MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Civil Disturbance Training in the National Guard

This memorandum summarizes steps we have taken in the last week with respect to civil disturbance training in the National Guard.

First, we have attempted to determine the nature of the problem, particularly in light of lessons learned from Detroit and Newark. As I see it, the most fundamental deficiency in current training standards is that they are directed almost entirely to traditional riot-control situations and techniques, e.g. dispersal of crowds and the like. They do not adequately cover what might be called the combat-in-cities type of situation experienced in Detroit; they do not really deal with how to control, with minimum force, an arson/looting/sniping type of outbreak.

The second problem has to do with the amount of time devoted to riot control training. A survey of selected states where civil disturbances are particularly likely indicates that this amount of time varied from 6 to 32 hours during the past year.

The third problem is one of military discipline and bearing. The image that troops present appears to be very important to the control of civil disturbance and, at least in Detroit, the National Guard's image at the outset left something to be desired.

The last problem concerns planning rather than training. While we do not have detailed data as yet, it appears that some states lack adequate plans for movement of National Guard troops into particular cities or for integrated command and control of available forces in a city, or both.
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In the light of the foregoing we have taken the following steps:

(1) Issued instructions to all active Army and Reserve Component units to incorporate certain lessons learned from Detroit in riot control planning and training. These lessons learned, which are preliminary, are listed in the attachment.

(2) Started development of a detailed training program for the remaining training periods in August and September. The program and implementing directive will be completed next Wednesday, August 9.

(3) Called a meeting of all 50 Adjutants General for next Thursday, August 10 for the purpose of presenting the new program.

These steps are designed to cope with the short range problem. As we further assimilate the Detroit and Newark experiences over the next few weeks, we will be elaborating on the steps already taken and developing a more definitive program.

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David E. McGiffert
Under Secretary of the Army
Lessons Learned (Preliminary)

Operational Items

1. Necessity for commanders at all levels to make repeated personal on-the-ground checks of troop dispositions to ensure that critical assigned facilities are secured and instructions are being carried out in a military manner.

2. Importance of soldierly appearance and military discipline as a factor in impressing the populace that a disciplined force means business.

3. Importance of strict adherence to rules of engagement, standards of conduct and fair treatment of civilians.

4. Need for military personnel at all echelons to be observant and for reporting significant events and information promptly to enable commanders to estimate the situation.

5. Need for training in the detection and apprehension of snipers and the caution required when they are intermingled with innocent civilians.

6. Emphasis on the use of chemical munitions and their delivery by grenade launchers and adapters.

7. Familiarization with firefighting equipment in order to facilitate its protection and to assist civilian firemen when casualties occur.

8. Accomplishment of unit reliefs in place to insure that the relieving unit has physically occupied assigned facilities and area of operation (AOR).

9. Written instructions for each soldier, outlining rules of engagement, standards of conduct and detention procedures.

10. Varied frequency of patrol patterns to preclude rioters from planning activities.
Planning Considerations

1. Possible use of psychological operations units to encourage
civilian cooperation and to explain the military mission.

2. Use of night illumination in controlling snipers and looters,
by discouraging overt actions.

3. Integration of police and military patrols for area familiarity
and legal considerations.

4. Coordination of searchlight equipped observation helicopters
with ground patrols to insure complete coverage day and night.

5. Establishment of a mobile reserve to react to new or increased
violence.

6. Establishment of priorities for physical security to preclude
dissipation of force on less important facilities or those having their
own physical security capability.

7. Targeting of potential trouble spots in states and cities,
with maps and dossiers for contingency planning.

8. Plans for equipping and supporting troops for extended
commitment, including change of uniform, sleeping gear, and bath
and laundry units.

9. Vehicle augmentation for units deployed without TOE vehicles
or for units whose missions dictate additional vehicular requirements.

10. Saturation of areas with police and military patrols to
suppress looting and vandalism.

11. Value of armored vehicles, not for main armament, but
for their psychological impact and the protection they provide from
sniper fire. Close in protection of armor by foot elements is
essential.

12. Clear definition of AOR and the requirement for unity of
command within the AOR.

13. Co-location of military and police command elements
from highest to lowest levels.

14. Wallet card for each Guardsman describing his status
when federalized.
15. Guard units' requirement for documentation of federalization.

16. Increased use of PIO home town releases.

17. Listing of intelligence/information sources and the type of information each can provide.

18. Advantages schools offer as CP sites, i.e., facilities for communication, living quarters, recreation, kitchen and parking area.

19. Supplies of city maps/plans.

20. Military assistance in cleaning up debris and restoring normal conditions as soon as possible to foster atmosphere of control and normalcy.

21. Augmentation of communications with civilian items, and police, and taxi radio capability.

22. Development of riot control SOP and CPX to exercise plans.

23. Control of weapons and ammunition source (i.e., stocks in stores, rifle clubs, and ROTC units).

24. Handling of prisoners, including searching, processing, transporting and feeding and housing.