

17 January 80

PD

Arnie Raphael called. He said Vance had noted the Tarnoff Brz and wanted to know if you cleared. I told him I cleared when they called since the memo is simply a factual account of what has gone on and the language on the UNHRC and steps Argentina might take ~~was~~ was same as Pat Flood worked on last week. In any event Secretary is clearly sensitive to your concerns.

CS

~~Department of State, A/GIS/IPS/SRP~~

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington, D.C. 20520

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Date 12-14-80~~

January 17, 1980

TO: HA - Ms. Derian  
FROM: HA/HR - Charles B. Salmon, Jr. *[Signature]*  
SUBJECT: Talking Points on Argentina

Attached for your consideration are draft talking points.

I understand OES, IO and Ambassador Smith also have complained about not clearing the January 15 message. Consequently, I wouldn't emphasize the bureaucratic clearance problem.

What needs to be emphasized is that in a time of stress, we are in danger of doing exactly what the pundits have been predicting, i.e., signalling our willingness (or apparent willingness) to trade off our human rights concerns for Argentine support on the grain question.

We have always been careful to isolate our human rights concerns from basic security interests elsewhere, i.e., Korea, Philippines. We have been able to maintain human rights and security dialogues without necessarily linking the issues.

There was no good reason to link our grain problem with human rights or to permit the Argentines to force us to accept this linkage. If there is a reason of which HA is unaware, we should have had the opportunity to at least weigh in on the issue.

The Argentines may read our present position as abandoning our human rights policy vis-a-vis their country and seek to obtain all they can in exchange for not selling the grains to the Soviets. A paragraph on grain was added.

Also attached are the cables Ruser provided and a memo which went to the White House.

Attachments:

As stated.

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ARGENTINA AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Talking Points

~~Department of State, A/GIS/IPS/SRP~~  
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-- On January 16, I was told that several important decisions concerning Argentina, the human rights situation there and our conduct at the forthcoming UN Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva had been taken without my being consulted.

-- From the outset of the Administration, Argentina has villified our human rights policy and me personally.

-- Therefore, I am grievously disturbed at being excluded from the decisionmaking process.

-- Last week our Chargé in Buenos Aires proposed a dialogue with the Argentines on the upcoming UNHRC meeting in Geneva. He suggested we use Argentine apprehensions about possible condemnation in Geneva to spur definite human rights improvements. The cable was shown to the President. He directed that we follow up on the suggestion.

-- HA helped draft the reply approving the dialogue. Our reply proposed specific steps the Argentines might take. We also noted the procedures in Geneva ruled out the drastic steps the Argentines feared.

-- This message, though eventually transmitted, was overtaken by a flash message to BA transmitting a letter to

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President Videla from the President. It requested Argentine support for our policy of grain restrictions to the Soviets, i.e., Argentine should not make good the Soviet short fall.

-- Poor staff work resulted in the President not being aware of Argentine stocks which if sold can negate our restrictions. The President's message was designed to soothe Argentine sensibilities about not being properly consulted, and to ensure their participation in the grain consultations last weekend.

-- I am informed Mr. Christopher (not ARA) added a final paragraph to the cable transmitting the President's message. It read "In delivering the foregoing, you should note that we want to be helpful with respect to the UN Human Rights Commission's consideration and will be in touch with the specifics. We are also taking a look at how we can be helpful on other matters of special interest."

-- DCM Chaplin delivered the President's message to Under Secretary Cura at 5 p.m. Friday, January 11. Cura expressed special satisfaction with Chaplin's offer of U.S. recognition of Argentina's human rights improvements. Cura said recognition was all Argentina wanted. He expressed optimism about the future of U.S. Argentine relations.

-- At an SCC meeting January 15, the Deputy National Security Advisor reportedly asked for the draft human rights

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reports on Argentina and Brazil.

-- Late January 15, a cable was sent to Buenos Aires reiterating our hope that Argentina would not act in a way which would undo our restrictions. We offered to send a special emissary for broad review of our relations. Among the issues to be discussed would be "The U.S. stance in multilateral fora where the human rights situation in Argentina is under discussion." There was momentary thought given to clearing the cable with me but it was not.

-- On January 15, Ambassador Bowdler reviewed the draft human rights report and made significant changes especially in the introduction. These represented a softening of the draft I negotiated with the Argentine Country Director before Christmas. I understand ARA's judgment was that the report as originally drafted would have a devastating effect on our bilateral relations at this juncture.

-- I appreciate the problems we face at the moment but am deeply distressed by:

a. Mr. Christopher's addition to the cable containing the Presidential letter to Videla. It implies we are ready to do much of what the Argentines might wish in the human rights area at Geneva if only they go along with us on the grain issue.

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b. Reiteration of this suggestion in the cable of January 15. In view of Argentina's track record, I doubt they would make even the modest improvements requested in the cable approving a dialogue. Given their present reading of our desire for cooperation on the grain issue, I am fearful the Argentines may demand that we prostitute ourselves and thereby the UNHRC process at Geneva. I also suspect they make make other demands in the human rights area (e.g., an undertaking to seek repeal of the Kennedy Humphrey amendment) which we could not or should not honor.

c. The possibility (suggested by Aaron's request for the reports and the subsequent ARA revisions) that we will consider shading or slanting our reports for purely political reasons. This would be an inexcusable violation of the integrity of the reports process. If allowed to occur, it would not go unnoticed by either the public or the Congress. Inevitably, it would be a topic of discussion during the annual HFRC hearing on the reports.

d. The Argentine government is now reviewing the draft report of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. My information is that the report is a devastating incident of GOA's past and present human rights practices. They are

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looking for a way to call the integrity of that report into question and have instituted a worldwide campaign to find a way to insure that the signals from other human rights advocates do just that. The USG is about to hand them a golden opportunity with its grain concerns.

e. If we make a deal to soften our human rights stance with Argentina, it won't be a secret. And all our assurances about the integrity of our policy will be thrown out the window. Changing the human rights report now will also destroy the integrity of the country reports process.

f. The Argentines don't keep their agreements. It is wishful thinking to believe that they will adhere to the grain agreement (should they acquiesce at any point) or that they will make real human rights changes in a trade with us.

g. Argentina is a gross violator of human rights.

h - USAMC & VIDIA both raised  
HR reports

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Argentina (3 of 4)