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DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)

History of the Office of Special Activities

Chapters ~~IX~~ ^{IX to} and XII

(PERIOD)

From Inception to 1969

DO NOT DESTROY

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CHAPTER IX. MATERIEL

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CHAPTER IX. MATERIEL

Early Planning

The initial logistics plan for AQUATONE, which concerned itself principally with the government furnished equipment (GFE) to be supplied by the Air Force, was worked out under the guidance of Colonel Gerald F. Keeling of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel (General C. S. Irvine). The plan devised in order to make the Air Force supply system most responsive to project requirements was to set up an administrative staff in USAF Headquarters under a cover story, and brief the Air Force Chief of Allocations, Chief of Operations and Supply, and the Commander of the West Coast depot which would be used for stockpiling project materiel. The first task under this plan was to procure, deliver and receipt for the complete list of GFE required by Lockheed.

In April 1955 the decision was reached that engine spares would be stored in the Pratt & Whitney bonded warehouse at Hartford. Both overhaul and maintenance spares would be stored together and requisitions for overseas delivery would be made directly to Pratt & Whitney to be shipped from Hartford.

Spares for components manufactured on the West Coast by Lockheed, Ramo-Wooldridge and Hycon were to be stored at

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[redacted] Arrangements for use of space at [redacted] were made by the DCS/M with General Rawlings of Air Materiel Command, but since the depot was short of personnel, the Project would have to staff its own operation there. Major Robert Welch, USAF, was assigned to the Project Staff early in July 1955 and was sent to [redacted] to organize the project depot.

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The logistics set-up at Project Headquarters was slow in developing. In June 1955 an Air Force materiel officer, Lt. Col. William A. Wilson, was assigned to the deputy slot, and an Agency staff supply officer, [redacted] was assigned to the test site at Watertown, but the Director of Logistics, CIA, had difficulty in finding a civilian officer whom he could release to fill the Director of Materiel slot. With the lack of headquarters organization and direction in this area, the materiel officers assigned to the SAC 4070th Support Wing moved into the void and took on the planning for equipping and deploying the first detachment.

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The Operational Plan of the 4070th dated 15 December 1955 outlined its responsibility to CINCSAC for not only training, determining combat readiness, and deployment overseas of each AQUATONE operational unit, but for the establishment of support detachments, each

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capable of supporting an operational unit in its overseas location. The Operational Plan (which is attached as Annex 65) was reviewed by Project Headquarters staff and returned to SAC, agreed with no changes.

Early in 1956, the Project Director noted to [redacted] who had been assigned from the Agency's Office of Logistics to fill the slot of Director of Materiel:

"I am disturbed by the fact that we may be taking too little initiative on supply matters in this Headquarters and leaving too much initiative to be taken by the 4070th SAC Support Wing. What I have in mind is that, not only are such tasks as detailed FAK (flyaway kit) and SLOE (standard list of equipment) lists made up by Colonel Shingler, but that, so far as I am aware, the planning and the initial drafts of all our supply procedures have originated there. The former of these two tasks is one for which we may not have adequate facilities at Headquarters. In any event it is appropriate that specific lists should be developed at Watertown and [redacted] rather than in Washington. I do feel strongly, however, that we should be taking the initiative in developing supply procedures and not leaving it to the support organization." 1/

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In the same vein, Col. Osmond J. Ritland, on completing his tour as Deputy Project Director in March 1956, wrote:

"Although the materiel activities of the project have progressed nicely during the past three months, it has not

1/ SAPC-4639, 26 March 1956. Memo to Project Director of Materiel from Project Director.

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been accomplished by project personnel. I do not believe that this is too great a deficiency since our original charter requires SAC to support AQUATONE... At this point I would not disturb the present procedure, but I do feel an additional materiel officer is needed in Project Headquarters, and with the activation of Bases B and C, I visualize the need for a full-time construction engineer..." 1/

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In the same report, Col. Ritland gave praise to the as one of the strongest organizations in the project. He had been very favorably impressed with the facility, the personnel and the method of handling all supply activities at that installation. He also gave credit to the SAC Support Group in a letter to General LeMay (CINCSAC), as follows:

"... Materiel has been our weakest function with little or no seasoned ability to solve this complex problem. In a period of just a few months Col. Shingler, Lt. Col. Lien and Warrant Officer Moberly have planned and supervised the implementation of a workable supply system. This was not their assigned responsibility and was undertaken by them for the over-all advancement of the project..." 2/

Materiel Support to Field Units

The SAC Support Plan for Detachment A had included arrangements through 7th Air Division in England to extend all needed assistance to

1/ TS-143306, 30 March 1956. Final Report by Col. O. J. Ritland.

2/ Letter to CINCSAC (unnumbered), 30 March 1956, by Col. O. J. Ritland.

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the unit in carrying out its mission. When Detachment A was forced in June 1956 to move its operations to Germany, these arrangements were no longer valid. Therefore it was necessary to reconsider the 4070th's support plan in conjunction with the USAFE Director of Material, General Lester W. Light, who felt that SAC liaison support would not be required if all levels of command within USAFE properly accomplished all functions outlined in the Overseas Logistical Support Plan. He did not object to SAC representation to assist in monitoring logistics support, but felt that any such representative should be attached to Headquarters USAFE for control and appropriate direction.

In October 1956, Headquarters SAC in a letter to Headquarters USAF requested relief from the overseas support of the AQUATONE detachments. The Headquarters USAF Project Officer (Col. Geary) and the Project Director both agreed that the support responsibility should be transferred (in the case of Detachments A and B) to Director of Materiel, Headquarters, USAFE, with one supply liaison officer retained in the field as a troubleshooter. Thereafter logistics support for the first three field detachments was arranged through local and theater commands with the assistance of the Headquarters USAF Project Office, and with supplementary procurement through Agency channels (for

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example, the purchase and shipment to Adana of trailers for base housing at Detachment B).

The principal role played by the Project Headquarters Materiel Staff was in advising the Project Director on materiel policy matters, arranging with various Air Force echelons for needed support, and monitoring depot and field base activities. Once operations were underway in the summer of 1956, Headquarters Materiel set up a system of daily and weekly cable reports to headquarters on field consumption of fuel and film, engine time, malfunctions, field modifications to equipment and other usage statistics, in order to ensure the timely flow to the field of needed supplies and spares.

Depot Support

Heavy reliance was placed on the project depot which was set up to handle the project-peculiar items related particularly to the U-2 aircraft and its photo and electronic systems. The depot operation was first located at [redacted] from mid-1955 to June 1958, when it was moved to [redacted] with Major Welch still in charge. In October 1960, Project Materiel Staff for security reasons proposed shifting the overt support of the U-2 activities from [redacted] to the SAC U-2 (DRAGON LADY) depot at Warner Robins Air Force Base,

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Georgia, with all shipments to and from Project CHALICE detachments to be made through that facility. The principal reason for this move was in order to continue using [] in support of the follow-on program (OX CART). The removal of the U-2 support activity from [] was expected to enhance the security of both programs and avoid cross-contamination. It was also expected that monetary savings would result for the government by eliminating dual stock levels as between the SAC and CHALICE U-2 programs by amalgamating their depot support.

On 13 February 1961 a memorandum of understanding with respect to funding of CIA/SAC U-2 maintenance, overhaul and spare parts contracts was signed between DPD/Contracts and the USAF Air Materiel Command represented by Lt. Col. Sidney Brewer. The decision was to consolidate logistic support activities within a single Weapons System Support Center (WSSC) at Warner Robins Depot effective 1 January 1961. An analysis was made of comparative costs and future expected levels, and funding percentage ratios for each contract were agreed between the two parties. This common support program alleviated the necessity for detailed appropriation accounting for individual line items of support supplies and services.

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The activity and staff at [] grew along with the OXCART program, additional manning being required for the increased work load including the installation of automatic data processing. Maj. John Druary replaced Major Welch at the end of the latter officer's eight-year tour with the project in August 1962. In May 1963 in anticipation of the transfer to the Air Force of responsibility for [] support for OXCART and the SAC SR-71 program, USAF was requested to provide about 35 new slots for the depot and also became responsible at the time of take-over for 50 slots previously supported by the Agency.

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Meanwhile, Secretary of Defense McNamara was effecting economies in Defense Department installations which involved among other measures the phasing down of [] to a deep storage operation. This required another move and arrangements were made for space at San Bernardino Air Materiel Area at Norton Air Force Base, California. This move took place at the end of 1963 and as of 1 January 1964 the Air Force Logistics Command at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base assumed full manpower and logistics control at the new depot for OXCART, TAGBOARD and SR-71 programs. The U-2 operating hardware is still supplied from Warner Robins.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Headquarters Materiel Staff

From 1956 until 1962 the Materiel Staff at Project Headquarters maintained a T/O strength of only six or seven. During the period from 1959 to 1962 when the DD/P air operations formerly under the Air Maritime Division were placed under the cognizance of DPD, the materiel support for the P2V and other [] air programs continued to be carried out by the former Aircraft Maintenance Support Division's staff, which had been constituted as a separate branch under DPD Materiel. Following the reorganization of the special projects under the Deputy Director for Research and the return of other DD/P air operations to the Special Operations Division (SOD) effective in July 1962, the separate aircraft maintenance branch was also transferred to SOD, leaving the project materiel staff at its original seven.

In 1962 on the departure of [] the Director of Materiel slot was filled by an Office of Logistics nominee, [] [] Upon assignment in September 1962 of Col. Jack Ledford as Assistant Director for Special Activities, the organizational formula for the Office of Special Activities (OSA) was revised in order to reduce the number of division and staff heads reporting directly to the front office (then numbering ten) to a more manageable arrangement.

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Materiel was bracketed along with the operational functions under the "Director for Field Activities" as a part of that reorganization.

During [] tenure as Director of Materiel the staff was increased, looking toward an operational OXCART program in addition to continuation of the U-2 project, and numbers reached as high as 24 on the Headquarters Materiel Directorate staff. In August 1964, Colonel Alfred K. Patterson, USAF, replaced [] and continued to direct Materiel's maximum effort toward operational readiness of the OXCART and its sensor and countermeasures systems and to render necessary materiel support to the U-2 activities at Detachments G and H.

Another reorganization of OSA which took effect in mid-July 1966 restored Materiel to a separate Directorate, removing it from the Directorate for Field Activities, which in turn became the Directorate of Operations. At that time the Materiel Directorate was composed of five divisions: Installations, Maintenance, Supply, Plans and Requirements, and Avionics.

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ANNEX 65

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15 December 1955

Headquarters Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska

Operational Plan - 4070th Support Wing

I. MISSION

1. The Commander, 4070th Support Wing is directly responsible to the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command. This wing has the mission of training and equipping the operational units of Project "AQUATONE" and providing support for these units in overseas theaters. Specific responsibilities are:

- a. Direct and supervise the training of combat crews.
- b. Determine that these crews, and their equipment are operationally combat ready.
- c. Determine that the unit as a whole is operationally combat ready.
- d. The deployment overseas of each operational unit.
- e. Establishment of support detachments, each capable of supporting an operational unit in its overseas location.
- f. Effect the necessary coordination with this Headquarters to effect the action required of United States Air Force, Air Materiel Command, Military Air Transport Service, Overseas Theater Commanders and any other agencies deemed necessary to insure adequate and timely support for continuous operations.

II. CONCEPT

1. The 4070th Support Wing must be organized and manned so as to support separate operational units by detachments. Detachments must be capable of staging from forward bases remote from parent and intermediate base of operations.

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2. Operation will be based upon formation of three operational support detachments. Upon development of satisfactory degree of combat readiness, the first support detachment and operational unit will be deployed overseas to its intermediate base (Upper Heyford, UK). The second detachment and operational unit will be similarly deployed to the Far East upon attainment of combat readiness. The third detachment and operational unit will be based within the Zone of Interior at Watertown Air Force Base, Nevada and will be so organized as to train to, and maintain a readiness status permitting either the rotation of a complete detachment and/or operational unit or a flow of replacement personnel to deployed detachments and units. The selection of the Far East intermediate base will be predicated upon security, operational facilities and habitability.

3. Operations will consist of operating from intermediate bases or staging at forward bases and subsequent operation over areas of interest. The forward staging of operational units will be supported by detachments, with integral airborne support. The staging operation will be such as to minimize ground time at the forward bases and be adaptable to minimum installation facilities. This concept of operation will enhance the security of operation, maximize operational flexibility and minimize the risks inherent in focalizing operation in a given segment contiguous to unfriendly territory.

III. DETACHMENT ORGANIZATION

The organizational structure will be such as to provide for three detachments equally equipped and manned. Each detachment will be organized so as to permit independent operation; each detachment to be organized, manned and equipped to provide support necessary for operational units to stage to forward bases, operate therefrom with minimum base support, and subsequent return to intermediate base. Airlift support and manning will be integral to each in such quantity as to permit support of operational units at forward staging bases.

IV. TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATIONAL UNITS

1. Quantative and qualitative training will be sufficient to train supervisory and crew personnel. Training operational readiness standards, will be as established by CINCSAC.

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2. Aircrew training requirements are as follows:

a. The first operational unit will be combat ready by 15 April 1956. The second unit scheduled for deployment will achieve a combat readiness status as soon thereafter as equipment and personnel status permit. The third unit will be trained to achieve combat readiness in sufficient time to permit rotation with deployed units to provide a flow of replacement personnel as may be necessary.

V. TRAINING LEAD TIME

1. The 4070th Support Wing will be activated 20 December 1955. In order to have one support detachment and operational unit operationally ready in a minimum length of time, the headquarters personnel will be in place at March Air Force Base, California, by 20 December 1955.

2. Scheduled dates of activations, equipping and operational readiness are as follows:

a. Activation - 4070th Support Wing - 20 December 1955

b. Equipping date (1st Unit) - 15 January 1956

c. Target date for 100% manning - 15 January 1956

d. Combat ready (1st Unit) - 15 April 1956

3. Personnel requiring specialized training will be scheduled to complete courses of instruction, and be in place at Watertown concurrent with or prior to unit equipping date.

4. Unit manning provides for 10 pilots with minimum operational readiness based on pilot to aircraft ratio of 1.5 to 1.

VI. OPERATIONALLY READY REQUIREMENTS

1. The criteria established by AFR 55-6 will be used for reporting the operationally ready status of operational units. Minimum requirements for combat readiness for each item are set forth in SAC Manual 171-2.

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a. An operational readiness index of 7, based on the weakest link principle must be reflected in Column "C" (Commander's estimate of operational readiness) for the unit to be considered combat ready.

b. In order to report an over-all readiness index of 7, the minimum category indexes specified below must be met.

- (1) Column D - Non-Crew Personnel assigned - 9.
- (2) Column E - Non-Crew Personnel assigned, operationally ready - 8
- (3) Column F - T/O Equipment assigned (other than aircraft) - 9
- (4) Column G - T/O Equipment assigned operationally ready (other than aircraft) - 8
- (5) Column H - Flyaway Kit and Spares - 9
- (6) Column J - Average T/O aircraft possessed operationally ready - See Para IX, 2, a(1).
- (7) Column L - Average aircrews assigned and combat ready - 8 (See para V, 4).

2. In the determination of combat readiness, the following material factors will apply:

a. The unit will be required to maintain an in-commission rate of 70% with desirable attainment of 100% in-commission.

b. Flying hour support will be 70 hours/month.

c. Sortie rate will be based on eight flights/month.
(Includes test hops and ferry flights).

d. Individual units mission and support equipment must be available at the ZI base on or before date detachment training is scheduled to commence.

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e. Unit operating tables II, VII, XVI, and XIX for common items must be located at the ZI operating base 30 days prior to receipt of T/O aircraft.

f. Unit operating tables II, XVI, XIX peculiar items, must be located at 30 days prior to receipt of respective T/O aircraft.

g. Materiel Reserves:

(1) Station Sets: Unit operating at intermediate operating bases will utilize station set equipment pre-stocked under AFL 67-44. Peculiar equipment support will be transported by support aircraft in sufficient quantities to support each unit at enroute, forward operating and staging bases.

(2) Flyaway Kit: Three basic flyaway kits each consisting of items common to all aircraft will be required to support six aircraft for 30 days. These kits should be complete and phased in place 30 days prior to unit deployment to intermediate bases.

h. Flyaway kit and common item re-supply support will be as follows:

(1) Enroute support will be furnished by SAC.

(2) Common supply support will be obtained from the area to which deployed.

(3) Re-supply of kit components, UEE, emergency requirements, and common items not available in the deployed area will be obtained by priority requisition, on the prime ZI support point and airlifted to the using bases in accordance with Vol. XVI, Air Force Manual 67-1.

(4) Resupply of peculiar spares and equipment will be obtained as directed.

(5) Repairables will be returned to overhaul activities through logistic channels as specified. Airlift for this purpose will be used as required.

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i. Consumables

(1) Consumable bulk items including, but not limited to POL, JP fuel, will be furnished by the area sources to which units are deployed, based on the utilization rate.

(2) Special fuels will be requisitioned as directed.

j. Unit Flyaway kits and UEE will be located at Watertown Air Force Base, Nevada, and will deploy with the unit.

k. Consumable bulk items, including, but not limited to POL, JP fuel, and gaseous supplies must be available in sufficient quantities to support wing training operations based on utilization rates.

l. Facilities: Facilities, such as aprons, parking areas, office space, warehousing, etc., must be available as agreed between participating agencies.

m. Non-crew personnel, including maintenance and technical representatives must be trained and available to the operational unit prior to deployment.

VII. OPERATIONALLY READY DATES

The first unit will be combat ready 15 April 1956, the remaining units will achieve a combat ready status as soon thereafter as equipment and personnel conditions permit.

VIII. DEPLOYMENT LOCATIONS

The 4070th Support Wing will be based at March Air Force Base, California, and will be capable of deploying support detachments and operational units to intermediate bases. Units based at intermediate bases will be capable of operating from any overseas base normally supporting USAF fighter, bombardment or reconnaissance wings.

IX. MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS

1. Units will be allowed a maximum of 14 days to deploy to an intermediate base.

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2. Deployment will normally be conducted in the following manner:

a. Aircraft will be deployed as combat readiness is achieved by unit.

(1) Units will not be deployed with less than four operationally ready aircraft and a pilot to aircraft ratio of 1.5 to 1.

(2) Ground support personnel and equipment will be airlifted to staging bases.

(3) Mobility plans will be developed as required.

X. CHANNELS OF CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION

1. The 4070th Support Wing will be attached to the 8070th Air Base Group, March Air Force Base, California, for administration and logistical support.

2. Operational control and support responsibilities will be effected as set forth in "Organization and Delineation of Responsibilities" dated 2 August 1955.

(Signed)

R. M. MONTGOMERY
Major General, USAF
Chief of Staff

Distr:

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Proj AQUATONE Hqs 4
4070th Support Wing 2
Hqs SAC 6

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CHAPTER X. CONTRACT PILOTS

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CHAPTER X. CONTRACT PILOTS

Foreign Versus U.S. Pilots

During the White House meeting at which approval was granted for the U-2 reconnaissance program, the possibility of a forced landing of the U-2 in enemy territory was touched on, but it was the apparent Agency view at that time that the repercussions of such an accident would be somewhat mitigated if the aircraft were manned by "non-official" U.S. personnel, and to the extent practicable it was intended to man the U-2 with non-U.S. nationals.

A mechanism for recruiting foreign pilots was already in being within the Air Maritime Division (Project ZESTFUL), but the available pilots were extremely few and the lead time for acquiring and processing one was six months. A recruiting effort was initiated through the AMD channel early in 1955 and sources in Europe were canvassed for prospects. The majority of pilot candidates offered, however, were unacceptable for either physiological or security reasons.

At the end of July 1955, fifteen foreign pilots [redacted] [redacted] between 23 and 25 years of age had been recruited, all of whom had at least 500 hours current jet time, but all of whom lacked facility in the English language. Arrangements for language training for these

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recruits were worked out with the Office of Training prior to their assignment to air operations.

The Project Director had learned from the aeromedical experts that very high qualifications from both the physical and proficiency standpoints would be required of pilots for this program, which might necessitate the exclusive use of U.S. pilots. This was broached to the DDCI (Gen. Cabell) who made no strong objection and was apparently prepared to accept this eventuality. Therefore, while the recruitment of foreign pilots continued, Col. McCafferty began discussions with the Air Force with a view to future recruitment of currently qualified Air Force pilots.

A proposal was made to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, of the Air Force (Lt. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell) on 13 June 1955 as follows:

"Whereas provisions are under way to provide adequate numbers of trained indigenous pilots for Project AQUATONE it is considered desirable to use American pilots. Present plans are to use American pilots if the international situation will permit a favorable policy decision at the time the operational phase of AQUATONE commences.

"In our discussions regarding the recruitment of Americans for this job, we felt that it would be highly desirable to obtain currently qualified Air Force officers. We would hope to obtain reserve officers with three to five

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years experience in jet aircraft in the First Lieutenant or junior Captain category. In addition, we would stipulate that they should be under thirty years of age, single, and in A#1 physical condition.

"We feel that, if properly approached, many young officers in this category would be willing to accept employment for hazardous duty of this sort. Our plans are to establish a cut-out organization and to provide this organization with funds, legal assistance and the power to write contracts for the employment of the American pilots. The pilots would be told that this was an organization backed by a group of American philanthropists, organized with at least the tacit approval of the United States Government. Their principal aim would be to recruit a group of volunteer pilots to fly hazardous missions in the interest of the United States Government against the Soviet Union and its satellites.

"These officers would be expected to go on inactive status, or possibly resign their Air Force Reserve commissions, and accept employment with this cover organization. They would be offered excellent pay with substantial bonuses for successful completion of operational missions. It would be most helpful if they could be offered a termination clause that would provide for their reinstatement or re-entrance on active duty in the Air Force. Obviously, these pilots would have to be told initially that this program had the blessing of the U. S. Government and specifically of the United States Air Force.

"We feel that recruitment could be carried out in the following steps:

"a. Initially a communication would be addressed to specific Wing Commanders through the appropriate Air Force command channels which would describe in a rather general way the intention of a civilian organization to recruit pilots in accordance with the cover story, indicate that the Air Force looked with favor upon the project, and ask that the recipients indicate the names of individuals in their units who would be

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likely candidates and could meet the qualifications specified above.

"b. From the names thus submitted, a list of candidates would be selected and Wing Commanders would be notified of the individuals in their units who were to be approached.

"c. The approach to the candidates would be made by a civilian representative of the cover organization. This representative would make it clear to the candidates that they were under no restriction in discussing the proposal with their Commanding Officers.

"It is believed that we should get started on this program at the earliest practical date since it will be necessary, first to run a security check on all personnel nominated by the respective Wing Commanders prior to contact and, second, to provide some time lapse to allow their separation from the service and employment by the cover organization prior to their actual training in project aircraft.

"If this proposal meets with your approval, we are prepared to staff out the details with whomever you might designate as your project officer. Col. George O. McCafferty is designated as the project officer for this Agency." 1/

The Air Force agreed to supply a limited number of pilots from SAC for the first detachment. (As it developed, SAC eventually furnished pilots for all three detachments.) Arrangements were made for cleared USAF officers in the Pentagon and at the SAC fighter bases

1/ TS-103563, 13 June 1955. Memorandum for Chief of Staff, USAF, Attn: Lt. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell, Jr., from Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

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to be visited to screen likely candidates and arrange for interviews by an AMD officer accompanied by a Security Officer and a Personnel Officer from the project staff (all working in alias).

Recruiting Procedures

The first pilot recruiting trip was made on 7 November 1955 to Turner Air Force Base, Albany, Georgia, and resulted in four candidates. The following week Bergstrom Air Force Base in Austin, Texas, was visited, netting four more. A second visit to Albany in March 1956 secured eight pilots out of eighteen interviewed, and in June 1956 teams visited Malmstrom Air Force Base at Great Falls, Montana, and Larson Air Force Base at Moses Lake, Washington, where a total of 15 candidates were signed up. The procedures employed by the recruiting teams were generally as follows:

a. The first interview was held in a hotel or motel room with proper security safeguards being observed. The following proposition was made: An American organization (unnamed) was seeking to recruit a group of volunteer pilots for hazardous flying with commensurate pay. It would be necessary to resign from the Air Force but a guarantee of reinstatement would be furnished in writing. If the pilot was interested he was asked to return for a second interview.

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b. At the second interview a hypothetical overflight mission for electronic intelligence collection against Russia was outlined. Terms of contract were stated as \$775 per month (general duty status), \$1500 per month (operational duty status), and \$1000 per month bonus (to be paid on completion of assignment), a total of \$30,000 per year maximum, plus subsistence, insurance and medical expenses to be paid by the organization.

c. Those willing to sign up were given instructions for further processing which included: a week-long physical and psychological examination at the Lovelace Clinic in Albuquerque; measurement for partial pressure suit and fitting of the suit; altitude chamber test at Wright Patterson; and polygraph and psychiatric interview by Agency Security Office and Medical Staff.

Before signing a contract, the recruit was given an operational briefing on the capability of the aircraft and equipment and on the true sponsor of the project. He was also afforded an opportunity to talk with a Headquarters USAF personnel and legal officer and to read the guarantee of reinstatement into the Air Force signed by Generals White and Twining. The contract was then signed, the men were photographed, fingerprinted, given their individual cover story and sent back to their bases to resign from the Air Force.

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[redacted]

With the signing of the first eight USAF pilots, less emphasis was placed on acquisition of more foreign pilots for the project, although recruitment continued under ZESTFUL to satisfy other Agency needs. In November 1955 the Project Director said in a status report to the DCI:

"We are at present planning to use American pilots, because of their greater proficiency and trustworthiness... In order to have a second string to our bow, we have recruited and are carrying out the basic training of some six to eight non-U.S. [redacted] pilots who could be used if political circumstances dictated." 1/

In mid-December 1955 [redacted] pilots had passed their physicals and initial checkout and were put into advanced pilot training at a USAF base (under AMD sponsorship) while awaiting a decision as to their use. [redacted] pilots had been turned over to the P2V program.)

[redacted]

[redacted] In April 1956 Col. McCafferty and Lt. Col. Leo P. Geary visited the [redacted] at their training base and pronounced them fully qualified on the basis of proficiency, language

1/ TS-142630, 19 November 1955. Status Report on Project.

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and morale to be used on Project AQUATONE. There were four of the original eight left at this point; the others had chosen to return to [] after having been away from home almost a year.

Since it was still felt desirable to have some fully qualified foreign pilots available in the event political conditions prevented the use of Americans, the [] were sent to Watertown in late June 1956 for training in the U-2. []

[] Before their departure for training, the Cover Officer had searched in vain for a means of fitting the [] into the project cover story. With the acceptance of sponsorship by NACA as cover, the very attribute for which these [] were recruited (that of being non-Americans) was now a drawback, for the use of civilian pilots of foreign origin was fundamentally incompatible with NACA procedures. [] recommendation to the Project Director was:

[] "If other considerations dictate that we must employ the pilots in AQUATONE, I would recommend that they continue to be handled [] as they have been in the past. The inherent problems and security risk of such an arrangement would have to be recognized and accepted." 1/

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1/ SAPC-6734, 5 June 1956. Memo to Project Director from Cover Officer.

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
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Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 403g)

In [] opinion the [] pilots should have been written off before the U-2 training was begun, because cover-wise they jeopardized the entire program; this view was shared by the Project Security Officer.

Due partly to language problems, the [] had a difficult time learning to fly the U-2 and on 15 July 1956, Colonel William Yancey, commander of the training unit, reported that they were not qualified to continue in the U-2 program. (Cols. McCafferty and Geary disputed this determination by the SAC training commander but to no avail.) The [] pilots were returned to Washington and the decision was made (with the concurrence of Gen. []) to keep them in the United States until the end of the project because of the extensive knowledge of the whole operation they had acquired at Watertown. A year's program of study and training was arranged for them and in October 1956 their cases were turned over to the Contacts Division of the Office of Operations for administration.



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Once operational overflights began, the need to use other than U. S. pilots did not arise again until the long political stand-down of overflights. In February 1958 the British were offered pilot training in the U-2 and participation in the program, which they accepted, and in January 1961 an agreement was signed with the Chinese Nationalists for a joint reconnaissance program over Mainland China using Chinese Air Force pilots. Other than in these two joint programs, only American pilots have been used in the program.

Pilot Cover

In April 1956 arrangements were worked out with Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for furnishing employment cover for the contract U-2 pilots while assigned to the project. This plan was developed as described by Mr. Bissell in a memorandum to the Contracting Officer:

"Discussions to date have indicated the feasibility of an arrangement with Lockheed whereby the pilots under Project AQUATONE will appear to have been hired by Lockheed as Flight Test Consultants. Checks will be issued by Lockheed for the monthly compensation of each pilot although none of these funds will inure to the benefit of the individuals. In fact they will be required to sign a classified document acknowledging that the open contract establishes no right and obligations between Lockheed and the pilots.

"It has been agreed by NACA that a purported contract will be prepared whereby Lockheed is to furnish the services of certain pilots under a services contract with NACA.

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Contemporaneously a contract will be entered into between the Agency and Lockheed reflecting the true arrangements and acknowledging that the NACA contract confers no legal rights. The arrangements are such that the purported billings under the NACA-Lockheed contract will be in fact the billings and reimbursement under the Lockheed/CIA contract. The services contract will call for payment of \$10,000 per year per pilot for a group of approximately 30 pilots. The actual administrative charge to the Agency for this service will be \$250 per month for the entire group. For security reasons within the accounting system of Lockheed it will be necessary that an advance be made to Lockheed by the Agency in the amount of \$25,000 which, in effect, will be utilized as a revolving fund for their payments. Under these arrangements we will require Lockheed not to file with Federal or State tax agencies the normal types of information returns such as the Federal Form 1099 and the California Form 599. In view of this possible technical violation of law, Lockheed will require indemnification for possible additional costs." 1/

The pilot cover contracts negotiated with Lockheed in 1956 (numbered NA-W-6471 and NA-W-6471(R)) have been extended year by year to continue the arrangements described above, and were still in effect for Fiscal Year 1968.

For their overseas assignments the pilots were documented as civilian contract consultants to the three Weather Reconnaissance Squadrons, and deployed on military orders issued by the HEDCOM cover unit (the 1007th Air Intelligence Service Group).

1/ TS-143292, 12 April 1956. Memorandum for Contracting Officer from Project Director.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Pilot Morale

In the first year of training and operations there were those (including the Project Flight Surgeon) who considered that the pilots were being overfostered in many respects by various project staff who administered pilot affairs. However, in view of the investment made to bring each of the pilots to a state of operational proficiency in the U-2 aircraft, and of the high hopes for the success of their mission, it was to be expected that every possible effort would be made to keep these men in a state of physical health and comfort, and of mental wellbeing.

The large majority of the pilots joined the program because of the monetary rewards involved and therefore careful attention to all matters relating to their individual finances was a crucial factor in the maintenance of morale. One headquarters finance officer was occupied almost full time keeping the pilots' financial affairs running smoothly,

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There were of course other important factors in maintaining the pilots' morale, including the improvement of personal equipment and procedures relating to the flying of missions from both a safety and a comfort standpoint; the guarantee of some flying time in other aircraft than the U-2; liberal rest and rehabilitation policies; prompt handling of personal mail through the security postal system, as well as attention to family emergencies; and assistance to those desiring to apply for regular Air Force commissions. A principal cause of low morale among the pilots as well as other detachment members, over which the Project Headquarters had no control, was the forced inactivity which recurred during periods of political stand-downs.

Pilot Contracts

The terms of the original contract signed in January 1956 by the first group of pilots provided, in addition to a monthly salary of \$775 when in general duty status and \$1500 when in operational duty status, a bonus payment of \$1,000 per month, to be accumulated for payment upon completion of the contract, provided termination was not for cause.

In March 1956, after discussion among themselves at Watertown, the eight pilots then in training signed a joint memorandum protesting the inequity of the bonus clause and requesting that the full \$1,000 bonus

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be credited to them monthly, even though payment might be delayed a year. This in effect amounted to treating the bonus as current salary. This requested change was reviewed by the Project Director of Administration with the General Counsel, and a counter-proposal (approved by the DCI on 20 March 1956) was made to the pilots whereby \$500 of the \$1,000 bonus would be credited on a monthly basis (although for tax purposes it would not be payable until the succeeding calendar year). The other \$500 would be payable upon successful completion of the contract and would not be paid if the individual were terminated for cause. The revised contracts were signed by all the pilots on 21 March and all agreed at that time that it appeared to them to be a very good contract. (See Annex 66 for terms of the contract.)

The 21 March 1956 version of the pilot contract remained in effect until the end of 1957. In view of the plan for the continuation of AQUATONE activities abroad and the imminent expiration of many of the pilot contracts, it was felt that new contracts should be signed by all those who were to be retained in the project. In view of the experience they had acquired over two years of operations, it was desired to retain as many as possible in order to avoid cost and delay of training new pilots. Although Col. Geary recommended (and Mr. Cunningham

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agreed) that the new contracts should be written at a lower figure, this suggestion was disapproved by the Deputy Project Director (Col. Jack Gibbs) who felt that the pilots should not be penalized because the Air Force was flying the same type of equipment at a lower cost, nor should they be penalized because they were flying fewer missions per month than had been anticipated when the pay scale was fixed. The General Counsel's Office (Mr. John Warner) agreed with Col. Gibbs. Certain increases were provided in the new contract and at the same time the pilots were accorded the privilege of having their dependents accompany them to Turkey or Japan. A comparison of the new contract with the old shows the following:

<u>Former Contract</u>	<u>New Contract</u>
General Duty Status \$775 monthly	\$1,000 monthly
Operational Duty Status \$1,500 monthly (both in the U.S. and overseas)	\$1,250 monthly (U. S.) \$1,500 monthly (overseas)
First \$500 increment: An amount of \$500 to be credited on the books of the Agency for each month of satisfactory service in an operational duty status overseas and to be paid in the year following that year during which it was earned.	Same.

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An amount calculated at the rate of \$500 per month for each month of satisfactory service in an operational duty status overseas to be paid provided services not terminated for cause based on misconduct or abandonment of obligations as set forth in the contract. This accumulated amount to be paid within a three (3) year period from termination of contract.

Same for overseas duty but now also applies to operational duty status in the U.S. and is to be paid within a 4-year period from termination of contract.

Post differential:

No provision.

To receive a post differential at rates established by the Project Director while serving at certain overseas locations.

The terms of the new contract were effective 1 January 1958 and ran through December 1959 in most cases. At this point there were seventeen of the original thirty pilots recruited in 1956 who signed for another two years. Air Force approval for the extension was granted verbally by General O'Donnell through Colonel Geary. At the end of 1959 all the pilots were extended for a fifth year under the same terms, and with Air Force approval again obtained verbally by Colonel Geary.

On 31 October 1960, six pilots were released for return to the Air Force (one having returned earlier that year) which left ten available. At this point action to extend or modify contracts was held in abeyance

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pending the outcome of high level deliberations regarding the future use of CHALICE assets. As an interim measure pilot contracts were extended on a month-to-month basis in the form of simple amendments approved by the General Counsel which in no way affected or altered the provisions of the existing contracts; the periods specified for return to the Air Force or for simple separation remained the same.

At the beginning of 1961, when Detachment G at Edwards Air Force Base had just been revamped into an operational group, the Acting Chief of the Development Projects Division, Col. Stanley W. Beerli, recommended that pilot contracts be renegotiated to provide a payment of \$1,750 per month for active duty status, and a bonus of \$750 for each month in which the pilot either was assigned to a mission involving overflight of foreign territory, or was given an unusual task to perform as determined by the Division. This rate of pay was approved 17 February 1961 by the DD/P and contracts then in effect were extended at this rate of pay to the end of 1961 (see Annex 67).

Meanwhile an elaborate program of medical, psychological, proficiency and security evaluations of the current pilot slate resulted in the decision to release three more to the Air Force as of 31 July 1961. A one-year contract for calendar year 1962 and a further one-year

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extension for 1963 was signed with the remaining seven who were assigned at Detachment G where they were occupied in testing aircraft and equipment, training other pilots, and flying operational missions from staging areas as required.

A new contract was negotiated for calendar year 1964 (when a few new pilots were recruited) wherein the principal change was the introduction of a graduated pay scale based on years of Agency service, as follows:

Up to two years of service, \$24,000 per annum;
Over two years and up to four years, \$30,000; and
Over four years, \$36,000.

Other emoluments than salary remained approximately the same as before. The terms of this contract have remained in effect since 1964 with extensions being made for a year at a time.

Insurance and Death Benefits

The original contract with the pilots provided that the Agency would arrange insurance and pay the premiums thereon as follows:

A \$15,000 policy with United Benefits Life Insurance Company (UBLIC);

A \$15,000 policy with War Agencies Employees Protective Association (WAEPAA); and

An \$18,000 policy with Federal Employees Group Life Insurance (FEGLI).

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[redacted] was consulted on the legality of the proposed insurance coverage and he endeavored to secure alternate coverage from commercial companies on a sterile basis. He was particularly anxious to remove the pilot category of employee from the Agency-sponsored plan as underwritten by UBLIC in order to protect the interests of the other Agency employees insured thereunder. He was unsuccessful in this effort.

Meanwhile, on 15 May 1956, pilot Wilburn Rose was killed in a training accident at Watertown and death benefits had to be paid under the UBLIC policy, administered by Government Employees Health Association (GEHA). On 31 May 1956, the GEHA Board of Directors met and passed a resolution making AQUATONE's contract pilots ineligible for UBLIC coverage. They asked the Agency also to cancel those policies already written thereunder.

The whole matter of insurance for the pilots was then taken under study by the General Counsel. The GEHA Board was upheld in its position and the policy was established and approved by the Director on 18 January 1957 that the Agency (through AQUATONE) would underwrite the GEHA payment of death benefits on pilots. This was done by making advance payments to GEHA: the first for \$53,000 (\$30,000 to cover

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benefits paid out on the second and third fatality which occurred in the interim) and \$1,000 per man per year in the form of premiums to build up a reserve. The cryptonym JBMAVBUSH was assigned to this accounting mechanism by the Project Comptroller to afford secure handling of these arrangements.

Ironically, the second and third fatal accidents requiring the payment of death benefits occurred in 1956 while the insurance matter was being thrashed out, but the program then went for eight years without a fatality involving a contract American pilot.

In January 1964, Colonel Jack Ledford (then Acting Director of Special Activities) recommended, and obtained approval for, the discontinuance of the special coverage arrangements in favor of regular coverage at the normal rate for all personnel, since the OXCART pilots had been accepted for UBLIC coverage. As fate willed it, the coverage had scarcely been arranged when the next fatality occurred in April 1964 at Edwards Air Force Base. On 1 June 1964 the balance of funds held in reserve by GEHA amounting to \$77,500 were returned to OSA and the JBMAVBUSH account was liquidated.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Pilot Emergency Procedures

During early contingency planning for possible loss of a U-2 in hostile territory, the Project Security Officer put forward the following considered opinion of the Office of Security on the subject:

"We should not undertake any actual U-2 mission without a completely satisfactory destruction device. Moreover, we should consider the need to issue specific instructions to carry and use the 'L' pill... consideration must be given to the moral and religious aspects of leaving the final decision to the individual. Such instructions would place the ultimate responsibility for this extreme measure with the United States Government. We would want to assure ourselves that pilot personnel absolutely dispose of the 'L' pill in the event they fell into enemy hands and failed to utilize it. Possession would be contrary to our cover explanation and thwart any explanation that the aircraft was on a peaceful flight but merely off course." 1/

The question of a destructor for the aircraft was handled with the aid of Lockheed who designed a simple detonator with a three-pound charge which could be activated by the pilot as he prepared for emergency ejection from the aircraft. The question of self-destruction was a thornier problem and after the weightiest consideration by responsible project officers, a consignment of lethal ampoules was sent to each of the commanding officers of the field units along with a letter of instruction

1/ SAPC-4234, 12 March 1956. Memorandum to Project Director from [redacted] Project Security Officer.

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which read in part:

"The philosophy underlying the furnishing of these devices... is that these ampoules are to be 'made available' to the pilot just prior to the commencement of a mission over enemy territory. The individual pilot is under no obligation to carry an ampoule on his person during a mission, but he must have the opportunity of deciding on his own if he wishes to carry such a device. Even if carried, he is obviously under no compulsion to employ it if captured, though he should be advised of what treatment it is conceivable he might receive at the hands of the enemy, almost regardless of the information he is authorized to tell them or is finally compelled to reveal. However, should he decide, when first reaching enemy territory, that he does not wish to employ the device, he should be cautioned to dispose of it immediately lest its presence on his person give rise to certain suspicions about the exact nature of his mission. Again however, should he elect to try to conceal the ampoule, it is well to indicate that it can be swallowed whole and passed through the system without harm, or it can be secreted elsewhere in the body, though it is likely that in a thorough search even such a place of concealment would be discovered." 1/

Later, when operations began, the furnishing of an ampoule was added to the mission pre-flight check list, the Commanding Officer or his Deputy being the responsible agents, and the pilot made his own choice to carry one, or not, at that point. Most of the emergency planning, however, was done on the premise that the pilot would be captured alive by the enemy, despite the harsher alternative presented by Security.

1/ TS-143454, 2 May 1956. Letter to Commanding Officer, Detachment A, from the Project Director.

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When the Commanding Officer of Detachment A in March 1956 suggested giving his pilots broad intelligence briefings on the order of a National Intelligence Estimate, he was advised by the Director of Operations, then Col. A. M. "Mike" Welsh, that no intelligence should be passed to pilots except tactical intelligence such as defensive capabilities which might affect their missions. Col. Welsh was in favor of adopting a liberal policy, allowing the pilot to tell all he knew in the event of capture in order to obtain preferential treatment from the enemy. This, however, meant insuring that the pilot did not have knowledge of matters which should be kept from the enemy.

The following preliminary conclusions in the area of contingency planning were reached by the Project Director in agreement with his staff, in March 1956:

"The pilots' equipment, preparation, and briefing should be designed to contribute in every way possible to high morale without increasing the grave dangers inherent in the loss of a U-2 behind enemy lines. Specific preparations for this contingency should be made.

"a. Pilots should be briefed on escape and evasion methods and if they desire arrangements should be made for escape and evasion training either at Watertown [redacted] / This was carried out with the pilots of all three detachments [redacted] by Office of Training staff. 7

"b. Pilots should be given the best possible survival equipment subject to weight and space limitation; the

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personal equipment will be sterilized with respect to USAF markings or identification.

"c. The pilot will be informed about the 'L' pill and permitted to carry one if he so desires but will receive no firm instructions to use it or not to use it.

"d. The pilot will be told he is perfectly free to tell the full truth about his mission with the exception of understating moderately the performance of the aircraft. He will be advised to represent himself as a civilian, to admit previous Air Force affiliation, to current CIA employment, and to make no attempt to deny the nature of his mission.

"e. Such briefing would leave the pilot the greatest possible freedom, by responding to interrogation to safeguard himself from extreme treatment." 1/

An instruction for pilots concerning their action in the event of an emergency was drafted by Colonel Welsh based largely on the above conclusions and later cleared with the DDCI and the Air Force. This instruction was issued as Operations Policy Letter No. 6 on 15 May 1956 at the time Detachment A was deploying to the field, and was in effect when Francis Gary Powers went down in Russia. (See Annex 68 for text.) After that event and the subsequent Russian revelations of information obtained from their prisoner through interrogation and presented at his trial, Operations Policy Letter No. 6 was revised to

1/ SAPC-4082, 22 March 1956. Memorandum to Staff from Project Director, Subject: Planning for Contingency of Loss of a U-2.

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place greater stress on the absolute necessity for destruction of the aircraft in an emergency, and to limit the information which a captured pilot should volunteer. This revised version was issued in December 1960.

In 1961 a program was begun in coordination with the Office of Training, Security and Medical Staff, during which the IDEALIST and OXCART pilots received risk-of-capture training and were assessed individually for their ability to withstand interrogation. Specific individual training was developed and conducted on a continuing basis. As an outgrowth of this program, Headquarters Directive 50-1055-24, meant to replace Operations Policy Letter No. 6, was drafted in March 1964, subsequently redrafted several times and finally passed forward for approval in October 1964 by Col. Ledford. The new directive was based on the theory that "resistance in successive positions" is more effective for a captive than attempted rigid adherence to a doctrine such as giving name, rank and serial number. The "successive positions" were defined and permissible and impermissible disclosures by the pilot were set forth.

The Executive Director/Comptroller (Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick) expressed disagreement with permitting a captive pilot to admit his

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CIA affiliation; the DD/P (Mr. Helms) on the other hand recommended that the pilot be instructed to give only name, date and place of birth, address, and CIA affiliation, and disagreed with the idea of imposing a complicated set of instructions regarding fall-back positions upon the pilot who would, finding himself in hostile hands, already be under psychological pressure. The draft directive was returned to OSA in January for rewrite.

Months later, after many conferences, a meeting chaired by Col. Lawrence K. White produced an agreed version which set forth clearly permissible and impermissible disclosures and placed fewer demands upon a captive's judgment than did the former policy letter. It was dated October 1965 and was approved on 15 November 1965 by Mr. Helms (who at that time had succeeded to the position of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. The directive was entitled "Policy Governing Conduct of Resistance to Interrogation Training, and Guidance for Project Pilots Forced Down in Hostile Territory". It was presented to the National Security Council's "Special Group" on 26 November 1965 and approved by that group on 16 December 1965. (See Annex 69 for text.) As of the end of 1968 this directive, fortunately, had not needed to be invoked.

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In August 1960, the Project Security Officer, Mr. William J. Cotter, recommended terminating all contract pilots and recruiting and training six or eight new ones from SAC. Mr. Cunningham agreed and said he felt it was asking for trouble to move ahead with plans for Soviet overflights or even peripheral collection flights using the present group. Col. Beerli concurred in this recommendation. However, since the proposed renewal of overflights from Detachment B did not receive approval, the question of risking overflights with the currently assigned pilots became academic.

In late 1961, when U-2 operations were being conducted over Cuba and in the Far East, Mr. Cotter brought the matter up again in a memorandum to the Acting Chief, DPD:

"In view of the continued operational activity in IDEALIST and taking cognizance of the probability that this activity will continue for some time in the future, it is the strong opinion of this Branch that immediate action be initiated to recruit and train new pilots.

"The present staff of pilots available to DPD possess a wealth of knowledge concerning a broad spectrum of Agency intelligence activities. Although it must be assumed that certain of this information is already available to the RIS as a result of the 1 May incident, I suggest that grievous damage would result from additional information or confirmatory data which would be extracted from one of the present pilots in the event he were lost to the opposition.

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"I recognize the technical qualifications of the present staff of pilots is exceptional. I suggest, however, that we consider spotting, recruiting, processing and training, gradually, replacements for the present staff in the interests of sound security." 1/

In June 1963, one additional pilot was recruited and in June 1964 two more were recruited, all three from the U.S. Air Force. In November 1964, one U.S. Navy pilot was added, and one of the British pilots from the JACKSON contingent at Detachment G resigned his commission in the R.A.F. and was hired as a contract pilot in his status of resident alien. As of July 1967, four out of the original thirty pilots recruited in 1955-56 were still with Detachment G, each having served with the program for eleven years. (See Annex 70 for a listing of U-2 pilots, 1956-1967).

1/ DPD-5485-61, 8 September 1961. Memorandum for AC/DPD from Chief, DPD Security Staff.

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Aeromedical Support and Pilot Personal Equipment

At an early meeting of the Project Staff in January 1955, Col. Ritland recommended that the project seek the advice and assistance of a top-notch aeromedical expert as soon as possible. There were a wide variety of physical and psychological problems involved in long-range, high altitude flights which must be explored. No one had flown above 50,000 feet for much more than an hour or two and at 60,000 feet for only minutes. He recommended that Dr. Randolph Lovelace of the Lovelace Clinic in Albuquerque be consulted, since he was the outstanding expert in the country, having been involved in most of the Air Force work in the aeromedical field.

It was discovered that Dr. Lovelace was out of the Air Force picture at the moment and was concentrating on developing his clinic. Mr. Trevor Gardner was anxious for the aeromedical work on the project to begin immediately and recommended that Brig. Gen. Don D. Flickinger, Commander of the Office of Scientific Research of ARDC, be chosen to head up this work. Approval was given by Gen. Putt and Gen. Thomas Power (then Commander of ARDC) for Gen. Flickinger's participation in the program and for the use of all available Air Force facilities and research and development in the aeromedical field.

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General Flickinger immediately began to look for candidates with the special skills and training required to support the project, and to monitor closely the development and testing of pilot personal equipment. At the first suppliers' meeting in April 1955, he reported that the partial pressure suit planned for use by the U-2 pilots had proven effective for periods from 30 minutes to seven hours at 50,000 feet after descending from 65,000, depending on the condition of the pilot. The full pressure suit being developed by the Air Force was under high priority study and might possibly be ready by September 1956.

Early personnel nominations by Gen. Flickinger were:

Major George Steinkamp, Project Medical Officer; and Major Leo V. Knauber, Physiological Training Officer, who was largely instrumental in setting up the aeromedical facility at Watertown between July and September 1955. Lt. Col. Philip Maher of the Human Factors Division of the Air Force Surgeon General's Office assisted Gen. Flickinger in meeting project requirements, including furnishing medical supplies and training aids, monitoring the equipment contracts, and securing Air Force technicians to man the test site and the detachments.

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Medical services at the test site during the first six weeks of operation (including assignment of a doctor to the base until the arrival of the Project Flight Surgeon in mid-September 1955) were furnished by the Lovelace Clinic under an existing Air Force contract. At the end of 1955 the project contracted directly with Lovelace for its services, principally for pilot examinations, but also for continuing medical support for Watertown when needed. Reports on pilot examinations and Lovelace recommendations thereon were sent to the Project Flight Surgeon at Washington Headquarters and it was then his responsibility to secure appropriate review and approval by General Flickinger on behalf of the Air Force, and by the CIA Medical Staff. The area of responsibility of the Agency Medical Staff with regard to passing on these examinations and the criteria on which they were based, and with regard to other medical aspects of the project, was not clearly understood by the Project Flight Surgeon (Maj. Steinkamp), and it was well into 1956 before proper liaison and coordination between the Agency Medical Staff (represented by Dr. Frank Gibson), and Maj. Steinkamp was established.

Procedures were set up at the beginning of the training period at Watertown for interrogation of the U-2 pilots immediately following

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each flight. Interrogations were conducted by the assigned Flight Surgeon and/or Aviation Physiologist who were skilled in extracting the information relating to personal equipment and to the physical and psychological reactions of the pilots, which was needed for improving equipment and for establishing rules and procedures for safety of flight.

As with other critical categories of Air Force personnel, medical officers and NCO technicians were very difficult to obtain and late in arriving. To add to the medical staff shortage, the Air Force personal equipment specialist at Watertown was killed in the Mount Charleston crash of the MATS shuttle in November 1955, and the physiological training officer, Major Knauber, suffered a heart attack in the early spring of 1956 and had to be withdrawn from participation in the project. A contract for the services of a personal equipment technician for each base was written with the Firewel Company (which subcontracted for the manufacture of the pressure suit and auxiliary equipment), but these technicians had to be recruited and trained and were not available in the early training phase. A full-time Flight Surgeon for Watertown, Maj. James Deuel, reported for duty the first of June 1956, by which time the medical and equipment problems were beginning to smooth out.

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While certain parts of the pilots' personal equipment existed in Air Force stocks, modifications to the pressure suit and other components were deemed necessary for the environment to be experienced in the U-2, and therefore a period of development and testing of these items of equipment had to be undertaken along with the aircraft and systems testing. At the end of March 1956, Col. Ritland noted that although the history of personal equipment had been poor at the start, continuous improvement had been made in each item, and he anticipated that by the time Detachment B deployed in August 1956, this equipment would be standardized and available in sufficient quantities to meet project needs. The situation did improve through the summer of 1956 so that the Project Flight Surgeon was able to report in October that the personal equipment situation was in excellent shape both supply-wise and in operation, as was also the level of training of detachment personnel.

In the fall of 1957 when the Project Flight Surgeon's two year tour finished, it was agreed that a replacement at Headquarters would not be required, since the aeromedical needs of the two remaining field detachments and the test group which had moved to Edwards were being met routinely. General Flickinger was more easily available to the

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Project Headquarters staff for advice and consultation since ARDC Headquarters had moved meanwhile from Baltimore to Andrews Air Force Base on the outskirts of Washington. Therefore the Headquarters Medical Officer slot was cancelled and a Physiological Training Officer was assigned to Headquarters with the main task of monitoring the development and testing of personal equipment and establishing proper procedures for training the pilots in the use thereof. This policy has continued to the present.

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ANNEX 66

(Terms of Original Contract Signed by U-2 Pilots January 1956)
As Amended in March 1956

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY wishes to employ you in connection with an activity which has been discussed with you in some detail. The relationship created under this contract is classified in accordance with Agency regulations and is information affecting the national defense within the meaning of Sections 793 and 794 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

1. For the duration of this contract your services will be reserved exclusively for Agency activities, and you will make yourself available for these activities at such times and places as the Agency may direct.

2. You will carry out such instructions as the Agency may from time to time impart to you. Normally, you will receive instructions through your immediate superior, who is also your normal channel for communication with the Agency. You will be kept fully informed as to whom this official will be.

3. For these services you will be paid monthly for the duration of this contract in accordance with the following scale:

a. General Duty Status - \$775.00 per month.

This status will be in effect until reporting for duty at the first site and will be in effect in the event the activities contemplated are discontinued.

b. Operational Duty Status - \$1,500.00 per month.

This status will begin upon first arrival at the initial site and will continue so long as you are engaged in the contemplated activities whether in this country or elsewhere and in the event the activities contemplated are discontinued, you will be continued in an operational duty status for a period of ninety (90) days. Also, in the event you are unable by reason of misconduct or refuse without reasonable cause to engage in the contemplated activities, you will revert to general duty status.

c. In addition to the above amounts there will be credited on the books of this Agency an amount of \$500.00 for each month of service in an operational duty status overseas. At your option,

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in lieu of crediting this amount on the books, a \$500.00 Series G United States Savings Bond will be purchased in your name. However, this amount or the bonds will not be paid or delivered to you until after the first day of the calendar year following the performance of service for which these amounts or bonds are applicable. Fractional portions of a month will be prorated on the basis of a 30-day month.

d. In addition, an amount calculated at the rate of \$500.00 per month for each month of satisfactory service in an operational duty status overseas will be paid to you provided your services are not terminated for cause based on your misconduct or abandonment of your obligations hereunder. This amount will be paid within a three (3) year period from termination of this contract and the specific date of payment will be at the sole discretion of the Agency. Fractional portions of a month will be prorated on the basis of a 30-day month.

e. Compensation currently payable will be paid on or about the tenth day of the month succeeding the month in which earned. Payment shall be made in a manner requested by you in writing provided the method is acceptable to the Agency.

(1) From compensation payable to you there will be deducted appropriate amounts for withholding for Federal income tax purposes and Social Security deductions.

(2) You will file annual Federal income tax returns in a manner approved by this Agency.

f. The determinations required under this paragraph will normally be made by your immediate superior and in any event final determination will be at the sole discretion of the Agency.

4. In addition to the compensation otherwise provided in this contract, you will be provided:

a. Quarters and meals during the entire period of your service while at locations designated by the Agency except while in a leave status, or in a general duty status in the continental United States.

b. Transportation including authorized travel expenses in substantial compliance with Agency regulations to and from areas of Agency activities or to and from such other points when the travel is directed and approved by the Agency.

c. Upon expiration or termination of this agreement, transportation to point of hire or such other point as may be mutually agreed.

d. Thirty (30) calendar days leave annually, accruing at the rate of 2-1/2 calendar days per month. Such leave will be accrued and credited in accordance with the duty status for the period in which earned. No more than 60 days leave may be accumulated. While on leave, you will continue to accrue leave and will be paid in accordance with your status immediately prior to commencement of leave. When leave accrued in one duty status is exhausted, additional leave taken will be charged against and paid at the rate of leave accrued in the other duty status. Unused leave standing to your credit at time of expiration or termination of this contract will be paid for on a lump-sum basis at the rate of earnings at the time of accrual, i. e., leave earned while in an operational duty status will be paid at the operational duty status rate of pay and leave earned in a general duty status will be paid at that rate. All leave will be calculated on the basis of a 30-day month.

e. Transportation to and from such leave area as the Agency may approve.

f. Payment of medical costs and compensation for disability, injury or death incurred in performance of duty, to the extent provided by any applicable United States' laws or regulations.

g. In the event of sickness or injury to yourself not covered under this contract, you will be provided with the following:

(1) For minor injuries, sickness, and other medical and dental care, not requiring hospitalization, you will receive the office services of a doctor, selected by the Agency, free of charge, and necessary transportation in connection therewith, or, as deemed necessary and appropriate, medical care and treatment from appropriate facilities and doctors as may be approved by the Agency.

(2) The cost of hospitalization, or other specialized medical care for sickness or injury not due to your own misconduct, and necessary transportation in connection therewith.

h. In the event you are determined to be missing in service, benefits will be paid in accordance with Agency regulations on this subject which are in general accord with the principles of the Missing Persons Act.

5. The Agency has made arrangements whereby you will be eligible to secure certain life insurance and the Agency will pay the premiums on this life insurance. Payment of benefits under these various insurance programs will be in accordance with the laws, regulations and policies applicable in each case. The specific programs are as follows:

a. The life insurance plan underwritten by the United Benefit Life Insurance Company of Omaha, Nebraska. The face amount of this policy will be \$15,000.00.

b. The term life insurance policy available through the War Agencies Employees Protective Association which program is underwritten by the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States. The face amount of this policy is \$15,000.00.

c. The Federal Employees Group Life Insurance program which was authorized by Public Law 598, approved 17 August 1954. The face amount of this policy will be established at the next higher multiple of \$1,000.00 which is in excess of the current annual compensation rate.

Appropriate application forms and designation of beneficiaries will be required to be executed. The settlement of any claims arising under these policies will be initiated by the Agency without the requirement that the beneficiaries initiate action. The beneficiaries, of course, will be required to execute appropriate documents which documents will be transmitted to the beneficiaries by the Agency through appropriate means.

6. You hereby agree to make no claim for any compensation, benefit or service, other than those provided in this contract.

7. The duration of this contract will be two (2) years from the effective date hereof except that it may be terminated by the Agency at any time for cause based on your misconduct, wilful failure to follow

instructions, or abandonment of your obligations under this contract. In the event the activities contemplated are discontinued you may apply for reinstatement in your previous employment provided the Agency approves such application. If you do not apply for reinstatement under such circumstances this contract shall terminate sixty (60) days after the conclusion of the prescribed reinstatement period. In addition, if the Agency approves, you may apply for reinstatement in your previous employment at any time. In any event, this contract shall terminate as of the date of your reinstatement. Further, this contract may also be terminated at any time by mutual agreement in which case all benefits accrued to the date of termination will be paid you.

8. The effective date of this agreement is _____.

9. Due to the security considerations surrounding this contract and your activities, disputes or disagreements as to the terms of the contract are not subject to appeal to any other instrumentality of the United States Government and the final authority shall vest with this Agency.

10. You hereby agree never to disclose either the fact of this relationship or any information which you may acquire as a result thereof to any person, except as the Agency may authorize in writing. This clause imposes an obligation on you which shall survive the termination of this contract.

11. Your signature hereon will constitute acceptance of the terms of this agreement.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

By _____

ACCEPTED:

WITNESS:

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ANNEX 67

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(Terms of Pilot Contract as Amended Effective 1 January 1961)

Mr. _____

Dear Mr. _____:

Reference is made to your agreement with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective _____, as amended, a copy of which is attached hereto.

Effective _____, said agreement, as amended, is further amended as follows:

A. Paragraph 3. Delete sub-paragraphs a, b, c, d and substitute in lieu thereof the following:

"a. General Duty Status - \$1000.00 per month.

You will be placed in this status in the event your immediate supervisor determines that it is in the best interest of the contemplated activities, or in the event that you are unable by reason of lack or loss of personal proficiency in the contemplated activities, misconduct, or refusal without reasonable cause to engage in the contemplated activities, or if incapacitated as stated in paragraph 4e below, pending further decision of the Agency as to the future utilization of your services. Otherwise you will be in an:

b. Active Duty Status - (1) \$1250.00 per month.

(2) In addition, an amount calculated at the rate of \$500.00 per month for each month of satisfactory service in an Active Duty Status will be paid to you provided your services are not terminated for cause based on your misconduct or abandonment of your obligations hereunder. In the event your services are terminated for cause arising after 1 January 1961, the period of services from the commencement of this agreement to 1 January 1961 shall be considered a period of satisfactory service for the purpose of payments to be made under this sub-paragraph. The amount payable will be paid within a four (4)

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year period from the termination of this agreement and the specific date of payment will be at the sole discretion of the Agency. Fractional portions of a month will be prorated on the basis of a 30-day month. As of 1 January 1961, any amounts accrued under this agreement to 1 January 1961 will be placed in-escrow by the Agency for your account and will be paid in accordance with the provisions of this section, provided however, that as to such amounts placed in escrow the conditions for payment included in the first sentence of this section shall not be applicable.

c. Bonus - \$750.00 per month.

(1) You will be paid \$250.00 for each calendar month in which you are assigned to participate in an operational mission which has as its objective the overflight of the territory of a foreign nation, or you perform an unusual task. What constitutes an unusual task will be determined by the Agency in its sole discretion. Payment under this sub-paragraph shall not exceed \$250.00 for any one calendar month.

(2) In addition to and for each bonus payment made under the above provision, there shall be concurrently credited on the books of this Agency the amount of \$500.00. At your option, in lieu of crediting this amount on the books, a \$500.00 United States Savings Bond of an appropriate type will be purchased in your name. However, this amount or the bonds will not be paid or delivered to you until after the first day of the calendar year following the performance of service for which these amounts or bonds are applicable."

B. Paragraph 4. Delete sub-paragraph d. Substitute new paragraph d as follows:

"d. Thirty (30) calendar days leave annually, accruing at the rate of two and one-half (2-1/2) calendar days per month. Monthly leave credit and accrual shall be at the following calendar day values:

General Duty Status	-	\$33.33 and 1/3 cent
Active Duty Status	-	\$58.33 and 1/3 cent
Active Duty Status		
with		
Bonus	-	\$83.33 and 1/3 cent

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While on leave, you will continue to accrue leave at the same calendar day value as you did immediately prior to commencement of leave. Leave will be charged on the same basis. All leave standing to your credit as of the effective date of this amendment will be converted to the above leave schedule with "Operational Duty Status Overseas" being equated to "Active Duty Status with Bonus", and "Operational Duty Status in the United States" being equated to "Active Duty Status". All leave will be calculated on a 30-day month. No more than ninety (90) days leave may be accumulated. Unused leave credited to your account at the time of expiration or termination of this contract will be paid for on a lump sum basis."

C. Paragraph 7. Delete paragraph 7 and substitute the following therefor:

"7. This agreement is effective as of _____ and shall continue thereafter through 31 December 1961, except that it may be terminated by the Agency at any time prior thereto for cause based on medical or other incapacitating reasons including lack or loss of personal proficiency, misconduct, willful failure to follow instructions, abandonment of the obligations under this agreement, or upon ninety (90) days actual notice. During the ninety day termination period, your Status (General Duty or Active Duty) as of the date of receipt of said notice shall remain unchanged. In the event of termination, you may apply for reinstatement in your previous employment provided the Agency approves such application. If you do not apply for reinstatement within thirty (30) days after notification of termination, this agreement shall terminate sixty (60) days after the conclusion of such prescribed thirty (30) day reinstatement period. In addition, if the Agency approves, you may apply for reinstatement in your previous employment at any time. In any event, this contract shall terminate as of the date of your reinstatement. Further, this contract may also be terminated at any time by mutual agreement in which case all benefits accrued to the date of termination will be paid you."

If the extension of the effective period of the agreement and the amendments occasioned thereby and set forth above are acceptable to you, would you indicate your acceptance at the place indicated below and return this letter and the copy of the agreement to the Contracting Officer.

ACCEPTED:

WITNESS:

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

By: _____

Special Contracting Officer

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ANNEX 68

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8 May 1956

OPERATIONS POLICY LETTER NO. 6

SUBJECT: Intelligence Briefings, Including Policy for Pilots
Forced Down in Hostile Territory

1. Purpose: The purpose of this policy letter is to furnish guidance to detachment commanders on the classified information which may be furnished to Project pilots concerning their mission, and the briefings which should be given to Project pilots on procedure and conduct to be adhered to in the event they are forced down in hostile territory. The policies set forth herein are general in nature. Specific information, as applicable, will be included in separate intelligence instructions.

2. Classified Information:

a. Generally, the classified intelligence information imparted to primary mission pilots should be limited to that information which is considered essential to the successful accomplishment of their mission. Non-essential information concerning equipment fabrication and capabilities, utilization of photography and ELINT information acquired, Project organization and personnel, etc., should be divulged only when the withholding of such information might adversely affect pilot morale and/or jeopardize the mission itself.

b. It should be stressed to the pilots during briefings that the less intelligence information they possess, consistent with mission requirements, the better it will be for them in the event of capture. For this reason it is imperative that they be limited to only such intelligence as is necessary to carry out their mission.

c. Comprehensive tactical intelligence briefings should be given to all primary mission pilots on those defensive capabilities which could directly affect their respective missions or which might enhance the possibilities of safe return to friendly territory in the event of an emergency. These briefings should include at least the following:

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- (1) Air order of battle
- (2) Radar order of battle
- (3) Anti-aircraft order of battle
- (4) Guided missile order of battle
- (5) Air escape routes
- (6) Detection, tracking and intercept capabilities
- (7) Aircraft performance and tactics

d. In addition, all primary mission pilots should be thoroughly indoctrinated in evasion and escape procedures and techniques, and conduct and procedures to be followed in the event they are forced down in hostile territory. (See paragraph 3, below)

3.. Conduct and Procedures in Event of Emergency:

a. In the event of an emergency portending the loss of the aircraft behind enemy lines, the following procedures will be followed:

(1) If the emergency occurs in a populous area, prescribed procedures for demolition of the aircraft and classified equipment will be instituted. Under these conditions, bail out by the pilot will be standard procedure and a crash landing should not be attempted. These instructions, however, should not be construed as a restriction of the pilot's prerogative to attempt bail out or crash landing in neutral territory if there is a reasonable chance that such an attempt might be successful.

(2) In a remote area where the danger of immediate capture is less, a crash landing may be attempted at the option of the pilot, and the aircraft and equipment utilized for survival purposes. In this instance, the aircraft and classified equipment will be destroyed before departing the site of the crash landing.

b. After bail out or crash landing, if circumstances appear favorable, it is strongly recommended that evasion procedures and techniques be instituted immediately. Even when forced down on a deep penetration where successful evasion and ultimate return to friendly territory appears improbable, any delay in capture will be advantageous. In the final analysis, however, it will be the pilot's decision, based on the circumstances at the time, as to whether evasion will be attempted.

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c. Prior to deployment overseas, pilots will be given their choice of survival items to be included in their seat packs. Survival experts will furnish guidance on the selection of survival aids, if such assistance is desired.

d. If evasion is attempted, standard evasion techniques will be employed.

4. Conduct and Procedures in Event of Capture:

a. If evasion is not feasible and capture appears imminent, pilots should surrender without resistance and adopt a cooperative attitude toward their captors.

b. At all times while in the custody of their captors, pilots will conduct themselves with dignity and maintain a respectful attitude toward their superiors.

c. Pilots will be instructed that they are perfectly free to tell the full truth about their mission with the exception of certain specifications of the aircraft. They will be advised to represent themselves as civilians, to admit previous Air Force affiliation, to admit current CIA employment, and to make no attempt to deny the nature of their mission. They will be instructed, however, to understate moderately the performance of the aircraft in a plausible fashion. (It is recommended that stated capabilities should be decreased from actual capabilities by 10,000 feet altitude and 500 miles range). Such briefing should safeguard pilots from extreme treatment by permitting them the greatest possible latitude in responding to interrogations.

d. Pilots should make every effort to avoid discussing or divulging information given them during the tactical intelligence briefings on defensive capabilities; i. e., AOB, ROB, etc.

e. With regard to signed confessions, radio interviews, and similar activities which could be exploited for their propaganda value, all efforts must be made to resist.

5. Escape: Escape from captivity may be attempted at the discretion of the individual.

6. Policy and procedures for the conduct of pilots who are forced down in friendly or neutral territories will be as prescribed in Annex B of the Operational Order.

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ANNEX 69

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HEADQUARTERS DIRECTIVE
50-1055-24

INTELLIGENCE
27 OCTOBER 1965

POLICY GOVERNING CONDUCT OF RESISTANCE TO INTERROGATION
TRAINING AND GUIDANCE FOR PROJECT PILOTS FORCED DOWN IN
HOSTILE TERRITORY

1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this directive, which supersedes Operations Policy Letter Number Six, is to furnish guidance to the detachment commander on the classified information which may be furnished to Project pilots concerning their mission, and the briefings and training which should be given to Project pilots on procedure and conduct to be adhered to in the event they are forced down in hostile territory. The policies set forth herein are general in nature. Specific information, as applicable, will be included in separate intelligence instructions and Operations Plan Intelligence annexes.

2. CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

a. Generally, the classified intelligence information imparted to primary mission pilots must be limited to that information which is considered essential to the successful accomplishment of their mission. Non-essential information concerning equipment fabrication and capabilities, utilization of photography and ELINT information acquired, Project organization and personnel, etc., will not be divulged.

b. It should be stressed to pilots immediately upon recruitment and in subsequent briefings that in the national interest, and in their own interest, it is desirable that the technical, operational, and intelligence information they possess be held to the absolute minimum consistent with mission requirements.

It is imperative that they be limited to only such intelligence as is necessary to carry out their mission.

c. Tactical intelligence briefings should be given to all primary mission pilots on those defensive capabilities which would directly affect their respective missions or which might enhance the possibility of safe return to friendly territory in the event of an emergency.

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d. Primary mission pilots should be thoroughly indoctrinated in evasion and escape procedures and techniques, and conduct in hostile territory. (See paragraph 4, below)

3. INFORMATION TO BE WITHHELD FROM PILOTS:

The following information has been and will continue to be withheld from Project pilots:

- a. Involvement or support of other governments;
- b. Mission approval mechanisms;
- c. Knowledge of any other non-project related CIA operations, locations or personnel;
- d. Non-project covert organizations, activities and modus operandi of CIA;
- e. Existence and accomplishments of related similar parallel reconnaissance programs;
- f. Communications network, equipment and operations.

4. CONDUCT AND PROCEDURES IN EVENT OF EMERGENCY:

a. In the event of an emergency portending the loss of the aircraft within denied territory it is of paramount importance that the pilot insure the destruction of the aircraft and its equipment to the greatest extent possible. This can best be accomplished by ejecting at a safe altitude with the expectation that the aircraft will encounter major structural damage and burning upon ground impact. The pilot would be expected to actuate destruct systems installed in electronic countermeasure systems aboard.

b. After bail-out or crash landing, evasion procedures and techniques will be instituted immediately. Even when forced down on a deep penetration where successful evasion and ultimate return to friendly territory appears improbable, any delay in capture will be advantageous.

c. Standard evasion techniques will be employed.

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5. CONDUCT AND PROCEDURES IN EVENT OF CAPTURE WITHIN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC:

a. If all attempts to evade should fail and immediate capture is inevitable, pilots should surrender without resistance.

b. At all times while in the custody of their captors, pilots will conduct themselves with dignity.

c. When interrogated by their captors, pilots will freely furnish the following information only:

- (1) Name
- (2) Date and place of birth
- (3) Address in United States
- (4) CIA affiliation (civilian)

d. Beyond information in 5. c. , all queries should be met by a respectful refusal to divulge any further information.

e. It is assumed that the Communists will resort to a variety of methods and techniques in order to extract information they wish to obtain. Resistance to interrogation training includes instruction on methods and techniques of interrogation, including those common to all organizations and those specifically found in each potential target country. Emphasis should be placed on the importance of delaying any disclosures which could be exploited by hostile propagandists.

f. Disclosure of personal information: The pilot is expected to resist interrogation beyond the information set forth in 5. c. If, during the process of interrogation, the prisoner believes that his resistance to interrogation would be strengthened by adopting a different stratagem, he would make available some additional information. This new information should be wholly of a personal nature which will hopefully buy time for him and the United States Government. The individual will be assessed and instructed as to those parts of his personal life which should not be discussed. Each pilot will be made aware of the potentially dangerous

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consequences of talking about himself indiscriminately. For example, the discussion of certain emotionally loaded areas of his personal life can be exploited by a skilled interrogator to generate more emotion and thereby impair the captive's rational processes that are necessary for successful resistance. Counselling provided the pilot beforehand attempts to point out his own emotionally laden areas and to advise him on ways of avoiding them in his sessions with the interrogator. He will be further instructed to draw out allowable personal disclosures in order to give as much time as possible.

g. Disclosure of "Intelligence" information: A third group of disclosures has been chosen which would appear to the interrogators to be valuable intelligence information but which, in reality, would do little if any harm to CIA, its personnel and operations, or to the prisoner. The disclosures should be held in reserve and used as a last resort and given one at a time as reluctantly as possible. If the pilot is convinced that he must make disclosures within this group, he should preface any such disclosures with a statement that for obvious reasons he was given very little information other than what was essential for him to complete his mission. Technical data concerning our reconnaissance systems were not made available to him; he simply "pushed buttons" as he was instructed to do. In addition, throughout his association with our Project he was stringently compartmented to prevent his acquiring information that was not essential to his primary function as a pilot.

- (1) Name and position of one CIA (civilian) employee who sent the pilot on the mission;
- (2) Limited modus operandi of CIA as it has been exposed to the pilot, and names of a few CIA detachment personnel he has met, stressing CIA involvement not military;
- (3) Limited technical information on the mission aircraft (only the information needed for pilot operation and excluding all details of construction and payload);
- (4) Names of contractor firms that may be involved in the Project but excluding detailed knowledge of their contributions;
- (5) Involvement of military personnel in a support role only, as associated with the overt ostensible unit mission, i. e., cover story.

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6. INFORMATION TO BE WITHHELD FROM INTERROGATORS:

The individual will be specifically instructed to resist to the limit of his ability disclosing or confirming the following:

- a. Knowledge of, or involvement in past overflights;
- b. Confirmation that the entire detachment was involved in reconnaissance operations over denied territory and specifically that military personnel were knowledgeable of this mission;
- c. Confirmation that refueling aircraft bore Air Force markings;
- d. Knowledge of any classified military operations he may have been exposed to in his Air Force career;
- e. Technical information about the mission aircraft or its systems except for those basic cockpit instructions needed to operate the vehicle.

7. CONDUCT AND PROCEDURES IN EVENT OF CAPTURE IN HOSTILE AREAS OTHER THAN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC:

- a. If all attempts to evade should fail and immediate capture is inevitable, pilots should surrender without resistance.
- b. At all times while in custody of their captors, pilots will conduct themselves with dignity.
- c. Pilots, in these circumstances, will strictly adhere to the cover story given them prior to the mission. Their cover story will be an appropriate statement which will be tailored to the circumstances of specific missions, and will be set forth in detail in the Fragmentation Order for the mission, or series of missions if applicable.
- d. Headquarters will be responsible for issuing instructions prior to each mission concerning aircraft markings, preparation of cover props, composition of survival and E&E gear, etc., to insure to the greatest possible extent that recoverable evidence is consistent with the cover story.

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8. FRIENDLY OR NEUTRAL TERRITORIES:

Policy and procedures for the conduct of pilots who are forced down in friendly or neutral territories will be as prescribed in the Operations Plan.

9. PILOT INDOCTRINATION INTO HOSTILE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS:

Every effort will be made to acquaint the pilots with procedures followed in the various hostile judicial systems under which they could be imprisoned and tried. These systems will include the USSR and Communist China as well as others to which they could be subjected. Specific training and indoctrination will involve examples of undesirable legal or propaganda effects to be expected as a result of submitting to certain demands made by the pilots captors.

10. ESCAPE:

Escape from captivity may be attempted at the discretion of the individual.

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ANNEX 70

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under statutory authority
of the Central Intelligence Agency
FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(6)

U-2 PILOTS - 1955-1967

<u>Name</u>	<u>EOD</u>	<u>Detachment</u>	<u>Termination</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Abraham, James G.	28 May 56	B	14 Oct 56	[redacted] returned to Air Force.
Baker, Barry H	10 July 56	C, B & G	30 June 67	Returned to Air Force and took 20-yr retirement. Awarded DFC and 1st Oak Leaf Cluster.
Barnes, James A.	13 July 56	C, B & G		With Detachment G.
Birkhead, Thomas C.	14 May 56	B & C	31 Oct 60	Returned to Air Force.
Carey, Howard	30 Mar 56	A	17 Sept 56	Killed in explosion of U-2 after take-off from Wiesbaden.
Cherbonneaux, Jas. W.	4 Oct 56	B & G		With OSA; converted to Agency Staff.
Crull, Thomas L.	31 Jul 56	C	31 Oct 60	Returned to Air Force.
Dunaway, Glendon K.	19 Jan 56	A	31 Jul 61	Returned to Air Force.
Edens, Buster E.	16 May 56	B, C & G	25 Apr 65	Killed during U-2G test flight at Edwards; bailed out, chute failed to open.
Ericson, Robert J.	25 Aug 56	C, B & G		With Detachment G.

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of the Central Intelligence Agency
FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(6)

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Gorman, Arthur W.	25 Aug 1956	C	12 Dec 1956	[Redacted]
Grace, Frank G.	13 July 1956	A	31 Aug 1956	Killed in crash at Watertown at Take-off on a night practice flight.
Grant, Bruce G.	22 January 1956	A	12 July 1956	[Redacted] returned to Air Force; [Redacted]
Hall, William W.	1 June 1956	B & G	23 Jan 1958	Contract terminated on mutual agreement; returned to Air Force awarded second Oak Leaf Cluster to DFC.
Jones, Edwin K.	28 May 1956	B & C	31 July 1961	Returned to Air Force.
Kemp, Russell W., Jr.	25 Aug 1956	C	11 June 1957	[Redacted] returned to Air Force.
Knutson, Martin A.	12 January 1956	A, B & G		With Detachment G.
Kratt, Jacob, Jr.	21 January 1956	A & C	31 July 1961	Returned to Air Force.

Withheld from public release
under statutory authority
of the Central Intelligence Agency
FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(6)

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McMurray, William H.	13 May 1956	B & C	31 Oct 1960	Returned to Air Force.
Overstreet, Carl K.	9 Jan. 1956	A	8 Jan 1958	Returned to Air Force; awarded DFC.
Powers, Francis G.	14 May 1956	B	6 Oct 1962	Shot down by Russians 1 May 1960 near Sverdlovsk. After release and return to States, opted accept employment with Lockheed as test pilot.
Rand, Albert J.	31 July 1956	C, B & G		With Detachment G.
Rose, Wilburn S.	15 April 1956	A	15 May 1956	Killed in training accident at Watertown.
Rudd, Walter L.	31 July 1956	C	31 October 1960	Returned to Air Force.
Shinn, John C.	31 July 1956	C & B	31 October 1960	Returned to Air Force.
Smiley, Albert B.	25 August 1956	A	4 June 1957	Returned to Air Force; awarded 3rd Oak Leaf Cluster to DFC.
Stockman, Hervey S.	21 Jan 1956	A	20 Jan 1958	Returned to Air Force. awarded 1st Oak Leaf Cluster to DFC.
Strickland, Frank L.	31 July 1956	C	29 Oct 1956	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 150px; height: 20px; display: inline-block;"></div> returned to Air Force.

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of the Central Intelligence Agency
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Snider, Sammy V. C.	16 May 1956	B & C	31 October 1960	Returned to Air Force.
Vito, Carmine A.	10 January 1956	A, 	18 April 1960	

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Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

partici-
pated in Indonesian over-
flight program
Returned to Air Force.

The following pilots were recruited subsequent to the initial thirty, listed above.

Bedford, James R., Jr.	27 June 1963	G	Recruited from Air Force.
Hall, Robert E.	24 June 1964	G	Recruited from Air Force.
McMurtry, Thomas C.	20 November 1964	G	Recruited from Navy.
Schmarr, Daniel W.	24 June 1964	G	Recruited from Air Force.
Webster, Ivor B.	16 November 1964	G	Former RAF (JACKSON) hired as resident alien.

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CHAPTER XI. DETACHMENT A.

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Detachment A - Officer Cadre

Col. Frederic E. McCoy, Commanding Officer (Sept. 1955-June 1957)

- [Redacted]
- Lt. Col. Elmer Gould, Materiel Officer
- Maj. Philip Karas, Operations Officer
- Maj. George K. Reberdy, Medical Officer
- Maj. John T. Whitescarver, Intelligence Officer
- Maj. Fred W. Pope, Weather Officer
- Maj. Delbert E. Eversole, Pilot AOB, Intelligence Officer
- Maj. Henry H. Spann, Pilot AOB
- Maj. Samuel J. Cox, Jr., Photo Navigator
- Capt. Edward S. Majeski, Photo Navigator
- Capt. Russell E. Johnson, Physiological Training Officer

[Redacted]

Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 403g)

U-2 Pilots:

- Howard Carey (killed on local training flight in Germany, 17 Sept 1956)
- Glendon K. Dunaway
- Frank G. Grace (killed on night training flight, Watertown, 31 Aug 1956)
- Bruce G. Grant [Redacted]
- Martin A. Knutson
- Jacob Kratt, Jr.
- Carl K. Overstreet
- Wilburn S. Rose (killed in training accident at Watertown, 15 May 1956)
- Albert B. Smiley
- Hervey S. Stockman
- Carmine A. Vito

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CHAPTER XI. DETACHMENT A

Organization, Manning and Training of First Field Unit

On 7 September 1955, General Orders No. 1 of the 1007th Air Intelligence Service Group, HEDCOM, USAF, announced the designation and organization of Project Squadron Provisional, with subordinate units, Flights A, B C and D, "for the purpose of providing an organizational structure, operating units, and command channels for the USAF elements of a classified project". These were the original CIA cover units to which Air Force officers and enlisted men were assigned when selected to staff the headquarters and field units of AQUATONE.

Headquarters, USAF, proposed and CIA accepted as nominee for Commanding Officer of Flight A Colonel Frederic E. McCoy who, upon reporting to Project Headquarters in September 1955 was almost immediately sent to the domestic training base in Nevada, where in addition to building his detachment "from scratch" he was required to act as Base Commander until the nominee for that position arrived on board. He was thus thrown into a command position over a heterogeneous group in the field before he had enough time at Headquarters to absorb the flavor of the project and understand the philosophy behind its joint military/civilian nature.

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Col. McCoy's first concern, the build-up of his detachment cadre, was hampered by shortages of personnel and delays in reporting dates of those assigned. He advised Headquarters at the beginning of December 1955 that unless immediate action were taken to fill key positions, the detachment would certainly not deploy on schedule, with consequent adverse effects on the entire program. He expressed a strong desire to have an Air Force officer assigned as his Deputy rather than a civilian Executive Officer as called for by the Detachment Table of Organization. He was willing to have the administrative support officer also be designated a Deputy Commander if this were desired in order to retain for the Agency the control and liaison necessary between CIA Headquarters and the detachment in the field.

The Project Director of Administration did not concur with this suggested change in the command structure and said in a memorandum to the Project Director:

"...As I understand it, the thinking about the operational phase of the project has been that CIA would retain operational control of Detachment activities. I do not think that an overseas Detachment can be completely successful unless a large degree of autonomy is granted it, not only in its day-to-day administration, but in the actual conduct of its operational missions. If both the Detachment CO and the Deputy are of the same cloth, be it CIA or Air Force, you do not obtain that

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counterbalance and relative objectivity that initially seemed desirable..." 1/

Mr. Bissell agreed with this interpretation of the intent of the joint agreement, and an Agency staff officer, was recruited as Executive Officer for Detachment A.

The question of whether Commanding Officers of AQUATONE field detachments should be considered Chiefs of Stations or Chiefs of Bases under existing Agency Regulations was raised with the DD/S in January 1956 and it was confirmed that Chief of Station status was correct since these officers would report directly to Headquarters.

SAC Training Unit at Watertown

As a part of the Air Force support of AQUATONE, the 4070th Support Wing was activated 20 December 1955 with Headquarters at March Air Force Base, California, and with the mission of training and equipping the operational units of AQUATONE and providing support for these units in overseas theaters. Previously, in September, Col. William Yancey had been named to head the training detachment which was sent PCS to March, with TDY to the test site at Watertown for the purpose of training the three AQUATONE detachments.

1/ SAPC-2886, 9 December 1955. Memorandum to Project Director from Project Director of Administration.

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The SAC officers assigned to the training unit visited Watertown on 19 October and held discussions with Mr. C. L. Johnson and the Lockheed training pilots, and with Headquarters personnel. Suit fittings and chamber tests were set up for the next two weeks, followed by an orientation period at the Lockheed plant. The first week of November the unit began flying the U-2 under Lockheed test pilots' supervision.

Shortages were reported by Col. Yancey in mid-November including more personnel needed to maintain base aircraft and ground power equipment and to service fuel trailers; more ramp space and supply facilities; and two chase planes for the training program.

In December 1955 Col. Yancey reported further to Project Headquarters that he could not discharge his responsibility to Gen. LeMay of certifying to combat readiness of Detachment A until the detachment was assembled as a unit at Watertown Strip prior to deployment of any of its echelons overseas. Mr. Bissell agreed with this procedure.

* SAC Training Unit Cadre: Col. William Yancey, Commanding Officer; Lt. Col. Philip O. Robertson; Maj. Robert E. Mullin; Maj. John DeLap; Maj. Louis A. Garvin, Capt. Louis C. Setter, Capt. John H. Meierdierck; MSGT Frederick D. Montgomery, SSGT Davis N. Sweidel, SSGT Paul W. Briest.

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and approved the augmentation of housing and other facilities required at Watertown. This action, however, took some time to accomplish.

On 7 February, Col. Berg also reported to Mr. Bissell that he had received some static from SAC Headquarters because Detachment A was not yet an entity at Watertown. The training program had been delayed almost a month due to the late arrival of the pilots, the first three beginning indoctrination and transition training in the T-33 on 11 January. Headquarters Staff meanwhile was bending every effort to fill the Detachment's T/O and get the assignees on board at the training base.

By the middle of February 1956 the majority of the Detachment A cadre and the first six contract pilots were at Watertown and with the aid of the SAC Support Unit were progressing in flight training in the U-2 and in setting up the flyaway kit and procedures for maintaining it. The operations staff were beginning to plan training flights and brief and debrief pilots under supervision of the SAC training officers. There were still personnel shortages, particularly in the materiel, personnel, and physiological training and personal equipment fields.

A Case Officer (in the Clandestine Services sense) to handle the needs of the contract pilots had been included in each detachment T/O

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(stemming from the original intention to use foreign pilots). Col. McCoy preferred, however, that his pilots be completely integrated into the unit and billeted overseas along with the other members of the group, with their administrative affairs being handled by regular unit personnel. Headquarters agreed, and returned the Detachment A Case Officer designee, to Washington for reassignment.

One difficult problem faced in organizing Detachment A was the practice of various Project Headquarters components and parent services of dealing directly with the Detachment's assigned personnel rather than going through command channels. Col. McCoy's frustration over this situation culminated in the following message to the Project Director:

"... This is a formal complaint relative to the lack of control of Detachment A personnel by the Commanding Officer caused by direct actions of other sources and channels. Request that Security, Communications and Administration be advised this is improper procedure. If such actions continue I will request withdrawal from the project. The Commanding Officer must control all personnel and materiel of his unit." 1/

Mr. Bissell immediately gave orders to Headquarters elements that once a detachment was activated at the test base, its personnel were

1/ CABLE-1743 (IN 00434), 5 April 1956.

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under control of its Commanding Officer and could not be directed by staff officers at Headquarters. The purpose of activating detachments at a training base before deployment was to cut the direct line between particular groups in the field and their Headquarters components, thus establishing the unit as a completely separate and self-sufficient entity under the immediate control of its Commanding Officer.

At the end of March 1956, cover arrangements for the overseas operational phase were negotiated with NACA and the Air Weather Service and on 29 March Detachment A was reconstituted "Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional (1st)" by authority of AWS General Order No. 7.

Selection of Base for First Operations: Early Survey of Turkish Bases

In March 1955, the Project Director outlined the operational concept of AQUATONE to Chief of Operations, DD/P, and said that rear operating bases would be needed in the U.K., Turkey and Japan, and forward staging bases probably in Pakistan or Iran, and Norway. The Chief of Operations (then Mr. Richard Helms) made two recommendations: first, that the initial and sole operational approach to any government be to the security service of that government, possibly supported by a parallel approach at the very highest level but no other

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approach should be considered through State Department or military channels; second, that the cover story generally to be used in these approaches should be that CIA is planning agent infiltration or exfiltration and will possibly take advantage of the opportunity to get incidental photographic or electronic coverage. (As a practical matter, neither of these plans turned out to be feasible once the operational stage was reached.) It was planned to have a knowledgeable person with CIA operational experience visit countries where bases would be desired and investigate the possibilities. It was tentatively agreed that regular Station (CIA) personnel would not be cut in on the project at any stage with the possible exception of Station Chiefs.^{1/} (On various occasions, due to the exigencies of the situation, this plan had to be modified in order to obtain vital assistance from Agency Stations.)

In the summer of 1955 Col. Marion C. Mixson of Headquarters Operations Staff and Mr. Gilbert Greenway of the Air Maritime Division investigated availability of bases in Europe and the Middle East, ostensibly for an Air Force project, and developed a base facilities list for future consideration.

^{1/} TS-103270, 1 March 1955. Memo for the Record by R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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On 7 October 1955, Lt. Col. Leo P. Geary, USAF (who was at that time assigned to [redacted] began a week's survey of available bases in Turkey; after visiting Incerlik, Diyarbakir, and Batman, he reported the latter two unsuitable, but considered Incerlik (the SAC base at Adana) as satisfactory, provided a fair amount of additional construction could be accomplished before arrival of the Detachment. On the strength of Air Force support for the use of Adana, planning went ahead on the assumption that Detachment A would go to Turkey with approval being obtained as quickly as possible from the Turkish Prime Minister. It had been learned that an approach through either the Turkish Intelligence Service or the Turkish Air Force would not suffice since Menderes would have to know and approve the operation in any case. When the State Department was consulted in November 1955, however, it was recommended that the approach to Turkey be put off due to the less than cordial relations at that moment on the diplomatic front.

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A survey was made in December by Lt. Col. Geary of existing facilities in Greece, which led to a request that [redacted] approach the Greek Government to ascertain its attitude toward the use of bases at Elevsis or Neankhialos. (At the end of January 1956 the Greek

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Government gave its approval for project operations from either base, but action was postponed, on advice of the State Department, until after the upcoming Greek elections due to be held 16 February 1956.)

Approval Sought to Operate from the U. K.

During the first week of January 1956, it had been decided to approach the British for permission to operate out of a SAC base in England (by far the best choice of bases), even though the current Conservative Government and Prime Minister Eden were under heavy attack by the opposition at the time and were working toward rapprochement with the Soviets. Mr. Bissell departed on his mission on 9 January after receiving detailed guidance from Mr. Dulles and Gen. Cabell on the nature and substance of what should be said to the British. The effort was to be made throughout the talks to describe the proposed operation in such a way as to accomplish two results:

"...to emphasize the potential value to the UK and the sense of partnership with respect to the intelligence take and ...to play down the political significance and to emphasize the high probability that the majority of missions will go entirely undetected. The objective is not only to pave the way for clearance to operate from the U. K. but to minimize any sense of alarm about possible political repercussions and thus to minimize the incentive on the part of the British to try to maintain a tight control over operations." 1/

1/ TS-142937, 6 January 1956. Memo for Record by R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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On the 10th and 11th of January 1956 the special project was discussed in London with two representatives of the British Government.

Mr. Bissell's record of the conversations follows:

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"An initial approach was made in company with [redacted] to Sir John Sinclair, Chief of MI-6. A parallel approach was made 24 hours later by General Wilson, Commander, Third Air Force, USAF, to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, the ranking RAF Officer in London at the time. Both men were briefed quite fully on the Project. The reason for these approaches was stated to be, in general, our wish to invite the partnership of HMG in an activity which would be of as great benefit to them as to us and, specifically, to advise them that permission would very probably be requested to operate from the U. K. It was explained to them that, although the Project was of course fully known to and approved by highest political authorities in our own Government, final and definitive permission to proceed with operations had not yet been sought. It was further said, however, that the development phase was now virtually completed and such permission would, we hoped, soon be obtained.

"In the course of the discussions, the following points were made concerning the character of the operation and the relationship of the British Government to it:

"a. The operation will not be a military one, but rather a clandestine intelligence gathering activity. It will be conducted by a mixed task force largely civilian in composition and under civilian control.

"b. The right of HMG to withdraw at any time its permission to operate from the U. K. would be clearly recognized (and is implicit in a request for permission to initiate such operations). In order to permit review of its decision from time to time, the British Government would be kept fully and continuously informed about operations undertaken from the U. K.

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"c. All raw intelligence secured through this project would be shared with the British Government, subject only to agreement on secure handling thereof. This applies to intelligence secured in operations from locations other than the U. K. as well as to that secured from operations out of the U. K. (with the possible exception of operations in the Far East).

"Both of the individuals to whom this presentation was made were advised that, although no formal request was being addressed to HMG pending final approval within our own Government, it was anticipated that this matter would be raised on the occasion of the Prime Minister's forthcoming trip to Washington. Sir John Sinclair undertook to bring the matter promptly to the attention of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs so that he and the Prime Minister would be prepared to discuss it in Washington. Sinclair made it clear that the request would have his own strong support. The Deputy Chief of the Air Staff likewise undertook to discuss the proposed operation with the Foreign Secretary and to furnish a technical opinion from the standpoint of the RAF. He, too, indicated that the project would have his enthusiastic support. Both men were advised of the extreme closeness with which knowledge of this project has been held within the U. S. Government and agreed that it should receive similar treatment in London. Among the Americans who took part in these conversations it was the consensus that the Foreign Secretary would play a central part in the final decision of the British Government, that he would probably favor the project, and that the Prime Minister would probably have strong reservations. . . " 1/

A meeting was to be arranged between the DCI and the Foreign Secretary during the course of the latter's visit to Washington, in order to get the reactions of the British Government, and Mr. Bissell recommended that before Prime Minister Eden and the Foreign Secretary

1/ SAPC-3455, 20 January 1956. Memorandum to DCI from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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arrived in Washington, approval should be sought from highest U.S. authority to begin the operational phase of AQUATONE, contingent upon the host government's agreement. (The latter recommendation was not acted upon since General Cabell counseled delaying the approach to the President until Detachment A was farther along the way toward a complete state of readiness.)

On 2 February 1956 the DCI met with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and the special project was discussed at length. The Foreign Secretary said he saw no objection in principle to the conduct of operations from the U.K. He emphasized that the Prime Minister would have to make the final decision and that HMG would not wish operations to be undertaken during the forthcoming visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to the U.K. It was agreed that the Foreign Secretary would take the matter up with Eden within the next few days and convey a definite answer in a week's time. If the answer were favorable, the Foreign Secretary would then be advised through the British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Roger Makins, as to specific action required of the British in order to expedite the preparation of a base in the U.K. 1/

1/ TS-143202, 3 February 1956. Memorandum for the Record, by R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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On 8 February the DCI wrote to the Secretary of State advising him of the discussion with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and requesting that he formalize the approach to the British by transmitting a memorandum to the Foreign Secretary through Ambassador Makins. A suggested draft note to the Ambassador was supplied for the Secretary's use. It was later learned that no memorandum was given to the Ambassador when he called at the Department on 9 February--only a verbal request for information on his Government's willingness to cooperate in the special project. (See Annex 71 for text of exchange of notes between the DCI and the Secretary of State.)

No reaction was received to the U.S. query until 2 March 1956 when a rather negative and indefinite message was delivered by Ambassador Makins to the Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr. Later on that same day, a note to the British was drafted and approved by State requesting a definite answer so that, if necessary, alternate planning could go forward. It was agreed to halt construction going on under USAF direction at Lakenheath Air Base in England until definite reaction was received from the British; also to ask General Light, DCS/Materiel, USAFE, to survey available facilities in Germany for the project and develop plans for adapting

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the best available base to project needs; and, since the political climate vis-a-vis Turkey appeared to be improving, to take a fresh look at prospects for a high level approach to the Turks.

On 6 March 1956, [] announced that approval had been given by the British for the project to operate from Lakenheath. Lt. Col. William A. Wilson, the project's Deputy Chief of Logistics, who had departed from England for Germany to negotiate with USAFE for an alternate base, was called back to Lakenheath to get construction moving again, and the 7th Air Division (SAC) was advised by SAC Headquarters to render all necessary assistance in readying the base for Detachment A's deployment.

Detachment A Combat Ready

An optimistic estimate for deploying the first field unit had been set as between the 1st and 31st of March 1956, and Headquarters USAF had blocked space for 210 personnel and 160,000 pounds of cargo to be airlifted during that period. As delays in readiness occurred, the airlift requirement was rescheduled, eventually slipping to May 1st.

The quota of U-2 pilots for each detachment was set at 10, but due to the complex and time-consuming procedures for getting these pilots on board, only six had completed training by the end of March.

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At that time a total of more than 900 flying hours had been accumulated on the U-2 aircraft, and 39 of the more than 350 flights had been long-range ones of more than six hours duration. The proved performance of the aircraft at this date showed maximum altitude from [] [] range 4,150 nautical miles, and speed []

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The Unit Simulated Combat Mission (USCM) tests were set for 10-14 April 1956 and an Evaluation Board appointed by the Air Force monitored and passed on each detail of the Detachment's performance. According to Col. Mixson of the project headquarters staff, who was a member of the Evaluation Board, the detachment proved its ability to carry out its assigned mission even though camera reliability was less than 100%, and engine performance was still somewhat of a problem. This latter point caused a good deal of concern and Gen. Cabell questioned whether deployment should not be postponed until engine performance was more reliable. (During the tests there was one forced landing away from home base due to a flame-out. The aircraft and pilot were recovered safely with the assistance of the Commanding General at Kirtland Air Force Base, where the emergency landing was made.)

Mr. Bissell, on 19 April wrote to Gen. Cabell and set out for his consideration the extent to which the deployment of Detachment A had

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already proceeded and the dislocation which would ensue as a result of a postponement of the move to the U. K. He made a very strong case for carrying through the scheduled deployment and then conducting a sufficient number of shake-down flights over friendly territory to prove the reliability of the system, familiarize the pilots with the operational environment and possibly test enemy radar.

On the same day Mr. Bissell's memorandum recommending the earliest possible deployment to England was written, a Russian seaman on the deck of the Soviet Cruiser Ordzhonikidze (which had brought Khrushchev and Bulganin to England on an official visit) sighted a frogman maneuvering in the water near the cruiser in Portsmouth Bay. The subsequent events of that day did not reach public attention until the 5th of May when the Soviet protest note was delivered to the British.

Deployment to England

On 24 April the DCI was informed by memorandum from Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Jacob E. Smart, that Detachment A was considered operationally ready as a result of the USAF evaluation. It was recommended that Detachment A be deployed to Lakenheath Air Base, England, during the period 29 April to 4 May 1956 in accordance with the planned schedule. Mr. Dulles concurred and added, in reply:

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"I particularly wish to express on behalf of this Agency my gratification at the highly effective support that has been rendered to this project by all components of the USAF and also at the close and cooperative relationship that has been developed between our two parent organizations. In particular, I would like to call your attention to the very great contribution that has been made to this enterprise by the SAC 4070th Support Wing under Colonel William R. Yancey, by his Director of Materiel, Colonel Herbert I. Shingler, Jr., and by the Project Office in USAF Headquarters under Colonel Russell A. Berg. Preparations for the operational phase could not possibly have been made so quickly or so well without the skillful and devoted service of the men in these two USAF components." 1/

The deployment took place on schedule with an airlift composed of eleven SAC and MATS C-124's and two MATS C-118's. By 7 May the entire group was in place at Lakenheath. The Operations Order of WRSP (I) stated its mission to be the conduct of "regular and frequent overflights of the Soviet Bloc to obtain photographic and electronic intelligence and to conduct weather and air sampling flights for cover purposes as required."

While the Detachment was settling into its new home and readying the aircraft and equipment for its primary mission, the case of the lost frogman (Commander Larry Crabb) became headline news. Certain British news media quoted "experts" as saying that British

1/ TS-143422, 1 May 1956. Memorandum for Maj. Gen. Jacob Smart from Allen W. Dulles.

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Intelligence had carried out this activity without Eden's knowledge and accusing Eden of not exercising proper control over his intelligence agencies. Criticism of the government mounted daily and the matter was brought up for debate in the House of Commons on 15 May.

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On the 16th of May, Mr. Bissell arrived in London for the purpose of getting British approval to launch overflight operations. On the 17th he learned

that Prime Minister Eden had sent a message to President Eisenhower on 16 May requesting a postponement of the beginning of overflights from the U. K. The Eden note was delivered to the President on 17 May via the British Embassy and the State Department. Mr. Allen Dulles was shown the note and later dictated a summary of it from memory, as follows:

"I regret to trouble you again, but I now have new embarrassments in the frogman incident which was bad business. It was a Secret Service affair. The press is on the alert and likely to ask questions about unusual aircraft. I do not feel I can take further risk though I realize that you on your side will take all precautions. But there could be mishaps.

"In my Commons speech, I said I intended to safeguard at all costs the possibility that the discussions with B. and K. might prove to be the beginning of a beginning of better relations. This may bring a lessening of tensions and I can't

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risk impairing this prospect. I understand that high altitude sampling is the cover. If limited to this it would not wholly stultify preparations already made and would relieve me of anxieties for the time being. I am sorry to suggest a postponement and this is only asked because of my present difficulties." 1/

On 18 May during a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Patrick Dean, Mr. Bissell mentioned that four U-2's were now at Lakenheath and were beginning their shake-down and training flights, at which news Mr. Dean became quite agitated since, he said, the Prime Minister had been informed there was only one aircraft involved. He requested that all air operations cease immediately until further notice. Col. McCoy was notified to ground all flights. On the same afternoon, however, a U-2 on a training flight had already caused an RAF fighter squadron alert which had been taken care of by the 7th Air Division with the aid of Air Vice Marshal McDonald after a very nervous few moments.

It was deemed advisable to have a statement released to the press announcing the presence of the Detachment in the U. K. in order to minimize curiosity on the part of the press and public once the new aircraft was sighted, as well as to enhance the cover story. The near

1/ Unnumbered ~~TS~~ Memo for the Record, 19 May 1956, Subject: Outline of Note from "A" to "E", delivered 17 May 1956.

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catastrophe of the fighter alert made this a necessity before further local flights took place. The Prime Minister agreed to a release within his imposed limitation that only high altitude sampling flights would be allowed. The approved text as released by the Air Ministry on 22 May read as follows:

"Preparations are being made to carry on a recently announced research program of the U.S. National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics in the U.K. and elsewhere in Europe with U.S. Air Force support. The program, recommended by the NACA's Gust Loads Research Panel, involves the gathering of information about clear air turbulence, convective clouds, wind shear, and the jet stream at altitudes between 50,000 and 55,000 feet.

"Although civilian personnel and aircraft will be used, the Air Weather Service of the USAF will provide operational and logistic support for the program, since the NACA has no facilities of its own outside the U.S. In the U.K. the program will be conducted from one of the RAF bases used by the USAF.

"Among the types of aircraft to be used is one recently developed by the Lockheed Aircraft Corp. for use as a high altitude test-bed. It is powered by a single jet engine, has a light wing loading, can maintain a ten-mile high altitude for several hours at a time and is therefore well suited for the gathering of data at high altitudes." 1/

Movement of Detachment A to Germany

As soon as it was known that the Prime Minister's "postponement" would be in the order of months rather than days, plans were followed

1/ TS-143476, Tab A, 25 May 1956. Memo for the Record by A. D. Marshall.

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up with General Light at USAFE Headquarters to prepare the base at Giebelstadt for a limited staging group with perhaps two aircraft rotating back to Lakenheath between operational missions for major maintenance. This arrangement was agreed at a meeting on 23 May in Frankfurt attended by Chief of Station Tracy Barnes, General Light, and General William H. Tunner of USAFE, and Mr. Bissell representing the project. However, while these plans were going forward, it was learned on 1 June that the Prime Minister was planning to request complete withdrawal of the U-2 unit from the U. K. as quickly as feasible. On 4 June 1956, the DCI sent a message to [redacted] with the following information to be passed to the British [redacted]

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"In view of the Prime Minister's determination, we will transfer AQUATONE operations to Germany or Turkey. For the interim period of approximately five weeks, we will leave one or two U-2's at Lakenheath for meteorological missions. Line of command, supply channel and communications will be established direct from Headquarters to interim operating base. Remaining activities at Lakenheath will be completely separate. . . Since we have no inclination here to seek modification of the Prime Minister's views, believe no useful purpose will be served by another letter on this subject from the Prime Minister to the President. Hope Patrick Dean can forestall another letter since these communications are apt to have the effect of hardening and formalizing positions on both sides. In any event we are abandoning all plans for utilization of Lakenheath

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other than continuing meteorological missions pending completion of facilities elsewhere." 1/

Since Giebelstadt could not be made ready quickly enough to receive the full group, on 5 June a conference in Gen. Light's office (with Cols. Mixson, McCoy and Shingler representing project interests) reached agreement that available space at Wiesbaden Air Force Base was operationally suitable and should be made the interim base for Detachment A, the move to take place beginning 11 June. Headquarters approved this plan and the movement of approximately half of the detachment was accomplished between 11 and 13 June with the all-out logistic support of USAFE Headquarters.

Approval to Begin Overflights

At a White House meeting on 28 May 1956, the DCI discussed the AQUATONE readiness for operations, among other subjects, with the President, but no decision came out of that meeting. On 1 June the DCI and General Twining met with Col. Goodpaster and left with him a paper entitled "AQUATONE Operational Plans" (see Annex 72) for the President's approval. The President had entered Walter Reed Hospital for tests and diagnosis of an abdominal ailment at the time.

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The paper outlined the present operational concept for the three U-2 detachments and the value of the intelligence which could be obtained, underlining the wasting nature of the asset and the necessity for an immediate beginning in order to reap the benefits of the temporary technical advantage now enjoyed over the Russians. On the basis of these considerations, it was proposed to proceed as follows:

"a. We are making preparations to start operations from Germany if possible by 15 June.

"b. Initially we will limit ourselves to missions over the Satellites. These fall within the pattern of operations already in progress by the Air Force.

"c. After a few such missions have been flown, we will, if all goes well, seek permission to undertake longer-range missions.

"d. In accordance with already established practices, we will not consult with the German Government with respect to our initial limited operations. Prior to the start of our long-range operations, however, we will inform Chancellor Adenauer of our plans. We will not specifically ask his approval in order to avoid placing an unwelcome responsibility on him. If, however, he raises any objections or feels these operations might prove embarrassing to him, we will consult further before embarking upon them.

"e. Depending upon the Chancellor's reaction, we will either plan to continue operations from Germany for the life of the project (as we hope) or operate only temporarily from Germany until facilities can be made ready in other locations..." 1/

1/ TS-143443/B, 31 May 1956. (See Annex 72)

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It was noted in the paper that the plan of action had the approval of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Secretary of State.

The President's illness, meanwhile, was diagnosed as ileitis and on 9 June he underwent corrective surgery, remaining at Walter Reed Hospital until 30 June, then going to Gettysburg for a recuperation period. Having received no negative reaction from the White House regarding the proposed action, on 13 June Mr. Bissell advised the DCI:

"Our first detachment will be ready to begin operations from Wiesbaden on or about 15 June. It is planned to start with a few missions over Satellite territories in accord with your earlier decision.

"These initial operations are fully covered by the already outstanding authority granted the Air Force to conduct overflights of the Satellites, moreover they will fit within a specific Air Force program of 16 overflight missions which has been approved under that general authority by the JCS, State and CIA, and with which Commanding General USAFE has authority to proceed. It would appear no problem of additional authority arises.

"There can be no doubt that the substitution of the initial missions planned by the Detachment for some or all of those contemplated in the Air Force program will significantly reduce the political risks involved. The use of our new equipment will permit the same intelligence to be collected in fewer missions with less chance of tracking and with virtually no chance of interception. It goes without saying that this arrangement has the full approval of the Air Force and the Theater Commander for precisely these reasons.

"I propose to proceed as above unless you instruct me to the contrary." 1/

1/ SAPC-6753, 13 June 1956. Memo to DCI from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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The Director agreed with the proposed course of action, and on the same day, 13 June, obtained the approval of the Secretary of State to proceed. On this authority Detachment A was notified to commence overflights of the Satellite countries as directed by Headquarters Operations Control Center.

At this point, although Detachment A was operationally ready at Wiesbaden, the opportunity was taken between 15 and 17 June to replace the P-37 engines with the newly approved P-31's in view of the higher performance attained by the P-31's.

As a result of discussions between Mr. Bissell and Gen. Cabell on the CIA side and Generals Twining and Millard Lewis on the Air Force side with regard to USAFE's requirements for Satellite photographic coverage, the following agreed position with respect to AQUATONE missions over the Satellites was conveyed to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee on 18 June:

"All concerned are in agreement that it is operationally unwise to employ the AQUATONE specialized reconnaissance system for targets of as low priority as those in the Satellites especially since these targets can be pretty safely covered by the use of other less advanced equipment. On the other hand, it is also recognized by all concerned that we have in effect been instructed by higher authority that at least a few missions limited to the Satellites must be flown in order finally to prove out our weapons system before we will be permitted to employ

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it for deep penetration missions of the USSR, the purpose for which it was designed. Accordingly, there is no disagreement as to the course of action to be followed.

"The commitment it is proposed to make to Gen. Tunner is simply that during our initial missions over the Satellites and, where appropriate, on the outward and homeward legs of longer range missions, we will obtain as complete a coverage of his targets as possible. For the initial phase when missions are restricted to the Satellites, the decision has already been made, for the reasons indicated in the preceding paragraph, to incur the risks involved even though the targets are of limited importance. In the later phase when deep penetrations are in progress, it is understood that coverage of the Satellites will be strictly a by-product of operations justified by much higher priority requirements..." 1/

The first mission was flown on 20 June 1956 from Wiesbaden over Poland and return; the pilot was Carl Overstreet, the U-2 was equipped with the A-2 camera, and photographic results were classified as "good". The next day Gen. Twining made a stop-over in Germany on his way to Moscow to attend a Soviet air show and while at USAFE Headquarters he requested a stand-down of overflights for the duration of his visit to Russia. Detachment flying was therefore restricted to local test hops for another full week.

On 21 June Mr. Bissell accompanied Drs. Land and Killian to a meeting with Col. Goodpaster at which the President's policy guidelines

1/ SAPC-7029, 18 June 1956. Memorandum to Chairman, ARC, from Project Director.

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for the conduct of AQUATONE were set forth. The President was still in the hospital but he had read the "AQUATONE Operational Plans" memorandum and, in general, approved the course of action recommended. He had expressed these specific desires as to operational timing, as reported by Col. Goodpaster (see Annex 73):

a. Overflights of the Satellites could be carried out without informing Chancellor Adenauer but no overflights of the USSR should begin until the Chancellor had been informed of our plans.

b. Once missions had begun over the Soviet Union, every effort should be made to obtain the priority target coverage as quickly as possible so that the operation would not have to be continued for too long a period of time.

Immediate plans were made to brief Chancellor Adenauer so that the primary objective of the project could be undertaken as soon as possible. Gen. Cabell and Mr. Bissell proceeded to Frankfurt and on 27 June 1956, accompanied by Chief of Station Tracy Barnes and Mr. Alan P. White (acting as interpreter), went to Bonn and gave a full project briefing to the Chancellor and Foreign Minister Hans Globke. The reactions of the Chancellor were described by Mr. Barnes as "approval and enthusiastic endorsement" of the project. (Later

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at the request of the Chancellor a briefing was also given to the head of West German Intelligence (Gen. Reinhard Gehlen) on 11 July by Mr. Barnes.

First Missions over the Soviet Union

With the briefing of the German Chancellor accomplished, and Gen. Twining safely back from his trip, the weather turned unfavorable over the primary Soviet targets. Two more Satellite missions to the South were flown on 2 July covering Bulgaria and Rumania, but photographic results were only fair to poor.

On 3 July Project Headquarters cabled Detachment A that a high level decision had been made that the first two weeks operations (1 - 14 July) would be carefully reviewed on the 15th; and that clearance to continue after that would have to be renewed at short intervals. The Detachment was requested to develop maximum capability for the remaining time allowed, subject to equipment reliability and safety of flight, in order to make the best record possible.

At that point the weather cleared somewhat to the north and on the 4th of July the first mission over Russia was flown over Moscow and Leningrad. Because of heavy cloud cover over Moscow on the first mission, a second was flown on the 5th with excellent results. Three

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more missions covered the Baltic area, Kiev and Minsk (via Czechoslovakia and Hungary) on 9 July, and the Crimea/Black Sea area on the 10th.

Soviet Tracking Capability

Estimates of Russian radar and interceptor capabilities in the early planning stage of AQUATONE were: limited detection capability above 60,000 feet; little tracking capability; no aircraft interception; ground-to-air missile ceiling 50,000 feet, going to 60,000 feet in possibly a year and a half. On 30 March 1956, when Col. Ritland was leaving the project after a year as Deputy Project Director, he noted that the several sightings of the U-2 made by radar stations in the West Coast area were not consistent with intelligence forecasts to date. He felt it should be assumed that the aircraft would be picked up by unfriendly radar and plotted for short distances. He recommended that simulated maneuvers be conducted with the aid of the Air Defense Command to pin down the capability of ground radar to intercept and identify the aircraft.

The Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) of DD/I was called upon to make the recommended study (the first in a long line of vulnerability studies by OSI) and submitted their report on 28 May 1956:

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"a. Maximum Soviet radar detection ranges against the Project aircraft at elevations in excess of 55,000 feet would vary from 20 to 150 miles, depending on the radar and the manner in which it was employed. In our opinion, detection can therefore be assumed.

"b. Considering the importance of such factors as distance and speed, it is doubtful that the Soviets can achieve consistent tracking of the Project vehicle. There is certainly no available evidence from any other operation which would indicate sufficient capability on their part.

"c. No known Soviet interceptor can achieve the requisite altitude to enable successful engagement of the Project vehicle at its intended operational altitude, nor would there be much risk at any elevation above 57,000 feet. The possibility of using a stripped-down fighter or research vehicle to ram or otherwise intercept it is remote.

"d. An estimate of the risk from Soviet guided missiles, surface-to-air or air-to-air, can not be made with great certainty. We estimate a SAM capability in the regions of Moscow and Leningrad but, from analogy with U.S. missiles, we doubt that the Soviet SAM maintains adequate stability beyond 60,000 feet to be a major interception device against the Project vehicle. We know nothing about Soviet air-to-air missiles but, considering the problems of launching at extreme altitude coupled with the difficulty of getting the launching platform in position to launch, we believe no great risk attends this mode of interception (air-to-air) versus the Project vehicle.

"e. We believe it feasible, though extremely difficult, for the Soviets to maneuver a stripped-down reconnaissance aircraft into a position from which visual or photographic surveillance can be achieved for a brief time. We believe successful reconnaissance of this type would be the result of an unlikely combination of favorable circumstances rather than solely because of successful operation of Soviet GCI. Such reconnaissance could

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only occur near the centers of Soviet aircraft experimental work (Moscow-Remenskoye and the like). " 1/

In light of paragraph b, above, it came as a rather rude shock to some to find that on the first overflight (20 June over Poland) the U-2 was tracked from the moment it entered the Soviet orbit throughout the flight. Mr. Bissell reported to the Project Staff on 10 July that Russian radar was tracking the U-2 so consistently that they would probably be able to compute its altitude more accurately than the aircraft's own altimeter. He anticipated the possibility of a diplomatic protest and said while such a protest might not force Project activities to stop, it would certainly limit the area of operations.

Russian Protest

On 11 July 1956, Soviet Ambassador to Washington Georgi N. Zaroubin presented a protest note (see Annex 74) to Secretary of State Dulles, charging that United States "military aircraft", identified as a twin-engined bomber, had grossly violated Soviet air space on 4, 5 and 9 July with flights as deep as 200 miles inside the Soviet Union. The Secretary of State, at the instruction of the President, called for the grounding of all overflight operations immediately.

1/ TS-143485, 28 May 1956. Memorandum by OSI, "Estimate of Interceptor Capabilities".

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On 16 July, Polish Ambassador Ramuald Spasowski delivered an oral protest to Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy that jets flying at high altitudes on 4, 5, 9 and 10 July had violated Polish airspace. On 21 July the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry passed a note of protest to the American Embassy in Prague demanding that overflights of Czechoslovakia be stopped.

The reply to the Russian protest was delivered to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington on 19 July and stated that after conducting a thorough inquiry, it had been determined that no United States military aircraft could possibly have been involved in the overflights alleged by the Soviet Union. (Full text of reply is in Annex 74.)

Faced with an indefinite grounding as a result of the first protest, Mr. Bissell addressed his thoughts on the "Immediate Plans for AQUATONE" to the Director and General Cabell on 18 July, in part as follows:

"...I can not help wondering whether the purely political implications of an immediate and probably final cessation of operations in Europe have been fully considered by the Secretary of State. As you are aware, it will appear to the Soviet authorities that their protest accomplished its purpose literally within hours of its delivery. Is it really desirable to demonstrate in this way both the closeness of our control over these operations and our extreme sensitivity to a diplomatic protest even when no evidence can be adduced in its support? Do we

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wish to demonstrate again to Adenauer and Menderes, as in the case of GENETRIX, that we will not carry through projects of this sort in the face of a protest? I would think that at a minimum one or two missions should be flown over satellite territories and at least one penetration made into the USSR if only to avoid what seems to me to be disastrous political consequences of a demonstration of timidity. I recognize this is a matter for the Secretary of State. If he is not worried about the political considerations or if he believes it is futile to reopen this matter with the President, there is certainly no move that can be made from this Agency...

"With respect to the construction now in progress at Giebelstadt, I believe the Air Force should be advised that there is little prospect we will ever wish to operate from that base so they may reach a prompt decision as to the completion, modification or suspension of work now in progress there...

"Although I do not recommend any modification at this time of the decision to install a detachment at Adana as soon as that base is ready, I would like to emphasize for the record the basis of that decision. The fact of the matter is that there is very little likelihood of our being able to penetrate the USSR from the south without detection. We have already flown missions over the Crimea and have been tracked more accurately there than in Central Russia. It is no exaggeration to say that the only prospect of being able to penetrate without tracking is for flights over the Caspian Sea. Accordingly, if the President's present views remain substantially unchanged, we will never be permitted to operate from Adana. Viewed in this light, the deployment of a unit to that location can be justified only as a preparation for the contingency that the President will change his mind in a few weeks time. I suppose this can be justified on the ground that we have already spent some 75 million dollars to little purpose and we may as well spend a bit more on the off chance that things will change for the better." 1/

1/ TS-158355, 18 July 1956. Memo for DCI and DDCI from Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

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It is understandable that Mr. Bissell should have felt almost complete frustration at the turn of events for he had been responsible, more than any one man or group of men, for bringing this unique reconnaissance system to operational readiness and, by the force of his own persuasion, obtaining political approval to launch it on its mission.

From this point on in the history of the project it became a matter of selling the capability of the system in order to stay in business. A special processing center for handling the mission film payload had been set up at Eastman Kodak Company's Rochester plant and as soon as the film from the first Russian overflights arrived there and processing began, a relay of Headquarters photo-interpreters visited the center to inspect the results and clip sections of film which showed promise of the greatest intelligence value. These were blown up to make briefing boards for the daily high level expositions of the AQUATONE intelligence product. These briefings came to be known as "Lundahl's Dog and Pony Show", so-called for Mr. Arthur C. Lundahl, head of the Photo Interpretation Center (PIC, later NPIC) which was then in process of being set up to handle the exploitation of AQUATONE film. His lucid expositions of the photo intelligence obtained made him a very effective advocate for the continuance of the program. However,

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it was again Mr. Bissell, who, after this first grounding, had to carry the burden of persuading higher levels not to abandon the U-2 capability.

Detachment A Command and Morale Problems

A visit by Mr. James Cunningham to Wiesbaden during the first week of July confirmed the fact that the concept of a civilian Executive Officer as second in command of Detachment A was not working out at all. While this was partially attributable to the personality conflict between the two men involved, Mr. Cunningham felt it was more the result of Colonel McCoy's clear, stated feeling that the Air Force should take care of everything pertaining to operations and the flying of the aircraft, and Agency personnel should take care of security and other support matters, and neither side should concern itself with the affairs of the other. As a result of this attitude, the senior Agency member of the team, [redacted] was not being informed at all of the nature and progress of operations, had never been asked to sit in on a mission briefing, did not know the "target for the day" or the alternate German bases to be used in the event of an emergency.

Mr. Cunningham recommended to the Project Director that the Executive Officer be withdrawn, and asked for a ruling on whether or not the concept of command should be revised. Mr. Bissell directed that

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while the present incumbent should be withdrawn without prejudice for reassignment, the concept of command remained valid (as demonstrated by the satisfactory arrangement between the Detachment B Commander and his Executive), and that a replacement for Executive Officer at Detachment A was to be recruited immediately. (This was done, but took several months to accomplish.)

Weather and local proficiency flights were resumed at Wiesbaden after a week of inaction following the protest, but morale of the personnel was very poor and the Commanding Officer was offering no leadership and exercising very little restraint on the group's behavior either on or off base. The temporary installation at Wiesbaden was unsatisfactory for a protracted stay with crowded housing, poor messing, and other causes for grumbling. The contract pilots had time to indulge in "gripe sessions" and to draw up lists of grievances (some justified, others not), all of which had to be arbitrated back at Headquarters. The basic cause of demoralization was the stand-down and the lack of information on prospects for future activity. All travelers returning to Washington from visiting Wiesbaden brought the same story of a slackening of effort by the group to stay operationally ready.

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Future Plans for AQUATONE

A conference was held at Headquarters on 26 July to discuss AQUATONE's future prospects, those present being Mr. Bissell, Gen. Cabell and Gen. Frank Everest, Director of Operations, Headquarters, USAF. It was planned to make a joint CIA/USAF/JCS approach to the President on 15 August 1956 to request permission to resume AQUATONE overflights. Detachment B was to be deployed as planned. Pending the 15 August verdict, Detachment A would remain at Wiesbaden but plans for redeploying to the Far East would go forward on a contingency basis. Construction at Giebelstadt was to continue on an orderly, rather than a crash, basis with the intention to send Detachment C there in November.

At the end of July, Gen. Curtis LeMay, Commander of SAC, had informed Agency representatives that, recognizing the value to SAC of AQUATONE's capability, he would give his fullest support if political approval was forthcoming. He was asked to let the Joint Chiefs know of his support in order to add weight to the approach to higher authority. (It should be remembered that at this time the Air Force follow-on program for procuring U-2's to bolster SAC's reconnaissance capability was well along with sizeable sums of money committed.)

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The Project Director devoted his best efforts in early August toward setting out for the Director the strongest possible brief in support of the continuance of the program, always with the realization that the presentation to the President would require previous concurrence of the Secretary of State. The final Bissell draft of this brief was presented to Gen. Cabell for approval and, with his changes, was passed to the Director on 11 August 1956 (see Annex 75). Mr. Allen Dulles agreed to see his brother, the Secretary of State, and obtain his approval of the recommendations in the memorandum. The Project Director hoped to obtain permission for about 15 deep penetrations of the USSR to cover the highest priority targets on the approved list, but if a negative decision resulted, he proposed that the capability be used against the lower priority Chinese Communist targets, operating out of Japan.

Middle East Activity: Postponement of Further Soviet Overflights

Before a hearing could be arranged with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the Secretary departed for the London Suez Conference, and the hoped-for meeting with the President was also put off until September. As a result of the conflict in the Middle East, approval was given for coverage of the trouble spots and Detachment B, just

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arrived on base at Adana, Turkey, was told to prepare to run these missions. Col. McCoy obtained permission also for his group to join in this coverage and on 29 and 30 August Detachment A originated two flights from Wiesbaden, covering Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, refueling at Adana, and returning to Wiesbaden. The results of these flights were processed and given immediately to the British and were used by them in tactical planning in the Suez action, although their field commanders were not privy to the source of their intelligence. While coverage of the Middle East continued by both Detachments A and B, on 30 October 1956 the decision was made by higher authority to deny the British any further intelligence from this source in view of the trend of British/French action in this very touchy international situation.

On the return to Washington of Secretary Dulles, a briefing was held on 7 September with Mr. Bissell and Col. John Bridges of the USAF Intelligence Directorate briefing, and Secretary of the Air Force Donald Quarles and Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Radford, in attendance. Secretary Dulles expressed concern that any further operations from Germany would surely result in another protest from the Russians and said he would like to give further thought to the matter before any

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decision was made. Meanwhile he had to return to Europe for more conferences and during his absence an opportunity availed for a briefing of the President on 17 September.

(On the same day, the first U-2 accident at an overseas base occurred. Shortly after take-off from Wiesbaden on a training flight, the aircraft exploded in mid-air, killing the pilot, and spreading wreckage over a wide area. The President was given this information during the briefing of 17 September.)

After the briefing, the President indicated that he wished to have another meeting with the Secretary of State and General Cabell before making any decision regarding further overflights. He expressed again the feeling that as long as the Russians knew we were engaged in this activity they would feel it was intolerable and might feel they had to take some action such as hot pursuit of one of our aircraft to its base, thus creating an international crisis. Or the Russians might even consider the presence of our aircraft over their territory a preparation for war and be led to take countermeasures which might lead to war.

Despite the qualms expressed by the President, Mr. Bissell reported to his staff that the President appeared friendly and relaxed and did not appear inclined to postpone a decision of the issue beyond his next

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meeting with the Secretary of State. However, the hoped-for meeting was delayed further due to the international situation, or the absence of one or the other of the two principals from Washington.

Meanwhile the construction at Giebelstadt was completed and early in October 1956 Detachment A was relocated there with a much improved environment, including quarters, mess and security of operations. The replacement Executive Officer, [REDACTED] joined the group in September and found it even more demoralized than he had been warned it would be. The move to Giebelstadt brought morale up somewhat, at least temporarily.

In October 1956, the eyes of the world were on Hungary where the Freedom Fighters were being brutally subdued by Soviet troops and tanks. It was hoped that a decision in favor of further overflights of the USSR could be obtained from the President since there would be less likelihood of a Soviet protest, or if one were made, little chance of its attracting any sympathy whatever. When the Director met with the President on 15 November, however, there was still no decision on further AQUATONE activities, and the status quo continued with both Detachments A and B flying Middle East missions and an occasional Satellite overflight.

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Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

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At the beginning of April 1957, Mr. Bissell again reminded the Director of the major questions requiring answers, beyond the principal one of whether overflights of Russia would be permitted in the coming good weather period. If the Agency expected to retain the U-2 capability after the fall of 1957, he saw four possibilities:

- a. Continue at roughly the same strength.
- b. Continue at half strength and cut to two instead of three detachments.
- c. Continue at reduced scale under cover of a commercial survey company.
- d. Continue in cooperation with the Navy with one or two carrier-based units.

Decisions also had to be made on the disposition of Watertown, recruitment of replacement personnel for those whose tours were expiring; preparation of the budget for FY 1958; and establishment of requirements for Air Force (or possibly Navy) support. Mr. Bissell recommended discussing these issues with the Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Thomas White, and others of the Joint Chiefs, before seeking Presidential guidance. The meeting with the President was postponed several times and finally was held on 6 May 1957. Approval was obtained for

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a series of missions to be staged from Pakistan by Detachment B, but overflights of Russia from Germany were still considered too much of a provocation by the Secretary of State and the President.

For the first half of 1957 Detachment A flew only one operational mission (over Albania) and was occupied principally with local flights in support of the meteorological and air sampling programs. At the end of June 1957, Col. Mixson relieved Col. McCoy as Commanding Officer, and his arrival exerted quite a sobering influence on those members of the Detachment whose working and living habits had grown too lax under the previous regime.

On 20 September 1957, Detachment A was notified that its activities were to be phased out and the facility at Giebelstadt closed down in November. In October the final two operational missions approved for Detachment A were flown from Giebelstadt--one Elint mission over the Barents Sea during Soviet Navy Maneuvers, and one photographic mission over Murmansk with excellent results--a belated opportunity to demonstrate, after a year of frustration, what might have been accomplished by this group had the political climate been less unfavorable.

As a footnote to the last two missions, Norwegian radar plotted these two flights all the way back to base in Germany and as a result

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Norwegian Intelligence (Col. Evang) put pressure upon the [redacted]

[redacted] to get the intelligence from these missions for

his service. [redacted] authorized to

offer Evang intelligence in the form of written reports, unless the

Norwegians insisted on photos. The offer was made on 15 November

and the Norwegians accepted the offer of a written report with appreci-

ation, promising support for future operations if ever required.


On 5 and 6 November 1957, two U-2's took off from Giebelstadt each day and were flown via Plattsburg, N. Y., two to Edwards Air Force Base for Detachment G use, and two to Del Rio, Texas, to the SAC U-2 Wing. By 15 November, all Detachment A personnel had departed from Giebelstadt and on that day the communications link with Giebelstadt was closed and the facility turned back to the Air Force.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

8 February 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State

SUBJECT : Meeting with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd,
2 February 1956

1. On 2 February when I met with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, the first topic I discussed with him was the Special Project (AQUATONE/OILSTONE - TS) with which you are familiar. You will remember that Mr. Bissell had advised the British of this Project two weeks ago in London. At that time it was taken up with them simultaneously through Sir John Sinclair of MI-6 and the Deputy Chief of Air Staff. Both men were advised that the matter would be raised by us on the occasion of the Washington meetings. My purpose in discussing the matter with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd was to ascertain his attitude toward our provisional request that we be allowed to conduct operations under this Project from the UK.

2. Present at this meeting in addition to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and myself were Sir Roger Makins, Mr. P. F. Hancock (Mr. Lloyd's private secretary), and Mr. Bissell. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd remembered the Project when I mentioned it to him and as we discussed it he seemed quite well informed about it. He seemed generally well disposed toward it and did not raise any objection in principle to the conduct of operations from the UK. He emphasized, however, that the Prime Minister would have to make the final decision. He explained that the Prime Minister had been told about the Project and the proposal to operate from the UK but had not been asked for a definite decision, since no formal request for permission to operate there had yet been presented to the British Government by us. He also added that his Government would not wish operations to be carried on during the forthcoming visit of the Soviet leaders to the UK.

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Copy 1 of 6

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- 2 -

3. Certain specific points should be noted about the conversation.


a. At no point was any reference made to the imposition of controls or limitations on our activities by the British (in the event that they permit us to operate from the UK), although I made clear our recognition of their right to halt operations at any time and promised that they would be kept closely informed of our operations.

b. We indicated that we would share the intelligence take from any operations run out of England.

c. We told Mr. Selwyn Lloyd that his help would be needed in expediting certain modifications of existing structures that will have to be undertaken. (It was understood that we would pay for these modifications.)

4. In concluding the discussion it was agreed to proceed as follows: The Foreign Secretary promised to discuss this Project with the Prime Minister in the course of the remainder of their trip so that the latter would soon be prepared either to grant or to refuse approval in principle to the conduct of operations from the UK. Meanwhile, in order to put the matter in the proper channels, I said that I would communicate with you with a view to the transmission by you of a memorandum to Sir Roger Makins who would in turn send a message to London requesting the reaction of HMG. This message would serve both to formalize our approach and to remind Mr. Selwyn Lloyd of my conversation with him.

5. I attach herewith a draft of a note you might consider sending to Sir Roger Makins. Since our discussion of the Project was reasonably full and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd's secretary took notes on it, I do not believe it is necessary for either your communication to Sir Roger Makins or his cable to London to do more than refer to our conversation. For security reasons we would obviously prefer that no revealing reference to the Project be made in the British cable traffic. Accordingly, this draft is brief and quite sterile.



Allen W. Dulles
Director

Attachment: Draft

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PROPOSED NOTE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO SIR ROGER MAKINS

In the course of the visit to Washington of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs last week, the Director of Central Intelligence and Mr. Richard M. Bissell, jr. discussed with the latter a sensitive Project (AQUATONE/OILSTONE - TS) which will involve the collection of certain kinds of intelligence information on a much expanded scale. I understand that you participated in this conversation.

For technical reasons the operations contemplated in this Project cannot be conducted from the United States. The plan is to conduct them from several friendly countries both in Europe and the Far East. It is our earnest hope that they can start in the United Kingdom.

The purpose of this note is to ask that you ascertain through your channels the reaction of the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister to this proposal. In making this request, I wish to emphasize the real importance that is attached to this Project by the intelligence community of this Government and the benefits that will accrue to both Governments if it can be carried out successfully.

I hope the handling of the matter in this manner is in accord with the understanding that was reached in the conversation referred to above.


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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON~~TOP SECRET~~

February 9, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR The Honorable Allen W. Dulles

I raised the project referred to in your attached memorandum of February 8 with Ambassador Makins today. I asked him whether his Government was prepared to cooperate with it and what their ideas were about timing.



John Foster Dulles

Attachment:

Memorandum dated February 8,
re Meeting with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd.

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ANNEX 72

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31 May 1956

AQUATONE OPERATIONAL PLANS

1. In the light of the discussion of AQUATONE and related matters on 28 May, we have reviewed operational plans and possibilities in consultation with the Air Force. The following facts and considerations have a major bearing on our conclusions:

a. Work is going forward as rapidly as possible to prepare facilities in Turkey but these cannot be ready much before 1 August. Operations could be initiated in Germany by 15 June.

b. The six weeks from mid-June to late July that can be gained by starting operations in Germany are of especial importance because the weather is at its best and the days are longest at that time of the year. Operations over all target areas can be conducted more frequently and more productively in June and July than during the autumn and winter. These months acquire added importance from the fact that operations can be usefully conducted over northern target areas only during the summer months.

c. A second unit will be ready for deployment overseas early in August and facilities should be ready to receive it. There would not be room for both units at Adana, Turkey. In any event it is desirable to base operations at two or more locations so as to secure maximum coverage and to preserve our flexibility in the face of changing political circumstances.

d. Providing reasonably good security can be maintained locally, the operation of our equipment at a German base should involve no greater risk of compromise than its operation in England, since unauthorized persons are given the same opportunity to see it from a distance at any overseas base. Its appearance at several locations in Europe is consistent with the cover story that is being used and might help to dispel any air of mystery about the activity.

e. We are actively planning for operations in the Far East and expect shortly to select a base in that area and move forward with the preparation of any specialized facilities. However, in terms of numbers, some four-fifths of our intelligence targets in the USSR, and in terms of

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quality a higher percentage of really important targets, are accessible from Europe rather than from the Far East. Moreover, many of the Far Eastern targets have been, or can more readily be, covered by other means. It is for this reason that we propose to use the first two units in Europe and the third in the Far East.

2. The major task to which all of our preparations have been directed is the performance of long-range missions over areas hitherto inaccessible with any degree of safety. Such missions promise to yield decisively valuable intelligence obtainable in no other way. Time is of the essence in the performance of this task since the technical advantage that has been gained is only temporary and the security that cloaks it is a wasting asset. Before long, the Russians will develop the capability consistently to track and somewhat later to intercept high altitude aircraft. We must assume that they will soon have photographs of our equipment which will allow them to guess at its performance and will stimulate their efforts. Meanwhile, with the mere passage of time, the maintenance of tight security grows more difficult. Accordingly, it is our conviction that the sooner we are able to embark upon our major task the more securely it can be accomplished.

3. On the basis of the above considerations we propose to proceed as follows:

a. We are making preparations to start operations from Germany if possible by 15 June.

b. Initially we will limit ourselves to missions over the Satellites. These fall within the pattern of operations already in progress by the Air Force.

c. After a few such missions have been flown, we will, if all goes well, seek permission to undertake longer-range missions.

d. In accordance with already established practices, we will not consult with the German Government with respect to our initial limited operations. Prior to the start of our long-range operations, however, we will inform Chancellor Adenauer of our plans. We will not specifically ask his approval in order to avoid placing an unwelcome responsibility upon him. If, however, he raises any objections or feels these operations

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might prove embarrassing to him, we will consult further before embarking upon them.

e. Depending upon the Chancellor's reaction, we will either plan to continue operations from Germany for the life of the project (as we hope) or operate only temporarily from Germany until facilities can be made ready in other locations.

4. The Chief of Air Staff concurs in the above conclusions as far as they concern operational matters. (Specifically he concurs in 3 a, b, and c but makes no comments on d and e.) The Secretary of State also concurs in the above conclusions.

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ANNEX 73

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22 June 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster,
Dr. James Killian and Dr. Edwin Land, 21 June 1956

1. At Dr. Killian's request I accompanied him and Dr. Land to the White House at noon on 21 June to brief Colonel Goodpaster on AQUATONE and to discuss current operations with him. No one else was present. Before the briefing was started, Colonel Goodpaster explained that he had just returned from a meeting with the President at Walter Reed Hospital and that the President had discussed AQUATONE with him. Colonel Goodpaster had with him the original copy of the memorandum entitled "AQUATONE Operational Plans" dated 31 May (copy of which is attached) which had been handed to him by the DCI and General Twining at the beginning of the month. The President had read the paper and had made a longhand notation upon it. His discussion of AQUATONE with Colonel Goodpaster had been related to the paper.

2. Colonel Goodpaster stated that the President's views were as follows:

a. In general, he approved the course of action recommended in the paper.

b. Specifically, he was entirely willing that we should operate over the satellites without informing Chancellor Adenauer about these activities but he emphasized that no longer run missions should be undertaken until the Chancellor had been told of our plans.

c. He agreed that the approach to the Chancellor should take the form recommended in the paper--that is, he should not formally be asked for his approval but merely told about the projected longrange operations, which would give him a chance to raise objections if he so desired.

3. The President, Colonel Goodpaster said, had added a general instruction in rather strong terms as to the policy to be followed in AQUATONE. This was to the effect that every effort should be made

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to obtain just as quickly as possible coverage of the high priority targets which were the real objective and justification of AQUATONE so that operations would not have to be continued for too long a period of time. I pointed out to Colonel Goodpaster that restriction of operations to the Satellites was directly inconsistent with the policy desired by the President. Goodpaster replied that in his view the President had no particular desire to restrict us to these limited operations except that he did not wish deeper penetration missions to be undertaken until after the project had been discussed with the Chancellor.

4. In concluding this phase of the conversation, I asked Colonel Goodpaster whether a correct interpretation of what he had said was that after the projected conversation with the Chancellor we are free to proceed with deep penetration overflights, provided, of course, that the Chancellor raised no objection and that our limited operations had gone well in the meanwhile. He indicated that this was his view.

5. The balance of the conversation was devoted to a rather full briefing of Colonel Goodpaster and discussion of various phases of the project primarily by Drs. Killian and Land. The main topics discussed were the following:

a. Progress of equipment, with special emphasis on the shift that has been made to the new (J-57/P-31) and more reliable engine and on the extremely high quality photography obtained in recent flights in the U. S. with the A-1 and A-2 camera configurations.

b. Present enemy interception capability, the predictable development of a higher altitude interception capability, and a consequent urgency of making use of this reconnaissance system while a clear advantage over interception still obtains.

c. Colonel Goodpaster's desire for periodic operational reports when deep penetration missions are being conducted.

d. The whole question of the position to be taken by the U. S. in the contingency of the loss of an aircraft over enemy territory. On this point I explained that arrangements of a rather pedestrian sort were being worked out with the Department of State and other interested parties. Drs. Killian and Land suggested consideration of a much bolder action by the U. S. involving admission that overflights were being

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conducted to guard against surprise attack. It was left that we would think further about this matter and perhaps suggest several alternative courses of action which would be discussed with someone in the Department of State and among which a choice could be made on short notice.

(Signed)
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Project Director

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ANNEX 74

(Text of Russian Protest: Unofficial Translation)

Embassy of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

10 July 1956

Note No. 23

The Embassy of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United States of America and, acting on instructions from the Soviet Government, has the honor to state the following:

According to precisely verified data, on July 4 of this year, at 8:18 a.m. Moscow Time, a twin-engined medium bomber of the United States Air Force appeared from the American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany and flew over the territory of the German Democratic Republic, entering the air space of the Soviet Union from the direction of the Polish People's Republic at 9:35 in the area of Grodno. The aircraft which violated the air space of the Soviet Union flew on the route Minsk, Vilnyus, Kaunas and Kaliningrad, penetrating territory of the Soviet Union to the depth of 320 kilometers and remaining over such territory for one hour and 32 minutes.

On July 5 of this year, at 7:41 Moscow Time, a twin-engine medium bomber of the United States Air Force, coming from the American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany, flew over the territory of the German Democratic Republic, and at 8:54 penetrated the air space of the Soviet Union in the area of Brest, coming from the direction of the Polish People's Republic. The aircraft violating the air frontier of the Soviet Union flew along the route Brest, Pinsk Baranovichi, Kaunas, and Kaliningrad, having penetrated Soviet territory to a depth of 150 kilometers and having remained one hour and 20 minutes over such territory. The same day another twin-engine bomber of the United States Air Force

Department of State of the
United States of America
Washington, D. C.

invaded the air space of the Soviet Union and penetrated to a significant depth over Soviet territory.

On July 9 there took place new flights of United States aircraft into the Soviet air space.

The above-mentioned violation of the air frontiers of the Soviet Union by American aircraft cannot be interpreted as other than intentional and conducted for purposes of reconnaissance.

It must be underscored that these gross violations of the air space of the Soviet Union took place at a time when, as a result of the efforts of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving governments, a definite lessening of international tensions has been achieved, when relations between governments are improving, and when mutual confidence between them is growing. Such a development of international relations is fully supported by the peoples of all countries who are vitally interested in strengthening peace.

One cannot, however, fail to recognize that reactionary circles hostile to the cause of peace in a number of countries are worried by the relaxation of international tension which has taken place. These circles do everything possible to interfere with further improvement of relations between countries and the creation of mutual trust among them. Among such attempts is the said gross violation by the American Air Force of the air space of the Soviet Union, which consistently carries out a policy of strengthening peace and broadening businesslike cooperation with all countries, including the United States of America.

In this connection, the fact attracts attention that the said violations of the air frontier of the Soviet Union by American aircraft coincided with the stay of General Twining, U. S. Air Force Chief of Staff, in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Soviet Government energetically protests to the Government of the United States against such gross violation of the air space of the Soviet Union by American military aircraft and considers this violation as an intentional act of certain circles in the United States, planned to aggravate relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

Calling the attention of the Government of the United States to the inadmissibility of such violations of the air space of the Soviet Union by American aircraft, the Soviet Government states that all responsibility for possible consequences of such violations rests with the Government of the United States.

The Soviet Government expects that steps will be taken by the Government of the United States to punish those guilty for the said violations and to prevent such violations in the future.

Washington, D. C.
July 10, 1956

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

July 19, 1956

No. 398

FOR RELEASE AT 7:00 P.M., E.D.T., THURSDAY, JULY 19, 1956.
Not to be previously published, quoted from or used in any way.

UNITED STATES REPLY TO SOVIET NOTE OF JULY 10
ALLEGING VIOLATIONS OF SOVIET TERRITORY BY UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT

Following is the text of a note delivered to the Soviet Union today. It is in reply to the Soviet note of July 10, 1956 alleging violations of Soviet territory by United States Air Force twin-engine medium bombers:

The Department of State has the honor to inform the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that the latter's note no. 23 of July 10, 1956 alleging violations of Soviet territory by United States Air Force twin-engine medium bombers coming from Western Germany, has received the most serious consideration of the United States Government. It is noted that the Soviet Government's note refers to "the American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany". Attention is called to the fact that there is no longer an American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany. Presumably, the reference is to the Federal Republic of Germany.

A thorough inquiry has been conducted and it has been determined that no United States military planes based, or flying, in or adjacent to the European area at the time of the alleged overflights could possibly have strayed, as alleged, so far from their known flight plans, which carefully exclude such overflights as the Soviet Note alleges. Therefore the statement of the Government of the Soviet Union is in error.

The Department of State at the same time feels obliged to comment on the accompanying statements in the Soviet Embassy's note implying a plot to hinder the improvement of international relations and insinuating that the alleged American Air Force flights might have been arranged by General Twining in Germany, following his visit to the Soviet Union. These remarks, which are as obviously out of place as they are unwarranted, indeed of themselves have the effect of hindering the improvement of international relations.

Department of State,
Washington, July 19, 1956.

(Text of Russian Protest: Unofficial Translation)

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One cannot, however, fail to recognize that reactionary circles hostile to the cause of peace in a number of countries are worried by the relaxation of international tension which has taken place. These circles do everything possible to interfere with further improvement of relations between countries and the creation of mutual trust among them. Among such attempts is the said gross violation by the American Air Force of the air space of the Soviet Union, which consistently carries out a policy of strengthening peace and broadening businesslike cooperation with all countries, including the United States of America.

In this connection, the fact attracts attention that the said violations of the air frontier of the Soviet Union by American aircraft coincided with the stay of General Twining, U. S. Air Force Chief of Staff, in the Federal Republic of Germany.

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The Soviet Government expects that steps will be taken by the Government of the United States to punish those guilty for the said violations and to prevent such violations in the future.

Washington, D. C.
July 10, 1956 .

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

July 19, 1956

No. 398

FOR RELEASE AT 7:00 P.M., E.D.T., THURSDAY, JULY 19, 1956.
Not to be previously published, quoted from or used in any way.

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Department of State,
Washington, July 19, 1956.

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ANNEX 75

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8 August 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR ; Director of Central Intelligence *

SUBJECT : Decision on Project AQUATONE

1. Present Status: Reflecting the discussions and decisions of the past three weeks since AQUATONE operations were halted on 11 July, the following is the present status of the Project.

a. Detachment A is at Wiesbaden in complete state of readiness with four aircraft operational. It has been advised that no missions will be flown over denied areas until after 15 August at the earliest but in the meanwhile infrequent weather missions and certain test missions are being flown over friendly territory. Work is still proceeding on a permanent base, originally intended for this unit, at Giebelstadt.

b. Detachment B has completed training and its deployment to Adana from Watertown will start on 13 August. It should be fully operational with four aircraft at Adana by 25 August.

c. An advance party is surveying available facilities at Yokota AFB, Japan, and Kadena AFB, Okinawa. Plans are being completed and airlift scheduled for the redeployment of Detachment A from Wiesbaden to the Far East beginning about 21 August. (The same airlift will be used for the initial deployment of Detachment B and the redeployment of A.) It is understood that the final decision to leave Detachment A in Germany or redeploy it to the Far East will not be made until about 15 August and it will remain in a state of operational readiness until that date. If redeployed this Detachment should be operational in the Far East about 15 September.

d. The assembly, equipping and training of a third detachment (Detachment C) is going forward on schedule at Watertown. Most of its senior personnel have already entered on duty and eight pilots have been recruited. The Detachment should be ready for deployment in the first half of November.

e. As a result of slippage in the development of the most advanced cameras and much of the electronics equipment, considerable

(* The Bissell version with changes suggested by General Cabell.)

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development remains to be done. The C camera cannot be expected to be operational much before the end of the year and electronics system #4 will not be operational until late winter. On the basis of present plans these development programs and some training activities will continue at Watertown until 1 February. Thereafter plans are being made for Watertown will to be shut down and the remaining development activities will be handled at an Air Force base subject to decision subsequent to 25 August.

2. Decisions Required: By 15 August it will be necessary to decide:

a. Whether Detachment A is to resume operations in Europe, be redeployed promptly to the Far East, or remain inactive at Wiesbaden awaiting a later resumption of operations or redeployment.

b. Whether Detachment B is to start active operations from Adana when it is operational, fly "probing" missions or remain inactive there other than for flying its cover missions, awaiting later decisions.

Immediately after 15 August it would seem desirable to review procurement and development programs in the light of the above decisions with a view to determining whether or not to ~~curtailing~~ development and procurement which might be no longer required for this Project. At the same time it would likewise seem wise to review the requirement for a third detachment.

3. Considerations Bearing on these Decisions: What are here listed as considerations bearing on the problem are believed to be reasonably clearly established and objectively stated circumstances which in no way determine the major policy decisions but which do have clear implications for the form and timing of these decisions.

a. If it is determined that there is no reasonable prospect that Detachment A is ~~not~~ going to be used in Europe either at Wiesbaden or along with Detachment B at Adana, it ought to be put to work as soon as possible in the Far East after that determination is made. If a decision is not made by 15 August either to let it resume operations or to redeploy it, the opportunity for a prompt redeployment would be lost ~~and more time would be wasted to no good purpose.~~

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b. The organization which has been built up to carry out AQUATONE has been designed to conduct operations for a period of slightly more than a year. It is not a permanent organization and is ill-adapted to the task of maintaining in a routine manner a standby capability to be used in the event of war or of unforeseeable sharp change in the political climate. Its personnel, both civilian and military, have been recruited for short tours of duty, assigned overseas on a TDY basis without their families, and every effort has been made to develop the motivation for an intensive temporary undertaking. If the decision is made that a part or all of the capability that has been developed is to be placed on a standby basis, with no prospect of active use at any foreseeable time, /we would have serious problems in keeping/ the present organization would lose /from losing/ its morale, many of its best people, and its effectiveness.

c. Development and procurement are currently going forward on a scale adequate to support three detachments on a fully active basis for a continuous period of 15 months. Savings of some millions of dollars (part of which would accrue to the Agency and part to the Air Force) could be achieved by prompt cutbacks in these programs. Such cutbacks would, however, prevent the development of the full capability originally planned. Under the circumstances, failure to achieve any clear-cut decision as to the scale on which and the time period for which this capability will be actively employed is bound to /might/ result in the waste of substantial sums as well as the wasteful tying up of technical manpower which may be needed in other national security programs.

d. It must be repeated that well-informed technical opinion allows the existing reconnaissance system less than a year before the probability of interception of the U-2 aircraft starts to increase. /It would of course be longer before there could be generally effective deployment of advanced interceptors. /

4. Conclusions: All of the above considerations argue powerfully in favor of an attempt to secure reasonably clear-cut decisions on the future of this Project by the middle of August. /The most desirable decision is that authorizing a concerted effort against the top priority targets. Failing this, CIA and the Air Force should consider what the probabilities are of eventual favorable action. / ~~The broad decision that needs to be made is whether this capability is going to be used~~

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~~(a) against the USSR, (b) against China, (c) against the European Satellites, or (d) not at all. It /can be argued/ is difficult to believe that /no/ any facts not now available are required as the basis for such a decision or that the passage of a few more weeks would not greatly alter an evaluation of risks to be incurred and benefits to be gained. In particular it is difficult to see what good can come of "probing" missions which will merely alert the defense and stimulate more political protests without accomplishing any really important purpose.~~

5. Proposed Procedure: In order to secure a decision it is believed that two kinds of staff work should be done:

a. First, a specific plan of operations should be proposed as the desired course of action ~~and the more sensible alternative courses of action should be defined in equally specific terms so that a clear choice is presented to the political authorities.~~ A specific proposal has been prepared in the form of a plan for some fifteen missions over the western USSR which would cover the highest priority intelligence targets. ~~It is believed that for practical purposes there are only two alternative courses of action:~~

- ~~(1) - Operations limited to China and the European Satellites.~~
- ~~(2) - The placing of the capability on a standby basis.~~

b. Second, the proposal should be staffed out with the interested military authorities (the Air Force and the JCS) and with the Department of State in the hope that it can be presented with their concurrence. To this end, a military assessment of AQUATONE is being prepared by the Air Force and it is believed that support will be forthcoming both from General Twining and from Admiral Radford on behalf of the Joint Chiefs. It had been hoped that the Secretary of State's views could be obtained well in advance of 15 August.

6. Recommendations: It is strongly recommended:

a. That the recommended plan of operations over the USSR from the west, ~~together with the two alternative courses of action,~~ be presented to the Secretary of State at the earliest opportunity and the plan be modified if necessary so as to obtain his concurrence or at least acquiescence.

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~~That in the event of his non-concurrence in any further operations steps be taken forthwith to turn over all the assets of the Project to the Air Force to be maintained as a standby capability.~~

~~o. /b/~~ That in the event of his concurrence in a plan of operations, this be presented to higher authority as a joint recommendation of the DCI and the JCS with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Project Director

cc: DD CI

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CHAPTER XII. DETACHMENT B

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Detachment B - Officer Cadre

First Tour (May 1956 - October 1957)

Col. Edward A. Perry, Commanding Officer
Mr. John Parangosky, Executive Officer
Lt. Col. Roland L. Perkins, Operations Officer
Operations Staff:
Maj. Harry N. Cordes
Maj. John F. Carlisle
Maj. Chester Bohart
Maj. James B. Hester
Maj. William E. Kennedy
Maj. Donald R. Curtis
Maj. Joseph E. French
Maj. Thomas W. Land
Capt. Warren R. Kincaid, Jr.
Capt. Roger J. Tremblay
Maj. William R. V. Marriott, Medical Officer

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Second Tour (November 1957 - May 1960)

Col. Stanley W. Beerli, Commanding Officer (Nov. 1957 - July 1959)
Col. William E. Shelton, Commanding Officer (July 1959 - May 1960)
Mr. John Parangosky, Executive Officer (through March 1959)
Lt. Col. Carl F. Funk, Materiel Officer
Operations Staff:
Maj. Raymond N. Sterling
Maj. Joseph L. Giraud, Jr.
Maj. Arthur DuLac
Maj. William Dotson
Maj. James T. Deuel, Medical Officer

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~~TOP SECRET~~Detachment B - Contract PilotsFirst Tour (May 1956 - October 1957)James G. Abraham

Thomas C. Birkhead

James W. Cherbonneaux (joined Det B in Turkey, December 1956)

Buster E. Edens

William W. Hall

Edwin K. Jones

William H. McMurray

Francis G. Powers

Sammy V. C. Snider

Second Tour (November 1957 - May 1960)

Barry H. Baker (transferred to Detachment G August 1959)

James A. Barnes, Jr.

Robert J. Ericson

Martin A. Knutson (transferred from Detachment A November 1957)

Francis G. Powers

Albert J. Rand (transferred to Detachment G August 1959)

John C. Shinn

Glendon K. Dunaway (transferred from Detachment G August 1959)

Jacob Kratt, Jr. (transferred from Detachment G August 1959)

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CHAPTER XII - DETACHMENT B

Organization and Training

The activation and training phase of the second field detachment proceeded in a great deal more orderly fashion than the first, and while this was to be expected in the light of experience gained, there were other factors which led to the smoother transition of the second group into a well-knit, effective and highly motivated unit.

The Commanding Officer, Colonel Edward A. Perry, was an aggressive leader with a strong urge to lead a winning team. He demanded the full support and loyalty of his men and in turn, spared no effort in trying to achieve the best possible conditions for them. Col. Perry was tapped for the assignment from the Training Directorate of SAC Headquarters in January 1956 and thus had three months before the activation of his detachment in which to visit Project Headquarters and be fully briefed, to visit the training base and witness operations there, and to hand pick approximately 60% of his officer cadre from men known to him. In addition, the facilities at the training base at Watertown were in better shape in all respects to receive the second group: the SAC Training Unit had been able to put forward recommendations on deficiencies and problem areas in the aircraft for correction and to tailor their training course in line with the experience gained

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
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with the first group; arrangements for recruiting and indoctrinating techreps for overseas service were working more smoothly; and the primary equipment had been operationally proven.

Col. Perry's orders assigned him to the 1007th Air Intelligence Service Group with duty as Commanding Officer of Flight B of Project Squadron Provisional, effective 6 March 1956. He reported at Project Headquarters, Washington, and began working with the staff on the recruitment of his cadre and drafting plans and procedures for the training and operational phases. Personnel shortages and lateness in reporting were still being encountered, particularly in the specialties of aeromedicine and supply and warehousing.

May 7th (date of completion of Detachment A's deployment) was set as the day for activation of Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional (II) at Watertown and the majority of the detachment's personnel had reported in by the middle of May. The detachment was not fully manned, however, until the middle of July.

The estimated date for completion of training in the U-2 of the nine^{*} contract pilots and four Detachment B officers was for 10 July, with the

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USCM tests beginning 23 July and deployment to follow about 10 August. Mr. Bissell wanted to advance these dates to 16 July and 5 August respectively in view of the fact that the sun angle over the Soviet targets of interest would become less favorable for photography each day. He also wanted to set target dates which would require real effort to meet; this was understood and agreed by Col. Perry.


The optimistic outlook was adversely affected by the late reporting of the detachment's contract pilots. Five were on deck by mid-May and three additional pilots reported by 1 June. The concurrent training of the four Greek pilots and two casualties for Detachment A, as well as the running of accelerated tests on the P-31 engine during May, June and July 1956 put a heavy burden on available aircraft. Col. Yancey's estimate in the middle of May was for a possible six weeks' delay in the operational readiness date; however, with some adjustments in work schedules and training programs and maximum effort by all concerned, the detachment held its USCM tests 18 through 21 July, was declared combat ready, and began deployment on 13 August 1956.

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Turkish Approval for Operations at Incerlik Air Base

The Air Force recommended on 7 March 1956 that Adana, Turkey, be developed as a base for Detachment B in preference to Elevisis, Greece. Reasons for the choice of Adana were that it was closer to priority targets, had better terminal weather and available alternate landing bases, available SAC logistical support (this was later discovered to be almost non-existent), and better physical security.

The Project Director concurred and proceeded to seek State Department concurrence. There was a delay due to a new Ambassador to Turkey not having been confirmed. On 11 April 1956 the Department of State approved an approach to the Turks through Turkish Air Force channels.

Meanwhile the Project Engineer, [redacted] was sent via USAFE to Adana to ascertain what construction was necessary. The Air Force was to sustain the costs of additional facilities but the Project Director offered to reimburse the costs, if any, which the Air Force was unable to meet. After the survey, [redacted] estimated

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that the basic facilities would be ready approximately 10 August, if there were no slippages in delivery of materials. This means the bare essentials required for living and operating on the base. The additional base support facilities required would take up to four months to construct.

On 24 April Col. Russell Berg, together with Mr. Bissell's Personal Assistant, [redacted] went to Ankara for the purpose of obtaining approval for overflights from Turkey by Detachment B at the Service-to-Service level. It became evident from conversations with Agency and U.S. Air Force contacts in Ankara, and the Charge' d'Affaires, Mr. Foy Kohler, that approval could only be received ultimately from the Prime Minister. [redacted] requested Project Headquarters by cable to obtain State Department concurrence in a Government-to-Government approach, and asked that the Charge' be so notified. This was done and on 28 April a message from the Secretary of State to Mr. Kohler was sent to Ankara [redacted] (see Annex 76 for text).

On 1 May 1956 Mr. Kohler saw Prime Minister Menderes and received unqualified approval for operations from Turkey. The Prime Minister was told that the [redacted]

[redacted] 50X4, E.O.13526

[redacted] that the group at

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Adana would consist of about 130 personnel with five U-2's; that the operation would last approximately two years; that the intelligence collected would be given to the Turks through normal channels; and that in the event of a compromise, the Turkish Government would not be expected to take any of the responsibility. Menderes replied that in such an event he would at least meet in consultation and promised to keep knowledge of the operation (in the extended cover story version) to General Tunaboylu, Chief of Staff of the Turkish General Staff, and his Deputy, Lt. Gen. Rustu Erdelhun, and Mr. Nuri Birgi, Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry.

Because of approaches made to the Greeks concerning possible use of Elevisis, it was felt politically expedient to let the King and Queen and the Prime Minister know immediately that there had been a change in plans, but without referring to the use of a Turkish base. This was accomplished by

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Deployment to Incerlik

The advance echelons of communications, security and operations personnel departed for Adana on 25 and 27 July 1956, and by 2 August a temporary communications link was established between Incerlik and Project Headquarters. The officer in charge of the advance party,

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Lt. Col. Roland L. Perkins, sent back a gloomy report on the status of construction at Incerlik, but the Project Director felt there was no alternative to going ahead with deployment even though the U-2's and some of the equipment would have to be left in the open for a while until hangar and storage space was ready. Therefore the move went ahead according to schedule and between 14 and 17 August 1956 a combined MATS/SAC airlift of C-118's and C-124's delivered WRSP (II), complete with aircraft, equipment and supplies to Turkey.

To insure that there would be no misunderstanding with regard to line of command (as had occurred with Detachment A) the Project Director sent a dispatch to Col. Perry before his departure from Watertown outlining the duties of the Executive Officer in the management of the Detachment's affairs. These were:

- a. To implement policies and orders of the Commanding Officer and assure compliance therewith.
- b. To maintain liaison with CIA 50X1, E.O.13526
- c. To maintain liaison with host government agencies and coordinate contact of other detachment personnel with these agencies.
- d. To advise the Commanding Officer on Agency policies, regulations, etc.

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- e. To act as office of record for the detachment.
- f. To coordinate support activities with operational planning.
- g. To review organization and procedures and advise the Commanding Officer on proposed changes.
- h. To perform other duties as the Commanding Officer may direct.

Colonel Perry accepted fully the concept of joint administration but at the same time insisted that as Commanding Officer he retain full control over all elements of his command and that detachment personnel (including security and communications) should not communicate directly with their superiors in Washington, and that any reports by official visitors to the detachment should in every case be submitted through him.

Although the detachment retained its unit designation as WRSP (II), the additional designation of Detachment 10-10, TUSLOG, was added in order to incorporate the unit into the theater command for support purposes (including APO mailing privileges). Facilities construction, airlift, ground vehicles and other normal Air Force support were to be levied on USAFE Headquarters with the promise of priority treatment.

Incerlik Air Base, a SAC post-strike base for long-range aircraft, situated seven miles out of Adana near the southern coast of Turkey,

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was occupied by a small housekeeping group with little or no activity at the time of Detachment B's arrival. Liaison with the base complement was established with Col. Gordon F. Thomas, Base Commander, and cleared contacts in the local OSI and Provost Marshal sections.

The settling in of detachment personnel and readying of the aircraft and equipment for operations was hampered by delayed completion of facilities, poor sanitation, substandard mess, electrical failures, low quality indigenous help, and extreme heat.

The Detachment Flight Surgeon, Dr. Marriott, shortly after arrival of the group wrote up a detailed report of the unsatisfactory and unsanitary condition of the mess at Adana which was sent back to Headquarters. When it was shown to Col. Geary (who then occupied the position of Headquarters USAF Project Officer) he immediately brought it to the attention of Gen. Smart, Vice Chief of Staff, who in turn referred it to Gen. Tunner at USAFE Headquarters. Gen. Tunner sent his Inspector General down to Turkey to investigate (although he was quite angry at the report having reached Washington without "going through channels"). Action was soon taken to relieve the Food Service Officer and his assistant and get replacements. Other corrective action included procurement of dishes, glasses, silverware, water coolers and other

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items to improve service. New screening for windows and screen doors was ordered, and sanitation in general improved by cleaning and fresh paint. All of this did not happen overnight--in fact it took several months to realize the necessary improvements in the living and working areas.

The problem of airlift in and out of Adana for both freight and passengers was a principal concern of Col. Perry's group for almost four months after arrival. Consideration had been given to establishing a twice-weekly Athens-Adana run using the Agency C-54 [] [] but this was ruled out for security and other reasons (except in cases of dire emergency), and dependence had to be placed on the limited regular USAF flights (two or three a week) from Athens or Rhein Main, Germany. In December 1956 USAFE finally delivered a support C-54 to the detachment for its own use and this was probably the greatest boon to morale that was experienced by the group during its entire stay in Turkey. It meant not only the ability to bring in badly needed supplies and equipment and to exchange pouches and passengers for quick connection with Washington, but it also meant the possibility of scheduling rest and rehabilitation trips out of Turkey for Detachment personnel.

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Liaison was established with the Agency Station at Frankfurt, Germany, and arrangements were made for the Station's assistance in local purchases and other day-to-day project business in Germany. Later a Project Liaison Officer from Headquarters was established at Wiesbaden, first in the office of the DCS for Operations (physically located in the office of Lt. Col. R. D. Steakley) and later moved to the office of Lt. Col. Charles Carver of the USAFE Materiel Directorate. The project officer assigned performed liaison as required between Project Headquarters, USAFE components, the two operating detachments, Frankfurt Station, and the photo-interpretation center at Wiesbaden (URPIC/W). His activities were facilitated by access to

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and Agency pouch and other facilities at Frankfurt Station.

First Operations: Middle East Coverage

In the late summer and early fall of 1956, the rapid deterioration of the situation in Egypt and the relations between that country and the British and French, and the cutting off of intelligence bearing upon these developments, led the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (ARC) to recommend to the Intelligence Community that requirements for coverage of the Middle East be levied on Project AQUATONE whose

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U-2 aircraft were deployed conveniently nearby awaiting permission of higher authority to resume their primary mission of overflights of the Soviet Union. The initiation of Middle East overflights was authorized by the White House after concurrence by the Secretary of State in the ARC's recommendations. Both the President and the Secretary of State were kept constantly informed of the progress of these overflights by reports or by briefings with photographic displays of intelligence obtained.

The first Middle East flight by Detachment B was flown on 11 September 1956, and the last on 28 February 1960. During this period a total of 151 overflights were made: 11 by Detachment A, 17 by British pilots attached to Detachment B, and the balance by Detachment B's American pilots. During this period the following Middle Eastern countries were covertly* overflown:

Aden	Kuwait
Afghanistan	Lebanon
Bahrein	Pakistan
Egypt	Qatar
Ethiopia	Saudi Arabia
Israel	Syria
Iran	Turkey
Iraq	Yemen
Jordan	

* There is no information available that indicates that the U-2 was subject to radar tracking by any Middle East country except Israel.

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When Middle East coverage got underway in September 1956, the film from missions was still being sent back to the Eastman processing facility, but when the military situation in the Suez area heated up and mission results were required for immediate tactical use, the Photo Interpretation Center (PIC) established a branch at Wiesbaden (URPIC/W) with a small sub-unit later set up at Adana (URPIC/1), manned by a three-man team led by [REDACTED]. The Detachment thus had an immediate read-out capability so that flash reports could be cabled to Washington within a very short time after the mission aircraft landed at Adana. This facility was maintained in stand-by condition during non-operational periods so that on demand it could be reinstated in a matter of 12 to 24 hours.

Honoring the promise to Prime Minister Menderes to share the intelligence obtained with the Turks, the first intelligence summary was given to him on 27 November 1956 and related principally to the Syrian Air Order of Battle.

Problems with Commanding Officer, Detachment B

Once Detachment B was established at Adana, Col. Perry instituted a continuous stream of cable messages to Headquarters which at first were limited to listing deficiencies requiring Headquarters or USAFE

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supply action, but which soon turned to policy matters, questioning Headquarters decisions, and suggesting changes in established procedures. Interspersed were messages on the private channel to either Mr. Bissell or Col. Gibbs

[Redacted]

In January 1957 his request for Headquarters consultation was granted, along with ten days of home leave to visit his family.

[Redacted]

In announcing Col. Perry's forthcoming TDY at Headquarters, Mr. Bissell noted to the concerned members of his staff:

"I do not anticipate any earth-shaking decisions or important new policies to emerge from Col. Perry's trip. I feel it is most important, however, especially in the light of our long exchange and not infrequent differences of view with him during the past several months, that we be exposed face to face to his philosophy and attitudes and he to ours. If we can obtain a more vivid and complete understanding of his problems as he sees them and he of ours, and if each of us can get a better grasp of the other's reasons for holding the views he does, the visit will be most profitable." 1/

[Redacted]


1/ SAPC-12083, 4 January 1957. Memorandum to Project Staff from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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During his TDY at Headquarters on 5 and 6 February 1957, Col. Perry had a long private talk with Mr. Bissell, of which no record was made, but the results were that Col. Perry discussed his detachment problems with the Headquarters Staff in a fairly calm and cooperative spirit and departed for Adana apparently intent on getting on with the job.

In March a visit was paid to Adana by Col. Gibbs and a Headquarters party for purposes of a general inspection, and to discuss cutback and reassignment of personnel. The political hold-down of the primary mission and uncertainty of the future of the project made it necessary to try

1/ Letter to Dr. William R. Lovelace, Jr., dated 7 January 1957.

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to maintain the capability in the field on as economical a basis as possible. The condition of the Detachment's facilities and adequacy of current supply lines and procedures were reviewed. An improvement in the over-all picture was evident and the Liaison Office at USAFE Headquarters, Wiesbaden, was functioning very well since it had been placed in the offices of the Materiel Directorate in lieu of Col. Steakley's office in Operations.

The number of Middle East missions during the first few months of 1957 had decreased to a minimum as a result of United Nations peace-making activities in the Suez affair, and on 1 February the ARC had recommended discontinuance of use of the U-2 for this coverage in order not to jeopardize its use in penetration flights into the Soviet orbit in the current photographic season, permission for which it was hoped would be forthcoming soon. Two successful Elint missions with System V were flown along the Soviet border, the second of which on 18 March 1957, returning from Afghanistan inadvertently overflew a portion of the Soviet Union which set off a chain reaction through the intelligence community up to SAC Headquarters, and a written explanation of why and how this happened had to be prepared for Headquarters, USAF, with corrective action being taken with regard to pilots' operational procedures to ensure no repetition of the incident.

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The Middle East moved toward another crisis in April 1957.

King Hussein of Jordan threw pro-Communists out of his government and was faced with a possible uprising. The U.S. 6th Fleet was ordered to the Eastern Mediterranean to show support for Hussein. Middle East missions were flown as required for tactical coverage of this development by Detachment B until the situation in Jordan calmed down and the 6th Fleet was moved back on its normal station.

First Staging from Pakistan

At a meeting with the President on 6 May 1957 the decision was reached that overflights of Russia would be renewed and would be staged by Detachment B from Pakistan if permission could be obtained from the Government of Pakistan for use of a base. Mr. Bissell's Personal Assistant, [REDACTED], visited Karachi for this purpose

between 3 and 7 June 1957 and along with [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] briefed President Mirza and requested approval for a U-2 staging mission "into Sinkiang for air sampling and electronic intelligence" from a base in Pakistan. The President asked that Prime Minister Suhrawardy's approval be sought (without informing him that the President had already been seen). This was done and the Prime Minister gave his approval but said he would like the group to talk with

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General Ayub Khan. General Ayub, when approached, said he would advise the Prime Minister against this project unless the U.S. was willing to furnish Pakistan the needed military aid (principally fighter aircraft) previously requested. On 5 June 1957 a second visit with the Prime Minister by the U.S. representatives disclosed that Ayub had not dissuaded him from permitting the operation. Although the Prime Minister said he agreed with Ayub that Pakistan should have more aid, he did not ask a quid pro quo for use of the base. Lahore was chosen for the operation since the runway at Peshawar (a more desirable location) was undergoing repair. Col. Perry and the Project Engineer, [redacted]

[redacted] joined [redacted] to visit and inspect the base facilities.

Operation SOFT TOUCH

Use of the base at Lahore was agreed for the approximate period of 7 July 1957 through 7 August 1957, with a possible extension if found to be necessary. The advance echelon arrived on 12 July and communications were established with Adana on 13 July. The main task force of 40 personnel, including all eight contract pilots and three U-2 aircraft (two with the new anti-radar application) followed immediately and after shake-down of equipment, waited until 4 August before target weather cleared and the first mission could be run. Nine overflights

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were carried out between 4 and 28 August and while four were classified as "poor" due to camera or other malfunction or target weather, excellent coverage was obtained of the guided missile test range at what later came to be known as Tyura Tam, and of the Siberian atomic proving ground at Semipalatinsk, as well as other known or suspected installations. (See overleaf for a listing of SOFT TOUCH missions and the targets covered.)

On 10 August 1957 the Government of Pakistan received a complaint from the Indians through the UN Kashmir Observer on an overflight of Indian territory on 5 August. The violation was not attributed to the U-2, and the Pakistanis took care of the Indian complaint by blaming the overflight in question on the Russians. 50X1, E.O.13526 recommended early withdrawal of the staging party since its continued presence would aid the Soviets in pinpointing the operating base from which the overflights were originating. The task force therefore withdrew on 30 August and returned to Turkey.

Briefings were given in Washington in early September on the results of these missions to the President and the Secretary of State by Gen. Cabell and Mr. Lundahl. On 27 November, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, and members of his cabinet were also briefed by Mr. Lundahl in London on SOFT TOUCH intelligence.

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SOFT TOUCH Missions:

Date	Msn. No.	Duration	Pilot	Targets	Config. & Results
4 August 1957	4036	8 hr. 35 min.	Powers	China, TiHwa, Mongolia (abort before Irkutsk)	A-2 Poor
5 August 1957	4035	7 hr. 30 min.	Edens	Novokazalinsk, Kzylorda, Aral Sea (Tyura Tam)	B(DB)* Good
11 August 1957	4039	6 hr. 25 min.	Mc Murray	Ust Kamerogorsk (abort before Novosibirsk)	B(DB) Poor
20 August 1957	4045	8 hr. 40 min.	Snider	Tomsk, Novosibirsk	A-2 Good
20 August 1957	4048	8 hr. 5 min.	Jones	Semipalatinsk, Omsk Balkhash	A-2(DB) Fair
21 August 1957	4049	9 hr. 10 min.	Birkhead	Krasnoyarsk	A-2 Poor
21 August 1957	4050	8 hr. 05 min.	Cherborneaux	Stalinsk, Semipalatinsk, Alma Ata	A-2(DB) Excellence
21 August 1957	4051	6 hr. 40 min.	Hall	Tibet, Lhasa	B Poor
28 August 1957	4058	7 hr. 35 min.	Jones	Leninabad, Aralsk (Tyura Tam)	A-2(DB) Excellence

* Note: DB stands for "Dirty Bird", the name given the U-2 with the anti-radar application.

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On 18 August 1957 a pro-Soviet military group in Syria executed a coup and subsequently joined forces with Egypt under Egyptian control. Coverage of Syria by Detachment B on 31 August and 1 September was obtained and a report on Syrian troop disposition and air order of battle was furnished the Turks on 9 September in order to forestall their over-flying Syria to obtain such information and possibly touching off further serious hostilities.

On 10 September permission was received for a one time flight by Detachment B to cover the Russian missile test range at Kapustin Yar and fortunately the mission was timed so that the facilities were photographed just after a missile had been fired which provided bonus information.

Change of Command, Detachment B

On 20 September 1957, a change in policy was instituted by Headquarters allowing dependents to accompany detachment personnel overseas. The immediate effect was the necessity for additional housing. Before [] departed for Adana on 25 September to look into the furnishing of additional quarters, he was given guidelines and delegated contractual authority by Mr. Bissell with the following proviso:

"I am interested in doing everything reasonable and proper to ensure that personnel of this Project stationed at

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Base B enjoy facilities, both residential and recreational, that are as livable as the conditions over which we have no control will permit. At the same time I do not wish to attempt construction on such a scale that we will overcommit ourselves financially or that through sponsorship of major construction we will attract attention to Base B as an Air Force base blessed by 'special favors' or a privileged status in Air Force Headquarters. " 1/

Twenty off-base houses were rented during [redacted] TDY in Adana and contractual arrangements were entered into with a local firm for renovation needed to bring them up to acceptable standards.

Col. Perry completed his 18-month tour and returned to Headquarters in October 1957 for reassignment by the Air Force. Col. Stanley W. Beerli agreed to move from his post as Commanding Officer of Detachment C in Japan and take over command at Adana. With the arrival of Col. Beerli in November 1957 at Detachment B, there was an almost complete change-over of personnel. Col. Beerli brought with him from Japan several of the unit who had served with him there as well as five of the Detachment C contract pilots.

By January 1958 the shaking-down process of the new command was generally completed. Two of the Detachment's earlier problems

1/ SAPC-19633, 25 September 1957. Memorandum for [redacted] from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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were still bothersome--supply and air transport. This could be attributed in a measure to the geographic location of the base with respect to sources of supply, as well as to the lowered priorities now being granted to filling the Detachment's requirements, since the fast strike nature of the operation had given way to piece-meal coverage of primary targets.

Col. Beerli began work in February 1958 on a "Fast Move" staging concept which would allow the deployment of a self-supporting task force of approximately 30 men and one U-2 aircraft to a remote base with shop and office facilities installed within the C-124 used for airlifting the group to the forward staging base. This plan was drafted and sent to Headquarters where the Operations Staff, after full discussion, recommended that the concept be further investigated and refined so that it could be used in future staging operations to bases where permanent facilities were not available, thus expanding operational capability.

Second Staging Planning

Early in February 1958, as a result of briefing by the DCI and Mr. Bissell on future operational plans of the project, the Secretary of State approved approaching the Pakistanis again and requesting the use of a base for Operation BLUE MOON, a follow-up to the missions run

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the previous August from Lahore. The approval of President Mirza and Prime Minister Noon was secured on 21 February 1958. [redacted]

[redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526 [redacted] of

the Project Headquarters Staff in Washington conducted the negotiations. The briefing on mission purpose given the Pakistanis followed the Elint cover story (with no mention of photography). The U.S. Ambassador, James Langley, was also briefed, using the same cover story. Mr. Ali Asghar, Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Defense was seen by Col. Beerli in company with Col. Clinton True, Air Attaché, and

[redacted] and permission was granted to use the base at Peshawar, a hangar and necessary facilities.

On 6 March 1958 the Soviet Government presented to the State Department (without making it public) a protest concerning the overflight of their Far East Maritime Province. The flight was a Detachment C mission over Ukrania on 1 March; however the Russians attributed the aircraft to the U.S. Air Force in its first protest note (later identifying the aircraft as of the U-2 type). All overflights by U-2's were immediately grounded, indefinitely, on order of highest authority, and BLUE MOON was therefore called off.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Staging from Norway: Planned and Postponed

On 26 June 1956 Mr. Bissell and Gen. Cabell flew to Germany to brief Chancellor Adenauer on AQUATONE. They were invited to travel in the aircraft of the Chief of NATO Forces, Gen. Albert Gruenther, and enroute to Germany they took the opportunity to brief Gen. Gruenther on the U-2 project and get his views concerning an approach to the Norwegians for use of a base from which to operate over Russia. Gruenther was pessimistic concerning these prospects and indicated that if any approach were made, it should be at the highest level in the Norwegian Government and not through Col. Evang, head of Norwegian Intelligence.

The next day [redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526 [redacted] was briefed on AQUATONE in anticipation of an approach to the Norwegians and he reported that the Norwegians were still somewhat sour as a result of the failure of GENETRIX (the balloon project) to achieve promised intelligence. He recommended that the first approach be to Col. Evang.

It was two years before an approach was actually made to the Norwegians in June 1958. [redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526 [redacted] arranged through Evang for Col. Beerli and [redacted] to visit Bodo on 19 June to inspect the available base facilities. Planning then went ahead for Operation HONEYMOON to be staged from Bodo. Two events intervened which

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delayed the carrying out of these plans. First on 27 June 1958 the Agency's C-118 aircraft from the Wiesbaden Air Section was shot down over Armenia by the Russians; the surviving members of the crew (including Lt. Col. Dale Brannon and other Agency-assigned military personnel) were seized and held by the Russians, while charges and countercharges were aired in the international press. Second, on 14 July a pro-Nasser group in Iraq assassinated King Faisal and took over the government. The next day, President Eisenhower ordered 5,000 U.S. Marines to be put ashore at Beirut from the 6th Fleet at the request of Lebanese President Chamoun, who feared overthrow of his government. At the same time British troops were requested by Jordan. The daily or twice daily U-2 coverage of the Middle East trouble spots on behalf of the Intelligence Community, particularly the U.S. Navy, required all of Detachment B's assets.

The proposed operation from Bodo had been opposed by Gen. LeMay unless each sortie were carefully and specifically justified. The Air Staff believed that three of the planned missions could produce inadvertent overflights with consequent Soviet protests. Meanwhile, [redacted] [redacted] that Norwegian Intelligence felt the Bodo operation should be postponed in view of the Middle East crisis.

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General Cabell concurred in the postponement, with future reactivation of the operation to be at the discretion of the Project Director.

United Nations intervention in the Middle East, voted at an emergency session of the General Assembly on 8 August, brought a lull to hostilities. On 11 August 1958, Detachment B, at the request of the U. S. Navy, ran Operation BIG EARS with Elint System IV over the 6th Fleet in order to test the Fleet's radar capabilities and limitations. The results of this operation were of great value to the Navy not only in its operations but for future research and development purposes as well.

Project NEW MOON

With the Middle East temporarily quiet, on 28 August 1958 the President was briefed on Operation NEW MOON (replacement for HONEYMOON) and he approved about 90% of the coverage proposed, personally checking the flightlines of each mission plan. NEW MOON was planned so as to use the Elint operation previously approved by the Norwegians as cover for an added Soviet overflight. Col. Evang was the only Norwegian to know of the overflight phase of the operation.

Col. William Burke, then Deputy Project Director, briefed the Air Staff on 2 September 1958 concerning the proposed coverage from Bodo of Polyarny Urals, including the President's desire that this overflight of the USSR be launched from Norway. The reaction of the Air

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Staff was that this mission was more likely to cause a protest than a mission originating in Pakistan and landing at Bodo, but all were pleased that at least a mission had been approved. Norwegian approval for use of Bodo was cleared [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] on 4 September 1958, and the task force departed from Adana on 10 September, arriving at Bodo on the 15th due to weather and aircraft malfunction enroute.

The weather was unfavorable until 25 October, when an Elint peripheral mission was launched. After waiting ten days longer for suitable weather for the primary mission, with no prospect of better weather, a substitute mission was flown from Bodo over the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea, and thence returning to Adana. The mission was tracked by Russian radar, and officials of the Norwegian Foreign Office became aware of the flight and were very unhappy, more over their ignorance of the arrangements made through Norwegian Intelligence than with the activity itself. Evang's position at that point was something less than secure.

Mr. Bissell expressed concern on the need for better liaison planning in future staging operations. He noted to Col. Burke in a follow-up on the Bodo operation:

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"Looking at our Norwegian activity with the advantage of hindsight, it is my impression that the following discrepancies may be outlined:

"a. We failed to achieve suppression of radar for one of the flights into Bodo.

"b. Though we went into Bodo under USAF cover, we failed to arrange for any notification to reach either Gen. Johnson or Gen. Motsfield through normal USAF channels. We thereby called the attention of the Norwegian Air Force to the unusual nature of this operation.

"c. We never seemed able to reach a clear mutual understanding with Evang as to what information we were to furnish him during our stay in Bodo...

"The preparation of a liaison plan should cause us to consider carefully the nature of our cover in any country in which we operate and to inquire how notification of our arrival would reach the local authorities concerned if our cover story were in fact true. I would like to suggest therefore that the Cover and Security Sections in Headquarters as well as Operations and the appropriate individuals in the Detachment be concerned with the planning of future staging operations." 1/

In January 1959 it was learned that the Norwegian Ambassador to Moscow had been called in by Foreign Minister Zorin and told that the Norwegian Government should take steps to halt hostile acts against the USSR (i. e., allowing U.S. and British warplanes to use Bodo as a base for reconnaissance flights against the USSR).

1/ CHAL-0491, 30 December 1959. Memorandum to Deputy Director, DPS, from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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British Join Detachment B

In December 1958 the British OLDSTER unit arrived at Adana and were gradually integrated into the Detachment. The Prime Minister's approval for British pilots to participate in operational missions carried the proviso that some cover background should be built up with meteorological flights. Therefore before the unit settled in, one U-2 was ferried to Watton RAF Base, England, for the purpose of running some missions with the weather configuration to establish cover in England. (British participation in the program is covered in Chapter XIII.)

Elint Missions

Two outstanding Elint missions by Detachment B were among the "firsts" in the field of electronic intelligence collection. Timed to coincide with an expected Soviet "moon shot" on 2 January 1959, an Elint mission with System IV (Ferret) was flown over the Soviet/Afghanistan border in order to cover the launching of the Russian lunar probe "Metchta" from the Kyzyl Kum Desert in Turkmen. The results were good. The other "first" was the acquisition, using System VII, on 9 June 1959, of an intercept of 30 seconds of telemetry prior to the first stage burn-out of a Soviet ICBM launched from Kapustin Yar. The second stage telemetry was obtained by a SAC RB-47 at a lower altitude

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with manned equipment and the two mutually confirmed intercepts were of great value to analysts in determining the size, type and other characteristics of the engines used in the missile.

Further Operations, 1959

Other than Elint missions, the Detachment kept busy with routine coverage of Middle East trouble spots, upper air sampling and weather missions. Two weather flights were staged by the British pilots, again out of Watton RAF Base, continuing to build their cover. These flights occurred on 7 and 8 May 1959 with the support of Detachment B and the British Meteorological Office, in coordination with the RAF.

In May 1959, Col. William Burke made an inspection visit to the Detachment and found the unit in good shape, particularly in pilot proficiency (including the British) as confirmed by tracker analysis of missions flown. He found the Detachment's off-base housing to be adequate but recommended that all pilots and their families should live on base, and that, if the tenure at Adana were extended through another season, trailers should be installed on base for all personnel for project security and to avoid any anti-American incidents.

Soviet Missile Launch Site Covered Again

The requirement of the U.S. defense community for intelligence on the status of the Soviet missile program was rendered more critical

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by the bellicose statements being made by Khrushchev referring to an already operational Soviet ICBM capability. Two CHALICE operations were planned and tentatively approved early in 1959 which would collect additional hard information on the location of operational ICBM sites and facilities engaged in missile production. A Big Three meeting in Washington the first of April, and plans for a Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva in May (at which Khrushchev's demand for a "Summit" meeting to settle all issues was to be discussed) caused the postponement of the planned U-2 operations. The inconclusive conference in Geneva adjourned on the 20th of June until July 13th, and in the interim permission was given for one mission. On 9 July 1959 a successful overflight of Tyura Tam and the Urals (Operation TOUCHDOWN) was flown from Peshawar and collected excellent photography.

A change of command at Detachment B took place when Col. Beerli finished his tour and departed for Washington to become Project Director of Operations. He was replaced at Adana by Col. William Shelton who arrived on duty on 31 July 1959. In August two contract pilots (Rand and Baker) rotated back to the ZI for assignment with Detachment G at Edwards while two Detachment G pilots (Kratt and Dunaway) moved with their families to Adana. Also in August, two U-2C's (the model

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configured with the J-75 engine) were ferried to Adana and an accompanying team, during an intensive two-weeks period, trained the operating and maintenance personnel, checking out 10 pilots. The aircraft, engines and other equipment functioned well and the system was declared operationally ready at the end of two weeks.

British Operations

In October 1959 Operation FULL HOUSE was staged from Watton RAF Base by the British pilots for meteorological missions and cover build-up. A Detachment B task force using the "Fast Move" concept of operations supported the deployment and two successful missions were flown. Two Soviet overflight missions by British pilots were finally approved by the Prime Minister in November and permission was obtained from the Government of Pakistan through British channels to use Peshawar as a staging base. Two separate deployments were supported by Detachment B to carry out these missions. On 6 December 1959 a successful photographic overflight of Kuybyshev, Saratov-Engels, and Kapustin Yar, landing at Adana, was flown, and on 5 February 1960 another flight was made over Tyura Tam, Ukraine, and Kazan, also terminating at Adana. Both of these missions collected excellent photographic intelligence, including coverage of the principal Soviet aircraft production centers.

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Project Relations with Norwegians

In November 1959, Miss Frances Willis (U.S. Ambassador to Norway) was in the Department of State on consultation and requested that Ambassador Cumming (State/Agency Liaison) arrange a meeting for her to discuss Project CHALICE relations with the Norwegians. Mr. James Cunningham, on behalf of the project, met with the two ambassadors on 18 November and the discussion immediately turned to CIA relations with Col. Evang and his unique position in the political structure in Oslo, particularly with regard to his dealings with the U-2 project representatives. In Mr. Cunningham's record of the meeting he noted:

"There was general agreement that in the event another mission is projected from Norway in the spring that the winter might profitably be spent in exploring the desirability and timing of briefing Cabinet members on CHALICE materials in order to make actual mission approval in the spring much easier. Ambassador Cumming stated that he was of the view that Secretary Herter would press the President rather hard in the spring for a high priority mission in Northwest Russia and that, in Cummings' opinion, the President would probably approve. Ambassador Cummings indicated that Secretary Herter's interest in this particular mission had been rekindled only yesterday by Premier Khrushchev's statements about missile production in the Soviet Union." 1/

1/ CHAL-0790, 18 November 1959. Memorandum for the Record by James A. Cunningham, Jr.

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Ambassador Willis said she would think about which of the Norwegian Cabinet members might most profitably receive such a briefing and would communicate with Ambassador Cumming on the Roger channel after her return to Norway in December regarding timing of a briefing. (Nothing has been found in the records to indicate that Ambassador Willis followed through on the recommended procedure for circumventing Evang as a sole channel for approvals. At any rate, the next approach to the Norwegians at the end of February 1960, looking toward staging from Norway in April, was made to Evang [redacted]

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Planning for Spring 1960 Operations

On 19 February 1960, General Goodpaster reported to General Cabell that the President had reviewed four CHALICE mission proposals which had been submitted for his approval, and had made the following decisions: ^{1/}

a. His first choice was a northern mission staged from a Norwegian base (Operation TIME STEP), which would cover the area along the Polyarny-Ural/Kotlas railroad line including a suspected

^{1/} CHAL-0890-60, 19 February 1960. Memorandum for the Record by Colonel William Burke.

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operational ICBM site.

b. If weather favored a launch from Pakistan, then Operation GRAND SLAM could be flown covering targets at Kyshtym, Sverdlovsk and the Kola Peninsula, including atomic energy, guided missile and submarine installations, with mission aircraft retrieving in Norway.

c. If, after waiting for favorable conditions to accomplish either a or b, above, these conditions did not develop within the allotted time, then the Sary Shagan mission could be flown (Operation SQUARE DEAL).

General Goodpaster made it quite clear that the President was approving only one mission and that the time period was between the 1st and the 30th of March 1960. The President could be approached for an extension if during that period the weather was not favorable. (A request for an extension was later granted up to 10 April, not because of weather but due to complications encountered in obtaining agreement from the Pakistanis and Norwegians.)

Project Headquarters requested [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to approach the Pakistanis for permission to run a series of U.S. flights from Peshawar. [REDACTED] replied on 5 March, after talking with U.S. Ambassador Rountree, that it might be a good idea

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to have the British High Commissioner, who had arranged for the use of Peshawar for the OLDSTER missions, negotiate on behalf of the U.S. This would avoid the question of F-104's for the Pakistani Air Force in exchange for use of a base being raised again by President Ayub Khan.

On 9 March 1960 Mr. Bissell was informed [redacted]

[redacted] that MI-6 had asked him to pass on the information that there had been a cooling off in the Pakistani official relationship with the British with respect to use of their facilities, due to pressure from the Soviets. This had been reported to London by the High Commissioner in Karachi after the 5 February 1960 U-2

overflight by the British team. It was therefore decided that Mr. Russell would approach Mr. Riaz Hussain, [redacted] principal liaison within the Pakistani Government, rather than go directly to President Ayub.

[redacted] reported on 15 March 1960 on the results of his approach to Col. Evang for permission to stage from Norway. Col. Evang had Norwegian Air Force approval for one British Elint flight in April and one U.S. flight in May. He therefore intended to approve TIME STEP for April, since the British had withdrawn their request for an April flight, but this had not as yet been cleared with Gen. Tofte Johnson, head of the Norwegian Air Force. A few days later

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[redacted] Headquarters that Col. Evang was ill with flu and not expected to be available until 28 March; therefore no plans could be discussed since Evang had authorized no one to discuss the mission other than himself.

Meanwhile on 25 March, Mr. Riaz Hussain notified [redacted] in Karachi that President Ayub had given permission to mount the operation from Peshawar allowing sixty days' use of the base if needed. The U.S. Ambassador and Air Attaché in Karachi were informed of the impending operation at that time [redacted]

The Project Director gave orders to Col. Burke on 28 March 1960, after reviewing the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee's latest input, as follows:

"You will accomplish TIME STEP or GRAND SLAM as soon after 31 March as weather is suitable for either mission. Should conditions develop in which either mission could be accomplished, first priority will be given to TIME STEP. It is assumed that the foregoing will require the preparation of alternative operations plans and the completion of arrangements to permit staging alternatively either East or North in response to the development of the weather." 1/

In Oslo, [redacted] learned from Col. Evang that between 9 and 19 April all Norway would be celebrating the Easter holidays and no government officials would be available during that period; also

1/ CHAL-0931, 28 March 1960. Memorandum to AC/DPD from DD/P.

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that both Andoya and Bodo Air Bases were involved in NATO exercises from 4 to 13 April. Therefore neither TIME STEP nor GRAND SLAM could be run before April 19th at the earliest, since the first was planned to depart from Norway and the second to retrieve there.

With Presidential authority due to expire on 10 April, the only alternative under the circumstances was to fly the third priority mission. Operation SQUARE DEAL was therefore staged from Peshawar on 9 April 1960, retrieving at Adana. The photographic mission was successful, but the aircraft was tracked for almost the entire route by Russian radar.

Operation GRAND SLAM

Planning continued toward carrying out the TIME STEP operation, with the hope of getting approval before the Summit Meeting in Paris on 16 May. Mr. Riaz Hussain was again requested to obtain approval from President Ayub for the additional mission to be flown from Peshawar and this was accomplished on 19 April 1960 with the proviso that the operation must end before the Summit Meeting. Also on 19 April, Col. Evang notified Gen. Tofte Johnson of the proposed mission and received his agreement for use of either Andoya or Bodo.

On 18 April 1960 the Detachment B Commander was notified that higher authority was being asked to approve three missions: TIME STEP,

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still number one, had been replanned to use Thule, Greenland, as an alternate pre-strike base, covering Novaya Zemlya in addition to the previously planned targets, and retrieving at Andoya or Bodo; GRAND SLAM, second priority; and a third possible mission, SUN SPOT, departing from Peshawar, covering Tyura Tam, the Vladimirovka Test Range, production facilities at Dnepropetrovsk and Kiev and five long-range bomber bases, and retrieving at Adana.

The DCI, Mr. Helms and Col. Burke briefed Secretary of State Herter on 19 April on the results of the SQUARE DEAL mission and on the plans for the three additional missions. Ambassador Cumming advised Col. Burke on 21 April that Secretary Herter approved the three missions, provided no use were made of Greenland bases. Also briefed on the three missions between 19 and 21 April were Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, and Generals Twining and LeMay.

On 25 April word was received via Gen. Goodpaster that the President had approved the three mission plans and gave permission to fly one of them before midnight 1 May 1960, Washington time. TIME STEP, the number one priority mission, required almost 100% perfect weather conditions, and the long-range forecast at that time was not favorable within the time span allowed. The Headquarters Operations Staff therefore

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began to plan for GRAND SLAM as the next choice. Col. Evang was advised that TIME STEP would probably be postponed and he agreed to support the new mission and to advise Gen. Johnson of the change.

On 26 April 1960, three C-130 support aircraft with fuel and pre-strike team departed Adana via Bahrein (permission for refueling there having been arranged by the British), landing at Peshawar. Two C-130's with fuel and post-strike team departed for Rhein-Main where they were to hold until the U-2 mission was launched. They would then proceed to Bodo arriving after the mission U-2, in order to support the story that the U-2 landing had been an emergency. (This was Col. Evang's cover story. He was later persuaded to allow the C-130's to arrive at Bodo three hours ahead of the mission aircraft so as to be prepared to effect a quick turn-around and relaunching of the U-2 for home base at Adana.)

Col. Beerli arrived at Bodo on 28 April (at Col. Evang's request) to coordinate the reception of the mission aircraft with the Norwegians. It was expected that GRAND SLAM might be launched as early as 28 April. The evening of 27 April, the primary U-2 and a spare departed Adana arriving at Peshawar prepared for an early morning 28 April take-off. At go-no-go time there was a cancellation due to route weather,

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and the two U-2's immediately flew back to Adana. On 28 April the two aircraft again proceeded to the pre-strike base only to receive another 24-hour hold for weather. The two aircraft again returned to Adana. The next weather briefing at Project Headquarters was held at 1130 GMT on 29 April and the weather was still marginal but showed promise of being acceptable for launching the mission early on the morning of 1 May (a Sunday).

On 30 April at 1415 GMT a cable went to Col. Beerli at Oslo (where he had gone to brief Col. Evang on mission plans) advising that the weather showed a fair chance of launching GRAND SLAM on 1 May, and that in the event a cancellation should be necessary at go-no-go time, the pre-strike force would be brought back to Adana from Peshawar, the post-strike group at Rhein-Main would be augmented to provide a pre-strike capability for TIME STEP, and the capability would be maintained to launch any one of the three approved missions if an extension of time could be obtained.

On 30 April at 1430 GMT the mission aircraft and spare again flew to Peshawar to await the launch signal from Headquarters. At about midnight on the 30th (local time at Adana) there was a loss of communication between that station and outside points, including the forward

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group at Peshawar, due to an unexplained radio blackout. The mission launch signal (HBJARGON-32) was sent from Headquarters to Wiesbaden and telephoned to Detachment B at Adana on an open line by the Project Liaison Officer at Wiesbaden [REDACTED] The substance of the launch message was then broadcast blind in clear transmission by Detachment B communications at Adana, using the phrase "HBJ 32 Go" on pre-arranged frequencies, for a period of about 30 minutes.

At 01/0230 GMT communications with Peshawar were re-established and the staging team acknowledged receipt of the clear text broadcast as of 01/0153 GMT. Mission launch had been made good at 01/0159 GMT (approximately one-half hour behind schedule). The post-strike team departed Rhein-Main for Bodo (via Oslo) with an estimated time of arrival of 01/0625 GMT to rendezvous with Col. Beerli and be prepared to receive the mission aircraft, which, as fate would have it, never did arrive.

The summary of Comint pick-up on the unsuccessful GRAND SLAM mission described the flight as follows:

"Good take-off 01/0159Z Peshawar, proceeded on course per mission plan. Soviet tracking began at border, continued without interruption for 1558 nautical miles until last reported position 01/0629Z nearly midway through flight plan.

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"Scattered fighter reaction occurred early in flight, not reported subsequently. Track for last 30 minutes showed U-2 in trouble, with reduced ground speed, altitude. Headquarters hypothesis, directly opposite Soviet reports, is that U-2 encountered some sort of mechanical malfunction, possibly including oxygen equipment.

"A special VIP flight took off from Moscow 01/1435Z, arriving at Sverdlovsk 01/1615Z, returned to Moscow 03/0247Z but quite unusually, landed at the Russian equivalent of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base rather than point of origin. Believe this aircraft may have been carrying top level aerodynamicists, possibly bits and pieces of the U-2..." 1/

On the non-arrival of the mission aircraft at Bodo within a reasonable period after its anticipated arrival time of 01/1119 GMT, a check was made at Andoya Air Base with negative results. Subsequently all other possible alternate landing points were checked to no avail. At 01/1617 GMT Col. Beerli telephoned from Bodo 50X1, E.O.13526 asking him to send the following message to Headquarters: "We have had no information from you for several hours. At this moment we have two planes standing by at Bodo as well as local help. What should we do?" Headquarters was at the same time sending a message to Col. Beerli, which crossed the one above, saying: "Situation here grim. Staff standing by for any eventuality. Imperative you keep Headquarters advised all information by any communications available."

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The Comint reports left little hope for the U-2's recovery and the Project Headquarters staff began to take care of the necessary details for pulling back the forward teams, and alerting all concerned stations around the world to the emergency. A first consideration was to fix the cover story which would be employed in the eventual announcement of a lost aircraft. The text of the announcement released on 2 May by the Adana Base Commander was agreed by all concerned agencies in Washington and said:

"... The U-2 aircraft was on a weather mission originating at Adana, Turkey. The purpose was the study of clear air turbulence. During a flight in Southeast Turkey the pilot reported he had oxygen difficulties. This was the last word heard at 1700Z over emergency frequency. The U-2 aircraft did not land at Adana as planned and it can only be assumed it is now down. A search effort is underway in the Lake Van area. The pilot's name is being withheld pending notification of next of kin." 1/

The change in the cover story with regard to the flight plan of the missing aircraft was decided at highest levels in Washington in an effort not to involve Pakistan, on the theory that the Turks were better able to stand the initial exposure to possible Soviet claims or threats.

Since it was impossible to predict in what form or manner the Soviets would break the news of the downed aircraft inside their borders, whether by open propaganda blast, or through private protest notes to the U.S.

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and others concerned, all that could be done was to brief all those involved and then wait for Khrushchev to show his hand, meanwhile tightening physical security at every point possible.

On 5 May, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, monitoring Radio Moscow, picked up the official announcement by Khrushchev of the shooting down near Sverdlovsk of an American plane which had crossed the Soviet frontier "from Turkey, Iran or Pakistan". On 7 May an additional statement said that the Soviets had captured the spy pilot alive and were interrogating him.

The rest of the story of the U-2 pilot, Frank Powers, and what happened over Sverdlovsk, is almost entirely in the public domain. The sequence of events in Washington following the May Day incident is covered separately in Chapter XIV.

Efforts to Remain Operational at Adana

All flights of U-2's from Incerlik Air Base ceased as of 3 May 1960 and not even local flights were allowed to maintain the aircraft and equipment in operationally ready status. The Menderes Government was ousted in a military coup on the night of 27 May 1960--a long-simmering revolt against its dictatorial and oppressive measures--and Menderes and most of the members of his government were imprisoned. No official of the new provisional government had been briefed on the U-2's mission,

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nor had any such briefings been requested. However, neither had any restriction against resumption of U-2 flights from Turkey after 1 May been imposed by the new government.

A strong effort to retain the U-2 capability in being in the field was made by the Project Director subsequent to the May Day mishap. Due to the political situation in Japan and the strong urging of U.S. Ambassador Douglas MacArthur, it became necessary to remove Detachment C's U-2 aircraft (and later its personnel) from Atsugi early in July 1960. The State Department also favored at least a temporary pull-back of Detachment B to the ZI in view of the Soviet intention to hold a public trial of Francis Gary Powers, and the possibility of revelations being made which would make the continued presence of Detachment B in Turkey a source of embarrassment to the U.S. Government. Plans were therefore made to phase the group out of Adana by September.

In August 1960 a high priority requirement of the Office of Scientific Intelligence of CIA for peripheral electronic reconnaissance of the Soviet/Middle East border region raised the question of keeping Detachment B in action to achieve this coverage. The return of the group to the ZI was suspended while a decision was sought. The DCI was agreeable to retention of Detachment B in place provided the State Department would

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consent. No decision had been reached at the time of the Moscow trial of pilot Powers (17-19 August 1960) and full time and attention of all concerned was being given to the monitoring of testimony made public there, and to the sifting of press and radio broadcast coverage of the affair. While the trial caused a worldwide sensation, the revelations were, over-all, not as damaging as had been feared, and the list of persons implicated by name was small compared to anticipated numbers of people and places feared "blown". The participation of the British was not brought out and the involvement of members of host governments whose bases had been used was fairly low key compared to what had been expected. Norwegian reaction to Soviet accusations caused the principal blowback among third countries involved.

In October 1960, an effort was made to obtain State Department reaction to the idea of retaining Detachment B for collection of Elint from the Soviet launch site at Sary Shagan. Mr. Cunningham visited Ambassador Cumming at State on 5 October for that purpose and was told that since Secretary Herter had previously supported the plan to return the group, any change in plans would require the Secretary's approval. Mr. Herter was not pressed for a decision at the time and a month later in an effort to settle the matter, Mr. Bissell sought

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General Cabell's recommendations on the future of the group at Adana. (USIB had meanwhile formally recommended the development and employment of a U-2 airborne Elint system for peripheral coverage of Soviet missile launching, but no source of funding had been ascertained.)

General Cabell's view was that a token force only be maintained at Adana, acting as caretakers of the equipment to be stored there, primarily for the purpose of retaining the use of the base in the event permission might be forthcoming in the future for Soviet Bloc or Middle East overflights, and secondarily to retain a base for the proposed Elint operations.

A principal problem to reactivating the U-2 flights in Turkey, even for merely local flying, was cover. NASA's Director, Dr. Glennan, had given a negative response (supported by State) to any further use of his agency as sponsor. Air Weather Service cover would require use of Air Force pilots and aircraft insignia, which would remove the civilian nature of the operation completely.

In consideration of problems relating to cover, funding and political approvals, Mr. Bissell concluded that Detachment B and its equipment should be returned to the ZI to augment the Edwards group and the new Taiwan group just being formed. Therefore on 10 November 1960 reduction to a holding unit was begun. All pilots were returned to Edwards

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and by January 1961 the unit was reduced to ten: Maj. Kenneth Martens, USAF, Commander; three CIA communications staff; four Lockheed techreps; and two support types.

The next effort to unground the U-2 and reactivate Detachment B came early in April 1961. Mr. Bissell obtained DCI and DDCI concurrence to a step-by-step revival of the capability, provided State was informed and given opportunity to disapprove. Mr. Hilsman, then Director of Intelligence and Research at State, was favorable toward the idea but recommended that the Special Group* be given detailed justification and time to study the proposal. The Special Group considered the proposal at a meeting on 17 August 1961 and instructed CIA and DOD to coordinate the ungrounding of the CIA U-2 in Turkey under

* At the 19 May 1960 meeting of the National Security Council's "Special Group" (the body which coordinated all CIA activities falling under the categories of covert activities listed in NSC 5412/2), Mr. Allen Dulles briefed the group on the 1 May U-2 incident. Afterwards, Mr. Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, expressed his belief that U-2 operations should have been a matter for the Special Group to consider and pass on. Mr. Allen Dulles explained that, since every phase of the project and all missions flown had received the coordination of the Secretary of State and the President, there had been no need to submit these operations to a lesser body for coordination. From that time onward, however, all U-2 overflights have, with very few exceptions, been passed on by the Special Group, the exceptions being the few cases of urgent requirements for which coverage was ordered by highest authority without reference to the Special Group.

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cover of TALL KING (a proposed SAC U-2/RB-47 operation over the Black Sea and Iran for Elint collection). This coordination was completed on 23 August but the U.S. Ambassador in Turkey, when queried by State regarding Turkish permission for the operation replied, in part:

"It remains my view that the use of U-2 aircraft, regardless of whether we have Turkish approval, could foreseeably have most serious public relations reaction as well as international political consequences which could be specially serious in present situation. My reasons for this have been previously expressed. This is admittedly, however, not only a Turkish problem, but one of wider significance and I must, of course, defer to any decision made on appropriately high level in Washington, but with hope that conclusion reached will in fact give full consideration to all implications, including possible effect on present flights which now going smoothly after period acute difficulty. I would wish to make clear that my concern here centers on use of aircraft of U-2 type in view its unfortunate history and by that token does not apply to RB-47 even though participating in joint exercises.

"As far as securing approval of Turkish Government is concerned, even though comments made above are essentially of political character, I do not feel approach here need be on a political level, but would recommend that request for U-2 and/or RB-47 flights be handled through presently established channel through which requests for other flights are transmitted. This channel is J-2, Office of General Kurttekin. I do not exclude the possibility, however, that Turks may wish to raise this problem to higher level, either within the military or in Foreign Office. . . " 1/

1/ IDEA-0476, 14 September 1961. Quoting cable from Ambassador Hare, Ankara, to the State Department.

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On 3 November 1961, the Department sent Ambassador Hare a further message saying that the Special Group had carefully considered his views (as expressed in the above-quoted cable) in the light of the changing international political scene, and had decided that the TALL KING operation should proceed as planned. He was accordingly requested to approach appropriate Turkish authorities. The approach was made through the U.S. Air Attaché, but no answer to the request was forthcoming from the Turks. At the time the Soviet airline, Aeroflot, was petitioning for the right to overfly Turkey on a Moscow-Cairo run and the Turks were giving this request serious consideration.

With little prospect of getting Turkish agreement to U-2 flights, Detachment B was told to complete plans for evacuation. The one remaining U-2 was disassembled and airlifted to Burbank for inspection and repair as necessary, and modification, the personnel were reduced to seven, and the Detachment B hangar at Incerlik Air Base was partitioned so as to allow the Air Force to use part of the facility. After departure of the last aircraft in February 1962, a small caretaking group with a communications tie-in with Project Headquarters in Washington remained at Incerlik as merely "a foot in the door".

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ANNEX 76

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/This message was drafted by Mr. Park Armstrong and approved for dispatch [] 50X1, E.O.13526 [] by Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr./

28 April 1956

EYES ONLY

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE CHARGE, ANKARA

I am taking this means of instructing you because of the unique sensitivity and security considerations concerning the project which is the subject of this message, namely, AQUATONE. Until otherwise directed, you should confine your communications on this matter to me to this channel. You should know that knowledge of this project within the Department is confined to myself, the Acting Secretary in my absence, and a very few high officers, but does not include the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs. You will be briefed more fully on this project by [] and Berg.

I desire that you see Prime Minister Menderes and present to him the request described below. You may tell the Prime Minister that this request comes personally from me. You may in your discretion take [] with you in order to answer any detailed or technical questions that the Prime Minister may ask.

You should approach Menderes along the following lines, if you think appropriate.

Now that the "weather balloon" project (GENETRIX) has been liquidated, the US Government wishes to express to the Government of Turkey its sincere appreciation for the wholehearted cooperation and assistance accorded the US Government in carrying out that effort.

The US Government admires the firm stand that your Government took when the USSR launched its propaganda campaign and protested against the balloons that entered its upper air space. The US Government regretted that it was not able at that time to coordinate its decision fully with you, but for reasons which are now to be conveyed to you, the US believed it wise to terminate promptly rather than to continue launchings.

(ADIC-1917, OUT 50888)

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Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

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The fact is that the balloon project was the first phase of a reconnaissance plan that will shortly be ready to embark on a second and more important phase. At the time that the balloon launchings commenced, it was not then convincingly demonstrable that the second phase, which was in the testing stage, would prove out so that it could be undertaken with acceptable levels of risk. But by the time that the Soviet Union protested the balloon flights, these tests had proceeded much further, and in the interest of avoiding possible prejudice to the success of the second phase, it was considered prudent to discontinue further balloon launchings. The tests have now been completed with results that are satisfactory to us, and it is now feasible to deploy the units involved.

At this point you should describe Project AQUATONE to the Prime Minister, giving him such detail as he requests. You should tell him that the project is considered of the highest priority by the US Government and that, because of its obvious sensitivity and the need for the greatest possible security, the US Government has restricted knowledge of the project to the smallest possible number of high officials. However, operations will not commence until the decision to do so has been taken by the highest level of the US Government. You could say that the US Government has the utmost confidence in the discretion of the Prime Minister and is thus prepared fully to disclose the nature of the project to him, but trusts that, if he concurs in it, he will not find it necessary to inform more than the absolute minimum number of officials in his government who would need to know of it if the project is to succeed.

You should then inform the Prime Minister that the US considers that the airfield at Adana, from which the balloons were launched, is from all points of view the most favorable site for AQUATONE. You should point out its geographic advantages and you can say that no other available site compares favorably with it. You could point out that this request, in effect, is a continuation of the balloon phase by different means, involving a manned vehicle. You can further say that the US Government solicits the continued cooperation of the Government of Turkey in using the Adana airfield for this purpose. You may inform the Prime Minister that the UK is expected to cooperate with the US in this project by providing a site.

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In describing Project AQUATONE to the Prime Minister, you should frankly indicate that its purpose is overflight of hostile areas for reconnaissance purposes, but unless pressed by him, you should leave the maximum penetration capability and the intention to employ it as vague as the circumstances permit.

If the Prime Minister raises the question of quid pro quo, you may indicate to him that the US is prepared to share such of the results as would be of direct interest to the Turkish Government with it. By this we have in mind areas adjacent to Turkey and the northern littoral of the Black Sea.

If the Prime Minister should demur on the grounds that there are reasonable prospects that the USSR will agree eventually to the President's "open skies" proposal, you may tell him that the US Government is satisfied, as a result of reports of the position stated by the Soviet leaders recently in England, that the USSR has no repeat no intention of undertaking any such agreement. Thus it is of the utmost urgency for the US and Turkey to exercise the recently developed US capability to overfly the defenses before the USSR has time to develop the matching intercept capability.

I request that you hold this matter on an EYES ONLY basis. Ambassador Warren is being briefed on the project prior to his departure from Washington. I believe, however, that it is better for you to make this approach than have it be one of the first things Ambassador Warren would take up upon his arrival.

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