interest, consistent with existing international instruments which document the belief that all forms of terrorism through acts of violence or threats thereof to persons are prohibited.

Con

M/CT believes that to deny this commercial sale would:

-- cast serious doubt on our commitment to cooperate with other governments in combatting terrorism.

-- send a "double standard" message to the Argentinians (and to other governments similarly threatened by terrorist organizations) that while we acquire modern communications equipment for our own law enforcement agencies, we will not sell such equipment to other governments engaged in combatting a much more serious terrorist threat than our own.

M/CT:HIsham:ijg
2/17/78

E-SYSTEMS

February 13, 1978

Vice President

The Honorable
Howard Isham
Ambassador-at-Large for Terrorism
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Subject: Request for Export License for Argentina
Department of Commerce #285632

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Recently I had the opportunity to discuss this case with the Secretary of State. He was interested in the situation I covered involving conflicts between human rights and terrorists considerations when related to commercial sales and U.S. policies.

Since I mentioned our conversation of January 20th relating to this subject, I thought you would appreciate a copy of my letter to him. I believe it is self-explanatory (copy of letter is attached). As you know, E-Systems will soon run out of time in responding to its commitments on this program. If we delay much longer we run a high risk of loosing an opportunity for a U.S. firm to complete our system. We are, of course, hopeful that U.S. industry, rather than an overseas competitor, will become known as the world leader in public safety communications systems.

I am very appreciative of the opportunity of discussing this matter with you personally. If you or any of your office need any further particulars, please call me at 703/524-2310.

Very truly yours,

Alfred C. Herrera
Regional Vice President
International Customer Relations

/sd
attch

E-SYSTEMS, INC. · 1901 NORTH MOORE STREET · ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209 · (703) 524-2310

NW 52970 DocId:32735952 Page 16

ARGENTINA ACCUSED OF KILLING ATTEMPTS

Guerrillas Say Junta Sent Team to Slay Rebels Living in Exile in Mexico but Effort Failed

By ALAN RIDING
Special to The New York Times

MEXICO CITY, Jan. 28 — Argentine guerrillas have charged that the Argentine military junta sent an assassination team to Mexico to kill rebel leaders living in exile here.

One member of the team, they say, was a captured guerrilla who pretended to collaborate after his companion and 18-month-old son were held in Argentina as hostages. On his arrival here last week, he denounced the alleged plot.

Both the Argentine and Mexican Governments have refused to comment on the case, but well-placed sources here have confirmed the broad lines of the guerrillas' story. However, it is not certain whether the Argentine military agents were planning to kill the guerrilla leaders or merely infiltrate their ranks, the sources said.

Some 5,000 Argentine leftists and their families have been granted political asylum in Mexico over the last three years. Many of them, members of the so-called Montonero Peronist Movement, have been allowed to carry on their political activities against the Argentine junta from Mexico.

As a result, relations between Mexico and Argentina have been deteriorating and the Argentine Government has refused to grant a safe-conduct pass to former President Héctor J. Cámpora, who has been living in the Mexican Embassy in Buenos Aires for almost two years.

Frictions Are Avoided

The sources here suggested that Mexico had decided not to protest publicly about the latest incident since the next step might be a formal rupture of diplomatic relations. Although Mexico broke relations with Chile's military junta in November 1974, the year-old Government of President José López Portillo has sought to avoid friction with South America's military regimes.

But in recent months, the Montoneros, a political and guerrilla organization of Marxists and leftist followers of the late President Juan Domingo Perón, have repeatedly denounced the activities of the Argentine military intelligence in Mexico and other countries where there are Argentine exiles.

As told by the Montoneros here, the latest incident began Jan. 2 with the capture in Mar del Plata, Argentina, of Tulio Valenzuela, a high-ranking guerrilla leader, along with his companion and son. They were taken to the headquarters of Argentina's Second Army Corps in Rosario and held in a private house occupied by military intelligence.

Mr. Valenzuela said at a news conference here that he was well treated and was given the opportunity of collaborating with the Argentine Army by going to Mexico and infiltrating a planned meeting of Montonero leaders from around the world.

Mr. Valenzuela said that with the approval of his companion, Raquel Negg, he pretended to agree, personally telling Gen. Fortunato Galtieri, head of the Second Army Corps, that he would go along with the plan.

Alleged Team Members Named

He also asserted that the plan "to infiltrate and collect data in order to eliminate our companions abroad" was approved by the head of Argentina's military junta, Gen. Jorge Rafael Videla, and army leaders at a meeting in Buenos Aires on Jan. 13.

Two days later, Mr. Valenzuela reportedly left Buenos Aires accompanied by a guerrilla-turned-collaborator, Carlos Laluf, an army major who went by the name Sebastián, a lieutenant using the name Daniel and a civilian agent with the alias Barba.

Mr. Valenzuela, who showed reporters his airline ticket, said he arrived in Mexico City on Jan. 16 after stopovers in Rio de Janeiro and Guatemala City, entering this country with false documents that identified him as Jorge Raúl Cattone.

He added that he and Mr. Laluf, who he said entered Mexico under the name Miguel Villa, checked into Room 404 of the Mayaland Hotel here. Reporters later confirmed that a Mr. Villa was registered in the hotel although he could not be found. Mr. Valenzuela said that the three other agents arrived a day later and checked into another hotel.

"You may ask how the main repressive organs of the country allowed me to leave and ran the risk of this press conference," the rebel leader said. "But you must remember the conditions under which I came. The main condition is that my companion, who is six months' pregnant, and my 18-month-old son are in the hands of the enemy. They are hostages and I was warned that they would be immediately executed if the mission failed or something like this occurred."

Press Conference Called

Soon after his arrival here, Mr. Valenzuela said, he contacted Montonero leaders in Mexico and the press conference was called. He said the immediate targets for assassination were Dr. Ricardo Obregón Cano, former governor of Córdoba Province, Rodolfo Puiggrós, former rector of Buenos Aires University, and several Montonero leaders, Mario Eduardo Firmenich, Rodolfo Galimberti, Oscar Bidegain and Horacio Mendizábal.

As evidence of the truth of his story, Mr. Valenzuela said the telephone number of the house where he was kept in the district of Funes outside Rosario was 93-200. Reporters from the Mexico City newspaper Uno Más Uno called the number and were able to speak to General Galtieri, who reportedly said that "I have no control over my agents outside the country."

Since the denunciation of the alleged plot, there has been no word on the whereabouts of the other members of the Argentine intelligence team. There were unofficial reports that they had gone into hiding in the Argentine Embassy here or that they had been arrested by the Mexican authorities.

A spokesman for the Argentine Embassy here said, "We know nothing of this affair, we only know what we've read in the newspapers."

Terrorism in Argentina on the Wane

Over the past year the security situation in Argentina has greatly improved. The best available estimates of terrorist strength reflect 400-500 Montoneros, 70-100 People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) and less than 20 Workers Power Communist Organization (OCPO) members. The leadership of both the Montoneros and the ERP is operating out of Europe and the organizations are in disarray. The OCPO has not engaged in terrorist activities recently and for the most part its members are in deep hiding. Not long ago a cache of arms belonging to the Marxist Leninist Communist Party (PCML) was discovered in Mar Del Plata. However, the PCML has not been involved in significant terrorist activities for over one and a half years.

The Montoneros represent the major terrorist threat. They are operating principally in the southern part of greater Buenos Aires, which includes the major industrial area. They have been trying to forge an identification with dissatisfied workers and to capitalize on the harsh economic situation. They have threatened business executives whose companies have become involved in labor disputes or who have laid off workers. To identify strongly with workers' aspirations through attacks against management is, and will continue to be, their main goal during this coming year.

The major limitation on Montonero terrorist activity results from their depleted resources. They have suffered major defections, in some cases of high ranking personnel. Many of these defectors are collaborating with Argentine security officials, making it very difficult for the Montoneros to successfully conduct operations. The strongest and largest Montonero column is column 25, which is operating in the southern area of greater Buenos Aires. It has 60-80 members. This column received a serious setback in December when its leader, Raul Motola, was killed in a confrontation with security forces. He was responsible for several assassinations over the past couple of years and last October concealed a bomb in a car which exploded in front of the house of Eduardo Beach, an Argentine executive of Chrysler Corporation. The detonation killed Beach's bodyguard and a passerby. Two others were injured.

The overall assessment by American officials on the scene is that Argentina is safe for U.S. tourists and for U.S. government officials coming on private visits. The security situation has also improved for American business personnel. They should be in no danger if they follow good security practices, avoid publicity and if their companies are not involved in any serious labor disputes. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Declassified Case: NW 52970 Date: 10-24-2012

Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 MCT-01 SY-05 EB-08 COME-00 HA-05
A-01 AID-05 TRSE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01
INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02
SS-15 USIA-06 /086 W
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R 111543Z JAN 78
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4073

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 0206

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ASEC, PINS, AR
SUBJECT: TERRORISM

REF: (A) 77 BUENOS AIRES A-151, (B) 77 BUENOS AIRES 9764, (C) STATE 001340

1. OVER THE PAST YEAR THE SECURITY SITUATION IN ARGENTINA HAS GREATLY IMPROVED. THE BEST AVAILABLE ESTIMATES OF TERRORIST STRENGTH REFLECT 400-500 MONTONEROS, 700-100 ERP AND LESS THAN 20 WORKERS POWER COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION (OCPO). THE LEADERSHIP OF BOTH THE MONTONEROS AND THE ERP IS OPERATING OUT OF EUROPE AND THE ORGANIZATIONS ARE IN DISARRAY. THE OCPO HAS NOT RECENTLY ENGAGED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND FOR THE MOST PART THEY ARE IN DEEP HIDING. RECENTLY A CACHE OF ARMS WAS DISCOVERED IN MAR DEL PLATA BELONGING TO THE PCML (MARXIST LENINIST COMMUNIST PARTY). HOWEVER, THEY HAVE NOT BEEN INVOLVED IN SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES FOR OVER 1 1/2 YEARS.

2. THE MONTONEROS REPRESENT THE MAJOR TERRORIST THREAT. THEY ARE OPERATING PRINCIPALLY IN THE SOUTHERN AREA OF GREATER BUENOS AIRES WHICH INCLUDES THE MAJOR INDUSTRIAL AREA. THEY HAVE BEEN TRYING TO FORGE AN IDENTIFICATION WITH DISSATISFIED WORKERS AND TO CAPITALIZE ON THE HARSH ECONOMIC SITUATION. THEY HAVE THREATENED BUSINESS EXECUTIVES WHOSE COMPANIES HAVE BECOME INVOLVED IN LABOR DISPUTES OR WHO HAVE LAID OFF WORKERS. THIS ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY STRONGLY WITH WORKERS' ASPIRATIONS THROUGH ATTACKS AGAINST MANAGEMENT IS AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE THEIR MAIN GOAL DURING THIS COMING YEAR.

3. THE MAJOR LIMITATION ON MONTONERO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES RESULTS FROM THEIR DEPLETED RESOURCES. THEY HAVE SUFFERED MAJOR DEFECTIONS, IN SOME CASES OF HIGH RANKING PERSONNEL. MANY OF THESE DEFECTORS ARE COLLABORATING WITH ARGENTINE SECURITY OFFICIALS, MAKING IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE MONTONEROS TO SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCT OPERATIONS. THE STRONGEST AND LARGEST MONTONERO COLUMN IS COLUMN 25 WHICH IS OPERATING IN THE SOUTHERN AREA OF GREATER BUENOS AIRES. IT HAS 60 TO 80 MEMBERS. THIS COLUMN RECEIVED A SERIOUS SETBACK ON DEC. 14, 1977 WHEN ITS LEADER (RAUL MORTOLA) WAS KILLED IN A CONFRONTATION WITH SECURITY FORCES. HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF GENERAL OMAR ACTIS IN 1976, COL. ANGEL SURADA IN MAY 1977, OR RODOLFO IARCIE, MANAGER OF ALGODONERA LAVALLOL, AND, ON OCT. 13, 1977, HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANTING A BOMB IN FRONT OF THE HOUSE OF MR. BEECH, MANAGER OF CHRYSLER. THIS SETBACK HAS TEMPORARILY REDUCED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SOUTHERN COLUMN WHICH HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR NUMEROUS ATTACKS AGAINST BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL.

4. THE EMBASSY'S OVERALL ASSESSMENT IS THAT ARGENTINA IS SAFE FOR U.S. TOURIST TRAVEL ANDGOVERNMENT OFFICIALS COMING ON PRIVATE VISITS. THE SECURITY SITUATION HAS IMPROVED FOR AMERICAN BUSINESS PERSONNEL AND THEY SHOULD FEEL FREE TO TRAVEL TO ARGENTINA WITH THE CAVEAT THAT THEY FOLLOW GOOD SECURITY PRACTICES, AVOID PUBLICITY AND THAT THEIR COMPANIES ARE NOT INVOLVED IN ANY SERIOUS LABOR DISPUTES. ALL U.S. BUSINESS EXECUTIVES VISITING ARGENTINA SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO MEET WITH THE EMBASSY SECURITY OFFICER TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC SECURITY SAFEGUARDS TO BE FOLLOWED WHILE IN ARGENTINA.

5. THE NUMBER OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES OF U.S. FIRMS PRESENTLY BASED IN ARGENTINA IS APPROXIMATELY 55.
CASTRO

Argentina

Declassified Case: NW# 52970 Date: 10-24-2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Department of State

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

0335

PAGE 01 STATE 001340
ORIGIN ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 MCT-01 SY-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05
H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01
SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 EB-08 COME-00 HA-05 A-01
AID-05 TRSE-00 /086 R

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APPROVED BY ARA/ECA:RWZIMMERMANN
M/CT:RDODSON

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

Argentina
Montoneros

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 001340

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PINS, AR

SUBJECT: TERRORISM

REFS: (A) B.A. A-151, (B) B.A. 9764

1. DEPARTMENT HAS RECEIVED A NUMBER OF RECENT REQUESTS FROM U.S. BUSINESSMEN CONCERNING SECURITY SITUATION IN ARGENTINA. DEPARTMENT RESPONSE HAS BEEN THAT SITUATION HAS GREATLY IMPROVED SINCE EARLY 1977 AND THAT THERE IS PRESENTLY NO REASON NOT TO TRAVEL TO BUENOS AIRES AND THE INTERIOR. HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH PERTINENT ONLY FOR PERIOD FROM JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1977, REF (A) WOULD MAKE IT APPEAR THAT MONTONEROS ARE AGAIN TARGETING FOREIGN BUSINESSMEN FOR ASSASSINATION.

2. REF (B) MAKES CLEAR THAT NO U.S. CITIZEN EXECUTIVES HAVE BEEN HIT BY MONTONEROS, BUT WE WOULD APPRECIATE EMBASSY VIEWS ON SECURITY SITUATION REGARDING U.S. VISITORS AND RESIDENTS IN ARGENTINA.

3. DEPARTMENT WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE EMBASSY'S BEST ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN PRESENTLY BASED IN ARGENTINA. CHRISTOPHER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassified Case: NW# 52970 Date: 10-24-2012

File

ARGENTINA

INCIDENT DATA ON INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED PERSONS & PROPERTY, 1972-78:

(A) U.S. DIPLOMATS & PROPERTY WITHIN COUNTRY:

Sept. 1973	Buenos Aires	Two bombs exploded in Ambassador's residence garden; they appeared to have been launched from motor-type weapon. No personal injuries but number of glass panels were shattered; estimated cost $60.00. Restitution not requested.
Mar. 12, 1974	Buenos Aires	Bomb exploded at front door of Cordoba BNC at 2:10 a.m. causing estimated $350 damage.
Mar. 16, 1974	Cordoba	Second bomb exploded at front door of BNC causing $1000 damage. No personal injuries.
Apr. 12, 1974	Cordoba	Alfred A. Laun III, Chief of the United States Information Service in Cordoba, was kidnapped by terrorists belonging to the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). Laun, who had been beaten and shot when he resisted his abductors, was released 15 hours later when the seriousness of his wounds became evident. ERP is Marxist-Leninist terrorist group; established 1970; military arm of the Revolutionary Workers Party; has suffered significant losses since military coup in March 1976.
Sept 8, 1974	Rosario	A bomb thrown from a passing automobile damaged the offices of USIS but did not cause any injuries. The three occupants of the car, believed to be associated with the Montoneros, continued to throw four more bombs at other places in the city.

NW 52970 DocId:32735952 Page 21

During pursuit by police, a bomb in the car exploded killing the occupants.

Montoneros: largest Leftist dissident group operating in Argentina; offshoot of Peronist movement; engages in terrorist acts; went underground in September 1974. Leader: Mario Fermenich.

Oct. 21, 1974	Cordoba Province	The USIS binational center and three affiliates of U.S. companies were targets of terrorist bombs. An explosion occurred at the USIS center in Rio Cuarto at about 4:00 a.m. Considerable damage was done, but no one was injured. An Argentine official of the Transax Company (a Ford affiliate) was seriously injured by a powerful bomb as he left his home in San Carlos. A Ford showroom and a Pepsi-Cola bottling plant in Rio Quarto were bombed, with moderate damage and no injuries.
Feb. 26, 1975	Cordoba	John P. Egan, US Consular Agent in Cordoba, was kidnapped from his home by twelve armed members of the Montoneros. The kidnappers demanded the release of four imprisoned comrades. The Argentine Government refused to negotiate. Egan was murdered 48 hours later. *(Montoneros: See 9/8/74)
Sept. 20, 1976	Buenos Aires	Fire broke out on 20 September in the new U.S. chancery building in Buenos Aires. An inspection of the building by American officials was underway at the time. Although the fire was quickly brought under control,

		damage estimated at over $10,000 was caused to the central electrical system. The inspecting officials believed the fire was intentionally set, as they found cardboard jammed into the utility shaft where the fire started.
Apr. 15, 1977	Buenos Aires	One water closet, two urinals and a lavatory were smashed at the Office Building site. Estimated cost of damage is in excess of $1,500. Replaced by U.S.G.

ARGENTINA

INCIDENT DATA ON INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED PERSONEL & PROPERTY, 1972-78:

(B) OTHER DIPLOMATS & MISSIONS WITHIN COUNTRY:

Feb. 5, 1973	Argentina	An incendiary bomb was discovered in the automobile of the Paraguayan ambassador to Argentina.
July 6, 1973	Buenos Aires	A terrorist group hurled incendiary bombs and opened fire on the residence of the Uruguayan ambassador in Buenos Aires. No injuries resulted. The People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) claimed credit for the incident.
July 8, 1973	La Plata	The Uruguayan consulate in La Plata was seized for 15 minutes by two men and one woman. Signs were painted on the walls, proclaiming "solidarity with the Uruguayan Revolutionaries and Workers." The People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) claimed credit for this action.
Sept 11 & 14, 1974	Salta Buenos Aires	On 11 September a bomb exploded at the residence of the Chilean consul at Salta causing considerable damage but no personal injuries. On 14 September three men driving past the Chilean embassy fired a machine gun burst at the building and injured the driver of a car parked in front of the embassy. Simultaneously, several anti-tank grenades were fired against the embassy from an adjacent public park. The 22 August Fraction of the Argentine Forces of Liberation (FAL) has claimed responsibility for the attack.

NW 52970 DocId:32735952 Page 24

Apr. 18, 1975	Mar del Plata	Bomb Explosion at Chilean Consulate in Argentina A bomb exploded at the door of the Chilean consulate in Mar del Plata on 18 April, causing serious damage to part of the building. Argentine officials think the explosion might be linked to the recent visit of the Chilean president.
Apr. 25, 1975	Buenos Aires	Bomb Explosion at British Embassy Residence A bomb placed in automobile parked in front of the British embassy residence in Buenos Aires exploded on 25 April, killing a police guard and injuring two persons. The ambassador and his family were not injured. No group has claimed credit for this act.
Aug. 5, 1975	Buenos Aires	Ecuadorean Embassy Bombed A bomb exploded in the basement of the Ecuadorean embassy in Buenos Aires causing serious damage. There were no injuries. No group has claimed responsibility
Aug. 13, 1975	Buenos Aires	Cuban Officials Attacked Three or four unidentified terrorists in an automobile shot at two Cuban embassy vehicles entering the embassy compound. The Cuban ambassador was in one car and a visiting Cuban official and an attache were in the other. No one was injured. Accion Cubana, an anti-Castro Cuban exile group, claimed credit for this attack.
Oct. 8, 1975	Buenos Aires	Chilean Refugees Seize U.N. Office A group of 16 Chileans and one Brazilian seized the office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in Buenos Aires on 8 October. Fourteen Argentine

		employees were held hostage. The group said it wanted to draw world attention to the way Latin refugees are being treated. On 10 October they and their families left for Algeria, which agreed to give them asylum, and the hostages were released.
Dec. 8, 1975	Buenos Aires	Mexican Consulate Bombed A bomb exploded at the Mexican consulate in Buenos Aires on 8 December, causing property damage. No one was injured. A caller to the Associated Press said the bomb was "repudiation against that traitor Luis Echeverria (Mexican president) who embraced Fidel Castro." Cuban exiles probably were responsible for the bombing.
Jan. 15, 1976	Cordoba	British Cultural Institute Bombed The British Cultural Institute in Cordoba was bombed on 15 January. There was property damage but no one was injured. The blast was reportedly the work of nationalists protesting against Britain's refusal to recognize Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.
June 1 & 2, 1976	Buenos Aires	Ex-President of Bolivia Assassinated General Juan Jose Torres, former President of Bolivia, was found dead on 2 June after having been reported missing the previous day. He was found blindfolded and shot three times in the head. Torres had been living in Argentina as a political exile.

NW 52970 DocId:32735952 Page 26

June 25, 1976	Clorinda	Paraguayan Consulate Bombed A bomb exploded at the Paraguayan consulate in Clorinda, Argentina on 25 June, causing extensive damage. No one claimed responsibility for placing the bomb. Clorinda is located directly across the border from Asuncion, Paraguay. Either Paraguayan or Argentine terrorists could be responsible.
Nov. 14, 1976	Buenos Aires	Residence of Chilean Diplomat in Buenos Aires Bombed The residence of the Chilean embassy's press attache in Buenos Aires was bombed and machine-gunned on 14 November by unknown attackers in a passing car. There was considerable damage to the front of the building but no injuries.
Mar. 28, 1977	Buenos Aires	Explosion in Buenos Aires at Building Housing Soviets A bomb exploded outside a Buenos Aires building containing the offices of the Soviet commercial attache and the residences of members of the Soviet embassy. No one was injured. The attack was one of several bombings in the city on the same night.

NW 52970 DocId:32735952 Page 27

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. What is the Argentine government's attitude toward terrorism?

A. The Argentine Government has strongly opposed internal and international terrorism. It has proposed resolutions in the UN and OAS strongly attacking terrorism.

Q. Has the GOA violated human rights in its efforts to eliminate terrorist organizations?

A. Yes it has. There have been many disappearances attributed to the security forces, torturing of prisoners has been reported and the GOA has continued to detain over 3,000 prisoners without charge.

Q. What are the largest terrorist groups operating in Argentina?

A. The Montoneros, who have perhaps 300-400 active combatants left and the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) with some 100 members remaining.

Q. Have the terrorist organizations attacked U.S. businessmen and government officials in Argentina?

A. Yes they have, a number were killed (although none in the last year), and the U.S. business community has fallen from 500 in 1974 to 50 now.

Q. What is the Argentine Government doing to clean up its counterterrorist efforts?

A. They have published lists of those detained under state of seige provisions, reduced disappearances, released some prisoners, reinstituted a modified "right of option" to go into exile and permitted the ICRC to inspect civilian prisoners. But much remains to be done.