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DDS&T Historical Paper

No. OSA-1
Vol. IV of XVI

DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)
History of the Office of Special Activities
Chapters VI and VII

(PERIOD)
From Inception to 1969

DO NOT DESTROY

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
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DECLASSIFICATION DATE: March 1, 2016

Controlled by : DDS&T
Date prepared : 1 April 1969
Written by : Helen Kleyla
Robert O'Hern

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CHAPTER VI. COMMUNICATIONS

Project Communications Chiefs



1955 - 1960

1960 - 1961

1961 - 1965

1965 - 1968

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Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

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CHAPTER VI. COMMUNICATIONS

Agreement with Director of Communications, CIA

On 17 March 1955 the Director of Communications,

outlined the support he anticipated would be required of his office by Project AQUATONE in the following memorandum to the Project Director:

"To facilitate orderly planning it is considered essential that the tasks to be performed by the Office of Communications in Project AQUATONE be defined as completely as practical at this time. A great deal must be done in a limited time if the project schedule is to be met. If we are to successfully execute all our responsibilities in this project, we must initiate the detailed planning for all of them immediately.

"Accordingly, the following project tasks are understood as being those presently assigned to this Office:

- "a. Radio Location System (RANOL technique).
- "b. Staff communications with bases and advanced bases.
- "c. Maximum security flight communications (telemetering techniques).
- "d. Provide Elint equipment.
- "e. Maintain all electronic equipment identified with the foregoing functions. In addition, maintain the conventional radio communications and navigation equipment installed in the aircraft.
- "f. Perform preliminary Elint data reduction and deliver to designated official.

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"In the above, it is understood that we will monitor the development of the unique equipment involved, including its testing, and the development of the operational technique for its use. We will insure that spares exist at the proper locations and that teams of selected communications technicians are trained and competent in servicing and pre-flight checking the equipment mentioned in sub-paragraph f. Further, it is understood that we will perform all these functions during all phases of the project as it develops and as the unique equipment becomes available. Consequently, we are aware that for all practical purposes we must be ready in all respects for the first test flights in July.

"It is probably equally important to delineate related functions which it is believed the Air Force is in a better position to perform. These are:

"a. Conventional VHF/UHF terminal communications at main, advanced and recovery bases. This will include control tower to aircraft communications for flight control during take-offs, landings and ground-controlled approaches (GCA).

"b. Trunk-line transmission of project staff communications at the appropriate Air Force bases. (This is not an unusual requirement, but will necessitate specific agreements by this Office for the delivery of our cables to our mobile communications teams for deciphering and delivery to the project control officer at the base." 1/

The Project Director replied on 22 March 1955 confirming the above understanding of Office of Communications support to be furnished, and further confirmed his understanding that [redacted] would be the administrative communications officer for the project, under

1/ Letter from [redacted] to Mr. Bissell, dated 17 March 1955.

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[redacted] general supervision, and would participate in organizational and operational planning, taking primary responsibility for the planning of the communications systems and developing a table of organization for communications and electronic maintenance personnel. The communications plan and operational concept as set forth in the composite AQUATONE Planning Guide issued in October 1955 is attached as Annex 51.

HBJAYWALK Channel

In July 1955 the special communications set-up to service Project AQUATONE traffic was arranged and the Chief of the Signal Center,

[redacted] organized a staff of about ten cleared communicators to handle project traffic. All messages were delivered to and picked up from the L Building Signal Center. The indicator "HBJAYWALK" was assigned for project cable traffic and the cryptonym "DYADIC" was assigned by the Office of Communications to AQUATONE Project Headquarters. The shortened form, ADIC, has been used since as the cable address for incoming messages to Project Headquarters.

Between July 1955 and February 1956, communication links were established on this channel with the test site at Watertown, Lockheed at Burbank (also servicing Hycon and Ramo-Wooldridge by courier),

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[redacted] and Pratt & Whitney. A separate Signal Center to support the project was set up in the new Project Headquarters on the fifth floor of the Matomic Building on 27 February 1956 with a direct link to the main Signal Center. The HBJAYWALK channel was opened with [redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526 net early in 1956 in anticipation of deploying the first field detachment to Europe.

The reasons for establishing project communications as a separately controlled net, briefly summarized, were the need for maximum speed in message handling, special security requirements limiting access to such messages, the flexibility for setting up and controlling short-term circuitry, and not least, the necessity for Project Headquarters to closely control all field activities via immediate communications.

Test Site Communications

The communications plan developed for supporting the U-2 test phase at Watertown Strip was based on the use of a transportable radio station made up of two communications trailers. Radio communications, either CW or radio-teletype circuits, as required, were established with the Agency radio station in the Washington area. This channel would maintain a continuous Test Site/Washington radio watch for

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priority and after-hours traffic. Radio frequencies for the circuits were appropriately backstopped with Federal Communications Commission. A VHF radio circuit connected the Test Site and Mercury, Nevada (the AEC field station nearby) which served as a relay point. The weather unit supporting Watertown operations was located at Mercury and had four teletype circuits and one facsimile channel with a VHF link to Watertown.

The Watertown communications team also furnished HF communications with aircraft whenever required by Project Operations. It also furnished and serviced walkie-talkie sets for the security patrol and the ARC-3 radios installed in the mobile ground control vehicle and the base ambulance.

By the end of August 1955 cable traffic between Watertown and Headquarters had reached 8,000 word groups per week and by October 11,000 groups per week. At the end of November 1955 this rate had jumped to 32,000. Shortage of personnel at the test site made it necessary for the communicators assigned there to put in many hours of overtime.

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~~TOP SECRET~~AACS Support

The Commanding General, Army-Airways Communication System (AACS), was briefed on AQUATONE by Colonel Berg in December 1955 and promised his wholehearted cooperation in supporting the Project's communications needs. A requirement for his help developed rather quickly and in March 1956 Gen. McClelland wrote to the Project Director as follows:

"It is now apparent that AQUATONE will require the augmentation of the staff of operators and technicians at my principal radio stations to an extent not originally contemplated and in excess of the T/O of each station. I do not have sufficient qualified personnel for this purpose nor can I foresee a recruiting program that would promptly yield qualified personnel.

"It is my understanding that the Air Force will procure and operate aircraft nearly identical to AQUATONE's. In this event the AACS will be required to furnish the same support to SAC that O/C will provide for AQUATONE. It would appear to the distinct advantage of the AACS if some of their technicians could acquire operational and technical experience with the ground station aspects of System II... It is my belief that with Air Staff approval, the Commanding General of AACS would be pleased to make available up to 65 specially selected personnel... I believe this virtually the only method by which I can properly reinforce my base radio stations to adequately perform their support functions." 1/

The Project Director concurred in the use of AACS personnel at certain

1/ SAPC-4749, 5 March 1956. Memofandum for Project Director from Director of Communications.

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specified communications installations, provided they were not employed in positions which properly should be under the administrative control of a Detachment Commander or Project Headquarters, and subject to agreement by Colonel Berg on behalf of the Air Force. He replied to Gen. McClelland as follows:

"Although I concur in this arrangement and am most appreciative of your efforts to ensure proper support for this project, I do wish to raise again with you the question as to the wisdom of placing for a long period of time such a heavy requirement on the Air Force to provide trained personnel in support of an Agency operation. The question in my mind is the very fundamental one of whether this Agency should not staff and equip itself more nearly to stand on its own feet when it undertakes major new tasks.

"I am well aware of the fact that several special projects which are currently active in the Agency have combined to place an especially heavy burden on the Office of Communications... Under the circumstances it would have been impossible for you to expand your staff rapidly enough to fill these extraordinary requirements without any help from the military services, and it might be unwise to expand it to this extent in view of the probably temporary requirements. Nevertheless, I am inclined to feel that the Agency should be taking steps which will make possible at least a substantial reduction in the use of AACCS personnel as rapidly as suitable individuals can be recruited and trained to take their place." I

The decision not to use the System II communication and navigation equipment in the U-2 relieved the recruiting problem in that respect.

I / S^{APC}-4712, 24 March 1956, Memorandum to Director of Communications from Project Director.

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in the summer of 1956, although AACCS continued to support the Project by supplying personnel when requested, furnishing communications lines, and lending equipment. (This support by AACCS carried over into the successor program at both Area 51 and the OXCART field stations.)

Growth of Cable Traffic Volume

The urgency attached to all activities relating to the U-2 project and to the subsequent overhead reconnaissance projects of the Agency was nowhere more apparent than in the number of word groups of traffic handled by the special signal center (ADIC, later changed to OPCEN). In November 1956 the Project Communications Officer reported overload of facilities and manpower to the tune of 900,000 groups per month, which at that time represented about one-fifth of all Agency traffic. The recommendation was to cut wherever possible, and to make greater use of deferred precedence.

At a Director's Staff Meeting at the beginning of July 1957, discussion of the enormous and steadily growing communications traffic of the Agency brought out the fact that AQUATONE was responsible for a significant fraction of the total traffic. A survey revealed that nearly half of the total project cable traffic represented dummy deception messages transmitted for the purpose of preventing marked variations

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in the over-all traffic pattern which would indicate periods of active operations. This was considered a necessary precaution against compromise of missions through traffic analysis by the enemy. The Project Communications Officer concluded that significant reduction could only be achieved by (1) scheduling penetration missions two weeks or more in advance, (2) launching such missions with no close control by Washington, or (3) deactivating one or more overseas bases.

Because of dependence on weather information and political approval, (1) and (2) were out of the question. One of the three bases would be closed in three or four months but could not be closed sooner. The over-all conclusion was that no major reduction in traffic was feasible until one base was deactivated, but meanwhile the staff was exhorted to eliminate all unnecessary communications.

After DPD was set up as a Division of DD/P, Mr. Bissell in January 1959 forcefully brought to the attention of the DPD staff the fact that the current volume of cable traffic would no longer be condoned and ordered an immediate cutback. (He particularly singled out the verbose cables between Headquarters and the British Air Ministry regarding Project OLDSTER, and between Headquarters and various Agency Chiefs of Station abroad.)

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In 1960 with the addition of the satellite and the follow-on aircraft programs, many new stations were added to the HBJAYWALK network, principally industrial suppliers and Air Force installations. Detachments G and H became operational and communications support in the establishment of circuitry, message handling and engineering and maintenance support increased proportionately. During February 1960 the special signal center handled a total of 1,063,393 word groups of traffic.

With the establishment of the Directorate of Science and Technology, the special signal center took on communications support for the Office of Special Projects, Office of Elint, and Office of Research and Development, and other components of DD/S&T in addition to Office of Special Activities (OSA). During the operational life of the OXCART vehicle, a data processing capability was maintained by OSA and its transmissions were also serviced by OSA Communications Staff.

Following the blanketing of OSA operational activities under the National Reconnaissance Program, another large block of stations was added to the HBJAYWALK network. A directory of this network as of the end of December 1966 (alphabetically by cable designator) is attached as Annex 52.

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The OSA Communications Division was relieved of the responsibility for supplying electronic technicians for Detachments G and H in 1964 when OEL took over Elint responsibility for all of CIA.

At the end of 1966 the total T/O for the OSA Communications Division was made up of Headquarters and field personnel. Message volume handled by the Special Signal Center had reached a monthly rate of about 10,000 messages (word groups were no longer counted); 64% of this traffic was generated by OSA; 20% by the satellite activities of OSP; and 16% by other components of DD/S&T and other miscellaneous traffic.

Support for Staging Operations

In addition to the more or less fixed installations which Communications supported in the field during the life of the U-2 program, there has been the requirement to support forward staging base operations, which over the years between 1956 and 1966 have amounted to approximately 25 separate stagings to the following widely scattered bases:

Bodo Air Base, Norway
Charbatia Air Base, India
Cubi Point Naval Air Station, Philippines
Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska
Lahore Air Base, West Pakistan
Laughlin Air Force Base, Del Rio, Texas
Peshawar Air Base, West Pakistan

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Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico
Takhli Air Base, Thailand
USS Ranger, at sea in the Pacific
Watton RAF Base, England

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A typical Communications Annex to an Operations Order setting forth detailed communications activities to be performed in support of a staging operation, is attached as Annex 53, and relates to the second staging from Charbatia, India, during which coverage was obtained of the Sino-Indian border area.

Since 1963 Communications support of staging operations has included the monitoring of BIRDWATCHER* emissions from the mission aircraft. At the outset of this program the only ground monitoring stations were at Detachment G and Detachment H. The need for additional ground stations in key locations was foreseen in order to provide an effective monitoring network. Since the Office of Communications, CIA, had a number of active radio stations geographically suited to this purpose, steps were taken to seek the assistance of these stations and special equipment for monitoring the BIRDWATCHER was ordered in the spring of 1964.

By the end of 1964 an extensive network was in operation with the following stations in the Far East participating, as required:

* See Chapt. V, Annex 43, page 9, for description of this equipment.

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In 1965 two additional stations were added to the net: [REDACTED]

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BIRDWATCHER coverage has also been provided for during ferry flights of the IDEALIST aircraft from Edwards Air Force Base, California, to the Far East. A special monitoring kit was fabricated and placed aboard the accompanying KC-135 tanker so that monitoring could be accomplished enroute by personnel aboard the tanker as well as by ground stations.

In Praise of Commo

As a commentary on the outstanding support which the U-2 and other OSA projects have received from the Agency Communications Staff, the following extract from a paper by Mr. James A. Cunningham is relevant:

"Communications and Communications Security:

"The Project IDEALIST Communications Staff operates not only administrative communications but is responsible for operations communications as well. In contrast to the Air Force system, all Project traffic is by direct circuit transmission and all of it is enciphered to the highest standards.

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The Communications Staff is composed exclusively of professional personnel, trained to the uniform Agency standard of maximum proficiency, security and speed. The only cryptographic violations we have experienced in the past year, for example, have been on those circuits manned by USAF personnel. This staff has also furnished specialized communications and Elint service to Project IDEALIST in the form of engineering and maintenance assistance. On Elint systems, they work closely with the analysts so that technical maintenance enjoys a real-time relationship to the collection equipment. This is an important asset not available in package form to the Air Force. As an example of its speed, and even allowing for SAC unfamiliarity with communications from Omaha to Edwards Air Force base, on the initial SAC-executed mission of 14 October, the go-no-go weather forecast took SAC a total of 14 hours, 22 minutes to transmit through relay points from Omaha to Edwards Air Force Base, in contrast to a re-transmission time of one hour, 13 minutes from Washington to Edwards Air Force Base on CIA's system, utilized in this instance as a backup capability. By the time the SAC forecast arrived at Edwards, the mission had been on the ground at McCoy Air Force Base for 42 minutes, and the weather was no longer within the valid period for which it had been requested." 1/

1/ BYE-3944-62, 14 October 1962, Paper by Mr. James A. Cunningham, Jr., Subject: Agency U-2 Versus SAC Coverage of Cuba.

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ANNEX 51

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~~TS-142636~~
October 1955COMMUNICATIONS OUTLINE PLANGeneral

The Office of Communications within the CIA has assumed responsibility for providing communications support to the Project AQUATONE mission. Personnel have been detailed from the Office of Communications and have been assigned to Project AQUATONE under the general direction of the Project Director. In addition, the facilities and resources of the Office of Communications, both in the ZI and overseas, are available to the Project AQUATONE mission as required.

Assumptions

Communications support will be required for potentially three rear bases with associated forward staging bases from each rear base. It has been stated that two forward staging bases could be operational simultaneously from any of the rear bases.

A long range navigation and communications system will develop to furnish ranging and azimuth information along the flight path of the special vehicle and to provide a limited communications channel between appropriate ground stations and the special vehicle while on flight missions.

Newly developed Elint equipments will be available for the planned overflights and will be used extensively throughout the Project operational phase.

Over-all operational control will be maintained by the Project Headquarters in Washington.

Air Weather Service support, required on a continuous basis for all rear base installations, will, to a large degree, be furnished by the USAF Weather Central in Washington.

Tasks

The Project communications support responsibilities can be categorized generally as follows:

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1. Installation of communications facilities and maintenance of all the Elint and conventional electronic equipments to be utilized for the Project mission.
2. Establishment and operation of the communications circuits providing communications between rear bases and advance staging bases including air-ground communications with special vehicles.
3. Establishment of rapid communications links from Project Headquarters in Washington to the rear bases overseas.
4. The development of a comprehensive training program to properly equip communications personnel for the varied and specialized tasks imposed by the Project mission. This training program is currently underway, and will be continued for the required period of time.

Operational Concept

The establishment of communications links between Project Headquarters and rear bases overseas will usually be accomplished by utilizing existing services after determination of the most secure and rapid communications channel. A special signal center, within the CIA Signal Center complex, is available to process traffic for sensitive projects and will be utilized to process traffic for Project AQUATONE Headquarters. This signal center has tie-lines with ACAN, GLOBECOM, and CIA networks and will route Project traffic via the appropriate channel as directed by the Project Communications Officer. A Project signal center will be established and manned at each of the rear bases thereby providing complete cryptographic control of all Project traffic by designated CIA personnel. Transit time studies of Project traffic flow will be made on a continuing basis in an effort to insure most expeditious delivery of cables between Project Headquarters and rear bases overseas.

A cryptographic facility will be established at the Air Weather Central in Washington and linked to the special signal center by landline. This will serve to disseminate weather data from the Air Weather Central to rear bases, the Watertown site and such other users as deemed necessary.

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The Office of Communications maintains large communications installations on a global scale. CIA base radio stations in [redacted] are being considered for support of Project communications objectives. In addition, a radio facility in Alaska can and will be established for Project AQUATONE purposes, if required. These CIA base radio stations will have the dual function of directly communicating with the special vehicle and providing a communications link with Project personnel at advance staging bases.

System II equipment, requiring high power transmitters and extensive antenna installations, will be located at certain of these base radio stations. A rapid communications channel will be established between the rear base launching an operational flight and the base radio station in position to communicate with the special vehicle. By this means, communications between rear bases and special vehicles is achieved on a limited but two-way basis. This method of communications is currently envisioned as consisting of pre-arranged messages represented by three digit groups which will be displayed to both pilot and ground operator by some electro-mechanical means.

The CIA base radio stations will also support Project field components by furnishing communications to advance staging bases. When an advance staging base develops, a two-position, trailer-mounted radio facility will be transported to the advance staging base and will communicate with the pre-determined CIA base radio station. The CIA base radio station will then be in position to relay messages between the rear base concerned and the advance staging base. All CIA base radio stations involved in Project duties will embark upon a dummy traffic deception program, prior to their operational utilization, in an attempt to disguise the unusual circuit activity which could alert opposition intercept activities.

A communications team, under the supervision of a communications team leader, will locate at each of the rear bases. These teams will install facilities at the rear base, as required, to terminate the communications command channels and will then assume the duties of operating and maintaining these facilities. The communications links terminating at the rear base will be the ACAN, GLOBECOM or CIA channel with Project Headquarters in Washington and the circuit with the nearest or most appropriate CIA base radio station.

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The communications team at the rear base will either utilize existing ground to air facilities or install facilities deemed necessary for Project operations. Each rear base will have the following ground to air communications capability:

- a. A 100-watt UHF ground station equipped with well-designed antennas to work against the AN/ARC-34 UHF command set in the special vehicle.
- b. A UHF DF equipment which can serve to furnish steer information to the special aircraft.
- c. A LF beacon, which can be voice modulated, for working with the ARN-6 radio compass in the special aircraft.

At such times as advance staging bases develop from the rear base, the communications team will have the capability to deploy small teams with each advance staging group. Equipment for the advance staging bases will be such as to provide the same ground to air capability outlined above in addition to the two-position trailer-mounted radio facility which serves to communicate with CIA base radio stations. A secure cryptographic system will also be added to each advance staging base to enable the handling of enciphered communications. It is intended that all of the equipment required for establishing the communications facilities at advance staging bases will be placed in trailers or carefully crated for handling by the supporting logistics function.

The training program for communications personnel assigned to Project AQUATONE can generally be described as follows:

- a. Preparatory training and indoctrination in Washington immediately after assignment to Project duties.
- b. Formalized training at the Ramo-Wooldridge plant on Systems I, the ARN-6 radio compass and the AN/ARC-34 UHF command set.
- c. "On-the-job" training and drilling at the Watertown base on all the equipment to be encountered overseas.

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d. Final maintenance training on specific units in a specialized shop established in the Washington area.

e. Radio operating, cryptographic, propagation and other training, as deemed appropriate, in the Washington area.

f. Specialized training for field engineers, one to each team, at the Ramo-Wooldridge plant for Systems II, III, and IV.

Conclusion

Considerable effort is being exerted to select and properly modify equipment for the Project AQUATONE mission. Also, especial emphasis is being placed upon the training and programming of communications personnel to achieve the maximum in competent and well-balanced communications teams for each rear base. A small, fully-trained reserve team will be held available in Washington to assist with Project tasks in the ZI and also to be deployed to the overseas bases as the need arises. These measures supported by the resources of the Office of Communications should serve to meet all Project communications requirements.

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ANNEX 52

HBJAYWALK Directory

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8/55	ABOUT	Pratt & Whitney	Los Angeles	
1/60	ACORN	Itek	Lexington, Mass.	2

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7/59	BABY	Perkin-Elmer Corp.	Norwalk, Conn.	4
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7/56	BAIL	Eastman Kodak	Rochester, N. Y.	3	2
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8/55	BEIGE **	Lockheed Aircraft Corp.	Burbank, Calif.	3
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2/64	BELLY	Itek	Palo Alto, Calif.	2
2/63	BIJOU	Applied Technology Inc.	Palo Alto, Calif.	2
8/62	BINGO	Minneapolis Honeywell	Burbank, Calif.	1
10/64	BOOK	David Clark Co.	Worcester, Mass.	4
-	BRISK	Eastman Kodak (AF)	Rochester, N. Y.	
12/55	CABAL****			
7/55	CABLE	Area 51 Test Site	Mercury, Nevada	7
6/57	CACTUS	Detachment G	Edwards AFB, Calif.	6
10/60	CARD	Detachment H	Tao Yuan, Taiwan	

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<u>Date Opened</u>	<u>Designator</u>	<u>Station</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Communicators Company/ Project</u>
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[Redacted]

2/64	COACH	OX Detachment/Staging	Wake Island	
1/61	COBRA	Detachment G/Staging	Cubi Point, P. I.	

[Redacted]

7/56	CORK	Detachment B/later OX	Incirlik AFB, Adana, Turkey	1
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[Redacted]

1/65	LMSC	Lockheed Missile & Space	Sunnyvale, Calif.	2
1/66	LRL	Lawrence Radiation Lab.	Livermore, Calif.	3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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
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<u>Date</u> <u>Opened</u>	<u>Designator</u>	<u>Station</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Communicators</u> <u>Company/ Project</u>
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	SANDIA	Sandia Corp.	Albuquerque, N.M.	4
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4/62	SPECTRE	NPIC	Washington, D. C.	8
	SPER	JASPER Radio Site	England	
	SYSTO	Perkin-Elmer (AF)	Norwalk, Conn.	
	TOWER	Lockheed (AF)	Los Angeles, Calif.	

6/63	TRW	TRW Systems Grp.	Redondo Beach, Calif.	5
10/62	WADDY	RecTech (AF)	Westover AFB, Mass.	8(AF)



7/61	WECEN	Weather Central, SAC Hq	Offutt AFB, Neb.	5
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5/63	WHALE	AFRDR(AF)	Pentagon	
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<u>Date Opened</u>	<u>Designator</u>	<u>Station</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Communicators Company/Project</u>
1/63	WHIG	D/NRO Staff (AF)	Pentagon	
12/63	WH	White House	1600 Pennsylvania Ave.	
7/61	WITCH	Air Weather Service (AF)	Scott AFB, Illinois	

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ANNEX 53

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ANNEX E (COMMO) - PROJECT BIG BARRELL III OPS ORDER 7-64
 Dated: 23 November 1964

I. Commo links

A. Ferry flight support

50X1, E.O.13526

(1) Over-the-counter service, utilizing OTP's will be provided at Guam. Contact at Guam is Lt. Col. Willoughby. Routing indicator []

(2) CIA facility at [] will be utilized. Contact is []

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B. Charbatia

(1) Radioteletype with KW-26 primary and OTT back-up circuit to [] for entry AXANET network. Radio equipment already in place Charbatia (from previous staging) remaining associated equipment and crypto gear being provided and deployed by Detachment G.

(2) CW capability with OTP circuit to [] for alternate back-up. Equipment already in place Charbatia.

(3) KODGER CW emergency capability, using "Ferry Flight" [] OTP's; Crypto link between Charbatia/OPCEN.

(4) CW radio link Charbatia/emergency recovery base, if required. Equipment and crypto material being deployed by Detachment G.

C. OPCEN

(1) OPCEN-[] fast freight patch activated 18 November.

(2) OPCEN-[] fast freight patch activated 20 November.

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II. Personnel deployment

A. Detachment G

(1) Detachment G deploying one team leader, three CT/C's, two CT/R's, two ET's, and one WET.

(2) One ET and two CT/C's to accompany ferry flight.

B. OPCEN

(1) Two CT/C's being assigned TDY

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(2) Two CT/C's being assigned TDY

C. SEACA

One CT/R being assigned TDY Charbatia.

III. Equipment

A. Radio equipment already in place Charbatia, additional spares being deployed from Detachment G.

B. Crypto equipment being deployed from Detachment G.

C. Elint: Systems IXA, XII and XIII plus "p" and "S" Bands System VI and BIRDWATCHER will be utilized. Systems III and VI being deployed per ADIC 7966, para L1.

D. Nav aids and SSB/BW - Radio jeep w/LF Beacon and Ground SSB/BW facility already in place or being deployed by Detachment G.

IV. BIRDWATCHER

A. Ferry flight: Special BW kit to be placed aboard KC 135 for monitor. CARD and Charbatia to monitor also. Detachment G will provide signal plan info and alert stations for monitoring.

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B. Operational missions: Charbatia and [] will monitor; [] will also monitor if required.

V. Deception

[] KW 26 RTTY deception circuit activated 19 November. When Charbatia ready activate, circuit will be picked up by Charbatia and dropped by [] At completion of staging when Charbatia deactivates, [] will pick up again and continue operation of circuit on 24 hours basis for approximately one week.

VI. Crypto Stock

A. Key material for Charbatia [] crypto link in place [] Detachment G deploying Charbatia ends. [] will be control station.

B. Detachment G providing pads for ferry flight "over-the-counter service" at Guam. These pads will also be utilized for emergency KODGER crypto link Charbatia/OPCEN.

VII. Crypto Procedures

A. With exception of KODGER, which utilizes special procedures, all pad links follow [] procedures. Reciprocal system indicator [] to be used between [] and Charbatia. System indicator [] to be used for KODGER and [] messages.

B. Charbatia, [] OTT circuit assigned reciprocal system indicator [] procedures apply. Charbatia routing indicator is [] is []

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CHAPTER VII. SECURITY AND
COVER

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Chiefs of Security and Cover Officers - 1954-1968

Security:

William H. Marr
December 1954 - November 1955

[Redacted]
November 1955 - July 1960

William J. Cotter
July 1960 - April 1964

William R. Kotapish
April 1964 - July 1966

[Redacted]
July 1966 - September 1967

[Redacted]
September 1967 - August 1968

[Redacted] *aug 70*
September 1968 - Present

Cover:

Initially cover was an additional
duty of the Security Staff.

[Redacted]
October 1955-April 1956

[Redacted]
April 1956 - May 1962
(Doubled as Cover Officer
and Security Officer)

[Redacted]
May 1962 - October 1967
(Doubled as Cover Officer and
Special Assistant to DSA for
Liaison)

[Redacted]
October 1967 - Present
(Doubling as Cover Officer and
Security Officer)

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CHAPTER VII. SECURITY AND COVER

Development Period

At the outset of Project AQUATONE, before a Headquarters Staff had been formed, matters relating to security and cover were handled directly by Mr. Bissell and his personal assistant. Their first tasks were the initiation of a clearance list of knowledgeable participants, and first steps toward the development of cover. Mr. Bissell himself put a great deal of thought into designing a cover story for the development stage of the project which would keep knowledge of the most highly sensitive facts to an absolute minimum. These facts he considered to be: (a) the altitude and range expected from the aircraft; (b) aircraft delivery schedule; (c) association between the aircraft and the photographic and electronic equipment being developed as components of the reconnaissance system; (d) CIA connection with the project; and (e) the purpose for which the system had been approved.

Meanwhile, at the end of December 1954, the Director of Security, Colonel Sheffield Edwards, was briefed and pledged full support of his Office and as a first action, nominated Mr. William H. Marr of his staff to be Project Security Officer. The immediate problems to be solved, in view of the fast-moving activities of Mr. Johnson's group at

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Lockheed, were (1) a cover story for the contractors, and (2) plant security and personnel investigation and clearance procedures.

The development period cover story, based on Mr. Bissell's outline with inputs from knowledgeable Air Force and contractor representatives, was promulgated on 26 January 1955 and copies were distributed to key men in each supplying company. (See Annex 54 for text.) At the same time contact and communications instructions were issued to the five current suppliers covering procedures for personal contacts between headquarters personnel and contractor representatives. Through the Office of Security a series of post office boxes with notional addressees were rented for the secure exchange of postal communications between Project Headquarters and the contractors.

For emergency communications (before the secure teletype system came into being in midsummer 1955) unlisted telephones were installed in Project Headquarters and key offices at suppliers' plants, and the numbers were exchanged among those needing to have immediate access to one another.

The system of postal communications, which began in February 1955 with the establishment of mail channels between Headquarters and five companies, with eight post office boxes in four cities being

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serviced once or twice a week, developed over the extended life of the U-2 and successor projects until at the end of 1966 it encompassed the following network:

For outgoing mail from Project Headquarters: 115 post office boxes in 85 cities with addressees including approximately 100 suppliers, 3 field units, 1 depot and 1 weather station, with daily servicing by company or unit personnel in most cases. Of the 115 boxes, 15 are used by other DDS&T units and 10 are used for Air Force contract business.

For incoming mail to Project Headquarters: 16 post office boxes in Washington, D. C., at various post offices, with daily servicing by Office of Security personnel. An average of 30 pieces of mail per day is received through these boxes, a few of which boxes are also used by other components of DDS&T.

Plant Security

In the middle of January 1955, the Air Force and Navy representatives at Lockheed Aircraft Corporation were given limited briefings on the special project in "Building 82" and were relieved of any security responsibility for work in that area. [redacted] of the Agency's Los Angeles office was given the job of Project Security Officer for plants on the West Coast. Inspections were made of physical security arrangements at Lockheed and Ramo-Wooldridge and found to be adequate. With the assistance of the machinery available in the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI), a system for processing security

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clearances for plant personnel via OSI to the Agency's Office of Security was set up which had the appearance of a normal Air Force procedure. Investigations began immediately on the civilians nominated to work on the aircraft and supporting systems. Arrangements were also made for secrecy agreements to be obtained, through OSI, from all military personnel briefed on the project.

On 7 February 1955, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, was briefed on the project and the Agency's interest in it, particularly with regard to the work at Lockheed. Three men in the FBI Los Angeles office were briefed (including head of the Espionage Squad), and they, as well as FBI Headquarters in Washington, continued to support the project wherever possible with personnel, facilities and files.

Security Responsibility: Agreements

Although agreement in principle was reached with the Air Force and Navy in December 1954 that CIA would have security responsibility for Project AQUATONE, within a few months it was felt by the Project Director and the Office of Security that it would be advantageous to have this clearly spelled out and agreed in writing. On 29 April 1955 the following agreement was formalized:

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"In order that security responsibilities relative to Project AQUATONE may be clarified and understood by the Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force, and Office of Naval Intelligence, U.S. Navy, the following provisions shall apply:

"1. The Central Intelligence Agency has assumed primary responsibility for all security in this Top Secret project, which includes operational security as well as granting security clearances.

"2. The Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force, and Office of Naval Intelligence, U.S. Navy, will furnish liaison assistance in connection with clearance actions, including making available to Central Intelligence Agency pertinent information from their files. Where necessary, Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force, and Office of Naval Intelligence, U.S. Navy, will assist Central Intelligence Agency by giving needed support relative to various phases of the Project, the scope of such support to be determined by prior agreement of the undersigned.

AGREED: Maj. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, USAF
Director of Special Investigations

RAdm. Carl F. Espe, USN
Office of Naval Intelligence

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
Central Intelligence Agency. " 1/

The agreement signed with the Air Force in August 1955 for the joint direction of the project did not reiterate the Agency's prime responsibility for security; however, when the Air Force U-2 program

1/ TS-103552, 29 April 1955. Memorandum for the Record.

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was set up, the Air Force agreed in December 1956 to follow certain prescribed security procedures to insure proper control of the follow-on program and to protect CIA's association with it.^{1/} The "need to know" principle restricting information was to be adhered to, personnel involved who would be aware of the Agency's interest were required to have TS clearance including a National Agency Check and background investigation, and the Air Force agreed to certify to Project Headquarters the names of their people attending joint meetings or visiting suppliers' installations so that proper notifications could be made in advance. While this agreement was fulfilled in the main, there were numerous breaches requiring Project Security action--briefings and debriefings, investigations of information leaks, etc., involving many man hours and much travel by the Security Staff.

At the inception of CORONA in April 1958, Project Security assumed responsibility for cover and security for that project and subsequent Agency participation in the reconnaissance satellite program, involving principally the procurement and delivery of the payload.

1/ TS-158772, 14 December 1956. Memorandum from Brig. Gen. M. A. Preston to Mr. R. M. Bissell, Jr., Subject: USAF R-17 Program. Para. 8 a-d. (Annex 55).

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When the OXCART agreement was signed in February 1961 between the Air Force and CIA, two paragraphs relating to security responsibility were inserted:

"3. d. Security of this project within the DOD will be the responsibility of the Air Force Project Officer. All clearances for personnel within the DOD will be approved in advance and monitored by the Air Force Project Officer.

.....

"5. Responsibility for the overall security of the program shall rest with CIA. In view of the security aspects of this project, it is important that maximum practicable compartmentation should include provision for logical, innocent explanation of the activities involved." 1/

In May 1962 an "Agreement Between Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence on Responsibilities of the National Reconnaissance Office" was negotiated, and the question of security responsibility was covered as follows:

"3. Security: In accordance with the basic responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for protection of intelligence sources and methods, CIA will establish security policy for the NRP, including provision for a uniform system of security control and appropriate delegations of security responsibility.

1/ OXC-0321, "Organization and Delineation of Responsibilities, Project OXCART" signed 18 February 1961.

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.....
"6. Public releases of information will be the responsibility of the DNRO, subject to the security guidance of CIA." 1/

Clearance Procedures

The industrial security phase of AQUATONE opened up a new realm and concept to the Agency's Office of Security. The unique problems presented required the establishment of a new set of operating principles in order to deal with the numbers and types of personnel who became involved in various phases of the project. In the early days clearances were obtained and briefings given on an ad hoc basis by various staff members as the occasion demanded, and the degree of knowledgeability imparted varied from one individual to another, and was seldom detailed in writing for the record.

In January 1956 the Project Director became alarmed at the large numbers of Air Force personnel being fully briefed on the project and visiting the test area on their own cognizance. He wrote to Col. Ritland:

"It seems to me that we are rapidly sliding into a position where literally hundreds of senior Air Force officers

1/ BYE-1166-62, 2 May 1962. "Agreement Between Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence on Responsibilities of the National Reconnaissance Office."

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have been and are being cut in on AQUATONE, not because they have any real need to know or because we expect any contribution from them, but only because they are in the habit of knowing about projects of this sort which are handled through regular Air Force channels... I do feel we should review with Col. Berg the extent of knowledgeability in the Air Force and launch a new campaign to clamp down." 1/

In reply, Colonel Ritland noted that since the Air Force would begin to operate their own U-2's about September 1956, a realistic attitude must be taken with regard to the increasing numbers of USAF personnel involved in planning for the follow-on program. His solution was to have Project Security set up categories of knowledgeability by phases. Once these were firmly defined, the briefing of individuals could be restricted to that phase in which they were to participate, thus cutting down the numbers of fully knowledgeable persons.

The eventual system of distinguishing between three levels of security access (which has continued through subsequent projects) was based on criteria set forth below as developed principally for guidance in dealing with the great volume of contractor personnel clearances.

A Phase I approval is required for an individual who does not need to know and cannot determine the ultimate application

1/ SAPC-3080, 7 January 1956. Memorandum to Col. Ritland from R. M. Bissell, Jr., Project Director.

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or future sensitive use of the equipment being developed or manufactured. Generally speaking, the work which he is doing could have a variety of applications, is a job that he would normally be performing and would, in most cases be a fabrication type function which does not require access to sensitive Project areas.

A Phase II approval is required for an individual who needs to know equipment or system configuration, performance characteristics, identification of other contractors, suppliers and vendors, test site locations and knowledge of equipment or subsystem capabilities. In general, this individual will or may become knowledgeable of information, requirements and parameters which reflect an advance in the state of the art or, by the nature of the function he performs, will have access to areas, material or information from which he might be able to deduce such knowledge.

A Phase III approval is required and will be granted only for those individuals who require official confirmation of mission objective and project knowledge which includes operational information, plans and identity of Project Headquarters. Phase III approvals will not be granted as a matter of courtesy, deference or convenience and requests for approval at this level must be adequately justified.

The Deputy Director of Security for Investigation and Support,

was made responsible by the Director of Security for supporting project needs in all areas of security. He soon realized that the scope of the job required more manpower than he had readily available. Decisions were made in April and May 1955 to give the Agency's Office of Security responsibility for the physical security of the test site (even though the AEC maintained a

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perimeter guard), as well as of the overseas field bases. It was further decided that the Project Security Staff would be responsible for custodial and courier activities, including the transport of mission photographic yield.

In November 1955, [] noted to the Project Director that the initial conception of AQUATONE as a short-term project, which would require only a temporary diversion of Security's efforts away from other Agency activities, was no longer valid. Requirements levied on Security were increasing rather than diminishing. At last count 1,759 clearances had been processed although initially it was believed that there would be only about 600 in all. Therefore at least six more professionals and twelve more clerks were needed and an addition of \$100,000 to the current Office of Security budget in order to weather the crisis. The Project Director approved the addition of four slots to the Project T/O but recommended all other needs be put to the Deputy Director for Support as increases in the Office of Security T/O and budget; this was done with the Project Director's strong backing. As the life of the project was extended, the requirements for security support grew, as did the staff. In November 1956 Mr. Bissell wrote the following note of appreciation to Col. Edwards:

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"It was brought to my attention that your office has initiated 4,611 clearance cases of various types since this Project has been in existence, of which 4,008 have been completed. In addition 452 support cases which your office has completed have materially facilitated the accomplishment of our program. Although the AQUATONE mission and resulting requirements are far from completed, I would like to express sincere appreciation for your continuing support. Your accomplishments have demonstrated a major team effort." 1/

In 1958 the 5,000 mark was passed in clearance cases. From December 1958 through August 1959 the Security Office handled over 1,000 clearances of Convair employees engaged in the GUSTO feasibility study (for a successor to the U-2). More than 800 of these were handled by a temporary security group set up in 50X1, E.O.13526 manned by eight professional and four clerical personnel on a rotating basis, and using a commercial investigative force to supplement their efforts.

Once the follow-on vehicle to the U-2 was approved and production of the system began, the numbers of clearance cases handled by CIA Security increased by leaps and bounds. Also, meanwhile, during early 1962 the National Reconnaissance Office was being

1/ SAPC-10905, 27 November 1956. Memorandum to Director of Security from Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

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organized and OSA's reconnaissance programs were blanketed under the new agency's control. The DCI expressed the desire that CIA should control the security systems of each and every program within the NRP domain. This did not include clearances in programs such as SAMOS and MIDAS but CIA would be the central point of record for all clearances and responsible for inter-Agency coordination, clearance recordation and dissemination of clearance information on all of them. In view of the implications of this requirement to the Office of Security in terms of manpower and budget, the Director of Security initiated action to centralize within the Office of Security, CIA, all records of persons approved for access to programs requiring special clearance for which CIA had security responsibility. Planning went forward during the summer for collation of all clearance data into the central indices under the control of a "Special Security Center". The Center was organized and staffed, and [redacted] [redacted] was designated as its head effective 4 September 1962. As of that date OSA Security Staff was relieved of all record-keeping and paper work involved with clearances other than those instigated by OSA.

Statistics on clearances current as of the beginning of 1966 on OSA's two principal projects were as follows:

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OXCART:

CIA personnel	1,507
Government (other agencies)	1,765
Industry, all phases	<u>11,651</u>
Total OXCART	14,923

IDEALIST:

CIA personnel	2,021
Government (other agencies)	2,158
Industry, all phases	<u>2,857</u>
Total IDEALIST	7,036

Security at Watertown Test Site

In May 1955 a crash recruiting and training program was instituted to ready 15 security agents for duty at Watertown (later to deploy abroad with Detachment A) and 15 each for Detachments B and C, in turn.

Applicants were required to possess at least an undergraduate degree from an accredited college and were selected on the basis of both present and future potential with the idea of phasing them into the Security Support Division after their project assignments. A school for these agents was set up at Watertown to continue their training in weaponry, radio and switchboard operation, and the practical application of security methods and procedures. It was considered essential that these young men possess the flexibility to respond to crisis situations

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as well as to do well the monotonous jobs required of personnel dedicated to the broad concept of security support.

Security duties at the test site were wide-ranging and included:

Physical Security:

Manning of two checkpoint gates and roving patrol 24 hours a day.

Apprehension and interrogation of intruders.

Badge and documentation control and maintenance of access lists.

Briefing and debriefing of base personnel and transients.

Local hire employee investigation and clearance documentation.

Area and safe checks, burning of classified waste and Top Secret Control.

Safety of work areas and coordination of base firefighting plan with contractor-furnished fire crew.

Air Shuttle, Burbank to Watertown:

Dispatch control of passengers and cargo to and from the test site (in coordination with the West Coast Security Officer in Los Angeles).

Courier and Escort Duties:

Classified documents and equipment accompanied and given protection and proper storage.

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Escort of remains of accident victims, briefing and giving aid and comfort to bereaved families.

Cover:

Briefings and promulgation of cover based on issuances from Headquarters.

Responsibility for local implementation of the USAF cover established for the testing phase at Watertown.

Emergency Assistance:

Proper notification to all points on details of accidents, crashes, etc.

Securing of wreckage and equipment in case of crashes.

Debriefing of uncleared witnesses, and control of publicity.

Other:

Administration of program to determine radioactivity level at the area through personnel wearing film badges while at the site and checking exposed filters.

Daily liaison with AEC Security Office at Mercury, Nevada on mutual security problems.

Daily consultation and advice to base administrators and base personnel in areas of security and cover as required.

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MATS Shuttle: Burbank to Watertown. To protect the security of activities at Watertown, the decision was made that ingress and egress to and from the training area would be by air in all but certain special cases. Since the majority of personnel travelling to the test site were contractor employees (largely Lockheed) whose homes were in the Burbank and Palmdale areas, the first shuttle service was provided by a USAF C-47 bailed to Lockheed and flown and serviced by Lockheed crews. Since the project could not fully control this service and because difficulties were expected regarding individual insurance coverage of those using the flight, arrangements were made with the Air Force in September 1955 for a regularly scheduled shuttle using a USAF C-54 to be operated by MATS with project-cleared crews. This service began on 3 October 1955.

The Air Force (MATS) was responsible for providing aircraft service between the two points on a daily schedule (except Sundays), and for all flight operations, maintenance, parking, loading and unloading. The project was responsible for maintaining a facility at Burbank (staffed with Security personnel), to prepare and certify personnel and cargo manifests, establish priorities, and maintain communications with suppliers and others using the shuttle.

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Mt. Charleston Crash. Less than two months after this service was initiated by MATS, a tragic accident occurred which had especially severe effects in the area of project security. As described by the Deputy Project Director, Col. Ritland, it happened as follows:

"On 17 November 1955 at about 3:00 p. m. , EST, the Project Director's office was notified by telephone from Watertown that the MATS shuttle from Burbank was three hours overdue. The aircraft had cancelled its IFR clearance en route and was proceeding to Watertown under VFR conditions on last report. The weather was extremely bad with clouds topping all mountains and scattered snow showers throughout the area. Both cleared contacts at Norton Air Force Base (Generals Bunker and Caldara) were away from the base and therefore the SOP for accident reporting and investigation had not been put into effect. . .

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"After considerable confusion, General Caldara was located. . . through the efficient efforts of [redacted] and his Security channels in that area. . . General Caldara phoned his office and authorized his third in command, Colonel DeMarco, to assume full responsibility for following up on activities. . . The situation as described above caused some confusion since DFSR was handling and controlling the entire investigation, news releases, and assuming direct control over Flight Service and Nellis without the senior representative being knowledgeable as to why he was operating in this fashion. Considering all this, it is my opinion that the general handling of matters. . . was extremely satisfactory." 1/

For a time due to bad weather no search activities could be accomplished

1/ Report (unnumbered) by Col. O. J. Ritland, 17-19 November 1955.
Subject: Shuttle Crash.

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but after a few hours notification came from General Robert Taylor of Air Defense Command that the wreckage had been sighted on the south slope of Charleston Peak. From the report of the condition of the aircraft, it was obvious that there were no survivors. Headquarters staff immediately put in motion all necessary actions which must eventually be carried out.

A great many uncleared and unbriefed people (principally Air Force personnel and Special Agents from the Office of Security) had to be brought in very quickly to handle matters relating to the bringing out of the bodies, notification of next of kin, mortuary and escort arrangements, and dealings with the press. The fact that the Project Security Officer, Mr. William H. Marr, and four of his staff assigned to Watertown were among the victims added an emotional overtone to the crisis atmosphere prevailing at Project Headquarters. Many people became aware of Agency interest in activities at Watertown as a result of the crash and ensuing confusion, but fortunately no public breach of any magnitude resulted. The most damaging result of this first serious incident in the life of AQUATONE was the loss of the fourteen men. (See Annex 56 for listing.)

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As a postscript to the accident, on 5 August 1956 the briefcase of Mr. Marr, which had lain hidden at the scene of the wreckage for more than eight months, was discovered by some Boy Scouts hiking in the mountains and was turned over by their Scoutmaster to the OSI Special Agent at Nellis Air Force Base. Upon opening the case he discovered Mr. Marr's connection with CIA and forwarded the case and contents to his regional headquarters in the Los Angeles area for passing to the nearest CIA contact. This compromise of the project's security was contained by debriefing those involved and stopping up all possible leaks therefrom.

Emergency Procedures. The SOP established for accident investigation at Watertown Strip (which had just been completed prior to the MATS shuttle crash) proved basically sound but a complete review in light of the accident necessitated some changes. Public information releases were henceforth to be the responsibility of the PIO, USAF Headquarters, in the Pentagon, in conjunction with the air base nearest the accident, and the Atomic Energy Commission was to be brought into any press release activity immediately. Firm cover and identification documents must be prepared for all personnel operating under cover. The one critical name on the MATS list had been that of

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[redacted] who was listed as a passenger with no affiliation (later covered by USAF/OSI backstopping his documentation as a [redacted])

[redacted]

The MATS service from Burbank resumed on 28 November 1955 and was accident-free for the next year and a half's operation at Watertown. The emergency procedures, however, were called into use several times during the U-2 testing and training phase. (See Annex 57 for a listing of major U-2 accidents.)

Security Support in the Field

Prior to departure of Detachment A to the field in the spring of 1956, on the recommendation of the Security Staff, approval was given for briefing all Detachment A personnel (including the techreps) on project sponsorship and mission. Each member took a secrecy oath and signed a formal memorandum of understanding as to his responsibilities in protecting classified U.S. Government information. This briefing was very well received and appreciated by the members of the unit and became standard procedure for each succeeding detachment.

While the same general categories of support provided by Security at the test site were later required at the overseas bases, each unit had security requirements peculiar to its location and to its position.

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vis-a-vis the local authorities and other U.S. activities in the area. Increased policing of individual security observance was necessary (particularly after dependents were allowed to join detachments overseas). In addition there were varied courier assignments, chiefly the task of escorting mission "take" and pouches from the field to the film processing center, liaison with other U.S. security services on counter intelligence activities, monitoring of local public and press reactions, and public releases in support of cover.

Security Support at Headquarters

In addition to advising and counseling on the security aspects of day-to-day project business, the Headquarters Security Staff were called on to carry out various assignments, among which were:

Procurement, sweeping electronically, and guarding of rooms for suppliers' meetings and other conferences (usually in Washington or Los Angeles, sometimes in the Boston area).

Assistance to contractors in setting up plant security and documentation systems.

Investigation of reported or suspected security breaches.

Assistance in obtaining medical attention in several severe psychiatric cases where security of project operations was at stake.

Continuous recruiting and training of replacements for field positions.

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Drafting, clearing and promulgating policy paper on release of project-developed systems, subsystems and techniques to other U. S. Government agencies (text at Annex 58).

Cooperation with the Agency CI Staff in making a damage assessment following the shoot-down of the U-2 on 1 May 1960.

Control of publicity resulting from loss of Air National Guard crews involved in the Cuban operation.

Two incidents are detailed below as typical of jobs which the Security Staff was called upon to handle for Project Headquarters.

On 5 July 1957 an article appeared in the Morning Call of Allentown, Pa., reporting that a local area company had a contract with CIA to produce a dessicant film dryer for use in high altitude photo reconnaissance. The contract was an unclassified one entered into overtly by the Agency's procurement division and did not contain an anti-publicity clause. The president of the company, from his knowledge of the technical aspects of film development and chemical requirements involving a micron capability, had deduced the future use of the dryer and had given the information to a local reporter. This incident caused the expenditure of many man hours of travel, consultation, briefing, debriefing and reporting by the Security Agent assigned to the case. The recommendation was made that Procurement Division

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include an "anti-publicity clause" on all CIA contracts rather than leave such matters to the discretion of the company officials involved.

With regard to the second incident, on 27 March 1961, the Acting Chief of Development Projects Division wrote the following commendation letter to the Director of Security, CIA:

"On 14 March 1961 the Agency, and in particular this Division, was confronted with a security problem of considerable magnitude. A C-47 aircraft of this Division, enroute from Rochester, N. Y., to Bolling lost an engine and had to jettison 43 boxes of highly classified material /processed U-2 mission film being returned from Eastman to the Agency's Photo Interpretation Center/ in the rugged mountainous area in the vicinity of Williamsport, Pa.

"In response to an urgent request for assistance, the Office of Security immediately made available ten Security Officers who were dispatched to the probable recovery site. Through the diligent and most professional efforts of this team, whose activities were coordinated in excellent fashion by [redacted] DPD/Security, the complete classified cargo was recovered with dispatch. This particularly fine achievement is, indeed, a reflection upon the excellence of the caliber of men in the Office of Security career service..." 1/

The Project Headquarters Security Staff has been kept at the minimum number consonant with the volume of project business; however, the Office of Security has maintained cleared staff within its organization to support the U-2 project (and subsequent activities

1/ DPD-1695-61, 27 March 1961. Memo to Director of Security from AC/DPD.

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of DPD and OSA) in any jobs it was called upon to do. From a staff of one senior Security Officer and two assistants plus clerical help in 1955-56, the numbers had grown by 1961 to a Chief and six full-time Security Officers plus clerical help--two officers assigned to OXCART and one each to CORONA, Air Support, Cuban operation, and IDEALIST for primary responsibility. The approximately 45 field agents who worked for Detachments A, B and C were phased into other areas when it was decided to hire contract guards to maintain physical security at the Detachment G Base at Edwards (North) in 1957 and at Area 51 in 1960.

By the end of 1966, the Headquarters Security Staff numbered a Chief and ten Security Officers, with ten additional officers assigned to field detachments and stations in the ZI and the Far East.

Cover

During the testing and training period at Watertown, cover was provided by the Air Force and the Atomic Energy Commission under the guise of a joint upper air research project. The presence of uniformed Air Force personnel at the test site, the provision of materiel support by the Air Force and the conduct of pilot training by a SAC

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unit attested to an Air Force activity, and the location within the AEC Nevada Proving Ground lent credence to the idea of a joint AEC/USAF upper air research program, while hiding CIA involvement. The principal problem during that period was to avoid disclosure by the press, or in other ways, of the capabilities of the aircraft and its systems. Once the training program reached the stage of flying simulated missions great distances from home base, the dangers of such disclosure were multiplied. Two fatal crashes and several emergency landings away from the test site were weathered during the training period with the aid of the established cover, emergency procedures and controlled public releases from the Headquarters USAF Public Information Officer.

Thought was given meanwhile to a cover mechanism for the overseas operational phase of the project and various Air Force commands were considered as possible sponsors for a mixed task force. In December 1955 the Project Director of Administration, Mr. James Cunningham, reminded the Project Director that to move further along the current course of continuing Air Force cover for overseas activities would, in the event of compromise of the project by a hostile force, put the military in a position of not being able to effect plausible denial--

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the initial purpose for investing a civilian agency with responsibility for carrying out the program. He suggested the possibility of a volunteer group on the order of Chennault's Flying Tigers, which by "technical resignation" from the Air Force achieved nominal separation from the military without cutting themselves off from the flow of military support.

In January 1956, with Detachment A's deployment date approaching, the question of overseas cover became urgent. [redacted]

[redacted] a long-time Clandestine Services career officer who had been assigned to the Project Operations Staff was reassigned to work full-time on cover. As a result of his research and discussions with all concerned,

[redacted] put forward the following assumptions and considerations as a basis for establishing cover for the project's operational phase:

"The cover unit must be USAF. No other sponsorship would explain the use of a USAF installation, the extent of USAF logistic support involved, the type of aircraft and associated equipment involved, etc. While other considerations may suggest that it is desirable for other U.S. agencies (governmental or private) to appear to be 'participants' in the detachment's activity, the appearance of USAF control (with at least an executive agent's role) and sanction cannot be avoided.

"Policy considerations dictate that the USAF cover unit appear to have no tactical mission, nor be involved in a function of direct support to a tactical USAF unit.

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"Since the cover must explain plausibly the presence of a good number of civilian technicians, non-USAF participation in the cover unit's activities would lend credence to the story. AEC, U.S. Weather Bureau and private research institutions (e.g., Massachusetts Institute of Technology), have been mentioned as possible participants. The participation of non-USAF agencies would also serve to reinforce the impression that the unit is not tactical in nature..." ^{1/}

Additional considerations posed by were:

- (1) The necessity for the host government to sanction operations in areas where main bases as well as forward bases were established.
- (2) The requirement for exclusive U.S. security control of that portion of the base from which AQUATONE would operate, which would clearly indicate that the unit's activity was classified.
- (3) Assurance that the briefing of host government officials was consistent with the degree to which they were to share in the "take".
- (4) The question of insignia: Would the aircraft retain USAF markings during operational missions?
- (5) The advisability of releasing an unclassified cover story to the press, and the immediate conforming of the Watertown cover to that of the overseas units.

^{1/} TS-142951, 13 January 1956. Memo for Project Director from

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The Cover Officer felt that of all the major USAF commands, the one under which AQUATONE would most logically fall was the Air Research and Development Command (ARDC), and since it was desirable that the overseas detachments assume a composite flavor, it was proposed that other USAF elements and one or two non-governmental institutions assign participants to a task force unit for which ARDC would act as executive agent. Missions which could plausibly be assigned the unit were:

- (1) Upper atmosphere meteorological research of interest to Directorate of Scientific Service of the Air Weather Service.
- (2) Solar research in effect of sun spot activity (of considerable interest to the Army-Airways Communication Service).
- (3) Geophysical research directly associated with high altitude flight (e. g., cosmic ray studies, which utilize high altitude photography).
- (4) Field test and evaluation of new electronic and aircraft instrumentation systems.

The Chief of the Agency's Central Cover Branch was briefed on AQUATONE on 2 February 1956. He was given an opportunity

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to review the cover planning done to date, which he received favorably.

On the basis of this planning, the Project Director on 29 February 1956 drafted a "Cover Story for Operations Overseas" (TS-142996) which was the basis for discussion and approval as the eventual classified cover story. Those (other than CIA officials) whose advice and concurrence were obtained during this planning included the following:

USAF:

Maj. Gen. John Samford, Director of Intelligence
Maj. Gen. Thomas Moorman, Commander, Air Weather Service
Maj. Gen. Roscoe Wilson, Commander, 3rd Air Force
Maj. Gen. James H. Walsh, Commander, 7th Air Division
Col. Paul Heran, SAC U-2 Project Officer
Col. Russell Berg, USAF Headquarters Project Officer

NACA: (National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics)
Dr. Hugh Dryden, Director of NACA
Gen. James Doolittle, Member of NACA

Land Panel:
All Members

Representatives of the five principal contractors

Within the Air Force it was believed that USAF participation should be ascribed to the Air Weather Service (not ARDC) since AWS was not a tactical unit, had an obvious interest in upper atmosphere research, did not have responsibility for development of new equipment,

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and had previously conducted scientific research through joint task forces. It was further agreed that the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA) would be the most plausible and useful civilian participant since its charter was broad and its mixed groups of military, civilian, governmental and private organizations would bring together many of those having a plausible interest in such a program.

Once approval for use of this cover was obtained through appropriate channels in USAF, discussions were held with AWS and NACA personnel to work out administrative details. Results of meetings between Col. Richard M. Gill, Director of Operations, AWS, and project personnel, including the Project Weather Officer, Lt. Col. Ralph J. Steele (AWS Meteorologist), brought out the following problem areas:

(1) AWS had no charter for engaging in research activity; it could be properly concerned only with the development of operational techniques for high altitude weather reconnaissance.

(2) As proposed, the cover would not be backstopped by actual capability for collecting data; this would arouse suspicion within AWS itself as well as from outside interested parties.

(3) AWS questioned the plausibility of their role as executive agent for conducting operations abroad if the aircraft did not belong to the USAF and bear USAF insignia.

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(4) The backstopping of NACA's role would be complex: explaining ownership of the aircraft and the funding procedure for the project were the two principal problems.

Modifications were introduced into the cover story concerning the procurement and ownership of the aircraft and the living out of the cover story, and the final version of the classified cover story was issued on 26 March 1956 at TS-143267/1 (see Annex 59 for text).

While the classified cover story contained provision for equipping the U-2 with a meteorological configuration in order to live out the cover mission, the delay in assembling and installing this equipment and the slow rate of collecting and disseminating data justified the early fears of the Project Director of Administration (Mr. Cunningham) that

"...in our urgent haste to deploy on schedule, we may well be more interested in the purely frontal aspects of cover rather than in the full backstopping of our cover device." 1/

He recommended turning one of the 20 U-2's over to AWS so they could completely instrument it for a program of meteorological research within the ZI and abroad in order to accumulate actual data and/or cloud atlas photography to establish scientific backstop for the project

1/ TS-143237, 7 March 1956. Memo for Project Director from D/Admin.

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and for use as a counter propaganda weapon. This recommendation was only partially carried out. In April 1956 Lt. Col. Robert Houghten and Mr. Thomas Coleman (Technical Equipment Specialists of AWS and NACA respectively) were sent out to work with Lockheed engineers to devise a meteorological package suitable for collecting the kinds of information within the U-2's capabilities; however, even after these packages were fabricated and available, it was some time before operational priorities and assignment of equipment technicians would allow a regular program of weather flights for cover purposes.

Also in April 1956, a beginning was made in conjunction with AFOAT/1 (the Air Force Office of Atomic Intelligence) and AFSWP (Armed Forces Special Weapons Project) to develop an atomic sampling capability for the U-2, which further supported project classified cover while doing a real service for the offices concerned (and incidentally requiring the clearing and briefing of quite a number of their personnel).

At the beginning of May 1956, just prior to the deployment of Detachment A, copies of the unclassified and classified cover stories, press release for 7 May 1956 issue by NACA, and background information for dealing with press and other queries, were circulated to all concerned, including the contractors. (See Annex 60 for full text.)

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Emergency Procedures

The next order of business for the Cover Officer was the drafting of contingency plans for the possible loss of an aircraft over hostile territory. The Project Director advised the Cover Officer to

"... plan to produce a document which sets forth all actions to be taken... not only press releases and the public 'line' to be taken, but also the suspension of operations and at least an indication of the diplomatic action. If feasible this paper should be agreed with the State Department as well as the USAF and NACA and should probably be discussed... with the British Foreign Office /in view of Detachment A's expected deployment to the U.K./ We should at least make the attempt in this case to be prepared for the worst in a really orderly fashion." 1/

While the emergency procedures were being drafted and cleared, the Project Director, at a meeting with the President's Aide, Gen. Goodpaster, and Drs. Killian and Land, explained the kind of emergency arrangements being drawn up. At that point, Drs. Killian and Land suggested consideration of a much bolder action by the U.S. involving admission that overflights were being conducted to guard against surprise attack. This suggestion was not discussed in any detail and was put aside for further thought. Meanwhile the emergency procedures paper was cleared with all concerned including the State Department and was promulgated in

1/ TS-143290, 9 April 1956. Memorandum to Cover Officer from Project Director.

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final form as "Procedures to be Followed in the Event of an Aircraft Loss over Hostile Territory", dated 29 June 1956 (see Annex 61).

The same procedures, with appropriate changes to cover local situations, were issued to Detachments B and C in turn.

From the deployment of Detachment A to England in May 1956 through the events of May 1960, the cover arrangements and instructions for emergency procedures remained the same. In the fall and winter of 1956 during the political stand-down of overflights, consideration was given to use of a commercial aerial survey company or other non-governmental cover for operations, but with the critical situation developing in early 1957 in the Middle East, Detachments A and B were called on for almost daily reconnaissance of the trouble areas and discussions of alternate cover were discontinued.

Cover Activities in the Weather Field

In August 1956 the Project Director wrote to NACA concerning the lack of research studies needed as counterpropaganda in the event of a U-2 incident. Non-production to date had been due to lack of secure facilities and cleared people to handle film and tape; however, these matters were in hand and it was urged that production of research reports be given immediate attention. A preliminary study of

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weather data was published at the end of December 1956 by NACA, and data for further studies and reports continued to be collected by the detachments. The principal difficulty in publishing studies of interest to the aviation community based on U-2 flights was the fact that data for altitudes above 55,000 feet required secret classification or had to be sanitized before release (which made the reports of less significance to the recipients).

An excellent program of cover publicity stemming from Detachment C's typhoon coverage in the Far East was initiated in 1958 through the energetic efforts of [redacted] (who succeeded [redacted] as Cover Officer in 1956). The Air Weather Service gave unstinting support to the program, including the services of some of their top meteorologists who aided in the accumulation of data and preparation of reports for publication. The Commander of AWS, General Thomas Moorman, and his Deputy, Col. Norman Peterson, and Dr. Robert D. Fletcher, Director of Scientific Studies, were all intimately concerned in developing actual weather studies that could be directly attributed to the cover mission and could be legitimately discussed and defended in public forums if necessary. Their efforts produced a product that would have enabled the operation to live out its cover had it not been for the

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political situation in Japan and several untoward incidents which brought about a great deal of publicity, largely hostile. (See Annex 62 for significant examples of typhoon photography studies.)

Erosion of Cover: Incidents and Press Stories

In April 1957, at the time of the planned surfacing of the SAC U-2 program, Mr. Bissell wrote the following note to the Director and Deputy Director of CIA concerning the deterioration of cover which was to be expected as a result of SAC's activities:

"After careful review, it is my judgment that the present cover for the AQUATONE operation cannot be maintained much beyond next fall. Too many people, especially in the Air Force, are beginning to surmise the true mission of the AQUATONE units and even to suspect an Agency connection therewith. Moreover, the NACA will be most reluctant to continue to provide cover, at least in the present form, beyond the end of this year... The presently planned surfacing of the SAC U-2 program will, if carried through, gravely impair our cover. Not only will the fact that the U-2 is a reconnaissance aircraft become known to a very much larger number of Air Force personnel but, in the course of listing the U-2 in the Air Force inventory and handling its support through normal channels, the unusual procedures employed up to this point in the procurement and support of these aircraft will be widely revealed... I do not believe it is an exaggeration to say that the surfacing of the SAC program will absolutely compel the liquidation of AQUATONE under its present cover..." 1/

1/ TS-164213, 19 April 1957. Memorandum for the DCI and DDCI, from Project Director.

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Several security safeguards were imposed on the SAC U-2 program in the interest of protecting the existing AQUATONE operation, including maintaining the photographic and altitude capabilities of the U-2 under secret classification and restricting SAC's U-2 operations to peripheral flights. Thus the project did continue beyond Mr. Bissell's prediction of its life span, and NACA agreed in July 1957 to a two-year extension of cover support. However, the cover was a very thin veneer over the actual operations and there was bound to be speculation, evolving into stories in the press, many of which were written in a highly sensational style with obvious untruths included, but in general coming too close to the truth for comfort.

On 4 April 1957 a U-2 from the Edwards Air Force Base detachment crashed in the desert and the Lockheed test pilot, Robert Sieker, was killed. Growing out of this accident and the efforts of the local sheriff to be helpful in securing the crash area on behalf of the investigating team, an article by Wayne Thomis was published in the Chicago Daily Tribune on 12 April 1957 headlined "Secrecy Veils High Altitude Research Jet". It was a consolidation of previously published facts about the U-2 with a good deal of surmise added as well as many inaccuracies. At the same time the Los Angeles Times published a conclusive review by

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Marvin Miles of all publicly known activities of the U-2 to date. From that point, the press continued to refer to the U-2 as a "mystery plane" and used such names for it as "Super Snooper," "St. Peter's Special," the "Black Angel" and others. In 1957 the SAC U-2 squadron at Del Rio, Texas, suffered three fatal and one non-fatal crashes (two occurring on the same day, 28 June 1957) which also drew damaging press comment.

The aviation trade media particularly followed all U-2 incidents with eager attention. Aviation Weekly, the British magazine called Flight, and Japanese publications Air View and Aero Fan, were among those printing largely factual but speculative articles concerning the aircraft's specifications, capabilities, and probable missions.

In February 1959 the Project Security Officer, [REDACTED] in examining the state of project cover, expressed the following opinion:

"I recommend we give immediate consideration to exposure of the mission of the U-2 within the United Nations, indicating this capability was developed in furtherance of the President's 'Open Skies' proposal of July 1955 as a peaceful tool of the free world..." 1/

This proposal had small chance of serious consideration at the time and represented principally a Security Office warning that time was running out on the ability to maintain cover.

1/ DPD-0460-59, 26 Feb 1959. Memo to AC/DPD from [REDACTED]

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On 24 September 1959 a U-2 from Detachment C returning to base at Atsugi ran out of fuel and made a forced landing on a prepared dirt strip and was immediately surrounded by inquisitive Japanese (many with cameras). The photographic story of this incident, as published in the November 1959 issues of Air View and Aero Fan, are shown in Annex 63.

By spring 1960, cover had worn threadbare in many quarters and a certain amount of laxity regarding security of operations was present. Even though the detachment personnel worked very hard to produce trouble-free overflight missions, one must give credit to a goodly amount of luck when considering the number of things which could have gone wrong on any one of the 309 missions flown to date (approximately 75 of which were over, or peripheral to, Communist territory).

After the May Day 1960 episode and subsequent revelations in the press and other media, Dr. Glennan, Director of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), successor to NACA, was disenchanted with the project and wished to disengage NASA from sponsorship of any further flights. The ungrounding of the U-2 was the subject of protracted discussion during the summer of 1960 among CIA, State, and NASA personnel. On 1 September 1960, Mr. Cunningham

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wrote to the DD/P in that connection as follows:

"With the emergence of a requirement that may call for further U-2 flights from Adana in support of peripheral intelligence collection, we are up against the problem of how to get the aircraft ungrounded, which involves the knotty problem of under whose auspices these flights should apparently be undertaken... there are a limited number of possibilities:

- "a. Continue with NASA-AWS cover.
- "b. Drop all pretence of innocent Air Force (AWS) mission and adopt either SAC or USAFE organizational cover.
- "c. Drop all pretence and state that Detachment 10-10 is a CIA unit.
- "d. Drop NASA cover and substitute another innocent U. S. agency.
- "e. Drop NASA cover and convert to AWS cover.

Recommendation is that Air Force concurrence be sought in the proposal to replace NASA/AWS sponsorship with straight AWS sponsorship... " 1/

Reactivation of reconnaissance flights from Detachment B failed to receive approval of higher authority and therefore cover discussions with regard to sponsorship of an overseas-based detachment were dropped. The remaining personnel and equipment from Detachments B and C were returned to Edwards Air Force Base and amalgamated into Detachment G and subsequent operational missions staged by this

1/ CHAL-1171, 1 Sept 1960. Memo to DD/P from Actg. Chief, DPD.

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detachment, beginning in September 1960, have had individual cover stories, tailored to fit the circumstances.

From the inception of U-2 overflights, there was no written policy or standard procedure with regard to briefing American Ambassadors abroad, either in countries being overflown or in countries where flights might originate or terminate. Each operation involving a foreign country was evaluated from an individual operational and contingency viewpoint and a determination made in conjunction with the State Department as to whether the Ambassador should be made witting of the activity. State's position was deferred to whenever a strong conviction was expressed with regard to any particular operation. Generally the practice was to advise the Ambassador if operational advantage might accrue from so doing, or if ignorance on his part might prove embarrassing in the event of a mishap.

Once the National Reconnaissance Office came into being, contingency procedures were set forth in the NRO Security Policy Directive No. 1 of 20 November 1962, as follows:

"Prior to development test of a new reconnaissance system, the Ad Hoc Cover Committee will prepare a contingency plan for the system, covering situations which may occur as a result of:
(1) Malfunction of equipment during any period of 'operational'

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use, the result of which may subject the reconnaissance capability to unauthorized exposure, (2) recovery of intelligence product or vehicle by hostile powers, and (3) damaging press coverage.

"Such plans will include provisions which will enable the U. S. Government to counter any charges of an adverse nature as may be made by foreign powers. In addition, instructions will be issued to appropriate personnel and offices of the Government and industry concerning actions to be taken should any of the aforementioned emergency situations occur so as to centralize the control of information as a responsibility of specific offices, departments, or officials.

"All contingency plans prepared under the supervision of the Ad Hoc Cover Committee will be reviewed by the Special Group. After approval, the NRO will publish and distribute the plan.

"Personnel affiliated with projects of the NRP will not respond to press inquiries which seek information about NRP activities unless specifically authorized to do so by the DNRO or as called for by provision of a contingency plan." 1/

In August 1963 the Ad Hoc Cover Committee was redesignated the Interdepartmental Contingency Planning Committee (ICPC) on the initiative of the Director of CIA in order to more accurately reflect the function of the committee and to eliminate the undesirable connotation of the term "cover." The ICPC is chaired by the DNRO and member agencies are State, Defense, NRO, Joint Chiefs of Staff, USAF, CIA, and the White House. This committee has held very few formal meetings since its establishment and its procedures are presently outdated and generally unworkable in the face of an emergency.

1/ NRO Security Policy Directive No. 1, 20 Nov 1962, Paragraph 14.

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By late 1960 the multiplicity of procedures for special handling of communications relating to the special collection projects, and the overlapping between the collection projects and the dissemination of the intelligence acquired, had made it difficult to classify and control the related documentation. On 21 February 1961, the TALENT^{*} Control Officer (then Mr. James Q. Reber) circulated an instruction to certain TALENT and TALENT/KEYHOLE^{**} Control Officers in the community which drew attention to the problems presented in handling documents and materials falling within the purview of the two control systems which also contained IDEALIST (U-2) or satellite data. The clearances of certain individuals for access to T or KH material did not mean that they were automatically given access to information concerning the projects which produced the T and KH material.

In order to establish standard procedures to safeguard information pertaining to the sensitive collection projects for which CIA had responsibility, a control system was established called the "BYEMAN System". The indicator BYEMAN covered only the developmental and/or

* Control system for intelligence collected by the U-2 program.

** Control system for intelligence collected by satellite program.

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operational aspects of DPD's sensitive collection projects and did not concern itself with the control or dissemination of the intelligence product. Compartmentation within the BYEMAN System was to be maintained through the continued use of individual project indicators and controls. BYEMAN materials which also contained T or KH data were to be handled as follows: TALENT control personnel would effect control and storage and TALENT courier service would handle deliveries. TALENT Control Officers would be responsible for seeing that the materials were made available only to persons possessing appropriate operational clearances.

Through 1961 the BYEMAN System operated on ad hoc procedures while a manual of instructions was being drafted and agreed. The BYEMAN Control Manual was first issued on 20 December 1961 by the Agency's BYEMAN Security Officer, Mr. William J. Cotter, then Chief of the Security Staff of DPD/DDP. During January 1962 steps were taken to set up the BYEMAN system throughout the intelligence agencies concerned. Members of the system were the same as the membership of COMOR: CIA, DIA, NSA, USAF, USN, USA and State. On 18 January 1962 at a meeting of COMOR, implementary procedures for the system were recommended relating principally to the need to

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communicate via electrical channels with all members of the community and with the needs of the various BYEMAN Control Officers for manuals, and appropriate rubber stamps, cover sheets, briefing forms, oath forms, etc. Since the Agency (DPD) controlled the electrical communication channel, Mr. Cotter also had the responsibility for disseminating the rules and regulations regarding such communications.

On 24 January 1962, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Mr. McGeorge Bundy), as a result of Recommendation No. 29 of the PFIAB's Report to the President of 20 January 1962, wrote to the DCI to register Presidential concern over the security of the most sensitive intelligence reconnaissance projects being conducted by CIA. Replying to Mr. Bundy on 20 February, Mr. Bissell (DD/P) was able to report:

"The following action has been taken on the recommendations of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board...

"On 20 December 1961 a security system specifically designed for the protection of information pertaining to these joint Air Force/CIA projects, for which the CIA has been given security responsibility, was approved (BYEMAN Security System). This system is presently being implemented throughout the intelligence community. Where feasible, billets will be established in each agency to assist in the stabilization and control of the number of clearances in each agency. All requests for access approvals will be submitted through a BYEMAN Security Officer designated by each agency, and he

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will have the responsibility to review critically each such request to assure that the individual must be authorized such information in order to directly contribute to the program. Each such BYEMAN Security Officer will periodically review the list of individuals cleared within his agency to ensure that all individuals listed thereon continue to require the appropriate project access approval. If a person is no longer contributing he will be immediately debriefed. Approximately every six months each BYEMAN Security Officer will rebrief all persons under his jurisdiction holding these special clearances...

"A communication is being directed to each control point throughout Government and industry inviting attention to the latest expression of Presidential concern and directing that immediate positive action be initiated to reduce the number of persons currently approved for access and requiring that new requests for clearances be held down to 'an absolute minimum consistent with practical requirements'...

"Within Government, since the large preponderance of individuals cleared for these joint Air Force-CIA projects are naturally within the Department of Defense, the Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. Charyk, will be requested to review, from the need-to-know aspect, the clearance lists of each segment of the Defense Department and each new request for such clearance in an additional effort to establish another level wherein nonessential individuals can be identified.

"At the moment the BYEMAN Security System encompasses Projects IDEALIST, CORONA, and ARGON. In the immediate future, however, Project OXCART will be added to the system. In the meantime, however, all steps being taken to tighten up the BYEMAN projects will also be taken with regard to Project OXCART." 1/

1/ BYE-0149-62, 20 February 1962. Memorandum for Special Assistant to the President from R. M. Bissell, Jr. (DD/P).

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On 2 May 1962, the agreement on "National Reconnaissance Planning and Operations" was signed by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence and in accordance with the basic responsibility of the DCI for protection of intelligence sources and methods, CIA was made responsible for establishing security policy for the National Reconnaissance Program, including provision for a uniform system of security control and appropriate delegations of security responsibility. As a consequence of carrying out this responsibility, all of the projects under the control of the National Reconnaissance Program have subsequently been added to the BYEMAN Control System.

In order to centralize security control and the handling of clearance matters under the BYEMAN System, a "Special Security Center" was established in the CIA Office of Security and on 4 September 1962 the positions of BYEMAN Security Officer and BYEMAN Control Officer for CIA, along with the attendant responsibilities, were assigned to Messrs. [REDACTED] respectively. The Office of Special Activities (formerly DPD) was thus relieved of these duties, which it had previously performed.

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ANNEX 54

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26 January 1955

SANITIZED COVER STORY - FOR USE DURING DEVELOPMENT STAGE

I. Purpose of Cover Story

Cover stories are designed as a secondary defense. Regular security procedures and precautions are the fundamental devices for limiting knowledgeability. By carefully applying the "need to know" principle the cover story itself will be needed very little and those who do hear it will have minimum evidence on which to question the cover. However, it should be remembered that the most essential precaution is to have all personnel properly cleared and well indoctrinated with the importance and extreme sensitivity of this project.

The cover story itself should be treated as classified since even the existence of projects imagined in the cover story are of great national interest. Cover stories should not be discussed over the telephone. As needed the cover should be spread. In many instances suspicions and inquiries can be allayed by simple offhand remarks or by using only part of the cover story. The effectiveness of any cover relies not only on the consistency of its use, but in the imagination and skill of its application. Very often inquiries based on hearsay, rumor or curiosity can be satisfactorily answered with a flat denial or reference to an apparent confusion with some other sensitive activity known to exist within the plant or area.

The cover story as well as the project itself should be protected. If any inquiries are made by persons who were not thought to have heard it or by persons who are known security risks and who display unusual knowledge of the cover story or the project itself, they should be immediately reported to the project or security officer. An attempted penetration can just as likely occur using the cover story for deception as an attempt to penetrate directly the project itself.

It should be noted that project names are classified and should not be used over the telephone or in any way compromised.

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II. General Cover Story (Project AQUATONE)

a. Purpose: These high altitude aircraft are to be used primarily for upper atmosphere sampling and secondarily, for other kinds of high altitude testing and research. The latter will include testing engine performance, pressurization, and probably the functioning of electronic and photographic equipment at high altitudes without pressurization, personal equipment, and the capabilities of personnel to perform missions requiring sustained flight at high altitudes. The primary purpose renders the project both urgent and sensitive by reason of the growing official and popular concern for the danger of widespread fall-out in the event of wartime use of thermonuclear weapons and with the danger of permanent atmospheric contamination as a result of repeated H-bomb tests. The secondary purpose is also highly sensitive because of the extreme importance of maintaining an exclusive advantage in respect to all aspects of high altitude flight.

b. Organization: Procurement is to be undertaken by the U. S. Government. The project is of interest to and is sponsored by four Federal agencies: the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the Civil Defense Administration. Funds are being contributed by the several sponsoring agencies. This basic organization was adopted because the requirement to be met by these aircraft is not purely military in character but reflects the interests of the three non-military agencies as well.

c. Procurement Channels: In view of the urgency, and especially the sensitivity of the project, and of the nature of its sponsorship, the decision was deliberately made not to employ regular Air Force (or Navy) procurement channels, since this would have required the participation on a fully knowledgeable basis of a sizeable number of officers, especially in AMC and ARDC. Nevertheless, the Air Force is supporting the project in two ways: (1) by procuring or supplying GFE, and (2) by providing technical supervision of development and construction (to the extent required in view of the considerable freedom of action necessarily left to the suppliers).

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d. Substantiation: To give the basic cover story substance, Lockheed has been requested to design or to subcontract for the construction of one or more air samplers fitted to the available space. And it would probably be desirable in fact to employ the aircraft for air sampling when a sufficient number are available. To further support the air sampling mission at Lockheed, General Daniel E. Hooks, Chief AFOAT-1, has been told of the existence of a sensitive project using this cover story and has volunteered to visit the area to increase its credibility. Meanwhile, special precaution should be taken to keep to an absolute minimum the number of individuals who are aware of the connection between photographic and electronic equipment under construction by two other companies and the Lockheed contract. Construction of both aircraft and reconnaissance equipment should be planned on the assumption that the equipment will not be actually installed until tests are being run at a site remote from the Lockheed plant. At that time, a further cover story may be required for the individuals conducting the tests. It might be simply that the aircraft will be used to test the possibilities of extremely high altitude photographic reconnaissance but that this use will be secondary to the primary use for high altitude sampling.

III. Subsidiary Cover Story (Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation,
Sub-project AZAROLE)

Since R-W has contracts with us, it will be difficult to keep our relationship to this contractor unknown. For this reason other contractors and project personnel should not meet at the R-W plant unless absolutely necessary. For internal purposes suspicion of our connection to this work will indirectly reinforce the main cover story in that this will be regarded as simply another contract for ELINT equipment from an agency that is already known to be interested in ELINT data and equipment. Consequently, the cover story will serve mainly to prevent employees from suspecting or detecting the other contractors and the full scope of the project. The most important aspect of this section of the cover story is to confine knowledge of the aircraft, its capability, and its sponsor to the minimum number of personnel.

a. Small package: The small ELINT package can be easily passed off as intended for use in luggage, packages, etc. in regular collection operations, and consequently should not stimulate unusual speculation.

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b. Large package: This package is more difficult to explain since it obviously must be airborne. While the means of its use will be known to those working on it, the cover story can conceal its ultimate use in a highly specialized aircraft by indicating its use will be in pods and wing-tip tanks of military and commercial aircraft flying near targets in routine flights.

IV. Subsidiary Cover Story (Perkin-Elmer Corporation and Hycon Manufacturing Company, Sub-project OCTROI)

The equipment being manufactured under this contract will obviously be for aerial photo reconnaissance. The important facts to conceal are the project's true sponsor, the existence of related projects, especially the aircraft, and the performance characteristics of the aircraft. Knowledge of these facts must be kept to an absolute minimum number of persons although it is to be assumed that imaginative scientists will very likely anticipate accurately the ultimate use of such equipment.

The commercial contract will prevent inquiries until it becomes self-evident that no private firm has the funds or requirement for such a large amount of equipment of this type. When commercial cover is no longer convincing, a government interest will have to be admitted and also the original cover explained away. The commercial contract has several advantages for specialized procurement since it avoids the "Buy American Act" restrictions (which is essential in this job), does not attract attention in government or business circles, and gives the purchaser full benefit of the experience of private firms.

If needed, the natural sponsor, and therefore the natural cover for this work, is the Air Force. More accurate inquiries or interest at later dates can probably be satisfied by labelling the project as Air Force camera research and development. If the need arises to relate the work to a specific aircraft, only as a last resort reference could be made to reconnaissance version of the F-100, Super Sabre jet fighter. As in the case of the ELINT contract, it is most important that no employees or supervisors become aware of either the Lockheed or Agency interest. Extreme caution should be exercised whenever witting members of several firms or project officers meet to discuss requirements or specifications.

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V. Subsidiary Cover Story (Pratt & Whitney, Sub-project DYEWEED)

No great difficulty is anticipated in covering the project contract with Pratt & Whitney. The engine has already been designed.

a. In the immediate future, the work can be explained solely by P&W's interest in developing new engines and retaining predominance in the field of jet propulsion. However and when needed it can be announced (as is the case) that a contract from the Air Force exists for its production under which our procurement will actually be hidden. Contacts will be among Air Force officials and aircraft engineers who regularly confer in any event and whose interest in the engine has already been established and is perfectly natural.

b. The engine being ordered is already reasonably widely known in the higher echelons of the Air Force and aviation management to be under contract for the modified Canberra being built by Martin Aircraft. Any further questions on the increase in the size of the order can be explained by unforeseen testing requirements--e. g., destruction testing.

Again the strength of the cover story rests on the careful security measures. If knowledgeability is restricted to the minimum number of persons it is unlikely that any suspicions will be aroused. While skilled engineers and technicians will undoubtedly have little difficulty predicting that the engine is intended for a high performance aircraft, especially where they need more specific data on the desired capability, this ought not compromise the project since Pratt & Whitney is constantly at work designing and producing higher performance engines to meet anticipated Air Force requirements. There is no need for anyone except a few key individuals to know the true sponsor, the desired capability of the aircraft or its eventual mission. Good security measures, especially in contacts and communications, should make the cover problem relatively simple.

VI. Distribution

This cover story has been distributed to one key man in each plant. All those who are fully witting and have need or occasion to use the cover story should be fully briefed before using it. If anyone who is witting has any doubts or confusion on the structure of the cover story, he should contact the project officer of his plant, who, in turn, can contact the central

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project supervisors, if there are any further questions. Once a cover story has been circulated, nothing is more damaging to the security of the project than to have several persons known to be familiar with a sensitive project contradict each other in using the cover story. Any variations or improvements that occur to key project officers should be communicated through safe channels to the central project group. They should not be used until considered and, if found desirable and feasible, disseminated to all those using the cover story. If this is not done the entire cover of the project may be jeopardized and possibly irreparable damage may be done to the success of the project.

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ANNEX 55

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Department of the Air Force
Headquarters United States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

14 December 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BISSELL

SUBJECT: USAF R-17 Program

1. The Air Force follow-on program has now reached the state where certain procedures regarding security, training, etc. must be finalized. Also, there are mutual problems associated with the phasing of USAF personnel and aircraft into Watertown which must be resolved.

2. Accordingly, our tentative operational plan for the Air Force follow-on program is transmitted for your review and comment. Representatives from this headquarters would like to meet with you as soon as possible to discuss those problems associated with our use of Watertown. A proposed agenda for this discussion is included as Inclosure 2.

(Signed)

M. A. PRESTON
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Director Operations
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

2 Inclosures

1. USAF R-17 Program
2. Proposed Agenda

(AH 1467-6 AFOIN)

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~~TOP SECRET~~USAF R-17 PROGRAM

1. The USAF is buying 29 U-2 aircraft (USAF designation R-17) from the Lockheed Aircraft Company. These aircraft are being purchased through the CIA as follow-on aircraft to the Agency's OILSTONE/AQUATONE Program. The Agency has issued letter contract SP-1914 to Lockheed for the 29 R-17 aircraft. The Lockheed Company is producing the R-17 at their Bakersfield, California plant. The latest production and the different configurations of the R-17 follows:

	1956					1957					Totals					
	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J		J	A	S	O	N
Photo	1		1	2	3		1	2	1	1			1	1		14
Test						1				1				1		3
Ferret											1		2	1		4
HRR						1				1						2
Sampler							1					2	3			6
Totals	1		2	4	7	9	11	13	16	18	20	23	26	28		29

2. The 29 R-17's being purchased by the Air Force will be assigned as follows:

- a. SAC - 20 Reconnaissance configured aircraft.
- b. SAC - 6 Sampler aircraft to accomplish AFSWP mission.
- c. ARDC - 3 for test purposes.

3. The present understanding between the Air Force and the CIA indicates the Air Force will inherit all the OILSTONE/AQUATONE aircraft after the next photo season (approximately October 1957). There probably will be 15-16 U-2 aircraft remaining in the agency program by June 1957. All of these aircraft will be assigned to SAC as Reconnaissance aircraft and as the Air Force receives them they will be redesignated the R-17. Therefore, by FY 2/58, the Air Force should have a total of approximately 45 R-17 aircraft in the inventory.

4. All of the R-17's assigned to SAC, including the Sampler aircraft of AFSWP, will be assigned to the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Light. The 4080th Wing will be equipped as follows:

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4025 Squadron - 20 RB-57D
 4028th Squadron - 26 R-17 (20 Reconnaissance and 6 Sampler
 aircraft)
 4029th Squadron - 16 R-17 (Residue of Agency's program)

The 4080th Wing is located at Turner AFB, however, since Turner is not acceptable as an operations or training base for the R-17 aircraft, a new home base is being secured. The permanent home base for the 4080th Wing will be Laughlin AFB, Texas. Laughlin cannot be made available to the 4080th Wing until April 1957. During the interim period, the 4080th Wing Hqs and the 4025th Squadron with RB-57Ds will remain at Turner AFB. The R-17's will be located at Watertown AFB, Nevada until April 1957. At that time they will be transferred to the 4028th Squadron of the 4080th Wing at Laughlin AFB, Texas. While at Watertown, the R-17 aircraft will be assigned to the 4070th Wing for transition training of SAC's 4028th Squadron pilots. The 4070th will be responsible for the transition program. The following schedule reflects phasing of aircraft and personnel for training at Watertown:

	15 Dec	15 Jan	15 Feb	15 Mar	1 Apr
Personnel (SAC)	32	140	140	275	Move to Laughlin AFB
R-17	4	7	9	11	13

CIA

"C" Detachment move to "X" Base

5. It is anticipated that the utilization rate of the R-17 while at Watertown will be 30 hours per month for the months of December and January. Thereafter, until April 1957, the utilization rate will be increased to approximately 40 hours per month per aircraft operationally flyable. It is also anticipated that no more than 9 aircraft can be operated from Watertown during the period December - April 1957. This is due to the limited facilities at Watertown AFB. When the 4080th Wing is permanently assigned to Laughlin AFB, the anticipated utilization of the R-17 aircraft will be approximately 40 hours per month per aircraft assigned. The three aircraft assigned to ARDC for tests will be assigned to the Test Center at Edwards on a continuing test program.

6. The concept of operations for the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing when it is assigned to its permanent home follows:

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a. The R-17 unit will be organized as an augmented squadron with a detachment capability for independent operations from overseas bases for periods of up to six (6) months TDY. Anticipated overseas bases for R-17 operations are Eielson AFB, Alaska; Yokota AFB, Japan; Rhein Main AFB, Germany and Adana, Turkey. It is anticipated that from one to three detachments may be required for simultaneous operations from separate bases overseas. In addition, a training detachment may be operating at home base. Airlift for complete detachments (aircraft crews, equipment, etc.) will be necessary. Flying time at overseas bases will be based upon a sortie rate of six (6) per month, approximately 40 hours per month per aircraft. July 1957 is the target date for initial deployment of an R-17 detachment.

7. It is necessary to develop a cover plan whereby CIA-USAF association in the AQUATONE/OILSTONE Program is protected and the true intent and capability of the USAF organization charged with operating the R-17 aircraft is disguised. Therefore, the following procedures will be utilized:

a. The 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, presently located at Turner AFB, Georgia will be immediately redesignated the 4080th Weather Reconnaissance Wing, Provisional. This unit will include the 4025th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron equipped with 20 RB-57Ds, the 4028th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron equipped with 26 R-17 aircraft, and the 4029th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron equipped with the residue of the Agency's AQUATONE operation, approximately 16 R-17's (when available).

b. The mission of the 4080th Wing, as published by SAC, will be to support the 3rd Weather Wing of Air Weather Service by:

- (1) Providing meteorological data from high altitude.
- (2) Conducting upper air research and testing.
- (3) Sampling. Note: The sampling mission will be assigned by means of a classified supplement to the basic mission directive.

c. When the 4080th is redesignated a Weather Wing, a public release will be made indicating the unit's unclassified weather mission, its eventual home, the type aircraft assigned and their capability.

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8. To insure proper control of the USAF program and to protect CIA association, the following security procedures will be adhered to:

a. Information pertaining to the USAF program will be restricted on a need to know basis.

b. Personnel involved in the USAF program will have clearances as follows:

(1) All personnel aware of Project AQUATONE will have a Top Secret clearance to include a National Agency Check and background investigation. This includes headquarters personnel and individuals working in ; personnel training at Watertown while CIA Detachments are there, or personnel contacting CIA Headquarters or their overseas detachments. NOTE: This does not apply to Watertown when CIA Detachments have been deployed.

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(2) All personnel in the warehousing and maintenance categories and those visiting or in training with AQUATONE suppliers, but who will not have access to those installations listed above, will have a Secret clearance to include a National Agency Check and favorable military record.

(3) All others in the USAF Program will have SAC approved clearance.

c. Prior to participation in AQUATONE affairs, CIA (Project) Headquarters will be furnished names of USAF personnel involved with certification concerning appropriate clearance.

d. Whenever any USAF project personnel, coming within scope of above, plan to visit any of AQUATONE's installations or suppliers, their names and itinerary will be furnished AQUATONE Project Headquarters so appropriate notification of visit can be made.

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PROPOSED AGENDA

1. Our R-17 Plan.
2. Follow-on Group phasing into Watertown.
3. The following listed details:
 - a. Space utilization and replacement of equipment at Watertown.
 - b. Moving the Lockheed assembly and flight test personnel from Watertown to Bakersfield.
 - c. Parking Space for FOG and Agency aircraft.
 - d. GCA.
 - e. MATS Schedule.

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ANNEX 56

Weather Slows Plane Rescue

LAS VEGAS, Nev., Nov. 19 (AP). —An Arctic rescue team may require two more days to climb the final three miles up steep, wind-lashed Charleston Peak to the wreckage of an Air Force transport carrying 14 men, all presumed dead.

Five paratroop medical technicians camped during the night on the precipitous ice-clad mountain in temperatures under 20 below zero. Using snowshoes and skis, they clambered four miles the first long day after leaving a four-wheel drive Arctic truck.

The rescue group, from the 42d Air Rescue Squadron at March Air Force Base, Calif., radioed they might reach the crash scene late today, but probably not until tomorrow.

It may be a week before rescue crews bring down from the 11,910-foot mountain the bodies of five Air Force men, five Air Force civilian employes, two aviation engineers and two Air Force consultants.

The four-engine C54, en route from Norton Air Force Base, Calif., to the Nevada Atomic Bombing Range, crashed Thursday near the peak at an elevation of 11,300 feet.

Planes from nearby Nellis Air Force Base will drop food for the rescue team.

Aboard the C54 were:

William Marr, University Park, Md.; James F. Bray, Houston, Tex.; James W. Brown, Savannah, Ga.; Frederick F. Hanks, Pasadena, Calif.; Rodney H. Kreimendahl, Burbank, Calif.; Terrance O'Donnell, New York; Harold C. Silent, Los Angeles; Edwin J. Urolatis, Brockton, Mass.; Richard Hrudu, Hollywood, Calif.

1st Lt. George F. Pappas, San Antonio, Tex.; 2d Lt. Paul E. Winham, San Antonio; Airman 2/c Guy R. Fasolas, Nephi, Utah; S/Sergt. Clayton Farris, San Antonio, and S/Sergt. John H. Gaines, Ripley, Tenn.

Mr. Silent was a weapons development researcher and physicist. Mr. Hrudu and Mr. Kreimendahl were engineers for Lockheed Aircraft Corp.

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Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

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ANNEX 57

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MAJOR U-2 ACCIDENT CHRONOLOGY - 1956-1968

1. 15 May 1956 - U-2 No. 345:

Both pogos failed to release after take-off. The pilot followed established procedures to release pogos. The left pogo released on the first attempt. On the second attempt to release the right one, the pilot failed to maintain adequate airspeed and altitude. The aircraft stalled in a right turn and hit the ground, fatally injuring the pilot and demolishing the aircraft. Most probable cause was pilot error. (Wilburn Rose)

2. 31 August 1956 - U-2 No. 354:

The pilot made his initial climb after take-off in a nose-high, low-air-speed attitude. At approximately 40-50 feet the left wing dropped and the aircraft stalled into the ground. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot fatally injured. Probable cause of this accident was pilot error with possible loss of night vision as a contributing factor. (Frank G. Grace)

3. 17 September 1956 - U-2 No. 346:

Approximately eight minutes after take-off the aircraft was seen by two pilots in a T-33 and four pilots in a flight of RCAF F-86's at 35,000 feet. About five seconds after passing the F-86's and 500 feet above them, the U-2 disintegrated and fell. The pilot was fatally injured. The cause of this accident could not be definitely determined beyond an initial failure of the right wing. Metal fatigue, overstress, or high internal wing pressures were suggested as possible causes of the wing failure. The possibility of sabotage was thoroughly investigated and ruled out as a cause. (Howard Carey)

4. 19 December 1956 - U-2 No. 357:

Excessive oxygen consumption was noted in the first hour by the pilot. After approximately four and one-half hours of flight he made an emergency descent and allowed the airspeed to exceed the

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the placard limit, causing buffet and loss of control. The pilot was blown out as the aircraft disintegrated. The primary cause of the accident was pilot error; the contributing cause was a leak in the oxygen system. The pilot failed to take corrective action and return to base prior to becoming hypoxic at altitude. (Robert Ericson)

5. 4 April 1957 - U-2 No. 341:

A Lockheed pilot on a test flight planned to fly one hour at normal operating temperature and then one hour at 20° Centigrade above normal. Radio communication was lost. The fatally injured pilot and demolished aircraft were found 72 hours later. The official accident investigation concluded that the cause of the accident was hypoxia of the pilot from an undetermined cause. Engine flameout due to hydraulic system failure and subsequent loss of cabin pressurization, malfunctioning cockpit seals, oxygen system and/or personal equipment were considered the most probable causes for the hypoxia. (Robert Sieker)

6. 24 September 1959 - U-2 No. 360:

On GCA final approach to NAS Atsugi, Japan, the aircraft flamed out due to fuel starvation and made an emergency landing on a prepared dirt strip. The pilot was not injured and the aircraft was reparable. This was one of the first fuel consumption profiles flown with the J-75 equipped U-2 at Detachment C. The primary cause of the accident was supervisory and pilot error in not maintaining the fuel profile.

7. 5 April 1960 - U-2 No. 349:

On return from an overflight of China the pilot lost radio beacon reception at 20,000 feet. He descended through haze and smoke to 6,000 feet, but was unable to find the base. While attempting a climb out towards his alternate, the engine flamed out due to fuel starvation and a successful crash landing was made. The pilot was not injured and the aircraft was reparable (at the factory). Primary cause of the accident was pilot error; contributing factor was failure of radio aids.

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8. 1 May 1960 - U-2 No. 360:

During an overflight of the USSR, the aircraft experienced difficulty and was "downed" in the Sverdlovsk area. The pilot was captured and the aircraft destroyed. There are two basic hypotheses for the accident: One, engine malfunction which resulted from climbing the aircraft to excessive altitude (damage sustained to the aircraft probably occurred at lower altitudes); and two, SAM damage at altitude to the engine turbine blade which resulted in engine overheating and finally flameout.

(The above was corrected when the pilot, Frank Powers, was finally released by the Russians on 10 February 1962, and gave his own story -- see Annex 101, following Chapter XIV.)

9. 19 March 1961 - U-2C No. 351:

While making a night transition landing, the pilot, a Chinese Nationalist Air Force officer, attempted a "go around". The pilot permitted the wing to drop and the aircraft struck the ground inverted and was demolished by fire. The pilot was fatally injured. Primary cause was believed to be pilot error, in that he lost control of his aircraft. (Maj. Chih)

10. 14 September 1961 - U-2 No. 353:

After a normal air sampling mission, the aircraft stalled on final approach and struck the ground short of the runway at Edwards Air Force Base. As it came to rest on the runway the aircraft burned beyond repair, but the pilot escaped uninjured. The primary cause was pilot error; contributing causes were pilot fatigue and possible abnormal turbulence off the approach end of the runway. (Edens)

11. 1 March 1962 - U-2 No. 344:

Structural failure resulted from an aerial refueling training flight. Fatal to pilot (Capt. Campbell, SAC).

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12. 8 September 1962 - U-2 No. 378:

Lost on an operational mission over Nanchang, China, Mission GRC-127, cause unknown. (Lt. Col. Ch'en)

13. 27 October 1962 - U-2 No. 343:

Hit by surface-to-air missile (SAM) on operational mission over Cuba, crashed on Cuban territory. The pilot was killed and the U.S. was later allowed to remove his body from Cuba. (Major Anderson, SAC)

14. 31 October 1963 - U-2 No. 355:

Tracking of Mission GRC-184 terminated suddenly at 0623 GMT on 1 November, at a point southeast of Nanchang on the return from photo coverage of the Missile Test Range at Shuang Ch'eng Tzu. Fate of the pilot and aircraft unknown. (Maj. Yeh)

15. 20 November 1963 - U-2 No. 350:

Returning from overflight of Cuba, aircraft went into the sea approximately 40 miles northwest of Miami; aircraft and pilot lost. (Capt. Hyde, SAC)

16. 22 March 1964 - U-2F No. 356:

Aircraft and pilot lost on routine training mission off south coast of Taiwan. Probable cause, pilot error -- pilot inadvertently allowed aircraft to exceed its airspeed and structural limitations. (Capt. Liang)

17. 7 July 1964 - U-2G No. 362:

Aircraft and pilot lost on operational mission over east coast of China, in area of Lung Chi across the Straits of Quemoy. (L/C Lee)

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18. 10 January 1965 - U-2C No. 358:

Aircraft and pilot lost on an infra-red camera mission over the atomic site at Pao Tou. Probably hit by SAM since missile sites later found to be in the area where aircraft was lost. (Maj. Chang)

19. 25 April 1965 - U-2G No. 382:

Test flight of carrier-configured aircraft at Edwards Air Force Base went out of control, pilot bailed out but chute streamed. Pilot and aircraft lost. (Buster Edens)

20. 22 October 1965 - U-2C No. 352:

Training mission out of Tao Yuan, pilot and aircraft went into the sea off Taiwan; causes unknown. (Col. John Wang)

21. 17 February 1966 - U-2F No. 372:

Training mission from Tao Yuan crashed after overshooting runway following flame-out and emergency landing. Pilot killed and aircraft demolished. (Maj. Wu)

22. 25 February 1966 - U-2F No. 342:

Structural failure to aircraft following a practice refueling flight; the pilot bailed out safely. (Mr. Hall)

23. 21 June 1966 - U-2C No. 384:

Aircraft went out of control on training flight from Tao Yuan. Pilot bailed out too low, chute failed to open; aircraft and pilot fell into the sea near Naha, Okinawa. (Maj. Yu)

24. 8 September 1967 - U-2 No. 373:

An operational mission over Mainland China, shot down in the vicinity of Shanghai by surface-to-air missile. Fate of pilot unknown, assumed dead. (Capt. Huang)

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ANNEX 58

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21 December 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: All Suppliers

SUBJECT: Release of Project Developed Systems,
Sub-systems, Components, Techniques and
Technical Know-How to Department of Defense

1. Purpose: It is the purpose of this memorandum to set forth the basic policy of this Headquarters regarding the release of Project developed information to other than Project cleared persons and to outline a procedure for implementing this policy.
2. Security Standards: It is re-emphasized that from its inception access to knowledge of this Project has been consistently limited to individuals who are not only acceptable from a security point of view but have a valid "need to know". With few exceptions, such considerations as a high official position, the possession of security clearances for sensitive data, or an official concern with research and development or with operations of the type involved in this project have not been accepted as sufficient reasons for admitting an individual to knowledgeability. As suppliers are aware, an effort has been made to apply this policy to all persons regardless of their place in government or private industry although some erosion of security standards has inevitably occurred; partly as a result of the sheer number of individuals with a valid "need to know" but partly by reason of the pressure to cut in individuals on the basis of position or "responsibility" for a certain field of activity. One purpose of this memorandum is to prevent further erosion of security standards without inhibiting a desirable spread of knowledge of subsystems developed for the Project.
3. General Policy: Within the limits set by the requirement for continued security, the basic policy will be to permit the release with only a low security classification of information on subsystems to unwitting personnel who are cleared for the low classification involved, with the exceptions stated in paragraph 4 below. On the other hand, knowledge of the existence of an integrated weapons system based upon the U-2 aircraft and including all the subsystems remains highly classified and every effort must be made to withhold such knowledge from unwitting personnel. It is possible at this time to reduce the classification on subsystems only because no one subsystem is regarded as highly sensitive in itself and only if information concerning the subsystems is

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handled in such a way as not to permit unwitting personnel to infer the existence of the total weapons system.

4. Specific Rules: The following specific provisions which give effect to the general policy stated above should guide all suppliers in handling information concerning the Project's subsystems:

a. The existence of the U-2 aircraft itself has been acknowledged in carefully worded press releases which have been attributed to it (by inference) a range of perhaps 1800 nautical miles and a ceiling of about 55,000 feet. Photographs designed to reveal as little as possible concerning the aircraft's performance have received some circulation among military components overseas and may soon be released for publication. Nevertheless, the aircraft carries an official classification of SECRET (so physical access to it can be denied and security precautions explained), and its true performance is classified TOP SECRET and may be made known only to witting personnel. Likewise, the fact that it is a reconnaissance aircraft and any association of the various subsystems with the U-2 should be revealed only to witting personnel.

b. Each supplier of a subsystem is at liberty to disclose the existence of the subsystem as an already designed and developed piece of equipment and to provide information concerning its performance to potentially interested agencies of the United States Government and to business firms to which such disclosure is necessary in order to encourage the widest use of the subsystem for the purposes of the United States Government. Where it is desired to make disclosure to exploit a purely commercial opportunity prior clearance must be obtained. Information about each subsystem will normally carry the classification of "CONFIDENTIAL" in order to protect it from publication.

c. In disclosing information concerning a subsystem, the supplier must be prepared with a plausible and tenable explanation of its development. In many cases it may be sufficient to state it was developed for a TOP SECRET project concerning which no information whatever can be released. In other cases it may be plausible to explain the idea as having been developed by the supplier with its own resources. In no case can unwitting persons be permitted access to test data or records of experience of the subsystems which reveal anything concerning the Project or other elements of the total weapons system of which the subsystem is a component.

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d. An over-all procedure is presently being worked out with the Air Force for purchase by that Department through normal channels of any project-developed items desired by the Air Force. Suppliers will be fully briefed with respect to such procedures when they have been established.

5. To insure compliance with the requirements of this policy and to assist suppliers in the protection of Project information, suppliers will be responsible for keeping Project Headquarters advised of proposed discussions, negotiations, briefings, etc., with any non-Project-cleared personnel or departments. Approval of such meetings will be a normal routine matter, provided the arrangements are in accord with the above established general instructions. Any departure from the established standard will necessarily require a prior review by the Security Staff and notification should, therefore, be made sufficiently in advance of any proposed meetings.

6. The substance of this memorandum will be made available to those Government agencies currently associated with our program which logically may have occasion to avail themselves of Project development. It is expected they will respect the requirements levied against Project suppliers. The responsibility for compliance with this policy, however, will continue to rest with each individual supplier and any questions should be immediately forwarded to Project Headquarters to insure satisfactory review and disposition.

7. More detailed instructions to suppliers will be forthcoming in the future as procedures are developed. In the meantime suppliers will proceed in accordance with specific instructions given to individual suppliers with respect to specific problems of this nature which require immediate action.

(Signed)
PROJECT DIRECTOR

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ANNEX 59

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26 March 1956

PROJECT COVER STORY

1. Requirements: So far as possible the cover story for this Project should satisfy the following requirements:

a. Although it should plausibly explain Air Force support of and participation in the alleged activities (since such support including the use of USAF facilities is essential and cannot be concealed), the cover story should be designed to dilute Air Force responsibility. The story should convey the impression that the activities are of interest to civilian organizations as well and that the Air Force is not exclusively responsible for them.

b. The story should not focus attention upon new and presumably highly interesting specialized equipment and especially not upon any new type of aircraft but rather upon the mission being performed, since the latter can be described in terms that make it far less sensitive than the former.

c. Granting that at least partial Air Force sponsorship is undeniable, the cover story should lodge such responsibility in a non-tactical component of the Air Force and should describe the activities in progress in such a way as to make them appear to be as remote as possible from any tactical mission.

d. The story must account for the peculiar nature of the project organization as a mixed task force predominantly civilian in composition, which will be apparent to many observers.

2. Nature of Activities: Project operations will be conducted under double cover, one aspect of which will be unclassified and part of a publicly-announced program, the second aspect being a classified activity in which the cover unit is allegedly engaged. The two aspects of this dual cover will be as follows:

a. Unclassified Aspect: The primary mission of overseas units will be described as the gathering of meteorological data at altitudes to 55,000 feet which will assist in the development of new forecasting techniques and provide climatological background for meteorological research by governmental and private agencies and institutions in the U. S. The specific objectives of the meteorological mission are as follows:

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- (1) Secure quantitative measurements of the following items:
 - (a) Turbulence: associated with jet streams; through the tropopause; in the lower stratosphere.
 - (b) Detailed temperature structure (i) Tropopause; (ii) lower stratosphere.
 - (c) Wind structure, 45 to 55 thousand feet.
 - (d) Measurement of ozone concentration.
 - (e) Watervapor content.
 - (f) Visibility in vicinity of tropopause.
 - (g) Additional information as available.
- (2) Test and evaluate current and newly developed high-level weather reconnaissance instruments.
- (3) Collect high-level cloud photography for the purpose of forming the basis for development of new techniques of analysis based on cloud structure rather than currently used methods of quantitative measurement.

b. Classified Aspect: A limited number of individuals who are cleared for access to highly classified information but who do not have a valid need to know the true project mission will be told (or allowed to infer) that in addition to the foregoing unclassified explanation of the activities of the overseas detachments, these units are engaged in high altitude air sampling. This story will be used only with a limited number of USAF and RAF officers and senior civilian officials who are not in sufficiently close contact with project activities to suspect that something more than the gathering of meteorological data is involved and who also feel that they are due some explanation of such classified activities. The maximum extent of information given would reveal that thermonuclear weapons tests send up into the stratosphere large quantities of radioactive debris. With the increased frequency of high yield weapons tests, the uncertainty as to the quantities of these fission products which exist in the

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stratosphere and which filter down slowly into the lower atmosphere have not been accurately verified. High altitude balloon sampling techniques have not proved completely satisfactory to date. Additionally, sampling of thermonuclear weapons debris forced into the stratosphere will be of great value to the AEC and DOD in their analyses of radioactive cloud geometry and composition.

3. Possible Future Expansion of Research Activities: At the time press releases are prepared, it can be announced that program activities may in the future be expanded to include additional research objectives, such as the following: cosmic ray studies and studies of ionospheric refraction as it affects radio propagation predictions. (These added objectives will not be publicly announced, however, unless further investigation reveals that they are technically feasible and the U-2 could be given an actual collection capability to backstop these added research activities.)

4. Backstopping of Primary Cover Mission: If high altitude meteorological reconnaissance cover is to "hold water" it is essential that the U-2 be equipped with meteorological instrumentation which will give it an actual capability of collecting the weather data in which the program is purportedly interested. Plans are underway to construct at least four meteorological configurations for use in the ZI and at overseas bases. If feasible, the configuration will include a small tracking camera useful for cloud photography but having no significant utility for reconnaissance of intelligence interest. Actual weather reconnaissance missions will be flown (restricted to friendly territory) employing these configurations. Initially, in the interest of time, only readily available instrumentation will be employed; modifications can be arranged at a later date. The meteorological packet will be constructed so as to permit ready insertion into and removal from the aircraft bay. The operational concept will call for flying weather reconnaissance missions during orientation, ferry and test flights, thus making full utilization of such flights for cover purposes and reducing the diversion of aircraft from the project's primary operational tasks. Data obtained at altitudes above 52,000 feet will be considered classified; arrangements will be made with AWS for the handling, dissemination and use of this material. Data (including cloud photographs taken with tracking camera only) secured up to 52,000 feet will be considered unclassified and will be made available to AWS and NACA for further dissemination as seems appropriate. Thus, this data can be exhibited and disseminated to support the cover story. Moreover, complete photographs will be made of the primary mission aircraft with the research instrumentation installed. The meteorological instrumentation

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will also be photographed outside the aircraft. Both data and photographs will be assembled for counter-propaganda use in event a U-2 is lost over hostile territory.

5. Use and Dissemination of Cover Stories: It is anticipated that the double cover story outlined in paragraph 2 above will be employed in such a way as to create 4 distinct categories of knowledgeability of project activities as follows:

a. There will be a wide circle who are aware that some out-of-the-ordinary activities are being carried on and who have access to the unclassified cover story as the explanation thereof.

b. A much smaller group, including mainly USAF and foreign technical and military personnel and certain personnel in the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and perhaps other civilian organizations, will be aware of the activities and will know the unclassified cover story but will also be told that the aircraft in question are also engaged in a classified mission, the nature of which cannot be divulged.

c. A still more restricted category, described in paragraph 2 b above, will have access to both cover stories and will therefore have an explanation of both the unclassified and classified activities in progress.

d. Finally, there will be the most restricted category of fully knowledgeable personnel.

Although the unclassified cover story will obviously have to be made public in order to serve its purpose it should be so handled as to minimize the attention drawn to and the interest developed in the project.

6. Sponsorship: In order to dilute USAF responsibility for the activities to be undertaken this project will be described as a joint undertaking of NACA and the AWS of the USAF. The role ascribed to the NACA and the unclassified cover story will be to have been the original promoter of the research program, to have provided guidance in the development of equipment and instrumentation required to perform the research mission, to provide continuing scientific guidance as required and to coordinate the exploitation of the scientific results obtained. This account of the role of the civilian agency will explain not only the mixed character of the enterprise but the circumstances under which most of the specialized

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equipment was developed outside of the regular Air Force channels. Participation on the part of the USAF will be ascribed to the Air Weather Service which meets the requirement of being a non-tactical unit. Its role will be said to be that of executive agent responsible for the actual conduct of operations overseas. It is plausible that, in such a joint project, operational responsibility overseas should be assumed by a component of the USAF since the NACA does not engage in operations outside the country. Moreover, the arrangement will lend treaty rights granted to the USAF applicable to this project.

7. Procurement and Ownership of Aircraft: The primary mission aircraft will be said to have been procured by the USAF, primarily for performance of a highly classified mission. The explanation of their availability for the mission described in the unclassified cover story will be that a limited number of these aircraft can be spared, the number varying from time to time, from the classified mission. The aircraft will carry civilian markings. Thus, in the unclassified story it will be implied that the operations being conducted abroad have no connection with the classified mission. Taken as a whole, this story will explain plausibly the procurement of the aircraft and the manner of their coming into the hands of the NACA. Only those individuals who have access to the classified cover story will have reason to believe that the classified and unclassified missions are being performed concurrently. It is perfectly consistent with the assignment of the aircraft to the AWS for actual operations overseas and also with the story that the development of the aircraft was monitored by the NACA. It will be implied at all times that the number of such aircraft is very small, and that its development as a "platform" for upper atmosphere research was carried out in experimental facilities and not on a production basis.

8. Organization: The cover unit will be designated as the 1st Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional, and allegedly be under the administrative control of the AWS. It will be explained that other USAF components are of course performing supporting roles, as would normally be expected; it will probably be unnecessary and unwise to be too specific as to the organization of such supporting activities. All USAF personnel will be documented as AWS; all civilian personnel will be documented as Department of Defense civilians, except that at least one NACA employee will be assigned to each of the overseas detachments. All personnel will travel on AWS orders. Project pilots will be described as civilians,

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possibly the employees of a cover organization, but working under the terms of a contract with the NACA. The arrangement will be consistent with alleged NACA ownership of the aircraft. The use of such civilian pilots rather than USAF personnel will be explained by their alleged familiarity with novel equipment developed by the NACA. More specific details of this feature of the arrangement remain to be developed.

9. Backstopping NACA Participation: Certain moves should be made both prior to and after deployment overseas to lend credence to the story of NACA participation.

a. Just as soon as practicable it will be desirable to begin living at Watertown the modified cover story. This will require the replacement of USAF by appropriate insignia on the aircraft and possibly, at an appropriate time, a news release or merely the deliberate leak of some information about activities at Watertown. The story to be used or leaked would be that the NACA, with Air Force cooperation, had been undertaking upper atmosphere meteorological research from the Watertown location. From this it would be widely inferred, by reason of location, that upper air sampling was also involved. Such a release coupled with this inference would support the basic story that these aircraft had been procured for a classified mission and later made available to NACA for an unclassified (or less highly classified) program.

b. Prior to deployment it will probably be desirable to allow the primary mission aircraft to be seen at one or more airfields other than Watertown in order that its first public appearance shall not be at an overseas location. It may well be desirable that at least one of the locations at which a landing would be made would be Moffett Field or some other widely known NACA installation.

c. After deployment occasional visits of reasonably well-known NACA officers could be arranged to overseas bases. These would, of course, be limited to NACA personnel already knowledgeable to some degree of the project.

10. NACA will be given a cover story for use in the event one of the aircraft is lost in unfriendly territory.

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(NOTE: The initial pre-deployment press release will be based on the unclassified cover story which follows; it will contain only a portion of the information outlined below. Answers to subsequent press queries will be based on the fuller details which follow, but will not go beyond.)

UNCLASSIFIED COVER STORY

Around mid-1954 Lockheed Aircraft Corporation initiated independently the construction of a high-altitude, single-engine jet aircraft. The aircraft, powered by a Pratt & Whitney J-57 engine, operates in the mid-subsonic speed range and up to altitudes of 55,000 feet; it has a low wing loading with a capability of extended operation at high altitudes. While having no combat or tactical significance, the aircraft's performance makes it a more suitable and economic vehicle (as compared with tactical types) for carrying out high-altitude research. Lockheed planned both to use the prototype model as a testbed or "platform" for carrying out a variety of its own experimental activities, and to interest the military in the aircraft as a vehicle for conducting research and experimental tests of their own. LAC carried out the development and testing of its experimental aircraft in consultation with NACA (National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics). Overcoming of fuel control problems was one of the areas in which NACA rendered assistance.

Although Lockheed developed the first experimental prototype on its own initiative, the USAF monitored the Lockheed development and had observers present during the aircraft's initial test flights. The aircraft's performance gave rise to USAF interest in a limited procurement contract. The high altitude performance of the aircraft made it a suitable vehicle for use in a joint USAF-AEC test program. Contractual negotiations between Lockheed and the USAF proceeded rapidly; first deliveries were made late in 1955.

Early in 1956 the NACA, relying in part on its knowledge of the U-2 aircraft, began planning for an atmospheric research program of broad interest to U.S. aeronautical science, both civilian and military. NACA, original promoter of the program, has not only provided guidance in the development of the aircraft and of equipment and instrumentation required to perform the research program but will coordinate the exploitation and dissemination of the scientific results obtained. The primary objective of NACA's program is the gathering of upper

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atmosphere data, e.g., turbulence associated with the jet stream and convective clouds, temperature and wind structures at jet levels, cosmic ray effects, etc., at altitudes up to 55,000 feet. Widespread but simultaneous observations from various points in the Northern Hemisphere will enable an integrated study of high altitude phenomena which is expected to be of particular value both to governmental and private research organizations. NACA considered the newly procured U-2 as one of the most suitable vehicles for carrying out its research program. The USAF agreed to make available a limited number of U-2's to NACA since the joint USAF-AEC test activities are intermittent in nature and NACA's program is considered of definite interest to the USAF, particularly the Air Weather Service. Availability of the U-2, one type of several aircraft that will be used in NACA's research activities, helps to obtain the needed data in an economical and expeditious manner.

Pilots employed in the NACA program are civilians hired and trained by LAC and made available to NACA specifically for the latter's research activities. NACA could not afford to draw upon its limited and already heavily committed group of test pilots. Lockheed also was unable to spare pilot personnel for the program, but did undertake the hiring and training of highly qualified civilians.

These activities will be conducted both in the United States and abroad. Since NACA does not have independent facilities for conducting test programs abroad, the overseas program will be organized as a "joint task force" based at USAF installations and supported by appropriate USAF major commands. The Air Weather Service will act as USAF "executive agent" in support of NACA activities, and will activate provisional units to give operational direction and render direct support to NACA. The Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional, (1st), has recently been activated to support the initial NACA research team assembled at Watertown Strip, Nevada.

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~~SECRET~~CLASSIFIED COVER STORY

Under cover of the NACA-AWS high altitude research program described separately, Air Weather Service will carry out a parallel and classified mission: upper air sampling of thermonuclear debris resulting from atomic tests. Data concerning the quantity of these fission products, which exist in the stratosphere and filter down slowly into the lower atmosphere, will be of great value to the AEC and Department of Defense in their analyses of radioactive cloud geometry and composition.

Just as is the case in NACA's meteorological research, the integration of sampling data obtained simultaneously at various points in the Northern Hemisphere will be of particular value.

Regarding the performance of the U-2, the following additional information can be revealed as needed to individuals made cognizant of the above classified cover story. The U-2 has an altitude capability of 55,000 feet with full payload. Its normal endurance is four to four-and-a-half hours with payload. Maximum range: 2,000 miles. It is contemplated that staging operations will be run from various bases to extend coverage capabilities.

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For release Monday, 7 May 1956

NACA ANNOUNCES START OF NEW RESEARCH PROGRAM

The need for more detailed information about gust-meteorological conditions to be found at high altitude, as high as 50,000 feet, has resulted in the inauguration of an expanded research program to provide the needed data, Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, Director of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, announced today.

"Tomorrow's jet transports will be flying air routes girdling the earth," Dr. Dryden said. "This they will do at altitudes far higher than presently used except by a few military aircraft. The availability of a new type of airplane, which is one of several that will be used in the program, helps to obtain the needed data in an economical and expeditious manner."

This aircraft, the Lockheed U-2, is powered by a single Pratt & Whitney J-57 turbo-jet engine and is expected to reach ten-mile-high altitudes as a matter of record, according to the NACA. A few of these aircraft are being made available for the expanded NACA program by the USAF.

The program is along the lines recommended by the Gust Loads Research Panel of the NACA's technical Subcommittee on Aircraft Loads. In its research programs, the NACA is charged with coordination of aeronautical research, and with taking action necessary to avoid undesirable duplication of effort.

Among specific research goals will be more precise information about clear air turbulence, convective clouds, wind shear, and the jet stream. Richard V. Rhode, Assistant Director for Research of the NACA, said that as a result of information so to be gained, tomorrow's air travelers might expect degrees of speed, safety and comfort beyond hope of the air transport operators.

"The program would not have been possible," Mr. Rhode said, "without the ability of American scientific efforts to join forces."

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Actually, according to Mr. Rhode, success of the program depends in large degree upon the logistical and technical support which the Air Weather Service of the USAF will be providing. USAF facilities overseas will be used as the program gets underway, to enable the gathering of research information necessary to reflect accurately conditions along the high-altitude air routes of tomorrow in many parts of the world. The data gathering flights will also be used, at the request of the USAF, to obtain information about cosmic rays and the concentration of certain elements in the atmosphere including ozone and water vapor.

The first data, covering conditions in the Rocky Mountain area, are being obtained from flights made from Watertown Strip, Nevada. Mr. Rhode noted that the data would be equally useful to technical experts of the Air Weather Service in expanding their knowledge of atmospheric conditions at high altitude.

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The Lockheed Aircraft Corporation has built a single engine jet aircraft (using the Pratt & Whitney J-57 engine) of which a number have been procured by the United States Air Force. It has been designated as the U-2. A few of these aircraft have been made available to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics for conducting a research program designed to observe and measure certain phenomena at high altitudes. Studies will include the effects of cosmic rays, turbulence characteristics especially in the jet stream, temperature structure, wind structure, and the concentration of certain elements in the atmosphere such as ozone and water vapor. The program will be conducted by the NACA with the logistical and technical support of units of the USAF/Air Weather Service. Research activities are presently being conducted in the United States from a restricted area at Watertown Strip in Nevada. Similar activities will be conducted from certain USAF installations overseas where the Air Weather Service will act as executive agent in the actual conduct of data-gathering operations since the NACA has facilities and personnel only in this country.

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ANNEX 61

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TS-143486/Final

29 June 1956

PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED IN THE EVENT OF AN AIRCRAFT
LOSS OVER HOSTILE TERRITORY *I. Action - Prior to Evidence of Hostile Reaction

A. Immediate notification of Headquarters by the Detachment Commander through both Agency and USAF channels. In turn, Project Headquarters will notify State Department and NACA contacts and, along with USAF Headquarters, arrange for final review and agreement on action items indicated under II, below. The Detachment Commander's notification to Headquarters should include or be followed immediately by a report of those details which Headquarters will require in preparing its release in response to hostile reaction; i. e., actual location and circumstances (e. g., aircraft crash or forced landing, condition of the pilot, weather conditions, etc.) of the loss if known, text of Detachment "presumed lost" release (Paragraph C, below), and cover flight plan outlining the track alleged to have been followed by the aircraft.

B. Overflight operations will cease immediately. However, Detachment will continue to operate as normal with all flights assigned cover data-gathering missions.

C. Normal USAF press release prepared by Detachment Commander (and coordinated with appropriate Air Force contacts in USAFE) will be issued indicating that a U-2 aircraft is overdue and presumed lost, adding that the last reported position of the aircraft was -- (see below and Paragraph II. E(1)). The release will go on to indicate that Air Rescue Service has instituted a search for the aircraft. The announced area of search will depend upon the known or estimated point of compromise (e. g. loss over Murmansk area or the Arctic fringe of European USSR would suggest northern Norway as the area for Air Rescue operations; loss over the Ukraine would suggest the Black Sea littoral of Turkey as the most logical area for search.)

The release should be timed to accord with normal USAF practice (no more than a few hours after a known or assumed loss). Should press queries immediately follow the initial "presumed lost" press release but precede evidence of hostile reaction, a press release based on

* An earlier version of this instruction was issued to Detachment A on 8 June 1956. This revision of the same paper (with appropriate changes to cover local situations) was also issued to Detachments B and C.

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the unclassified cover story will be issued by the Detachment Commander (through, and after coordination with, USAFE) describing the alleged mission of the aircraft and sponsorship of the program.

D. Immediate and special counter-espionage precautions will be taken at the base of operations with steps of action coordinated by Detachment with 50X1, E.O.13526 and with local USAF/OSI contacts.

II. Action - After Hostile Press and/or Radio Reaction

50X1, E.O.13526

A. General PIO Policy: All releases in response to hostile reaction will originate in and emanate from Headquarters after full coordination has been made. Releases decided upon will be communicated immediately (1) through USAF channels to USAFE; (2) through Agency channels to the Detachment Commander (3) through State channels to U. S. Ambassadors in London, Bonn, and Moscow. Thus, upon evidence of hostile reaction, no releases will be made by field elements of the USAF or by host country authorities except those made subsequent to and in accord with releases communicated from Headquarters.

B. General Guide on Press Releases: The nature of the hostile reaction cannot be predicted in advance, thus the precise detail of post-loss releases must remain flexible. It is assumed that hostile reaction can take the form of a fairly complete and accurate exposé of project activities; whether Soviet and/or Satellite reaction will take such form is open to speculation. Since we must be prepared for any eventuality, the sample releases which follow should be treated as general guidelines. The need for flexibility up to the point of actual release is the major reason for centralizing release authority in Headquarters to assure that the U. S. Government speaks with one voice. All releases dealing with the nature and sponsorship of project activity will of course be in accord with releases already issued and the unclassified cover story; however, this paper concerns itself only with the additional explanations that must be given to cover a loss over hostile territory.

C. Loss Close to Hostile Periphery: Should the aircraft be lost close to, but inside, the hostile periphery (within 200 miles), and this be admitted or at least not denied in the hostile reaction, we shall maintain one of the two following positions, depending upon the circumstances and relative plausibility:

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(1) the pilot was intercepted along the hostile periphery (but over Western territory or international waters) and forced to follow the hostile interceptors inside Soviet and/or Satellite frontiers; or

(2) that the pilot was obviously confused in his navigation and became lost, inadvertently overflying Soviet and/or Satellite territory.

D. Loss Deep Within Hostile Territory: In the event of a loss deep within hostile territory, there are two positions which could be maintained. The first position outlined below is preferred since it stands considerably less risk of being effectively disproved by a hostile power. The second position is included below because, under certain circumstances, the inherent risks of its being effectively countered by a hostile power might be minimal. In the end, the choice of the two alternatives outlined below would depend upon the detailed circumstances surrounding the incident as reported to Headquarters by the Detachment Commander (in accordance with paragraph I. a., above). This choice would rest with the Department of State.

(1) First Position: Should the loss occur deep within hostile territory, we would impliedly admit that Soviet accounts as to the location of the incident may well be correct, but we would go on to maintain that the violation of Soviet airspace was most certainly neither intended or ordered by U. S. authorities. We would emphatically deny any Soviet charge that the incident was a willful violation by the U. S. of their airspace for purposes of intelligence reconnaissance. We would indicate that the pilot last reported his position as (-----) and that subsequent radio contact could not be established presumably because of a malfunction or failure of the aircraft's radio communication and navigation system. Quite possibly the incident resulted from pilot hypoxia which, combined with failure of the aircraft's electronic navigation system, could have resulted in a grave deviation from the aircraft's planned course. With the aircraft on "automatic pilot" and the pilot in a euphoric condition, an unintended violation of Soviet airspace may have unfortunately resulted. (See Attachment B-1 for sample release).

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(2) Alternative Position: Should the loss occur deep within hostile territory, and the depth of penetration be revealed in the hostile reaction, we shall maintain that Soviet and/or Satellite allegations are incorrect or inaccurate, going on to state (using one or the other of the two variants in C, above) that the incident was close to the hostile periphery. Our counter-charge would claim that the hostile power is obviously distorting the facts for propaganda purposes just as has been done in several instances in the past when the Soviets or Satellites claimed willful violation of their airspace. We shall bolster our counter-propaganda position by maintaining that the incident could not have occurred deep within hostile borders since the known performance of the aircraft would not have enabled it to penetrate that deeply, given the known flight path of the aircraft up to the time of its last reported position. (See Attachment B-2 for sample release.)

NOTE: This position might be effectively countered by a hostile power if the photographic film recovered from the aircraft could be developed and analyzed, thus revealing the actual track traversed. Moreover a hostile power would undoubtedly attempt to line up neutral nationals to view the scene of the incident and testify to the accuracy of the hostile power's version of the affair.

E. Backstopping of Release: The type of releases suggested in C and D, above, require further backstopping as follows:

(1) The releases in II. C and D would be strengthened if we could assert positive knowledge concerning the location of the aircraft a short time before the incident. Thus, the release indicating the aircraft is overdue and presumed lost (I. C, above) should contain a statement on the "last reported position", adding that communications contact with the aircraft was subsequently lost. The "last reported position" should coincide with the area in which search operations are conducted.

(2) To lend credence to all of the counter-propaganda positions recommended above, we shall have photographs of the meteorological configurations allegedly carried by the lost aircraft; moreover, we shall point to upperatmosphere data (studies produced by NACA and

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USAF) which confirm the fact that the alleged data collection program was in fact conducted as evidenced by the data collected and studies compiled. (NOTE: Should the compromise occur early in the operational program, we may not have studies actually prepared since such studies would be based on data collected over a period of several weeks; however, this could be openly admitted since it is quite plausible, and selected portions of raw "take" could be used in lieu of prepared studies.)

Attachments:

A-1
A-2
B-1
B-2

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ATTACHMENT A-1

(NOTE: A proposed release for use in the event that an aircraft is lost close to the hostile periphery. Attachment A-2 is an alternate release.)

The U. S. Government denies the Russian accusation that an American aircraft which the Soviets charge (crashed, was shot down, was forced down) within Russian territory, was engaged in a photo reconnaissance mission over Russian territory.

Moscow Radio announced last night that an American aircraft (crashed, was shot down, was forced down) twenty miles south of Murmansk. The announcement charged that Soviet authorities investigating the incident had ascertained that the aircraft was engaged in a reconnaissance flight over Russian territory (and added that the American pilot, identified as, confirmed that his mission was one of photographing Soviet military installations and collecting other intelligence data).

A Russian diplomatic protest has been lodged with the U. S. Ambassador in Moscow. A formal U. S. reply to the Soviet note will follow a thorough investigation by U. S. authorities of the circumstances surrounding the incident.

The aircraft in question may possibly be one and the same as the Lockheed U-2 reported missing by USAF officials three days ago. This aircraft, engaged in a NACA-sponsored research program, was the object of intense air-sea rescue search during the last three days following a USAFE announcement that the aircraft was overdue and presumed lost 75 miles west of the North Cape of Norway. All efforts to locate either plane or pilot have failed.

The NACA research program, announced to the U. S. press in early May has as its purpose the collection of data on upper air phenomena (i. e., turbulence measurements, temperature and wind structures at jet levels, cosmic ray effects, etc.) at altitudes up to 55,000 feet. The NACA program is conducted both in the U. S. and abroad. Research aircraft abroad are based at USAF installations where NACA is supported by the USAF Air Weather Service.

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USAF authorities speculate that the missing U-2 aircraft, whose last reported position was 75 miles west of the North Cape of Norway, may have been intercepted over international waters and (was forced to land within the USSR, was shot down over international waters--a fact the Soviets are attempting to hide with their sensational accusations, crashed in an attempt to evade Soviet attack). One or a combination of the above explanations may account for the lost U-2.

ATTACHMENT A-2

(Same as Attachment A-1 with exception of the last paragraph, which is as follows)

USAF authorities state that the missing U-2 last reported its position as 75 miles west of the North Cape of Norway. Contact with the pilot was then lost. These officials speculate that the pilot (flying in bad weather, hampered by loss of radio contact and loss of radio navigation system) may have wandered inadvertently over Soviet territory where he later (was forced down, was shot down, by Soviet interceptors, crashed in an attempt to evade Soviet attack).

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ATTACHMENT B-1

Moscow Radio announced last night that an American aircraft (crashed, was shot down, was forced down) in the vicinity of Moscow. The announcement charged that Soviet authorities investigating the incident had ascertained that the aircraft was engaged in a reconnaissance mission. This was determined, the Soviet statement added, not only by an examination of the aircraft (wreckage) but also as a result of the "free admission" of the American pilot. The pilot, identified by the Russians as allegedly confirmed that his mission was one of photographing Soviet military installations and collecting other intelligence data.

A Russian diplomatic protest has been lodged with the U. S. Ambassador in Moscow. The U. S. reply to the Soviet note will follow in due course.

USAF spokesmen assert that Soviet accounts as to the location of the incident may be correct, but emphatically deny the incident resulted from a willful violation by the US. of Soviet airspace for purposes of intelligence reconnaissance. The violation of Soviet airspace, these spokesmen add, was certainly neither intended nor ordered by U. S. authorities. The American aircraft in question was a Lockheed U-2, reported missing by USAF officials three days ago. Engaged in a NACA-sponsored research program, the aircraft was the object of intense but unsuccessful air-sea rescue search off the Black Sea coast of Turkey. The NACA research program announced to the U. S. press in early May, has as its purpose the collection of data on upper air phenomena (turbulence measurements, temperature and wind structure at jet levels, cosmic ray effects, etc.) at altitudes up to 55,000 feet. The NACA program is conducted both in the U. S. and abroad. Research aircraft abroad are based at USAF installations where NACA is supported by the USAF Air Weather Service.

USAF authorities indicate that the missing U-2 aircraft, whose last reported position was 20 miles north of Sinap, Turkey, lost radio contact with its base. Presumably, the aircraft's radio communication and navigation system either developed a malfunction or failed outright. Quite possibly the incident resulted from pilot hypoxia which, combined with failure of the aircraft's electronic navigation system, could have resulted in a grave deviation from the aircraft's planned course. With the aircraft on "automatic pilot" and the pilot in a euphoric condition, an unintended violation of Soviet airspace may have unfortunately resulted.

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ATTACHMENT B-2

Moscow Radio announced last night that an American aircraft (crashed, was shot down, was forced down) in the vicinity of Moscow. The announcement charged that Soviet authorities investigating the incident had ascertained that the aircraft was engaged in a reconnaissance mission. This was determined, the Soviet statement added, not only by an examination of the aircraft (wreckage) but also as a result of the "free admission" of the American pilot. The pilot, identified by the Russians as allegedly confirmed that his mission was one of photographing Soviet military installations and collection other intelligence data.

A Russian diplomatic protest has been lodged with the U. S. Ambassador in Moscow. The U. S. reply to the Soviet note will follow in due course.

USAF spokesmen indicated that the Soviet allegations were palpably false and were a purposeful misrepresentation of the facts. They stated that the American aircraft in question was a Lockheed U-2, reported missing by USAF officials three days ago. Engaged in a NACA-sponsored research program, announced to the U. S. press in early May, has as its purpose the collection of data on upper air phenomena (turbulence measurements, temperature and wind structure at jet levels, cosmic ray effects, etc.) at altitudes up to 55,000 feet. The NACA program is conducted both in the U. S. and abroad. Research aircraft abroad are based at USAF installations where NACA is supported by the USAF Air Weather Service.

USAF authorities speculate that the missing U-2 aircraft, whose last reported position was 20 miles north of Sinop, Turkey, may either have been intercepted by Soviet fighters over the Black Sea or may have inadvertently wandered over the Soviet Black Sea coast, at which point it (was forced down, was shot down, or crashed in an attempt to evade Soviet attack). In no case, these officials added, could the incident have occurred deep within Russian territory as maintained in the Soviet charge, since the known performance of the single-engine jet aircraft would never have enabled it to reach the Moscow area, given the flight path already traversed by the aircraft up to the time of its last reported position.

The intent behind the serious Soviet charge probably reflects Russian embarrassment over an incident which actually occurred over

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international waters--a fact which the Soviets are attempting to hide by making their sensational charges. Alternatively, the pilot may have through (an error in navigation, bad weather, an emergency resulting from engine failure) wandered over the Soviet Black Sea coast--but Soviet charges are designed to make more sensational propaganda just as has been done in several instances in the past when the Soviets or Satellites claimed willful violation of their airspace.

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ANNEX 62

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ANNEX 63

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