MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President on Canada 1715 hours May 2, 1963 in Cabinet Room

PRESENT: The President
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Acting Secretary of State George Ball
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William Tyler
Director of British North America Willis Armstrong
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Paul Nitze
Mr. William Lang
General John Gerhardt - CINCORAD

In the course of the conversation before the President entered the room, Secretary Ball raised the question of the need to consult the Joint Committee on permitting Canadian aircraft to fly _____ Secretary McNamara felt that it was too early to take any action at this time and to do so might result in leaks to the press. Secretary Ball agreed with this judgment and the matter dropped.

The President entered the room at 1715, announcing that in general he felt the McNamara paper was a good one and that we should give it to the Prime Minister. Secretary Ball and Mr. Bundy suggested that the way to accomplish this is to send a somewhat sanitized version to Ambassador Butterworth for transmittal to the Prime Minister, and the President further suggested that it might be well to identify the paper to Ambassador Butterworth and to Prime Minister Pearson as simply a briefing paper prepared for the President by State and Defense.

The President mentioned that the Bomarc continued to constitute a rather touchy subject, and both Secretary McNamara and General Gerhardt thereupon defended the Bomarc weapon system with various argumentation. Mr. Bundy asked me at this point to secure for the President's use a map showing the locations of US as well as Canadian Bomarc squadrons and I have asked Mr. Lang to send such a map over here by 1600 tomorrow Friday May 3.
Mr. Bundy, referring to the paragraph toward the end of the McNamara paper which refers to Mr. Pearson's possible insistence on some form of insistence, we were prepared to go further than did the McNamara paper, which provides for consultation in time of heightened tension. Secretary McNamara answered that he saw no practicable alternative, and that if Mr. Pearson raised this question we should let him suggest alternative solutions for consideration.
Mr. Bundy then raised the somewhat different approaches of the President and the Prime Minister to the Hyannisport meeting, noting that the Prime Minister does not necessarily share the President's continuing hope that some substantive progress can be accomplished and reported at Hyannisport. Secretary Ball noted some of the reasons which were probably impelling the Prime Minister to refrain from any premature agreements of substance, but the President was obviously not fully convinced.

The President noted that unless the two heads of government achieve and report some substantive progress at Hyannisport, Pearson himself may find that he is politically vulnerable in Canada because of having participated in a loudly heralded but inconclusive meeting. The President further wondered what alternative in fact was available to the achievement of substantive progress, and proposed that we ask Butterworth to inquire of the Prime Minister how he would propose to handle the meeting if indeed it is not to achieve and report substantive progress.

Mr. Bundy, referring to the paragraph toward the end of the McNamara paper which refers to Mr. Pearson's possible insistence on some form of _, asked if we were prepared to deal with such an insistence from the Prime Minister. Secretary McNamara answered, in effect, that he felt it would be unwise for the US side to raise this question, and that if Mr. Pearson raised it we should let him suggest the answer or alternative answers.

The President at this point wished to be assured that State and Defense would be making additional material available to him prior to the Hyannisport meeting, and he was so assured. Mr. Bundy asked me to arrange for the President's weekend reading some material to demonstrate that the Prime Minister's position vis-a-vis North American air defense is symmetrical to that of the President; I have therefore asked Mr. Lang to provide this material to the White House by 1600 tomorrow May 3.

There ensued a brief discussion of CINCORAD's authority to establish DefCon I and of the status of both Canadian and US units which would follow. The President asked if, short of DefCon 1, the Prime Minister could withhold permission for Canadian units to observe, for example, DefCon 3 or DefCon 2;
General Gerhardt answered that the Prime Minister was "not supposed to" do so, but indicated that prior to DefCon I he would propose to consult both governments through his military channels of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Canadian Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The President once again directed that the McNamara memorandum be sanitized for transmittal to Canada. Mr. Bundy proposed that, since the Bomarc had unfortunately acquired a rather bad reputation during the Canadian campaign, any private or public references to Bomarcs in the context of Hyannisport should probably mention that the Bomarc would of course be replaced as better weapons are developed. The President also reiterated that, in case the Prime Minister continues to resist the achievement of substantive progress at Hyannisport, Butterworth should press him somewhat to indicate what in fact he does want to do at the meeting and what in fact he wants to say after the meeting.

Mr. Bundy noted that the Canadian F-104s in NATO presented no problem comparable to the Bomarcs and interceptors on Canadian soil, adding that it would be a good idea if we could "rehabilitate" the public image of the Bomarc, especially if such a rehabilitation could be attempted by Canadian military professionals.

By way of summing up, the President directed that in effect Ambassador Butterworth should present three alternative courses of action to the Prime Minister; in decreasing order of desirability from the US viewpoint these courses would be: (a) agreement on the matters covered in the McNamara memorandum, as proposed in that memorandum; (b) agreement on so much of the McNamara memorandum as covers F-101 interceptors and the NATO F-104s and Honest Johns with decisions on Bomarcs deferred pending further joint study; and (c) inviting the Prime Minister to react with some ideas of his own.

After the meeting, Messrs. Nitze, Tyler, and their associates drafted a cable to Ambassador Butterworth in Ottawa designed to carry out the sense of the President's decisions during the course of this meeting. It was also agreed to send by cable to Ambassador Butterworth a somewhat sanitized version of the McNamara memorandum.

L. J. LEGERE

* Also US F-102 interceptors and US and Canadian ASW aircraft.