## MEMORANDUM

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GONFIDENTIAL ACTION	./	February 19,	, 1980	A.
MEMORANDUM FOR:	ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI			420
FROM:	THOMAS THORNTON	ć	See Bob	Pastors attached.
SUBJECT:	Chile and Argentina (	U)		(Jon
(attached). I ubattle the UNITAclusion and Davidecide the issue	no for the VBB last Thur inderstand that it was d AS issue out on their ow id Newsom wants us to ta e. I continue to recomm e as appropriate):	ecided that S n. They have ke a position	State and DOD not come to and, presuma	should a con- bly, check
1. Agree to UN	TTAS for Argentina.	Ye	es V	NoA
2. Disapprove (C)	UNITAS for Chile.	Ye	s <u>/</u>	No
a DOD cartograph down. This is a Since DOD has ta elements (and we	n issue between State on her's slot should be about matter of massive inconken a longer cut in pere would be scrubbing UNI matter. Concur?	lished as par nsequence fro centage terms TAS for Chile	t of the Lete m any point o than other E ) I suggest t	lier crack- f view. mbassy
There is also the	ne question of visits learticularly contentious.	ft over from Do you conc	the VBB altho ur that:	ugh I don't
1. Allen should	be allowed to visit Ar	gentina? Ye	s	No
<ol> <li>The Galtieri</li> <li>(C)</li> </ol>	invitation should be d	elayed? Ye	s	No
I still think the resolution. If know your prefer	e larger issue (discusse you do not want to burde ences. Should we:	ed on page 2 o en the VBB wi	of attached m th it, please	emo) needs let me
Substantially co	nsider the Letilier pha	se over?		avoid
Continue to take	follow-up actions influ	senced by it?		(c) h-7
Attachment: cc: Robert	Dootes		NGS/SBS/SBN	(c) hund to take a prairie
	Chanceto	tment of State, A		
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#### MEMORANDUM

### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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February 13, 1980

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

THOMAS THORNT

SUBJECT:

V-B-B Lunch -- Latin American Issues

DOD may bring up two Southern Cone issues:

- 1. Should the Argentinian Army Chief be invited to the US and our Chief of Air Staff go to Argentina?
- Should we invite Chile and Argentina to participate in the annual UNITAS naval exercises? (C)

On the first point, I am in no tearing rush to issue the invitation -- the idea for which apparently came out of the Goodpaster mission. Even assuming that we want to invite Galtieri, I would want to hold off until we are sure that he does not appear as a human rights villan in the upcoming Interamerican Human Rights report. The visit of GEN Allen to Argentina (a tag-on to an already scheduled visit to Brazil) seems unobjectionable. I think that both of these visits would, however, be too much. Recommendation: O.K. for Allen; hold off on Galtieri for a while.

On the UNITAS maneuvers, I don't think that Argentina poses a problem. I understand that they have routinely participated in the past -- it makes no sense to cut them out now after (a) there has been some human rights improvement and (b) Goodpaster has been there. Derian wants to punish them for being uncooperative with us at the UNHRC meeting at Geneva.. This is not the instrument that I would use if, indeed, we want to show our displeasure. (C)

The Chile/UNITAS question is less clearcut. DOD wants to go ahead. The State position will be that we should not let the Chileans participate this year as one more punishment for the Letelier affair. I find that reasonable although it does raise a larger problem (see below). Recommendation: Yes on Argentina, No on Chile, keyed specifically to the Letelier case. I would not argue, however, if you decided otherwise on Chile. (C)

Review on Feb. 13, 1986

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## The Larger Issue

The President authorized a number of steps in the Letilier case and these have been taken (or are about to be taken). The question arises as to whether we want to continue punishment of the Chileans on this issue. Do we want this to be a time-limited action or is it supposed to remain a semi-permanent factor in US-Chilean relations? The UNITAS issue is one example and there will be some others coming up shortly. My preference is to put the issue behind us — the UNITAS decision would be our last one under its influence — and judge future issues in US-Chilean relations on the basis of their merits and overall Chilean behavior. It is possible, however, that you, Vance and even the President may want to come down harder and more lastingly on the Chileans. If so, the bureaucracy needs guidance. (C)

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- A. That you raise with Vance (and later, if necessary, the President) the question of whether we want to keep the pressure on the Chileans over the Letilier case or consider actions under it to be completed.
- B. That you take the latter position in the discussion.
- C. That you let me know the outcome. (C)

CONFIDENTIAL

#### MEMORANDUM

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

February 20, 1980

INFORMATION

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

ROBERT PASTOR

SUBJECT:

Comments on Thornton's Memo on Chile (U)

Let me briefly comment on an important issue Tom raises in his memo:

"Should we consider the Letelier phase over?" The President made his decision to adopt a cool posture to Chile in late October; and in late November, the decisions were announced in a strong statement condemning Chilean government complicity in a heinous crime of international terrorism. I would pose Tom's question differently: How much staying power does the USG have? I think it would be a terrible embarrassment to the President if we proceeded with "business as usual," such as suggested by the UNITAS exercise, four months after he announces a strong and firm policy. (C)

With Mark Schneider running Kennedy's campaign, you can be absolutely certain that a decision to put the "Letelier phase" behind us and proceed with UNITAS will be noticed. And Kennedy is hungry for issues. Moreover, there is no good reason for us to go ahead with UNITAS; we are hardly in danger of losing Chile to anyone but the militarists. (C)

While I agree with Tom that the question of whether or not a DOD cartographer's slot should be abolished is an unimportant matter, Tom neglects to mention that one of the President's decisions was to reduce the size of our own mission. If all of us agree that this slot is unnecessary, then to be consistent with the President's decision it should be abolished. I see no reason why we should back DOD on this matter. (C)

cc: Tom Thornton

CONFIDENTIAL,

Review 2/20/1990 Extended by Z. Brzezinski

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