



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 1, 1979

MEMORANDUM

TO: HA - Ms. Patricia M. Derian  
 THROUGH: HA - Mark L. Schneider  
 FROM: HA/HR - Charles B. Salmon, Jr.  
 SUBJECT: Your Meeting on Argentina  
 Thursday, February 1 at 9:30

Attached for your use at the meeting are:

A. Your Memo of January 26 to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary on the situation in Argentina. The memorandum may be used as a talking paper.

B. Cable backup and memoranda of conversation which the memo digested.

C. Recent Embassy traffic on the human rights situation.

D. Ambassador Castro's recent discussion with General Viola on the HR situation.

E. Recent digests of HR situation in Argentina including AI Board Member Tom Jones speech to Open Forum.

F. An HR strategy paper on how we might proceed in Argentina drafted by Pat Flood.

You also have a copy of the latest AI report on Argentina.

You might mention the invitation you have to speak to the Trustees of the Council of Hemispheric Affairs (February 6) at which time they will give you a long list of disappeared, tortured, etc. in Argentina.

~~Department of State, A/GIS/IPS/SRP~~  
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 IPS by    Date 12-5-16



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Washington, D.C. 20520

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IPS by 62 Date 12-5-79~~

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January 26, 1979

TO: The Secretary  
The Deputy Secretary

FROM: HA - Patricia M. Derian

SUBJECT: Next Steps in Argentina

The increasing magnitude and brutality of Argentine human rights violations convince me that it is time for us to take additional measures to underscore our concerns and bring pressure to bear on the Junta to make improvements. Only substantial pressure across a broad front is likely to have any real effect, and there are a number of things we can and should do.

The situation is clearly deteriorating:

-- 38 bodies, many of them without heads or hands, were recently washed ashore on one of Argentina's Atlantic beaches. A Buenos Aires newspaper which had investigated the report killed the story at the direction of the Presidential Press Office.

-- Our Embassy estimates that about 55 disappearances a month take place in Argentina. The International Red Cross representative in Buenos Aires recently characterized the disappearances as "a calculated policy" of the Argentine authorities.

-- For the past three weeks, security forces have arrested and threatened to imprison mothers of the disappeared who have held weekly silent demonstrations in the capital's main square for the past two years. This heavy-handed police intimidation follows by only a few weeks the soothing promises given the mothers by a Presidential Palace spokesman at Christmas.

-- An officer of the Argentine Permanent Assembly for Human Rights told our Embassy in December that security forces simply murdered a couple in their own home without bothering to take them to a detention center. The same source said he had received other recent reports of such killings.

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(RDS-4 01/26/94, DERIAN, Patricia M.)

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-- We continue to receive numerous highly credible reports that torture is used routinely in the interrogation of detainees. The electric "picana," something like a supercharged cattle prod, is still apparently a favorite tool, as is the "submarine" treatment (immersion of the head in a tub of water, urine, excrement, blood, or a combination of these).

-- Prison treatment of the 3,200 acknowledged political detainees has deteriorated sharply in recent months, according to the International Red Cross representative in Argentina. Torture, beatings, and dietary neglect are common for them and for the unacknowledged detainees held in secret military facilities. Another source reported that fifty female detainees recently transferred between prisons "have not been exposed to the sun for so long that their skin color is greenish...Some have lost their eyesight. Many are mentally deranged."

These developments illustrate the reasons why I believe we should, at a minimum, take these actions:

-- Vote "No" on all IFI loans to Argentina which do not clearly meet the basic human needs criteria, and at least invite other donor countries to take similar action.

-- Switch from "Yes" to "Abstain" on IFI loans which meet the basic human needs criteria.

-- Instruct our Delegate to the UN Human Rights Commission to make a strong statement condemning Argentine human rights violations.

-- Begin to deny commercial licenses of military-related equipment destined to the Argentine Armed Forces, as we now do with equipment for the police.

-- Deny or delay Export-Import Bank financing for new projects in Argentina. If necessary, we should seek a Presidential determination under the Chaffee Amendment that denial would advance U. S. human rights objectives.

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- 3 -

-- Mount major new diplomatic effort to persuade foreign arms suppliers to stop selling military and police equipment to Argentina.

-- Give careful consideration to suspending or halting entirely the pipeline of U. S. - origin military equipment purchased by Argentina under earlier programs.

-- In connection with, and explanation of, the above measures, issue a strong public statement condemning the continuing deterioration of Argentine human rights practices.

We simply have to begin to take measures like these if we expect to see any meaningful improvements. There is no longer any doubt that Argentina has the worst human rights record in South America. We cannot wait for the Inter-American Human Rights Commission visit at the end of May. While we hope that Argentine Government preparations for the visit, and the visit itself, will result in some improvements, we should not rely exclusively on this event. A high-ranking Foreign Ministry official recently said his government plans to stonewall the Commission on the disappearance issue.

We would not be alone in taking more forceful measures. I understand that both Canada and the UK share the view that the situation is worsening. Canada, as a result, has halted transfers--not just of arms--to the Argentine military. Both countries, as well as some Scandinavian countries, are seriously considering opposing IFI loans to Argentina.

~~SECRET~~

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: December 27, 1978

REPLY TO: POL - F. Allen Harris

SUBJECT: Disappearance Numbers

TO: FILE

# memorandum

*PF* ~~*PF*~~ ~~*AUS-FYL*~~  
*Ret PF*

EO25x1  
EO25x6

EO25x1  
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On December 22nd, [redacted] stated at an informal meeting of local Embassy "human rights officers" that a senior army official had informed [redacted] that the armed services had been forced to "take care of" 15,000 persons in its anti-subversion campaign.

In late November during Brian Blood's farewell call on Ministry of Interior Assistant Secretary for Internal Security, Col. San Roman noted that he was preparing charts showing that the number of disappearances reported to the Ministry of Interior had declined dramatically. In mid-December the FOWG desk officer Martin Saravia, made the same observation. Martin stated that the Ministry of Interior had received approximately 2,500 reports of persons who disappeared in 1976, about 1,500 such reports for 1977 and only 780 reports of disappearances through September, 1978. Martin stated that this was concrete evidence of Argentina's improving performance in the human rights area.

NOTE: The FOWG desk officer's total of reported disappearances from 1976 to November, 1978 is 4,780. This total parallels the number reported to other organizations. For example, the Permanent Assembly has over 3,100 documented disappearance cases in which habeas corpus petitions have been filed. Plus the Assembly has over 1,000 cases in which reports have been made, but habeas corpus proceedings have not been pursued.

Copies To:  
ARA/ECA - Mr. Bumpus  
HA/HR - Mr. Flood  
AMB/DCM  
POL:FAHarris:sz 12/28/78

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IPS by (u) Date 12-5-16

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GDS 12/27/84 (HARRIS, F. Allen) OR-P

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1976-241-530/3018

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
(REV. 7-76)  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6  
5010-112



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INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BUENOS 00530 210114Z  
ACTION ARA-15

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BUENOS 00530 210114Z

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 0530

E.O. 12065 1-17-85 (HARRIS, F. ALLEN) OR-P  
TAGS SHUM, AR  
SUBJECT BEACHED CADAVERS TRIGGER JUDICIAL INQUIRY

REF: 78 BUENOS AIRES 1919

1. (U) PRESS COVERAGE -- LOCAL PRESS AND WIRE SERVICES  
CARRIED STORIES ON DECEMBER 20 AND 22 OF BODIES BEING  
WASHED ASHORE ON ARGENTINE ATLANTIC RESORT BEACHES.  
THESE ACCOUNTS REPORTED THAT BETWEEN 11 AND 15 BODIES HAD  
BEEN FOUND IN ADVANCED STATE OF DECOMPOSITION OVER A  
16 MILE STRETCH OF BEACH, 210 MILES SOUTHEAST OF BUENOS  
AIRES.

2. (C) A REPORTER FROM CLARIN WAS SENT TO THE AREA  
TO WRITE A STORY ON THE REPORTS. ACCORDING TO A COLLEAGUE,  
HE RETURNED AGHAST AT WHAT HE SAW AND HEARD.  
THROUGH INTERVIEWS WITH FIREMEN, POLICE, AND LOCAL  
RESIDENTS HE ACCUMULATED REPORTS OF 38 BODIES WASHED ASHORE.  
IMMEDIATELY UPON HIS RETURN, THE EDITOR OF CLARIN  
RECEIVED A CALL FROM THE PRESIDENCY'S PRESS OFFICE  
INDICATING THAT IT WOULD BE INCONVENIENT TO RUN ANY  
MORE STORIES REGARDING THE BODIES. THE REPORTER  
DID AN INTERNAL MEMO AND THE STORY WAS DROPPED.

3. (U) MOTHERS INVESTIGATE -- IN RESPONSE TO THE  
PRESS STORIES, THREE MOTHERS OF THE PLAZA DE MAYO  
VISITED THE BEACH AREA ON DECEMBER 16. THERE THEY  
MET WITH THE CRIMINAL JUDGE OF DOLGUES DISTRICT, A  
DR. FACIO, WHO INFORMED THEM THAT HE HAD OPENED A  
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE PRESUMED HOMICIDES.  
DR. FACIO REPORTED THAT A TOTAL OF 17 BODIES HAD  
BEEN FOUND, MOSTLY OF MALES. JUDGE FACIO SAID THAT  
REMAINS APPEARED TO BE OF YOUNG PERSONS WHO WERE  
BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN IN THE WATER FOR UP TO TWO  
MONTHS. FACIO REPORTED THAT MANY OF THE BODIES  
WERE FOUND WITHOUT HANDS, AND A NUMBER WITHOUT  
HEADS. HE SAID THAT LOCAL POLICE HAD REMOVED  
THE AVAILABLE HANDS FROM THE BODIES AND SENT THEM  
TO THE PROVINCIAL POLICE LABORATORY AT LA PLATA  
FOR IDENTIFICATION. NO REPORTS HAVE YET BEEN  
RECEIVED BY THE JUDGE.

4. (U) THE MOTHERS RETURNED TO DOLGUES ON  
JANUARY 5 TO FOLLOW UP ON THE JUDICIAL AND POLICE  
INVESTIGATION. THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE BODIES  
HAD BEEN BURIED. AFTER  
INITIALLY REFUSING, THE LOCAL JUDICIAL OFFICIALS  
ACCEPTED HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS FROM THE MOTHERS.

5. (U) THESE REAPPEARANCES HAVE LED A NUMBER OF  
PLAZA DE MAYO MOTHERS TO PRESENT HABEAS CORPUS  
PETITIONS REQUESTING THAT THE JUDICIARY VERIFY THAT--  
A. THE BODIES WASHED UP ON THE ATLANTIC BEACHES,

B. THE ALLEGED TERRORISTS REPORTED KILLED IN  
SHOOT OUTS IN ROSARIO AND IN MAR DEL PLATA,  
C. PERSONS REPORTED TO HAVE DIED MYSTERIOUSLY IN  
THE ONTIVEROS PSYCHIATRIC FACILITY, D. THE TWO  
PRISONERS REPORTED POISONED AT AN UNNAMED POLICE  
STATIONS, AND E. THREE BODIES BURNED AT LA SALADA  
ARE NOT THEIR MISSING CHILDREN.  
THE PERMANENT ASSEMBLY HAS REPEATED THESE POINTS GENERALLY  
IN PETITIONS PRESENTED TO THE SUPREME COURT AND  
TO PRESIDENT VIDELA.

6. (U) OTHER REPORTS -- NAVY SOURCES RESPONDED  
TO AN EMBASSY INQUIRY WHEN THE NEWS STORIES FIRST  
APPEARED WITH INFORMATION THAT THE BODIES WERE  
MEMBERS OF THE CREW OF THE URUGUAYAN VESSEL WHICH  
HAD SUNK IN MID-DECEMBER 1978.

7. (U) A COLLEAGUE OF AN EMBASSY CONTACT REPORTED  
HAVING SEEN ONE OF THE CADAVERS WHILE VACATIONING  
IN THE AREA. THIS SOURCE DESCRIBED THE MALE CADAVER  
HE SAW AS BEING "FRESH" IN APPEARANCE.

8. (C) PERMANENT ASSEMBLY SOURCES HAVE INFORMED US  
THAT THEY BELIEVE THAT THE BODIES WERE DROPPED INTO  
THE OCEAN FROM AIRCRAFT OPERATING FROM THE NAVAL  
AIR STATION AT NEARBY PUNTO INDIO. THE EMBASSY HAS  
RECEIVED A NUMBER OF REPORTS OF "PACKAGES" BEING  
DROPPED INTO THE OCEAN OFF THE COAST BY MILITARY  
AIRCRAFT.

9. (C) EMBASSY COMMENT: THERE WERE SIMILAR REPORTS OF  
BEACHED CADAVERS DURING FEBRUARY-  
MARCH OF LAST YEAR.  
(SEE REFTEL.) NONE OF LAST YEAR'S CADAVERS WERE EVER  
PUBLICLY OR (TO OUR KNOWLEDGE) PRIVATELY IDENTIFIED.

10. (C) THE LACK OF IDENTIFICATION HAS NOW BECOME AN ISSUE  
FOR THE HUMAN  
RIGHTS GROUPS HERE. THEY ARE NOW INSISTING THAT THE  
GOVERNMENT NOT ONLY EXPLAIN THE FATE OF THE MANY DISAPPEARED,  
BUT THAT THE EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES PUBLICLY  
IDENTIFY THOSE FEW VICTIMS WHOSE BODIES DO, IN FACT,  
REAPPEAR. END COMMENT.  
CASTRO

~~Department of State, A/GIS/IPS/SRP~~  
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Department of StateINCOMING  
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ACTION ARA-15

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 HA-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01  
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TAGS SHUM, AR  
SUBJECT POLICE ROUNDUP 43 MOTHERS NEAR PLAZA DE MAYO

REF: BUENOS AIRES 148

1. FEDERAL POLICE AGAIN CLOSED THE PLAZA DE MAYO ON JANUARY 11TH TO PREVENT THE MOTHERS FROM CONDUCTING THEIR USUAL THURSDAY AFTERNOON DEMONSTRATION. THE MOTHERS WERE PHYSICALLY PROHIBITED FROM ENTERING THE PLAZA DE MAYO, CONSEQUENTLY THERE WAS NO DEMONSTRATION. FORTY-THREE PERSONS WERE IDENTIFIED AND ARRESTED BY PLAINCLOTHESMEN ON STREETS AROUND THE PLAZA AND IN NEARBY COFFEE SHOPS. ALL WERE TAKEN TO THE SECOND PRECINCT AND QUESTIONED ABOUT WHO ORGANIZED THE MOTHERS' DEMONSTRATIONS, THEIR REASONS FOR ATTENDING THE PLAZA DEMONSTRATIONS, ETC. THE GROUP WAS NOT PHYSICALLY HARMED BUT ITS MEMBERS WERE AGHAST TO BE PUT IN A ROOM WITH A

DEAD MOTORCYCLIST VICTIM OF AN ACCIDENT HOSRTLY BEFORE. MOST GROUP MEMBERS WERE RELEASED EARLY FRIDAY MORNING WITH THE WARNING THAT IF THEY WERE ARRESTED AGAIN THEY WOULD BE SENTENCED TO THIRTY DAYS TO BE SERVED IN VILLA DEVOTO PRISON.

2. EIGHT OF THE MOTHERS' GROUP CALLED ON AMBASSADOR CASTRO IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE POLICE'S ACTION ASKING THE USG'S INTERVENTION ON BEHALF OF THE ARRESTED MOTHERS AND FOR THE MOTHERS TO BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE THEIR DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE PLAZA DE MAYO. EMBOFFS CONTACTED POLICE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OFFICIALS AND WERE TOLD THAT THE ARRESTED MOTHERS HAD EITHER BEEN RELEASED OR WOULD BE FREED SHORTLY.

3. COMMENT: THURSDAY'S ACTION SHOWED THE GOA'S DETERMINATION TO PUT A STOP TO THE WEEKLY MOTHERS' DEMONSTRATIONS, WHICH HAD RECENTLY BECOME LARGER AND MORE VOCAL. CASTRO

~~Department of State, A/GIS/IPS/SRP~~

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Date 12-5-76

Declassified Case: 17X- 87087 Date: 06-06-2013

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 27, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Cyrus Vance<sup>CV</sup>

1. Meeting with the Cranston Group: I had lunch today with Alan Cranston and a group of 15 senators interested in SALT II. I first brought them generally up to date and then outlined the foreign policy consequences of a failure of the Senate to ratify. John Glenn read a long list of items which he said we would not be able to verify as a result of the closing of the Iran installations. I assured the group that we would not sign a treaty that was not adequately verifiable and described in general terms the intelligence community's proposals for dealing with the Iran loss. John Culver expressed concern that members of the Senate Armed Services Committee were planning to push us to decide prematurely on a basing mode for the MX. Ted Kennedy asked whether we were contemplating other agreements with the Soviets that would create a more positive atmosphere for the consideration of SALT and suggested the possibility of an improvement in the human rights climate in the Soviet Union, e. g., the release of some of the dissidents.

2. PRC: Warren met with Ambassador Chai today and they discussed the Taiwan legislation for more than an hour. They went over the Chinese objections point-by-point, and Warren also handed over a paper responding to the Chinese points. Warren thinks he may have made some progress, especially in pointing out that some of the PRC's objections pertain to provisions which did not survive the Conference Committee. Warren also told Chai that we might wish to have a US Navy ship visit a Chinese port and that, while not ready to make definite plans, we would like a reaction as to whether such a visit would be welcomed. Chai promised an early answer. Chai was also told that we are prepared to exchange military attaches.

Department of State, A/GIS/IPS/SRP

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RDS - 2/3 3/27/99 (Vance, Cyrus)

NSC Declassification Review [EO 13526]

DECLASSIFY IN FULL

by John Powers on 2/20/2018

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*Good*

3. Shah's Travel: Preparations for the Shah's onward travel concentrated today on the Bahamas. Dave Newsom has worked closely with David Rockefeller's office and Robert Armao, a New York public relations consultant who will meet with Bahamian Foreign Minister Adderley Wednesday. We have helped to arrange this meeting, and our Chargé in Nassau was scheduled to see Adderley late this afternoon. He will inform him of the Shah's wish to arrive this Friday. In two recent soundings by our Embassy, Adderley did not close the door to the Shah, but his government has still not reached a final decision. Assuming the answer is positive, the Shah and his party would stay on the secluded island of Eleuthera. We understand that the Shah regards the Bahamas as a temporary stop. His principal interest remains Mexico, although his representatives have decided not to approach the Mexicans until after arrangements to move to Eleuthera are complete.

*I agree*

4. Uganda: Nyerere has told us that over the weekend Quadafi sent him an ultimatum giving Tanzania 24 hours to withdraw from Uganda. Nyerere ignored this threat and is continuing to pursue his military campaign against Amin, but he has expressed his concern to us and other Western representatives and has asked us for our assessment of Libyan involvement in Uganda. We will give him our intelligence on Libya's military capability. Our initial estimate is that the Libyan threat contains a large element of bluff.

Ugandan exile leaders meeting in Tanzania have elected an 11-member council as a provisional government. The council, which is representative of the regional and ethnic groups of Uganda, plans to establish itself in southern Uganda.

*The Europeans & Japanese should raise some hell with the Arabs since they were so careful not to offend them in the past.*

5. OPEC Price Increase: OPEC decided today to raise the price of "marker crude" by about 9 percent to \$14.54 per barrel -- the price originally supposed to take effect October 1. Each OPEC member, however, is free to set the price of its own crudes independently from the marker price taking into account differences of quality, transportation distances to major markets, and other factors. The Iranian representative said his government would like to get oil production up to a level of about 4 million

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barrels per day (compared with about 6 mmbd under the Shah). He asked other OPEC members to stop supplying incremental output to the market as they have done since October to help offset the Iranian shortfall.

Results of the meeting are disquieting. The price increase alone will add about \$12 billion to world oil import bills, with the surcharges adding more. Uncertainty about the amount of oil to be provided by producers with surplus capacity will aggravate the current tight market conditions. The meeting results illustrate that Saudi Arabia cannot, in present circumstances, exercise its traditional overwhelming influence on OPEC prices. Even with the Saudis producing oil at near-maximum levels, the reduction in Iranian exports leaves supply and demand essentially unbalanced, keeping pressure on prices and preventing the seasonal stock build-up needed to cover next winter.

6. Peru: Chris met today with the new Peruvian Ambassador, Alfonso Arias Schreiber. Chris told him of our concern about the Cuban candidacy for a seat on the Security Council and said the US would back Peru if it gained the support of the Latin American caucus. Arias will report this to his government, and may have something to say to you on the subject when he presents his credentials Friday.

*Good*

Following up on the discussion Fritz had on this topic last week with Brazilian Foreign Minister Guerreiro, I plan to send a personal letter to Guerreiro asking for more active Brazilian support of a Peruvian candidacy.

*This is worse than I thought*


7. Argentina: I have been increasingly concerned about the absence of substantial human rights progress in Argentina. During 1978 Argentine security units continued to abduct and torture (and in many cases summarily execute) an average of more than 50 persons per month. Last month we informed the Argentines that, in the absence of substantial improvements, we would not be able to maintain our position of abstention on loans to Argentina in the multilateral development banks, and instead would have to vote against the loans. Late last week

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the Argentine Ambassador responded with a number of potentially significant representations, including that the moderates have strengthened their position within the junta, that abductions by security units have been stopped, and that any reports of abductions will be immediately investigated. Although we have learned to be skeptical of Argentine promises, reports of abductions have greatly diminished in February and March. On the basis of their representations, Warren told the Argentines that we are adhering to our abstention position on a World Bank loan today and would continue to watch the situation closely.



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INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BUENOS 10053 271244Z  
ACTION ARA-15

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INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HTS CZ

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E.O. 12065: GDS 12/26/84 (HARRIS, F. ALLEN) OR-P  
TAGS: SHUM AR  
SUBJ: GOA RESPONSE TO MAJOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEMONSTRATION

(C - ENTIRE TEXT) SUMMARY: IN AN UNPRECEDENTED ACTION ARGENTINE OFFICIALS RECEIVED TWO HUMAN RIGHTS DELEGATIONS INTO THE CASA ROSADA (THE ARGENTINE WHITE HOUSE) ON DECEMBER 22 FROM A GROUP OF 500 TO 1,000 DEMONSTRATORS IN THE PLAZA DE MAYO. CASA ROSADA SPOKESMAN ISSUED SEVERAL PROMISES: FIRST, THAT A CHRISTMAS AMNESTY FOR SEVERAL HUNDRED PEN PRISONERS WOULD BE ANNOUNCED SHORTLY; SECOND, THAT THE NAMES OF THOSE SENTENCED BY MILITARY TRIBUNALS WOULD BE MADE PUBLIC AND THEIR SENTENCES WOULD BE REDUCED BY TWO THIRDS; AND THIRD, THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD PROVIDE A RESPONSE NEXT THURSDAY TO THE SUBMITTED PETITION TO THE CASA ROSADA SEEKING INFORMATION REGARDING THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE MANY DISAPPEARED. END SUMMARY.

1. BETWEEN 500 AND 1,000 HUMAN RIGHTS PROTESTERS GATHERED IN THE PLAZA DE MAYO ON THE THURSDAY BEFORE CHRISTMAS (12/21). A DELEGATION OF ARGENTINE HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS ORGANIZED BY THE PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS WERE ADMITTED TO PRESENT A PETITION TO OFFICIALS IN THE CASA ROSADA REPORTEDLY SIGNED BY 37,500 PERSONS. THE SIMPLE PETITION ASKED THE GOVERNMENT FOR INFORMATION ABOUT THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE DISAPPEARED, BETTER TREATMENT FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS, AND THE FREEDOM OF ALL PEN PRISONERS CURRENTLY BEING HELD WITHOUT CRIMINAL CHARGES.

2. THE MOTHERS OF THE PLAZA DE MAYO AND THE OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS WHO GATHERED IN THE PLAZA HELD AN EMOTIONAL TWO-HOUR DEMONSTRATION. THE MOTHERS FOR THE FIRST TIME BEGAN CHANTING "NOS DIGA DONDE ESTAN," (TELL US WHERE THEY ARE.) AS THEY CIRCLED AROUND THE PLAZA DE MAYO IN THE AFTERNOON'S HEAT. ALTHOUGH A LARGE NUMBER OF PLAINCLOTHES POLICEMEN WERE IN EVIDENCE THERE WERE ONLY MINOR REPORTS OF HARASSING.

3. ABOUT AN HOUR AFTER THE DEMONSTRATION BEGAN, A GROUP OF APPROXIMATELY 300 PERSONS MOVED FROM THE PLAZA TO THE ENTRANCE OF THE CASA ROSADA AND DEMANDED ENTRY. A PERSON WHO IS SAID TO HAVE IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS THE CHIEF OF SECURITY OF THE CASA ROSADA SAID THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO TALK WITH A SMALL DELEGATION OF THE PROTESTERS. SIX OF THE MOTHERS AND ONE MAN WERE ADMITTED AND REAPPEARED A HALF AN HOUR LATER TO INFORM THE DEMONSTRATORS THAT THE CASA ROSADA SPOKESMAN HAD MADE THREE SIGNIFICANT PROMISES:

A) A CHRISTMAS AMNESTY LIST OF SEVERAL HUNDRED PEN PRISONERS WOULD BE ANNOUNCED BY SATURDAY, DECEMBER 23. FURTHERMORE THESE INDIVIDUALS WOULD BE ACTUALLY FREED AND NOT JUST HAVE THEIR PEN STATUS REMOVED. (SEE SEPTTEL.) (ATTN: ME D)  
B) THOSE PERSONS WHO HAVE BEEN SENTENCED BY MILITARY TRIBUNALS WOULD BE NAMED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND WOULD HAVE THEIR SENTENCES REDUCED BY TWO-THIRDS.

C) IF THE DELEGATION WOULD RETURN ON THE FOLLOWING THURSDAY, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD REPLY REGARDING THE PERSONS INQUIRED ABOUT IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS' PETITION. ACCORDING TO A PRESS ACCOUNT IN THE BUENOS AIRES HERALD, THE SPOKESMAN NOTED THAT ONE SHOULD NOT TALK OF THE DISAPPEARED AS THERE ARE ONLY PEOPLE UNDER CIVIL AND MILITARY JUSTICE.

4. AMBASSADOR CASTRO IN THURSDAY MORNING MEETING (12/21) MENTIONED "RUMORS" TO GENERAL VIOLA THAT A LARGE SCALE POLICE ACTION WAS PLANNED AGAINST THE MOTHERS IN THE PLAZA DE MAYO THAT AFTERNOON. GENERAL VIOLA EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND NOTED THAT THE TIMING FOR SUCH AN ACTION AGAINST THE MOTHERS WITH THE "BEAGLE PROBLEM" COMING TO A HEAD WAS POOR. IN THE PRESENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR, HE CALLED IN ARMY SECRETARY GENERAL BIGNONE AND ORDERED THAT NO ACTION BE TAKEN AGAINST THE MOTHERS' DEMONSTRATION THAT AFTERNOON.

5. EMBASSY COMMENT: THURSDAY'S EVENTS WERE SIGNIFICANT. THE DEMONSTRATION WAS THE LARGEST AND MOST VOCAL HELD IN THE PLAZA SINCE THE DISAPPEARANCE LAST DECEMBER OF SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE PLAZA DE MAYO LEADERSHIP. SECONDLY,

TWO DELEGATIONS WERE ADMITTED INTO CASA ROSADA AND A GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROMISES TO THE DEMONSTRATORS.

7. SINCE THE INTERNATIONAL FLAP CAUSED BY THE NOVEMBER 1977 BRIEF ARREST OF SOME 300 MOTHERS AND THE MID-DECEMBER DISAPPEARANCE OF 13 OF THE MOTHERS' GROUP, THE ATTITUDE OF THE GOA TOWARDS THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT HERE HAS BEEN ONE OF CAREFUL SCRUTINY AND BENIGN NEGLECT. THE DECEMBER 21ST ACTIONS WERE A DEFINITE DEPARTURE. WHETHER THOSE ACTIONS WERE PREMEDITATED OR TAKEN ON AN AD HOC BASIS BY SECURITY OPERATIVES TO DEFUSE THE LARGE AND AGITATED DEMONSTRATION WE DO NOT KNOW. HOWEVER, THE ACTION WAS SIGNIFICANT AND IS ENCOURAGING MORE VISIBLE ACTIONS BY HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS HERE.  
CASTRO

*flim flam is right*  
*P-*

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ED HER 11 HABEAS CORPUS REQUESTS.  
HERALD WEDNESDAY REPRINTED STANLEY HOFFMAN STORY "HUMAN  
RIGHTS POSITIVE FOR U.S." FROM NEW YORK TIMES.  
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USCINCSO FOR SJ2C-AD

HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS. - PRESS REPORTS TUESDAY SAID 17  
PEOPLE WHO HAD BEEN DETAINED IN CONNECTION WITH THE ABDUCTION  
AND ASSASSINATION OF ELENA HOLMBERG WERE RELEASED AS POLICE  
CONTINUED TO INVESTIGATE THE DEATH OF THE ARGENTINE CAREER  
DIPLOMAT. CLARIN AND HERALD EDITORIALS PRAISED THE "STRONG,  
BRAVE WORDS" FROM FOREIGN MINISTER PASTOR AT MISS HOLMBERG'S  
FUNERAL, WHICH "REVEALED THE DEEP IMPACT THE MURDER HAS MADE  
IN ARGENTINE SOCIETY, AND THE CONCERN OF THE GOVERNMENT ABOUT  
IT." BOTH PAPERS DEMANDED FAST ACTION TO STOP THE VIOLENCE.  
HERALD SAID "THERE HAVE BEEN TOO MANY DEATHS IN INEXPLICABLE  
AND ODDIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES (READ: MURDERS FOR WHICH  
LEFTWING TERRORISTS CANNOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE) BEFORE  
THIS -- AND, INEXPLICABLY, SINCE THE ARMED FORCES TOOK  
POWER TO RESTORE LAW AND ORDER. YET THERE IS NOT A  
SINGLE CASE IN WHICH ANY ONE HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO  
JUSTICE OR, EVEN, NAMED." CLARIN DECLARED THAT THE  
HOLMBERG CASE MUST BE "INVESTIGATED TO ITS ULTIMATE  
CONSEQUENCES" AND "TERRORISM AND ASSASSINATION... NO  
MATTER WHO IS RESPONSIBLE, ARE CONFRONTING THE AUTHORITY  
OF THE STATE, WHICH CAN ONLY BE BASED IN THE RULE OF  
LAW."

HERALD AND CRONICA REPORTED THE PERMANENT ASSEMBLY FOR  
HUMAN RIGHTS SENT A LETTER TO PRESIDENT VIDELA STATING  
"ITS DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE LACK OF REACTION AND FAILURE  
TO RESPOND TO THE PROBLEM POSED BY THE LARGE NO. OF  
PEOPLE WHO HAVE DISAPPEARED AFTER BEING KIDNAPPED."

THE ASSEMBLY ALSO SENT VIDELA A LIST OF 4381

"DOCUMENTED CASES OF PEOPLE WHO DISAPPEARED AFTER BEING  
KIDNAPPED-- GENERALLY BY ARMED MEN CLAIMING TO BE  
MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES." THE STORY ADDED:

"THE ASSEMBLY ENCLOSED RECENT NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS REPORT-  
ING THE FINDING OF 17 BODIES... ON THE BEACH AT SANTA

TERESITA, THREE ALLEGED TERRORISTS KILLED IN A SHOOT-OUT

IN ROSARIO, ANOTHER EXTREMIST SHOT IN MAR DEL PLATA,

"DUBIOUS" DEATHS IN A PSYCHIATRIC ESTABLISHMENT IN THE

ONTIVEROS COLONY IN SANTA FE, THE DISCOVERY OF THREE

CHARRED BODIES AT LA SALADA, IN THE PROVINCE OF BUENOS

AIRES, AND THE REPORTED DEATH FROM POISONING OF TWO

PRISONERS IN AN UNNAMED POLICE STATION." THE LETTER

SAYS THE ASSEMBLY "HAS NO WAY OF KNOWING WHETHER ANY

OF THESE CASES HAVE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS BUT THEY ARE

ALL OF SOCIAL CONCERN." ALSO CLAIMS THAT "THE KIDNAPPING

OF PEOPLE IS CONTINUING, ALTHOUGH AT A SLOWER RATE."

ON THE SAME PAGE, HERALD SAID THE LIFELESS BODY OF A

YOUNG WOMAN WITH HER HAIR SHAVED WAS FOUND MONDAY IN THE

SALADO RIVER IN SANTA FE.

HERALD WEDNESDAY PRINTS A LETTER FROM MRS. ANA ETCHVERRY

DE RICCI IN BAHIA BLANCA WHO SAYS SHE IS TRYING TO LOCATE

HER SON, AGED 21, WHO WAS KIDNAPPED IN LA PLATA MAR 30,

1977. SHE STATES "WE CANNOT FIND ANY WITNESSES WILLING

TO TESTIFY BECAUSE THEY ARE ALL AFRAID... MY 12 TELEGRAMS

TO PRESIDENT VIDELA AND INTERIOR MINISTER HARGUINDEGUY

REMAIN UNANSWERED." SHE ALSO SAYS THE COURTS HAVE REJECT-

4381 CASES

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E.O. 12065: GDS 12/27/84 (HARRIS, F. ALLEN) OR-P  
TAGS: SHUM AR  
SUBJ: YEARLY CHRISTMAS PRISON VISITS DENIED IN CORDOBA

1. (U) SOME 26 POLITICAL (PEN) PRISONERS BEING HELD BY THE ARMY THIRD CORPS IN CORDOBA PRISON WERE DENIED THEIR ANNUAL CHRISTMAS VISIT WITH THEIR FAMILIES. THIS EMBASSY, THE NUNCIATURA, CHURCH AND HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS HAVE RECEIVED PROTESTS FROM THE AFFECTED FAMILIES.

2. (C) ACCORDING TO MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND FAMILY REPORTS, SOME 220 PEN AND CLANDESTINE PRISONERS HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THE THIRD CORPS AREA IN THE LAST MONTH. RED CROSS AND FAMILY SOURCES REPORT THAT THERE ARE STILL SOME 26 PEN PRISONERS DETAINED UNDER THE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OF THIRD CORPS COMMANDER MENENDEZ. TWENTY-THREE FAMILIES WERE REFUSED ADMISSION BY PRISON AUTHORITIES ON CHRISTMAS DAY IN CORDOBA. THE PRISON OFFICIALS REPORTEDLY TREATED THE INCIDENT AS A JOKE.

3. (C) EMBASSY COMMENT: THE ISOLATION OF PEN PRISONERS IN THE THIRD CORPS AREA--NO MAIL, NO VISITORS--HAS BEEN A SUBJECT OF FREQUENT CRITICISM IN ARGENTINA AND ABROAD. IN THE PAST THE ONLY CONTACT ALLOWED EACH YEAR BETWEEN THE PEN PRISONERS AND THEIR FAMILIES WAS A TWO HOUR CHRISTMASDAY REUNION. WE ARE TRYING TO FIND OUT WHY THE ANNUAL FAMILY VISIT WAS DENIED AND WILL LOOK FOR OPPORTUNITIES TO EXPRESS CONCERN. CASTRO

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AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

*SUAREZ-MASON  
CHIEF OF STAFF*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 00897

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. THE VIDELA-VIOLA TEAM COMES OUT AHEAD IN THE NEW ARMY ASSIGNMENTS THAT WERE ANNOUNCED LATE FRIDAY, JANUARY 26, AND BEGAN TO TAKE PLACE (NOTABLE IN SUAREZ MASON'S TAKING OVER AS CHIEF OF STAFF) ON MONDAY TWENTY NINE. IT LOOKS TO US THAT THE PRESENT REGIME HAS RENOVATED ITS CHARTER -- BOTH IN TERMS OF ITS FUTURE AND ITS PRESENT SPAN OF CONTROL. THOSE CHANGES WE BELIEVE ESPECIALLY PERTINENT TO THE PROCESS OF MILITARY POLITICS ARE THE FOLLOWING: END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

3. MAJOR GENERAL GUILLERMO SUAREZ MASON BECOMES ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF. THE TOUGH FIRST CORPS COMMANDER, WHOM WE BELIEVE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTIVITIES ON THE REPRESSION FRONT THAT LED TO SCORES OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS MOVES TO A POSITION OF PRESTIGE AND ALIGNS HIMSELF TO REPLACE VIOLA AS ARMY COMMANDER. HIS "NEW APPARENT" JOB ALSO CONFERS A MEASURE OF CONTROL OVER WHEN HIS ARMY BOSS MIGHT HAVE TO MOVE ON -- IE HIS OPINION COUNTS HEAVILY IN THE TOP BRASS HAT CONSENSUS THAT BESTOWS OR WITHDRAWS "CONFIDENCE" IN VIOLA. BUT IN LEAVING FIRST CORPS COMMAND HE TAKES HIMSELF FROM DIRECT COMMAND OF TROOPS AND AWAY FROM A KIND OF MILITARY FIEF. SUAREZ MASON'S POSITION AS AN OUTSPOKEN RIVAL OF VIOLA WHO BELIEVES HE CAN DO IT BETTER (AND HAS SUPPORT FOR THESE AMBITION IN MILITARY CIRCLES) APPEARS THEN TEMPORARILY DIMINISHED BOTH BY CO-OPTION AND BY POWER AMPUTATION.

4. BRIGADIER GENERAL TOMAS LIENDO, FORMER MINISTER OF LABOR, BECOMES SUAREZ MASON'S SECOND IN COMMAND. LIENDO IS RESPECTED FOR HIS HANDLING OF THE LABOR PORTFOLIO AND IS A LOYALIST -- MEANING WE THINK HE WILL HOLD FIRM WITH THE EXISTING VIOLA-VIDELA LEADERSHIP.

5. MAJOR GENERAL LEOPOLDO FORTUNATO GALTIERI REPLACES SUAREZ MASON AT FIRST CORPS. HE COMES TO THIS JOB FROM SECOND CORPS COMMAND, AND WE NOTE THAT IN THAT GEOGRAPHICAL AREA EARLY PROGRES WAS MADE IN GETTING PEN PRISONERS TRIED, SENTENCED, PROCESSED. IF HE CAN BRING TO THE FIRST CORPS DISTRICT SOMETHING OF THE JUDGEMENT HE SHOWED WHILE IN ROSARIO THEN WE BELIEVE THERE IS REASON FOR ENCOURAGEMENT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRONT. HE TOO WILL PROBABLY LOOK TOWARD VIDELA'S AND VIOLA'S LEADERSHIP -- A PROFESSIONAL WHOSE INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY POLITICS HAS NOT BEEN NOTABLE.

BRIGADIER GENERAL JOSE ROGELIO VILLARREAL  
FORMER DEPUTY FIRST CORPS COMMANDER. UNTIL EARLY DECEMBER SECRETARY OF THE PRESIDENCY, VILLARREAL PRESUMABLY BRINGS TO HIS NEW JOB THE LOYALTY TO VIDELA AND VIOLA THAT SAW THEM THROUGH THE PAST FEW

YEARS.

7. AT "MILITARY INSTITUTES," REPLACING HARDLINE MAJOR GENERAL SANTIAGO OMAR RIVEROS, WHOSE ENMITY FOR VIOLA AND WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN ACTS APPARENTLY INTENDED TO EMBARRASS BOTH VIDELA AND VIOLA WAS WIDELY DISCUSSED, IS MAJOR GENERAL JOSE MONTES -- WHO HAD BEEN ACTING TEMPORARILY AS VIOLA'S ARMY CHIEF SINCE VIOLA HIMSELF CAME TO REPLACE VIDELA. DESPITE ITS TAME SOUNT "INSTITUCIONES MILITARES" IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE IT CONFERS CONTROL OVER THE ARMY'S ENORMOUS "CAMPO DE MAYO" BASE JUST OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL. RIVERO'S DEPARTURE FOR THE INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD IN WASHINGTON CLEARLY REMOVES AN ELEMENT OF ANTI-VIDELA/VIOLA FRICTION. AGAIN, VIOLA SCORES.

*Montes*

8. MAJOR GENERAL ANTONIO DOMINGO BUSSI, THE NEW GENDARMERIE CHIEF REPLACING RETIRING GENERAL SANTIAGO, IS A VIOLA MAN ALSO. A BRIGHT, DEDICATED PROFESSIONAL -- KNOWN FOR HIS ANTI-GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN TUCUMAN -- HIS ASSIGNMENT TO THE GENDARMERIE SIDELINES IS PUZZLING. ONCE AGAIN THOUGH HE DOES COMMAND TROOPS -- UP ONE FROM HIS RELATIVELY POWERLESS POSITION AS RIVEROS' SECOND AT "MILITARY INSTITUTES."

9. SIMILARLY MAJOR GENERAL ADOLFO JAUREGUI'S REPLACING GALTIERI AS SECOND CORPOS COMMANDER APPEARS TO PUT A "VIOLA MAN" IN A LEADING COMMAND POSITION.

10. MORE ON THE NEUTRAL SIDE WERE RECONFIRMATION OF MAJOR GENERAL LUCIANO B. MENENDEZ AND JOSE ANTONIO VAQUERO AS THIRD AND FIFTH CORPOS COMMANDERS -- SUPPOSEDLY BECAUSE OF THE NEED OF THEIR STAYING PUT ON THE CHILEAN FRONTIER. ON THE OTHER HAND, FAILURE TO APPOINT MENENDEZ TO THE PRESTIGIOUS FIRST CORPOS COMMAND IS TAKEN BY SOME AS A CALCULATED AFFRONT BY VIOLA.

11. BRIGADIER GENERAL JUAN BAUTISTA SASSIAIN (THE FINA "W" CARRIES A "TILDE") REPLACES OJEDA AS CHIEF OF NATIONAL POLICE. SASSIAIN BRINGS A TOUGH, CRUEL REPUTATION TO THIS AREA OF SIGNIFICANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT'S REPRESSIVE EFFORTS. IF THERE IS AN OMINOUS APPOINTMENT, THIS IS IT. SASSIAIN WAS FORMERLY COMMANDER OF THE TENTH INFANTRY BRIGADE AND, AS COMMANDER ALSO OF SECURITY SUBZONE ELEVEN -- HE REPORTEDLY BECAME AN "EXPERT" IN COUNTERSUBVERSION. WE DO NOT KNOW FOR SURE HOW HE STANDS IN TERMS OF LOYALTIES THOUGH BY ONE REPORT HE IS A "VIOLA MAN".

12. OTHER CHANGES IN THE ARMY, BEING REPORTED IN OTHER CHANNELS, LOOK AT THIS POINT TO US EITHER POLITICALLY NEUTRAL OR INSCRUTABLE -- ALTHOUGH, AGAIN, THERE MAY BE AN EDGE TOWARD THE VIDELA-VIOLA TEAM. CASTRO

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EXDIS

E.O. 12065 XDS-1 1-31-09 (CASTRO, RAUL H.) OR-M  
TAGS PGOV, AR  
SUBJECT: (C) COUP RUMORS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0174

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. YESTERDAY NOON (JAN 30) I HAD LUNCH WITH CLOSE AND PERSONAL FRIEND OF GENERAL SUAREZ MASON. THIS CONTACT MADE IT CLEAR TO ME HE WAS SUPPORTING SUAREZ MASON IN HIS EFFORTS TO UNSEAT THE GENERAL VIDELA-VIOLA COMBINE. I INQUIRED WHY EFFORT WAS BEING MADE TO DEPOSE VIDELA & CO. HE GAVE ME THE FOLLOWING REASONING:

3. INFLATION: CONTACT SAID WITH INFLATION AT 170 PERCENT LIFE WAS BECOMING UNBEARABLE FOR MIDDLE-CLASS PERSONS AND ABOVE. HE SAID THE "BOTTOM-POOR" LIVING IN "VILLAS MISERIAS" (SHACKS) WERE NOT THAT EFFECTED IN THAT THIS GROUP DIDN'T HAVE CARS, TELEVISIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER OBLIGATIONS TO MEET. THEY LIVED FROM DAY TO DAY. CONTACT SAID IT WAS MIDDLE CLASS AND SMALL AND MEDIUM BUSINESSMEN BEING DIRECTLY HIT. HE SAID THERE WERE AN ALARMING NUMBER OF BANKRUPTCIES, WHICH IN TURN WERE CREATING UNEMPLOYMENT, UNKNOWN BEFORE IN ARGENTINA. I TOLD HIM I HAD SEEN ADVTS ASKING FOR WORKERS. HIS REPLY WAS WORKERS NEEDED WERE NOT IN THE CATEGORY OF THOSE BEING LAID-OFF. HE SAID NINECON MARTINEZ DE HOZ WAS ARGENTINA'S NEMESIS AND HAD TO GO.

4. NON-PAYMENT OF DEBTS: CONTACT SAID GOA HAD INCURRED LARGE DEBTS WITH SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED BUSINESSES DUE TO BEAGLE CHANNEL AFFAIR, BUT WAS NOT MEETING ITS OBLIGATIONS. HE SAID THESE BUSINESSES ARE BEING FORCED OUT OF BUSINESS. CONTACT STATED GOA'S CREDIT WAS EXCELLENT ABROAD, BUT TERRIBLE DOMESTICALLY.

5. MILITARY DISSATISFACTION: SOURCE SAID GREAT TURMOIL EXISTS WITHIN MILITARY RANKS. HE SAID A LARGE NUMBER OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL, JUNIOR, MIDDLE- AND SOME TOP OFFICERS WERE UNHAPPY OVER THE MONTEVIDEO BEAGLE CHANNEL ACCORD. CONTACT SAID THESE MEN WERE PRIMED TO DO BATTLE AND WOULD ACCEPT NOTHING LESS. HE FURTHER STATED THESE UNHAPPY MILITARY VIEWED THE MONTEVIDEO ACCORD AS NOTHING MORE THAN A "CHICKENING OUT" PROCESS, LEAVING GOA IN AN EMBARRASSING SITUATION.

6. WEAK GOVERNMENT: SOURCE SAID GENERAL SUAREZ MASON CATEGORIZED THE VIDELA-VIOLA GOVERNMENT AS WEAK, UNDECISIVE AND INEPT. HE REPEATED FACT VIDELA HAS KEPT MARTINEZ DE HOZ FOR OVER TWO YEARS WAS AN OBVIOUS DISREGARD OF GOA'S BEST INTERESTS. I THEN ASKED IF TOA'S IS SO WEAK THEN WHY WOULD SUAREZ MASON ACCEPT THE POSITION OF CHIEF OF STAFF. HE READILY REPLIED SAYING SUAREZ MASON WANTED TO BE CLOSE TO THE "TILL", MEANING HEART OF THE ACTION. HE STATED CARLOS, AS HE CALLED SUAREZ MASON, WAS NOW READY TO MOVE UP AND WAS IN A NATURAL POSITION. I ASKED HIM TO FURTHER EXPLAIN.

7. GENERAL STRIKE: SOURCE THEN STATED SUAREZ MASON AND

HIS FOLLOWERS HAVE ENCOURAGED LABOR LEADERS (TRADE UNIONS) TO ENCOURAGE A GENERAL STRIKE AROUND FEBRUARY 19. A HINT WAS GIVEN ME THAT SOME OF THE KEY LABOR LEADERS WERE BEING SUBSIDIZED BY SUAREZ MASON & CO. SOURCE ALSO SAID TRADE UNIONS WERE BEING SUPPORTED BY A GROUP OF BUSINESS PEOPLE IN THEIR EFFORTS TO STRIKE. CONTACT SAID IF A NATION-WIDE STRIKE TAKES PLACE THEN SUAREZ MASON WILL STEP IN AND TAKE OVER THE GOA. HIS STATEMENT WILL BE, AFTER THE FACT, THAT HE DID IT TO SAVE ARGENTINA FROM ECONOMIC CHAOS. HE SAID THIS WAS THE SAME REASON GIVEN BY THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION WHEN IT TOOK OVER ON MARCH 24, 1976.

8. NEWSPAPER: SOURCE SAID A NEW NEWSPAPER WAS ABOUT TO APPEAR ON THE STREETS OF BUENOS AIRES. THE NAME OF THIS DAILY IS TO BE "NOSOTROS" AND IT IS ALREADY DULY REGISTERED WITH GOA. IT IS TO BE AN ORGAN OF PROPAGANDA FOR SUAREZ MASON. A FEW DAYS AGO I TALKED TO A NEWSPAPER PROFESSIONAL WHO CONFIRMED THIS FACT AND STATED HE WOULD BE IN CHARGE OF ITS PUBLICATION.

9. COMMENT: SOURCE IS A WELL-KNOWN INDUSTRIALIST. HE MANUFACTURES RAILROAD EQUIPMENT, SUCH AS CARS, AND IS INVOLVED IN A MYRIAD OF OTHER BUSINESS INVESTMENTS. HIS REPUTATION IS ONE OF BEING EXTREMELY WEALTHY, BUT MUCH OF IT MAY BE "HOT AIR". HE IS A NEXT DOOR NEIGHBOR OF GENERAL SUAREZ MASON, WHO HAS OFTEN TOLD ME OF HIS CLOSE TIES TO SOURCE. NORMALLY, WHEN SUAREZ MASON WANTS INFORMATION MADE KNOWN TO ME HE USES THIS PERSON AS THE INTERMEDIARY. ALTHOUGH MUCH OF THE INFORMATION FURNISHED ME IN THE PAST BY THIS SOURCE HAS NOT PROVEN ACCURATE. I FIND THIS CONTACT TENDS TO EXAGGERATE SOMETIMES AFFECTING HIS CREDIBILITY. DESPITE CONTACT'S PROPENSITIES, I FEEL THERE MAY EXIST PROBABLY CAUSE FOR SOME TRUTH IN SOURCE'S ALLEGATIONS. THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUAREZ MASON AND SOURCE JUST CAN'T BE IGNORED. AS THE SAYING GOES "WHERE THERE IS SMOKE, THERE IS FIRE". THE SYMBOLIC SMOKE WILL COME INTO BEING IF AND WHEN THERE IS A SEMBLANCE OF A STRIKE. THAT SHOULD BE THE CAVEAT OF THINGS TO COME.

CASTRO

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E.O. 12065 GDS 1-30-65 (HALLMAN, WILLIAM H.) DR-P  
TAGS SHUM, AR  
SUBJECT VISIT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION TO  
ARGENTINA: HOW CAN WE ENHANCE ITS SUCCESS?

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0027; BUENOS AIRES 0054

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY. THE VISIT HERE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION CAN BE AN IMPORTANT EVENT IN PROMOTING THE OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND GETTING THE GOA TO BRING ITS FORCES UNDER CONTROL AND REDUCE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS THE EMBASSY'S VIEWS ON AREAS WHERE WE BELIEVE THE RIGHT KIND OF COMMISSION EFFORT WOULD HAVE POSITIVE EFFECT -- BOTH SHORT-RANGE AND OVER A LONGER PERIOD. THESE AREAS ARE: CENTRALIZATION OF THE REPRESSIVE EFFORT, PROVIDING MEANS FOR JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF EXECUTIVE POWER ACTIONS, WORKING TOWARD "CONSENSUS DEFINITIONS OF "TERRORISM" AND "SUBVERSION"

THAT NOT EVERY GUN TOTER IS FREE TO PURSUE HIS OWN JEAS, HIGHLIGHTING THAT HUMAN RIGHT VIOLATIONS CONTINUE EVEN NOW LONG AFTER TOP LEADERS ASSURE THE COUNTRY THE WAR AGAINST SUBVERSION HAS BEEN WON, REQUIRING BETTER TREATMENT OF (FEWER AND FEWER) PRISONERS AND EXTERMINATING THE USE OF TORTURE, FORCING OUT REVELATIONS OF REMAINING CLAUDESTINE PRISONERS, AND AMELIORATING THE SITUATION OF THE FAMILIES OF "DISAPPEARED" THROUGH NEW LEGAL-CIVIC DEFINITIONS. IF THE DEPARTMENT AGREES, WE HOPE THESE VIEWS CAN BE SHARED WITH COMMISSION MEMBERS. END SUMMARY.

3. WE HOPE THAT THE VISIT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION TO ARGENTINA (SCHEDULED NOW FOR MAY 29-JUNE 6) WILL BE A MAJOR EVENT IN THE WAY THE GOVERNMENT SEES ITS OWN REQUIREMENTS AND PROSPECTS IN THIS AREA.

4. FIRST, WE HOPE THE COMMISSION'S REPORT WILL HAVE THE TOUGHNESS, EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT AND FAIRNESS THAT WILL MAKE THE DOCUMENT ACCEPTABLE TO A WIDE SPECTRUM OF ARGENTINES AS A DEFINITIVE STATEMENT. WE WANT THE DOCUMENT TO HAVE IMPACT IN FORMING PUBLIC OPINION HERE. ARGENTINES -- INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY FORCES AND GOVERNMENT -- HAVE TOO LONG BEEN TREATED TO PARTIAL, ANECDOTAL AND BIASED TREATMENT OF THIS COUNTRY'S APPALLING HUMAN RIGHTS HISTORY. ATTEMPTS BY OUTSIDE GROUPS, NOTABLY AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TO DESCRIBE THE SITUATION HERE HAVE BEEN TO EASILY DISMISSED AS PROPAGANDA EFFORTS BY INIMICAL GROUPS OR AS THE SUPERFICIAL EXAMINATIONS OF BLEEDING HEARTS WHO DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE REALITIES OF ARGENTINA'S "DIRTY WAR." WE BELIEVE THE COUNTRY'S BETTER APPRECIATION OF REALITY IS A PREREQUISITE FOR REAL IMPROVEMENT. IN THE TERM "THE COUNTRY" WE INCLUDE GOVERNMENT MEMBERS THEMSELVES, AS WELL AS POTENTIAL PRESSURE GROUPS LIKE THE CHURCH, PROFESSIONAL ORGANI-

ZATIONS AND THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY.)

5. NEVERTHELESS WE BELIEVE THE COMMISSION'S PRINCIPAL FUNCTION OF PROMOTING THE OBSERVATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS WILL BE BETTER SERVED IF IT GOES BEYOND FACT-FINDING AND CONDEMNATION. A PART OF THE ARGENTINE REALITY IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE EFFORTS ALREADY TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION. THERE ARE FEWER PEN PRISONERS. TOTAL NUMBERS OF "HITS" BY SECURITY FORCES ARE DOWN AS COMPARED WITH YEARS PREVIOUS. THIS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED.

6. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THERE IS RECOGNITION ALREADY AMONG ARGENTINA'S PRESIDENT AND JUNTA THAT THE COUNTRY'S SITUATION MUST BE NORMALIZED, THE COMMISSION MIGHT PRIVATELY INITIATE CONVERSATIONS ABOUT A PROGRAM OF REMEDIAL ACTION WITH THE COUNTRY'S LEADERSHIP. ALTHOUGH SPECIFIC REMEDIES AGREED AS NECESSARY AND FEASIBLE BETWEEN THE COMMISSION AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA MIGHT NOT HAVE THE LOOK OF HIGH HOPES AND PURITY THAT THE COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS ONLY MIGHT HAVE, WE BELIEVE THEY WOULD HAVE A BETTER CHANCE OF BEING PUT INTO PRACTICE.

7. HERE BELOW ARE SOME AREAS WE BELIEVE ARE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT:

A) CENTRALIZATION. WE BELIEVE THE COMMISSION WILL FIND THAT THE GREATEST SINGLE FACTOR CONTRIBUTING TO HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IS DECENTRALIZATION OF CONTROL AMONG A BEWILDERING, OFTEN MUTUALLY ANTAGONISTIC ARRAY OF OFFICIAL ENTITIES: THE ARMY, THE NAVY, THE AIR FORCE, THE FEDERAL POLICE, THE STATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIDE) AND THE FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE -- WITH FURTHER BREAKAGE INTO SUB-GROUPS ALONG SEVERAL OF THESE. THE FIRST RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMISSION SHOULD BE THAT CONTROL OVER SUPPRESSION OF REMAINING TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION BE CENTRALIZED AND RATIONALIZED AS A PRIMARY MEANS OF GETTING CONTROL OVER A SITUATION EVEN ARGENTINE MEMBERS OF GOVERNMENT (INCLUDING MILITARY MEN) AGREE ALLOWS AN EXCESS OF AUTONOMY.

B) LEGAL PROCESSES. THIS AREA IS DIFFICULT BECAUSE THE ARGENTINE CONSTITUTION RECOGNIZES STATE OF SEIGE PROVISIONS, BEHIND WHICH EVERY ACT OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER (THE "PODER EJECUTIVO NACIONAL" OR PEN) STANDS IN ORDER TO ESCAPE SCRUTINY BY THE REGULAR COURT SYSTEM. THIS POWER IS RECOGNIZED BY COURTS THEMSELVES. THEIR OPINIONS OFTEN CONTAIN INTRICATE LEGAL DISCOURSES THAT STOP SHORT BEFORE THE GREAT LEGAL WALL THAT STATE OF SEIGE POWERS CONSTITUTE. UNLESS THE COMMISSION CAN GAIN ACCEPTANCE BY THE EXECUTIVE POWER THAT AN ENTIRE NEW CONSTRUCT IS REQUIRED -- AN ENTIRE NEW AREA OF "INTERFACE" IN WHICH PEN POWER IS CIRCUMSCRIBED BY THE JUDICIARY -- THEN ANY ARGENTINE REGIME WILL BE FREE TO TREAT CITIZENS MORE OR LESS AS IT PLEASES. WITHOUT THESE BASIC NEW JURISDICTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS "JUDICIAL REFORM," ONE OF THE TENETS OF THE NATIONAL RE-ORGANIZATION PROCESS, WILL REMAIN A CYNICAL -- EVEN CRUEL -- SLOGAN. IN THIS CONNECTION THE COMMISSION SHOULD MAKE EFFORT TO TABULATE THOSE INSTANCES WHEN COURTS HAVE INDEED RISEN TO JUDGE AGAINST SUCH ACTIONS ONLY TO MET WITH SILENCE ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT.

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C) SUBVERSION/TERRORISM DEFINED. A PRINCIPAL PROBLEM IN BOTH CENTRALIZATION AND IN CREATING LEGAL REMEDIES AS EXPLAINED ABOVE DERIVES FROM THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT'S APPARENTLY LACKING DEFINITIONS OF "SUBVERSION" AND "TERRORISM" THAT COULD GUIDE EVEN WELL INTENTION SECURITY OFFICIALS AND DEDICATED JUDGES IN THEIR COMPLICATED CHORES. THE COMMISSION MUST NOT ACT AS THOUGH IT EXPECTS ARGENTINA TO "RETURN" (COMMENT: THE COUNTRY WAS NEVER THERE) TO A SECURITY-LEGAL SYSTEM THAT WOULD STAND THE EXACTING REVIEW OF A WESTERN EUROPEAN OR US COURT. THIS PLAYS INTO THE HANDS OF "DIRTY WAR" THEORISTS WHO JUSTIFY ANY METHOD OF COMBAT ON GROUNDS THAT THE TERRORIST ONSLAUGHT AGAINST ARGENTINE WAS SIMPLY TOO GREAT FOR ITS LEGAL SYSTEMS TO STAND AGAINST THEM. THIS GOVERNMENT AND ITS FORESEEABLE SUCCESSORS ARE GOING TO GUARD AGAINST WHAT IS REGARDED AS ATTACKS AGAINST THE GOVERNING STRUCTURE. WHAT CAN BE REALISTICALLY IMAGINED -- AND THIS WOULD HAVE INCALCULABLE BENEFIT -- IS THAT WITH THE COMMISSION THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT MIGHT DEFINE (AFTER IN-HOUSE DEBATE MADE PUBLIC) WHAT IT CONSIDERS TO BE A "TERRORIST," AND IN DOING THIS ANNOUNCE WHAT PENALTIES A TERRORIST CAN EXPECT, AND WHAT IT CONSIDERS A "SUBVERSIVE" AND WHAT PENALTIES, IF ANY, ATTACH. AT PRESENT THE CATEGORIES "TERRORIST" AND "SUBVERSIVE" TOO EASILY SLIDE TOGETHER, AND A "SUBVERSIVE" CAN BE PRACTICALLY ANYTHING, INCLUDING A MOTHER DEMANDING TO KNOW THE WHEREABOUTS OF HER SON.

D) PRESENT AND PAST ANTI-TERRORIST/ANTI-SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. THE COMMISSION IN ITS REPORTS AND ITS CONVERSATIONS SHOULD HIGHLIGHT THE RECENT DISAPPEARANCES AND RECENT EVIDENCE OF TORTURE AND MISTREATMENT THAT MAY COME ITS WAY. A FREQUENT ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT DEFENSE OF ITS ACTIVITIES IS THAT BAD THINGS HAPPENED IN THE BAD OLD DAYS, AND THAT THESE EVENTS ARE HISTORY. THEY ARE NOT. THEY CONTINUE TO OCCUR ALBEIT WITH DECREASING FREQUENCY. IT WILL BE BRACING FOR ARGENTINES TO REALIZE THE FREQUENCY WITH WHICH SERIOUS VIOLATIONS TAKE PLACE AT A TIME WHEN VIDELA, VIDELA, MASSERA, AGOSTI, LAMBRUSCHINI, HARGUINDEGUY HAVE EACH SAID -- IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER -- "SUBVERSION IS LICKED AND NOW WE TURN TO THE PROCESS OF HEALING."

E) PEN PRISONERS. THE FACE OF THE COMMISSION'S COMING ALREADY HAS LED TO REDUCTION OF THE NUMBERS OF PEN PRISONERS. WE KNOW OF PLANS FOR IMPROVED PROCESSING

THE SYSTEM OPERATED BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, WOULD HELP THE SITUATION. WE BELIEVE A RECOMMENDATION BY THE COMMISSION FOR RELEASE UNDER RIGHT OF OPTION (AND CLEMENCY FOR PERSONS CONVICTED -- PERHAPS AFTER A SPEEDY REVIEW OF SOME SORT) MIGHT PROVIDE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AN INCENTIVE FOR DOING WHAT MANY PROFESS TO WANT TO DO ANYWAY: RELEASE PERSONS PICKED UP WHILE VERY YOUNG AND PERSONS WHOSE ONLY LINK WITH SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WAS MARGINAL.

F) TORTURE. HOSTILE INTERROGATION WITH THE ELECTRIC PICANA, "THE SUBMARINE," ETC. LIES AT THE HEART OF THE ARGENTINE REPRESSIVE SYSTEM. THIS IS AN AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE WHICH CAN BE CLEARLY AND FACTUALLY DOCUMENTED BY THE COMMISSION. THE COMMISSION SHOULD (AND CAN WE BELIEVE DEMONSTRATE THAT TORTURE HAS BECOME A REGULARLY UTILIZED PROCEDURE IN CRIMINAL AS WELL AS SUBVERSIVE CASES. THE COMMISSION MIGHT POINT OUT THAT ACCEPTANCE OF TORTURE BY JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES WITHOUT TRIGGERING INQUIRIES AGAINST THE RESPONSIBLE MILITARY OR POLICE OFFICIALS HAS DEBASED THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE AND AT VERY LEAST IS AN AREA WHERE PEN ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE SURGED.

G) CLANDESTINE PRISONERS. IT IS HARD TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS INSCRUTABLE AREA, FOR THEORIES RANGE BETWEEN THERE BEING "THOUSANDS" OF CLANDESTINE PRISONERS -- THESE OPINIONS BEING HELD, SADLY BUT NATURALLY, BY FAMILIES WHO KEEP ALIVE IN THIS WAY HOPE FOR THEIR MISSING RELATIVES -- TO THERE BEING VERY FEW. (COMMENT: THIS EMBASSY FAVORS THE SECOND VIEW, LESS FROM EVIDENCE THAN FROM FAILURE TO IMAGINE ANY PURPOSE TO BE SERVED BY THE ARMED FORCES' HOLDING A GREAT MANY UNDECLARED PRISONERS.) THE COMMISSION COULD URGE THE THREE ARMED FORCES AND THE POLICE TO RECOGNIZE ALL PRESENTLY HELD PRISONERS AND THEN TO DECLARE UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT THEY HOLD OTHERS. AS SEPTIET STATES (BUENOS AIRES 679) THIS IDEA IS FAVORED BY AN OFFICIAL OF THE INTERIOR MINISTRY AS A MEANS OF CONVINCING FAMILIES THAT THE DISAPPEARED ARE IN FACT DEAD. FINALLY, THIS IS AN AREA TO WHICH THE COMMISSION SHOULD PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION; EVERY BIT OF EVIDENCE THAT CAN BE GOTTEN ON THIS SUBJECT IS VALUABLE.

H) THE DISAPPEARED. THERE WILL BE NO REVIVING THE DEAD, BUT THERE ARE STEPS THE COMMISSION MIGHT URGE FOR ALLEVIATING THE PROBLEMS OF THE LIVING:

- 1) IT MIGHT URGE THE GOVERNMENT TO INFORM FAMILIES -- DIRECTLY OR THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES -- THAT EVIDENCE EXISTS A PERSON HAS DIED.
- 2) IT MIGHT SUGGEST LEGAL MEASURES BY WHICH PRESUMPTION OF A PERSON'S DEATH COULD BE MADE QUICKER AND SIMPLER -- THUS PERMITTING MYRIAD PRACTICAL TRANSACTION THAT NOW ARE IN ABEYANCE BECAUSE OF A FAMILY MEMBER'S UNCLEAR STATUS.
- 3) INFORMALLY, IT MIGHT RECOMMEND CLOSE CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, SO THAT THE STATUS OF WIDOWS AND ORPHANS CAN MORE EASILY BE DEFINED FOR BELIEVERS BY THE CLERGY THEY CONSULT.
- 4) IT MUST INSIST THAT THE GOVERNMENT SEEK TO IDENTIFY BODIES THAT TURN UP IN MYSTERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES, THE APPARENT RESULT OF GOVERNMENT'S REPRESSION.

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TAGS: SHUM, AR, UNHCR, OAS  
SUBJECT: (U) ARGENTINA SEEKING UNHCR SEAT

REF: BUENOS AIRES 9998

1. (C- ENTIRE TEXT).

2. ACTING FOMIN FOREIGN POLICY COORDINATOR ARLIA CALLED IN EMBDFF ON JANUARY 17, 1979 AGAIN TO REQUEST USG SUPPORT (OR NEUTRALITY) FOR THE ARGENTINE INITIATIVE TO FILL THE LATIN AMERICAN SEAT ON UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (UNHCR). ARLIA TOUCHED ON ALL THE USUAL POINTS IN HIS PRESENTATION; HOWEVER, TWO POINTS WERE OF SPECIAL INTEREST. FIRST ARLIA ARGUED THAT US SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINE FOR THE UN POST AT THE APRIL ECOSOC MEETING WOULD SIGNAL THE IMPROVEMENT BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE UPCOMING INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (IAHRC) VISIT. SECONDLY, ARLIA OFFERED IN CONSIDERATION FOR US SUPPORT (OR NEUTRALITY) FOR THE ARGENTINE BID FOR THE UNHRC POST THAT THE GOA WOULD BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE REELECTION OF PROFESSOR TOM J. FARER TO THE IAHRC. ARLIA SAID THAT ALTHOUGH FARER AND THE COLOMBIAN IAHRC COMMISSIONER WERE PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE REJECTION OF THE GOA'S "GUIDELINES" FOR THE SITE VISIT TO ARGENTINA, THE GOA WOULD BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT FARER AS A POLITICAL GESTURE. ARLIA NOTED THAT FARER HAD SUFFICIENT SUPPORT FOR RE-ELECTION, BUT THAT THE ARGENTINE VOTE WOULD SIGNIFY THE "GOA'S POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE COMMISSION".

2. EMBASSY COMMENT: THE GOA HAS BEEN SEEKING SUPPORT FOR ITS BID TO GET A SEAT ON THE UNHRC IN SELECTED CAPITALS AROUND THE WORLD. ARLIA EARLIER ADMITTED THAT THE DIPLOMATIC SOUNDINGS WERE NOT GOING WELL. THE MOST RECENT APPROACH SEEKING OUR SUPPORT LOOKED ALSO LIKE A FISHING EXPEDITION, ONLY THIS LAST TIME A BIT OF BAIT WAS OFFERED. ALTHOUGH IT IS TEMPTING TO WRITE OFF THE INITIATIVE AS AN EXAMPLE OF ARGENTINE DIPLOMATIC CHUTZPAH, GIVEN THIS COUNTRY'S HUMAN RIGHTS REPUTATION, THE FACT THAT A GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE HAS SUGGESTED A "PAYOFF" FOR US SUPPORT (OR NON-OPPOSITION) ON THIS ISSUE IS INTERESTING.

OUR UNDERSTANDING HERE IS THAT OUR VOTE IN THESE FORUMS USUALLY GOES TO THE REGIONAL "CONSENSUS CANDIDATE", AND FROM HERE IT LOOKS LIKE ARGENTINA IS SEEKING ARGUMENTS TO BOLSTER ITS CANDIDACY WITH THE LATIN BLOC. ALTHOUGH THE WHOLE MATTER OF "TRADE-OFFS" MAY BE ACADEMIC, WE PROPOSE SAYING TO GOA IN RESPONSE TO ARLIA'S INITIATIVE THAT IT WOULD BE HARD FOR US TO CONSIDER ARGENTINA'S CANDIDACY ON THE COMMISSION BECAUSE OF CONTINUING DISAPPEARANCES AND THE NUMBERS OF PEN PRISONERS STILL UNCHARGED.

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E.O. 12065: N/A  
TAGS: SHUM AR  
SUBJ: REPLIES TO US INTEREST CASES PRESENTED TO THE FOWG.

REF: STATE 019464

1. THE FOREIGN OFFICE'S WORKING GROUP ON HUMAN RIGHTS (FOWG) HAS RECENTLY INFORMED THE EMBASSY THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAS NO RECORD OF THE DETENTION OF THE FOLLOWING PERSONS, NOR ANY INFORMATION REGARDING THEIR WHEREABOUTS:

CASE NO.	NAME	US INTEREST
47A/77/2	ALVAREZ ROJAS, FEDERICO EDUARDO	SEN. CRANSTON CONG. GILMAN CONG. DU PONT CONG. FINDLEY
9/76/11	MISETICH, ANTONIO ANSELMO	AAAS-ADL
12/76/11	GLEYZER, RAIMUNDO	SEN. ABOUREZK SEN. CASE SEN. DANFORTH SEN. JAVITS SEN. KENNEDY SEN. STEVENSON
13/76/11	GLEYZER, RAIMUNDO	SEN. WEICKER, JR. SEN. WILLIAMS, JR. CONG. BONKER CONG. BURTON CONG. MOFFETT CONG. UDALL CONG. WAXMAN CONG. WOLFF CONG. LOTT SEN. JAVITS SEN. MOYNIHAN CONG. CAPUTO CONG. COUGHLIN CONG. DOWNEY CONG. ROSENTHL CONG. SCHEUER CONG. UDALL ADL
93/77/9	RUS, DANIEL LAZARO	SEN. BROOKE SEN. LONG SEN. PERCY SEN. SPARKMAN CONG. COLLINS CONG. HECKLER CONG. REUSS CONG. RODINO CONG. ROSTENKOWSKI CONG. YATES SEN. CHURCH SEN. JAVITS SEN. KENNEDY SEN. PERCY
237/77/12	ELBERT, HORACIO ANIBAL	AAAS
341/78/5	JAROLAVSKY, MAXIMO EDUARDO	AMN. INT'L

504/78/8 FIDALGO, ALCIRA GRACIELA

608/78/9 VOLNOVICH, JORGE RUBEN

609/78/9 WATTS, JORGE FEDERICO

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618/78/9	FALCONE, NORMA RAQUEL	AAAS-WOLA
611/78/9	MORALLI, GUILLERMO	AAAS-WOLA
613/78/9	TOUNDAIAN, ANGELICA BEATRIZ	DEPT. OF STATE
614/78/9	BEDDYAN, MARIA	CONG. STOCKMAN
615/78/9	IKONICOFF, IGNOCIO	CONG. STOCKMAN
616/78/9	SPINELLA, MIGUEL ANGEL	
	SERAFIN	WOLA
617/78/9	GUTIERREZ, ALEJANDRO ENRIQUE	CONG. MYERS
619/78/9	INFANTE ALLENDE, ADOLFO	
	VICENTE	DEPT. OF STATE
620/78/10	DOLZ DE CASTORINO, MARGARITA	
	ROSA	WOLA
621/78/10	KENNEDY DE SADY, DELIA	DEPT. OF STATE
622/78/10	SADY, AMERICO	DEPT. OF STATE
623/78/10	ALONSO, JUAN MANUEL	CONG. MCHUGH
626/78/10	TORNEY NIGRO, ALBERTO JORGE	CONG. FENWICK
627/78/11	DEPRATTI, OSVALDO NEREO	SEN. BAKER
		SEN. HOLT
628/78/11	ABELLA RAMIREZ DE DEPRATTI,	
	MARIA NELIDA	SEN. BAKER
		SEN. HOLT

2. THE FOWG ALSO PROVIDED INFORMATION ON THE FOLLOWING CASES:

612/78/9	RUSSO, HORACIO HUGO	AAAS-WOLA
	DETAINED AT DISPOSAL OF MILITARY AUTHORITIES.	
623/78/12	SARAVI, TOMAS MARIO ERNESTO	AAAS
	ARRESTED: DECREE 3511, 11-22-75	
	CHARGES: IN CONNECTION WITH SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES.	
	OPTION: DENIED 8-31-78.	
624/78/12	BROCHI, MARCOS	AAAS
	ARRESTED: DECREE 2369, 4-10-76	
	CHARGE: IN CONNECTION WITH SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES.	
	OPTION: DENIED 11-8-76.	

3. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED DEPARTMENT'S REQUEST TO PRESENT FOLLOW UPS FOR FEDERICO EDUARDO ALVAREZ ROJAS AND HILDA GRACIELA LEIKIS. (SEE REFTEL) AS NEGATIVE INFORMATION REGARDING FEDERICO EDUARDO ALVAREZ ROJAS HAS JUST BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE FOWG WE WILL NOT PRESENT FOLLOW UP AT THIS TIME. WE ARE PRESENTING ONE ON THE OTHER CASE.

4. WE ARE WRITING TO CONGRESSIONAL OFFICES DIRECTLY.  
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E.O. 12065: GDS 1/25/85 (FREEMAN, ANTHONY G.) OR-P  
TAGS: ELAB PGOV PINT AR  
SUBJ: (U) COMMITTEE OF 25 DECLARES "STATE OF ALERT"

REF: (A) BUENOS AIRES 174; (B) BUENOS AIRES 084

1. (C) SUMMARY: WHILE MILITARY TENSIONS OVER THE UN-RESOLVED BEAGLE DISPUTE ARE SIMMERING DOWN, THERE MAY BE PROBLEMS ON THE HORIZON CREATED BY THE ECONOMIC SITUATION. TRADE UNION LEADERS GROUPED IN THE "COMMITTEE OF 25" HAVE DECLARED A WORKERS' "STATE OF ALERT" AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC POLICIES. TRADITIONALLY, SUCH STATEMENTS ARE THE FIRST STEP LOOKING TO STRIKE ACTION. WE SUSPECT THAT THE COMMITTEE HAS BEEN ENCOURAGED BY SOME MILITARY OFFICERS AND INDUSTRIALISTS TO ISSUE THIS STATEMENT, THE IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE BEING TO FORCE THE ECONOMY MINISTER FROM GOVERNMENT. THERE MAY ALSO BE COUP PLOTTING INVOLVED ON THE PART OR ON BEHALF OF GENERAL SUAREZ MASON, BUT THE ODDS ARE THAT THIS SITUATION WILL SHOOT OUT AT LEAST TEMPORARILY WITH ARMY COMMANDER VIOLA APPOINTING SUAREZ MASON HIS CHIEF OF STAFF. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHAT ACTION, IF ANY, THE VIDELA GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE AGAINST THE TRADE UNION SIGNERS OF THE DECLARATION, WHICH IS IN OBVIOUS VIOLATION OF CURRENT PROHIBITIONS AGAINST POLITICAL AND LABOR ACTIVITY. TRADE UNION SOURCES BELIEVE IT WOULD TAKE THE COMMITTEE OF 25 SEVERAL WEEKS TO PREPARE THE WORKERS FOR A GENERAL STRIKE. END COMMENT.

2. (U) THE "COMMITTEE OF 25," A PROVISIONAL BOARD WHICH PURPORTS TO SPEAK IN REPRESENTATION OF A MAJORITY OF THE ARGENTINE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT, ISSUED A STATEMENT JANUARY 25 DECLARING THE ENTIRE LABOR MOVEMENT IN A "STATE OF ALERT" IN PROTEST AGAINST INADEQUATE WAGES AND "SHARP, GROWING AND UN-CONTROLLED INFLATION." THE COMMUNIQUE RATIFIED THE COMMITTEE'S REJECTION OF THE RECENT ECONOMIC PLAN ANNOUNCED BY ECONOMY MINISTER MARTINEZ DE HOZ AND SEVERELY CRITICIZED THE LATEST INDUSTRY-BY-INDUSTRY WAGE RATES WHICH, IT SAID, "DEFAUDED THE WORKERS' EXPECTATIONS AS TO THE RATES OF INCREASE THEY SHOULD HAVE RECEIVED. (THE COMMITTEE'S OBJECTIONS TO THE MARTINEZ DE HOZ PLAN WERE DETAILED IN A DOCUMENT ISSUED LAST DECEMBER 19.) THE COMMUNIQUE STATES THAT THE COMMITTEE OF 25 DELAYED UNTIL NOW ITS DECLARATION OF A STATE OF ALERT BECAUSE OF THE NEED FOR NATIONAL UNITY IN THE CRISIS WITH CHILE OVER THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE (WHICH HAS NOW BEEN TAMPED DOWN AS A RESULT OF THE VATICAN'S DECISION TO MEDIATE THE PROBLEM).

3. (U) THE COMMUNIQUE WAS SIGNED BY THE FIVE-MAN EXECUTIVE BOARD OF THE COMMITTEE OF 25. (INSURANCE WORKER LEADER JOSE VALLE, NOW A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIVE, IS ONE OF THE SIGNERS; A SUBSTITUTE

LEADER FROM THE GARMENT UNION SIGNED FOR ENRIQUE MICO.)

4. (U) ACCORDING TO UNION TRADITION, THE DECLARATION OF AN ALERT PUTS THE COMMITTEE "IN PERMANENT SESSION" AND OPENS THE WAY FOR STRIKE ACTIONS AND OTHER PRESSURE TACTICS.

5. (C) THERE HAVE BEEN RUMORS OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS THAT MILITARY OFFICERS ASSOCIATED WITH ARMY FIRST CORPS COMMANDER GENERAL SUAREZ MASON, CONSPIRING TOGETHER WITH DISGRUNTLED INDUSTRIALISTS, HAVE BEEN PRESSURING TRADE UNION LEADERS TO CALL A GENERAL STRIKE WHICH WOULD BE COORDINATED WITH A COUP AGAINST ARMY COMMANDER VIOLA, PRESIDENT VIDELA AND ECONOMY MINISTER MARTINEZ DE HOZ. LABOR SOURCES TOLD US LAST WEEK THAT THE STRIKE CALL WOULD PROBABLY NOT OCCUR UNTIL MARCH WHEN TRADE UNION LEADERS AND SOME INDUSTRIALISTS ESTIMATE THERE WILL BE A RENEWED SPURT OF INFLATION (FOLLOWING THE TRADITIONALLY LESS ACTIVE MONTH OF FEBRUARY) AND "A NEW DOWNTURN IN PRODUCTION." THESE SOURCES NOW SAY THAT THE FOLLOWING FACTORS CONVERGED TO PERSUADE THE COMMITTEE OF 25 TO MOVE AT THIS TIME AT LEAST PART WAY TOWARD A STRIKE:

(A) MILITARY OFFICERS FROM THE VIOLA CAMP AS WELL AS SUAREZ MASON SUPPORTERS ALLEGEDLY HAVE BEEN EXERTING PARALLEL PRESSURES ON UNION LEADERS TO ISSUE STATEMENTS AGAINST MARTINEZ DE HOZ IN ORDER TO "ACCELERATE THE POLITICAL PROCESS."  
(B) MEDIUM-SIZED INDUSTRIALISTS, FORMALLY GROUPED IN THE CGE (THE ENTREPRENEURS' ASSOCIATION FORGED BY THE LATE ECONOMY MINISTER GELBARD DURING THE PERONIST PERIOD) ARE EXPECTED TO ISSUE A BLAST SHORTLY AGAINST MARTINEZ DE HOZ.

(C) THE "CNT", THE TRADE UNION BLOC WHICH RIVALS THE COMMITTEE OF 25 FOR LEADERSHIP OF THE ARGENTINE LABOR MOVEMENT A WEEK OR SO AGO ISSUED A STATEMENT AGAINST MARTINEZ DE HOZ. THE COMMITTEE OF 25 REPORTEDLY COULD NOT STAND IDLY BY AND ALLOW ITS RIVAL, WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO BE THE TAMER OF THE TWO TRADE UNION BLOCS, TO ATTACK GOVERNMENT POLICIES WITHOUT

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NO DOUBT THAT THERE IS ENORMOUS LABOR AND POPULAR DISCONTENT OVER LOW WAGES AND CONTINUING INFLATION. THE ALERT DECLARATION COULD EVEN SPARK A SPONTANEOUS STRIKE ACTION BY RANK-AND-FILE WORKERS. BUE JANUARY IS VACATION MONTH, TRADITIONALLY NOT A GOOD TIME FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION. WE THINK THE CHANCES FOR A GENERAL STRIKE, IF INDEED THERE IS ONE, WILL PROBABLY BE BETTER IN MARCH AND THEREAFTER. END COMMENT.  
CASTRO

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EMITTING A SIMILAR EVEN MORE DRAMATIC STATEMENT. (D) THE RECENT UNCOVERING OF A BANKING SCANDAL, ALLEGEDLY INVOLVING FINANCIERS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CLOSE TO MARTINEZ DE HOZ APPEARED TO MAKE THE ECONOMY MINISTER AND HIS TEAM "EASIER GAME."

6. TRADE UNION SOURCES, CONTACTED JANUARY 25, SEE THE "STATE OF ALERT" AS A WARNING TO VIDELA BUT NOT NECESSARILY A SIGNAL THAT A SUAREZ MASON COUP IS IMMINENT. THE NEW ARMY COMMAND ASSIGNMENTS ARE EXPECTED TO BE ANNOUNCED SHORTLY. THERE IS A BELIEF THAT VIOLA WILL DESIGNATE SUAREZ MASON AS CHIEF-OF-STAFF OF THE ARMY, WHICH, SHOULD THIS BE ACCOMPLISHED AND SUAREZ MASON ACCEPT, WOULD SIGNIFY AT LEAST A TEMPORARY ALLIANCE OF CONVENIENCE BETWEEN THE TWO GENERALS. THE STATE OF ALERT CALL PRESUMABLY IS INTENDED TO HELP THIS PROCESS ALONG IN THE BELIEF THAT THE FIRING OF MARTINEZ DE HOZ JUST MIGHT BE BROUGHT OFF AS A HAPPY RESULT. THE OBJECTIVE, THEN, IS FIRST OF ALL TO PRECIPITATE THE SACKING OF MARTINEZ DE HOZ AND TO HELP THE POLITICAL PROCESS MOVE IN A DIRECTION WHICH EVIDENTLY WORKER LEADERS, SOME INDUSTRIALISTS AND MILITARY MEN BELIEVE BETTER SUITS THEIR INTERESTS. LABOR SOURCES BELIEVE THAT VIOLA'S OBJECTIVE IS TO TRY TO SAVE PRESIDENT VIDELA AND PERHAPS EVEN MARTINEZ DE HOZ, BUT THAT IF THE PRESSURES SHOULD BECOME TOO GREAT, VIOLA MAY BE FORCED TO DISPOSE OF BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND THE ECONOMY MINISTER. REPORTEDLY, VIOLA AIDES ARE ALREADY TELLING TRADE UNION SOURCES THAT VIOLA PLANS TO TAKE THIS ACTION AND THEN DECLARE HIMSELF PRESIDENT IN VIDELA'S STEAD, I.E. HE WILL REVERT TO THE PREVIOUS MODEL OF THE ARMY COMMANDER HOLDING DOWN THE PRESIDENCY AT THE SAME TIME. (COMMENT: WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS IS INDEED VIOLA'S PLAN; WE KNOW ONLY THAT THIS IS WHAT HIS AIDES REPORTEDLY ARE CLAIMING. IT IS ALSO UNCLEAR TO US WHAT SUAREZ MASON'S ATTITUDE WOULD BE TO VIOLA'S RETAINING HIS COMMAND OF THE ARMY AND ASSUMING THE PRESIDENCY.)

7. (C) WORKER SOURCES CONTACTED JANUARY 25 DO NOT APPEAR TO ANTICIPATE A HARSH GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE COMMITTEE OF 25'S STATEMENT, ON THE THEORY THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS WEAK AND WILL NOT WISH TO TAKE ACTION WHICH MIGHT PRECIPITATE ITS OWN DOWNFALL. COMMENT: THIS MAY BE AN OVERLY COMPLACENT ATTITUDE. END COMMENT.

8. (C) LABOR SOURCES BELIEVE IT WOULD TAKE THE COMMITTEE OF 25 AT LEAST A WEEK, AND PROBABLY MORE, TO PREPARE THE GROUND WORK FOR AN EFFECTIVE GENERAL STRIKE BUT THAT THE SITUATION IS RIPE FOR A GOOD LABOR BLOW-UP. COMMENT: WORKER LEADERS WILL PROBABLY WANT SOME ASSURANCES FROM MILITARY CHIEFS THAT THEY WILL NOT BE SUBJECT TO SEVERE REPRISALS BEFORE COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO A GENERAL STRIKE. MUCH DEPENDS ON HOW THE GOVERNMENT REACTS TO THE THREAT TOO. THERE IS

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E.O. 12065: GDS 1/23/85 (HARRIS, F. ALLEN) OR-P  
TAGS: SHUM, AR  
SUBJECT: (U) VISIT OF IAHRC - HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION'S  
PREPARATIONS AND CONCERNS.

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).
2. AN INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE OF PERMANENT ASSEMBLY  
LAWYERS HAS BEEN ORGANIZED BY DRS. CONTE-MACDONELL AND  
MIGNONE AND HAS BEGUN PREPARING A "WHITE PAPER" ON ALL ASPECTS  
OF THE ARGENTINE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION FOR THE IAHRC.  
THE PAPER WILL EMPHASIZE THE LACK OF LEGAL REMEDIES AND  
PROCEDURES TO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA, THE VERY  
SAME ISSUE WHICH WE HAVE BEEN TOLD GOVERNMENT MEMBERS FEEL  
THEY CAN BEST USE TO DEFEND THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD.
3. HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERS ARE OPENLY EXPRESSING CONCERN  
ABOUT THE ABILITY OF IAHRC TEAM TO ABSORB THE HUGE AMOUNT  
OF CASE INFORMATION AVAILABLE AND ALSO LOOK INTO SUCH BROAD  
PRIORITY TOPICS AS CLANDESTINE PRISONERS, RIGHT TO TRIAL,  
PRISONER MISTREATMENT, TORTURE, AND THE THOUSANDS OF "DESAPARECIDOS"  
IN THE NINE OR TEN DAYS ALLOTTED FOR THE  
OAS GROUP'S STAY IN ARGENTINA. GIVEN THE LARGE NUMBER  
OF DISAPPEARANCE CASES IN ARGENTINA (WHICH THE HUMAN  
RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS NOW UNIFORMLY ESTIMATE AT AROUND  
15,000), IF ONLY A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THOSE CASES WERE  
TO BE ACTUALLY DISCUSSED OR INVESTIGATED BY IAHRC MEMBERS  
WHILE HERE, THIS WOULD OCCUPY A MAJOR AMOUNT OF THE OAS  
TEAM'S TIME.
4. THE CURRENT FOCUS FOR THE IAHRC VISIT WITHIN THE  
PERMANENT ASSEMBLY IS ON THE CLANDESTINE PRISONERS.  
ASSEMBLY MEMBERS BELIEVE THAT MOST OF THE DETENTION AND  
INTERROGATION FACILITIES PRESENTLY IN OPERATION ARE  
LOCATED ON MILITARY BASES--AREAS WHICH PROBABLY WILL BE  
OFF LIMITS TO THE COMMISSION. ALTHOUGH THE ASSEMBLY  
ACTIVISTS DISCOUNT THE PROSPECT OF FIRSTHAND "DISCOVERIES"  
BY THE COMMISSION, THEY ARE HOPING THAT THE "THREAT" OF  
SITE VISITS WILL PUT PRESSURE ON THE ARMED SERVICES TO  
RECOGNIZE AND/OR RELEASE THE CLANDESTINE PRISONERS THEY  
ARE HOLDING. (COMMENT: ALTHOUGH WE HAVE RECEIVED SEVERAL  
REPORTS OF THE CLOSING OF INTERROGATION FACILITIES--NAVY  
MECHANICS SCHOOL, "LA PERLA" AND "LA RIVERA" IN CORDOBA--  
WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE THE LARGE NUMBERS OF  
SURVIVING PRISONERS RUMORED TO BE HELD BY THE MILITARY.
5. TO FACILITATE THE DISAPPEARANCE CASE WORK OF THE  
COMMISSION A PERMANENT ASSEMBLY TASK FORCE, WORKING  
IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE LEAGUE FOR THE RIGHTS  
OF MAN AND THE ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS  
(MEMO), HAS PREPARED A LIST OF ALL THE DISAPPEARANCE  
CASES REPORTED TO THE THREE ORGANIZATIONS. AS OF  
JANUARY FIRST THE COMPUTERIZED LIST CONTAINED 4,497

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INFO 52065: GDS 1/22/65 (HARRIS, F. ALLEN) OR-P  
TAGS: SHUM, AR  
SUBJECT: (U). PREPARATIONS FOR IAHRC VISIT

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: PREPARATIONS FOR THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (IAHRC) ARE UNDER WAY IN THE MINISTRIES OF INTERIOR AND FOREIGN RELATIONS. GOA OFFICIALS SEE THE ARGENTINE HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD MOST VULNERABLE ON THE ISSUES OF TORTURE, MISTREATMENT OF PRISONERS, AND LONG-TERM DETENTION OF EXECUTIVE ("PODER EJECUTIVO NACIONAL") PRISONERS WITHOUT CHARGES. THE GOA IS TAKING STEPS ON THE LATTER POINT TO IMPROVE THE TREATMENT AND THE PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH ITS PEN PRISONERS. THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR HOPES TO REMOVE FROM PEN DETENTION ALL PRISONERS WHO ARE ALSO UNDER CHARGES BY THE CIVIL MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM. MOST NEW CASES ARE NOT BEING PLACED UNDER PEN, BUT UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF MILITARY COURTS. A FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL TOLD US HE DOES NOT SEE A GREAT THREAT COMING OUT OF AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION OF THE "DESAPARECIDOS". WITH NO HARD EVIDENCE OF GOA INVOLVEMENT AVAILABLE, THE ISSUE BECOMES A QUESTION OF THE GOVERNMENT'S WORD AGAINST THE WORD OF THE MISSING PERSON'S RELATIVES OR FRIENDS. END SUMMARY.

3. THE FOREIGN OFFICE WORKING GROUP ON HUMAN RIGHTS (FOWG) HAS BEGUN WORK TO PREPARE FOR THE DATE-MAY IAHRC VISIT TO ARGENTINA. AS A START, THE FOWG HAS PRODUCED A TWO-INCH BRIEFING BOOK FOR THE VISIT FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS NEW AIR FORCE TEAM. IN RECENT CONVERSATIONS, FOWG HEAD ARLIA ADMITTED THAT THERE ARE THREE PRINCIPAL AREAS WHERE THE ARGENTINE HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD IS VULNERABLE TO THE IAHRC INVESTIGATION. THE FIRST IS THE "BAD TREATMENT" RECEIVED BY PEN PRISONERS AND PERSONS "BEING QUESTIONED", AS ARLIA PHRASES IT. A NUMBER OF FIRST-HAND REPORTS OF SUCH MISTREATMENT WILL BE FORMALLY PRESENTED TO THE COMMISSION DURING ITS VISIT, AND ARLIA BELIEVES, THAT THE GOA CANNOT SUCCESSFULLY DISAVOW THOSE TESTIMONIES. THE SECOND AREA OF VULNERABILITY IS THE FAILURE OF THE GOVERNMENT TO TRY LARGE NUMBERS OF PRISONERS IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM. THE THIRD, AND COROLLARY, PROBLEM IS THE LONG DETENTION WITHOUT CHARGES OF A LARGE NUMBER OF PEN PRISONERS--SOME CASES FOR PERIODS OF THREE TO FOUR YEARS. IN THESE AREAS, THE FOREIGN OFFICE SEES LITTLE THAT THE GOA CAN DO TO REBUT THE IAHRC REPORT.

4. MINISTER ARLIA BLUNTLY STATED THAT THE ISSUE OF THE "DESAPARECIDOS" WAS NOT AN AREA OF CONCERN AS THERE WAS NOTHING THE GOVERNMENT COULD DO TO RESOLVE

THIS PROBLEM. THE DISAPPEARANCE REPORTS WOULD BE A QUESTION FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S WORD THAT THEY HAD NO INFORMATION ON THE CASES AGAINST THAT OF PARENTS AND OTHERS CLAIMING THAT GOVERNMENT FORCES WERE RESPONSIBLE.

5. ARLIA WENT ON TO EXPRESS THE MINISTRY'S DISPLEASURE OVER THE IAHRC'S RECENT FINDINGS AGAINST THE GOA IN 14 HUMAN RIGHTS CASE INVESTIGATIONS.

6. ARLIA SAID THAT THE GOA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE COMMISSION'S VISIT WOULD DEPEND ENTIRELY ON THE COMMISSION'S BEHAVIOR. IF THE COMMISSION MEMBERS CAME TO ARGENTINA PREPARED TO INCLUDE "HEARSAY EVIDENCE" IN ITS REPORT, THEY WOULD MEET STRONG OPPOSITION FROM THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. IF ON THE OTHER HAND, THE COMMISSION ARRIVED TO MAKE AN OBJECTIVE APPRAISAL OF THE ARGENTINE SCENE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE TERRORIST ANTECEDENTS OF THE ARGENTINE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM AND NOTING THE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE LAST YEAR, THE COMMISSION WOULD FIND THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT MOST COOPERATIVE.

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7. ACCORDING TO FOREIGN MINISTER PASTOR IN AN INTERVIEW WITH CLARIN PUBLISHED JANUARY 21, THE IAHRC WILL VISIT ARGENTINA "WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS" TO SEE THE "EVERYDAY REALITY" OF THE COUNTRY. THE COMMISSION WILL ALSO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE THE FUNCTIONING OF ARGENTINA'S LEGAL INSTITUTIONS WHICH, ALTHOUGH THEY CAN BE IMPROVED, ARE NOT ONLY ADEQUATE BUT "COULD SERVE AS A MODEL FOR OTHER COUNTRIES," PASTOR SAID. PASTOR ASID THAT ALTHOUGH THE IAHRC'S "IN LOCO" OBSERVATION VISITS FOLLOW CERTAIN GUIDELINES, IN PRACTICE THESE RULES ARE NOT RIGID, AND THEREFORE THEY SHOULD BE ORIENTED BETTER TO CAPTURE THE PARTICULAR ELEMENTS THAT MAKE UP THE CURRENT ARGENTINE SITUATION." AS FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY, PASTOR REMARKED THAT ALTHOUGH THE SITUATION IS STILL NOT WHAT EVERYONE WOULD WANT, IT IS PROGRESSING TOWARD FULL REESTABLISHMENT OF GUARANTEES AND FREEDOMS CONTAINED IN THE CONSTITUTION, AS THE CAUSES OF THE PROBLEMS CONTINUE TO DIMINISH. EMBASSY COMMENT: WE STILL DO NOT KNOW WHAT JAIL AND OTHER FACILITIES THE IAHRC WILL BE ALLOWED TO SEE. TO US PASTOR'S COMMENT SAYS "WE'RE STILL PLAYING IT BY EAR." END COMMENT.

8. A SOURCE AT THE INTERIOR MINISTRY (SAN ROMAN-SEE SAN ROMAN/SACKETT-HARRIS MEMCON OF JANUARY 10, NOTAL) SPOKE RECENTLY OF A NUMBER OF IMPROVEMENTS BEING SOUGHT IN PRISONER TREATMENT AND IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF RIGHT OF OPTION PROGRAM. WITHOUT LINKING THESE IMPROVEMENTS DIRECTLY TO THE IAHRC VISIT, HE SPOKE OF CONCENTRATING PEN PRISONERS WITHIN SIX PRISONS, WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM TRANSFERRED TO THE INTERIOR MINISTRY AND AWAY FROM THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, AND OF REDUCING PEN NUMBERS BY REMOVING FROM THE LISTS THOSE CHARGED WITH CRIMES. SAN ROMAN SPOKE ALSO OF GETTING BETTER HOLD OF THE RIGHT OF OPTION PROCESS, WITH THE IDEA OF GETTING MORE PEOPLE OUT OF THE COUNTRY. FINALLY, HE MENTIONED THE IDEA OF HAVING THE ARMED FORCES DECLARE FLATLY THEY ARE NOT HOLDING CLANDESTINE PRISONERS--THUS CREATING A PRESUMPTION OF DEATH FOR THE DISAPPEARED AND RESOLVING AT LEAST IN PART THE ANXIETY AND LEGAL PROBLEMS FACED BY THE FAMILIES OF THE MISSING.

9. WHERE WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO DETECT THOROUGH PREPARATIONS FOR THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION IS AT THE CASES ROSADA. A PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT (MALLEA GIL, PROTECT) TOLD AN EMBASSY OFFICER JANUARY 10 THAT, BY CONTRAST, HE WAS BASICALLY RESIGNED TO THE COMMISSION'S WRITING AN "UNFAVORABLE REPORT" AFTER ITS MAY 29-JUNE 6 VISIT HERE. CASTRO

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E. O. 12065: GDS 1/19/65 (HARRIS, F. ALLEN) OR-P  
SUBJECT: "LAW OF CONDONATION": A WAY OUT FOR THE MILITARY WHEN  
THEY NEED A WAY OUT? (C)

REF: CONTE, MIGNONE, HARRIS MEMCOM OF 12/29/78

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: RADICALS, CHRISTIAN  
DEMOCRATS, PERONISTS AND OTHER POLITICIANS HAVE AGAIN  
BEGUN DISCUSSING PROPOSALS FOR "ADVANCE FORGETFULNESS"  
FOR THE ACTIONS OF ARGENTINA'S MILITARY IN ITS "DIRTY  
WAR" AGAINST SUBVERSION, AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO  
POLITICAL NORMALIZATION. ALTHOUGH THE "LEY DE OLVIDO"  
IDEA IS BEING DEBATED ONLY WITHIN LIMITED POLITICAL  
CIRCLES, THE FACT THAT THESE PROPOSALS HAVE RESURFACED  
CONSTITUTES AN ESTIMATE BY ARGENTINE POLITICIANS THAT  
THE VIDELA-VIOLA GOVERNMENT LOOKS LESS VIABLE,  
AND THE PROSPECT FOR CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT--ALTHOUGH  
STILL FAR IN THE FUTURE--THEREBY MOVES CLOSER.  
END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

3. MANY POLITICAL OBSERVERS HERE BELIEVE THAT THE  
THREAT PERCEIVED BY THE ARMED FORCES OF FUTURE  
INVESTIGATIONS OF THEIR CONDUCT OF ANTI-SUBVERSIVE  
OPERATIONS WILL CONSTITUTE A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO  
POLITICAL NORMALIZATION IN ARGENTINA. CONSEQUENTLY,  
POLITICIANS IN ARGENTINA DEVELOPED AND ARE NOW AGAIN  
DISCUSSING AMONG THEMSELVES FORMULAE FOR ASSURING  
THE MILITARY THAT NO "NUREMBERG-TYPE" TRIALS WILL BE  
HELD IN ARGENTINA UPON THE MILITARY'S WITHDRAWAL FROM  
THE GOVERNMENT. BOTH PERONISTS AND RADICALS CLAIM  
CREDIT FOR ORIGINATING THE IDES OF A "LEY DE OLVIDO"  
(LAW OF FORGETFULNESS OR CONDONATION).

4. CONDONATION FOR THE MILITARY WAS ORIGINALLY DISCUSSED  
IN 1976 AS TAKING THE FORM OF A SECRET COMPACT BETWEEN  
THE LEADERSHIP OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE  
MILITARY TO FORGET IN THE FUTURE THE EXCESSES COMMITTED  
IN THE WAR AGAINST SUBVERSION. ANOTHER BODY OF POLITICAL  
OPINION TODAY HOLDS THAT SUCH A SECRET COMPACT WOULD  
NOT ASSUAGE THE MILITARY'S CONCERNS AND THAT MORE  
ELABORATE, AMNESTY TYPE PROPOSALS ARE NOW NEEDED.  
RECENTLY, RADICAL PARTY LEADER BALBIN TOLD EMBOFF  
PRIVATELY THAT A BROAD AND PUBLIC CONSENSUS WOULD  
BE NEEDED ON THE CONDONATION ISSUE FOR SUCH A  
REMISE TO BE CREDIBLY TO THE MILITARY.

5. THE CREDIBILITY QUESTION IS COMPLICATED IN THE  
VIEW OF OTHER POLITICAL OBSERVERS BY THE FACT THAT  
EACH OF THE ARMED SERVICES AND THE POLICE FORCES  
HARBOR INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE REGARDING THE OTHER

PARTICIPANTS IN THE REPRESSION. EACH GROUP FEARS THAT  
THIS INFORMATION MAY BE SURFACED AGAINST THEM IN THE  
FUTURE IN INTER-SERVICE RIVALRIES. BLUNTLY STATED,  
IF THE ARMED SERVICES AND THE POLICE CANNOT HANG  
TOGETHER (WHICH APPEARS UNLIKELY, BASED UPON RIVALRIES  
VISIBLE TODAY), THEY MAY HANG EACH OTHER INDIVIDUALLY.

6. ALTHOUGH THE QUESTION OF CONDONATION HAS NOT  
BEEN WIDELY DISCUSSED IN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCILS,  
EMILIO MIGNONE, ONE OF THE LEADERS OF THE PERMANENT  
ASSEMBLY, RECENTLY INDICATED HIS PERSONAL SUPPORT FOR  
A CONDONATION PROPOSAL. MIGNONE ARGUED THAT AN  
AMNESTY TYPE PROPOSAL WAS NECESSARY BEFORE THE  
MILITARY WOULD PROVIDE INFORMATION REGARDING THE  
WHEREABOUTS OF "DESAPARECIDOS" OR RELEASE THE  
CLANDESTINE PRISONERS THEY ARE BELIEVED TO BE HOLD-  
ING. MOST HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS, HOWEVER, VIEW  
THE FUTURE IN TERMS OF EXPLANATIONS AND JUSTICE.

7. EMBASSY COMMENT:  
CONSIDERATION OF CONDONING  
THE MILITARY FOR THE ENTIRE RANGE OF ITS ANTI-  
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES SHOWS THE PRICE WHICH SOME  
OF ARGENTINA'S POLITICAL LEADERS MAY BE WILLING TO  
PAY TO SMOOTH THE MILITARY'S RETURN PATH TO THE  
BARRACKS. AT PRESENT WE BELIEVE THESE DISCUSSIONS  
ARE BEING HELD ONLY AMONG THE POLITICIANS. THE  
MILITARY'S PLANNING HORIZON IS STILL TOO LONG FOR  
THEIR ACTIVE CONCERN AND PARTICIPATION ON THIS  
ISSUE. THE FACT THAT CONDONATION FOR THE MILITARY  
IS AGAIN BEING DISCUSSED MAY SAY MORE ABOUT THE  
POLITICIAN'S VIEW THAT THE VIDELA-VIOLA GOVERNMENT  
IS IN SERIOUS TROUBLE THAT IT DOES ABOUT QUESTIONS  
OF FUTURE JUSTICE. OPINION HERE IS THAT SEVERAL  
STAGES MUST BE PASSED BEFORE CIVILIANS ONCE AGAIN  
RUN THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. NO REALISTIC PERSON  
BELIEVES HERE THAT VIDELA AND VIOLA WILL BE REPLACED  
BY A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT--ONLY THAT THEIR DEPARTURE  
BRINGS THIS ULTIMATE EVENT CLOSER. END COMMENT.  
CASTRO

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SOC-02 OMD-01 DOE-15 ACDA-12 MC-02 XMB-02 HA-05  
FTC-01 JUSE-00 MCT-02 NRC-05 OES-09 /181 W  
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R 181700Z JAN 79  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9153  
INFO AMEMBASSY BOHN  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
AMEMBASSY KINGSTON  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MEXICO  
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AMEMBASSY ROME  
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE  
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USEEC

E.O. 12065: CDS 1/17/85 (KELLY, GEORGE L.) OR-C  
TAGS: EFIN ESTC ETRD EARD AR  
SUBJ: EXPORT DISINCENTIVES  
REF: 76 STATE 317134

(ENTIRE TEXT CONFIDENTIAL)

1. SUMMARY: AS A RESULT OF SELF-IMPOSED DISINCENTIVES TO EXPORTS OVER A PERIOD OF APPROXIMATELY 18 MONTHS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1978, US FIRMS LOST, OR WERE PREVENTED FROM EFFECTIVELY COMPETING FOR, SALES TO ARGENTINA AMOUNTING TO BETWEEN \$2.5 AND \$4 BILLION. THE LARGEST SHARE OF THIS TOTAL IS REPRESENTED BY ARGENTINE ARMS PURCHASES FROM THIRD COUNTRIES, (\$1.6 BILLION), FOR WHICH THE US COULD NOT COMPETE UNDER EXISTING ARMS SALES POLICY. ACTIONS BY USG IN SUPPORT OF ITS HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY TO DENY EXPORT LICENSES OR TO OPPOSE CREDIT FOR ARGENTINE PROJECTS AFFECTED POTENTIAL EXPORTS OF \$1,065,150,000. DENIAL OF LICENSES FOR MUNITIONS EXPORTS - \$122 MILLION; DENIAL OF VALIDATED LICENSES BY DEPT. OF COMMERCE - \$30.1 MILLION; EXIM BANK CREDIT DELAYS OR DENIALS - \$331.05 MILLION; AND US VOTES IN MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS - \$58 MILLION. ARGENTINA FOUND ALTERNATIVE SOURCES FOR CREDIT AND FOR VIRTUALLY ALL GOODS, MILITARY OR OTHERWISE. US RESTRICTIONS HAVE NEITHER PREVENTED ARGENTINA FROM GIRDING FOR WAR NOR COERCED HER TO CEASE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. PRINCIPAL IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM EFFECT HAS BEEN TO DAMAGE SERIOUSLY THE IMAGE OF US AS A RELIABLE SOURCE OF GOODS AND CREDIT AND TO FOSTER ESTABLISHMENT OF TRADING CHANNELS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES THAT WILL AFFECT US TRADE WITH ARGENTINA FOR YEARS TO COME. END SUMMARY.

2. THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS KEYED TO REFTEL WITHIN EACH CATEGORY OF DISINCENTIVE, SECTIONS OF RESPONSE ARE

DESIGNATED (A) (ATTAINMENT OF POLICY OBJECTIVE), (B) (EXTENT OF EXPORT LOSSES), AND (C) (IMPACT ON OVERALL RELATIONS WITH GOA).

3. (1 - ARMS CONTROL)

(A) ATTAINMENT OF OBJECTIVES - ALTHOUGH ALL ACTUAL DENIALS OF ARMS TRANSFERS TO ARGENTINA IN FY 1978 WERE BASED ON HUMAN RIGHTS GROUNDS (SEE PARAGRAPH 7), THE ENUNCIATED CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER POLICY WORLDWIDE EFFECTIVELY REMOVED THE US FROM CONSIDERATION BY ARGENTINA AS A SOURCE FOR MANY ITEMS. IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO CONCLUDE THAT BASIC USG ARMS CONTROL POLICY REDUCED THE THREAT TO WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY EQUILIBRIUM IN ARGENTINA AND ENVIRONS, AS THE GOA WAS ABLE, WITH ARMS OBTAINED FROM NON-US SOURCES, TO PREPARE --APPARENTLY ADEQUATELY-- FOR A POSSIBLE WAR WITH CHILE OVER THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE.

(B) EXPORT LOSS - EMBASSY IS AWARE OF FOLLOWING ITEMS (WHICH MUST BE REGARDED AS A MINIMUM LISTING; THERE WERE DOUBTLESS MANY MORE) PURCHASED RECENTLY BY ARGENTINA FROM INDICATED COUNTRIES. NOT INCLUDED ARE MUNITIONS PURCHASES, BELIEVED TO TOTAL SEVERAL MILLION DOLLARS.

VENDOR	ITEMS	COST (US\$)
UK	147 LASER RANGE FINDERS	4,000,000
UK	26 IFF TRANSPONDERS	500,000
UK	50 GYRO STABILIZED DOPPLER NAVIGATORS	11,000,000
FRANCE	2 CORVETTES	200,000,000
FRANCE	CROTALE AA MISSILES	10,000,000
FRANCE	EXOCET MISSILES (SHIP TO SHIP)	12,000,000
FRANCE	ETENDARD AIRCRAFT (TO REPLACE A4S)	UNKNOWN
FRANCE	1 ROLAND MISSILES SYSTEM	50,000,000
FRANCE	50 RADIO ALTIMETERS	1,000,000
FRANCE	9 PUMA HELICOPTERS	81,000,000
FRANCE	60 PANHARD ARMORED CARS	18,000,000
NETHERLANDS	FOKKER F-28 AIRCRAFT 12 OR 31	15,000,000
FRG	6 DESTROYERS	900,000,000
FRG	4 SUBMARINES	800,000,000
FRG	500 TANKS (JOINT FRG-ARGENTINE DEVELOPMENT LICENSE)	250,000,000
FRG	2 PATROL BOATS	1,800,000
ISRAEL	76 MIRAGE V AIRCRAFT	190,000,000
ISRAEL	100 SHAFRIR MISSILES	4,500,000
ISRAEL	7 PATROL BOATS (DABUR CLASS)	15,000,000
CANADA	50 BOMBING DISPLAYS FOR A4 AIRCRAFT	8,500,000
ITALY	9 AGUSTA HELICOPTERS	30,000,000
AUSTRIA	50 TANKS (PANZERJAGER "K")	28,000,000
TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS:		\$2,622,800,000.
WE ARE AWARE THAT MANY OF THE SALES LISTED MIGHT NOT HAVE		

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SOE-02 OMB-01 DOE-15 ACOA-12 MC-02 XMB-02 HA-05  
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R 191700Z JAN 79  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9154  
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
AMEMBASSY KINGSTON  
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BEEN MADE BY THE US EVEN HAD THERE BEEN NO RESTRICTIVE  
ICIES, AND ALSO THAT SOME OF ABOVE EQUIPMENT COULD  
POSSIBLY NOT HAVE BEEN SUPPLIED BY US BECAUSE OF NON-  
AVAILABILITY IN US INVENTORY. SOME OF THIS MIGHT HAVE  
BEEN AVAILABLE, HOWEVER, HAD US FIRMS BEEN ALLOWED TO  
MANUFACTURE AND MARKET ARMS WITHOUT LIMITATION.

(C) IMPACT ON RELATIONS - AS IN MANY LATIN AMERICAN  
COUNTRIES, THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, WHICH IN ARGENTINA  
IS SYNONYMOUS WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, CHAFES AT  
US ARMS TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS THAT PREVENT ITS ACQUIRING  
WEAPONS SYSTEMS OR SUPPLIES PREFERRED OVER THOSE OF  
COMPETING SUPPLIERS. IN ARGENTINE MINDS, HOWEVER, IT  
WAS OUR DISCONTENT OVER HUMAN RIGHTS WHICH LED TO A US  
ARMS CUTOFF - OUR OTHER ARMS LIMITATION POLICIES ARE  
NOT WELL KNOWN. SEE THEREFORE PARAGRAPH 7 BELOW.

4. (III - FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT - FCPA)

(A) WE HAVE INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION ON WHICH TO JUDGE  
SUCCESS OF FCPA IN ELIMINATING ILLEGAL PAYMENTS.  
HOWEVER, COMMENTS REPORTED UNDER 16, IMMEDIATELY  
FOLLOWING, INDICATE THAT FCPA IS INHIBITING PAYMENTS  
THAT MIGHT OTHERWISE BE MADE.

(B) LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES OF US FIRMS HAVE INFORMED  
EMBASSY (MOST RECENTLY IN COURSE OF SURVEY OF IMPACT OF  
US DOLLAR DEVALUATION ON TRADE) THAT ONE MEANS WIDELY  
EMPLOYED BY COMPETITOR-NATION FIRMS IN OVERCOMING US  
PRICE ADVANTAGE HAS BEEN INCREASED USE OF "DIRTY TACTICS",  
(INCLUDING BRIBES), AND THAT US FIRMS INHIBITED BY LAW  
(OR PRINCIPLES) FROM USING SAME TACTICS ARE CLEARLY  
ADVERSELY AFFECTED. WE HAVE NO WAY OF ESTIMATING VALUE  
OF EXPORTS LOST FOR THIS REASON.

(C) FCPA PER SE HAS HAD NO PERCEIVABLE EFFECT ON OUR  
RELATIONS WITH GOA.

5. (IV - ANTI-BOYCOTT AND ANTITRUST)

WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON ANY DIRECT OR INDIRECT EFFECTS  
ON TRADE OF US ANTI-BOYCOTT OR ANTITRUST LAWS.

6. (V - REEXPORTS)

SO FAR AS WE ARE AWARE, ARGENTINA IS NOT A CENTER OF  
DIVERSIONS OF US GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES TO PROHIBITED  
DESTINATIONS.

7. (VI.C. - HUMAN RIGHTS)

(A) ATTAINMENT OF OBJECTIVES - ACTIONS TAKEN TO DELAY OR  
PREVENT SALES OR TO DENY CREDITS TO ARGENTINA HAVE, OF  
COURSE, CALLED THE ATTENTION OF GOA OFFICIALS AND THE  
ARGENTINE PUBLIC TO THE USG WISH TO DISSOCIATE ITSELF  
FROM REPRESSIVE PRACTICES. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT  
THESE DISINCENTIVES HAVE HAD ANY EFFECT IN  
FURTHERING THE US POLICY OBJECTIVE OF AN IMPROVEMENT IN  
THE ACTUAL OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE DISINCENTIVES HAVE  
RAISED THE VISIBILITY OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE BUT IN  
THE CONTEXT OF "A PROBLEM THAT WE HAVE WITH THE USG"  
AND NOT WITH THE RESULT OF FURTHER-  
ING REASONED DISCUSSION WITHIN GOA OF HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. REASONS  
WE BELIEVE EXPORT DISINCENTIVES HAVE NOT ATTAINED OUR  
HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES ARE (1) THE GOA CONVICTION THAT  
ACTIONS WE HAVE OBJECTED TO ARE JUSTIFIED AND/OR  
UNAVOIDABLE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE "DIRTY WAR" IN WHICH  
THEY OCCURRED; (2) GOA RESENTMENT OF US "MEDDLING" IN  
INTERNAL ARGENTINE AFFAIRS, AND GOA'S INEVITABLE  
RELUCTANCE TO APPEAR AS APPEASING SUCH INTERFERENCE;  
(3) THE FACT THAT CREDITS AND NEARLY ALL GOODS ARE  
AVAILABLE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES ANXIOUS TO SUPPLY THEM;  
(4) THE EXISTENCE OF A \$6 BILLION FOREIGN EXCHANGE  
RESERVE (17 MONTHS IMPORTS) AT THE ARGENTINE CENTRAL  
BANK AND CONTINUING FAVORABLE CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES,  
AND (5) FACT THAT ARGENTINES REGARD APPLICATION OF US  
HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY TO THEIR COUNTRY AS INCONSISTENT  
WITH POLICY AS APPLIED TO OTHER COUNTRIES. THE GOA'S  
STRONG ECONOMIC POSITION AND HIGH LEVEL OF EXCHANGE  
RESERVES, TOGETHER WITH THE EAGERNESS OF OTHER COUNTRIES  
TO SUPPLANT US AS A SUPPLIER OR LENDER HAS MEANT THAT  
ECONOMIC COERCION WAS EFFECTIVE IN PRODUCING ONLY  
IRRITATION AND OCCASIONAL PALLIATIVE FOR USG CONSUMPTION.  
THERE ARE GROUNDS TO DOUBT THAT THE  
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS HAVE SUCCEEDED IN CONVEYING THE PRECISE  
POLITICAL AND ETHICAL MESSAGE THE USG INTENDED. THE  
VARIOUS RATIONALES FOR VOTING AGAINST OR ABSTENTIONS ON  
A VARIETY OF IDB, IBRD, AND EXIM BANK APPLICATIONS ARE  
NOT PERCEIVED BY THE ARGENTINE OFFICIALS CONCERNED --  
OR BY THE PUBLIC -- AS RELATED TO IMPROVEMENT OR LACK  
THEREOF ON HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN ARGENTINA. THE  
FINE-TUNING AT THE US END IS SIMPLY LOST ON ARGENTINES  
WHO BELIEVE THAT THE MEASURES ARE WRONG AND INTER-  
VENTIONIST IN THE FIRST PLACE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE  
EXIM BANK DECISION TO CONSIDER FINANCING OF THE YACYRETA  
PROJECT PLAYED A ROLE IN A SIGNIFICANT  
HUMAN RIGHTS "SUCCESS" OF 1978: AGREEMENT BY GOA TO  
RECEIVE THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION.  
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN ALL ITS ASPECTS HAS BEEN EFFECTIVE  
HERE IN CREATING THE DESIRED PUBLIC AWARENESS OF US  
AND INTERNATIONAL ATTITUDES, ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT YET  
OVERCOME WIDESPREAD PUBLIC APATHY CONCERNING THE FATE  
OF THE JAILED AND THE MISSING. OUR ATTEMPTS AT  
ECONOMIC COERCION CAN ONLY BY  
STRETCHING THE IMAGINATION BE LINKED TO CONCRETE, INDIVIDUAL  
HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN ARGENTINA AND MAY EVEN HAVE CAUSED  
INTRANSIGENCE IN QUARTERS WHERE THE POWER TO CHANGE  
THE SITUATION REALLY LIES.

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R 191700Z JAN 79  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
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OF THE PROJECT.) THE FOLLOWING LOANS ARE LISTED AS A PROBABLE TRADE LOSS BECAUSE US BIDDERS ON THE RESULTING PROJECTS ARE SEVERELY HANDICAPPED AT THE START BY THE DISAPPROVAL EXPRESSED BY THE US GOVERNMENT THROUGH ITS ABSTENTION OR ITS NEGATIVE VOTE. ALL LOANS WERE APPROVED DESPITE US ACTIONS.

IDB - CELULOSA ARGENTINA PAPER PROJECT (\$54 MILLION);  
IFC CREDIT FOR SOYBEAN PROCESSING PLANT (\$7 MILLION);  
IBRD - INDUSTRIAL CREDIT (\$100 MILLION); IDB - GAS PIPELINE (\$36 MILLION); IDB - PETROCHEMICAL COMPLEX (\$105 MILLION);  
IFC CREDIT FOR CEMENT PROJECT (\$9 MILLION); IBRD - AGRICULTURAL CREDIT PROJECT (\$60 MILLION); AND IDB - YACYRETA HYDRO POWER PROJECT (\$210 MILLION).

GRAND TOTAL OF 1, 2, 3, AND 4, ABOVE IS \$1.065 BILLION. THESE ARE KNOWN CASES BUT THERE ARE PROBABLY MANY MORE. WE KNOW FROM FREQUENT COMMENTS BY AFFECTED US BUSINESSMEN AND LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES OF US FIRMS THAT THE VOLUME OF EXPORTS LOST BECAUSE OF DELAYS OR DENIALS RELATED TO HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY HAVE INFLUENCED ARGENTINE BUYERS WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY ENCOUNTERED INCONVENIENCE AND DELAY TO IGNORE THE US AS A SOURCE RATHER THAN RISK FURTHER ANNOYANCE OR REFUSAL. KNOWLEDGE THAT USG FINANCING WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE IF REQUESTED PLACES US FIRMS AT DISADVANTAGE WHEN COMPETING WITH FOREIGN FIRMS ABLE TO OFFER ATTRACTIVE PRICE PACKAGE INCLUDING FINANCIAL BACKING BY THEIR GOVERNMENTS.

EXAMPLES: -- IN THE CASE OF THE YACYRETA HYDRO POWER PROJECT, ALTHOUGH THE EXIM BANK REVERSED ITS POSITION AND ISSUED A LETTER OF INTEREST, THE INITIAL DENIAL BY EXIM AND THE US ABSTENTION FROM THE IDB VOTE FOR YACYRETA ON HUMAN RIGHTS GROUNDS HAVE ALIENATED MANY ARGENTINE DECISION-MAKERS, DISCOURAGED POTENTIAL US BIDDERS, AND COULD EVENTUALLY CAUSE LOSSES OF HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN EXPORTS ON THIS PROJECT ALONE.

-- FOLLOWING THE US VOTE AGAINST AN IDB LOAN FOR A GAS PIPELINE IN SOUTHERN ARGENTINA, THE EMBASSY HEARD THAT ARGENTINE ANNOYANCE AT THE US VOTE PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN OUR SUBSEQUENT LOSS (DESPITE A LOWER BID BY THE US FIRM) OF THIS PROJECT TO A FRENCH FIRM.

-- WHEN THE DELAYS AND DENIALS IN MUNITIONS CONTROL CASES ON HUMAN RIGHTS GROUNDS MADE IT EVIDENT THAT THE US WAS NO LONGER A RELIABLE SOURCE, A LEADING ARGENTINE REPRESENTATIVE OF FOREIGN FIRMS (WITH MANY LONG-STANDING TIES WITH MAJOR US FIRMS) MADE A SPECIAL TRIP TO THE UK TO SEEK ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIERS OF ELECTRONIC AND OTHER TYPES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

-- EMBASSY WAS TOLD BY A LEADING US SUPPLIER THAT A DIRECTIVE WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE ARGENTINE NAVY THAT NON-US SOURCES SHOULD BE USED TO EXTENT POSSIBLE FOR ALL ITEMS BECAUSE OF PROBLEMS WITH US AS A SUPPLIER.

-- ALTHOUGH EXCON LICENSE WAS ISSUED AT LAST MINUTE FOR MARINE TURBINE ENGINES FOR FRIGATES TO BE BUILT IN FRG, GENERAL ELECTRIC LOST THE SALE BECAUSE OF THE MOMENTUM DEVELOPED TOWARD ALTERNATIVE SOURCING DURING THE LONG PERIOD OF DELAYED US ACTION. THE ARGENTINES, AFTER EXPERIENCE OVER THE PRECEDING YEAR WITH UNAVAILABLE US EXPORT LICENSES, HAD DEMANDED THAT THIS ONE BE OBTAINED BEFORE GE COULD SIGN THE TURBINE CONTRACT. (ALTHOUGH THERE WAS STRONG HINT OF BRIBERY BY SUCCESSFUL BIDDER IN THIS CASE, GE REPRESENTATIVES BELIEVED THAT THEY COULD HAVE MADE THE SALE IF EXCON LICENSE HAD BEEN AVAILABLE AT START OF NEGOTIATIONS.)

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(B) REDUCED EXPORTS - AVAILABLE INFORMATION SHOWS THAT THE US HAS LOST EXPORTS OR BEEN EFFECTIVELY PREVENTED FROM COMPETING FOR SALES TO ARGENTINA IN THE AMOUNTS SHOWN BELOW AS A RESULT OF THE APPLICATION (FOR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY REASONS) OF THE INDICATED DISINCENTIVES:

(1) EXPORTS OF MUNITIONS - \$123 MILLION. (FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) HELD UP AND NEVER APPROVED DURING FY 1978: \$28 MILLION; PLUS 212 MUNITIONS LIST LICENSE APPLICATIONS FOR COMMERCIAL SALES DISAPPROVED DURING FY 1975 OR ALLOWED TO EXPIRE ON OCTOBER 1, 1978: \$95 MILLION. LATTER FIGURE DOES NOT INCLUDE ADVISORY OPINION REQUESTS ON SALES PROPOSALS. NOTE: THERE IS PROBABLY SOME OVERLAP OF MUNITIONS LIST DENIALS ON HUMAN RIGHTS GROUNDS WITH EXAMPLES LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF EXPORTS LOST TO OTHER COUNTRIES UNDER BASIC ARMS CONTROLS.)

(2) COMMERCE EXPORT CONTROLS - \$30.1 MILLION: COMPUTERIZED VEHICLE DISPATCH AND CONTROL SYSTEM FOR ROSARIO POLICE (\$3,400,000); MARINE PROPULSION TURBINE ENGINES FROM GENERAL ELECTRIC FOR ARGENTINE FRIGATES TO BE BUILT IN FRG (\$26,700,000) (SALE OF ENGINES WAS LOST DESPITE LAST MINUTE GRANT OF EXPORT LICENSE.)

(3) EXIM BANK CREDIT DELAYS OR DENIALS - \$331.05 MILLION. TELEPHONE SWITCHING EQUIPMENT (\$200 MILLION); RADIO LINKAGE SYSTEMS (\$20 MILLION); TELEX MODEMS (\$3 MILLION); STEEL MAKING EQUIPMENT (TWO SEPARATE SALES) (\$50,811,891); STEAM BOILERS (\$9 MILLION); OIL DRILLING EQUIPMENT (\$5 MILLION); OCEANOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT (\$9 MILLION); METHANOL PLANT (\$15 MILLION); MICROWAVE EQUIPMENT FOR ARGENTINE PTT (\$11,650,000).

(4) US VOTES IN MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS - \$581 MILLION. NOTE: FIGURES GIVEN FOR LOANS ARE NOT EQUIVALENT TO POTENTIAL US EXPORTS AFFECTED. EXPORTS COULD HAVE BEEN EVEN MORE IN THOSE CASES IN WHICH LOANS COVER ONLY A FRACTION OF THE TOTAL VALUE

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USEEC

-- ANOTHER CLIFF-HANGER (WHICH APPARENTLY TURNED OUT FAVORABLY FOR US) INVOLVED THE SUSPENDED PRELIMINARY COMMITMENT FOR FINANCING BY EXIM BANK OF DREDGING OF BUENOS AIRES HARBOR BY GREAT LAKES DREDGE AND DOCK. GREAT LAKES WOULD HAVE LOST TO JAPANESE OR DUTCH COMPETITORS WITHOUT EXIM BACKING. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT HAD FINAL CONFIRMATION THAT PAPERS HAVE BEEN SIGNED, GREAT LAKES INFORMED US IN DECEMBER THEY HAD DEFINITELY SECURED CONTRACT FOR THIS \$42 MILLION-PLUS PROJECT.

(C2) RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT - THE WITHHOLDING OR REFUSAL OF LICENSES FOR THE SHIPMENT OF MUNITIONS LIST ITEMS UNDER SEC. 502B OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT (AND IN PART IN ANTICIPATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 30, 1978 DEADLINE FOR APPLICATION OF THE HUMPHREY/KENNEDY AMENDMENT) SUBJECTED US-ARGENTINE RELATIONS TO CONSIDERABLE STRAIN. IT DID NOT, HOWEVER, LEAD TO A REQUEST FOR THE DEPARTURE OF THE MILITARY GROUP OR TO OTHER THAN MUTED OFFICIAL DENUNCIATIONS OF THE US HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY IN GENERAL TERMS. CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATIONS AND OTHER US OFFICIALS INTERESTED IN INVESTIGATING HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS IN ARGENTINA HAVE BEEN RECEIVED COURTEOUSLY AND GIVEN ACCESS TO TOP OFFICIALS HERE. THERE IS A PERVASIVE CONCERN IN ARGENTINA AT ALL LEVELS FOR THE NATION'S FAVORABLE INTERNATIONAL IMAGE, ACCOMPANIED BY DEEP-SEATED PRIVATE RESENTMENT, PARTICULARLY IN MILITARY CIRCLES, AT WHAT IS SEEN AS DISCRIMINATORY APPLICATION OF THE US HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY. THE HUMPHREY/KENNEDY AMENDMENT ITSELF WILL BE A SOURCE OF FRICTION EVEN THOUGH THE SUPPLIES EMBARGOED ARE BEING PURCHASED ELSEWHERE. THE US STAND IN THE IERD AND THE WORLD BANK IS THOUGHT TO BE IN VIOLATION OF THE CHARTERS OF BOTH INSTITUTIONS AND, OF COURSE, DAMAGING TO ARGENTINA'S REPUTATION, THOUGH NOT TO ITS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS.

8. (VI.F. -TERRORISM) NOT APPLICABLE TO ARGENTINA.

9. (IX - NUCLEAR) OUR TOUGH NUCLEAR POLICY HAS CAUSED ARGENTINA TO REACH OUT TO OTHER SUPPLIERS FOR EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES,

BUT SO FAR AS WE ARE AWARE, US HAS NOT TO DATE DENIED EXPORT TO ARGENTINA OF ANY GOODS OR TECHNOLOGY ON GROUND THAT IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY. HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY IS UNDER CONSIDERATION IF ARGENTINA MEETS US REQUIREMENTS. (THE EXPORT OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (90 PERCENT) TO ARGENTINA FOR USE IN ITS RESEARCH REACTORS WILL BE RESTRICTED IN THE FUTURE DUE TO REGULATIONS UNDER THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ACT.)

10. (XI) - EXTRA-TERRITORIAL) (I - REEXPORTS)

WE ARE NOT AWARE THAT ARGENTINA IS EITHER A CONDUIT OR DESTINATION FOR US-ORIGIN GOODS OR DATA BEING DIVERTED IN VIOLATION OF US EXPORT CONTROLS. HOWEVER, IN CONNECTION WITH DEVELOPMENT NOTED IN FOLLOWING SUBPARAGRAPH, IT WOULD BE REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT THE TEMPTATION TO DIVERT WOULD HAVE BEEN FELT BY US FIRMS PREVENTED FROM SUPPLYING ARGENTINE BUYERS DIRECT FROM US AND POSSIBLY BY ARGENTINE BUYERS DETERMINED (FOR REASONS OF PRICE, LACK OF ACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTES, ETC.) TO OBTAIN US ITEMS DESPITE US EXPORT CONTROLS. (2) WE HAVE NO PRECISE INFORMATION ON IMPORTS INTO ARGENTINA FROM FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES OF US FIRMS AS ALTERNATIVES TO PROCUREMENT FROM US, BUT LOCAL BUSINESSMEN HAVE TOLD US THAT US FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES ARE AMONG THE OBVIOUS ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF GOODS THAT CANNOT BE SHIPPED TO ARGENTINA FROM US. DANGER TO US EXPORTS OF THIS TREND IS THAT CHANNELS OF DISTRIBUTION ESTABLISHED IN REACTION TO US DISINCENTIVES WILL TEND TO SURVIVE FOR YEARS AFTER FOREIGN IMPORTERS LEARN THEY CAN GET EQUIVALENT OR UNACCEPTABLY SIMILAR GOODS FROM OTHER SOURCES WITHOUT PAPERWORK AND DELAYS INVOLVED IN US PURCHASES.

11. (XIII - DELAYS IN PROCESSING EXPORT LICENSES) COVERED BY PORTIONS OF PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 7.

12. (XIV - HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES) WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON EFFECT CONTROLS ON EXPORTS OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES MAY HAVE HAD ON US/ARGENTINE TRADE.  
CASTRO

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E.O. 12065 GDS 1-16-85 (THAYER, UVONNE) OR-P  
TAGS SHUM, PINS, PINT, AR  
SUBJECT THREE ABDUCTIONS HIGHLIGHT POLITICAL COMPLEXITIES

(C) SUMMARY: IN THE PAST WEEK, TWO ABDUCTED JOURNALISTS REAPPEARED AND ONE ABDUCTED ARGENTINE DIPLOMAT WAS FOUND DROWNED IN A RIVER. NO CLEAR EXPLANATION WAS PROVIDED FOR ANY OF THE THREE CASES, ALTHOUGH ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES SPOKE OUT AGAINST THE CRIMES AND A JUDICIAL INVESTIGATION HAS BEEN LAUNCHED TO RESOLVE THE DIPLOMATS MURDER. KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, HARASSMENT OF CHILEAN RESIDENTS BECAUSE OF THE BEAGLE DISPUTE, INTERNAL POLITICAL AND/OR MILITARY RIVALRY, TERRORIST CONNECTIONS AND FACTIONAL WARRING ARE AMONG RUMORED MOTIVES BEHIND THE THREE CASES, POINTING UP THE COMPLEXITY IN ASSIGNING BLAME IN THIS VIOLENT AND STILL TROUBLED COUNTRY. END SUMMARY.

1. (U) ARGENTINE DIPLOMAT ELENA HOLMBERG, WHO WAS KIDNAPPED IN DOWNTOWN BUENOS AIRES DECEMBER 20, WAS FOUND DROWNED IN THE RIO LUJAN ON JAN 11. TWO AUTOPSIES CONFIRMED HER DEATH BY DROWNING SHORTLY AFTER HER ABDUCTION. FOREIGN MINISTER PASTOR STRONGLY CONDEMNED THE MURDER AND DECLARED THAT THE "CULPRITS MUST PAY" AND FEDERAL JUDGE MARQUARDT OPENED AN EXTENSIVE AND WELL PUBLICIZED INVESTIGATION INTO THE CASE. HOLMBERG'S BODY LAY IN STATE IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY BEFORE HER BURIAL JAN 14 WHICH WAS ATTENDED BY INTERIOR MINISTER MARGUINDEGUY, HOLMBERG'S UNCLE FORMER PRESIDENT ALEJANDRO LANUSSE, AND OTHER HIGH RANKING OFFICIALS. SOME CONFUSION DEVELOPED OVER THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE BODY WHEN THE BENAVIDEZ CEMETARY WHERE THE BODY WAS FIRST DEPOSITED SENT THE WRONG BODY TO BUENOS AIRES FOR A COURT ORDERED AUTOPSY. JUDGE MARQUARDT BRIEFLY HELD 17 PERSONS CONNECTED WITH THE REMOVAL OF THE BODY UNTIL IT WAS CLARIFIED THAT HOLMBERG'S BODY HAD BEEN MIXED UP WITH ANOTHER DROWNING VICTIM RECOVERED FROM LUJAN RIVER THE SAME DAY.

2. (U) JORGE ALBERTO FONTEVECCHIA, EDITOR OF THE NEWSMAGAZINE LA SEMANA, REAPPEARED JAN 13 AFTER HAVING BEEN KIDNAPPED BY THREE ARMED MEN THE WEEK BEFORE AS HE WAS DRIVING HOME FROM WORK. THE PRESS ALLUDED TO A RANSOM DEMAND, BUT NO OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OF THE KIDNAPPERS OR MOTIVE HAS BEEN MADE PUBLIC. EARLIER PRESS REPORTS ALSO SPECULATED THAT THE ABDUCTION MAY HAVE BEEN LINKED TO TWO RECENT LA SEMANA REPORTS, ONE ALLEGEDLY INDICATING UNDERSTANDING FOR THE SANINISTA "GUERRILLAS" IN NICARAGUA AND ANOTHER FUGITIVE LABOR LEADER CASILDO HERRERAS.

3. (U) CHILEAN JOURNALIST RUBEN GOMEZ QUESADA

REAPPEARED ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF JUJUY ON JAN 11, FOURTEEN DAYS AFTER HAVING BEEN ABDUCTED FROM HIS SALTA HOME. (SEE BUENOS AIRES 0147 NOTAL) QUESADA GOMEZ, A LONG TIME ARGENTINE RESIDENT, WORKED FOR THE SALTA NEWSPAPER EL INTRANSIGENTE.

4. (U) THE PERMANENT ASSEMBLY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IN A LETTER TO PRESIDENT VIDELA DATED JAN 11, EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE LACK OF ACTION AND FAILURE TO RESPOND TO THE PROBLEM OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE DISAPPEARED AFTER BEING KIDNAPPED. THE LETTER EXPRESSED CONDEMNATION AND HORROR AT THE KIDNAPPING AND DEATH OF ELENA HOLMBERG AND REFERRED TO THE THEN UNEXPLAINED KIDNAPPINGS OF GOMEZ QUESADA AND FONTEVECCHIA. ATTACHED TO THE LETTER WAS AN ADDITIONAL 4,550 SIGNATURES TO A PETITION SIGNED BY 37,000 PEOPLE BEFORE CHRISTMAS CONCERNING DISAPPEARANCE CASES AND A LIST OF 4,381 DOCUMENTED CASES OF DISAPPEARED PERSONS.

5. (C) THE THREE CASES POINT UP THE DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING THE MOTIVE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN WHAT HAS BECOME THE COMMONPLACE PROCEDURE OF ABDUCTION AND EVEN MURDER OF DISPARATE VICTIMS. THE GOMEZ QUESADA ABDUCTION APPEARS TO BE A CASE OF BLATANT HARASSMENT OF CHILEAN RESIDENTS, DUE TO THE BEAGLE CHANNEL CONTROVERSY, IN THE TENSE BORDER PROVINCES OF SALTA AND JUJUY. THE ABDUCTION OF TWO CHILEAN RESIDENTS IN SALTA EFFECTIVELY PROVOKED THE DEPARTURE OF MOST OF THE RESIDENT CHILEAN POPULATION, ACCORDING TO A SOURCE IN REFTEL. (A UNHCR SOURCE SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD EMBOFF THAT THE SMALL CHILEAN REFUGEE POPULATION OF SALTA AND JUJUY REMAINS THERE AND ITS MEMBERS HAVE NOT BEEN INTIMIDATED BY LOCAL OFFICIALS. THE JOINT SUBMISSION OF THE DISPUTE TO PAPAL MEDIATION HAS APPARENTLY RELAXED THE SITUATION OF CHILEAN RESIDENTS IN ARGENTINA FOR THE MOMENT.)

6. (C) THE FONTEVECCHIA ABDUCTION IS LESS CLEAR. KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WAS HINTED AT IN THE PRESS, AS WERE SUGGESTIONS THAT FONTEVECCHIA PROVOKED OFFICIAL DISPLEASURE BY PUBLISHING STORIES ALLEGEDLY FAVORABLE TO THE SANDINISTA MOVEMENT IN NICARAGUA OR TO INDICTED FUGITIVE LABOR LEADER CASILDO HERRERAS. PRIVATELY, IT IS SAID FONTEVECCHIA'S MAGAZINE WAS SUPPORTIVE OF AND/OR BANKROLLED BY ADMIRAL MASSERA.

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WHICH SPARKED ARMY WRATH. OTHERS HINT DARKLY HIS ABDUCTION WAS TO EMBARRASS PRESIDENT VIDELA. (THESE LAST TWO ALLEGATIONS -- POINTING THE FINGER AT TERNATIVELY AT THE ARMY AND THE NAVY SURFACE ROUTINELY IN EVERY ABDUCTION CASE.) AT ANY RATE, THE ABDUCTION APPEARS TO BE MOTIVATED BY POLITICAL RATHER THAN ANTI-TERRORISM CONSIDERATIONS IN A SOCIETY WHERE ABDUCTION AND EVEN PERMANENT DISAPPEARANCE HAVE BECOME A ROUTINE MECHANISM FOR HANDLING POLITICAL FEUDS.

7. (C) THE HOLMBERG DROWNING APPEARS ALSO TO FALL WITHIN THE POLITICAL CRIME CATEGORY, WITH DARK CONNECTIONS WITH THE MASSERA-ARMY RIVALRY. THE MOST OFTEN HEARD RUMOR IS THAT HOLMBERG HAD A SERIOUS FALLING OUT WITH MASSERA POLITICAL OPERATIVES DURING HER TOUR AS CULTURAL OFFICER IN THE ARGENTINE EMBASSY IN PARIS. ACCORDING TO THIS VERSION, HOLMBERG RETURNED TO BUENOS AIRES FROM PARIS TO "BLOW THE WHISTLE" ONE MASSERA INTIMATES' APPROPRIATION OF EMBASSY IMAGE-POLISHING CULTURAL FUNDS TO "BUY OFF" PROMINENT ARGENTINE EXILES ABROAD. NAVY USE OF VAST UNACCOUNTED FOR SUMS OF RECUPERATED MONTONERO MONEY ALSO FIGURES IN THESE STORIES. HOLMBERG'S IMMINENT REVELATION OF THESE SHADY DEALINGS CONVINCED THE NAVY TO DO AWAY WITH HER, ACCORDING TO THIS PLAUSIBLE ENOUGH VERSION. THE INEVITABLE COUNTERPOINT IS THAT THE ARMY DID HER IN AFTER SHE WAS PERSUADED (IN A TALK WITH FORN MIN UNDER SECRETARY CAPTAIN ALLARA) NOT TO GIVE AWAY HER DAMNING INFORMATION AGAINST THE NAVY. SOME ISOLATED VOICES GAMBLY BLAME THE TERRORISTS FOR KILLING HOLMBERG TO SHOW THAT THEY STILL ENJOY THE CAPABILITY TO MOUNT SUCH OPERATIONS. THIS VERSION HAS FEW ADHERENTS. GIVEN THE ACKNOWLEDGED DEFEAT OF LEFTIST TERRORISTS IN ARGENTINA AND THE NATURE OF THE ABDUCTION, EMBASSY PARIS MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE US WITH MORE THOUGHTS ON HOLMBERG'S PARIS DEALINGS.

8. THE HOLMBERG MURDER HAS HAD A PROFOUND AND DISTURBING EFFECT WITHIN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND THE ARGENTINE PUBLIC. THE FACT THAT SHE WAS A MEMBER OF A PROMINENT AND WELL-CONNECTED ARGENTINE FAMILY, A GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH RIGHTWING TENDENCIES AND A STRONG DEFENDER OF ARGENTINA'S IMAGE MAKE HER CASE ALL THE MORE SHOCKING IN A SOCIETY INURED TO DAILY DISAPPEARANCES AND EATHS OF UNNAMED "MARXIST" ENEMIES OF THE STATE. HER ABDUCTION REPRESENTS THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF TERRORIST TACTICS FOR POLITICAL MOTIVES REACHING BEYOND THE ANTI-TERRORISM CAMPAIGN AND REITERATES THE URGENCY OF REESTABLISHMENT OF LAW AND AN END TO EXTRALEGAL OPERATIONS IN ARGENTINA.  
CASTRO

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E.O. 12065 N/A  
TAGS SHUM, AR  
SUBJECT POLICE ROUNDUP 43 MOTHERS NEAR PLAZA DE MAYO

REF: BUENOS AIRES 148

1. FEDERAL POLICE AGAIN CLOSED THE PLAZA DE MAYO ON JANUARY 11TH TO PREVENT THE MOTHERS FROM CONDUCTING THEIR USUAL THURSDAY AFTERNOON DEMONSTRATION. THE MOTHERS WERE PHYSICALLY PROHIBITED FROM ENTERING THE PLAZA DE MAYO, CONSEQUENTLY THERE WAS NO DEMONSTRATION. FORTY-THREE PERSONS WERE IDENTIFIED AND ARRESTED BY PLAINCLOTHESMEN ON STREETS AROUND THE PLAZA AND IN NEARBY COFFEE SHOPS. ALL WERE TAKEN TO THE SECOND PRECINCT AND QUESTIONED ABOUT WHO ORGANIZED THE MOTHERS' DEMONSTRATIONS, THEIR REASONS FOR ATTENDING THE PLAZA DEMONSTRATIONS, ETC. THE GROUP WAS NOT PHYSICALLY HARMED BUT ITS MEMBERS WERE AGHAST TO BE PUT IN A ROOM WITH A DEAD MOTORCYCLIST VICTIM OF AN ACCIDENT HOSRTLY BEFORE. MOST GROUP MEMBERS WERE RELEASED EARLY FRIDAY MORNING WITH THE WARNING THAT IF THEY WERE ARRESTED AGAIN THEY WOULD BE SENTENCED TO THIRTY DAYS TO BE SERVED IN VILLA DEVOTO PRISON.

2. EIGHT OF THE MOTHERS' GROUP CALLED ON AMBASSADOR CASTRO IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE POLICE'S ACTION ASKING THE USG'S INTERVENTION ON BEHALF OF THE ARRESTED MOTHERS AND FOR THE MOTHERS TO BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE THEIR DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE PLAZA DE MAYO. EMBOFFS CONTACTED POLICE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OFFICIALS AND WERE TOLD THAT THE ARRESTED MOTHERS HAD EITHER BEEN RELEASED OR WOULD BE FREED SHORTLY.

3. COMMENT: THURSDAY'S ACTION SHOWED THE GOA'S DETERMINATION TO PUT A STOP TO THE WEEKLY MOTHERS' DEMONSTRATIONS, WHICH HAD RECENTLY BECOME LARGER AND MORE VOCAL. CASTRO

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E.O. 12065 N/A  
TAGS SHUM, AR  
SUBJECT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: AISC AND PAHR LISTS

REF: USINFO 291400Z DEC 78

1. PERMANENT ASSEMBLY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (PAHR) MEMBER PRESENTED EMBASSY WITH UPDATED AND COMPUTERIZED LIST OF THE DISAPPEARANCE CASES REPORTED TO THE PAHR, THE ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (MEDH), AND THE LEAGUE FOR THE RIGHTS OF MAN. THE ASSEMBLY'S LIST (BEING POUCHED TO THE DEPARTMENT) CONTAINS ENTRIES OF 4,381 DISAPPEARANCES. THE LIST INCLUDES ALL DATA AVAILABLE TO THE ASSEMBLY AS OF OCTOBER 30, 1978. AN ASSEMBLY MEMBER NOTED THAT THE CURRENT LIST WAS AN EXPANDED AND CORRECTED VERSION OF THE LISTS THE ASSEMBLY PUBLISHED IN THE PRESS IN MID-MAY (2,500 ENTRIES) AND THE MID-SUMMER LIST (500 ENTRIES). IT WAS ALSO NOTED THAT IN PREPARING THE CURRENT LIST, SOME 200 PREVIOUS ENTRIES HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED TO CORRECT FOR DUPLICATIONS AND REAPPEARANCES.
  2. THE WASHINGTON POST OF DECEMBER 29 CARRIED INFORMATION THAT THE ARGENTINE INFORMATION SERVICE CENTER (AISC) HAD ISSUED AN UPDATED LIST OF 12,000 VICTIMS OF GOA REPRESSION. WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING A COPY OF THIS LATEST AISC LIST FOR OUR INFORMATION AND USE.
- CASTRO

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12065 GDS 1-5-65 (HARRIS, F ALLEN) OR-P

AGS SKUM, AR

SUBJECT POLICE "CLOSE" PLAZA DE MAYO TO STOP MOTHERS DEMONSTRATION

REF: 1978 BUENOS AIRES 10053

SUMMARY: (U) FEDERAL POLICE "CLOSED" THE PLAZA DE MAYO ON JANUARY 4, 1979 TO PREVENT THE MOTHERS OF THE PLAZA DE MAYO FROM HOLDING THEIR USUAL THURSDAY DEMONSTRATION. POLICE ACTION WAS PROBABLY TRIGGERED BY THE SIZE AND ANIMOSITY OF RECENT DEMONSTRATIONS. SIX OR SEVEN DEMONSTRATORS WERE ARRESTED, INCLUDING A 90 YEAR OLD UNITED STATES CITIZEN SEEKING INFORMATION ON HIS GRANDDAUGHTER. NO SUMMARY.

(U) THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT ACTED ON JANUARY 4 TO THE REGULAR THURSDAY MOTHERS OF THE PLAZA DE MAYO DEMONSTRATION. ON RECENT THURSDAY REPORTEDLY OVER A THOUSAND MOTHERS AND FAMILY MEMBERS OF THE "DESAPARECIDOS" HAVE BEEN GATHERING IN THE PLAZA BEFORE THE CASA ROSADA WHICH HOUSES BOTH THE PRESIDENCY AND THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. DURING THE PREVIOUS TWO THURSDAY DEMONSTRATIONS (DECEMBER 21 AND 28) SECURITY OFFICIALS FROM THE CASA ROSADA AND THE FEDERAL POLICE HAD PROMISED THE MOTHERS THAT THEY WOULD PROVIDE INFORMATION REGARDING THE DISAPPEARED (SEE REFTEL). THIS UNDERSTANDABLY RAISED ENORMOUS EXPECTATIONS AMONG THE MOTHERS. THE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS' PROMISES LED TO AN INCREASE IN THE SIZE AND A CHANGE IN THE MOTHERS' BEHAVIOR. IN THE PREVIOUS TWO THURSDAYS, THE MOTHERS ABANDONED THEIR SILENT VIGIL PRACTICE AND BEGAN SINGING THE NATIONAL ANTHEM AND CHANTING "TELL US WHERE THEY ARE" (NOW DIGAN, DONDE ESTAN) AS THEY CIRCLED THROUGH THE TWO SQUARE BLOCKS OF THE PLAZA.

(U) ON JANUARY 4, WHEN THE MOTHERS ARRIVED HOPING FOR A REPLY FROM THE GOVERNMENT, THEY FOUND THE PLAZA FILLED WITH SEVERAL HUNDRED UNIFORMED FEDERAL POLICEMEN ARMED WITH RIFLES AND MACHINEGUNS, THE SURROUNDING STREETS STAKED OUT WITH SCORES OF PLAIN-CLOTHESMEN AND THE FEDERAL POLICE'S "FUERZA DE CHOQUE" STANDING BY IN ARMORED ASSAULT VEHICLES. THE TOWN'S CATHEDRAL, WHICH FRONTS ON THE PLAZA, HAD BEEN LOCKED BY A PRIEST JUST BEFORE THE DEMONSTRATION. THIS WAS ESPECIALLY EMBITTERING TO THE MOTHERS AS A SYMBOL OF CHURCH INDIFFERENCE. THE POLICE ALLOWED PEDESTRIANS TO CROSS THROUGH THE PLAZA, BUT DID NOT PERMIT ANYONE TO STOP. THOSE MOTHERS WHO ENTERED WERE WARNED TO MOVE ON. SIX OR SEVEN WERE ARRESTED.

(U) AMONG THOSE TAKEN WAS JULIUS WILLIAM ROBSON, 90 YEAR OLD AMERICAN CITIZEN. MR. ROBSON'S GRAND DAUGHTER, MARTA NOGUER DE VILLAGRA, DISAPPEARED WITH

HER TWO MONTH OLD BABY FROM A BUS STOP IN A BUENOS AIRES SUBURB IN JUNE, 1976. MR. ROBSON HAS BEEN A REGULAR DEMONSTRATOR IN THE PLAZA AND HAS WRITTEN SEVERAL STRONG LETTERS ON THE DISAPPEARANCE ISSUE TO THE BUENOS AIRES HERALD. MR. ROBSON WAS TAKEN TO PRECINCT NO 2 AND RELEASED QUICKLY DUE TO CONSIDERATION OF HIS ADVANCED AGE. THE OTHER DEMONSTRATORS WERE REPORTEDLY STILL IN POLICE CUSTODY LATE ON THE AFTERNOON OF JANUARY 5TH.

4. (C) EMBASSY COMMENT: POLICE ACTION AGAINST THE MOTHERS' THURSDAY DEMONSTRATION HAD BEEN RUMORED FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. IN THE PAST THE GOVERNMENT HAS TOLERATED THE MOTHERS' DEMONSTRATIONS AS LONG AS THEY WERE KEPT RELATIVELY SMALL--BETWEEN 100 AND 200 PEOPLE. IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1977 AND AGAIN IN RECENT WEEKS, THE THURSDAY DEMONSTRATIONS BECAME LARGE--OVER A THOUSAND DEMONSTRATORS WERE REPORTED TO BE IN THE PLAZA ON THURSDAY, DECEMBER 28TH. THIS APPARENTLY TRIGGERED THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTION. IN PREVIOUS ACTIONS THE GOVERNMENT ARRESTED 300 MOTHERS IN NOVEMBER 1977, "AND" "DISAPPEARED" THE GROUPS LEADER SHIP IN DECEMBER 1977 AND NOW THE GOVERNMENT HAS ADOPTED A NEW TACTIC OF CLOSING THE PLAZA TO THE MOTHERS.

5. THIS WILL CERTAINLY BE EFFECTIVE IN THE SHORT RUN AS THE MOTHERS' GROUP HAS NO FORMAL ORGANIZATION AND THEIR MAIN CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER IS AT THE THURSDAY DEMONSTRATIONS. HOWEVER, WE DOUBT THAT THE MOTHERS CAN BE DISSUADED PERMANENTLY FROM PRESSURING THE GOVERNMENT. WE EXPECT THE MOTHERS WILL SHORTLY FIND OTHER AVENUES OF EXPRESSION THROUGH MEMORIAL MASSES, ETC. THE GOVERNMENT'S RECENT ACTION IS BUT ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO TREAT THE SYMPTOMS RATHER THAN CURE THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE THOUSANDS OF ARGENTINE DISAPPEARANCES. END COMMENT.  
CASTRO

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FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0559  
INFO AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 0147

INFO: 12065 GDS 1-5-85 (THAYER, YVONNE GR-P  
AGS SHUM, AR, CI  
SUBJECT ARGENTINE MISTREATMENT OF CHILEAN RESIDENTS

REF: A BUENOS AIRES 10077, B BUENOS AIRES 9939

(U) SUMMARY: THE ARGENTINE INTERIOR MINISTRY IN A  
STATEMENT JANUARY 4 REJECTED AS AN "INSIDIOUS CAMPAIGN"  
RECENT CHILEAN CHARGES OF MISTREATMENT OF CHILEAN CITIZENS  
IN ARGENTINA. IT WAS ALSO REPORTED JANUARY 5 THAT THE  
MININT HAD ORDERED THE RELEASE OF FORMER CHILEAN SENATOR  
PAUL MORALES ADRIAZZOLA. A DELEGATION OF CHILEAN CITIZENS  
ARRIVED IN BUENOS AIRES JANUARY 3 TO APPEAL TO INTERIOR  
MINISTER HARGUINDEGUY FOR THE RELEASE OF CHILEAN CITIZENS  
RETAINED IN ARGENTINA, INCLUDING ADRIAZZOLA. AN EMBASSY  
SOURCE REPORTED THAT FEARFUL CHILEAN RESIDENTS HAVE  
ABANDONED THE CITY OF SALTA AFTER ONE CHILEAN JOURNALIST  
DISAPPEARED AND ANOTHER WAS DETAINED CLANDESTINELY FOR  
FOUR DAYS. THE CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTRY REPORTEDLY  
OFFICIALLY PROTESTED TO GOA FOR THE BAD TREATMENT AND  
KIDNAPPING OF CHILEAN CITIZENS AND INTIMIDATION OF  
CHILEAN CONSULAR OFFICIALS IN ARGENTINA. END SUMMARY.

(U) THE ARGENTINE INTERIOR MINISTRY ISSUED A STATE-  
MENT JANUARY 4 DENYING CHILEAN CLAIMS THAT ARGENTINA  
WAS AGGRESSIVELY EXPELLING CHILEAN CITIZENS. THE STATE  
MENT CLAIMED THE MIGRATIONS OFFICE WAS CHARGED WITH  
CARRYING OUT THE LAWS OF THE COUNTRY REGARDING ILLEGAL  
RESIDENTS WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION OF NATIONALITY. IT  
SAID THAT DURING LAST YEAR 2,175 PEOPLE WERE EXPELLED  
FROM ARGENTINA, INCLUDING URUGUAYANS, PARAGUAYANS,  
BOLIVIAN, CHILEANS, KOREANS AND PERUVIANS, WHILE  
8,428 REGULARIZED THEIR STATUS AND WERE PERMITTED TO  
REMAIN IN THE COUNTRY. THE INTERIOR MINISTRY ALSO  
REVEALED THAT IT HAD ORDERED THE RELEASE OF FORMER  
CHILEAN SENATOR RAUL MORALES ADRIAZZOLA. HIS ACTUAL  
RELEASE HAS NOT YET BEEN CONFIRMED.

(U) A DELEGATION OF CHILEAN CITIZENS, INCLUDING  
ABYER FRANCISCO DIAZ SALAZAR, FORMER SENATOR ARMANDO  
ABRILLO, RETIRED COLONEL FERNANDO MURZAGA, INDUSTRI-  
LIST OSCAR BOYIA AND AGRICULTURALIST DOMINGO VIDAL,  
ARRIVED IN BUENOS AIRES JANUARY 3 TO CONSULT WITH  
INTERIOR MINISTER HARGUINDEGUY AND ARGENTINE LAWYERS TO  
ACILITATE THE RELEASE OF CHILEAN CITIZENS DETAINED IN  
ARGENTINA. THE DELEGATION WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED  
ABOUT THE CASE OF ADRIAZZOLA WHO WAS DECEASED AS  
PERSECUTED DURING THE MARXIST REGIME OF SALVADOR ALLENDE.

(C) AN ARGENTINE JOURNALIST FROM SALTA TOLD EMBOFF  
JANUARY 4 THAT THE ENTIRE CHILEAN POPULATION OF THAT  
CITY HAD LEFT, MORE OUT OF FEAR THAN THROUGH DIRECT  
POLICE ACTION. THE CHILEAN EXODUS ACCELERATED WHEN, ON  
DECEMBER 28, SEVEN HOODED MEN TOOK AWAY CHILEAN JOURNALIST  
JOSE GOMEZ GUESADA FROM HIS HOME AT 1:30 AM. GOMEZ  
GUESADA, A LONG TIME ARGENTINE RESIDENT WHOSE WIFE AND  
CHILDREN ARE ARGENTINE, WORKED FOR THE SALTA NEWSPAPER  
EL INTRASIGENTE. DURING THE RAID THE GOMEZ HOUSE WAS

RANSACKED AND MONEY STOLEN. THE INCIDENT FOLLOWED  
A SIMILAR ONE INVOLVING ANOTHER CHILEAN WHO REAPPEARED  
AFTER FOUR DAYS. GOMEZ IS STILL MISSING.

5. (U) THE WIRE SERVICES REPORTED JANUARY 2 THAT THE  
CHILEA GOVERNMENT PROTESTED TO GOA OVER THE TREATMENT  
AND KIDNAPPING OF CHILEAN CITIZENS AND THE INTIMIDATION  
CAMPAIGN AND THREATS CARRIED OUT AGAINST  
CHILEAN CONSULAR OFFICIALS. IT ALSO CHARGED THAT MANY  
CHILEANS EXPELLED FROM ARGENTINE SUFFERED "SERIOUS MORAL  
AND ECONOMIC DAMAGE." THE PROTEST MENTIONED CASES OF  
ARBITRARY DETENTIONS AND ASSERTED SPECIFICALLY THAT  
"ARMED GROUPS ARE DETAINING AND KIDNAPPING CHILEAN  
RESIDENTS IN SALTA, INCLUDING MARIO DEL CARMEN GONZALEZ  
AND OSCAR MIRANDA". THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT ASKED THAT  
ARGENTINE OFFICIALS TAKE MEASURES TO PREVENT THESE  
ACTIONS AND TO REAFFIRM SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR CHILEAN  
CONSULAR OFFICIALS.  
CASTRO

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INVOLVED, AND MAY EVEN BE A CENTRAL FIGURE,  
IN THE PLOTTING. (COMMENT: WE TEND TO DOUBT THE  
FEASIBILITY OF SUCH A STRIKE PLAN. AT ANY RATE, WE  
DO NOT SEE SUCH A MOVE AS IMMINENT.)  
CASTRO

R 041910Z JAN 79  
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0932  
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
USMISSION GENEVA  
AMEMBASSY MEXICO

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E.O. 12065: GDS 1/3/85 (FREEMAN, ANTHONY F.) OR-1  
TAGS: ELAD, FINI, SHUM, AR  
SUBJECT: ARGENTINE LABOR LEADER RETURNED TO HOUSE ARREST STATUS

REF: A) 78 BUENOS AIRES 6768; B) 78 BS. AIRES 8357

1. LORENZO MIGUEL, FORMER HEAD OF THE ARGENTINE METAL-  
WORKERS UNION AND OF THE 62 PERONIST LABOR UNION MOVE-  
MENT, WHOSE DETENTION STATUS (SINCE THE ADVENT OF THE  
CURRENT MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN MARCH 1976) WAS LIBERALIZED  
LAST SEPTEMBER TO PERMIT HIM TO RETURN TO HIS FAMILY  
RESIDENCE IN HOUSE ARREST STATUS, WAS REARRESTED  
DECEMBER 29 BY POLICE OFFICERS AND TAKEN TO FEDERAL  
POLICE HEADQUARTERS. HE REMAINED THERE UNTIL JANUARY 2  
WHEN HE WAS ESCORTED BACK TO HIS HOME.

2. POLICE HAVE NO OFFICIAL EXPLANATION FOR MIGUEL'S  
72-HOUR REARREST, BUT HAVE INTIMATED THAT IT STEMS  
FROM MIGUEL'S HAVING VIOLATED HOUSE ARREST REGULATIONS  
WHEN HE HELD A TALK IN HIS HOME WITH JORGE DANIEL  
PALADINO, A FORMER PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE  
LATE JUAN DOMINGO PERON. PALADINO WAS ALSO BRIEFLY  
HELD BY POLICE BEFORE BEING RELEASED.

3. PERONIST PARTY LEADERS AND LEADERS OF THE TRADE  
UNION COMMITTEE OF 25 SENT TELEGRAMS TO PRESIDENT  
VIDELA, PROTESTING MIGUEL'S ARREST. THE "25" ALSO  
ASKED THE BRUSSELS-BASED ICFU UNION ORGANIZATION TO  
INTERVENE WITH GOA AUTHORITIES ON MIGUEL'S BEHALF.

4. WITH THE COMPLIVANCE OF A FRIENDLY POLICE  
INSPECTOR (PROTECTOR) UNDOUBTEDLY A CHUM FOR THE  
DAYS WHEN MIGUEL WIELDED MUCH POWER IN THE SHADY  
WORLD IN WHICH THE INTEREST OF RIGHT-WING BOSSES  
AND POLICE AND MILITARY CHIEFS (AND POSSIBLY ALSO  
THE INFAMOUS TRIPLE A COUNTER-TERRORIST ORGANIZATION)  
CONVERGED SEMI-CLANDESTINELY DURING THE LAST PERON  
GOVERNMENT--MIGUEL HAS BEEN HOLDING COURT AT HIS  
HOME SINCE LEAVING PRISON LAST SEPTEMBER RECEIVING  
A LARGE NUMBER OF LABOR AND POLITICAL FIGURES, IN  
INCREASINGLY MORE BLATANT VIOLATION OF HIS HOUSE  
ARREST STATUS.

5. HIS BRIEF ARREST MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN CONNECTED  
WITH REPORTS IN LABOR CIRCLES THAT THE COMMITTEE  
OF 25 IS PLANNING A NEW UNIFICATION DRIVE FOR THE  
LABOR MOVEMENT (WHICH WOULD EXCLUDE THE RIVAL "CNT"  
FACTION) WHICH WOULD ENVISAGE THE CALLING OF A GENERAL  
STRIKE AGAINST THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF ECONOMY  
MINISTER MARTINEZ DE HOZ. ACCORDING TO THE RUMORS,  
UNDISCLOSED MILITARY CHIEFS HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGING  
THE TRADE UNIONISTS TO PROCEED WITH PLANS FOR SUCH A  
STRIKE, AND SOME SOURCES PRESUME THAT MIGUEL IS

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC S931

INFO AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

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E.O. 12065: GDS 1/4/85 (HARRIS, F. ALLEN) OR-P

TAGS: SHUM AR PBOR CI

SUBJECT: VATICAN CONCERNS ON HUMAN RIGHTS

1. JESUIT PRIEST FIORELLO CAVALLI, MEMBER OF THE PAPAL BEAGLE DELEGATION, CONTACTED PERMANENT ASSEMBLY VICE PRESIDENT EMILIO MIGNONE DECEMBER 28, 1978 TO REAFFIRM VATICAN'S INTEREST IN HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ARGENTINA.

2. ACCORDING TO MIGNONE, CAVALLI'S PHONE CALL TO HIS RESIDENCE EARLY ON THE MORNING OF HIS DEPARTURE TO CHILE WAS A SURPRISE RESPONSE TO THE INFORMATION MIGNONE HAD EARLIER LEFT AT THE NUNCIATURA ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ARGENTINA. (NOTE: MIGNONE MET CAVALLI IN ROME IN LATE 1978.)

3. MIGNONE REPORTED THAT CAVALLI STATED THAT THE PAPAL EMISSARIES WERE WELL AWARE OF THE SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS IN ARGENTINA AND CHILE AND PLANNED TO USE THEIR GOOD OFFICES ON THESE CENTRAL HUMANITARIAN ISSUES, IN ADDITION TO TRYING TO BRING THE NATIONS TOGETHER ON THE BEAGLE PROBLEMS.

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E.O. 12065: XDS-1 1/2/59 (CASTRO, RAUL) OR-M  
TAGS: SHUM AR  
SUBJ: REHABILITATION PROGRAMS FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS

1. ENTIRE TEXT CONFIDENTIAL.

2. SUMMARY: THE EMBASSY HAS RECENTLY LEARNED DETAILS OF REHABILITATION PROGRAMS FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS RUN BY THE ARGENTINE ARMY AND NAVY. THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A PROGRAM WAS PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED IN MID-1978 WHEN SELECTED JOURNALISTS WERE HELICOPTERED TO A REHABILITATION FACILITY. THE INFORMATION NOW AVAILABLE INDICATES THAT BOTH POLITICAL RE-EDUCATION PROGRAMS APPEAR TO BE SMALL IN SIZE AND EXPERIMENTAL IN NATURE. END SUMMARY.

3. NAVY MECHANICAL SCHOOL REHABILITATION PROGRAM - THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON THE NAVY'S PROGRAM WAS PROVIDED BY CATHOLIC CHURCH AND FRENCH EMBASSY SOURCES (STRICTLY PROTECT - XDS-1): THE ARGENTINE NAVY HAS RUN A SMALL REHABILITATION PROGRAM AT THE NAVY MECHANICAL SCHOOL FOR 20 "SUBVERSIVES." THESE RETRAINEES WERE DIVIDED INTO 6- OR 7-MAN SQUADS, EACH LED BY A NAVY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER. THE RETRAINEES HAVE UNDERGONE PSYCHOLOGICAL RE-EDUCATION, CONDUCTED BY TRAINED PSYCHOLOGISTS AND SOCIOLOGISTS. REPORTEDLY, THE INDIVIDUALS' ATTITUDES TOWARDS FAMILY, RELIGION AND NATIONAL OBJECTIVES WERE "STRENGTHENED" TO REPLACE THEIR PREVIOUS POLITICAL-IDEOLOGICAL PERSONALITY SUPPORT SYSTEMS.

4. THE RETRAINEES WERE SELECTED FOR THEIR INTELLIGENCE AND DEMONSTRATED SKILLS FROM AMONG THE "RECOVERABLES" (I.E. NON-TERRORISTS) INTERROGATED AT THE NAVY MECHANICAL SCHOOL. THE RETRAINEES THEN SERVED AS TRUSTEES AT THE MECHANICAL SCHOOL'S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION FACILITIES. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE MOST TALENTED AMONG THEM WERE ORGANIZED INTO A GROUP TO WRITE SPEECHES AND MAGAZINE ARTICLES FOR ATTRIBUTION TO ADMIRAL MASSERA.

5. THE NAVY RETRAINEES WERE ALLOWED TO TELEPHONE THEIR FAMILIES, AND SEVERAL TIMES A YEAR THEIR SQUAD COMMANDERS TOOK THEM TO THEIR HOMES FOR FAMILY VISITS. SOME WERE ALLOWED TO SPEND WEEKENDS WITH THEIR FAMILIES.

6. ACCORDING TO OUR FRENCH EMBASSY SOURCE, THE NAVY'S BEST KNOWN RETRAINEE WAS HORACIO DOMINGO MAGGIO, WHO IN APRIL OF 1978 ISSUED A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE MECHANICAL SCHOOL DETENTION FACILITY THROUGH LETTERS TO SEVERAL PRESS AGENCIES AND EMBASSIES. THE LETTERS WERE "PUBLISHED" AND DISTRIBUTED BY AN APPARATUS WE BELIEVE HAS ITS ROOTS IN THE MONTONEROS. MAGGIO APPARENTLY ESCAPED DURING A WEEKEND FAMILY MEETING, ALTHOUGH TO OBSCURE THIS FACT HE CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ESCAPE DURING A TRANSFER BETWEEN PRISONS.

THE SAME SOURCE STATES THAT MAGGIO HAS SINCE BEEN CAPTURED AND KILLED BY NAVY INTELLIGENCE. INTERESTINGLY, MAGGIO'S WIFE WROTE LAST OCTOBER TO SEVERAL OF THOSE WHO HAD RECEIVED HIS LETTERS ORIGINALLY, STATING THAT HE SUDDENLY HAD DISAPPEARED.

7. BOTH SOURCES REPORT THAT THE NAVY IS CLOSING THE NAVY MECHANICAL SCHOOL DETENTION FACILITY. (NOTE: THESE REPORTS WERE GIVEN SUBSTANCE BY NAVY DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL ANTONIO LUCHETTA, WHO RECENTLY TOLD EMOFFS THAT THE NAVY WOULD INSIST THAT THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION VISIT THE NAVY'S MECHANICAL SCHOOL TO DISPROVE REPORTS OF DETENTION AND INTERROGATION FACILITIES BEING LOCATED THERE. LUCHETTA CITED SPECIFICALLY ALLEGATIONS PUBLISHED IN LE MONDE AND THE SPANISH MAGAZINE, CAMBIO-16.

8. THE FUTURE OF THE RETRAINEES WAS REPORTED TO HAVE PROVOKED A SERIOUS DEBATE WITHIN THE NAVY. ONE FACTION URGED THAT THE INDIVIDUALS BE RETRAINED TO WORK FOR THE NAVY OR IN THE MASSERA POLITICAL CAMPAIGN. THE WINNING FACTION ARGUED THAT THE RETRAINEES BE RETURNED TO ARGENTINE SOCIETY AT LARGE.

9. ARMY RETRAINING FACILITY ----- THIS EMBASSY AND THE FRG EMBASSY HAVE RECEIVED REPORTS REGARDING THE REHABILITATION BY THE ARMY OF A COUPLE IN THEIR TWENTIES WHO WERE FORMERLY PERONIST UNION ACTIVISTS IN A MAJOR ARGENTINE BANK. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE MAN'S MOTHER, BOTH FAMILIES RECEIVE REGULAR COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE COUPLE VIA PHONE CALLS AND LETTERS. IN ADDITION, ON ONE OCCASION THE MOTHER REPORTED THAT A GUARD FROM THE REHABILITATION FACILITY VISITED THE GIRL'S FAMILY HOME TO PICK UP SPECIAL FOODS, CIGARETTES, CIGARS AND SHOES FOR THE COUPLE. THE GUARD CHATTED AMICABLY WITH THE FAMILY FOR HALF AN HOUR OVER COFFEE BEFORE LEAVING.

10. FROM THE CONTACTS AND THE GUARD'S COMMENTS THE FAMILIES HAVE DEDUCED THE FOLLOWING: THE COUPLE IS BEING HELD IN AN ARMY RUN FACILITY NEAR EZEIZA AIRPORT. THE RETRAINING PROGRAM IS CONDUCTED BY A TEAM OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND SOCIOLOGISTS. THE COUPLE IS WELL CARED FOR. THEY HAVE PLENTY OF FOOD. THERE IS HEAT IN THE WINTER. THE FACILITY HAS TELEVISION.

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THE RETRAINEES WIDELY CELEBRATED WHEN ARGENTINA WON THE WORLD CUP FINAL. THERE ARE CARPENTRY SHOPS AND A PHOTO LAB. ARTS AND CRAFTS ARE ENCOURAGED. THE GUARD BROUGHT A DOLL AND SOME CROCHETED ITEMS MADE BY THE WOMAN FOR HER BABY, PLUS A DETAILED COLORED PENCIL PICTURE MADE BY ANOTHER PRISONER.

11. THE COUPLE'S PHONE CONVERSATIONS AND LETTERS WITH THEIR FAMILIES HAVE FOCUSED ON THE FAMILY. THE COUPLE HAS REPEATEDLY ACKNOWLEDGED THEIR MISTAKES OF THE PAST AND HAVE VOWED NOT TO COMMIT THEM AGAIN. THE COUPLE ALWAYS EMPHASIZED THEIR DESIRE TO DEDICATE THEIR FUTURE LIVES TO THEIR FAMILIES AND THEIR INFANT SON, WHO IS STAYING WITH THE MATERNAL GRANDMOTHER.

12. THE GUARD DURING HIS VISIT STATED THAT THE AUTHORITIES TRY TO PUT "RECUPERABLES" INTO RETRAINING PROGRAMS INSTEAD OF EXECUTIVE (PEN) DETENTION TO AVOID THE LONG DELAYS OF THE ARGENTINE JUDICIAL SYSTEM (SIC). THE GUARD STATED THAT THE RETRAINING PROGRAM GENERALLY LASTS FROM A YEAR AND A HALF TO TWO YEARS AS THE AUTHORITIES WANT TO INSURE THAT THE RETRAINEES ARE FIRM IN THEIR NEW BELIEFS AND WISH TO PREVENT "RELAPSES."

13. EMBASSY COMMENT: THESE REPORTS APPEAR CREDIBLE. IN ADDITION TO THESE TWO FACILITIES, THE EMBASSY HAS INFORMATION FROM MILITARY SOURCES REGARDING SECRET RETRAINING FACILITIES IN SOUTHERN ARGENTINA FOR MONTONERO AND ERP INFORMANTS. IN MID-1978 A GROUP OF CAREFULLY SELECTED JOURNALISTS WERE ALLOWED TO VISIT A RURAL REHABILITATION FACILITY LOCATED WITHIN AN HOUR'S HELICOPTER RIDE FROM BUENOS AIRES. ONLY TWO COUPLES WERE HOUSED IN THE LARGE, WELL APPOINTED FACILITY.

14. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH INFORMATION TO ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF PRISONERS INVOLVED IN THE VARIOUS REHABILITATION PROGRAMS, WE BELIEVE THE NUMBER TO BE SMALL, PERHAPS SEVERAL HUNDRED AT THE OUTSIDE. END COMMENT.  
CASTRO

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E.O. 12065 XDS-1 1-17-89 (CASTRO, RAUL H.) OR-M

TAGS SKUM, MHUC, PBOR, PINT, AR

SUBJECT AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH JUNTA MEMBER GENERAL VIOLA

REF: STATE 7868; STATE 10785

1. MY REQUESTED APPOINTMENT WITH GENERAL VIOLA WAS HELD IN HIS OFFICE YESTERDAY NOON (JAN 16). FOLLOWING TOPICS WERE DISCUSSED:

2. HOMBERG DEATH: I PRESENTED PRESIDENT CARTER AND USG CONDOLENCES TO GENERAL VIOLA, AS JUNTA PRESIDENT, OVER THE TRAGIC DEATH OF MS. HOLMBERG, GOA DIPLOMAT KIDNAPPED AND FOUND DEAD A FEW DAYS AGO. I TOLD VIOLA USG WAS SADDENED BY EVENT. HE THANKED ME AND SAID NO ROCK WOULD BE LEFT UNTURNED IN AN EFFORT TO FIND THE CULPRIT. VIOLA SAID NO CLEAR CLUES EXISTED BUT WITHOUT CLEARLY SPELLING IT OUT, SUGGESTED IT WAS A NAVY ACT. WITHOUT MENTIONING MASSERA'S NAME, BUT FULLY DESCRIBING HIM, STATED THEY HAD INFORMATION THIS PERSON WAS ATTEMPTING TO HAVE MEDIA PLACEMENTS IN US OF EMBARRASSING AND DEROGATORY NATURE TO GOA. SUGGESTION WAS MASSERA WOULD PAY THE TAB.

3. MOTHERS OF PLAZA DE MAYO: I REMINDED VIOLA OF MY MEETING WITH HIM ON DEC 21 DISSUADING HIS GOVT NOT TO ARREST MOTHERS WHEN THEY TRADITIONALLY MET ON THURSDAY. HE SAID HE HAD ISSUED AN ORDER TO CANCEL ORDERS OF ARREST AND THAT MOTHERS WERE NOT MOLESTED. I THANKED HIM FOR HIS ACT. I THEN TOLD HIM THESE SAME MOTHERS ARE BEING PUSHED AROUND AND PROHIBITED FROM THE USE OF PLAZA DE MAYO FOR THEIR WEEKLY MEETINGS. VIOLA TOLD ME HIS INFORMATION WAS MININT HARGUINDEGOY WAS HANDLING THE MOTHERS IN A DIGNIFIED MANNER. I TOLD HIM PREVENTING MOTHERS FROM PEACEFULLY ASSEMBLING TO INQUIRE ABOUT FATE OF THEIR CHILDREN WAS NOT DIGNIFIED NOR WOULD IT HELP ARGENTINA'S IMAGE ABROAD, MUCH LESS AT HOME. HE WAS TAKING COPIOUS NOTES AS I WAS TALKING AND SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS MATTER WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA. I TOLD VIOLA MOTHERS MET WITH ME FROM TIME TO TIME AT EMBASSY AND I FIND THEM TO BE DEDICATED AND LOYAL MOTHERS. I TOLD HIM I DIDN'T FEEL THOSE MOTHERS OFFERED ANY SECURITY THREAT TO GOA. TO THE CONTRARY, I SUGGESTED TO VIOLA TIME HAD COME TO THINK OF SOME ANSWERS FOR THESE MOTHERS WHO ONLY SEEK KNOWLEDGE OF WHEREABOUTS OF THEIR DISAPPEARED CHILDREN.

4. DISAPPEARANCES: I TOLD VIOLA USG WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED WITH CONTINUED DISAPPEARANCES. I TOLD HIM OUR RECORDS INDICATED AN AVERAGE OF ABOUT 55 MONTHLY DISAPPEARANCES STILL TAKING PLACE. HE RAISED HIS VOICE AND SAID "HOW MANY?". I THEN REPEATED THE FIGURE OF 55. VIOLA SAID HE COULDN'T BELIEVE THIS WAS POSSIBLE. I TOLD HIM IT WAS INEXCUSABLE TO HAVE THESE DISAPPEARANCES INASMUCH AS THE "DIRTY WAR" WAS OVER. I TOLD HIM ON MY ARRIVAL IN ARGENTINA JUSTIFICATION GIVEN FOR DISAPPEARANCES WAS "DIRTY" WAR AGAINST SUBVERSIVES. I REFRESHED HIS MEMORY OF VIDELA'S AND HIS OWN SPEECHES GIVING INDICATION WAR HAD BEEN WON AGAINST TERRORISM. IT WAS HERE WHEN HE AGAIN TOLD ME HE

LACKED A POWER BASE, BUT IF THINGS WORKED OUT WELL HE WOULD BE OPERATING FROM STRENGTH AND THESE THINGS WOULDN'T HAPPEN. (I THINK I KNOW THE PLAYERS OF THE GOA TEAM AND CERTAINLY FEEL I KNOW VIOLA QUITE WELL. WE BOTH SPEAK WITH CANDOR TO EACH OTHER.) IN VIEW OF THIS PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP, I TOLD VIOLA I COULDN'T QUITE UNDERSTAND HOW HE AS PRESIDENT OF THE JUNTA, ARMY COMMANDER, AND VIDELA AS PRESIDENT OF THE NATION FELT POWERLESS TO ACT. I SAID ARGENTINA'S GOVERNING POWER IS WITH THE ARMY AND HE WAS MR. ARMY. I SUGGESTED PERHAPS HIS WILLINGNESS TO WORK ON A CONSENSUS BASIS WAS BEING MISINTERPRETED AS A SIGN OF WAKNESS.

I SAID I KNEW I WAS STEPPING INTO A GREY AREA, BUT I FELT IT WAS UP TO GOA TO PUT THEIR ACTO TOGETHER BEFORE USG COULD BE OF ASSISTANCE. HE ACCEPTED MY COMMENTS IN THE SPRIT IN WHICH THEY WERE INTENDED AND SAID HE STILL FELT HE PULLED THE CHESTNUTS OUT OF THE FIRE. HE WANTED UNDERSTANDING FROM USG. I ASSURED HIM HE HAD IT.

5. SUSANA PANERO: I INQUIRED ONCE AGAIN ABOUT THE STAUS OF SUANA PANERO, A CASE I HAVE RAISED WITH HIM AT ALMOST EVERY MEETING. VIOLA'S IMMEDIATE REACTION WAS "ISN'T SHE OUT?". I REPLIED NEGATIVE AND I AM STILL AWAITING HER RELEASE. IN A STRONG TONE VIOLA POUNDED THE DESK AND SAID I GUARANTEE YOU HER RELEASE. IN INQUIRED "WHEN" AND HE SAID "VERY SOON".

6. JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES: I TOLD VIOLA THERE ARE TWO SUBJECTS WHICH ALWAYS LEAD TO EMOTIONAL OUTBURSTS, RELIGION AND POLITICS. I TOLD HIM MY TOPIC WAS RELIGION-JHOVAH'S WITNESSES. I TOLD HIM IT WAS BAD ENOUGH TO HAVE ARGENTINA DEPICTED AS A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATOR, BUT NOW THE THIRD DIMENSION WAS BEING ADDED OF BEING A COUNTRY OF RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE. I EXPLAINED TO HIM THE AMERICAN CONGRESS, USG AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE APPALLED AT GOA'S HOSTILE ATTITUDE TOWARDS JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES. VIOLA STATED IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO PENETRATE MILITARY MINDS FOR SYMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING TOWARDS WITNESSES WHEN THEIR CHILDREN REFUSED TO SALUTE THE FLAG AND SING THE NATIONAL ANTHEM IN SCHOOL. HE SAID REFUSAL TO SERVE IN THE ARMED FORCES ADDED TO THE DILEMMA. I TOLD VIOLA MUCH OF

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FOR ASST SECT VAKY

THE LAW MADE IN THE UNITED STATES, AS INTERPRETED BY THE COURTS, WAS DUE TO JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES CASES. I TOLD HIM IN MY LAW SCHOOL DAYS COURT CALENDARS WERE JAMMED WITH SALUTE FLAG REFUSAL AND NATIONAL ANTHEM NON-SINGING CASES. AS A RESULT OF GOOD SOLUTIONS WERE FOUND BY THE COURTS. I TOLD VIOLA GOA WAS UNDERGOING AND MAKING SAME MISTAKES WE (US) MADE MAY YEARS AGO WITH JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES. I FELT GOA COULD LEARN FROM OUR MISTAKES. VIOLA SAID HE CONSIDERED THE MATTER TO BE MOST SERIOUS. HE SAID "I CONSIDER THE WITNESSES VERY GOOD PEOPLE AND DO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION IN EVERY COUNTRY THEY ARE IN". HE CONCLUDED THIS SUBJECT BY STATING "IT'S HARD TO CONVINCE MILITARY BLOCK HEADS". HE SAID HE WOULD BE TAKING THE MATTER UP WITH VIDELA.

7. JAIMIE LOKMAN: I MENTIONED JAIMIE LOKMAN WAS ANOTHER HIGH INTEREST CASE FOR US. VIOLA INDICATED HE HAD VAGUELY HEARD OF THE CASE BUT LACKED DETAILS. HE SAID HE KNEW IT WAS ONE OF GENERAL MENENDEZ' CASES IN CORDOBA. I TOLD HIM LOKMAN HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER PRISON FROM CORDOBA TO GET HIM OUT OF MENENDEZ' CLUTCHES. VIOLA PROMISED TO TAKE UP THE CASE WITH MARGUINDEGUY AND VIDELA AT THE EARLIEST MOMENT.

8. VAKY VISIT: IN THE LIGHT OF STATE 10786, I EXPLORED VIOLA'S VIEWS ON A POSSIBLE VAKY VISIT. HE SAID HE WELCOMED ASST SECT VAKY'S VISIT AT THE RIGHT TIME. I INQUIRED WHEN WAS THE RIGHT TIME IN HIS OPINION. HE STATED ASST SECT VAKY SHOULD NOT VISIT ARGENTINA PRIOR TO MARCH 15. I ASKED HIM WHAT WAS MAGIC ABOUT MARCH 15. VIOLA REPLIED BY THAT DATE SOME WORD WOULD HAVE BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE POPE ON THE BEAGLE DISPUTE. HE ALSO SAID HE EXPECTED BY THAT DATE HIS INTERNAL PROBLEMS WOULD BE RESOLVED, ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. I TOLD HIM I HAD READ IN THE PRESS OF GENERAL SUAREZ MASON'S POSSIBLE APPOINTMENT AS CHIEF OF STAFF. HE SAID IT IS TRUE IT WAS BEING CONSIDERED BY NOT FINAL. HE SAID THERE WERE STILL A FEW "SIFS" TO RESOLVE. HE STATED ALL MILITARY ASSIGNMENTS WOULD BE MADE WITHIN EIGHT DAYS.

9. POPE'S MEDIATION: VIOLA SAID HE WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH THE POPE'S PROGRESS ON THE BEAGLE CHANLE MATTER. HE SAID HE HAD EXPECTED THE POPE TO ACCEPT OR REFUSE MEDIATION WITHIN ONE WEEK AFTER CARDINAL SAMORE'S RETURN TO ROME. HE SAID THE DELAY WAS PLACING HIM IN A TIGHT SITUATION. VIOLA SAID HE IS ANXIOUS TO WITHDRAW TROOPS, BUT CANT DO IT UNTIL GOA HEARS FROM THE POPE. MAINTAINING THE TROOPS ON AN ALERT BASIS IS A PROBLEM SOLDIERS ARE GETTING IMPATIENT AND DISCIPLINARY PROBLEMS MAY ARISE. HE EMPHASIZED SOME OF HIS HARD-LINE EFFORTS PLUS BROADCASTING ARGENTINA WAS TRICKED INTO AN IMPOSSIBLE SITUATION.

10. TLATELOLCO: THE PERENNIAL SUBJECT OF RATIFICATION OF TLATELOLCO WAS AGAIN RAISED BY ME. VIOLA FOR ABOUT THE FIFTEENTH TIME TOLD ME THERE WERE NO PROBLEMS WITH ITS RATIFICATION: I TOLD HIM FROM WHAT I HAD READ IN PRESS INTERVIEWS WITH CASTRO-MADERO, I WASN'T TOO SURE. VIOLA THEN SAID HE WOULD ONLY REPEAT WHAT VIDELA HAD TOLD HIM. I THEN REVIEWED OUR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY

TOWARDS ARGENTINA. I ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCE VIOLA IT WAS IN ARGENTINA'S BEST INTEREST TO COOPERATE AND WORK HAND IN HAND WITH USG. IT WAS APPARENT VIOLA DIDN'T UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED. HE SUGGESTED I TALK TO CASTRO-MADERO. I EXPLAINED TO HIM I WOULD BE SEEING CASTRO-MADERO ON MY TRIP TO ATUCHA NEXT WEEK.

COMMENT: VIOLA WAS MORE RELAXED THAN MY LAST INTERVIEW WITH HIM. HIS ONLY APPARENT CONCERN AT THE MOMENT WAS HIS DESIRE FOR THE POPE TO ACCEPT MEDIATION SO THAT TROOPS COULD BE WITHDRAWN FORTHWITH. IT WAS APPARENT HE GAVE GREAT CONSIDERATION TO THE DATE OF MARCH 15. I PERCEIVED THE FEELING THAT BY THAT DATE WHAT HAS TO HAPPEN WILL HAPPEN.

CASTRO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~HUMAN RIGHTS: ARGENTINA

Political terrorism of the left and the right has wracked Argentina since the late sixties and was partially responsible for the economic and political breakdown precipitating the March 1976 coup. The Junta's efforts to eliminate leftist terrorism led to a massive counter-terrorist campaign, undertaken by the security forces.

Although the Government has publicly stated that terrorism has largely been defeated, the anti-terrorist campaign of the last few years has continued and has resulted in severe violations of human rights.

At present, the Government of Argentina acknowledges approximately 3,200 state of siege prisoners detained under executive power (PEN). The state of siege powers, invoked in 1974, have been used to hold a wide variety of persons for long periods without formal charges. There are reports of an additional 500-1000 prisoners in secret military camps.

Arrests continue but have decreased considerably from the level of the past two years. From January through October, 1978, 357 were added to PEN and 663 released.

Security personnel and prison officials routinely use torture during the interrogation process to intimidate and extract information. The Embassy reports that practices include "electric shock, the submarine (prolonged submersion under water), sodium pentothal, and severe beatings."

In addition, thousands (estimates range between 3,000 and 20,000) have been abducted by security forces. These cases, known as the disappeared, include not only suspected terrorists but also a broad range of people, such as labor leaders, workers, clergymen, human rights advocates, scientists, and doctors. A movement led by human rights organizations and the mothers of the disappeared, with the support of some elements of the Church, is trying to trace the missing people and to mobilize popular support for this effort through newspaper advertisements. The Government has not

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- 2 -

to be dead. At present, our Embassy is receiving reports of disappearances at a rate of 16-45 per month. There are an increasing number of reports that the military has recently restricted the authority of Corps Commanders to authorize abductions. However, the effect of these orders has yet to be verified.

The Argentine Government and the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have agreed on the conditions for a visit by the Commission to Argentina in late May, 1979.

The GOA in late 1977 reinstituted a limited "right of option" for political prisoners, held under executive detention, to request exile. However, from January to August, only about 60 were allowed to leave under this program. Our Embassy reported in November that "the program remains practically paralyzed reportedly by Army opposition and the extensive clearance system." However, the Embassy has been granted permission to interview 80 PEN detainees. Our requests to see 160 other potential right of option cases were not accepted by the Argentines, in at least a few cases because the prisoners had already been released.

The GOA for the first time in February, 1978 published lists of those detained under the state of siege.

Once again, permission has been granted for the ICRC to visit non-military prisons.

Responsive action has been taken on a few cases in which the U.S. has expressed special interest. Newspaper editor Jacob Timerman was transferred from PEN detention to house arrest; Alfredo Bravo, Co-Chairman of the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights, was paroled; Guillermo Vogler was released to the U.S. under the right of option and the Deutsch family was released. Also placed on parole was Perez Esquivel, leader of Paz y Justicia and Nobel Peace Prize nominee.

Official harrassment of selected religious groups continues. The Jehovah's Witnesses have borne much of the brunt. Reports of anti-semitic incidents targeted at members of the Jewish community and Jewish prisoners have decreased.

- 3 -

Severe restrictions remain on civil and political freedoms, including trade union rights, fair judicial processes, and the activities of political parties. Press freedom continues to be curtailed, although some restrictions were recently lifted. There appears to be little concerted or effective effort to check fundamental abuses or to revitalize the legal and institutional barriers that would prevent human rights violations in the future.

#### ACTION TAKEN ON HUMAN RIGHTS

- On October 27, 1977, the U.S. voted "no" on a gas pipeline loan in the IDB. We followed this up with "no" votes on a cellulose plant on December 1 and a petrochemical complex on December 8. On November 3 we did, however, support an IDB loan for potable water on the grounds that it meets basic human needs.
- Early in 1978, we abstained on an industrial credit and a grain storage loan, both in the World Bank. We abstained rather than vote no to signal to the Argentine Government that we had noted limited improvements in some areas, and to encourage further positive developments. We followed this by an extension of a \$60 million agricultural credit loan in April and abstained on three IFC loans.

Ex-Im Bank has recently agreed to issue letters of interest to two companies interested in projects in Argentina.

- Argentina rejected FMS credits for FY-78. The Administration declined to sign the FY'77 FMS agreement and is not requesting FMS credits for Argentina for FY-79. All arms transfers (FMS sales and commercial sales of items on the munitions list) were reviewed on a case-by-case basis before the October 1 statutory cutoff imposed by the Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment.

- 4 -

Although some safety-related and other items were approved. The vast majority of license applications were returned unapproved to exporters. We approved the sale of 30 military training slots before the October 1 cutoff but withheld approval of about 50 other requests.

- We have discussed our human rights concerns with the GOA at the highest levels. Vice-President Mondale underscored these concerns in a meeting with President Veidla in Rome at the time of the installation of Pope John Paul I. Earlier representations include trips by two Assistant Secretaries, an Under Secretary and the Secretary of State. When Under Secretary Newsom visited Argentina in late May, he made clear to the Argentines that we want better relations with that country, but that there would first have to be improvements in the human rights area. He specifically asked for movement on: an invitation to the IAHRC; establishment of mechanism to inform the families of disappeared persons of their whereabouts; and trial, release or exile for the 3,400 PEN prisoners then held without charge.
- The Department has submitted over 1,000 names of individuals who are either detained or have disappeared to the Argentine Government and has requested that they furnish information on these individuals. The Argentine response to date has been sparse. In recent weeks, however, 40 people previously reported as disappeared have "reappeared" in Argentine prisons.

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Clearances: ARA:Mr. Bumpus *B*  
HA:Mr. Salmon *JS* (Substance)





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

F41: PD  
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PF

cc: file (Argentina)

January 8, 1979

TO: The Deputy Secretary  
P - Mr. Newsom  
ARA - Ambassador Vaky

FROM: HA/HR - Mark L. Schneider

SUBJECT: Argentina: Recent Case Histories

To provide a perspective on the current view of the NGO community on continuing human rights violations in Argentina, the attached paper, delivered at the Open Forum on December 20, 1978, by Amnesty International board member Tom Jones, is instructive.

Attachment:

As stated.

cc: ARA - Mr. Bumpus

~~Department of State, A/GIS/IPS/SRP~~

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II. Argentina: Recent Case Histories

In the three months after the government of Maria Estela Martinez de Peron was overthrown by a military coup, from March 24, 1976, reports of arrests and abductions, of torture, of deaths in custody, and of political executions reaching Amnesty International from Argentina showed an alarming increase. Amnesty International receives information from sources around the world, both public and private; it is our professional responsibility to search for the truth regarding issues of human rights where verification of allegations can be exceedingly difficult.

In November 1976, Amnesty International sent a mission to Argentina: the delegates were Lord Avebury, member of the British House of Lords and of the Human Rights Parliamentary Commission; Father Robert Drinan, a U. S. Congressman from Massachusetts, and Patricia Feeney, a British member of the International Secretariat of Amnesty International. In March 1977, Amnesty International issued a Report on the condition of human rights in Argentina, based in part on the Mission's findings and in part on material received independently by A. I. The report is 91 pages long. The Mission Report has been followed by a series of International Secretariat papers on repression in Argentina of scientists, lawyers, trade unionists, journalists, doctors, teachers, students, <sup>(and)</sup> women and children.

I will cite you a few recent case histories as reported by A. I.

1. 8 August 1978: Beatrice Perosio, president of the National Society of Psychologists in Argentina, disappeared in Buenos Aires.
- 2, 3. August 1978: Silvia Criado and her husband Alfredo Smith, both psychologists, abducted in Buenos Aires at a meeting called to demand the freedom of Beatrice Perosio.
4. 17 August 1978: Abraham Hochman, 38-year-old lawyer who had defended political cases, reportedly "disappeared" in Buenos Aires.

5. 16 September 1978: Daniel Eduardo Bendersky, 26-year-old physics student at the University of Buenos Aires, arrested by four plainclothesmen in presence of his mother, who has had no word of him since.

6. 23 October 1978: Eduardo Pesci, 36-year-old lawyer who had defended political prisoners, detained by unknown persons in Buenos Aires; no word of him since.

Perhaps a clearer impression of what is happening in Argentina can be gained from the following report from the English language Buenos Aires Herald of September 22, 1978, under the headline, "Doctor and Two Lawyers Kidnapped":

"In full view of his fellow physicians and a waiting room full of patients, a doctor -- who is himself gravely ill -- was dragged away from his consulting room in the Italian Hospital at 11:30 a.m. on Monday, his wife announced yesterday. The kidnapping of Dr. Leopanto E. Bianchi, who is 56, and is a surgeon in the prestigious orthopedic and traumatology department of the hospital was followed by the abduction yesterday of two well-known Cordoba lawyers, one of them also a journalist. In all three cases the kidnappers claimed to be police. And police headquarters in the federal capital and in Cordoba denied that they had made any arrests. Luis Reinaudi, a journalist working for Cordoba and Tempos de Cordoba, who is also a lawyer and a member of the board of the local bar association, and Roberto Yankilevich, another lawyer, were abducted in the early hours of yesterday morning from their homes by two different groups of five to six armed men . . . ."

Although Dr. Bianchi was subsequently released, lawyer Yankilevich and journalist-lawyer Reinaudi are reportedly being held incommunicado in Cordoba penitentiary.

It should be noted that repression of journalists has been consistent practice since the early days of the coup, and that the Spanish-language media generally do not carry reports such as that from the Herald quoted above. Following the coup the Government decreed on March 24, 1976:

-4-

"Anyone who through any medium whatsoever defends, propagates or divulges news, communiques or views with the purpose of disrupting, prejudicing or lessening the prestige of the armed forces will be subject to detention for a period of up to 10 (ten) years."

(Communique 19 -- Delito de Prensa)

Statistics published by Le Monde in January of this year indicate something of the extent of persecution of journalists in Argentina: since the 1976 coup by January 1978 twenty-nine journalists had been killed, forty had disappeared, seventy had been imprisoned, and four hundred had gone into exile. The number of Argentine journalists arrested, kidnapped, imprisoned, disappeared, exiled and/or killed continues to grow.

~~VIA AIR MAIL~~

The armed forces seized power in Argentina on 24 March 1976 in violation of the Argentine Constitution. Upon assuming power the military junta systematically destroyed the basic institutions of Argentine democracy.

According to a Library of Congress Report:

"Upon assuming power the military junta disposed of all democratic institutions. The National Congress, provincial legislatures and municipal councils were dissolved; . . . all political parties were suspended; all political activity was declared illegal; the members of the Supreme Court and lower courts were removed and the judiciary replaced by military tribunals; and trade union activity was outlawed. The military junta now rules by decree." (Human Rights Conditions in Selected Countries and the U. S. Response, U. S. Govt. Printing Office, Washington, July 25, 1978, "Argentina," p. 20.)

Following the military coup the new President, General Jorge Rafael Videla, pledged to restore respect for human rights, to eliminate terrorism, and to "monopolize" the use of violence. Politically-motivated kidnapping and killing by extremists of both left and right had been a tragic feature

-5-

of Argentine politics beginning in the late sixties. On the left the Montoneros and the Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo and on the right the Alianza Anti-Comunista Argentina and other para-police death squads were all guilty of violent atrocities. The response of the military government of General Videla in the two years and nine months since the military coup has been one of the most ruthless and bloody repressions in the history of our time. Not one member of the AAA or other para-police/military death and torture squads has been brought to trial or even charged. Yet these groups, in the thirty-three months since General Videla seized power, have been responsible for upwards of 15,000 "disappearances" which the Government has been unable or unwilling to explain. Thousands of corpses, the bodies so mutilated that they are unidentifiable, have been discovered on the banks of the River Platte or in common graves. Thousands more desaparecidos are thought to be still alive, held in special detention camps the existence of which is denied by the Government.

Who have been the targets of this savage repression? At a press conference this year, President Videla stated: "A terrorist is not just someone with a gun or a bomb but also someone who spreads ideas that are contrary to western civilization." Last May Videla declared: "All the necessary persons will die in Argentina to assure the country's security." Since March 1976 Argentina has been governed by a military oligarchy which has overseen the systematic kidnapping, torture, and disappearance or extermination of thousands of Argentine citizens as well as foreigners unfortunate enough to be caught in the web of repression. First, those accused of being Montoneros and ERP, and their alleged sympathizers, were systematically arrested, taken to secret torture centers, and forced to confess; it appears that hundreds or even thousands have been

-6-

executed, all without any rights whatsoever. Gradually the circle of targets has widened, from lawyers and doctors to teachers and friends and acquaintances; anyone with "left-wing sympathies" today in Argentina, as defined by ~~the government~~ right-wing extremist groups, is in jeopardy of his life. A government which permits its security forces to kidnap its citizens and resident aliens at any time of day or night, and which then allows hideous and systematic torture of these individuals by members of the police and armed forces, and which has allowed thousands of politically-motivated ~~murders~~ <sup>executions</sup> to go uninvestigated can only be regarded, I submit, as a government which governs by terror.

The Argentine government places the number of detainees in official custody at around 3,600 ~~Amnesty International says the number of Argentine political detainees held in detention camps at from 8,000 to 10,000~~ -- the majority of whom have never been tried or convicted, held under generally cruel and inhumane conditions without any judicial determination of guilt or innocence. Lawyers and human rights organizations within Argentina estimate that since March 1976 between 20,000 and 30,000 writs of habeas corpus have been filed at the Ministry of the Interior on behalf of missing persons. The government has never officially investigated any disappearance case. Amnesty International has received reports of over 100 new disappearances in the last 100 days; our Research Department believes the actual figure may be much higher.

Amnesty International recently received macabre corroboration of what appears to be the systematic ~~murder~~ <sup>extra-legal execution</sup> of detainees held in certain unofficial detention camps in Argentina. A 23-year-old Argentine woman had been kidnapped by para-military forces in the fall of 1977 and subsequently held

for nine months in an unofficial detention camp. Her parents learned of

her whereabouts from a fellow prisoner released from the same camp some months after the daughter's disappearance and were told that she had been tortured and was pregnant. In August of this year, 1978, they were called to a police station where they were shown their daughter's body, "half of her face blown away shot at point-blank range." Amnesty International has learned from reliable sources that the police/military have been disposing of from five to as many as sixty bodies a day under analagous circumstances in one part of Buenos Aires alone.

#### V. Conclusion

Amnesty International, in the words of Thomas Hammarberg, Swedish journalist who is Chairman of A. I.'s IEC, "opposes, criticizes and condemns" all types of terrorist violence, whether committed by individuals on their own or on behalf of some group, or by a government's law-enforcement personnel in whatever name. In Argentina, the violent left is reported to be all but destroyed and virtually ineffective; the violent right continues, in apparent alliance with the military junta, its savage repression of all political opposition, using kidnapping, torture, and extra-legal execution on a massive scale. Every day of the last six months has witnessed new kidnappings, tortures, and killings of teachers and journalists, lawyers and doctors, opposition politicians and students, trade union leaders and resident aliens. Resident aliens in particular have been subjected to illegal forced repatriation, or refoulement, as the para-military security forces of Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay work with those of Argentina to destroy the virus of ideas unpopular with the military rulers.

Argentina's Interior Minister Harguindeguy has claimed that all but a few of the detainees now held are "terrorists who had killed or kidnapped" and that "witnesses of all their crimes exist." If this is true, why does Argentina continue to hold thousands of prisoners without charges under executive authority? Why have individuals acquitted by the judiciary of all charges been immediately re-detained "at the disposal of the Executive Power"? For example, Jacobo Timerman -- called "the country's best-known newspaper publisher" by the Buenos Aires Herald -- continues under house arrest despite a Supreme Court ruling of July 20, 1978 declaring that "even under the government's own rules it could not justify holding Timerman any longer, and had in fact been holding him unjustifiably since last October [1977]."

The truth is that in Argentina today the rule of law has been destroyed; the judiciary has been subordinated to rule by the military junta. The truth is, as the March 1977 mission report states, "It is apparent . . . that in Argentina a large number of people who disappear are unofficially executed." The truth is that today in Argentina women and men can be kidnapped from their homes by plainclothesmen at any time of the day or night, taken to filthy secret interrogation centers, interrogated by physical torture day and night, including electric shocks applied to all parts of the body with the infamous Argentine picana (prod); or the "submarino," meaning immersion of detainee in water or filth with head covered by a cloth hood so that breathing is practically impossible; or beatings of all kinds, kicks, burning with cigarettes, and, especially for women, all kinds of sexual



abuse, including rape as well as cases of miscarriage caused by beatings.

Amnesty International has found, in Argentina:

(1) "overwhelming proof of the use of torture as an instrument of policy;"

p. 36

(2) "many innocent people have been tortured in the last few months;"

p. 37

The Argentine Republic is a signatory to the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the American Convention on Human Rights. It is evident that the Argentine government has consistently violated the right to life and the right to basic human dignity which international standards of law, as well as the Argentine Constitution, are intended to protect. Government-tolerated terrorism becomes Government terrorism -- that is the truth of Argentina today.

Paper presented to  
Open Forum  
U. S. Department of State  
Washington, D. C.  
December 20, 1978

Tom Jones  
Amnesty International U.S.A.

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MEMORANDUM ON TORTURE AND DISAPPEARANCES IN  
ARGENTINA

The Government of Argentina acknowledges approximately 3,400 state of siege prisoners detained under executive power (PEN). Arrests and disappearances currently continue although not on the massive scale of the past two years.

In May 1978, the US Embassy reported that "physical torture continues to be used regularly during the interrogation of suspected terrorists and so-called 'criminal subversives' who do not fully cooperate." It reports that if there has been a net reduction in reports of torture, this is not because torture has been fore-sworn but "derives from fewer operations" because the number of terrorists and subversives has diminished.

Torture used to intimidate and extract information is described by the Embassy to include "electric shock, the submarine (prolonged submersion under water), sodium pentothal, severe beatings, including 'El Telefono' in which a simultaneous blow is delivered to both ears with cupped hands." A 1978 Amnesty International report in addition describes "cigarette burns...sexual abuse, rape...removing teeth, fingernails, and eyes...burning with boiling water, oil and acid: and even castration."

The Embassy reports firsthand accounts of physical torture at La Perla Interrogation Center, outside Cordoba, in September 1977. It further reports reliable information about a case in late December 1977, and in the past few weeks credible information about another case. Most incidents reported to the Embassy took place in 1976 and 1977.

One well-known case of physical abuse was Jacobo Timerman. Another well-publicized case by Amnesty International was that of Elizabeth Kasemann, a 29 year old West German citizen who died three months after her arrest by security forces in May 1977. Amnesty and our Embassy have numerous documented examples.

The International Committee of the Red Cross reports "guard brutality" in the jails, and "beatings and assaults" during "transfers from jail to jail." The Embassy reports that "clandestine seizure, hostile interrogation, and summary adjudication remain basic operating procedures for Argentine security forces." These procedures are

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expected to continue at least until after the World Cup Soccer matches in June.

Our Embassy further notes that, while penalties exist for police maltreatment of common criminals, they do not for political detainees. Furthermore, no such charges have been made publicly against members of the Armed Forces which carry out much of the counter-subversive operations, although internal disciplinary proceedings have reportedly taken place for some "unauthorized excesses." Interior Minister Hardindeguy in May called for an end to police use of terrorist tactics, and it was reported that the military received similar orders. However, no progress has been reported in deed.

#### Disappearances

Reports of torture do not of course deal with the thousands (estimates range in the tens of thousands) of Argentine citizens who were abducted by security forces and summarily executed. These cases, known as the disappeared, include not only suspected terrorists but also encompass a broader range of people-- including labor leaders, workers, clergymen, human rights advocates, scientists, doctors, and political party leaders. A recent dramatic occurrence was the abduction in December of five "mothers of the disappeared" and two French nuns, whose bodies were reportedly discovered washed ashore.

There is a growing movement led by human rights organizations and the Church to trace the missing people. In La Prensa of May 7, an open letter to President Videla was printed as a full page ad listing the names of 2,592 disappeared and urging an accounting. It was sponsored by three Argentine human rights organizations and paid for by contributions from large numbers of Argentine citizens. Editorials in Argentine newspapers this month further called attention to the "political timebomb" of the tragic disappearances. The Buenos Aires Herald declared "Every effort must be made to trace missing people. It is the only way to convince the world, and to prove to ourselves, that we do care about human rights. If anxious relatives are ignored or treated with callousness, they will become symbols as victims of a totally brutalized society." Innumerable letters are received by the US Government from the relatives and friends of the disappeared calling for an accounting.

*On the spot  
rebutals*

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Internationally, human rights organizations are also supporting this campaign. Amnesty International, for example, on May 18 launched a major drive against political imprisonments, torture, disappearances and executions in Argentina.

Both the internal and external pressure building seek to generate an impact on the GOA to render a public accounting.

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TO - ARA - Mr. Bumpen + Mr. Brayshaw 1/2/79  
 FROM - ARA - Mr. Hester  
 SUBJECT - HA/HR - Patrick J. Flood

The attached draft strategy paper outlines steps HA feels we could take if the Argentine Govt. begins to make genuine improvements in the human rights situation. We also suggest a phased approach which might involve the GOA to undertake such improvements. We haven't, in this paper, addressed the issue of what we should do if the GOA makes no improvements or if the human rights situation worsens.

We prepared the draft in an effort to advance the concept of country strategy papers. We aren't seeking a formal ARA clearance at this stage, but we would like to have your informal comments by this Friday, if at all possible.

Thank, and Happy New Year -

Pat

SEE ATTACHMENT

Department of State, A/GS/IPS/SRP

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STRATEGY TOWARD ARGENTINA

~~Department of State, A/GIS/IPS/SRP~~

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SHORT-TERM (FROM NOW UNTIL  
IAHRC VISIT IN LATE MAY 1979)

GOAL NO. 1: Stop New Abductions / (Disappearances),  
Torture, and Arbitrary Detentions

ACTION: Tell the Argentines we regard this as the immediate first priority step they can take toward an eventual resumption of normal bilateral relations. Suggest that the highest authorities issue strict new instructions to all military and police authorities to cease these practices under threat of swift prosecution for acts committed subsequent to the issuance of these orders. If a new case occurs, prosecute the official responsible to demonstrate that the GOA is serious about curbing and punishing future abuses.

GOAL NO. 2: Release, Try, or Exile Under Right-of-Option the Estimated 4,000 Political Prisoners Held Under PEN or in Military Custody

ACTION: Tell the Argentines that, concurrently with the measures outlined under Goal No. 1, we want them to establish an accelerated new program to release, try in civilian courts, or exile under the right-of-option

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procedures, all political detainees. Recommend that the program include:

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- An amnesty for prisoners not yet formally charged with committing violent acts or common crimes.
- Transfer of all detainees from clandestine military camps to the regular prison system, and the notification to their families of their whereabouts.
- Begin immediately after the amnesty to try, release, or exile all non-amnestied PEN and former military detainees, at a rate sufficient to ensure the processing of all of these people by the time the IAHRC arrives in late May.

(Point out to the GOA that taking these measures will enable the GOA to receive the Commission with its house in much better order than would otherwise be the case, and to escape much of the international and domestic opprobrium that can be expected if these actions are not taken.)

ACTION: Respond to Argentine implementation of Goals 1 and 2 by releasing all pending Ex-Im transactions as soon as we are certain that the GOA has instituted the foregoing measures. For example, we could take this step soon after

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announcement of the amnesty if we had no credible reports of abduction or torture during the time between our presentation of this proposal and the announcement of the amnesty.

ACTION: When the political prisoner-processing program is 50% complete, switch from "ABSTAIN" to "YES" on votes for non-BHN loans for Argentina in the conventional-financing facilities of the IFI's. (This could occur as early as February or March if the GOA implements the program vigorously.)

ACTION: When the prisoner-processing program is 100% complete, switch from "ABSTAIN" to "YES" on non-BHN loan requests in the soft-loan windows of the IFI's.

(This could occur in May, just before the IAHRC arrives. We should not take any additional positive actions until after the Commission visit.)

GOAL NO. 3: (Establish a Mechanism to Inform Families of the Fate of the Disappeared

ACTION: Tell the Argentines that some accounting of the disappeared is essential to the resumption of normal relations with the U.S. We are not asking that the perpetrators of past killings and abductions be punished immediately, but we do not approve an amnesty for those who have killed and tortured. We are prepared to leave the



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question of possible prosecution to a successor government. What we seek now is information for the families, many of whom believe their disappeared relatives are alive. If they are, they should be told where to find them. If they are dead, they should be so informed and given the remains of the deceased and a death certificate explaining the cause of death, and the time and place. For these families, the Government should establish a procedure to indemnify them for their loss. Indemnification would not prejudice future criminal action against the perpetrators.

The establishment of such a mechanism should take place before the IAHRC visit.

ACTION: The U.S. should respond to the establishment of notification and indemnification procedures by taking positive steps, in addition to those already mentioned, in areas of interest to the GOA. For example, we could inform the Argentines we would be prepared to approve OPIC loans and guarantees once the mechanism is in full operation.

(However, this would depend also on whether the prisoner-processing program was on schedule. If the latter hogs down, we should delay action on licenses (for non-munition; list items) and OPIC, or at least approve them slowly until the prisoner program picks up speed.)

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MEDIUM-TERM: FROM THE IAHRC  
VISIT UNTIL THE END OF 1979

GOAL NO. 4: Restoration of Institutional Safeguards  
for Individual Rights

PREFACE: Whatever we do in the last half of 1979 should be based largely on the report and recommendations of the IAHRC after its visit. We pressed hard for the visit, so we should accord great weight to the Commission's findings. The latter, in turn, can constitute a valuable multilateral endorsement of U.S. policies. We do not, of course, know what the Commission will conclude. If however, the GOA has already taken steps to accomplish Goals 1, 2, and 3, and has cooperated with the Commission during the actual visit, it is likely that the Commission report will focus on measures to inhibit a recurrence of past abuses.

ACTION: We should tell the Argentines that abolition of the state of siege, restoration of habeas corpus for all offenses, guarantees for the independence of the judiciary, and the trial of civilians by civil courts are necessary to guard against future violations of the integrity of the person. We can say we would be prepared to respond to these measures by:

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- Opening discussions on a resumption of a small bilateral economic assistance program.
- Opening discussions on a possible resumption of FMS cash sales and IMET programs.

GOAL NO. 5: Restoration of Full Autonomy and Freedom of Action to Churches, Unions, and other Public Organizations including Political Parties and the Press, and a Public Commitment to Hold Elections in 1980

ACTION: Tell the Argentines that full restoration of effective legal safeguards for these organizations and a commitment to hold elections are prerequisites for the resumption of any substantial bilateral economic assistance program and for any significant progress toward the resumption of IMET and FMS sales. The latter would, of course, require repeal or modification of the Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment. If we would seek modification to permit FMS cash sales and IMET when the GOA fixes a date for elections to be held in 1979 or early 1980. Between the announcement of elections and the actual balloting, we would be prepared to approve sales of Munition List items except those destined for the police and other internal-security forces, providing there has been no retrogression in any areas covered by Goals 1-4 or in plans for the elections.

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GOAL NO. 6: Free Elections

ACTION: We would seek the outright repeal of ,  
permitting the re-establishment of an FMS credit program,  
when the Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment, elections are  
actually held.

As soon as a freely-elected government takes office,  
we would be ready to sign an FMS credit agreement.

FINAL NOTE: Where I say, "Tell the Argentines that...",  
I am advocating a graduated communication of our strategy.  
At each phase of the strategy, we should make our next  
step clear and precise, alluding only in general terms to  
"what we will do if the GOA does thus and so" at later  
stages. Tell them a little at a time, not all at once--  
but tell them something (privately, of course) at each  
step along the way. The theme should be that we want to  
restore normal relations, and that certain Argentine actions  
will make a gradual resumption of these relations possible.

Drafted by: HA/HR:PJFlood:bdr  
12/28/78:21180

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Drafted by: HA/HR:PJFlood:bdr  
12/28/78:21180

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HA chron + official records

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(letters on p. 1 correspond to tabs throughout)