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
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
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Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

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IN-1433098

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES



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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

CITE [Redacted]

DIST 24 OCT. 1978

FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i) (1)
- Intelligence Sources and Methods

REPORT CLASS

~~SECRET~~ WMINTEL [Redacted]

COUNTRY:

ARGENTINA [Redacted]

Political Matters

SUBJECT

[Redacted] ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COORDINATING JUNTA (JCR) AND THE "MONTONEROS"

[Redacted]

SUMMARY:

DISCOUNTS A REPORT

THAT THE ARGENTINE "MONTONEROS" AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COORDINATING JUNTA (JCR) RECENTLY CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT [Redacted] THE ARGENTINES ALSO ARE SKEPTICAL THAT THE JCR HAS FORMED A [Redacted] COORDINATING COMMITTEE [Redacted] TO ORIENT GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA IN KEEPING WITH [Redacted] DIRECTION. [Redacted] DOES NOT

BELIEVE THAT THE ORGANIZATIONALLY DECRETIT JCR IS CAPABLE OF INFLUENCING "MONTONERO" STRATEGY AND ACTION, OR THAT [Redacted]

EX 121

REC-80

109-12-201-373

[Redacted] WOULD LEAVE THE PLANNING OF CONTINENTAL REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY IN THE HANDS OF THE JCR. END SUMMARY. 2 NOV 3 1978

1.

[Redacted] HAS RESPONDED SKEPTICALLY TO

[Redacted] THE CURRENT ACTIVITIES OF THE

REVOLUTIONARY COORDINATING JUNTA (JCR). [Redacted]

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PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE JCR RECENTLY HAD CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT
[REDACTED] WITH THE ARGENTINE "MONTONEROS" [REDACTED]

THE JCR HAD FORMED A [REDACTED] COORDINATING COMMITTEE [REDACTED] BOTH TO
BROADEN THE JCR'S INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA AND TO SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF VARIOUS GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH [REDACTED]
PLANNING AND DIRECTION.

2. CONCERNING THE REPORTED UNIFICATION BETWEEN THE "MONTONEROS" AND,
THE JCR, [REDACTED] NO INFORMATION TO CONFIRM SUCH A
MERGER. THE "MONTONEROS" HAVE NEVER BEEN INTERESTED IN UNIFICATION WITH
OTHER ANTI-GOVERNMENT GROUPS, MAINLY BECAUSE THE "MONTONEROS" DISAGREE
ON THE CONCEPT OF REVOLUTIONARY POTENTIAL OF THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE, WHOM
THE "MONTONEROS" CONSIDER TO BE PERONISTS MORE THAN SOCIALISTS. FURTHER,
THE JCR IS SEVERELY WEAKENED AND EXTREMELY DISORGANIZED AT PRESENT, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IT IS THEREFORE NOT LIKELY THAT
THE "MONTONEROS" WOULD BE INTERESTED IN AN ALLIANCE WITH THE CURRENT
JCR, WHEN IT FOUND NOTHING ATTRACTIVE IN SUCH AN ALLIANCE WHEN THE JCR
WAS STRONG.

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3. [Redacted] THE IMAGE NOW BEING PRO-
JECTED ABROAD BY THE "MONTONEROS" IS NOT THE RESULT OF THE INFLUENCE OF
THE ORGANIZATIONALLY DECREPIT JCR. IT RESULTS FROM THE CREATION IN
MARCH 1976 OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SECRETARIAT, UNDER THE
LEADERSHIP OF FERNANDO HUGO ~~V A C-A~~ NARVAJA (~~V~~ "VASCO"). THE
LAUNCHING OF THE MONTONERO POLITICAL MOVEMENT [Redacted] IN 1977 UNDER
THE AUSPICES OF THE [Redacted] CONFIRMED THIS "MONTONERO"
ORIENTATION.

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[Large Redacted Block]

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- Intelligence Sources and Methods

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
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
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
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
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
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Intelligence Information Report

DE-21

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PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

DATE DISTR. 23 OCTOBER 1978

REPORT CLASS -- ~~SECRET~~ WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

POLITICAL MATTERS

FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i) (1) -
Intelligence Sources and Methods

COUNTRY : ARGENTINA/INTERNATIONAL

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT : CONCERN OF ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT OVER ACTIVITIES OF OSCAR
ALENDE, LEADER OF THE INTRANSIGENT POLITICAL PARTY

[REDACTED]

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*arg
from
10/23/78*

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE INTENSE
POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF OSCAR ALENDE, PRESIDENT OF THE INTRANSIGENT
PARTY, WHO RECENTLY TRAVELED TO SEVERAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO
CONSOLIDATE HIS POSITION WITH AND GAIN SUPPORT FROM THE SOCIALIST
INTERNATIONAL.

EX-130 DE-21 REC-80 109-12-201-3370

22 NOV 6 1978

2. ALENDE WAS ACCOMPANIED ON THIS TRIP BY RETIRED ARMY COLONEL
JUAN JAIME CESIO, FORMER CHIEF OF THE PLANNING AND POLICY SECTION
OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF DURING THE GOVERNMENT OF HECTOR

CAMPORA. COLONEL CESIO WAS DISMISSED FROM THIS POST AND RETIRED

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(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i) (1) -
Intelligence Sources and Methods

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RECEIVED
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FROM THE ARMY AS A RESULT OF HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH THE MONTONEROS. ^{31 JULY '78} ~~DESIO~~, WHO RECEIVED AN ARMY SCHOLARSHIP TO ATTEND THE SORBONNE, IS AN INTELLECTUAL KNOWN FOR HIS LEFTIST TENDENCIES. AT THE PRESENT TIME HE IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE INTRANSIGENT PARTY.





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4.



ALENDE'S

TRIP HAS CAUSED CONSIDERABLE UNREST AMONG INTRANSIGENT PARTY LEADERS, BECAUSE THEY FEAR THAT ALENDE IS IDENTIFYING HIMSELF TOO CLOSELY WITH ARGENTINE SUBVERSION AS REPRESENTED BY THE MONTONEROS. 



5. ALENDE RETURNED TO ARGENTINA ON 9 OCTOBER 1978. ALTHOUGH

HE SAID PUBLICLY THAT HE HAD OPPOSED THE INVITATION EXTENDED TO THE

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MONTONEROS TO ATTEND THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONGRESS IN VANCOUVER, HE DID NOT GIVE THE UNDERLYING REASONS FOR HIS OPPOSITION. ALENDE LATER  IF HE HAD SUPPORTED THE MONTONEROS HE WOULD HAVE ALIENATED THE REST OF THE TRADITIONAL ARGENTINE POLITICAL PARTIES AND HAVE ISOLATED HIS OWN INTRANSIGENT PARTY. HE ALSO BELIEVES THAT IF HE HAD SUPPORTED THE MONTONEROS, HIS LIFE WOULD HAVE BEEN IN DANGER ON HIS RETURN TO ARGENTINA. HE HAS ALSO LEARNED THAT ONE OF THE REASONS THE ARMED FORCES ARE CONSIDERING EXCLUDING THE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES FROM PUBLIC LIFE IS BASED ON THE PREVIOUS TIES POLITICAL LEADERS HAVE HAD WITH FOREIGN POLITICAL PARTIES OR LABOR MOVEMENTS THAT ARE OPPOSED TO ARGENTINA'S "TRADITIONAL WESTERN CHRISTIAN WAY OF LIFE."

EO25x1



FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i) (1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods

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ROUTINE
IN 1360177
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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ - ~~WINTEL~~ - [Redacted]

CITE [Redacted]
DIST 03 OCT 78

POLITICAL MATTERS

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARGENTINE MILITARY JUNTA AND
PRESIDENT JORGE RAFAEL VIDELA [Redacted]

[Redacted]

1. THE FREQUENT MEETINGS AND PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE ARGENTINE MILITARY JUNTA ARE UNDERMINING PUBLIC RESPECT FOR PRESIDENT JORGE RAFAEL VIDELA, [Redacted]

[Redacted] WHEN VIDELA RETIRED AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMY ON 31 JULY 1978, HE REQUESTED

AND RECEIVED ASSURANCES FROM LT. GENERAL ROBERTO VIOLA, [Redacted]

HIS SUCCESSOR, THAT THE JUNTA WOULD NOT MEET AS OFTEN AS IT HAD IN THE PAST AND THAT THE JUNTA WOULD REFRAIN FROM MAKING

PUBLIC STATEMENTS. VIOLA HAD TOLD VIDELA THAT THE JUNTA WOULD ONLY MEET ONCE A MONTH, BUT INSTEAD THE JUNTA HAS CONTINUED TO MEET FREQUENTLY. [Redacted] VIDELA

IS TIRED OF HAVING TO ANSWER TO THE JUNTA OVER THE DAY-TO-DAY

EX-110
REC-20 V-39 DE-37 109-12-201-3369X

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IN 1360177



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Intelligence Sources and Methods

PROBLEMS OF RUNNING THE GOVERNMENT AND IS HAMPERED IN HIS
ABILITY TO RUN THE GOVERNMENT AS A RESULT OF THE LIMITED
AUTHORITY GRANTED HIM AS COMPARED TO THE AUTHORITY GRANTED
THE JUNTA. THE JUNTA, HOWEVER, IS SPENDING 90 PERCENT OF
ITS TIME RESOLVING SECONDARY MATTERS AND ONLY 10 PERCENT OF
ITS TIME IS DEVOTED TO MATTERS VITAL TO THE PROGRESS OF THE
NATION.

EX-112

2. ALTHOUGH VIDELA HAD RECEIVED ASSURANCES FROM THE JUNTA
THAT HE WOULD HAVE A FREE HAND IN SELECTING HIS MINISTERS, HE IS
UNDER STRONG PRESSURE FROM THE NAVY AND THE AIR FORCE. THE
AIR FORCE WOULD LIKE TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
AND WOULD LIKE TO HAVE ALY PERE C O R B A T, ARGENTINE
AMBASSADOR TO BOLIVIA AND A RETIRED AIR FORCE GENERAL, BECOME
FOREIGN MINISTER, BUT THE NAVY DOES NOT WANT TO GIVE UP THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY. VIDELA WOULD LIKE TO NAME MORE CIVILIANS
TO THE CABINET BUT NO BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES WANTS TO
GIVE UP A MINISTRY IT NOW CONTROLS. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT
ONLY THE MINISTERS OF ECONOMY, JUSTICE AND EDUCATION WILL
BE CIVILIANS.

3. VIDELA IS ALSO UNDER PRESSURE FROM DIFFERENT GROUPS
WITHIN THE ARMY. VARIOUS FACTIONS HAVE PROPOSED THREE
CANDIDATES TO REPLACE ~~JUAN JOSE C A T A L A N~~, WHO RESIGNED
AS MINISTER OF EDUCATION IN EARLY SEPTEMBER 1978. TWO
CANDIDATES HAVE ALSO BEEN PROPOSED TO REPLACE BRIGADIER

Argentina

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IN 1360177

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all Argentina

~~Brigadier~~
GENERAL HORACIO TOMAS ~~LE~~ ~~ND~~ O, MINISTER OF LABOR, WHO

WANTS TO RETURN TO THE ARMY. FOR MINISTER OF EDUCATION,

VIOLA HAS PROPOSED ALBERTO ~~R~~ ~~O~~ ~~D~~ ~~R~~ ~~I~~ ~~G~~ ~~U~~ ~~E~~ ~~Z~~ ~~G~~ ~~A~~ ~~L~~ ~~A~~ ~~N~~,

A LAWYER AND UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR; MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS

~~ENRIQUE~~ ~~L~~ ~~A~~ ~~I~~ ~~D~~ ~~L~~ ~~A~~ ~~W~~, MINISTER OF PLANNING, HAS PROPOSED

JOSE LUIS ~~G~~ ~~A~~ ~~N~~ ~~T~~ ~~I~~ ~~N~~ ~~I~~, AN ADVISOR TO THE MINISTRY OF

PLANNING AND A FORMER MINISTER OF EDUCATION; AND MAJOR GENERAL

~~ALBANO~~ ~~H~~ ~~A~~ ~~R~~ ~~G~~ ~~U~~ ~~I~~ ~~N~~ ~~D~~ ~~E~~ ~~G~~ ~~U~~ ~~Y~~, MINISTER OF INTERIOR AND

ACTING MINISTER OF EDUCATION, HAS PROPOSED JUAN RAFAEL

~~L~~ ~~E~~ ~~R~~ ~~E~~ ~~N~~ ~~A~~ ~~A~~ ~~M~~ ~~A~~ ~~D~~ ~~E~~ ~~O~~, A FORMER UNDERSECRETARY OF

EDUCATION. FOR MINISTER OF LABOR, ONE ARMY GROUP WOULD LIKE

TO HAVE BRIGADIER GENERAL YAMIL ~~R~~ ~~E~~ ~~S~~ ~~T~~ ~~O~~ ~~N~~, COMMANDER OF

THE THIRD INFANTRY BRIGADE OF THE SECOND CORPS AND A CLOSE

ASSOCIATE OF VIOLA, WHILE ANOTHER MORE HARD-LINE FACTION WOULD

LIKE TO HAVE BRIGADIER GENERAL ADOLEO ~~S~~ ~~I~~ ~~G~~ ~~W~~ ~~A~~ ~~L~~ ~~D~~,

ARGENTINE MILITARY ATTACHE TO THE UNITED STATES. VIDELA'S

SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF MULTIPLE CANDIDATES IS TO HAVE

THE JUNTA MAKE THE DECISION.

FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i) (1) -
Intelligence Sources and Methods

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
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
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Argentina

5. VIOLA IS HAVING PROBLEMS FILLING KEY POSITIONS IN THE ARMY BECAUSE NONE OF THE MAJOR GENERALS WANTS TO BE REPLACED IN AN IMPORTANT POSITION. ADDITIONALLY, THE PROMISES VIDELA MADE TO HARDLINE GENERALS TO GAIN THEIR SUPPORT FOR VIOLA'S CANDIDACY HAVE MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR VIOLA TO RETIRE ANY OF HIS RIVALS IN THE ARMY. THUS, AFTER TWO MONTHS IN OFFICE, HE STILL HAS NOT NAMED A CHIEF OF STAFF.

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