Introduction: Mark A. Bradley, ISOO Director and ISCAP Executive Secretary

The ISCAP process:
- Overview of ISCAP activity, 1996-2018
- Summary of incoming appeals, 2017-2018
- The ISCAP prioritization process
- The ISCAP adjudication process
- Communicating ISCAP decisions and appeal status on the ISCAP website
- Declassification guides

Other Perspectives:
- George Sturgis, Office of the Secretary of Defense
- William Burr, National Security Archive

Moderated Discussion
What is the ISCAP?

- Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel

- Created by President Clinton in Executive Order 12958, “Classified National Security Information,” in 1995

- The ISCAP provides the public and users of the classification system with a forum for further review of classification decisions

- Four functions:
  - Decide on appeals for classification challenges
  - Approve exemptions to declassification at 25, 50, and 75 years: declassification guides
  - Decide on mandatory declassification review (MDR) appeals
  - Inform senior agency officials and the public of its decisions

- The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) is the Executive Secretary; ISOO provides the ISCAP Staff
Membership of the ISCAP

- National Security Council:
  - John Fitzpatrick, Senior Director, Records Access and Information Security Management (Chair)

- Department of Defense:
  - Garry P. Reid, Director for Defense Intelligence, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security

- Department of Justice:
  - Lionel Kennedy, Office of Law and Policy, National Security Division

- Department of State:
  - Eric F. Stein, Director, Office of Information and Program Services

- National Archives and Records Administration
  - David Mengel, Director, National Declassification Center

- Office of the Director of National Intelligence
  - Patricia M. Gaviria, Director, Information Management Division

- Central Intelligence Agency (for deliberations and activities regarding CIA information)
  - Nancy Morgan, Director, Information Management Services
ISCAP Functions

- Section 5.3(b) of E.O. 13526:
  1. Classification challenge appeals: one received in FY 2017
  2. Exemptions from automatic declassification
  3. Mandatory declassification review appeals
  4. Inform agencies and the public of decisions

- Bylaws published as 32 C.F.R. Part 2003
  - 32 C.F.R. Part 2003.15
MDR Appeals to the ISCAP

- Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) requests may be appealed to the ISCAP after the agency has made an appeal decision or if the requester did not receive a response after one year or a response to an appeal after 180 days
  - Agencies must continue to process MDR requests that have been appealed to the ISCAP due to the expiration of a response deadline: See ISOO Notice 2013-03

- Received in FY 2017: 577 appeals (a new record)
- Decided in FY 2017: 50 MDR appeals
  - 338 documents
  - 1676 pages
FY 2016: 338 Documents, 50 MDR Appeals

- **Affirmed**: 22 Documents (7%)
- **Declassified in Full**: 197 Documents (58%)
- **Declassified in Part**: 119 Documents (35%)
ISCAP MDR Decisions: 1996-2017

1996-2017: 2935 Documents

- **Affirmed**
  - 729 Documents
  - 25%

- **Declassified in Part**
  - 1285 Documents
  - 44%

- **Declassified in Full**
  - 921 Documents
  - 31%
ISCAP Appeals, FY 2009-2017

Fiscal Year

# of Appeals

Backlog

Appeals Received

Appeals Decided Upon


0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400
Appeal Analysis: FY 2017 Incoming

- Of the 577 appeals received in FY 2017:
  - 435 (76%) were due to the appellant not receiving a response within one year of the initial request (71% in FY 2016, 18% in FY 2015)
  - 48 (8%) were due to the appellant not receiving an agency level appellate decision within 180 days of filing an appeal (2% in FY 2016, 5% in FY 2015)
  - 32 (6%) originated with the National Security Archive researcher William Burr (10% in FY 2016, 31% in FY 2015)
  - 39 (7%) originated with Peter Pesavento (6% in FY 2016, 18% in FY 2015)
  - 450 (78%) originated with Allan G. Johnson
  - 7 (1%) incoming appeals were administratively closed (8% in FY 2016, 13% in FY 2015) A total of 60 appeals were administratively closed in FY 2017, including 2 received in previous years.
Appeal Analysis: FY 2018 Incoming

- Of the 76 appeals received by May 2018:
  - **14 (18%)** were due to the appellant not receiving a response within one year of the initial request (76% in FY 2017, 71% in FY 2016, 18% in FY 2015)
  - **2 (3%)** were due to the appellant not receiving an agency level appellate decision within 180 days of filing an appeal (8% in FY 2017, 2% in FY 2016, 5% in FY 2015)
  - **29 (38%)** originated with the National Security Archive researcher William Burr (6% in FY 2017, 10% in FY 2016, 31% in FY 2015)
  - **23 (30%)** originated with Peter Pesavento (7% in FY 2017, 6% in FY 2016, 18% in FY 2015)
  - **10 (13%)** incoming appeals were administratively closed (1% in FY 2017, 8% in FY 2016, 13% in FY 2015).
ISCAP Prioritization Process

- **Age of appeal:** The ISCAP is committed to resolving its oldest appeals.
- **Type of appellant:** An appeal from a first-time appellant may be prioritized over another appeal from a frequent appellant.
- **Declassification breakthroughs:** The ISCAP does weigh the relative importance of the content of the requests; an appeal containing an issue not addressed by the ISCAP before may be prioritized over one containing a topic frequently adjudicated.
- **Size and complexity of appeal:** Self-prioritization by appellant: Some appellants inform the ISCAP of their own priorities for their multiple requests; these wishes are taken into account by the ISCAP.
- **Type of appeal:** Classification challenge appeals to the ISCAP are comparatively rare and are prioritized for review when received.
ISCAP Appeal Adjudication Process

- Staff process and evaluate incoming appeals
- Staff request responsive materials from agencies
- Staff prioritize appeals and create briefing books
- Staff distribute briefing books to the Liaisons
- Liaisons discuss the appeals at twice-monthly meetings
  - Consult with specialists within agencies
  - Evaluate in light of related official releases
  - May invite subject matter experts from agencies to participate in discussions
- Decisions on appeals by Members recorded by ISCAP Staff
- 60-day period between decision and release for agency head appeal to President
- Releases conducted by ISCAP staff and posted on website
Decisions:

- To inform agency declassification staff and the public
- Declassified documents only
- All content is accessible to members of the public with disabilities impacting vision, hearing, color perception, speech, manual dexterity, reach, strength and cognitive, language or learning disabilities, meeting the requirements of the Revised Section 508 Standards for Information and Communication Technology (ICT).

ISCAP Decisions Table

Search ISCAP Decisions

This search box provides access to documents decided on by the Interagency Security Classification appeals Panel (ISCAP) from October 2011 (start of FY 2012) forward.*

Look For the Keywords: 

*Note: Because of technical considerations, final document files for some Fiscal Year decisions are still being prepared for posting to this website. New files will be posted as they become available.

ISCAP Released Files Decisions Menu

- **FY 2017** (October 1, 2016 - September 30, 2017)
- **FY 2016** (October 1, 2015 - September 30, 2016)
- **FY 2015** (October 1, 2014 - September 30, 2015)
- **FY 2014** (October 1, 2013 - September 30, 2014)
- **FY 2013** (October 1, 2012 - September 30, 2013)
- **FY 2012** (October 1, 2011 - September 30, 2012)

https://www.archives.gov/isoo
### Appeals Log:

- **All appeals active during the current Presidential administration**
- **Updated quarterly**
- **Status categories:** Materials Requested; Materials Received; Appeal Under Review; Decision Reached; Administratively Closed

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<th>ISCAP No.</th>
<th>Date of Request</th>
<th>Requestor</th>
<th>Source (Library or Agency)</th>
<th>Status (Last updated 10/05/2017)</th>
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<td>3/27/2014</td>
<td>Hood</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
<td>Materials Received from Agency</td>
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</table>

23 Agencies submitted Declassification Guides (same agencies as 5 years ago)

The Liaisons made a decision at the start of the Declassification Guide process that no guide would be approved until the ISCAP had an initial discussion of each guide.

The ISCAP has now completed an initial discussion of all of the guides and is working with agencies to revise their guides before approval.

7 agencies have had second round reviews by the ISCAP.
Developed standard language solutions that will go into all guides including:

- New opening section to all guides emphasizing:
  - The reviewers responsibility to conduct the appropriate research to prevent the continued withholding of information that has been previously officially released
  - The standard that if information does not cause damage to national security it should be declassified
- Standardized referral process
- The declassification exemptions apply to automatic, systematic, and mandatory review, as well as for FOIA review
- Standard approach to X9 issues: treaties
Outlook for 2018

- Upcoming appeals:
  - 9/11 Commission
  - Soviet Space and History of Telemetry
  - Nuclear topics
  - Israel Nuclear Program
  - “Glomar”

- Prioritizing appeals that have been completed at the Agency level

- Declassification Guides

- 32 C.F.R. Part 2003.15: May 23, 2018, Memo from National Security Advisor to ISCAP Executive Secretary

- National Security Council-led Policy Coordination Committee for revisions to E.O. 13526
Resources

- **ISCAP Decisions:**
  - [https://www.archives.gov/declassification/iscap/decisions.html](https://www.archives.gov/declassification/iscap/decisions.html)

- **MDR Contacts:**
  - [https://www.archives.gov/isoo/contact/mdr-contact.html](https://www.archives.gov/isoo/contact/mdr-contact.html)

- **MDR Training Video:**
  - [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OClgn8ed-tw](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OClgn8ed-tw)

- **Contact:**
  - Phone: 202-357-5250
  - Fax: 202-357-5908
  - Email: iscap@nara.gov
Office of the Secretary of Defense

- George “Frosty” Sturgis, Deputy Chief
- Records, Privacy, Declassification Division
Executive Services Directorate

ISCAP MDR FORUM
June 21, 2018

George “Frosty” Sturgis, Deputy Chief

Records, Privacy, & Declassification Division (RPDD)
OSD MDR PROGRAM

OSD is NOT the Primary Equity Holder for:

- Military Departments (Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force)
- DoD Intel Agencies (DIA, NGA, NRO, NSA)
- Joint Staff/Joint Chiefs of Staff*
- Combatant Commands
- Defense Logistics Agency
- Defense Information Systems Agency
- Defense Threat Reduction Agency
- DoD Inspector General
- Missile Defense Agency

*Note: OSD/WHS coordinates the staffing of MDRs for Joint Staff. However, JS provides an independent declassification review

OSD is the Primary Equity Holder for:

- The Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of Defense, and the Offices thereof
- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA, ARPA)
- Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA)
  - Previously Defense POW/MIA Organization (DPMO)
- Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
  - Previously Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA)
- Defense Technological Security Administration (DTSA)
- Director, Operational Test & Evaluations (DOT&E)
- Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE)
  - Previously Program Assessment and Evaluation (PA&E)
- Office of Net Assessment/Director of Net Assessment
  - DoD Think Tank: Andrew Marshall/James Baker
OSD MDR PROCESS

*Appeal cases follow same process. However, they are processed with higher priority than original case reviews.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN EFFECTIVE MDR REQUEST

• MDR Specificity/Scope Success
  1) Specify Document
     Provide as much detailed information as available:
     Record Group, Accession Number, Box Number, Folder Title,
     Document Title, Date, Originator
  2) Request from originating agency

Executive Order 13526, section 3.5(1) states that a “request for a review describes the document or material containing the information with sufficient specificity to enable the agency to locate it with a reasonable amount of effort.”

• MDR Specificity/Scope Failures
  – Folder Level requests
  – “Any and All” requests
  – Topic based requests
  – Information originated by:
    • The incumbent President or Vice President or their White House staff
    • Committees, commissions, or boards appointed by the incumbent President
    • Other entities within the Executive Office of the President that solely advise and assist the incumbent President
  – If an agency has reviewed the requested information for declassification within the past 2 years, the agency does not need to conduct another review and may instead inform the requester of this fact and the prior review decision
  – Information under pending litigation or currently under FOIA review
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<th>June 1st 2018</th>
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<td>Cases Open:</td>
<td>6,677</td>
<td>3,638</td>
<td>46%</td>
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<td>OSD Pending Action:</td>
<td>6,071</td>
<td>1,265</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases Open More than 1 Year:</td>
<td>2,921</td>
<td>2,478</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **OSD Caseload Reduction Program**
  - OSD MDR Program was at a failure point
  - Recognizing this issue additional staff and funding was allocated to invest in a short term surge to the MDR team
  - Staff has returned to pre-surge levels, however, the cases open and response time metrics have stabilized
Questions?

George Sturgis (aka: Frosty)
OSD/WHS/ESD/
Deputy Chief, Records, Privacy, and Declassification Division (RPD2)
RDD Mailbox: whs.mc-alex.esd.mbx.records-and-declassification@mail.mil
William Burr, senior analyst
Nuclear history documentation project
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

September 23, 1964

Re: Summary of the existing plans for emergency use of nuclear weapons

On March 26 you approved recommendations from McNamara and the Joint Chiefs to put into effect updated instructions for expenditure of nuclear weapons in emergency conditions.

This instruction covers four emergency situations. Two of them are:

1. In these two cases the commanders...

2. The other two cases are...

The instructions reveal an interesting difference between situations in which nuclear weapons would do enormous civilian and industrial damage and situations in which they would be used in the upper atmosphere or on the high seas.

It is possible that we ought to take account of this distinction in anything we say in the next few days.

Sincerely,

McG. B.

PARTIALLY DECLASSIFIED
ON APPROVAL L 3-13 1-2-68
LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 93-766
Document # 5

DECLASSIFIED BY THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL
DATE INITIALS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

September 23, 1964

Re: Summary of the existing plans for emergency use of nuclear weapons

On March 26 you approved recommendations from McNamara and the Joint Chiefs to put into effect updated instructions for expenditure of nuclear weapons in emergency conditions.

This instruction covers four emergency situations. Two of them are essentially defensive and would allow the use of nuclear weapons only against military targets in the air or at sea. These are: 1) active defense against air and space nuclear attack on the U.S., and 2) naval and air action against an imminent surface missile attack on the U.S.

In these two cases the commanders could act without consulting the President if the necessary delay would make it impossible for them to prevent the imminent attack.

The other two cases are:

1) retaliation to a nuclear attack on the U.S., and
2) reply to a major assault on major U.S. forces at sea or in foreign territory. In these two cases every effort to contact the President must be made (with the qualifying phrase in the second case: "every effort consistent with the preservation of his command"). The authorized retaliation for an attack on the U.S. is a strategic attack on the Soviet Union. The authorized retaliation in the other case is against hostile forces but not reprisal against the Soviet Union itself.

The instructions reveal an interesting difference between situations in which nuclear weapons would do enormous civilian and industrial damage and situations in which they would be used in the upper atmosphere or on the high seas. In the latter cases commanders have latitude to decide that the delay in consulting the President would be excessive. This is in line with a belief which Eisenhower had that when the destructive force of nuclear weapons would hit only military forces, the decision on their use was a very much less serious matter. It is possible that we ought to take account of this distinction in anything we say in the next few days.

Sincerely,

McG. B.
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 100-6-60

IMPlications of the Acquisition
By Israel of a Nuclear
Weapons Capability

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Joint Staff, and the
Atomic Energy Commission.

Convened by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

On 8 December 1960. Convening were: The Director of Intel-
ligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations Intelligence, Depart-
ment of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Air Force Intelligence;
USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Atomic
Energy Commission; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Di-
rector of the National Security Agency. The Assistant Di-
rector, Federal Bureau of Investigation, obtained the sub-
pub report being outside of his jurisdiction.

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS
PANEL, E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 5.3(b)(2)

ESCAP NO. 2006-020

SECRET/NOFORN

No 366
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   c. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), for the Department of the Navy
   d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
   e. Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for The Joint Staff
   f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
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Department of State
Department of Defense
Operations Coordinating Board
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

22 December 1960

MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF SNIE 100-8-6S, "IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACQUISITION BY ISRAEL OF A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY," dated 8 December 1960

E.O. 12958, as amended
Section 3.3(b)(1)
MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF SNI 100-8-60, "IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACQUISITION BY ISRAEL OF A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY" DATED 3 DECEMBER 1960

REFERENCE: Memorandum to Holders of SNI 100-8-60, dated 23 DECEMBER 1960

E.O. 12958, as amended
Section 3.3(b)(1)
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACQUISITION BY ISRAEL OF A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY

I. ISRAELI CAPABILITIES

1. Recent information confirms that Israel is engaged in construction of a nuclear reactor complex in the Negev near Beer Sheva. A number of interpretations of the function of this complex are possible, including research, plutonium production, nuclear electric power generation, or combinations thereof. On the basis of all available evidence, including the configuration of the complex, we believe that plutonium production for weapons is at least one major purpose of this effort. There may be other purposes, e.g., power, but the secrecy surrounding the project and the location of the installation suggests that it is intended for the production of weapons-grade plutonium, whether or not generation of electric power is involved.

2. We have extensive evidence that France is supplying plans, materials, equipment, technical assistance and also training Israeli personnel.

II. IMPLICATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

4. French Motivations. We have no direct evidence of French motivations for providing nuclear assistance to Israel. However, regardless of whether French planning and primary emphasis on the military or on the peaceful aspects of the project, their decision was consistent with their policy of bolstering Israel as the only reliable long-term French ally in an area swept by influences hostile to France. France has repeatedly indicated that vigorous and, if necessary, unilateral action was necessary to prevent anti-Western nationalists, neutralists and Communion from outflanking NATO in the Near East and North Africa.

5. Israeli Motives and Intention. We do not believe that Israel will embark on the development of nuclear weapons with the aim of actually starting a nuclear war against the UAR or another Arab state. The Israelis would consider such an action would be unlikely to gain them lasting security from the Arab threat, and that except in the most compelling circumstances, the risks and the adverse international reactions would outweigh the advantages. The Israeli Government...
ment would in particular be extremely sensitive about the prospect of severe reactions on the part of both, the US and the USSR.

2. Nevertheless, if achieved, possession of a nuclear weapon capability, or even the prospect of achieving it, would clearly give Israel a greater sense of security, self-confidence, and aspirations. Israel would clearly make the most of any such achievement in terms of impressing its Arab enemies—and other Asian states—with Israel's technological capabilities, military potential, and political prestige. In any public announcement concerning their nuclear reactor program, the Israelis would almost certainly stress the peaceful nature of their efforts, but they would also, as time goes on, make plain that henceforth Israel is a power to be accorded more respect than either its friends or its enemies have hitherto given it.

7. As Israel approached the achievement of a nuclear weapon capability, for example, it would make it increasingly clear that, whatever reaction to the Soviet test, an Arab attack on Israel would be met with nuclear retaliation. Israel would emphasize that the Arab hopes of solving the Palestine problem by boycott, blockade, and military means were now unrealistic and that the Arabs had no recourse but to negotiate with Israel for a peaceful settlement. At the same time, Israel would be less inclined than ever to make concessions, and would press its interests in the area more vigorously over such issues as

"The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that, as written in this paragraph, it attributes a more passive reaction to the considerations influencing Israeli attitudes than the history of modern Israel will support. It is, therefore, believed that this paragraph should read as follows:"

"We do not believe that Israel will submit to the development of nuclear weapons without the specific aim of actually starting a nuclear war against the US or another Arab state unless other weapons systems fail to provide sufficient military power to support Israeli policies. The Israelis would consider that such action would be an effective deterrent, and the Israeli Government, in particular, would be extremely sensitive about the prospect of severe reactions on the part of both, the US and the USSR."
III. PERCUSSIONS IN THE FREE WORLD

11. Public knowledge of French aid to Israel in the nuclear field will come very soon, and will almost certainly be coupled with widespread suspicion that this is for military purposes. This will bring forth a barrage of press and public criticism of the French and the Israelis. The criticism will be the more intense because of the secret nature of the cooperation. Some of the adverse reaction will occur in France itself. Western European official reactions, however, particularly those of the NATO nations, are likely to be somewhat restrained by fear of antagonizing de Gaulle at a critical time in the life of NATO and at a time when he is engaged in a showdown with extreme rightists on the Algerian question. The German Federal Government will be especially circumspect, not wishing to add to its existing differences with de Gaulle and being generally reluctant to condemn Israel.

12. This development will have an important and lasting effect on Western opinion regarding the arms race. Knowledge that Israel is well on the way to becoming a member of the nuclear club is likely to be greatly increased public pressure in the West for moves to check the spread of nuclear armaments. This pressure is likely to be given strong official support by Canada and some smaller NATO countries as well as by the neutral countries.

13. On the other hand, Israel's initiative will remove some of the inhibitions to development of nuclear weapons in other Free World countries with the resources and the military incentives to achieve such a capability. In particular, the Israeli development will probably lead to more urgent examination of the issue in several countries, such as Sweden and Switzerland, both of whose governments have given serious consideration to launching a nuclear weapons program.

14. Disclosure of the French program and of Israeli support for it would add a new and complicating factor to France's already tangled relations with African nations, many of which have strongly protested against French nuclear tests in the Sahara. Whatever support some of the African states may have been disposed to give France on the Algerian question will decline substantially. There is likely to be an angry wave of criticism of France on this issue. Ghana, Guinea, and other states taking full advantage of the opportunity to beat the drums for Afro-Asian solidarity. On the other hand, Israel's overall nuclear achievements are likely to enhance its prestige among certain Black African states which are already inclined to look to Israel for technical and economic assistance.

IV. SOVIET BLOC REACTIONS

15. The USSR will vigorously agitate the issue of a prospective Israeli nuclear capability. It will, for example, probably increase pressures on the US and UK for an agreement banning nuclear tests or even adopting broader prohibitions in the nuclear weapons field. The USSR will probably re-emphasize a former appeal for a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East; to include Turkey. It will further exploit the matter to build up nationalist and Western support for its current proposals on general and complete disarmament. It is probable that Khrushchev will find a way to employ this question in his quest for a meeting between himself and the incoming US President.

16. Apart from such manipulations, the Soviets will in fact be anxious to head off Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons. They are opposed to the spread of nuclear weapons. In addition, they recognize that this development will increase pressure from Communist China for Soviet assistance in achieving nuclear capability and produce demands from the PAF along the same lines. In this account, it is possible that the Soviets would be led to make concessions in their negotiating position on nuclear testing; they would doubtless also calculate that the US and the UK would themselves be under pressure to make concessions. In any event, they will probably make diplomatic approaches to the US designed to generate US pressure upon France and Israel.
ANNEX

ISRAELI REACTOR SITE NEAR BEERSHEBA

1. Recent information confirms that Israel is engaged in construction of a nuclear reactor complex in the Negev near Beersheba. A number of interpretations of the function of this complex are possible, including research, plutonium production, and/or nuclear electric power generation. Israeli statements and other sources indicate that the Israelis have been building a nuclear power reactor. However, the secrecy surrounding the project suggests that the complex is intended for the production of weapon-grade plutonium, whether or not generation of electric power is involved. Recent statements by Chairman of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission Bergman indicate that a 10-20 MW heavy water research reactor is being constructed near Beersheba.

2. We have extensive evidence that France is supplying plans, materials, equipment, technical assistance and also training Israeli personnel.

The Israelis have obtained, about 20 tons of heavy water and possibly, other assistance from Norway.

E.O. 12958, as amended
Section 3.3(b)(1)
E.O. 12958, as amended
Section 3.3(b)(1)
The Soviet "War Scare"

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

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