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Declassified Case: NW 54739 Date: 10-23-2013

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5-113a (Rev. 3-21-78)

~~SECRET~~/WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED [redacted]

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods

Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 3/31/75

[redacted] no information to date concerning possible terrorist plans to undertake hostile acts against Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during his forthcoming visit to Buenos Aires, Argentina. The date of this visit has not yet been announced.

EO25x1

[redacted] massive security mobilization by the Argentine services will probably act as a deterrent to any attempt at direct action against Secretary Kissinger. The possibility exists that plans will be made to carry out other acts of terrorism in order to embarrass him, and to detract from the success of his visit. Harrassment operations, such as bombing attacks against U. S. firms in Buenos Aires, and street demonstrations are expected.

[redacted]

You will be advised of any pertinent developments in this matter.

[redacted]

RJO:kjg

RJO mn FSP/SSM WRW/TWL PCM

~~SECRET~~/WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED [redacted]

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods

DOJ/FBI

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 28 1975

TELETYPE

NNNNVV EIA277 EIA655IQA021

[redacted]

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FM CIA

[redacted]

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods

Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
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Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NA

109-12-201

109-12-201-2949

~~S E C R E T~~ [redacted] SECTION 01 OF 3.

APR 2 1975

CITE [redacted]

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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

APR 10 1975

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~/WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/ [redacted]

COUNTRY : ARGENTINA

[redacted] EO25x1

SUBJECT : SECURITY SITUATION REPORT. ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL TERRORIST AND EXTREMIST THREAT TO SECRETARY KISSINGER AS [redacted] MARCH 1975

[redacted]

[redacted] HAVE NOT RECEIVED ANY INFORMATION TO DATE RELATING TO POSSIBLE TERRORIST PLANS TO UNDERTAKE HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER DURING HIS PROJECTED VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES. EO25x1

OF THE TWO PRINCIPAL TERRORIST GROUPS, [redacted] ONLY THE MONTONEROS HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO ATTEMPT SUCH ACTION, AS THE

ARG.

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FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods

PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP) ORGANIZATION IN BUENOS AIRES, ARG. PROVINCE HAS BEEN SEVERLY DISRUPTED BY RECENT POLICE ACTION. THE MASSIVE SECURITY MOBILIZATION BY THE ARGENTINE SERVICES WILL PROBABLY ACT AS A DETERRENT TO ANY ATTEMPT TO UNDERTAKE DIRECT ACTION AGAINST SECRETARY KISSINGER, BUT THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT PLANS WILL BE MADE TO CARRY OUT OTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM IN ORDER TO EMBARRASS THE U.S. OFFICIAL AND DETRACT FROM THE SUCCESS OF HIS VISIT. IT IS EXPECTED THAT MOST LEFTIST GROUPS, INCLUDING THE TERRORISTS, WILL UNDERTAKE HARRASSMENT OPERATIONS, SUCH AS BOMBING ATTACKS AGAINST U.S. FIRMS IN BUENOS AIRES AND STREET DEMONSTRATIONS. THE REPLACEMENT OF THE CHIEF OF FEDERAL POLICE IS EXPECTED MOMENTARILY, ALONG WITH A CORRESPONDING SHIFTING OF HIGH-LEVEL POLICE OFFICERS. THESE EXPECTED CHANGES WILL PROBABLY NOT HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE CAPABILITY OF THE POLICE TO PROTECT SECRETARY KISSINGER. END SUMMARY.

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1. [redacted] COMMENT: IT IS JUDGED THAT OF THE SEVERAL TERRORIST GROUPS OPERATING IN ARGENTINA, ONLY THE ERP AND THE MONTONEROS HHAVE THE CAPABILITY TO POSE A DIRECT THREAT TO SECRETARY

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KISSINGER. THE ERP, WHICH OPERATES UNDER THE POLITICAL UMBRELLA OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS' PARTH (PRT), IS A MARXIST-LENINIST ORGANIZATION WHOSE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE IS TO IMPLANT A MARXIST STATE IN ARGENTINA THROUGH ARMED REBELLION AND CIVIL WAR. ALTHOUGH HISTORICALLY IT HAS ENJOYED A HIGH DEGREE OF SUCCESS WITH THE TRADITIONAL TACTICS OF URBAN WARFARE, THE ERP BEGAN TO EMPHASIZE RURAL GUERRILLA ACTIONS IN JANUARY 1974, WITH UNEVEN SUCCESS THUS FAR. THE ERP HAS AN ESTIMATE 400 TO 600 ARMED AND TRAINED COMBANTANTS, WITH AN ADDITIONAL 900 TO 1,200 ACTIVE SYMPATHIZERS AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL. ITS MILITARY ORGANIZATION IS DIVIDED INTO FOUR COMPANIES, EACH NUMBERING BETWEEN 90 AND 120 MEN, WHICH OPERATE IN THE PROVINCES OF TUCUMAN, CORDOBA, AND BUENOS AIRES AN DIN THE AREA OF ROSARIO. THE ERP IS WELL-FINANCED WITH FUNDS DERIVED FROM THE ABDUCTIONS OF BUSINESSMEN, PRIMARILY REPRESENTATIVES OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS. THE MONTONEROS ARE ALSO MARXIST-LENINISTS IN IDEOLOGY, BUT THEY COMBINE THAT PHILOSOPHY WITH THEIR OWN PARTICULAR GRAND OF PERONISM--WHICH HAS GIVEN THIS MOVEMENT A FIRM NATIONALIST FLAVOR AND A STRONG FOLLOWING AMONG THE LEFTIST PERONIST YOUTH OF ARGENTINEA. WHILE THE MONTONEROS ACCEPT THE INEVITABILITY OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE AS

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THE ONLY LEGITIMATE MEANS TO ACHIEVE POWER, THEY HAVE DEVELOPED A NUMBER OF LEGAL OR SEMI-LEGAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH PARTICIPATE TO SOME DEGREE IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THE COUNTRY; E.G., TEIR INVOLVEMENT THROUGH THE AUTHENTIC PARTY IN THE MISIONES PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS. THE MONTONEROS ARE ESTIMATED TO HAVE 2,000 ARMED AND TRAINED COMBATANTS, WITH AN ADDITIONAL 5,000 TO 10,000 ACTIVE SYMPATHIZERS AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL. THROUGH THEIR PAST ASSOCIATION WITH PERONISM AND THEIR CURRENT SYMPATHIZERS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, THE MONTONEROS ARE JUDGED TO HAVE A HIGH CAPABILITY TO ACQUIRE INFORMATION ON THE PLANS OF THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE SECRUITY SERVICES.)

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2. [redacted] COMMENT: ARGENTINA IS PRESENTLY UNDERGOING A PERIOD OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND HIGH FREQUENCY OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS. THE TWO ARE NOT NECESSARILY RELATED, BUT EACH HAS AN IMPACT ON THE OTHER. FROM THE POLITICAL STANDPOINT, SEVERAL POWER SECTORS OF THE COUNTRY, INCLUDING THOSE WITHIN THE PRONIST MOVEMENT, ARE ATTEMPTING TO PRESSURE PRESIDENT MARIA ESTELA ~~M~~ A R T I N E Z DE ~~P~~ERON INTO REMOVING JOSE ~~L~~ O P E Z ~~R~~ E G A FROM HIS POSITION OF INFLUENCE OVER HER AND, THEREFORE, OVER GOVERNMENT POLICIES. A.G.

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THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS ACTION COULD BE SEVERE, SINCE THE DANGER EXISTS THAT THE PRESIDENT COULD RESIGN OR THREATEN TO RESIGN IF GIVEN AN ULTIMATUM ON THIS ISSUE. THE POTENTIAL CONFRONTATION COULD COME ABOUT IN EARLY APRIL, ALTHOUGH THE LEADERS OF THE ANTI-LOPEZ REGA MOVEMENTRIGINALLY WISHED TO AVOID A POLITICAL SHOWDOWN UNTIL AFTER THE 13 APRIL ELECTIONS IN MISIONES PROVINCE. IF LOPEZ REGA AND HIS SUPPORTERS ARE OUSTED, WITH OR WITHOUT THE RESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDENT, THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE A MODERATE CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL DIRECTION OF THE GOVERNMENT; I.E., FROM RIGHT OF CENTER TO THE CENTER, OR EVEN TO THE LEFT OF CENTER. IN THIS SITUATION, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD PROBABLY BE MORE DISPOSED TO INITIATE A DIALOGUE WITH THE MONTONEROS AND ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH SOME FORM OF MODUS VIVENDI. THE MONTONEROS ARE ALMOST CERTAINLY AWARE OF THE POLITICAL IN-FIGHTING AND ITS POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANCE. INDEED, [redacted] EO25x1

[redacted] INTERIOR MINISTER ALBERTO ~~X~~R O C A M O R A MAY HAVE ALREADY MET WITH LEADERS OF THE MONTONEROS' POLITICAL APPARATUS. THUS, THE TERRORISTS, AND PARTICULARLY THE MONTONEROS, ARE PROBABLY CONSIDERING ACTIONS DESIGNED TO WEAKEN THE GOVERNMENT AND

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 28 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.	
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
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Ident.	
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Intell.	
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Spec. Inv.	
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Legal Coun.	
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Director Sec'y	

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FM CIA

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~~S E C R E T~~ [redacted] SECTION 2 OF 3.

CITE [redacted]

CONTRIBUTE TO THE ANTI-LOPEZ REGA EFFORTS. IF THEY SHOULD BELIEVE THAT THE VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER COULD SERVE TO STRENGTHEN

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FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods

THE GOVERNMENT AND LOPEZ REGA, THEY MIGHT WELL BE CONTEMPLATING SOME ACTION DURING HIS VISIT TO DETRACT FROM ITS SUCCESS.)

[redacted]

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4. [redacted] HAVE RECEIVED NO INFORMATION RELATING TO POSSIBLE PLANS OF EXTREMIST GROUPS TO ATTEMPT TO TAKE DIRECT TERRORIST ACTION AGAINST U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER DURING HIS PROJECTED VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES. [redacted] THE MONTONEROS HAVE THE BEST CAPABILITY OF THE ARGENTINE TERRORIST GROUPS TO UNDERTAKE SUCH ACTION BECAUSE OF THEIR NUMERICAL STRENGTH AND THEIR PENETRATIONS AT ALL LEVELS OF THE GOVERNMENT, BUT THEIR INTENTIONS IN THIS REGARD WILL PROBABLY NOT BE KNOWN BEFOREHAND. [redacted] COMMENT: [redacted]

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[redacted] THE ERP HAD PROPOSED A JOINT OPERATION TO THE MONTONEROS TO KIDNAP A U.S. OFFICIAL OR THE HEAD OF A U.S. COMPANY IN ARGENTINA, DURING OR PRECEDING THE THEN SCHEDULED MARCH MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, AS A MEANS TO EMBARRASS SECRETARYKISSINGER AND DISRUPT THE PLANNED MEETING. THE MONTONEROS [redacted] REJECTED THE ERP PROPOSAL AS BEING COUNTERPRODUCTIVE POLITICALLY, BUT IT IS NOTED THAT ON 26 FEBRUARY 1975 THE MONTONEROS ABDUCTED AND SUBSEQUENTLY MURDERED U.S. CONSULAR AGENT JOHN PATRICK EGAN IN CORDOBA.)

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5. [redacted] THE ERP, ACTING ALONE, IS NOT CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT A HIGH-RISK, SPECTACULAR ACT OF TERRORISM IN BUENOS AIRES AT THIS TIME. [redacted] [redacted] THE RECENT FEDERAL POLICE RAID ON THE REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE ERP IN BUENOS AIRES IS JUDGED TO HAVE EFFECTIVELY DISRUPTED ERP OPERATIONSFOR THE PROVINCE. THE POLICE NOT ONLY CONFISCATED LISTS OF ERP MEMBERS AND SAFE SITE ADDRESSES FOR THE PROVINCE, BUT SINCE THE HEADQUARTERS SERVED AS THE PRINCIPAL COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY FOR THE ERP IN THE PROVINCE, CONTACT BETWEEN ERP CELLS AND GROUPS HAS BECOME EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT. THE CONTINUING

EO25x1

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POLICE RAIDS HAVE PLACED THE ERP ON THE DEFENSIVE IN THE PROVINCE. THE FEDERAL POLICE DO NOT DISCARD THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME ERP TERRORIST ACT DURING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT, BUT POLICE OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT DIRECT ACTION BY THE ERP ALONE IS IMPROBLE.

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6. [redacted] FOR THE PROJECTED VISIT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER, THE FEDERAL POLICE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THEY CAN GUARANTEE HIS SAFETY, IF HIS STAY IN BUENOS AIRES IS ONLY FOR A FEW DAYS. IN SUCH A SHORT SPACE OF TIME, THE FEDERAL POLICE WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE ENVIRONMENT AND PREVENT ANY PLANNED DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST HIM. THE POLICE WOULD USE AS MANY OFFICIALS AS DEEMED NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS--UP TO 10,000 UNIFORMED POLICE AND INCLUDING AS MANY AS 500 OFFICERS OF FEDERAL POLICE INTELLIGENCE. THE UNIFORMED POLICE WOULD CLEAR THE STREETS OVER WHICH THE SECRETARY WOULD TRAVEL AND THE AREAS WHICH HE VISITS. THE POLICE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WOULD WORK IN PLAIN CLOTHES TO MONITOR THE CROWDS DURING ANY POSSIBLE PUBLIC APPEARANCE BY THE SECRETARY. EO25x1 [redacted] COMMENT: JUDGING FROM PAST EXPERIENCE, THE POLICE WOULD ALSO PLACE AGENTS AND OFFICIALS AT THE TRADITIONAL TROUBLE SPOTS IN THE CITY IN ORDER

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TO MONITOR ACTIVITIES AND DISRUPT ANY EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE DEMONSTRATIONS.)

[redacted]

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8. THE PCA WAS OPPOSED TO SECRETARY KISSINGER'S SCHEDULED VISIT IN MARCH 1975 AND WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE OPPOSED TO ANOTHER SCHEDULED VISIT. IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE SUBJECT OF THE VISIT WAS TO BE DISCUSSED AT A CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING OF THE PCA [redacted] AND THAT APPROPRIATE DIRECTIVES WILL BE ISSUED [redacted] THE PCA IS EXPECTED TO MOUNT A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN, I.E., THE PUBLICATION OF LEAFLETS, WALL PAINTINGS,

EO25x1

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods

AGITATION IN FACTORIES, ETC. IF HIS VISIT IS PROLONGED, THE PARTY MAY ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS. [redacted] COMMENT: PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD BE THE MAXIMUM ACTION AGAINST SECRETARY KISSINGER THAT THE PCA WOULD ATTEMPT. SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD PROBABLY BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER LEFTIST GROUPS, WHICH WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY ATTEMPT TO PROTEST HIS PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRY WITH STREET DEMONSTRATIONS AND PROPAGANDA.) [redacted] COMMENT: DEMONSTRATIONS OF THIS NATURE NORMALLY DO NOT PRESENT THE POLICE WITH MUCH OF A PROBLEM TO CONTROL. [redacted] EFFORTS BY THE PRT TO MOBILIZE ARGENTINE TROTSKYIST GROUPS FOR A WIDESPREAD BOMBING CAMPAIGN AND LIGHTNING STREET DEMONSTRATIONS TO PROTEST THE VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER. THE DEMONSTRATIONS AND BOMBING ATTACKS WERE REPORTEDLY TO TAKE PLACE WHILE THE SECRETARY WAS IN THE COUNTRY.)

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[redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 28 1975

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
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Asst. Dir.:
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~~S E C R E T~~ FINAL SECTION OF 3.

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10. [redacted] POLICE CHIEF LUIS ~~M A R G A R I D E~~ RESIGNED EFFECTIVE 21 MARCH 1975. IF TRUE, THIS SIGNIFIES A NUMBER OF CHANGES AMONG HIGH-LEVEL POLICE POSITIONS, AS THE NEW CHIEF WILL PROBABLY APPOINT MEN OF HIS CONFIDENCE TO THE SENIOR POSTS. ALSO, COMMISSIONER MAJOR EDUARDO PEDRO ~~R A M I R E Z~~, WHO FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES HAS BEEN THE OPERATIONS CHIEF OF FEDERAL POLICE INTELLIGENCE, WAS TRANSFERRED ON 21 MARCH TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION AS CHIEF OF SUPPLY. RAMIREZ RESIGNED IN PROTEST. [redacted] COMMENT: THE POSSIBLE CHANGES OF HIGH-LEVEL POLICE OFFICIALS ARE NOT EXPECTED TO HAVE MUCH OF AN IMPACT ON THE CAPABILITY OF THE POLICE TO PROVIDE PROTECTIN TO VISITING DIGNITARIES. THE ACTUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR PLANNING AND MOUNTING PROTECTION SERVICES WILL BE IN THE HANDS OF SENIOR POLICE EXPERTS IN THIS FIELD, WHO WILL REMAIN IN THEIR POSITIONS DESPITE POSSIBLE CHANGES AT THE TOP ELVEL IN THE INSTITUTION.)

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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET/~~ [redacted]

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DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

[redacted]

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. Category 5B (1), (2). Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

PRIORITY

IN 535623

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~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

DIST 28 MARCH 1975

Political matters

5-RTO

109-12-201

COUNTRY : ARGENTINA

[redacted]

SUBJECT : SECURITY SITUATION REPORT. ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL TERRORIST AND EXTREMIST THREAT TO SECRETARY KISSINGER AS OF 27 MARCH 1975

[redacted]

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SUMMARY. ACCORDING TO AN EXPERIENCED POLICE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES HAVE NOT RECEIVED [redacted] RELATING TO POSSIBLE TERRORIST PLANS TO UNDERTAKE HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER DURING HIS PROJECTED VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES. OF THE TWO PRINCIPAL TERRORIST GROUPS, [redacted] ONLY THE MONTONEROS HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO ATTEMPT SUCH ACTION, AS THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP) ORGANIZATION IN BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE HAS BEEN SEVERELY DISRUPTED BY RECENT POLICE ACTION. THE MASSIVE SECURITY MOBILIZATION BY THE ARGENTINE SERVICES

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Copy to Buenos Aires by routing slip for ☑ info ☐ action date 3-31-75 by RTO/dan

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WILL PROBABLY ACT AS A DETERRENT TO ANY ATTEMPT TO UNDERTAKE DIRECT ACTION AGAINST SECRETARY KISSINGER, BUT THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT PLANS WILL BE MADE TO CARRY OUT OTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM IN ORDER TO EMBARRASS THE U.S. OFFICIAL AND DETRACT FROM THE SUCCESS OF HIS VISIT. IT IS EXPECTED THAT MOST LEFTIST GROUPS, INCLUDING THE TERRORISTS, WILL UNDERTAKE HARRASSMENT OPERATIONS, SUCH AS BOMBING ATTACKS AGAINST U.S. FIRMS IN BUENOS AIRES AND STREET DEMONSTRATIONS. THE REPLACEMENT OF THE CHIEF OF FEDERAL POLICE IS EXPECTED MOMENTARILY, ALONG WITH A CORRESPONDING SHIFTING OF HIGH-LEVEL POLICE OFFICERS. THESE EXPECTED CHANGES WILL PROBABLY NOT HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE CAPABILITY OF THE POLICE TO PROTECT SECRETARY KISSINGER. END SUMMARY.

1. [redacted] EO25x1 COMMENT: IT IS JUDGED THAT OF THE SEVERAL TERRORIST GROUPS OPERATING IN ARGENTINA, ONLY THE ERP AND THE MONTONEROS HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO POSE A DIRECT THREAT TO SECRETARY KISSINGER. THE ERP, WHICH OPERATES UNDER THE POLITICAL UMBRELLA OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS' PARTY (PRT), IS A MARXIST-LENINIST ORGANIZATION WHOSE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE IS TO IMPLANT A MARXIST STATE IN ARGENTINA THROUGH ARMED REBELLION AND CIVIL WAR. AL-

THOUGH HISTORICALLY IT HAS ENJOYED A HIGH DEGREE OF SUCCESS WITH THE TRADITIONAL TACTICS OF URBAN WARFARE, THE ERP BEGAN TO EMPHASIZE RURAL GUERRILLA ACTIONS IN JANUARY 1974, WITH UNEVEN SUCCESS THUS FAR. THE ERP HAS AN ESTIMATED 400 TO 600 ARMED AND TRAINED COMBANTANTS, WITH AN ADDITIONAL 900 TO 1,200 ACTIVE SYMPATHIZERS AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL. ITS MILITARY ORGANIZATION IS DIVIDED INTO FOUR COMPANIES, EACH NUMBERING BETWEEN 90 AND 120 MEN, WHICH OPERATE IN THE PROVINCES OF TUCUMAN, CORDOBA, AND BUENOS AIRES AND IN THE AREA OF ROSARIO. THE ERP IS WELL-FINANCED WITH FUNDS DERIVED FROM THE ABDUCTIONS OF BUSINESSMEN, PRIMARILY REPRESENTATIVES OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS. THE MONTONEROS ARE ALSO MARXIST-LENINISTS IN IDEOLOGY, BUT THEY COMBINE THAT PHILOSOPHY WITH THEIR OWN PARTICULAR GRAND OF PERONISM--WHICH HAS GIVEN THIS MOVEMENT A FIRM NATIONALIST FLAVOR AND A STRONG FOLLOWING AMONG THE LEFTIST PERONIST YOUTH OF ARGENTINA. WHILE THE MONTONEROS ACCEPT THE INEVITABILITY OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE AS THE ONLY LEGITIMATE MEANS TO ACHIEVE POWER, THEY HAVE DEVELOPED A NUMBER OF LEGAL OR SEMI-LEGAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH PARTICIPATE TO SOME DEGREE IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THE COUNTRY: E.G., THEIR INVOLVEMENT THROUGH THE AUTHENTIC PARTY IN THE MISIONES PROVINCIAL

ORGANIZATION

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ELECTIONS. THE MONTONEROS ARE ESTIMATED TO HAVE 2,000 ARMED AND TRAINED COMBATANTS, WITH AN ADDITIONAL 5,000 TO 10,000 ACTIVE SYMPATHIZERS AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL. THROUGH THEIR PAST ASSOCIATION WITH PERONISM AND THEIR CURRENT SYMPATHIZERS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, THE MONTONEROS ARE JUDGED TO HAVE A HIGH CAPABILITY TO ACQUIRE INFORMATION ON THE PLANS OF THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE SECRUITY SERVICES.)

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2. [redacted] COMMENT: ARGENTINA IS PRESENTLY UNDERGOING A PERIOD OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND HIGH FREQUENCY OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS. THE TWO ARE NOT NECESSARILY RELATED, BUT EACH HAS AN IMPACT ON THE OTHER. FROM THE POLITICAL STANDPOINT, SEVERAL POWER SECTORS OF THE COUNTRY, INCLUDING THOSE WITHIN THE PERONIST MOVEMENT, ARE ATTEMPTING TO PRESSURE PRESIDENT MARIA ESTELA M A R T I N E Z DE PERON INTO REMOVING JOSE L O P E Z R E G A FROM HIS POSITION OF INFLUENCE OVER HER AND, THEREFORE, OVER GOVERNMENT POLICIES. THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS ACTION COULD BE SEVERE, SINCE THE DANGER EXISTS THAT THE PRESIDENT COULD RESIGN OR THREATEN TO RESIGN IF GIVEN AN ULTIMATUM ON THIS ISSUE. THE POTENTIAL CONFRONTATION COULD COME ABOUT IN EARLY APRIL, ALTHOUGH THE LEADERS OF THE ANTI-LOPEZ REGA MOVEMENT ORIGINALLY WISHED TO

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AVOID A POLITICAL SHOWDOWN UNTIL AFTER THE 13 APRIL ELECTIONS IN MISIONES PROVINCE. IF LOPEZ REGA AND HIS SUPPORTERS ARE OUSTED, WITH OR WITHOUT THE RESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDENT, THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE A MODERATE CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL DIRECTION OF THE GOVERNMENT; I.E., FROM RIGHT OF CENTER TO THE CENTER, OR EVEN TO THE LEFT OF CENTER. IN THIS SITUATION, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD PROBABLY BE MORE DISPOSED TO INITIATE A DIALOGUE WITH THE MONTONEROS AND ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH SOME FORM OF MODUS VIVENDI. THE MONTONEROS ARE ALMOST CERTAINLY AWARE OF THE POLITICAL IN-FIGHTING AND ITS POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANCE. INDEED, [redacted] EO25x1

[redacted] INTERIOR MINISTER ALBERTO R O C A M O R A MAY HAVE ALREADY ARG MET WITH LEADERS OF THE MONTONEROS' POLITICAL APPARATUS. THUS, THE TERRORISTS, AND PARTICULARLY THE MONTONEROS, ARE PROBABLY CONSIDERING ACTIONS DESIGNED TO WEAKEN THE GOVERNMENT AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE ANTI-LOPEZ REGA EFFORTS. IF THEY SHOULD BELIEVE THAT THE VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER COULD SERVE TO STRENGTHEN THE GOVERNMENT AND LOPEZ REGA, THEY MIGHT WELL BE CONTEMPLATING SOME ACTION DURING HIS VISIT TO DETRACT FROM ITS SUCCESS.)

EO25x1 [redacted]

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[redacted]

4. [redacted] HAVE RECEIVED NO INFORMATION RELATING TO POSSIBLE PLANS OF EXTREMIST GROUPS TO ATTEMPT TO TAKE DIRECT TERRORIST ACTION AGAINST U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER DURING HIS PROJECTED VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES. [redacted] THE MONTONEROS HAVE THE BEST CAPABILITY OF THE ARGENTINE TERRORIST GROUPS TO UNDERTAKE SUCH ACTION BECAUSE OF THEIR NUMERICAL STRENGTH AND THEIR PENETRATIONS AT ALL LEVELS OF THE GOVERNMENT, BUT THEIR INTENTIONS IN THIS REGARD WILL PROBABLY NOT BE KNOWN

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BEFOREHAND.

EO25x1

5. [redacted] THE ERP, ACTING ALONE, IS NOT CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT A HIGH-RISK, SPECTACULAR ACT OF TERRORISM IN BUENOS AIRES AT THIS TIME. [redacted] EO25x1 [redacted] THE RECENT FEDERAL POLICE RAID ON THE REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE ERP IN BUENOS AIRES IS JUDGED TO HAVE EFFECTIVELY DISRUPTED ERP OPERATIONS FOR THE PROVINCE. THE POLICE NOT ONLY CONFISCATED LISTS OF ERP MEMBERS AND SAFE SITE ADDRESSES FOR THE PROVINCE, BUT SINCE THE HEADQUARTERS SERVED AS THE PRINCIPAL COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY FOR THE ERP IN THE PROVINCE, CONTACT BETWEEN ERP CELLS

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AND GROUPS HAS BECOME EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT. THE CONTINUING POLICE RAIDS HAVE PLACED THE ERP ON THE DEFENSIVE IN THE PROVINCE. THE FEDERAL POLICE DO NOT DISCARD THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME ERP TERRORIST ACT DURING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT, BUT POLICE OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT DIRECT ACTION BY THE ERP ALONE IS IMPROBLE. EO25x1

6. [redacted] FOR THE PROJECTED VISIT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER, THE FEDERAL POLICE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THEY CAN GUARANTEE HIS SAFETY, IF HIS STAY IN BUENOS AIRES IS ONLY FOR A FEW DAYS. IN SUCH A SHORT SPACE OF TIME, THE FEDERAL POLICE WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE ENVIRONMENT AND PREVENT ANY PLANNED DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST HIM. THE POLICE WOULD USE AS MANY OFFICIALS AS DEEMED NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS--UP TO 10,000 UNIFORMED POLICE AND INCLUDING AS MANY AS 500 OFFICERS OF FEDERAL POLICE INTELLIGENCE. THE UNIFORMED POLICE WOULD CLEAR THE STREETS OVER WHICH THE SECRETARY WOULD TRAVEL AND THE AREAS WHICH HE VISITS. THE POLICE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WOULD WORK IN PLAIN CLOTHES TO MONITOR THE CROWDS DURING ANY POSSIBLE PUBLIC APPEARANCE BY THE SECRETARY. EO25x1 [redacted] COMMENT: JUDGING FROM PAST EXPERIENCE, THE POLICE WOULD ALSO PLACE AGENTS AND OFFICIALS AT THE TRADITIONAL TROUBLE SPOTS IN THE CITY IN ORDER

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TO MONITOR ACTIVITIES AND DISRUPT ANY EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE DEMONSTRATIONS.)

[redacted]

EO25x1

8. THE PCA WAS OPPOSED TO SECRETARY KISSINGER'S SCHEDULED VISIT IN MARCH 1975 AND WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE OPPOSED TO ANOTHER SCHEDULED VISIT. IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE SUBJECT OF THE VISIT WAS TO BE DISCUSSED AT A CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING OF THE PCA [redacted] AND THAT APPROPRIATE DIRECTIVES WILL BE ISSUED [redacted] THE PCA IS EXPECTED TO MOUNT A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN, I.E., THE PUBLICATION OF LEAFLETS, WALL PAINTINGS, AGITATION IN FACTORIES, ETC. IF HIS VISIT IS PROLONGED, THE PARTY MAY ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS. [redacted] COMMENT:

EO25x1

EO25x1

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PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD BE THE MAXIMUM ACTION AGAINST SECRETARY KISSINGER THAT THE PCA WOULD ATTEMPT. SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD PROBABLY BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER LEFTIST GROUPS, WHICH WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY ATTEMPT TO PROTEST HIS PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRY WITH STREET DEMONSTRATIONS AND PROPAGANDA.) ([redacted]

COMMENT: DEMONSTRATIONS OF THIS NATURE NORMALLY DO NOT PRESENT THE POLICE WITH MUCH OF A PROBLEM TO CONTROL. [redacted] BY THE PRT TO MOBILIZE ARGENTINE TROTSKYIST GROUPS FOR A WIDESPREAD BOMBING CAMPAIGN AND LIGHTNING STREET DEMONSTRATIONS TO PROTEST THE VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER. THE DEMONSTRATIONS AND BOMBING ATTACKS WERE REPORTEDLY TO TAKE PLACE WHILE THE SECRETARY WAS IN THE COUNTRY.)

EO25x1

[redacted]

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EO25x1 [redacted] POLICE CHIEF LUIS ~~M~~ R G A R I D E RESIGNED EFFECTIVE 21 MARCH 1975. IF TRUE, THIS SIGNIFIES A NUMBER OF CHANGES AMONG HIGH-LEVEL POLICE POSITIONS, AS THE NEW CHIEF WILL PROBABLY APPOINT MEN OF HIS CONFIDENCE TO THE SENIOR POSTS. ALSO, COMMISSIONER MAJOR EDUARDO PEDRO ~~R~~ A M I R E Z, WHO FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES HAS BEEN THE OPERATIONS CHIEF OF FEDERAL POLICE INTELLIGENCE, WAS TRANSFERRED ON 21 MARCH TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION AS CHIEF OF SUPPLY. RAMIREZ RESIGNED IN PROTEST. EO25x1 [redacted] COMMENT: THE POSSIBLE CHANGES OF HIGH-LEVEL POLICE OFFICIALS ARE NOT EXPECTED TO HAVE MUCH OF AN IMPACT ON THE CAPABILITY OF THE POLICE TO PROVIDE PROTECTIN TO VISITING DIGNITARIES. THE ACTUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR PLANNING AND MOUNTING PROTECTION SERVICES WILL BE IN THE HANDS OF SENIOR POLICE EXPERTS IN THIS FIELD, WHO WILL REMAIN IN THEIR POSITIONS DESPITE POSSIBLE CHANGES AT THE TOP ELVEL IN THE INSTITUTION.)

[redacted] EO25x1

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~, [redacted]

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[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 17 1975

TELETYPE

5:00 PM URGENT 3-17-75 JW

TO DIRECTOR ATTENTION: LIAISON SECTION NR. 060-17

LEGAT BRASILIA NR. 009-17

FROM LEGAT BUENOS AIRES (66-2)(66-50) 4P

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Political Matters - Argentina

BUENOS AIRES OFFICE - ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER;
SECURITY OF BUENOS AIRES OFFICE PERSONNEL.

RENYCABS 3/4 AND 3/10/75 CAPTIONED "FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA."

FOLLOWING DATA IS SUPPLIED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU:

DURING THE PAST WEEK EIGHT FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA) AND PROVINCIAL POLICE (PP) OFFICERS HAVE BEEN KILLED IN TERRORIST TACTICS AND AMBUSHES. SEVERAL INDEPENDENT TERRORIST GRENADE ATTACKS HAVE ALSO BEEN CARRIED OUT AGAINST FPA AND PP BUILDINGS AND VEHICLES. FPA SOURCES REPORT THE ABOVE ATTACKS WERE CARRIED OUT BY THE ERP AND MONTONERO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN RETALIATION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT'S ACCELERATED ANTI-TERRORIST DRIVE WHICH HAS RESULTED IN A SUMMARY EXECUTION OF TERRORIST PRISONERS BY GOVERNMENT FORCES.

END PAGE ONE

09-12-241

DECLASSIFIED BY 34065 ON 4/24/01

Argentina Report

NOT RECORDED
APR 11 1975

70 APR 15 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE FOLLOWING INCIDENTS INVOLVING THE EMBASSY AND ITS PERSONNEL HAVE OCCURRED DURING THE PAST WEEK:

DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 3/10/75, TWO VEHICLES SPED BY THE U. S. EMBASSY RESIDENCE IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL AND THEIR OCCUPANTS DISCHARGED HANDGUNS IN THE DIRECTION OF THE EMBASSY RESIDENCE. FPA OFFICERS ULTIMATELY RECOVERED ONE OF THE ABANDONED VEHICLES WHICH CONTAINED STOLEN MILITARY AMMUNITION . THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO THE EMBASSY RESIDENCE AND NO INJURIES.

DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 3/10/75, THE TEEN-AGE DAUGHTER OF THE U. S. DEFENSE ATTACHE WAS ACCOSTED AND HARASSED ON THE STREET NEAR HER RESIDENCE IN BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE BY AN UNIDENTIFIED MALE INDIVIDUAL DRIVING AN AUTOMOBILE. AFTER FOLLOWING THE DEFENSE ATTACHE'S DAUGHTER FOR SEVERAL BLOCKS, THE UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL PROCEEDED DIRECTLY TO HER RESIDENCE AND WAITED FOR HER TO ARRIVE. UPON HER ARRIVAL AT THE RESIDENCE, THE UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUAL TOLD HER THAT "WE KNOW WHERE YOU LIVE. YOU HAD BETTER WATCH YOUR STEP."

END PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 3/13/75, THE DEFENSE ATTACHE WAS PROCEEDING TO HIS RESIDENCE TO CHECK ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIS DAUGHTER AS A RESULT OF 3/10/75 INCIDENT ENUMERATED ABOVE. WHEN HE APPROACHED HIS RESIDENCE TWO AUTOMOBILES CONTAINING FOUR INDIVIDUALS EACH CONDUCTED WHAT APPEARED TO BE AN ATTEMPTED BLOCKING ACTION; HOWEVER, THE DEFENSE ATTACHE'S CHAUFFEUR DETECTED THE TWO AUTOMOBILES IN TIME TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION AND CARRY OUT AN ESCAPE. NO TRACE COULD BE FOUND OF THE AUTOMOBILES OR THEIR OCCUANPANTS.

DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 3/16/75, THE REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER WAS FOLLOWED BY FOUR INDIVIDUALS IN AN AUTOMOBILE AS HE LEFT THE EMBASSY. IN A CHASE THAT REACHED SPEEDS OF 80 MILESPER HOUR THROUGH DOWNTOWN STREETS, THE REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER WAS ABLE TO ELUDE HIS PURSUERS AND ESCAPE WITHOUT ANY ACTION BEING TAKEN ON THEIR PART.

IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT DURING THE 3/10, 3/13/ AND 3/16/75 INCIDENTS, IT COULD NOT BE POSITIVELY ESTABLISHED THAT THESE

END PAGE THREE

BUE 66-2; 66-50

PAGE FOUR

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INCIDENTS WERE CARRIED OUT BY TERRORISTS; HOWEVER, AN ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION WOULD LEAD TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THEY PROBABLY WERE TERRORIST-ORIENTED ACTS.

LEGAT PERSONNEL ARE CONTINUING TO TAKE APPROPRIATE SECURITY MEASURES. THE BUREAU WILL BE PROMPTLY ADVISED OF ANY ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING THE SAFETY AND WELLBEING OF FBI PERSONNEL IN BUENOS AIRES.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5031 XGDS-2.~~

END.

BOYNTON
4634 JEH