

~~TOP SECRET~~

NO. 226

UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan:

A Cryptologic History (U)

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2009-055, document no. 1
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: November 21, 2017



GAMMA CONTROLLED
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS

Classified by: NSA/CSSM 123-2
Declassify On: Originating Agency's Determination Required

National Security Agency
Central Security Service

CH-E32-93-03

~~TOP SECRET~~

This monograph is a product of the National Security Agency history program. Its contents and conclusions are those of the author, based on original research, and do not necessarily represent the official views of the National Security Agency. Please address divergent opinion or additional detail to the Center for Cryptologic History (E324).

Contents of this publication should not be reproduced or further disseminated outside the U.S. Intelligence Community without the permission of the Director, NSA. Inquiries about reproduction and dissemination should be directed to the Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000, ATTN: E324.

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

*Special Series
Crisis Collection
Volume 8*

*The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan:
A Cryptologic History (U)*

Vera R. Filby



**CENTER FOR CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY**

1993

**GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY**

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

Withheld from public release under
§6 of the National Security Act of 1959,
50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

Table of Contents

	Page
Foreword	v
Acknowledgment	vii
Map	ix
Placenames	xi
Introduction	1
Chapter 1: <input type="text"/>	3
Chapter 2: Learning the Target	11
Chapter 3: Prelude to Invasion	15
Chapter 4: Collection and Processing	27
Chapter 5: The Language Problem	33
Chapter 6: <input type="text"/>	35
Chapter 7: Mobilization	39
Chapter 8: Final Readiness and Invasion	51
Bibliography	67
Annex A Interviews	71
Annex B Abbreviations and Acronyms	73
Annex C Organization Charts	77

GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Foreword

The study of history is important to any profession, and the study of cryptologic history is especially important for Signals Intelligence and Information Security professionals. Considering that this business is characterized by the constraining effects of anonymity and the rapid pace of changes in technology, it is all the more essential that each professional have the sense of perspective and the sense of pride that only institutional memory can provide.

Vera Filby's *A Cryptologic History of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, published by the Center for Cryptologic History, is a notable contribution to professional reading about Signals Intelligence. In fact, I believe it is destined to become a "classic" in the library of cryptologic literature. Here's why.

On the one hand, this monograph provides an exciting description of one of NSA's great success stories of the 1970s - the insight SIGINT afforded policymakers into an unexpected and destabilizing Soviet military action. It opens to us a clear example of how SIGINT made a real difference in United States policy and diplomacy.

Even more important for professional literature, this monograph unfolds for the reader a thorough case study of a SIGINT problem as it was worked from its inception through successful exploitation, until NSA could furnish this crucial support to policymakers. While the monograph is clear about the importance of technological advances, it emphasizes that technology alone is insufficient to accomplish the cryptologic mission, that the decisive factor in success is the individual - that is, the individual who has the ability to approach the problem at hand in a creative way and to use technology, analytic expertise, and the resources of the SIGINT system in new and forceful ways.

There is one additional aspect that should be mentioned. Mrs. Filby was not content to reconstruct this case study solely from the written documentation; rather, she conducted an extensive series of interviews with the participants in all aspects of this endeavor. As a result, the monograph gives the reader the real flavor of SIGINT as the story unfolds. This is the SIGINT effort "as it was lived."

The Center for Cryptologic History recommends *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: A Cryptologic History* to all members of the cryptologic community as a substantial addition to their reading for professional development.

DAVID A. HATCH

Chief,

Center for Cryptologic History

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

Acknowledgments

(U) I welcome the opportunity to thank all who contributed to the production of this monograph. My thanks go especially to the analysts and others who so kindly and readily agreed to be interviewed and who freely offered their knowledge, insight, and recollections and, where possible, their records. Their memory, after a dozen years, was astonishing in its detail and clarity. I am indebted most of all to [redacted]

[redacted] for the abundance of information they gave me and for the inspiration of their expertise, enthusiasm, and pleasure in the challenges of the problem.* They and others patiently answered my follow-up questions, and several have checked portions of the text for accuracy. Phillip H. Warren even drew a diagram, which appears in chapter 4. Any errors are, of course, my own.

(U) I am much indebted also to the ever-helpful librarians, archivists, and other information science analysts. On several occasions they found records I didn't know enough to ask for.

(U) Special thanks are due to David W. Gaddy, who invited me to take part in a program to write cryptologic "readers" and later to join the Center for Cryptologic History (CCH), which he created. I am also indebted to Whitney E. Reed, Chief, Education, Training, and Information Services Group, for his generosity in facilitating my move from the School, and I appreciate the support of my former supervisor, [redacted] who permitted me to get started on a reader while awaiting transfer.

(U) I also thank my colleagues in all branches of the CCH for their help in many ways, and I especially appreciate the help and advice of my editor, David A. Hatch.


VERA R. FILBY
January 1993

* The tape and a transcript of an interview with [redacted] are available in the NSA Center for Cryptologic History.

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY



GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Placenames

Alma-Ata	4315N	07657E
Amu-Darya River	4340N	05901E
Bagram	3458N	06917E
Bagram	3429N	06916E
Balkhash	4653N	07500E
Beloomut	5457N	03920E
Chervono-Glinskoe	4558N	02926E
Chimkent	4218N	06936E
Chirchik	4129N	06935E
Dushanbe	3803N	06848E
Fergana	4023N	07146E
Feyzabad	3706N	07034E
Gowrmach	3441N	06347E
Herat	3420N	06212E
Jalalabad	3426N	07028E
Kabul	3431N	06912E
Khalid (Qalid)	1818N	04248E
Khanabad	3851N	06556E
Kizyl-Arvat	3858N	05615E
Krivoj Rog	4751N	03318E
Kushka	3516N	06220E
Mary	3736N	06150E
Melitopol'	4653N	03518E
Moscow	5545N	03735E
Nebit-Dag	3930N	05422E
Pol-e Khomri	3556N	06843E
Qandahar	3135N	06545E
Salang Pass	3522N	06904E
Samarkand	3940N	06658E
Seshcha	5345N	03320E
Shatalovo	5420N	03227E

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

TOP SECRET UMBRA

Shindand	3318N	06208E
Smolensk	5447N	03203E
Tashkent	4120N	06918E
Termez	3714N	06716E
Ukurej	5222N	11702E
Vitebsk	5512N	03011E
Zavitinsk	5007N	12927E

GAMMA CONTROLLED

**NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY**

TOP SECRET UMBRA

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

Introduction

[] This is a history of the cryptologic effort behind the SIGINT story of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Day 1979. It extends through the invasion to the arrival of Marshal Sergej Leonidovich Sokolov and the Soviet General Staff Operations Group in Kabul in early January 1980.

[] The cryptologic story begins twenty years earlier []

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[] The signals environment is one part of a cryptologic history; the rest is the people and the hard work of collecting the signals, reconstructing their organization, learning the target, building the processing systems, making the unreadable readable and the readable understandable, and doing whatever else may be needed to make the SIGINT system work and produce SIGINT for the intelligence community. All these elements - and plenty of exploitable traffic as Soviet operations expanded - combined in the Soviet/Afghan crisis to create a SIGINT success story.

[] This happened despite the competition of SIGINT problems higher in priority. The Soviet target, in Soviet Central Asia, was a part of the total Soviet military problem, but a minor part because of the usually low level of activity. It was covered in the normal strategic scan that kept watch across the whole vast range of military activity. The Afghan target registered close to zero on the scale of customer interest, and collection resources were scanty; consequently, collection and technical data on the target were limited. All this changed as the signs of Soviet concern increased and the invasion was organized and executed. The contemporaneous hostage crisis in Iran was not a serious impediment to collection, but it did affect the users' acceptance of the SIGINT product until evidence of the impending incursion became undeniable.

[] The SIGINT story of the invasion and the war in Afghanistan was reported as it happened and recorded in summaries, term reports, and research reports. The accumulated SIGINT history exists in massive detail and vast amount in the NSA Archives. The cryptologic history, in contrast, exists in memory and in the records that have survived in archival, local, or personal collections. In the nature of things, the documents created in the flow of work - the memos, messages, OPSCOMM exchanges, and analysts' notes and worksheets, that could tell so much of the story - rarely survive.

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

Chapter 1


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NSA people remember the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a great SIGINT success. The Afghanistan story was a SIGINT classic, some will say. In classic circumstances of military buildup and crisis, the SIGINT system worked at its best. It recognized the threat, issued the alert, and reported the information. The process flowed well. Collectors worldwide provided the traffic. The traffic analysts, with knowledge based on many years of study and massively accumulated data, watched and analyzed the communications structure as it developed. The analysis and reporting teams were well rehearsed and ready for crisis response - though they had no way of knowing that the crisis they were prepared for would be Afghanistan.

[REDACTED]


E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY



E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY



E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

The traffic, from Soviet air, air defense, army, naval, and some East European originators, was evaluated for intelligence content by analysts working the targets. The air evaluation noted that the traffic examined made possible the analysis of

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

But intelligence information is

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

produced to be reported, and selected information was provided to a very limited distribution based on strict need-to-know in the special Category III GAMMA subseries.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] In a letter to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) dated 23 March 1975, Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr., Director, NSA/Chief CSS, referred to the reporting on a mobilization of a Soviet motorized division. He noted that the time of reporting was four to six days after intercept and that the delay was about par for such reporting. He listed some of the sources of the delay, which included the facts that

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] By the mid-1970s, many A Group and R Organization projects for the upgrading were already under way, with an attendant proliferation of

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN, KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

[redacted] In May 1975, [redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

justification was written for a new CDC-7600 computer.

[redacted]

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] In a memorandum on 16 March 1976, subject: Special Study, General Allen informed DDO, DDR, DDC, DDF, ADPM, and ADPR that "I plan a special effort to assure continued important intelligence support to our SIGINT users. This effort will proceed as three simultaneous studies, each directed to specific aspects of the problem. I have appointed coordinators for each study panel and asked that a consolidated report be ready by 18 June 1976. . . ."

[redacted] The subject to be studied was [redacted] The Director also appointed David Boak, a senior COMSEC officer, to be architect for security with the task of examining a few core secrets. [redacted] The objective was to foster its preservation for five years. Boak's report included a recommendation to set up a reporting control center in A Group. A Group management objected because of the cost in people, but they nevertheless complied. Ann Caracristi, Chief A, appointed [redacted] who was also a member of one of the panels [redacted] as a team to review reporting methods, tighten distribution, and provide interface with the users. They created the A Group Reporting Authority (AGRA) and took full control of all A Group end

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS · NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

P
S
C
t

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

product reporting. They did away with the GAMMA subseries, devised ways to suppress source indications, revised distribution, and brought in the Dissemination and Extraction Controlled by Originator (ORCON) caveat. The users, predictably, were upset by the changes and complained that information they needed was being withheld from them. It took a lot of briefings to convince them of the necessity of stricter security.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] In the mid-1970s A Group managers began to see that organizational changes were needed. [redacted] was at the heart of the matter. It had taken a long time to get production moving well. Reorganization would enhance previous changes made to

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] The aims of the new organization were expressed in the following mission and functions statement:

The new A organization will apply maximum available workforce to SIGINT production under single target managers, more clearly delineate and revitalize essential staff and other support functions and prepare for future changes in production means. Within these broad objectives it will assure quick reactions and surge capability, provide the operational means for new collection/remoting systems and ensure dynamic management of the transcriber and applications software development workforce.

The main result of the reorganization was to merge A7, SIGINT Research, and A8, Current SIGINT Reporting, into a new A2, Soviet Military Forces.

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Notes

1. (U) Although there is no official definition, the cryptologic community is generally understood to encompass the SIGINT organizations of the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Members use the term "Second Parties" for the other members.
2. (U) See the organization charts in Annex B.
3. (U) Soviet communications satellites include, among others, GORIZONT for maritime communications real-time relay and MOLNIYA and RADUGA for military and leadership communications real-time relay.

GAMMA CONTROLLED

**NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY**

Chapter 2

Learning the Target

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

[redacted] At the time of the Afghan crisis [redacted] were the chiefs of the twin watches of the SIGINT reporting team. For them, the SIGINT history of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began in the early 1970s when they discovered what they could do for each other. [redacted] in A7, SIGINT Research, was engaged in research on Soviet [redacted] data were beginning to come through to the analysts. [redacted] in A8, Current SIGINT Reporting, was working on traffic analysis of [redacted] military communications. In consulting with each other, they saw that each could provide answers to the other's questions. Putting their data together could reveal meaningful information that was not apparent separately. One had communications patterns showing organization, location, movement. The other had people talking, discussing problems, exchanging information, asking questions. One had the structure, the other the substance.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

[redacted] When the possibilities of this merging of sources began to be understood, a committee was formed to study how to deal with the [redacted] material [redacted] whose expertise was in traffic analysis of [redacted] served as a member of the committee. To him, as a "front end" analyst, it was fundamental that the approach should be to collect traffic [redacted] and find out what could be done with it. The obstacle to this was the impossibility of processing the traffic fast enough. Another problem at this early stage was that the extent of the system and nature of the users were not yet well known. The traffic [redacted]

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] The problem was a jigsaw puzzle, like any other in SIGINT, with uncertain dimensions and an unknown number of the pieces missing.

[redacted] But this was only the beginning. For six or seven years, [redacted] the linguists and analysts were cataloging and studying the traffic, learning how and when to process it and what to expect of it. Analysts in the Soviet military problem, using related HF [redacted] and related voice traffic to complement and illuminate each other, studied Soviet/Warsaw Pact exercises. The continuities and the duration of an exercise could be derived from the externals of the HF. The players could be discerned, and movements followed. But what were they doing? The [redacted]

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)


GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[] The analysts developed the problem and reported their findings, but they became dissatisfied with analyzing and reporting events as they came along. They wanted



E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

(U) [] was tasked to set up a study of the experiment. He carried out a detailed examination of exactly what happened and when it happened and produced a report that identified a lack of management as a cause of the failure to follow the Soviet

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

exercise in near real time. Several offices were involved, but who was in charge? Nobody was in charge.

[redacted] The effort confirmed what was already known, that it was easy to follow an exercise through analysis of the communications patterns. The problem was to create a system that would make it possible to follow the substantive information in [redacted] intercept at the same pace. TA reporting had been refined to an art. Major identification, actions, and phase changes in an exercise were readily discernible, but traffic patterns could not show what was actually happening. There had to be a way to get the [redacted] analysts and the linguist/analysts together to keep up with the timeline - the "thin red line," as some analysts called it - of a progressing exercise.

[redacted] The parts of the new A2, Soviet Military Forces, came together physically in January 1979. [redacted] had realized his wish to move to the current side of the problem and had become Chief, A212, with [redacted] as his deputy. They then tasked themselves with preparing to do in-depth, objective, "thin red line" reporting but found policy forbade current reporting based on the [redacted] material. So they worked out a solution and presented it to Ann Z. Caracristi, Chief, A Group. She took it to Admiral Bobby R. Inman, Director NSA/Chief Central Security Service, who approved it. They then proceeded to set up an operations plan, guided by the time and motion study of the [redacted] and established concrete objectives. It would not be acceptable, for instance, to take forty-eight hours to get a quality-controlled transcript ready. They were selective about the people, not only in the transcription area but also in all the subelements of collection, transcription, processing, and reporting, to work on two twelve-hour shifts. They set standards for the situation reports, which would be issued in a dummy series. These reports would not go out of the building; no customer would see them. By the end of January all the mechanisms were in place, and the plan was ready for a test.

[redacted] The Soviets announced an exercise to be held in [redacted] 1979. Here was the opportunity to try out the plan and run an A2 exercise in parallel. The project was named [redacted]. R06, an operations research group (later R56) was asked to monitor the test for quality control. Communications preparatory to the exercise started coming in, and standard reporting was soon under way. The test participants had been alerted. It was time to make the decision to call them in and start executing the internal test.

[redacted] exercise was reported in the normal vehicles, with a daily wrap-up, a 1000 daily summary for selected customers, and a 2100 report for Commander in Chief Europe (CINCEUR). The following summary is [redacted] final follow-up to the basic report:

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)


GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)


E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)



E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] Among the lessons gained during the experiment was the importance of the watch chief's having a deputy to look after the front end and keeping in touch with the collection and processing. It was important to follow the event to the end and summarize it quickly. It was important to keep as close as possible to the timeline. As the [redacted] event was being played out, the task for A21's desk in the National SIGINT Operations Center (NSOC)¹ was not to focus on the exercise but to be aware of other activities which might affect it. Many elements of A Group and all elements of A2 were involved in one way or another backing up the [redacted] teams and contributing to the success of the effort.



E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

Note

[redacted] NSOC is the continuously manned center for current operations and crisis management in the NSA/CSS and for command and control of current activities of the United States SIGINT System (USSS). (The USSS comprises the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, the Service Cryptologic Elements, the [redacted] and other authorized entities.)

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

**NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY**

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

Chapter 3 Prelude to Invasion

[redacted] Afghanistan fell under communist rule in April 1978. This misfortune ignited popular protest that grew in strength until by the end of 1979 it threatened the survival of the Soviet-supported Marxist government. The U.S. intelligence community had little interest in remote and backward Afghanistan, and consequently requirements for SIGINT reporting were few and low in priority. Nevertheless, the United States SIGINT System

[redacted]
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] Communications showed increased Soviet concern through 1979, and toward the end of the year there was mounting evidence of unusual military activity in regions adjacent to Afghanistan. At that time the intelligence community was transfixed by the hostage crisis in Iran. Afghanistan was a minor worry since there was little possibility of U.S. military involvement, but for Iran the possibility was all too real.

[redacted] Occasional low-priority cover of Afghan traffic was dropped in 1967 for lack of intelligence interest.

[redacted]
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

(U) On 26-28 April 1978, following demonstrations, riots, and arrests in Kabul, a group of Afghan army officers carried out a well-planned coup that ended the presidency and the life of Mohammad Daoud. Thousands were killed in the fighting. The Saur (April) Revolution culminated in the naming of Nur Mohammad Taraki as president and prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, with Hafizullah Amin as minister of foreign affairs. The revolution was followed by insurgent uprisings: the imposition of communist reforms under the harsh regime of Taraki and Amin was anathema to the Muslim population.

[redacted] The Soviets, who supported the coup, took immediate and vigorous action to increase their military presence. During late April-early May, Soviet personnel assumed supervisory responsibility at the Shindad, Bagram, Kabul, and Bagram military bases, and large numbers of Soviets entered the country.

[redacted]
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

area. At the end of May, radio broadcasts from Tashkent and Moscow announced that the Soviet Union would intervene directly in the event of a crisis in Afghanistan.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

In December the Soviet and Afghan governments signed a twenty-year treaty of friendship and cooperation.

For NSA the April coup meant that Afghanistan required more attention. Admiral Bobby R. Inman, Director, NSA/Chief, CSS, requested G Group to prepare a memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) on the Agency's capability to report on Afghanistan. G Group responded in the following memorandum, dated 18 May 1978, which summarized the problems affecting the SIGINT system's ability to respond to the crisis:

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: SIGINT Response to the Situation in Afghanistan

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

2. The internal communications of Afghanistan were last worked in 1967, and our technical records were last updated from occasional intercept in 1972 and from a brief examination of the communications in 1976. The Intelligence Community - no doubt reflecting the views of U.S. policymakers - regarded Afghanistan with little interest, in spite of an increasing Soviet presence there, apparently because it is a poor nation with small influence regionally or internationally.

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

This low regard was reflected in the requirements levied on NSA, for which reason the data base was allowed to lapse.

3. Shortly after the coup, the NIO [National Intelligence Officer] for the Near East, the State Department and other customers did levy requirements on NSA for reactions of its neighbors - the

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

In Afghanistan, events have broken quickly and we are struggling to produce as much as possible without the kind of technical preparation which is essential in order to satisfy the needs of our customers. This is the kind of contrast we need to keep in mind when we talk about curtailing our efforts against lower priority targets, shifting our equipment and analysts to other uses, then switching the SIGINT System back at a moment's notice. With at least a minimum of technical base, we may have good success; with virtually no base at all, the results, if any, will be less dramatic.

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

(U) In signing the memorandum, Admiral Inman praised it and had a copy sent to the Executive Registry as an example of the way memos should be done. Shortly after, community interest in Afghanistan having been roused, cover was assigned to selected Afghan communications..

[] Throughout 1979 the news services and other collateral sources as well as SIGINT reported extensively on events in Afghanistan and Iran as they moved toward the crises that would break out at the end of the year. Revolutionary forces drove the Shah of Iran into exile in January, and on 1 February the Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile to begin the establishment of his Islamic revolution. In both countries acts of hostility against the United States were committed almost simultaneously on 14 February. In Kabul, Ambassador Adolph Dubs was abducted on the street, taken to a hotel, and later killed when, against the wishes of the U.S. embassy personnel, Afghan police, with Soviet advisers present, stormed the hotel room where he was being held. These events were reported in a CRITIC¹ series (see fig. 3).

(FOUO) At NSA, NSOC was in the midst of handling the CRITIC when at 0813Z, three minutes after Afghan police attacked the hotel room in Kabul, STATE RCI sent a CRITIC reporting that a group of about one hundred men had attacked and penetrated the embassy compound in Tehran. After a period of stalemate, Prime Minister Bazargan sent troops to put an end to the situation, and the ordeal was over by 1330Z. NSOC's management of its double CRITIC crisis was hampered by a heavy snowstorm which prevented people from getting in.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(U) ON 14 FEBRUARY, THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN WAS KILLED AFTER BEING KIDNAPPED BY TWO TERRORISTS. WHILE EN ROUTE FROM HIS RESIDENCE TO THE EMBASSY, THE AMBASSADOR'S CAR WAS STOPPED BY WHAT WAS DESCRIBED AS A TRAFFIC POLICEMAN AND WAS THEN APPROACHED BY UNIFORMED PERSONNEL. THE AMBASSADOR WAS REMOVED FROM HIS VEHICLE AND TAKEN AWAY ON FOOT. THE AMBASSADOR WAS TAKEN TO THE HOTEL KABUL, WHERE HE WAS HELD IN A LOCKED ROOM. AS OF THE 0500Z HOUR, THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN HARMED. THE POLICE CORDONED OFF THE STREETS AROUND THE HOTEL AND WERE REPORTED TO BE SEARCHING ALL VEHICLES AND PEDESTRIANS.

SIGINT CONFIRMED THAT THE AMBASSADOR WAS BEING HELD IN THE HOTEL KABUL, AND INDICATED THAT ALL VEHICLES LEAVING THE CITY WERE BEING STOPPED.

(U) THE U.S. EMBASSY REPORTED THAT THE AMBASSADOR WAS BEING HELD BY TWO TERRORISTS WHO WERE TO TALK WITH THE AFGHAN PRESIDENT TO GAIN THE RELEASE OF THREE POLITICAL PRISONERS IN EXCHANGE FOR THE AMBASSADOR. FURTHER, IT WAS DISCLOSED THAT THE HOTEL WAS SWARMING WITH AFGHAN POLICE, WHO WERE BEING ADVISED BY A SOVIET POLICE ADVISER, SAID TO BE CALM AND "THOROUGHLY COMPETENT"; ALL GUESTS AT THE HOTEL WERE EVACUATED. THE U.S. EMBASSY ASKED THAT NO PRECIPITOUS ACTION BE TAKEN WHEN THE POLICE SAID THEY PLANNED TO BREAK IN AND TEAR GAS THE ROOM.

DESPITE THE EMBASSY'S REQUEST, THE POLICE DID ATTACK THE HOTEL ROOM AT 0816Z AND THE AMBASSADOR WAS KILLED IN THIS ACTION. ALSO, ACCORDING TO THE U.S. EMBASSY, THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CATEGORICALLY DENIED ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE INCIDENT. ONE OF THE TERRORISTS REPORTEDLY WAS CAPTURED.

THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE OF CONTINUING UNREST IN AFGHANISTAN AND OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ARREST OF NUMEROUS DISSIDENTS; FOR EXAMPLE, LAST WEEK'S ARREST OF SHI'ITE DEMONSTRATORS SYMPATHETIC TO IRANIAN DISSIDENTS. (A) IT WAS RECENTLY REPORTED THAT SHI'ITE CLERGY AND SCHOLARS, WHO DEMONSTRATED IN SUPPORT OF KHOMEINI AND REPORTEDLY INVITED THE AYATOLLAH TO AFGHANISTAN TO OPPOSE THE REGIME THERE, WERE ARRESTED.

(A) 3/00/4278-79, 022000Z, 4946-79, 071932Z.

REYW 14 FEB 09

#5020

NNN

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

Fig. 3.

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

(U) Rebellion broke out in the Afghan city of Herat in mid-March. News sources later reported that thousands had been savagely slaughtered, among them twenty to forty or more Soviet advisers and their families. Large numbers of Afghan Army men deserted. Also in mid-March, the Soviet media started a propaganda campaign alleging foreign interference in the affairs of Afghanistan. A news report in *Pravda* on 19 March stated that the trouble in Herat had been caused by Iranian army infiltrators, and an article in the same issue accused Western countries, China, Iran, and Pakistan of instigating unrest in Afghanistan.

[redacted] In March the Soviet General Staff conducted another major exercise, this time

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

retrospect, after the invasion of Afghanistan, many analysts concluded that the exercise had been a rehearsal for Afghanistan, and indeed even at the time of the March exercise one analyst, later retired, said that he believed it was a preparation for action against Afghanistan. Many features were almost identical, including the extent of mobilization, the number of flights, and the amount of airlift. Everything that needed to be practiced was practiced.

(U) Events then began proceeding toward some unspecified Soviet military action.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] The apparently increasing Soviet concern with Afghanistan called for a closer SIGINT look at the targets. In March and April, NSA tasked overhead resources to search

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

for evidence of Afghan government and insurgent activity, Soviet activity in country, and Soviet operations in areas near Afghanistan.

(U) General Alexej A. Yepishev, a first deputy defense minister and chief of the main political directorate of the armed forces, accompanied by a large delegation, arrived in Kabul on 5 April, according to reports in the *Herald Tribune* on 14-15 April and *Krasnaya Zvezda* on 25 April.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

[] In June, collateral from a fairly reliable source reported information on a military construction area northeast of Kabul and a large number of Soviet advisers there. The source also reported Flat Face and Spoon Rest radars at a large, new site near Kabul. and Back Net and Side Net radars at other sites in the Kabul area. These Soviet radars are associated with SA-2 (Guideline) air defense systems.

[] During the spring and summer, several periods of increased or unusual communications reflected Soviet activities in the Turkestan MD and in Afghanistan. On

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

Kabul from 18 August to 6 September. Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces General I.G. Pavlovskij began a two-month visit to Afghanistan on 18 August.

[] During his reign Taraki promoted a personality cult that bestowed on him the title "Great Leader." The *Kabul Times* made its last reference to the "Great Leader" on 13 September. On that date Taraki forces staged a Soviet-supported ambush to remove Amin, the minister of foreign affairs, who had entrenched himself and his relatives in power and was engaged in a vicious campaign of imprisonment or execution of his enemies and potential rivals. Amin not only survived the ambush but three days later took control of the country. Probably in connection with the foiled attempt and its reversal of fortunes, Soviet military communications with Afghanistan increased from 13 to 16 September, as

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[] Direction finding (DF) in mid-September indicated that the Turkestan Front Command Post deployed for about a week to Termez. Such a move was a key event in developments immediately before the invasion.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[] Imagery of Fergana on 16 September and 21 October, both Sundays, showed regiment-size alerts. Such activity is extremely unusual on Sundays.

[] Periods of increase in communications supporting the Turkestan Front CP, VTA, VDV, and field elements were evident in October and November, and during that period AN-30 aircraft were scheduled to conduct aerial photography flights over northwestern Afghanistan. These flights continued intensively in mid-November.

(U) On 22 October the deposed Shah of Iran, after months of living in exile, a sick and unwelcome guest in one country after another, entered the United States for cancer treatments. The enraged Khomeini urged students to carry out demonstrations and attacks against the U.S. and Israel. On the first Sunday in November the State Department issued a CRITIC and follow-ups reporting that "At 0730Z (11:00 A.M. Tehran, Iran, time) on 4 November a group of demonstrators occupied the American embassy in Tehran. Through at least 1230Z, the group of several hundred Iranian students remained in control of the embassy. The students are holding hostages, unofficially estimated to number around fifty people, and are demanding the extradition of the shah from the U.S. The hostages are reported to be safe. . . ."

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

[] Thus began the prolonged agony of the hostages in Iran. The crisis at once became the dominant concern of the U.S. administration, the intelligence community, and the cryptologic community. SIGINT responded with abundant production of diplomatic, military, financial, and economic information. Product showed a worldwide surge of diplomatic reaction to the situation and provided insight into the attitudes and intentions of foreign governments. It also gave extensive information on the effects of the crisis on world oil markets and financial responses to it.

[] In response to the crisis, NSA's Office of Asian and African External Affairs (G9) set up a twenty-four-hour watch in the affected branches on 9 November. On 14 November President Carter declared a national emergency and ordered a freeze on Iranian funds. On 16 November [] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[] sent a message to the NSOC Senior Operations Officer (SOO) recommending that a SIGINT alert be considered "because of the stalemate concerning the hostages and increase in possible Iranian military action against U.S. naval forces in the Persian Gulf."² The SOO replied that the recommendation had been considered, but the decision was made to continue monitoring the situation and to reconsider if circumstances changed.

[] On 20 November armed fanatics occupied the Grand Mosque in Mecca, setting off convulsions all over the Moslem world. The U.S. embassy in Pakistan was attacked; two Americans and four Pakistanis were killed. At 211904Z November NSA declared SIGINT Alert ORATOR "for Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and neighboring countries in view of the continuing demonstrations and the increased threat to foreign nationals." In a FLASH message at 221555Z November, [] in Washington relayed to the secretary of state in Washington a FLASH report from the American embassy in Islamabad that described the course of the student demonstrations, the strenuous efforts to get help from President Zia and others in authority in the government, the penetration and vandalizing of the embassy, the rampaging in the streets, the retreat of the embassy staff to the secure area, then the vault, where they secured the safe and destroyed sensitive materials, their ordeal as smoke and tear gas seeped through, and finally escape over the roof and rescue.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)

[] A summary in the ORATOR series on 23 November reported these items:

- Iranian demonstrations in Tehran;

[] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

While the attention of the U.S. was focused on these tumultuous events, the situation in Afghanistan was deteriorating, and the government of the brutal Amin was approaching collapse. The Afghan Army, suffering from thousands of defections and desertions, was unable to control the rebel forces. Refugees were fleeing in the thousands to Pakistan and Iran. examples:

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

(U) The Soviets' worries over Afghanistan were intensified by the situation in Iran and the increased presence of American naval forces in Mideast waters and the Indian Ocean. Relations between Iran and the USSR had been wavering in precarious balance. On 3-4 November Iran abrogated the 1921 treaty of friendship and cooperation with the USSR and the 1957 treaty of military cooperation with the U.S. At the same time, true to the Mideast tradition of multiple enmities, Iran was falling out with Iraq.

Changes in Soviet communications and unusual activities occurred in the Turkestan MD and Afghanistan in November and into December. Communications from the General Staff and the Soviet Air Force increased

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

Civil AN-30s carried out photographic surveys over Afghanistan. Civil and military aircraft made numerous round-trip flights.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

(U) The first anniversary of the signing of the treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual aid between the USSR and Afghanistan on 3 December served as an occasion for greetings between the heads of government. *Pravda* on 7 December published the texts of their messages. In his greeting "To dear comrades Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and Aleksey Nikolayevich Kosygin, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers," Hafizullah Amin expressed his confidence that "... this treaty will continue successfully to play a positive, peace-loving role in further strengthening the friendship and cooperation between the Afghan and Soviet peoples, on the basis of the working people's revolutionary solidarity and for the sake of further strengthening peace in the region and international security." L. Brezhnev and A. Kosygin in their greeting "To Comrade Hafizullah Amin, general secretary of the People's Democratic party of Afghanistan (PDPA) Central Committee and prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan" declared their belief that "... the treaty will continue to promote the successful development and strengthening of relations of friendship, good neighborliness and cooperation between our countries and peoples in the spirit of equality and revolutionary solidarity."

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

Notes

A CRITIC is a brief report for the transmission within ten minutes of information affecting the national security interests of the United States to such an extent that it may require the attention of the President and the National Security Council.

The SIGINT Alert system is a method for temporarily increasing USSS surveillance and reporting of an unusual or crisis situation. Relevant product is flagged with an identifying covername.

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Chapter 4 Collection and Processing

[redacted] The SIGINT story of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was derived from the signals of many originators, including Soviet General Staff, KGB, ground forces, Military Transport Aviation (VTA), Airborne Forces (VDV), air defense, long range air, civil and navigational air, and Afghan army and air. Second-hand sources were the prolific [redacted] and a scattering of others, mainly diplomatic and commercial. In the period from 1 December to the termination of SIGINT Alert POTENT on 13 May 1980, more than thirty-five U.S. [redacted] field stations were tasked to collect these signals, and a number of others conducted SIGINT searches. These were supplemented by [redacted] some Third Parties. No airborne collectors were used.

[redacted] Overhead coverage of Afghanistan benefited by the presence in the area of special systems collectors targeted against Iran but suffered from competition with that target.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

Tasking was increased in September, assigned as regular tasking at priority 5 early in December, and raised to priority 2 on 29 December. In 1980 the mission was stabilized at priority 2 for both ELINT and COMINT on military movements in Afghanistan.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] Soviet HF mainline communications and military and air nets serving Soviet elements in Afghanistan were remotely collected by the [redacted] terminating in the A Remote Operating Facility (AROF) at NSA. Ground stations routinely covered their assigned targets and reported events in KLI EGLIGHT/TACREPs³ and product reports according to normal reporting criteria.

[redacted]

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

(U) In addition, these and other stations copied traffic from the same and other sources at lower priorities.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] Afghan military and air and [redacted] communications are discussed in later chapters.

[redacted] Communications reflecting flights of aircraft involved in the Soviet Afghan operations included plain language air-ground transmissions, reporting of navigational checkpoints, and air scheduling information. Air defense tracking gave plotted positions.

[redacted]

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

and mountainous terrain impeded collection by ground stations, although atmospheric

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY


Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

phenomena sometimes allowed intercept over very long distances - plain language voice in line of sight transmissions in Afghanistan, for example, picked up at [redacted]

[redacted] The system for processing [redacted] from receipt at NSA to release of end product was very complex; it could not be otherwise, with numerous telecommunications systems, processing systems, and production group functions playing essential roles. Processing generally took three to four hours. Intercept from [redacted] sources was forwarded from the field terminals by various [redacted] to the remote operations control terminals at NSA. Depending on the source, the incoming traffic traveled by various routes on its way to the transcribers and finally the reporters.



E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY




Fig. 4. Organizational Chart

GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

were no unresolved disagreements in the final product; any changes of any kind were merely minor phrasing or word changes.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] The production system functioned well, relationships and processes having been worked out during the [redacted] exercises. For the working analysts, however, there was a certain isolation and lack of access to the overall situation, partly because of security requirements. The transcribers did not see the end product that came from their work, nor did ELINT analysts see the COMINT.

Notes

[redacted] The TACELINT is a short, formatted report of an intercepted noncommunications signal. Most TACELINTs are generated by NSA time-sensitive communications and processing systems from signals automatically intercepted, processed, and forwarded by overhead ELINT resources. The NSA systems also automatically disseminate the TACELINTs to producers and users.

[redacted] is a system to provide A Group and G Group with remote collection and processing of high frequency radio signals.

[redacted] A KLIEGLIGHT (also KLIEGLITE, K-LITE) /TACREP is a short, formatted, automated report of time-sensitive intelligence and technical information. A KLIEGLIGHT is transmitted from the field to NSA, where it is processed and forwarded in real time to NSOC and internal and external producers as a KLIEGLIGHT, which includes the technical information, and to users as a TACREP (tactical report), which does not contain the technical information.

[redacted] was an A-Group program to modernize the interfaces among a number of collection and supporting systems. In 1979 it provided facilities for creating, editing, and storing voice transcripts. The program included SEMESTER, a project for upgrading STEPSTONE systems beginning in 1980.

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)


Chapter 5 The Language Problems

[redacted] Central to the success of the SIGINT effort on the invasion of Afghanistan were the talent and dedication of the linguists.

[redacted] From about 1976 Persian linguist [redacted] worked what there was of the Afghan problem [redacted] At the time of the invasion of Afghanistan, G Group had no Dari linguist, so Persian linguists had to be pressed into double duty. Dari, the language of Afghanistan, and Persian (Farsi) are the same language. Educated people in each country can read the other's literature, but the colloquial spoken languages differ widely in pronunciation, vocabulary, syntax, even grammar. As [redacted] explained it to [redacted] Chief G6, who used the description in his pleas to Congress for more linguists, it was like the difference between the dialects of a Maine fisherman and a Louisiana shrimper.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] In December 1979, with the Iran hostage crisis under way, the Persian linguists were already working a twenty-four-hour watch. Nobody needed "Trashghanistan," as they nicknamed the problem. On 4 December G Group set up a special task force, including a five-member work center for Afghanistan, to handle the Iran and Afghanistan problems. The linguists sometimes felt, as [redacted] put it, like ping-pong balls, bouncing between Persian and Dari.



E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] The Russian language problem in the Afghanistan context was essentially [redacted] the reportable information. Many of the transcribers had long experience with the contents and

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] As a result [redacted] tested procedures and trained transcribers were ready when the time came.

[redacted] The transcription process needed its own special traffic analysis for interpretation and continuity. Conventional traffic analysis establishes the patterns of relationships in communications external. Voice traffic analysis establishes the relationships between communications and people. This special TA was developed largely by [redacted] He organized lists of information on callwords, personalities, communications usage, and many other items into a database that eventually became very large and is still growing.

[redacted] analysts made extensive studies of communications to determine such features as channels used by particular authorities, the paths of daily reports, the reporting of different echelons back to headquarters, and the relationships between communications centers, modes, and users. This knowledge could be applied to selection and collection management.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Chapter 6

C3 Set-Up

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)


E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)

[redacted] The central point for current operations in that part of the United States SIGINT System which was dedicated to the Soviet [redacted] problem was the desk of the Soviet Network Activity Posture (SNAP) in NSOC. The SNAP was the connecting point between the Office of Primary Interest (OPI), the field sites, [redacted] I&W customers, and other NSOC desks for time-sensitive Soviet [redacted] activity. At the time of the A7/A8 merger, A21 became the OPI for all command and control, and as A21 representative in NSOC the SNAP monitored all HF and LVHF target communications. The SNAP received KLIENLIGHTs, technical reports and other technical data from the field stations, COMSAT data, ge positioning data from low orbiters, and PHOTINT and other related collateral, and had contact via OPSCOMM¹ with field and [redacted] sites. The SNAP was responsible for first-echelon technical analysis and reporting [redacted]


E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] On 5 December 1979 the SNAP received two items from the field concerning the Turkestan MD. Because they were exceptions to the current norm, he submitted them for publication in the Special Activity Report for Threat Analysis (SPARTAN), which was a



E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY




E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)


Fig. 5.

GAMMA CONTROLLED

**NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY**



[redacted] Throughout the same period, field sites continued to report flights of military AN-22s and some civil aircraft to and from Afghanistan. [redacted] marked its reports with the Alert ORATOR flag. On 11 December [redacted] sent the 79th follow-up to its series, opened in June, reporting flights to Afghanistan.



[redacted] Opinion at NSA about what was going on in the Turkestan MD during this period was divided. Some thought it was just another exercise. Others speculated that it was a contingency reaction to events in Iran. But analysts most familiar with the problem believed that the Soviets might be preparing to intervene in the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan in order to maintain communist control of the country.

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

Notes:

OPSCOMM (also OPSCOMMS) refers to CRITICOMM circuit C, which provides point-to-point communications for analyst-to-analyst exchange and other informal and machine traffic. CRITICOMM, the Defense Special Security Communications System (DSSCS) is the primary record communications system for critical information and the communications system for SIGINT. It is under the operational and technical control of Director, NSA (DIRNSA).

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

Chapter 7 Mobilization


Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

[redacted] on 13 December unidentified military personnel reported that sixty helicopters had flown from Chirchik "to the border." They also reported a move of air defense troops from Dushanbe to Afghanistan and other unidentified elements or personnel to "the border of Iran."

[redacted] SIGINT units around the world were keeping track of what was happening in the faraway Turkestan MD. On 12 December [redacted] sent a message to DIRNSA noting that NSAEUR had a secondary contingency mission in the Mideast and had been receiving KLIÉGLIGHTs/TACREPs on the Iranian naval and air situations. USAREUR was very interested in the recent deployment of [redacted] elements to Kabul and requested a similar reporting program for Afghanistan.

[redacted] On Friday, 14 December, the watch at [redacted] sent a SNAP tip-off reporting that the TKMD Front CP was active in [redacted] communications and that about seven hours later a second unidentified authority, probably a CP authority, was also active. The station issued a spot report on these developments locating both terminals in the same general southern Turkestan MD area. The SNAP promptly requested maximum DF.

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)



[redacted] After receiving other requests for information from consumers, the SNAP requested technical details. [redacted] the duty watch officer, responded with data [redacted]

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] RDF located both terminals in the same general area. The message closed with, THAT IS ALL AND IT IS SNOWING HERE.

[redacted] By that time the Soviet/EURCOM Collection Manager (SECM) had sent out a message reporting the flight of thirteen VTA transports, two of them probably AN-22s from a division based at Seshcha, to Afghanistan via the Termez Airgate, probably to Kabul or Bagram. In an exchange with the SNAP following up the tech message, the [redacted] reporter said that the DF results plotted to a large ellipse half in Afghanistan and half in the TKMD. He also asked whether the AN-22 flights to Kabul might have carried troops.

[redacted] As analysis later showed, the Turkestan Front CP had relocated to Termez, and on 14 December began communicating [redacted]

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] The communications set-up initiated on 14 December, along with the surge of movements to and happenings in the Turkestan MD, eliminated most doubts in NSA about the object of Soviet attention. The move of the command post to the Termez area, on the border of Afghanistan, was the key. Within days, the bolder analysts were predicting invasion on Christmas Eve.

[redacted] This interpretation of the meaning of the move to the south was not accepted by SIGINT consumers. Deeply engaged in the Iran hostage crisis, they saw the potential threat in that context. Briefings, discussions, and reports at all levels presented the evidence, but it was not enough. NSA management pressed for uncontestable proof of the location and identity of the new terminal, and all effort was made to get saturation coverage. Messages were sent to the field requesting extra DF effort, and the field responded. Bearings from sites in Europe and one in Alaska were plotted and analyzed in A21 for several days, with results about as useful as could be expected at such distances. On 15 December the SNAP asked [redacted] to shoot some bearings [redacted]

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

(U) While the Soviets were organizing their forces on the borders of Afghanistan in secret, Soviet-Afghan friendship was being displayed in public. Among visiting Soviet VIPs was First Deputy Minister of the Interior General Viktor Semenovich Paputin, still in Kabul after his arrival with his entourage on 28 November. His meetings with his official host, the deputy minister of the interior, began on 30 November, and he was guest of honor at a dinner on 1 December. On 3 December the *Kabul Times* reported that

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Paputin had had an audience with Prime Minister Amin. A reference to his presence at an Afghan Communist party politburo meeting at which security matters were discussed appeared on 8 December, and on 13 December he departed. A delegation accompanied him to the airport and at his departure thanked him profusely for his services to Afghanistan.

On 14 December NSA issued a report summarizing military transport flights to Afghanistan from 29 November to 9 December. Later on the same day, NSA published a summary on the deployment of the Turkestan Front MD command post with the flag SIGHT ALERT ORATOR. This obviously aimed attention in the wrong direction and was omitted in follow-ups, which continued until 22 December.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)

(U) Thus gradually, by retrospective studies revealing associations not previously apparent and clarifying evidence previously considered tenuous, active preparation for invasion could be seen to reach farther back in time.

During the set-up phase of the timeline, 6-11/12 December, there was little to flesh out the communications picture. The multichannel

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] then senior A231 reporter, vividly remembers the first references to mobilization. He was called in at about eleven on Saturday night, 15 December, stayed until four the next morning, and came back in at eleven. He and other analysts and reporters on the team worked with the traffic to develop the story and produce a report. Among the items of information they had to work with was a new covername [redacted] assigned to an army located in the Turkestan MD. There was no army listed in the current order of battle. Another significant item was the term *desantrnaya shturmovaya brigada*, air assault brigade, which had been used for U.S. airmobile units in Vietnam but had not previously occurred in a Soviet context. The report was the first to contain evidence suggesting that the Soviets were preparing for military intervention. [redacted] Chief A205, who had also been called in, signed off on the report, and it was released early on 16 December.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] A message from USAREUR on the same day brought collateral evidence of mobilization. The message reported VDV battalion-size deployments from at least the Fergana and Chirchik regiments of the 105 GAD, large-scale movements of VTA aircraft to Seshcha Airfield, and the removal of airborne combat vehicles from storage. The message stated that "with the movement of the Turkestan Front to Termez the Soviets have the capability to direct large-scale operations in Afghanistan in which they have a direct combat role."

[redacted] Also on 15 and 16 December, Tashkent MD [redacted] communications contained conversations that referred to officers up to general-major level and concerned cargo for an airfield and requests for personnel and vehicles. The 15 December conversation mentioned representatives "at the river port."

[redacted] NSA issued a special summary, "Status of Soviet Activities in the Afghanistan Border Area, 12-16 December," which [redacted]

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] also noted that the 114th MRD at Samarkand was apparently being mobilized. This unit was later identified as actually the 360th MRD at Termez.

[redacted] Flights of VTA transports into and within the Turkestan MD continued to intensify on 15 December but slacked off the next day. An extraordinarily high level of ground-controlled approach radar activity took place on the 15th, involving sixteen

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

airfields. Weather reporting in support of flight activity increased on 16 December with the addition of four stations to the nine normally reporting on the Tashkent MD synoptic weather broadcast. Two of the added stations were at Nebit-Dag and Khanabad; the other two were unidentified.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] A facsimile transmission of a report from NSA/CSS Europe Intelligence Support Staff (NCEUR ISS) containing a copy of an item on Afghanistan prepared for General Rogers, Commander in Chief Europe (CINCEUR), was delivered to NSOC on 16 December. The report described ground forces and air activities in the Afghanistan border area up to 15 December and noted that as of about 10 December the Soviets had an estimated 8,500-9,000 personnel in Afghanistan, including 1,000 or more combat forces at Bagram Airfield north of Kabul. The assessments stated that the military situation in Afghanistan did not seem precarious, but "the Soviets may have decided that major moves were necessary to provide some military and moral support to the regime's forces. This would permit some regrouping during the winter months. The timing of these recent moves may be linked to the crisis in Iran, which the Soviets could expect to divert any attention and potential reactions from major new commitments of Soviet forces to the Afghan regime. Regardless of their motives, the Soviets clearly are placing themselves in an enhanced position to directly support the Afghan regime with increased military force."

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)

[redacted] NSA's fourth follow-up in the Afghanistan series, on 17 December, gave details on mechanisms set up to handle mobilization, noting that a chief of Special Services (*Spetz Sluzhby*) appeared to be involved in overseeing the mobilization. Intercept by this

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

stage was showing mobilization well under way, with accompanying confusion and occasional symptoms of panic. Men failed to report to their units. Equipment was found inoperable or was missing. Arrangements got disrupted, as evidenced in a report that ninety-five trucks loaded with ammunition had been sitting in one place for three days. People weren't sure what was happening. In one transmission a plaintive voice asked, "Is this real or is it an exercise?" The report also contained items of information on ammunition supplies.

[redacted] Increasing customer concern about what the Soviets were up to was apparent in a message of 17 December from Strategic Air Command (SAC) to A212 requesting wiring diagrams of [redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) [redacted] the links from the Front down to the probable Soviet unit deployed along the Afghanistan border and in Afghanistan. SAC also asked for any other pertinent information including relationships of Soviet MAG Kabul.

[redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) [redacted] stations were maintaining their close watch on Afghanistan. The station [redacted] reported that a transmitter using the broadcast frequencies of Radio Kabul had been set up in Termez. NSA noted this in its "Status of Soviet/Warsaw Pact Forces for Tuesday Evening 18 December" and commented that the transmitter was probably to be used in the event Radio Kabul was silenced by rebels. The Wednesday morning status report in the same series noted that plans were being made for at least two unidentified regiments to participate in a river crossing, and the Wednesday evening issue reported that elements of the 34th Air Army, Transcaucasus MD, were briefly active in a review of readiness conditions.

[redacted] After the pause on the 17th, air activity surged to a very high level on 18 and 19 December.

[redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)(d) [redacted] summaries in succeeding days gave details and related information on the flight activity. In its seventh follow-up to the series initiated on 14 December, NSA pointed out that VDV training had remained at a very low level since the October Revolution holiday in November, and suggested that the lack of training might be attributed to the buildup in the USSR/Afghan border area.

[redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) [redacted]

required. The SOO's (Senior Operations Officer) log of 17 December contained two entries concerning Afghanistan, one made during the changeover from the day to the eve watch, and the other in the middle of the eve watch. Both were surprises.

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS · NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

[] The first entry reported receipt of information that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) had directed that an Alert Memo be prepared on the possibility of Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan. Up until this time, NSA seniors, briefers, and target experts had been trying to make their downtown customers understand the significance of the SIGINT evidence that Soviet forces on the borders of Afghanistan were in an advanced state of mobilization. It was not for NSA to make the intelligence judgment that the Soviets were prepared to enter Afghanistan, but NSA representatives did try to show that there was ample SIGINT for the users to make that judgment. But the users were not ready to accept SIGINT alone. There was no recent PHOTINT, and SIGINT people realize, to their perpetual annoyance, that some customers have to see a picture before they will accept the SIGINT fact. There was little reliable HUMINT; observers were not free to roam around in Afghanistan, much less across the border in the USSR. In addition, some believed the Soviet target was Iran and were not about to change their minds.

[] SIGINT National Intelligence Officer for the USSR, remembers vividly the meetings of the Intelligence Committee. There were heated discussions about what the heightened activity and training meant. Members speculated that the Soviets were trying to take advantage of the diplomatic and political vacuum the U.S. had created with Iran, that they wanted to exploit the anti-Americanism rampant in the area. [] found it particularly frustrating that the CIA deputy chief, chairing the Intelligence Committee meetings, would open with a preamble giving the CIA position, and [] would then have to argue for the SIGINT and try to dissuade those who held that the Soviets were preparing to invade Iran. When [] in a telephone conversation with Frank Newton, quoted a statement in a draft committee report to the effect that activity in Central Asia "continues apace," they agreed with some exasperation that this was a rather less than adequate expression of the facts that NSA was trying to convey.

(U) The notion that the Soviets might mount an incursion into Iran contrasted with the view advanced by some commentators that the Soviets would not invade Afghanistan on the grounds that they had never invaded a nonbloc country since the end of World War II.

[] With the arrival of the DCI memo, it seemed that the SIGINT message was finally getting through. The memo stated that the DCI had directed that the National Intelligence Officers prepare an Alert Memorandum on the possibility of increased Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan. Copies of the draft as it progressed through editing were sent to NSA via facsimile, and the final version was published on 19 December.

[] The opening paragraph stated:

The Soviets have recently introduced three additional airborne battalions into Afghanistan and are building up other forces near the Soviet-Afghan border. This indicates the USSR has significantly changed the nature of its military commitment in Afghanistan and is now capable of conducting regimental-size combat operations there. The buildup of additional airborne,

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

tactical air and possibly ground forces near the Soviet-Afghan border suggests that further limited augmentation there is likely soon, and that preparations for a much more substantial reinforcement may also be under way.

[redacted] On the same day Stansfield Turner, the DCI, signed an Alert Memorandum for the National Security Council, subject USSR-Afghanistan. The text read:

The Soviet leaders have crossed a significant threshold in their growing military involvement in Afghanistan. The airborne units they have already introduced into the country at Bagram airfield north of Kabul in the last two weeks are capable of conducting multibattalion combat operations, and the Soviets are building up other more substantial forces near the Soviet-Afghan border. While the Soviets may not be less concerned about the adverse consequences for their relations with the U.S. of a major intervention in Afghanistan, they probably also wish to avoid deflecting onto themselves any of the militant Islamic hostility now directed against the United States. In seeking to balance their evident strong commitment to preserve a Marxist regime in Afghanistan against their probable concern to avoid a politically costly and militarily open-ended massive intervention, the Soviets are now ratcheting up the level of their direct involvement and may be positioning themselves in a deliberate manner to escalate further should circumstances require.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)

[redacted] In a message to [redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) [redacted] HQ European Command, Vaihingen, Germany, on 19 December, Chief, V3, stated NSA's belief that the Soviet activities were "not related directly to events in Iran or to anti-Americanism within the Moslem world for which reasons ORATOR was declared." He added, "FYI, draft Alert Memorandum which is presently being coordinated does not associate these activities with Iranian crisis. Hence, this is a unanimous U.S. intelligence community view."

[redacted] PHOTINT on 20 December showed that the Soviet special ground force unit that had been deployed at Bagram air base since 3 December had departed the air base and that in addition two airborne combat vehicle (BMD)-equipped airborne companies had also

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

46

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 3507)

left. The report speculated that the units might have moved to Kabul or might be conducting local training. This report was cited in a Spot Commentary from [redacted] [redacted] Director of CIA's Office of Current Operations, to Bob Gates, Office of the Special Assistant to the President, info Dennis Chapman, Director, White House Situation Room. [redacted] suggested that the Spot Commentary be brought to the attention of Dr. Brzezinski, Special Assistant to the President. Other PHOTINT also showed evidence of the mobilization as it progressed, and the intelligence agencies were receiving more information from various HUMINT sources.

(U) By this time reaction to the events was beginning to appear in the press. On 18 December the BBC daily summary of world events quoted the text of a dispatch from New Delhi under the headline "Moslem Leader's Appeal against Soviet Expansion," which reported on a written statement by Zia Khan Nasry, chairman of the Afghanistan Islamic and Nationalist Revolutionary Council. The statement expressed outrage at the Soviet buildup, stating that "Already the destruction and disruption of life has reached incredible proportions. Over 250,000 Afghans have been killed as victims of Soviet aggression and 60,000 people have been driven out of Afghanistan into Iran, while in Pakistan over 310,000 Afghan refugees await the return of their homeland." The statement, in the name of the guerrillas and the Moslem freedom fighters, called upon the free world as well as the Moslem population throughout the world to express their solidarity with them by picketing and organizing peaceful marches on Soviet embassies in all the world capitals.

(U) On the same day, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Report contained two stories on Afghan affairs. One, from a broadcast in Dari, refuted allegations of Soviet interference in Afghanistan. The broadcast commentary concluded with the statement that "It is clear to every impartial observer that the aim behind the motif of the so-called military interference of the Soviet Union is to divert the attention of the world's public circles from the real interference of the imperialists and their allies in the affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan."

(U) The other FBIS article quoted a Moscow World Service broadcast in English that reported that the magazine *Counterspy* said that the Central Intelligence Agency was involved in the training of Afghan rebels in camps on Pakistani territory and that there were similar camps in the Chinese province of Xinjiang.

[redacted] Through 20 and 21 December the communications linking Moscow and Kabul with the CP at Termez remained active.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d).

Military flights continued, as did enhanced weather reporting.

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

Readiness One since 15 December. Their mission was to monitor all air movements in the border area, regardless of nationality, to maintain flight safety.

[redacted] Senior analysts, watching and interpreting the transcripts as the flow increased day by day, estimated that the mobilization phase of the timeline was approaching completion. Meanwhile, Afghan military traffic told a story of worsening conditions, with shortages of supplies and losses of men through death, desertion, and defection to the rebels. Rebel forces were active in several provinces, and new groups were forming. On about 20-21 December, a rebel force laid siege to the city of Gowrmach in the northeastern province of Baglan.

[redacted] On about 21 December, Director, National Security Agency/Central Security Service Admiral Bobby R. Inman called Frank Newton to his office to discuss the situation and ask him what he thought was going to happen. Newton replied that in his opinion the Soviets were ready to intervene in Afghanistan, that the question was not whether but when, and that it would happen before the end of the year. After further discussion, the Director called the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, the State Department, and one or two other offices to inform them of this assessment. He and Newton then talked about how the system should work and what needed to be done. Finally he called the DCI and spoke briefly with him.

[redacted] On a different level, Admiral Inman took an active and direct interest in the analytic process. [redacted] remember how he would arrive, unannounced and unescorted, at an analyst's desk. He would ask many questions, keenly and incisively, but in an easy and congenial manner. He also requested special briefings; [redacted] for example, briefed him on the TA of voice communications.

[redacted] One or two analysts remember that about this time [redacted] issued a report based on plain language tank traffic concerning a march route into Afghanistan and offered the comment that invasion was probably imminent. The station was told to cancel the report. There were several reasons for this instruction: one, plain text is considered to have lower validity [redacted] two, the evidence was not good enough to support the conjecture; and three, conjecture goes beyond the limits of SIGINT responsibility. Nevertheless, the station was right.

[redacted] By 22 December ten days had passed since the establishment of the CP at Termez and the beginning of mobilization. A network linking Moscow, Termez, and Kabul had been established and continued active. VTA aircraft had been heavily engaged in airlift operations. Goods had been sent by rail to Termez, which was the end of the rail line. Two divisions and an assault brigade had deployed to areas of approach to Afghanistan. Groupings of airborne troops were in readiness at airfields in the Belorussian and Moscow MDs under the supervision of General Kurochkin, First Deputy Commander, Airborne Troops. Air defense elements were located along the border in the Turkestan and Central Asian MDs. [redacted]

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

The time had come to clarify the Agency's response to the perceived threat and to alert the SIGINT and intelligence communities. The best means of doing this was discussed and debated by seniors in the situation room, and the decision was made, despite some opposition, to declare a state of SIGINT readiness:

[redacted] SIGINT Alert POTENT was declared in a product released at 222244Z December. (See fig. 6.) At the same time the SOO, [redacted] issued a message announcing the declaration to distribution ALERT, which sent it to the concerned internal elements. This was followed ten minutes later by a message from the Deputy Director of Operations, Admiral Davis, to U.S. field elements,

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)

The SOO also sent a message to [redacted] sites. The SIGINT system was ready and waiting.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

*** BEGIN MESSAGE 1 ***

SERIAL = 3/00/49908-79 UDN = Q01NOV79-31DEC79 (35865)

CLASS = T O P S E C R E T UMBRA

DE [REDACTED] #3374 356306

ZNY MMNSH

ZKZK ZZ SOL AOI ADZ NSL ZSL ZNN DOX ZND ZAL DXR ZLL DE

Z 222244Z DEC 79 ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO NSA/QUEBEC

[REDACTED]

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

T O P S E C R E T UMBRA

XXMMENPO1F0079356


3/00/49908-79 SIGINT ALERT POTENT

[REDACTED]

SIGINT ALERT ONE POTENT DECLARED FOR SOVIET UNION AND AFGHANISTAN (C-CCO)

XXCC

[REDACTED] SIGINT ALERT ONE POTENT IS DECLARED FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND AFGHANISTAN
IN VIEW OF INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO BE PREPARING FOR INCREASED INVOLVEMENT IN
AFGHANISTAN.



~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

Fig. 6.

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

Chapter 8

Final Readiness and Invasion

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] When the Turkestan MD Front command post moved to Termez [redacted] A6 took action to prepare for whatever might come out of these new developments. Senior linguists were selected for watch operations. [redacted] in A62 began rounding up callword and channel pattern lists, maps, and other working aids. As the number of incoming voice tapes grew rapidly [redacted]

[redacted] Amidst the flow on 22 December were transmissions that sent a current of excitement running through the COG, the transcription shop, and the reporting center. VDV and VTA personnel were discussing the movement of two airborne assault battalions. They expressed confusion about the battalions' positions, questioning which battalions were at the landing points at places the transcribers could not identify. Dari linguists came over from G Group, listened to the passages in question, and recognized the Afghan placenames Pol-e Khomri and Salang Pass Tunnel, both on the road to Kabul. Some parts of the transmissions were inaudible or so difficult to make out that the translation had to be considered tentative. But the information in them obviously demanded publication. Senior personnel were called in. Discussion and debate continued into the evening, and finally a report was issued stating that Soviet airborne troops had landed in Afghanistan. But doubts remained, and the next day the chief of the COG requested the tapes. They were rerun, and senior transcribers went through them again, working over the poorest parts. [redacted]

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)

[redacted] Finally, the phrase "na karte" (on the map) could be made out in a nearly inaudible passage. This discovery was made virtually simultaneously in A6 and by [redacted] and it led to the conclusion that the intercept in question was an exercise.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)

[redacted] Meanwhile, [redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) [redacted] references to a war game in which staff officers of the 360th Division and the airborne assault brigade at Chirchik were to participate. This information had been published in a report on frontal forces operations. Looked at together, the two activities could be seen as parts of the same story. To resolve the matter, the report on the landing was cancelled and a new report was issued with the title, War Game Preparation for Incursion into Afghanistan, 22 December 1979.

[redacted] probably during this period, words were spoken that everyone who heard or read of them remembers vividly because of what they signified. In the transmission a VDV warrant officer was asking how to do inventory

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)

control. The answer was, "The same way we did it in Czechoslovakia." Different people remember the words a little differently but, however translated, the meaning was stunningly clear.

[redacted] While Soviet communications were revealing an accelerating process approaching climax, Afghan communications were reflecting a dismal picture of shortages, breakdowns, desertions, defections, and turmoil in all parts of the country. The [redacted] reported rebel clashes and the continuing siege and plundering of the city of Gowrmach.

[redacted] The Turkestan MD command and control net expanded on 22 December with the addition of a link between the MAG Kabul and probably Balkhash, the location of a frontal reconnaissance base in the Central Asian MD. On 24 December [redacted]

[redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) [redacted] the *Kabul Times* reported the arrival in Kabul of Soviet communications minister N.V. Talyzin.

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

[redacted] Although Soviet, Afghan, [redacted] communications provided most of the information on Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, information was occasionally to be found in [redacted] other communications. [redacted] sources got word of an attempt on Amin's life on 18 December. A report from the [redacted] Kabul [redacted] on 24 December included information on Soviet forces at the Bagram air base and in the city and reported that underground activities were increasing and that Assadullah Amin, nephew of President Amin and director of national security, had been shot and had died in Tashkent, where he had been sent for treatment. Amin's other nephew, the Kabul traffic chief, had been shot to death in the office of the "People's Friend." The report also stated that Amin had moved from his palace in the city to the palace in Darulaman.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) [redacted]

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

[redacted] Flight activity in the Turkestan MD was generally light on 23 December and during the day on the 24th. The 240600Z Turkestan MD weather broadcast contained upper winds forecasts from Kokajty (a weather station about thirty nm northeast of Termez) and two of the unidentified new stations.

GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[] Beginning at about 1500Z some [] transports took off from western bases. At NSA many people looking forward to their accustomed Christmas Eve festivities were about to miss out on them. In NSOC and the reporting shops, analysts were waiting for things to start happening, waiting for tippers from the field stations on flight activity. [] was waiting in his office in the reporting center, when at about five o'clock [] came in off schedule so that his partner could go home to his dinner guests. The latter set off for NSOC to find out what was happening just in time to meet the air desk analyst hurrying in the opposite direction to tell him that a flight of Soviet transports was moving southeast across the Caspian Sea. [] called Frank Newton, and the two went to work drafting two reports to be ready depending on whether the transports landed at staging bases or continued into Afghanistan. When they started landing at Dushanbe, the appropriate draft, written on yellow paper, was hand-carried to NSOC for release. The SOO convened a NOIWON¹ to notify the intelligence community watch centers. DIA was surprised; CIA acknowledged the information without comment. The [] report "Major Move into Afghanistan Possibly Imminent, 25 December 1979" went out at IMMEDIATE precedence at 250123Z to thirty-six addressees.

[] Christmas Day was another day of waiting. The command and control network continued in operation as usual. During the 1300Z hour, communications were set up between the General Staff central command post and the Central Asian Front command post. Finally, at about 1500Z, the final leg of the flights began. From then until the 1800Z hour, large numbers of transports flew from the staging bases in the Turkestan and Central Asian MDs and landed at air bases in Afghanistan. At 251928Z NSA reported in a standard series to a broad distribution; "Major Soviet Military Move into Afghanistan Apparently Under Way."

[] The flights in both stages were carried out in hours of darkness (Kabul time is GMT plus four hours and thirty minutes; 1500Z=1930Z), true to the procedures that had become so familiar to the analysts in their exercise studies.

[] On the morning after Christmas, the embassy in Kabul sent a message to the secretary of state, several other embassies, CINCEUR, and CINCPAC, describing the invasion as they experienced it. The summary stated, "Massive Soviet air operations into Kabul began on Christmas morning and have not stopped yet. AN-22s, heavy jets, and AN-12s have been observed in large numbers, and the total flights may now exceed one hundred and fifty to two hundred." The first phase, as the message described it, began at about 0400 and continued until just before 0700. "These operations were just the preliminary, however, as more action appeared to be under way at about 1800 Christmas evening. Heavy jet aircraft were heard arriving in fairly quick succession, but by that hour

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

darkness had fallen and, combined with a low ceiling, it was impossible to determine the exact type of plane." The message was amended before it was released to incorporate information from a State officer who had arrived from New Delhi and reported that he saw about 200 Soviet army troops and a group of armored personnel carriers at Kabul airport.

[redacted] At NSA on Christmas Day, [redacted] was on his regular watch as chief of a three-man team in A66 processing incoming tapes for the transcription shop, where [redacted] was in charge. Suddenly a surge of traffic started pouring in, spilling out of the computers. [redacted] and his team soon found themselves overwhelmed, and he started calling people in to help. For [redacted] this was the shape of things to come.

[redacted] Also at work on Christmas Day were some analysts whose presence was unscheduled, among them ELINT analysts [redacted] They went in to set up procedures to look at the Afghan environment and task overhead resources to collect threat (weapons-related) signals. It was a week or more before the procedures were programmed and ready, but meanwhile routine ELINT reporting mirrored the extent of flight activity. Although ELINT was lacking when the warning report was being drafted on Christmas Eve, there was ELINT showing activity on Christmas Day at seven staging bases and three Afghan air bases - Bagram, Kabul International, and Shindand.

[redacted] ELINT as well as the air defense and civil air traffic reported by the many field stations covering the flights gave evidence of very heavy airlift activity continuing on 26 and 27 December.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] Imagery added its contribution by catching Soviet equipment in the border area before the invasion and aircraft at Kabul International and Bagram airfields during and after. Although these regions were obscured by clouds much of the time for about two weeks before the invasion, there were some open periods. [redacted] was the NSA liaison officer on the midwatch at the imagery ground station on Christmas Eve along with photointerpreters and the DIA and CIA liaisons. Throughout the night the [redacted] in NSOC kept feeding him the KLIEGLIGHTs that were pouring in from the field stations. Imagery resulting from the tipoffs had not yet been processed by the time he finished his watch, but on his next watch he learned that they were only partly successful.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

(U) Eyewitness accounts of the arrival of large numbers of Soviet troops at Kabul airfields were soon being reported by the news media. A New Delhi AP dispatch on 26 December quoted observations of passengers who had arrived in New Delhi on a flight from Kabul. "I saw between 150-200 Russian soldiers armed with rifles walk past us and

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

TOP SECRET-UMBRA

there were considerably more in the staging area," said one passenger. Another said that the soldiers didn't seem concerned about being secretive and that the observation deck atop the airport terminal was crowded with well-wishers who could plainly see the Soviet troops arrive. Witnesses at the airport said the sound of approaching aircraft began about 11 P.M. on Monday, 24 December.

[redacted] On 26 December NSA tasked appropriate sites to collect and forward all traffic from two [redacted] Communications targets: [redacted]

[redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) [redacted] advised NSA on 27 December that it would give seventy-two-hour special emphasis to collection of Soviet HF communications to Afghanistan. On the following day NSA advised [redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[redacted] and AROF that Russian plain voice was being carried on an Afghan Air Force frequency and that Russian voice might appear in other Afghan military communications.

(U) On 27 December, [redacted] drafted a message to [redacted] [redacted] to give her A21's assessment of the situation (see fig. 7).

[redacted] At the time [redacted] wrote his message, he had not yet heard about what was happening in NSOC. There they were in crisis mode working the CRITIC messages that were coming in fast from [redacted] At 1500Z [redacted] reported that heavy fighting had broken out in the Darulaman area in the southwestern section of the city, where President Amin had reportedly recently moved the seat of government from the People's Palace in the center of the city. During the same timeframe heavy weapon and small-arms fire was reported around the Radio Afghanistan building adjacent to the U.S. embassy and in other areas of Kabul. At 1530Z [redacted] reported that two Soviet BMD armored personnel carriers had taken up defensive positions in front of the Radio Afghanistan building. At 1600Z [redacted] reported that Soviet troops at Radio Afghanistan had at least one artillery piece. The next report stated that at about 1615Z Radio Afghanistan announced that a coup had been carried out by Babrak Karmal, prime minister under former president Taraki, indicating that the pro-coup forces were in control of the Radio Afghanistan building by that time.

(U) Within a couple of hours, at 1945Z, Moscow TASS International Service transmitted in Russian an address by Karmal. He proclaimed to all elements of the Afghan population that "At last after harsh sufferings and torments the day of freedom and rebirth of all the fraternal peoples of Afghanistan has arrived. Today the torture machine of Amin and his minions - the savage butchers, usurpers and killers of tens of thousands of compatriots - fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, sons and daughters, children and old men - has been broken." The address continued in this vein, reaching a ringing climax in cries of

"Death to the bloodthirsty oppressors, the Nadirs and Amins!
"Death to black reaction and grasping imperialism!"

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)

Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 3507)

GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

CLASSIFIED TO: [REDACTED]
FM: ~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~ A21 CNR [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA/GAMMA~~

CLASSIFIED SUBJ: SOVIET/AFGHAN SITUATION.

1. COULDN'T GET A VOICE LINE THRU SO THOUGHT I'D SEND A NOTE.
2. TO US, IT LOOKS LIKE THE OPERATIONAL STAGING INTO THE SOUTHERN TURKISTAN MD IS ESSENTIALLY COMPLETE AND AIRLIFT INTO AFGHANISTAN IS WELL UNDERWAY.
3. WE DO NOT SPECIFICALLY KNOW AT THIS POINT IN TIME WHAT IS BEING BROUGHT INTO AFGHANISTAN, WHERE IT IS GOING OR HOW IT WILL BE EMPLOYED. THESE SEEM TO BE THE MAJOR INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS.
4. WE ARE LOOKING FOR A COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE WITHIN AFGHANISTAN AND LINKS OUT TO THE CONTROL AT TERMEZ AND/OR MOSCOW. SO FAR NO LUCK. HOWEVER, THEY MAY BE IN THE PROCESS OF SETTING UP THE COMMUNICATIONS STRUCTURE AT MAJOR BASE CONCENTRATIONS BEFORE ENGAGING IN TACTICAL OPERATIONS.
5. WE WILL CONTINUE OUR CURRENT CRISIS OPERATIONS TO AT EAST LEAST FRIDAY: 0900 (LOCAL) MEETING FOR GENERAL ASSESSMENT AND THEN A SUMMARY WRITTEN BY 1400 (LOCAL) WITH SPECIAL EVENT OR TOPICAL REPORTS WHENEVER APPROPRIATE. WE ARE WORKING ON A TOPICAL REPORT NOW TO RECAP VDV PREPARATIONS IN THE BELO/MOSCOW MD AREAS TO TRY AND BETTER ASCERTAIN QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF MATERIAL AND PERSONNEL THAT STAGED.
6. THIS IS HOW WE SEE IT HERE AS OF 1600Z. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OR THOUGHTS, PLEASE CALL. REGARDS AND A MERRY DAY TWO DAYS AFTER CHRISTMAS, [REDACTED]

This work shall remain classified within the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

(27 Dec 79)

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

Fig. 7.

GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

(U) Early on the morning of the 28th, in a Moscow TASS broadcast in English, the commentator, citing a speech by Karmal, editorialized: "The bloody clique of Hafizullah Amin and his flunkies, agents of imperialism, has been overthrown. Radio Kabul has broadcast that Hafizullah Amin was found guilty of crimes against the Afghan people and executed by the sentence of the revolutionary court."

(U) Also on the 28th the Soviet government, after many denials and accusations of foreign, imperialist interference in the affairs of Afghanistan, acknowledged its involvement. TASS reported a broadcast on Radio Kabul that quoted Soviet leader Brezhnev as saying, "We had no choice but to send troops." An AP story filed in Moscow embellished the lead with a comment: "Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev congratulated the new leader of Afghanistan today as the Kremlin acknowledged for the first time its military role in the upheaval in the affairs of its southern neighbor. The confirmation bore striking similarities to Moscow's justification for its 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia."

[redacted] NSA reported the story of the coup in the CRITIC Summary for CIA Washington CRITIC 1-79, which gisted the several reports received from COS Washington with the addition of some information in [redacted] SIGINT reports. SIGINT made no direct contribution to intelligence on what went on in the Darulaman Palace except for a short intercept later which told that the palace had been smashed to bits.

[redacted] The SIGINT contribution to the story of the coup and its aftermath came in the form of product based on diplomatic, attaché, and certain other traffic that offered a SIGINT supplement to the outpouring of reports, articles, and commentaries in the media. During 23-31 December there were fifty-one POTENT products, mostly translations, from communications of fourteen countries (other than Soviet, Afghan, and [redacted]) concerning the buildup, the airlift, the intervention, the coup, or relations with the new government.²

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

[] Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean were probably alerted to impending operations in Afghanistan. On 23 December []

[]
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[] These communications were in addition to the routine communications and were continuing on 31 December.

[] Several new communications links opened soon after the invasion. HF and links were activated between Moscow and the CAMD on 25/26 December. A []

[]
E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[] Air operations were at a reduced level on 28 and 29 December, but during that period combat aircraft began deploying to the southern border area. Winds aloft forecasts from four stations appeared in the Tashkent frontal aviation meteorological broadcast on 27 and 28 December. On the 27th surface weather reports for stations in Afghanistan for the 1500Z, 1800Z, and 2100Z schedules were missing from the international civil weather exchanges. Airlift operations were again heavy on the 30th and 31st, with extremely heavy activity at Shindand.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) [] sites were kept very busy reporting the events that came tumbling together: bombing and gunfire, especially at the Darulaman Palace, where the garrisons were still holding out on the 29th; a report that members of Amin's family and the minister of commerce had been killed there; bomb damage to public buildings; flights over the city breaking the sound barrier; Soviet soldiers and tanks everywhere; eyewitness reports of Soviet armor crossing the northwestern border and moving toward Herat; intercept of a clandestine radio identifying itself as the Voice of the Afghan Islamic Republic Party; heavy fighting throughout the country; all Afghan air force and army commanders ordered to Kabul; all Afghan military and police communications down as of 1600Z hour of the 27th; more Soviet troops arriving from the north.

[] At the same time, Afghan military communications were reporting fighting and losses, with a desperate need for troops and everything else from radio antennas to

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

rifles, from woolen overcoats and scarves to shoes. By the end of the month, both Soviet and Afghan communications contained reports that Afghan military personnel in Kabul and at all major air bases were being disarmed and their duties assumed by Soviets. Soviet soldiers were fighting the local people as well as insurgents and were suffering casualties.

(U) With the end of the year, the timeline for invasion reached completion. The mission had been accomplished. Forty-three thousand Soviet troops were in Afghanistan, according to estimates published in the press, and more were arriving. The campaign to control the country was about to begin.

[] The communications supporting the operations poured into NSA. Transcribers had been drawn from everywhere in the A6 transcription and support elements to cope with the flood of voice traffic. Collectors and analysts worked to keep up with [] communications as they expanded. ELINT analysts watched the TACELINTs for evidence of Soviet expansion in Afghanistan as well as for new signals of interest in the TKMD. Signals associated with Soviet AAA systems emanated from Shindand on 31 December. Previously, radars associated with air defense systems in Afghanistan were limited to Kabul and Qandahar. Communications reflected very heavy air activity at Shindand Airfield on 30/31 December.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[] Following up the preparations that [] initiated on Christmas Day, programmers created automatic reporting modules (ARMs) that defined geographical windows for the intercept of threat signals in Afghanistan. They were ready for use by early January.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) [] sites continued to supply an abundance of information to their HQ (as well as NSA, [] and other interested parties). A third site, established in September, began reporting on 31 December on the Afghan air force and police in northern Afghanistan. Conditions in Kabul were apparently getting too risky for the site

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

[] sites reported detailed information on the location, movements, and activities of Soviet and Afghan forces and the insurgents and on conditions in Kabul and the provinces where fighting was going on. Among items reported in the early days of January were the following:

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE.COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

- The Soviets had deployed around the city of Herat and continued to move into western Afghanistan;
- Soviet forces arrived in the Jalalabad area on about 5 January, and their presence alarmed the people;
- The Afghan Security and Intelligence organization (KAM) ordered all subordinates to collect detailed information on the rebels and forward it to Kabul as soon as possible for "planning by the Russian advisers."

[redacted] With the Soviet Union now committed to war in Afghanistan, the intelligence community began looking for ways to get more information from the interior of the country. In a memorandum for the record on 4 January [redacted] of the NSA V5 tasking element stated that [redacted] SIGINT Tasking Office had requested contingency planning information for possible airborne SIGINT collection operations against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The memo noted that the only feasible track would be overland in Pakistan near the Afghan border. The response to the political feasibility question came via the State Department representative to the Joint Chiefs of Staff/Joint Reconnaissance Center (JCS/JRC). State would have no problem in approaching the Pakistani government. Options for reconnaissance aircraft were USN-EP-3s, USAF COMFY LEVI C-130s, and USAF RC-135Vs of the BURNING WIND program.

[redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) [redacted] would also be a possibility. Of these the best would be the RC-135 because of its capability for multichannel, which could be expected to be used for much of Soviet communications, and because it was able to report material meeting KLEIGHT criteria. The memo pointed out that the limiting factor would be linguists. NSA had no capability for Pushtu, the common language of Afghanistan. Most of the desired communications, however, would be Russian.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)

[redacted] The daily Soviet-Afghan Situation Summary reports were transmitting to the intelligence community about 1,500-2,000 groups of information a day,

[redacted]

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)

[redacted] Events were moving very fast. As of 4 January, combat operations were being conducted with Soviet advisers, and a command network was established between the advisers and the command at Termez. A motorized rifle division had mobilized and moved from Kzyl' Arvat to Kushka. The CAMD was supplying tanks, signal troops, and medical provisions. Soviet crews were preparing for operations using MI-24 and MI-25 helicopters.

[redacted] In communications developments, a second VTA broadcast began on 2 January, and on the same date a KGB HF link opened between Moscow and the MAG in Kabul. In response to a question from a field element whether these were the first [redacted]

GAMMA CONTROLLED

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 3507)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)

First Deputy Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergej Leonidovich Sokolov arrived in Termez on 2 January and on 4 January proceeded to Kabul as commander of Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

(U) Soviet armed forces were now irreversibly engaged in the war in Afghanistan, a war that was to last more than nine years and whose cost to the people of the Soviet Union would be an admitted 15,000 Soviet dead. No one could ever calculate the cost to the people of Afghanistan.

(U) It may be of interest here to look back and consider the reasons why the Soviet government leaders undertook the adventure that would eventually prove to be their country's Vietnam.

[redacted] The NSA Afghan linguists/analysts got to know the country well in their peculiar way. They knew the language. They read the collateral and knew of the rumors and the conditions of life. They were well aware of Afghan relations with the Soviet Union and the military build-up north of the border. They had experienced through SIGINT the collapse of one Southwest Asia country, and they recognized the approaching collapse of another. They believed that the Soviets would soon have to come in and take charge if they wanted to maintain communist control of the country.

(U) Brezhnev and the Politburo made the same judgment, as have historians who have studied the invasion and its background. Henry S. Bradsher, Associated Press correspondent in Afghanistan in the 1960s and expert on Soviet and Chinese affairs, in his 1981 book cites the remarks of a Soviet official quoted in the *Kabul Times* on 25 November 1979: "To leave the Afghan revolution without internationalist help and support would mean to condemn it to inevitable destruction and to permit an access to hostile imperialist forces to the Soviet border." Bradsher adds, "The Soviet politburo had to choose. It could abandon its support for a regime that under Amin was intractable and unsuccessful, cut

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

its losses to prevent the disgrace of going down with him and the possible loss of thousands of Soviet lives if the guerrillas overwhelmed Kabul." ³

(U) The Soviet motive was straightforward: to preserve communist control of a neighboring country. Much more complex is an appreciation of the circumstances and timing of their decision. What were their perceptions of the political and international situation? What military judgments did they have to make? To what extent did historical, demographic, and economic considerations influence their decision? At what time, under what circumstances, and at what level was the decision made to begin preparing for the invasion? What was their assessment of the situation in Afghanistan at that time? When was a decision reached on the necessity and then on the time and circumstances of eliminating Amin? As events proved, the Soviets undertook to preserve communism in Afghanistan but not the communist government of Amin.

(U) Concerning the time when the decision was made, Bradsher concludes that it was a result of General Pavlovskij's visit to Afghanistan from August to October 1979. "The Pavlovskiy mission probably was the decisive one. The then seventy-one-year-old general . . . was accompanied by about a dozen other generals and a large support team. They had time to size up the growing opposition before Taraki's meeting with Brezhnev on 10 September. . . . Pavlovskiy stayed on in Afghanistan far longer than he had needed eleven years earlier to plan the invasion of Czechoslovakia. By the time his mission left in October, Shulman [Marshall D. Shulman, special adviser on Soviet affairs to the U.S. secretary of state] guessed later, it had come to the conclusion that Amin had to be removed, that as long as he was there the regime was headed for disintegration." ⁴

(U) Joseph J. Collins, specialist in international affairs and author of articles on Soviet policy toward Afghanistan and other foreign policy subjects, writes:

It is unclear whether the decision to change horses in Afghanistan was made before Pavlovskiy arrived or as a result of his initial observations on the scene; but it is clear, in retrospect, that a definite decision had been made to unseat Amin, who had become increasingly identified with repressive policies and centralization of political power. Amin had personally taken on the defense portfolio, appointed relatives to key positions, and repeatedly purged the army and the government of those whose loyalty he questioned. In the second week of August 1979, the U.S. embassy in Kabul reported that an anti-Amin plot was developing with Soviet complicity. ⁵

(U) After the failed attempt on Amin's life on 14 September and his seizure of power, the situation worsened rapidly. His violent, vengeful, incompetent government further weakened the resistance against the insurgent forces and injured the already failing economy. The tribal, fundamentalist population hated him, his communist government, communism in general, and the Russians in particular. Amin's relations with the Soviet government were correct but cold. He refused to invite them to provide military aid. Concerning his unwillingness to play the Soviet game, Anthony Arnold in his 1981 book writes:

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Amin's real sin . . . may have been a refusal to accede to demands that he invite Soviet troops to quell the resistance. For the USSR to have overlooked the possibility for a bona fide invitation seems most unlikely. The difference between an invitation that had been sanctioned and even requested by a chief of state, and one that must be extended ex post facto by a successor who has been installed by the intervening force is the difference between true fraternal assistance and an outright military invasion.⁶

The authors of another 1981 book summarize the Soviet motives briefly:

Amin was murdered, probably by the Russians, after he refused to agree to an expansion of the Soviet military presence. His death removed the last obstacle to complete Soviet control of the Afghan government. To guarantee control, an army capable of seizing Kabul and the other major cities had been sent in. The invasion force was not intended to carry the brunt of the fighting against the resistance forces. It was launched to rescue a Marxist government in Kabul from almost certain collapse and from an errant leader who had the presumption to defy Moscow.⁷

(U) It was eventually possible to assess the cost in lives of the Amin regime. Bradsher, discussing various estimates, including wild charges by Karmal in 1980 that Amin would have sacrificed half the population, concludes that "After discounting such political language, it is still possible to believe that Amin was responsible - both as Taraki's strongman and on his own - for well over 6,000 executions in addition to the innumerable deaths in the civil war that he had a major role in starting. The United States Department of State reported cautiously only that 'executions numbered in the thousands,' and Amnesty International cited reports of 9,000 persons still unaccounted for after thousands had been officially listed as dead."⁸

(U) Concerning the international circumstances in which the Soviets considered and made their decision, Bradsher defines three conditions influencing Soviet thinking and leading to a decision that the time was favorable. First was the reluctance of European powers and the United States to offer serious opposition to the Soviets' proxy wars in Ethiopia and Angola and its aggressive advancement of communist adventures elsewhere. A second was signs of U.S. weakness and irresolution following the political embarrassment over the Soviet brigade in Cuba. After declaring the presence of the brigade, which had been there for years, unacceptable, the Carter administration within weeks agreed to sell the USSR a million metric tons of grain. The third situation was the seizure of the hostages in Iran. U.S. Navy forces were building up in the Arabian Sea. If the U.S. were to use force against Iran, the resulting world reaction would attenuate reaction to a Soviet move in Afghanistan. Bradsher summarizes the situation as follows:

The way had been prepared by the changed correlation of forces, by the expansion of the Brezhnev Doctrine, by Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen, by the Soviet brigade in Cuba, and by Amin, whose thwarting of Soviet plans for Afghanistan in the summer of 1979 was followed by only partial compliance that seemed to the Kremlin to amount to defiance. It only remained for

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

the Soviet leaders to evaluate all their own domestic factors, and the Afghan and international ones, and then decide what to do about the worrisome neighbor on their Central Asian border.⁹

(U) The Brezhnev Doctrine was the name bestowed on the principle expressed in statements published in Soviet media in early January 1980, apparently in reaction to Western and other countries' condemnation of the invasion. The gist was that a threat to a socialist state was a threat to the entire socialist commonwealth of states and the concern of all socialist parties. From this it followed that it was the obligation of the Soviet Union to come to the aid of the socialist state of Afghanistan.

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

EPILOGUE

On 15 February 1989, the Soviet Union, in accordance with an agreement mediated by the UN, withdrew the last of an estimated 115,000 troops from Afghanistan. Civil war began between the communist government and the mujaheddin, with the Soviet Union and the United States supplying arms to the opposing sides. In September 1991, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to cease military support. On 25 December, exactly twelve years after Soviet forces entered Afghanistan, the Soviet Union collapsed and died. On 1 January 1992, as agreed, the flow of arms was cut off. In continued fighting, guerrilla forces prevailed and in April drove the communist Najibullah regime from power. A coalition government was formed, but rival ethnic and fundamentalist factions opposed it, and warring continued in the ancient Afghan tradition of tribal rivalry and conflict.

Notes

The National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers Network (NOIWON) is a conferencing system interconnecting the senior duty and watch officers in the Washington Area (in CIA, DIA, the White House, State, and the Pentagon). The network is used for exchange of information in conditions of emergency. The NSA terminal is located in NSOC.

During the period of the SIGINT Alert for Afghanistan, 23 December 1979 to 13 May 1980, a total of reports with the covername POTENT was issued.

3. Henry S. Bradsher. *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1983, 154.

4. *Ibid.*, 152-153.

5. Joseph J. Collins. *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: A Study in the Use of Force in Soviet Foreign Policy*. Lexington, Massachusetts/Toronto: D.C. Heath and Company, 1986, 66.

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

- 6. Anthony Arnold. *Afghanistan, The Soviet Invasion in Perspective*. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1981, 91.
- 7. Nancy Peabody Newell and Richard S. Newell. *The Struggle for Afghanistan*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1981, 108.
- 8. Bradsher, 121.
- 9. Ibid., 148.

Withheld from public release under the
 National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

[redacted] Upon joining the U.S. Navy (WAVES) in February 1943, Mrs. Filby trained in aerology at Lakehurst Naval Air Station. In the summer of 1944 she was stationed at the Naval Communications Annex (NCA), where she accepted an appointment as a civilian in May 1946 and served as an analyst, translator, reporter, and staff product and technical editor in the weather branch until 1958. This period included a tour with the [redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) [redacted] (1953-55). After joining the Agency in 1958, Mrs. Filby served as an analyst, cryptolinguist, and reporter in Soviet naval and merchant shipping problems until 1964. This period included assignment to the Military Cryptanalytics course (taught by Lambros Callimahos), a year-long Advanced Intensive Russian course, and the pilot SIGINT reporting course at the National Cryptologic School (NCS). She was instructor and developer of the NCS SIGINT reporting course (1964-83), organizer of a two-day seminar on SIGINT reporting including Second Parties (1978), and designer of the first SIGINT reporting course for the field (1982). Mrs. Filby was chief of the Intelligence Skills Division, Intelligence and Analysis Department (E4) at the National Cryptologic School (1983-86). She continued teaching and presented the field SIGINT reporting course in [redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) [redacted] E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d) [redacted] In 1986 she was assigned as special assistant to the Dean, E4, and as senior instructor. She studied the status of SIGINT reporting throughout the Agency; developed a course on the National SIGINT Operations Center; and developed and managed seminars on SIGINT Users, Support to Military Operations, and Current Issues in SIGINT Reporting. In July 1991, Mrs. Filby was assigned to the Center for Cryptologic History. She has been president of the Crypto-Linguistic Association (1975-1976) and has received several awards: NCS Teacher of the Year (1970); the Meritorious Civilian Service Award (1972); and the CIA Sherman Kent Award for the most outstanding contribution to the literature of intelligence (first NSA winner, 1983).

GAMMA CONTROLLED
 NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
 HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Bibliography

Books

Arnold, Anthony. *The Soviet Invasion in Perspective*. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1981.

Bradsher, Henry S. *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1983.

Collins, Joseph J. *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: A Study in the Use of Force in Soviet Foreign Policy*. Lexington, Massachusetts/Toronto: D.C. Heath and Company, 1986.

Newell, Nancy Peabody, and Richard S. Newell. *The Struggle for Afghanistan*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1981.

Other Collateral Sources

FBIS Daily Report

Press


SIGINT Product

Information was selected from hundreds of SIGINT summaries and individual reports. Key and representative reports are identified or described in the text. Following is a selected list of product sources.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY



E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

Collections

A212 files

A2312 files

[redacted] Working Group Background Papers. T5422 collection, NSA Archives

P3095 SIGINT Alert ORATOR file. NSA Archives

P3095 SIGINT Alert POTENT file. NSA Archives

[redacted] personal technical and product files

[redacted] personal collection of ELINT working papers.

[redacted] personal analytic and product files.

Technical and Other Reports

Evaluation of the National Security Agency's Performance During the Afghan Crisis. Report sponsored by NSA Deputy Director of Plans and Policy. NSA Archives.

Increased Weather Reporting on Turkestan Meteorological Broadcast Association with the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. A22 Technical SIGINT Report 9-80. A2243 files.

Project CAMPGROUND; R56 Evaluation. A212 collection.

Value of the SIGINT Product on Afghanistan (Since 1 December 1979). Evaluation by SIGINT Requirements, Validation, and Evaluation Subcommittee of the DCI SIGINT Committee. NSA Archives.

Miscellaneous

ELINT Diagrams, logs, charts.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) Paper by [redacted] student of [redacted] collection.

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Technical messages, working notes, communications diagrams, chronology. A212 collection.

References

Supplementary Working Aid for Machine Terminology, P1 Informal No. 6, August 1981, S-223,042; July 1988, S-230,633

Abbreviations and Acronyms Working Aid, P1 Informal No. 9, December 1988, S-231,285

GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Annex A

Interviews

**Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)**

**GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY**

Annex B
Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABNCP	Airborne Command Post
AGRA	A Group Reporting Authority
ADD	Air Defense District
ARM	Automatic Reporting Module
AROF	A Group Remote Operating Facility
BMD	<i>Bronevaya Mashina Desantnaya</i> Armored Combat Vehicle
CAMD	Central Asian Military District
CEG	Crisis Exploitation Group
CINCEUR	Commander in Chief Europe
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief Pacific
COG	Current Operations Group
COMSAT	Communications Satellite
COS	Chief of Station
CP	Command Post
CRITIC	Critical Intelligence
CRITICOMM	Critical Intelligence Communications
CSG	Cryptologic Support Group
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DSD	Defence Signals Directorate
EURCOM	European Communist
FANX	Friendship Annex
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
GAD	Guards Armored Division
GCHQ	Government Communications Headquarters
GMRD	Guards Motorized Rifle Division
GS	General Staff

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

JCS/JRC	Joint Chiefs of Staff/Joint Reconnaissance Center
JOPS	Joint Operations (center)
KGB/UPS	see UPS
MAG	Military Advisory Group
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MRD	Motorized Rifle Division
NSOC	National SIGINT Operations Center
OCG	Operations Control Group
OCM	Overhead Collection Manager
OCMC	Overhead Collection Management Center
OPI	Office of Primary Interest
OPSCOMM	Operational Communications
ORCON	Originator Controlled
NCEUR ISS	NSA/CSS Europe Intelligence Support Staff
NIO	National Intelligence Officer
NOIWON	National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers Network
PACOM	Pacific Command
RCOF	[redacted] Collection Operations Facility [redacted] Collection Operations Facility
RRCOF	[redacted] Collection Operating Facilities
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAF	Soviet Air Force

Withheld from public release under the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

[redacted]	[redacted]
SECOF	Soviet/EURCOM Collection Operations Facility
SESW	Soviet/EURCOM Surveillance and Warning
SOO	Senior Operations Officer
SNAP	Soviet Network Activity Posture
SOI	Signal Operating Instructions; Standard Operating Instructions
SPARTAN	Special Activity Report for Threat Analysis
STRUM	Standard Technical Report Using Modules
SUSLO	Senior U.S. Liaison Officer

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

TA	Traffic Analysis
TAF	Tactical Air Force
UPS	Uzel Pravitel'stvennoj Svyazi; Government Communications Center (KGB)
VDV	<i>Vozdushno-Desantnye Vojska</i> Airborne Troops (Forces)
VTA	<i>Voенно-Transportnaya Aviatsiya;</i> Military Transport Aviation
USAREUR	United States Army Europe
WCOF	<input type="checkbox"/> Collection Operations Facility

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)


GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

GAMMA CONTROLLED

77


TOP SECRET UMBRA



Annex C

TOP SECRET UMBRA

OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION (P)




GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

OPERATIONS ANALYSIS (A)

OPERATIONS STAFF
A04

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
A05



NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
GAMMA CONTROLLED

MANAGEMENT &
OPERATIONS STAFF
C09

OPERATIONS ANALYSIS
(C)

TECHNIQUES STAFF
C03

Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

GAMMA CONTROLLED

NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

OPERATIONS & REQUIREMENTS (V)

**AUTOMATION &
TECHNIQUES STAFF
V03**

**MANAGEMENT &
OPERATIONS STAFF
V09**

**REQUIREMENTS, COMPLIANCE,
EVALUATIONS & DIRECTIVES**

**COINS PROJECT
MANAGEMENT**

**OPERATIONS & CURRENT
REPORTING**

**SUPPORT TO MILITARY
OPERATIONS**

**COLLECTION REVIEW
CENTER**

**Withheld from public release under the
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.
3605 (P.L. 86-36)**

GAMMA CONTROLLED
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

GAMMA CONTROLLED
HANDLE VIA BYEMAN KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS

~~TOP SECRET~~