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Chapter XIV  
  
(PERIOD)  
From Inception to 1969

## DO NOT DESTROY

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CHAPTER XIV. THE MAY DAY  
1960 INCIDENT

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## CHAPTER XIV. THE MAY DAY 1960 INCIDENT

In Moscow

On the morning of May Day 1960, in the foreign diplomats' section of the reviewing stands in Red Square, the U.S. Air Attaché, Col. Edwin Kirton, was making notes which later that afternoon were sent "Operational Immediate" to the Pentagon under the heading "Hi-lites, May Day Parade" and included the following:

"Wide speculation caused by fact that Vershinin\* was 55 minutes late and entered upper deck only at very end of military portion of parade. Immediately after arrival he held series of seemingly very urgent and serious conversations. First to consult with him was Viryoxov, head of PVO.\*\*

"Vershinin went to head of line and consulted urgently for ten minutes with Malinovsky following which he came back to the right end of the line and continued serious conversation, pulling papers out of his pocket, and accompanied with repeated gestures. Speculation included: (1) that some spectacular event either succeeded or failed, but was of sufficient importance to keep Vershinin away from ceremonies, (2) that PVO forces may have shot down unfriendly aircraft..." 1/

In Washington

At approximately 0330 hours, Washington local time on Sunday, May 1st, personnel in the CIA operations control center at the Matomic

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\*Commander-in-Chief, Soviet Air Force.

\*\*Soviet Air Defense Command.

1/ DAF Msg IN 32702, 1 May 1960, from USAIRA Moscow.

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Building, where Mission 4154 was being followed through Comint channels, became aware that all was not well with the flight. The Soviet radar tracking of the aircraft's progress was discontinued at 0129 hours Washington time at a point southwest of Sverdlovsk, just short of half-way through the mission.

Key project personnel were summoned to the control center in the early morning hours to analyze the latest information as reflected by the Comint tracking and to implement appropriate actions in view of the probable loss of the aircraft. Present in addition to project staff were Mr. Walter Bonney, Press Relations Officer of NASA, and Colonel Leo P. Geary, USAF Project Officer. The group was later joined by Mr. Richard Helms, Acting Deputy Director for Plans in the absence from the city of Mr. Bissell, and Ambassador Hugh Cumming, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. A full-scale discussion of the proposed text of a suitable cover story release ensued. Mr. Bissell joined the group at about 1530 hours, and it was decided that a story should be released from the aircraft's home base at Adana, Turkey, to the effect that a NASA high altitude weather research airplane was missing having last been heard from in the vicinity of Lake Van, Turkey, at 0700 hours, and that at last radio contact the pilot had reported oxygen difficulty.

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Ambassador Cumming informed Under Secretary of State Dillon by phone of the agreed release and obtained his concurrence (in the absence of the Secretary of State). The story differed in some aspects from the prepared one distributed to the Detachment, to Headquarters USAF, to USAF European theater command, and to third countries involved. The revised story was based on the latest information and assumption that the aircraft was down deep within the Soviet Union where any story connected with navigational error, pilot hypoxia, or aircraft malfunction would be difficult to sustain. Yet, in the absence of any verified information on the actual fate of the mission, condition of the aircraft and pilot, and uncertainty as to whether the Soviets would admit to a penetration of such depth, it was felt that the revised release offered better prospects of being sustained in the event the aircraft was totally destroyed and the pilot killed, or if the Soviets should take credit for shooting it down, \* while at the same time electing to move the reported scene of the incident closer to their borders in order to conceal from their own people and the world the depth of the mission's penetration into the heavily guarded Russian heartland.

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\* During the period immediately after loss of the mission, the idea that the pilot might be taken alive did not receive the high priority attention which other possible eventualities received.

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The revised cover story, backed up by an actual mission flight plan, was sent through CIA communications channels to Detachment B, [REDACTED] and Headquarters USAFE. The Commanding Officer of the Detachment was directed to release the story after local coordination with the Incerlik Base Commander [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (This was done on 2 May, however the story did not appear in the news until 3 May when it was published with an Istanbul dateline.)

In Turkey

Word reached Detachment B at Incerlik Air Force Base in the afternoon of 1 May through cable channels of the non-arrival of the mission aircraft at Bodo and its probable loss deep inside Russia. In the absence of the Commanding Officer who was with the staging party in Pakistan, the senior officer in charge at Adana was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Housing and Administrative Officer, and it fell to him to break the news to Mrs. Barbara Powers, wife of the pilot, that her husband was missing on a flight. Mrs. Powers was suffering from a broken leg at the time, the result of a skiing accident a few weeks earlier. It was decided that it would be best for her to return immediately to the States, and on 3 May Headquarters authorized her PCS

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return by commercial air, with an escort for the full trip, as well as her German shepherd dog's transportation by the same plane (cost to be reimbursed by Mrs. Powers).

Secretary of State Herter and General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, were in Istanbul on 1 May, attending a NATO meeting when the U-2 was declared overdue, [REDACTED] was requested by Headquarters to fly to Istanbul and brief them on the situation.

Third Country Involvement: Pakistan

Since it was impossible to predict in what form the Soviets would break the news, whether openly or in private protests to the U.S. and other countries involved, on 2 May [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was requested by Headquarters to see General Ayub, [REDACTED] and tell him that the air intelligence activity approved by him through Riaz Hussain had experienced the loss of an aircraft which was believed down inside the USSR; that the U.S. would attempt to keep Pakistan from active involvement with the Soviets and would make every effort to minimize any Soviet pressure growing out of the incident; also that the U.S. was grateful to Ayub for his steadfast support of vital intelligence collection efforts. (Since Ayub had never

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been officially told of the true mission of the activity, Headquarters desired to forestall any violent reaction by him in case the Soviets laid blame on Pakistan.)

[redacted] saw Ayub on 4 May and delivered the message. Ayub received the news calmly, said he was sorry to hear of the loss of the aircraft but was not disturbed about what the Russians might say. He asked that the following message be relayed to Mr. Allen Dulles:

"We shall stand by our friends and will not let them down on this. The problem for us is not what to say or not to say to the Russians but what we can do about them and their continued overflights of our country. As to the latter we are very dependent on your assistance since we do not ourselves have the means to defend ourselves. Our needs in this regard, namely a few F-104 jet aircraft and some further supplement to our radar network, have already been made known to your government at the highest level... anything Mr. Dulles could say to the proper quarters to help out in this connection would be most appreciated." 1/

Soviet Disclosures: Washington Reactions

On 4 May, before the Soviets made any disclosure whatever, there were meetings at the Department of State attended by Col. William Burke, Acting Chief, DPD, with Ambassador Bohlen and Messrs. Richard Davis and Lampton Berry of the State Department. A question and answer brief prepared by the Agency principally for use by NASA was carefully

1/ [redacted]

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gone over. It consisted of answers to hypothetical questions which might be asked by the press concerning the aircraft and the upper air research program. This list was agreed by the conferees and was dispatched to all involved officials in Washington and at overseas stations.

The next day at a convocation of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow Khrushchev announced the shooting down of an American aircraft which he said had crossed the state frontier of the Soviet Union from either Turkey, Iran, or Pakistan. (See Annex 82 for Khrushchev statement.) The FBIS pick-up of this news from Radio Moscow was immediately referred to Project Headquarters and to the DCI who was attending a National Security Council meeting which was being held at High Point. After the NSC meeting convened, a further meeting of the President, Secretary of Defense Gates, Mr. Gordon Gray, Mr. Douglas Dillon, Mr. Allen Dulles and General Andrew J. Goodpaster, was held to consider the handling of the U-2 incident. It was agreed by the group that the President should not be personally involved, and it was determined that the Department of State should handle all publicity.

In Washington, a meeting at the Department of State attended by General Cabell and Mr. Bissell with Messrs. Davis and Berry of State, discussed the implications of the Khrushchev statement, which gave no

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clue as to the fate of the pilot. The group adjourned to Mr. Dillon's office on his return from the NSC conclave and learned of the decision that State would handle all publicity. In the afternoon of 5 May, the following agreed press release was made:

"The Department has been informed by NASA that, as announced May 3, an unarmed plane, a U-2 weather research plane based at Adana, Turkey, piloted by a civilian, has been missing since May 1. During the flight of this plane, the pilot reported difficulty with his oxygen equipment.

"Mr. Khrushchev has announced that a U.S. plane was shot down over the USSR on that date. It may be that this was the missing plane. It is entirely possible that, having a failure in the oxygen equipment which could result in the pilot losing consciousness, the plane continued on automatic pilot for a considerable distance and accidentally violated Soviet air space.

"In view of Mr. Khrushchev's statement, the U.S. is taking this matter up with the Soviet Government, with particular reference to the fate of the pilot." 1/

Meanwhile the White House Press Secretary, Mr. James Hagerty, made a statement to the press that the President had ordered an investigation of the entire matter. He also in a telephone conversation with Mr. Bonney of NASA suggested that the latter hold a press conference as soon as possible as a means of handling the heavy volume of press inquiries; such a conference was convened at 1330 hours on

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1/ ADIC-0313 (OUT 66457), 5 May 1960.

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5 May in NASA Headquarters. (It is presumed that Mr. Hagerty had not been informed at that time that the State Department alone was to handle all publicity regarding the U-2, and that neither had NASA been so informed in time to prevent the press conference.) The answers given the press by Mr. Bonney were based on the brief prepared and agreed between CIA and State on 4 May.

On 6 May there were two radio and press briefings at the Department of State, one at 1110 hours held by Mr. Tully, and one at 1235 hours, by Mr. Lincoln White. At the latter, Mr. White made the statement in reply to a question that there was no deliberate attempt to violate Soviet air space, and there never had been. (Although this statement was Mr. White's own response to the question asked, it was taken by the members of the press as the Department position and so printed and broadcast.)

Later in the day of 6 May, Embassy Moscow reported that the Swedish Ambassador had been told by Jacob Malik at a reception on 5 May that "the pilot hit the silk and we are now interrogating him". Project Headquarters' first reaction to this bit of news was that it might be a plant to force a reaction from the U.S. in an effort to spare the pilot possible torture at the hands of his Russian captors.

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Shortly after noon on 7 May, Munich Base cabled information monitored from Radio Moscow that the Russians had the pilot of the downed aircraft, that he was alive and had been identified as an Air Force pilot working for CIA; also that the Russians claimed to have equipment from the plane. (See Annex 83 for 7 May speech by Khrushchev.)

This news touched off a series of extended meetings in CIA and the Department of State, the first between noon and 1430 hours in the DCI's office with General Cabell and Ambassadors Cumming and Bohlen from State and General Goodpaster from the White House. In this session a draft press statement was agreed; however this statement was reworked by Mr. Dillon and the Secretary of State (to go farther down the road toward open admission of overflight), and after being cleared with the President, was released at 1800 hours. (See Annex 84 for text.) The DCI was informed by telephone of the later decision at higher level to, in effect, "come clean" in the 1800 press release. This statement, six days after the incident, was the first official statement casting doubt on the previously published cover story. On the same day a public display of a NASA-marked U-2 at Edwards Air Force Base had been held to satisfy press demands for detailed information on the plane and

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its meteorological equipment and to support the cover story on the U-2's weather mission.

Also on the same day, Detachment B was instructed to furnish a "black" airlift to remove the British cadre at Adana from Turkey and return them to the Air Ministry in London for debriefing and a temporary leave until the U-2 incident had calmed down. This procedure was agreed by Project Headquarters at the request of the Air Ministry.

The next day, 8 May, was Sunday and no further statements on the incident were made by official Government spokesmen on the Administration side. (There were many public statements by Senators and Congressmen, however.)

Third Country Involvement: Norway

On 9 May [50X1, E.O.13526] Col. Evang (Chief of Norwegian Intelligence) had requested that CIA Headquarters send him a full report of all information available to the U-2 pilot which might reveal Norwegian involvement so that Evang could prepare to defend himself when the matter was brought up in the Storting. Evang was talking of a possible five years behind bars, although he had been given a U.S. visa on 9 May (secretly) in the event it became necessary for him to leave the country. He predicted a difficult period for [50X1, E.O.13526]

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for the next few months even if he, himself, should survive the crisis.

Congressional Briefing, 9 May 1960

At 1000 hours on Monday, 9 May, a meeting in the office of the Secretary of State gave consideration to the question of the handling of Congressional inquiries. Present at that meeting were: Secretary Herter, Under Secretary Dillon, Defense Secretary Gates, Deputy Secretary of Defense Douglas, Ambassadors Bohlen and Kohler, and Messrs. Dulles and Bissell of CIA. It was agreed that the DCI would brief chosen Congressional leaders, giving the basic facts in a closed session, and that Secretary Herter would issue, subject to Presidential approval, a press statement clarifying the position of the United States Government. After consultation with the White House, it was further decided that Mr. Herter would give his statement to the Congressional leaders before it was published. (See Annex 85 for text.)

An appointment was set up for 1400 hours the same day for the Congressional briefing, to be accompanied by an exposition of U-2 photographic intelligence by Mr. Lundahl. Mr. Dulles spent the intervening time with aides preparing his presentation, and Mr. Bissell joined the group at State in drafting the Secretary's proposed statement.

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Shortly before 1400 hours Mr. Bissell and Mr. Dulles joined the Secretary of State for the ride to the Congressional hearing room during which the text of the DCI's proposed remarks was read and approved by the Secretary. (Text included in Annex 85).

Congressional leaders who were present for the briefing on 9 May were: Senators Lyndon B. Johnson, Mansfield, Dirksen, Bridges, Saltonstall, Russell, Vinson, Wiley and Fulbright; and Congressmen Rayburn, Halleck, Hayden, Arends, Morgan and Chipperfield.

Further Moscow Revelations

On 10 May Tass radio reported that Pilot Powers had in his possession a letter signed by General Thomas D. White permitting him to fly an Air Force aircraft. Parts of the downed U-2 were put on display in Gorky Park in Moscow and press reports indicated that various items of equipment were tagged with maker's name or identified as U.S. Government property. Detachment B was queried on what items the pilot may have had in his possession, and what pieces of equipment were aboard the aircraft which had any identifying markings on them.

In the early days of the project, the question of "sterilizing" the equipment carried by the U-2 received a good bit of attention with the

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idea that items would not be attributable to the manufacturers of the components. That idea was abandoned as impracticable and the concept of sterilization which was then followed was that the aircraft and equipment should not incorporate any items which by their markings indicated them to be the property of the U.S. Air Force.

Damage Assessment

On 10 May a damage assessment on the incident was ordered to be carried out by DPD Security Staff in cooperation with the CI Staff of the Agency with the purpose of accumulating the fullest possible record of information which must be presumed to be available to the Russians and which could be used against the United States and its allies. This initial assessment was submitted to the DD/P on 27 June 1960 (text included as Annex 86).

The CIA Director of Personnel on 10 May, in response to a request by DPD, affirmed to the Comptroller that, under the authority granted by Agency Regulation 20-760, he had reviewed the circumstances of the disappearance of Francis G. Powers and of his reported capture and on the basis of his review had determined that Powers was in a status qualifying him for benefits of the Missing Persons Act (P. L. 490, 77th Congress) as amended, effective 1 May 1960. Authorization was

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given for the continuance of Powers' pay and allowances to be accrued in an escrow account with the specific authorization for allotment disbursements to be furnished later through DPD. Included was an allotment for support of Mrs. Powers who had been escorted to her mother's home in Milledgeville, Georgia, under Project Security Staff guidance.

As a precautionary measure, all records on project pilots (including the British) who had gone through the Lovelace Clinic were retrieved from the Clinic and held at Headquarters. The suppliers of the U-2 aircraft, engines, and other components were given defensive briefings on meeting press inquiries. Witting project and other Agency and USAF personnel were advised as to the information which should remain classified and be so treated in spite of public revelations and announcements made during the previous ten days.

President Eisenhower's Press Conference, 11 May 1960

Despite the agreement of State, Defense, and Agency officials at the post-NSC meeting of 5 May to avoid any personal involvement of the President in the matter, President Eisenhower made the decision completely on his own to face the press and announce his cognizance and approval of the secret flights over Russia. The text of the President's statement is included as Annex 87.

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On the same morning, Mr. Allen Dulles, accompanied by Messrs. Lundahl and Houston, was meeting with the CIA Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee to brief them on the history of the U-2 project and the recent incident. At the end of the briefing and questioning by Members, the Director made a final statement that he knew from the start what chances were being taken and that the Agency was ready and able to take the brunt of the criticism, but he wished the Members to be aware of the extreme importance of the contribution this operation had made to U.S. intelligence. A vote of confidence in Mr. Dulles was proposed by Congressman Van Zandt and agreed to by the Members. Mr. Houston's record of the meeting indicated that:

"The Subcommittee did not show any great concern about the timing of this last U-2 flight and its nearness to the Summit. They seemed far more perturbed about the fact that the pilot had spoken so much and so early, although they made clear that they were not holding this against the man. It was also clear that Members were deeply impressed by the description of the intelligence product and had no question about the necessity for and value of the project generally. At the end there was some discussion of what the position of the Subcommittee should be--whether embarrassment, or disappointment. The consensus seemed to be strongly in favor of standing behind the Executive Department's action with no apologies." 1/

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1/ TS-174813, 12 May 1960. Memo for Record by General Counsel, CIA.

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In anticipation of a worldwide press barrage following the President's statement to the press on 11 May, the first propaganda guidance to CIA field stations on the U-2 incident was issued by cable later the same day, as follows:

"1. In discussion plane incident with your contacts you should for present and immediate future take basic guidance from Secretary of State official statement of 9 May and President's 11 May press conference. Will try to supplement official statements from time to time with additional points such as those in following paragraphs which you may use in discussion with senior cleared and witting officials your host government, but am sure you realize it difficult to keep you up to minute in this extremely fast-breaking situation.

"2. For time being prefer not to officially confirm exact details CIA participation in organization and control this operation but there no need deny CIA involvement. You may also say CIA considered product aerial surveillance program to be of extreme importance in assessment likelihood of and capability for Soviet surprise attack. This connection, you should cite many reasons for U.S. need obtain such information by clandestine means in view excessive Soviet secrecy and past record aggression. (Western Europe stations only: In those areas where our release of intelligence to local services includes general studies or estimates you should stress fact that host government was recipient benefits of information and in any event all Western countries benefitted from intelligence obtained.)

"3. You may inform liaison contacts that analysis information released by Soviets leads to serious doubt their claim to have shot down plane by rocket. This doubt based among other things on apparently faked photographs of crashed plane and of Soviet airfield, Soviet claim that maps, films, destruction device still intact despite crash from extreme altitude, contradictory statements as incident has progressed re place where plane downed, etc. Seems quite possible pilot had equipment failure and was forced down by fighters when reached lower altitudes. We attach

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no credibility to story he double agent or defected to Soviets and note past Soviet record in extracting confessions from persons under their control.

"4. Above raises many questions re Soviet motives and tactics whole affair. By own admission they knew of earlier surveillances but did not publicly announce until they could claim shoot down, in order hide weakness their air defenses and use incident as excuse again to brandish their nuclear missiles. Khrushchev propaganda treatment also obvious attempt blame U. S. for any failure at Summit and possibly to avoid real issues of disarmament inspection and control. . . " 1/

#### Further Third Country Problems

Because of pressure being exerted by Soviet diplomatic protests or visits by their Foreign Office emissaries, the Turkish, Norwegian, Pakistani and Japanese Foreign Offices in turn began to press the State Department for information to assist them in replying to the Russians. The texts of all the written and oral communications between the U. S. , the U. S. S. R. , and other governments in connection with the U-2 incident were collected by the State Department into one document dated 12 August 1960 (RSB MM-0 203, Secret Noform) a copy of which is appended as Annex 88.

#### Paris Summit Conference

While diplomatic notes were being passed back and forth, plans for the "Summit" meeting in Paris went forward and as one preliminary step

1/ Book Cable DIR-29243 (OUT 74598), 11 May 1960.

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General DeGaulle was afforded a briefing to bring him up to date on the U-2 matter. A flash summary to the DCI [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] reported that:

"DeGaulle stood before easel in his office one hour and twenty minutes on 14 May while briefed by Cunningham and Lundahl (NEDROW (P) interpreting). Original meeting had been scheduled to last one-half hour. He had minor interest in organization and history of project but showed much interest in U-2 incident, especially CIA conclusions regarding likelihood mechanical malfunction as cause versus Russian claims of shootdown. Once satisfied on this point, he expressed desire to see take, saying that it's the end results that count.

"He listened attentively to detailed PI briefing, carefully fixing most important locations in his mind and asking penetrating questions. For example, he desired to have our best estimate of the maximum effective range new Soviet Hexagon SAM sites and the bearing this had on SAC strategy and needs. Expressed great interest in Soviet atomic energy capabilities and in BW and CW evidence.

"He inquired whether the U-2 had uncovered Chinese atomic energy installations.

"When briefing completed, he made following points: he was very much impressed with the results and made it clear he considered CHALICE an intelligence operation of great significance. He was highly appreciative for briefing which he said would be helpful to him during Summit Conference. He believes that the operation should continue and he would like to be kept informed of significant intelligence developed in the future." 1/

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At the preliminary meeting of heads of governments in Paris on 16 May, Khrushchev condemned the United States in relation to the U-2 spy flights and gave his ultimatum for continuing with the Summit Conference, at the same time withdrawing the invitation for President Eisenhower to visit Russia. The U.S. President replied, leaving no doubt that the ultimatum was not acceptable to him. The invitation extended by President DeGaulle for a meeting of the four powers on 17 May was boycotted by the USSR and the other three powers issued a joint communique taking note of the fact that, because of the attitude adopted by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, it had not been possible to begin at the Summit Conference the examination of the problems which were to have been discussed, but affirming their readiness to take part in such negotiations at any suitable time in the future.

On 25 May President Eisenhower on radio and television from Washington gave the American people his version of what happened in Paris, and while he took full responsibility for approving all the various programs undertaken by the U.S. Government to secure military intelligence, he placed the blame for torpedoing the conference on Mr. Khrushchev and brought out the fact that Khrushchev had been aware

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of previous overflights of the Soviet Union at the time he visited the United States the previous September, but had said nothing then. In the same speech the President said that he had directed that the U-2 flights be stopped--their usefulness was impaired and continuance would only complicate relations of our allies with the Soviets. (Full text of the President's speech is at Annex 89.)

On 14 June in the Senate, the collapse of the Summit Conference was the subject of a major speech by Senator John F. Kennedy in which he said that the effort to eliminate world tensions and end the cold war through a Summit Meeting was doomed to failure long before the U-2 fell on Soviet soil, because the United States was unprepared with new policy or new programs to settle outstanding issues. In the same speech he put forward the challenge for a "Great Debate" on the issues by the American people through the media of their political parties.

Six weeks after the May Day event, after an appraisal of the favorable and unfavorable reactions with regard to CIA's role in the affair, a Book Dispatch went out to the Chiefs of CIA Stations and Bases from the Director, emphasizing the significant benefit to national security of the intelligence collected by the U-2 program and encouraging efforts to devise new methods for collecting vital intelligence in view of

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continued Communist secrecy and hostility. The text of the Director's secret testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 31 May 1960 was appended to the book dispatch for the background information of addressees (see Annex 87). In his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the Director had decided to go over to the attack, in which attitude he had the expressed support of the Acting DDP, Mr. Helms, who said he believed the Senators would appreciate the aggressive approach since underneath it all, there was a good deal of admiration and good will in the Senate and he felt they would react positively when they saw that the Director was neither apologetic nor on the defensive. This prediction turned out to be correct, and the Director was also able to maintain the precedent of non-disclosure of his testimony by the Committee.

As to the reaction of the Russian people to the U-2 incident, the Chief of the CIA Soviet Russia Division (Mr. John M. Maury) reported on 8 June 1960 that although persistent repetition of Soviet propaganda themes might eventually produce anti-American bias, travelers returning from Russia since the incident reported no change in the over-all friendliness toward Americans evidenced in personal contacts in recent years. Despite the expectation that the overflights would represent to

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the Soviet man in the street an affront to the dignity and sovereignty of the USSR, a threat to peace, and a menace to his own person, the attitudes reported reflected a sophisticated acceptance of espionage as a fact of life, and the expected emotional responses of indignation and hostility had not materialized. <sup>1/</sup>

Between 6 and 9 May 1960 the American Embassy in Moscow received approximately 6,000 letters and 200 telegrams purported to have been spontaneously written by ordinary Soviet citizens protesting the U-2 overflights. These communications were considered to be the result of a calculated psychological effort on the part of the Soviet propaganda bureau and showed that they had a substantial internal organizing ability along these lines.

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Preparation for the Defense of Powers

In the first week of June, State and CIA officers agreed that a maximum effort to provide legal assistance to the captured pilot would

<sup>1/</sup> DPD-4769-60, 8 June 1960, "Soviet Image of the U-2 Incident".

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be made; this would be done through a private front, and would of course be subject to whatever restrictions might be imposed by the Russians. Through the Department of State Legal Adviser, Mr. Eric Hager, an agreement was successfully negotiated with the President of the Virginia State Bar Association who promised to furnish adequate counsel without fee and to protect and keep secret the governmental interest in the case.

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An account of the negotiations between State and Agency officers, the Virginia lawyers, and the wife and father of Frank Powers during the month of June 1960 in preparing the basis for a defense of the captive pilot was set forth on 30 June 1960 by Mr. John McMahon (at that time DPD Personnel Officer) and is included as Annex 90.

As events later developed, the lawyers were never permitted to participate in the trial; however, considerable expenses were incurred.

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in preparation of the defense, including travel expenses of the Powers family and lawyers to Moscow and return.

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Propaganda for the Defense

On 7 July the Soviet news agency published the indictment of pilot Powers under Article 2 of the Law of the Soviet Union on Criminal Responsibility for State Crimes. The Embassy was instructed to pass an aide memoire to the Soviet Government once more requesting permission to interview Powers and provide him with legal counsel, but like previous overtures, the note was ignored. The date set for the opening of the trial was 17 August, and it was anticipated that it would follow the pattern of previous "show" trials with the prisoner well-rehearsed and rendered cooperative through "brainwashing" techniques. Through arrangements with Mrs. Barbara Powers, DPD obtained the letters

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written to her by her husband from his Russian prison. They were analyzed, first, for evidence of the prisoner's use of the simple code in which he had been instructed during his training. He did not make use of this means of communicating secretly. In addition, expert consultants in handwriting were retained through the efforts of General Don Flickinger, USAF Medical Corps, to make a study of representative samples of Powers' handwriting before and after his capture. While such studies must be classed as experimental (the consulting psychologists, Drs. Harrower and Steiner of New York, were not informed as to whose handwriting was involved), the findings were considered of enough significance to warrant possible exploitation through propaganda prior to the trial.

The most important deduction arrived at by the analysis of the before and after handwriting was that more than likely some type of organic psychiatric change of significant degree in the subject had taken place in the interim between the writings. Such a change could result from such things as brain injury, electroshock, cerebral infection, or vascular deprivation and psychochemical application. However, State Department policy with regard to pre-trial publicity negated the propaganda use of the "brainwashing" thesis. An instruction sent to field

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stations in this regard on 5 August said that official and attributable comment prior to the trial would appear only in response to direct queries from responsible sources. If access to the prisoner continued to be denied, State would probably release the text of the 30 July note to the USSR reviewing the unsuccessful efforts thus far to obtain access to Powers, and to obtain Russian visas for legal counsel.

Strictly unattributable assets of the Agency might refer in low key to previous Soviet practices of rigging trials and extorting confessions. However, it was considered inadvisable and possibly counter-productive to make a broad effort to suggest the probability of brainwashing in the Powers case. (During the processing by his Soviet captors at the time of his being confined to prison, according to Frank Powers' own report subsequent to his release, he was given a hypodermic injection which was probably a general immunization shot. Although he was kept in solitary confinement and subjected to constant interrogation, sometimes ten to twelve hours a day, there was no evidence that he was given truth serums or other drugs.)

Stations were advised to encourage the attendance at the trial of responsible, reputable journalists whose reports would be balanced, and generally favorable to the West. One propaganda ploy which had

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Agency support was the delivery of a speech at the Congress of International Astronautical Federations in Stockholm on the day before the Powers trial was to open. The speech, to be given by Mr. Spencer Beresford (a Congressional consultant on space problems), contained arguments refuting the Soviet indictment of Powers and raising the question of national sovereignty over airspace--which was not defined by international law and was generally assumed to reach only as far as could be enforced. The State Department, two days before the speech was to be given and [redacted] foreign media assets lined up to give the speech maximum play, reached the policy decision that extensive publicity of the speech was not desirable since it expressed a point of view at variance in some respects with the U.S. Government approach to such problems and raised questions the U.S. would prefer not to have raised at that time. [redacted]

[redacted]

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On 10 August 1960, the State Department released a statement regarding the U.S. policy with regard to public utterances on the Powers trial as follows:

In order to avoid any possibility of prejudicing Mr. Powers' situation and in the interests of national security, the U.S. Government for the present will withhold comment on any aspect of the trial itself.

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 Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50  
 U.S.C., section 403g)

However, it is to be noted that Powers has been in exclusive control of Soviet authorities for 101 days, that despite all efforts of this Government no one other than his jailers and captors has had access to him, and that anything he says should be judged in light of these circumstances and Soviet past practices in matters of this kind. \*

A special "Propaganda Guidance to Stations and Bases on the Powers Trial" was dispatched by the Agency's  on 1 August 1960 for maximum use with all assets (see Annex 91).

Ad Hoc Committee on Powers Trial

On 29 July 1960, Mr. Allen Dulles appointed Mr. John M. Maury, Chief of the Soviet Russia Division, to handle the over-all Agency coordination of activities related to the Powers trial. This occurred at the end of a meeting during which the Director gave a complete briefing to the Virginia lawyers picked to defend Powers, and granted permission for them to study the signed contract under which Powers was hired by the Agency.

Mr. Maury had met with the lawyers (all old friends of his) the evening before at the Mayflower to discuss ways of putting pressure on the Soviet Embassy to obtain visas for the party to go to Moscow for the trial. Mrs. Barbara Powers had also been present. Mr. Maury's note

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\* The second paragraph of the State Department Press Release was included at the specific request of the DCI, Mr. Allen Dulles.

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on the meeting reported that during the evening he had an opportunity to become acquainted with Barbara, who made quite a good first impression on him. At the same time he became aware of certain problems: (a) that Barbara had been dissatisfied with past Agency assistance rendered her and was particularly unhappy about the long delay in receiving any financial aid from the Agency; (b) that she wished to examine her husband's contract with the Agency, although her reason for this was not clear; (c) that she was highly critical of the State Department, contending that none of its officers (except Ambassador Bohlen) had offered her any significant advice or assistance; (d) she was also critical of Mr. Allen Dulles because he was not available to see her when she was at the Agency the day before.

On receipt of a copy of Mr. Maury's memorandum, the long-suffering DPD officers who had been assigned the onerous task of handling Barbara and seeing to her financial and other needs made known to Mr. Maury the completeness of the past assistance rendered and drew from him agreement that in any future contacts with Barbara, Mr. McMahon or  of DPD, or Mr. Mike Miskovsky of the General Counsel Staff would be present to challenge any complaints by Barbara on the adequacy of Agency assistance to her.

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Mr. Maury's ad hoc committee met daily as required through the pre-trial period and was a convenient forum for obtaining agreed positions for action and rendering daily reports to the Director and others concerned. As events developed, it became obvious that the lawyers would not be permitted by the Soviets to participate in the trial and their visas were held up until almost the eve of their planned departure. There was considerable anxiety within CIA as well as the State Department that Barbara Powers not travel to Moscow alone and therefore, in view of the possibility that the lawyers might be prevented from accompanying her, arrangements were made for her mother, Mrs. Monteen Moore Brown, and her family physician, Dr. James M. Baugh, to go to Moscow with expenses being underwritten by CIA.

The Agency had no direct contact with or control over the Oliver Powers family entourage as their travel to Moscow was arranged and underwritten by the editors of Life magazine who had negotiated exclusive rights to cover the family's attendance at the trial. Their party consisted of Mr. and Mrs. Oliver Powers (father and mother of the pilot), Miss Jessica Powers (his sister), a family friend, Mr. Sol Curry, and Mr. Carl McAfee, Attorney.

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Once the two family groups were finally airborne toward Moscow, the Project Headquarters braced itself for whatever sensational revelations might develop with the opening of the trial. The ad hoc committee had set up a temporary command post in the DPD office area in the Matomic Building with news tickers installed to receive immediate transmission from all news services, and with twenty-four hour coverage by relays of staff personnel.

It was expected that testimony by the prisoner would reveal information on U-2 overflights of other areas, including the Middle East, Indonesia and China, introduced in such a way as to discredit the United States with neutral or favorably disposed countries peripheral to the USSR. Within the stricture laid down by State of "no comment" on the trial, the United States was in a position to deny categorically overflight of Indonesia and China, as well as the Middle East (with special exceptions of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan). Any revelations concerning U. K. participation was to be handled by the British Foreign Office.

Of the third countries involved in the May Day flight, only Norway continued to create problems for the U. S. This was due largely to having dealt exclusively with Colonel Evang, who had acted unilaterally in granting base rights to the Americans without clearing this with higher authority within the Norwegian Government. Consequently, when the

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Russians put pressure on the Norwegian Government, Evang was only able to stick with his own personal cover story: that the Americans had misled him on the true nature of the May Day operation.

In June the Pakistani Ambassador to Moscow reported to his own Foreign Office that he had learned the following from the Norwegian Ambassador to Moscow: that his Government had decided that the Americans were so inept and unwise in their handling of the incident that it would be best for Norway to be absolutely straightforward in their dealings with the Russians no matter how much this might offend the State Department; that their Foreign Minister in Oslo sent for the Russian Ambassador to Oslo regularly and kept him posted with all that they learned about the event to convince the Russians that the Powers flight took place without their knowledge; that knowledge of the large number of Americans who had landed at Bodo on 1 May had trickled down all over Norway because the Americans had taken no precautions to cover up their presence; and that the Norwegian Government believed that Powers had already made a clean breast of all he knew to the Russians and therefore it was useless to keep them in the dark about anything that could be learned from the Americans. 1/

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The Trial and Subsequent Events

During the trial of Frank Powers, the principal points which the prosecution hammered down were that Powers was guilty of violation of the USSR's air space; expert testimony was given to support the military and espionage nature of his flight; participation of third countries (Turkey, Pakistan and Norway) was underlined; and the shooting down of the U-2 by a Soviet rocket at 68,000 feet was established. The defense built up the picture of Powers as a victim of the capitalist system making much of his proletarian family background, his total lack of political motivation or interest, his non-resistance when arrested, and his regret for the consequences of his flight.

The English translation of the complete transcript of the trial, as published by Translation World Publishers, Chicago, Illinois, was procured by the CI Staff and a summary made thereof, copy of which is attached as Annex 92. One item of interest not included in that summary is Power's final statement made at the end of the trial, before the sentence was passed, which he read to the court:

"The court has heard all the evidence in the case, and now must decide my punishment. I realize that I have committed a grave crime and that I must be punished for it. I ask the court to weigh all the evidence and to take into consideration not only the fact that I committed the crime, but also the circumstances

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that led me to do so. I also ask the court to take into consideration that no secret information reached its destination; it all fell into the hands of the Soviet authorities. I realize that the Russian people think of me as an enemy. I understand this, but I would like to stress the fact that I do not feel and have never felt any enmity toward the Russian people. I plead with the court to judge me not as an enemy but as a human being not a personal enemy of the Russian people, who has never had charges against him in any court, and who is deeply repentent and sincerely sorry for what he has done." 1/

The verdict of the court was rendered at 1800 hours on 19 August and Powers was sentenced to ten years deprivation of liberty, the first three of which were to be served in prison, commencing from 1 May. The verdict was not subject to judicial appeal.

Immediately upon conclusion of the trial, shortly after 6 p.m., the Powers family had their first visit with the prisoner accompanied by one Intourist interpreter, but closely monitored by six Soviets in uniform. The meeting was highly emotional with all in tears. Frank reported that his treatment had been better than he expected, he had not been subjected to any physical measures, but he had been prepared for the death sentence. He did not know the family were in Moscow until he saw them in the court room.

The lawyers saw the Prosecutor after the trial and later prepared a petition for clemency to the Supreme Soviet Presidium and a letter

1/ State Department Cable, Moscow 462, TOSEC, 19 August 1960.

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to Khrushchev requesting an audience with him for Barbara Powers. Presentation of the petition for clemency was discouraged by Soviet Advocate Grinev (who had acted as Defense Counsel for Powers). Grinev said he would himself file application for commutation at the appropriate time. However the petition drafted by the lawyers, addressed to Brezhnev, was delivered to Brezhnev's office, but was refused at the reception desk and therefore had to be sent by mail. The letter from Barbara to Khrushchev produced no results, however, the parents and wife were granted separate visits with Frank on 23 September, and Barbara had an additional private visit on 24 September.

The rules for future contact with the prisoner were explained as not less than one letter, 8 kilos of packages and 100 rubles of pocket money per month, one visit by relatives every two months, and one hour walk daily. Delivery of allowable items was arranged through the good offices of the U.S. Embassy, Moscow, and the two family parties left separately to return to the United States.

An effort was made by Oliver Powers, when Khrushchev visited New York in September 1960 for the United Nations General Assembly, to have an interview with the Russian leader, but he was unable to accomplish this. However, through the National Broadcasting Company's

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assistance, he appeared on the Dave Garroway morning television program on 27 September and read his letter to Khrushchev over a nationwide television network.

The end of the Powers trial brought a reappraisal of the security situation with regard to the U-2 project in the light of all events since 1 May 1960, and a revised security guidance was circulated to all members of the U.S. Government and contractors within the cleared community by the DD/P (Mr. Bissell):

"The following information previously classified is now general public knowledge:

"a. That the U.S. Government, specifically CIA, between 1956 and 1 May 1960 was engaged in a program of overflights of the USSR for photographic and electronic intelligence purposes, utilizing the U-2 aircraft under cover of a NASA-sponsored weather research program.

"b. That Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960 undertook such a mission using a U-2 aircraft based at Detachment 10-10, Incirlik Air Base, Adana, Turkey, taking off from Peshawar, Pakistan, enroute to Bodo, Norway, via Sverdlovsk.

"c. That the operational capability of the U-2 is at least 70,000 feet altitude and 2,825 nautical miles (distance from Peshawar to Bodo via Sverdlovsk).

"The following have been removed from CHALICE control and classified Secret to permit wider usage by the US defense community:

"a. Full performance characteristics of the U-2.

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"b. CHALICE intelligence collection hardware involved in the 1 May incident (B camera, Systems III and VI, Mark 30 anti-radar and drift sight).

"The following information remains classified under CHALICE and should be handled accordingly by all:

"a. CHALICE activity subsequent to 1 May 1960.

"b. Extent of past CHALICE operations (COMOR may release certain product information where in best interest of U.S. defense community in a manner not to divulge U.S. exploitation of CHALICE).

"c. All details of CHALICE operational concepts.

"d. Details of cognizance and approvals of higher authority on past and future specific missions.

"e. USAF participation in CHALICE including pilot recruitment, training, reinstatement rights, materiel support.

"f. British participation.

"g. Host government arrangements and relationships.

"h. Contractual and development mechanisms and backstopping procedures (including Eastman Kodak Company Processing Center).

"i. Intra-U.S. Government relationships in CHALICE activities." 1/

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1/ CHAL-1177-60, 27 Sept 1960. Memo to All Members CHALICE Community from the DD/P.

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As a postscript to the Powers trial, the National Broadcasting Company announced in October 1960 that they were in production on the first in a series of six so-called NBC White Papers, the theme of which they advertised as the "Political Effects of the U-2 Incident". Both the Air Force and the State Department shied away from any overt indication of disapproval of such a program, and neither would take steps to thwart it. The DCI was requested to appear on NBC-TV but turned down the request. Lockheed was approached in an attempt to enlist Mr. C. L. (Kelly) Johnson as narrator of a portion of the program. When this was put to the Agency for its reaction, the answer given was that the decision to cooperate with NBC in the aerodynamics aspects of the story was left to Mr. Johnson and Lockheed management. If they elected to cooperate, the Agency desired to be allowed to go over the prepared script in conjunction with the Air Force Project Office well in advance of the program's filming. This was agreed and a taping of the remarks of Mr. Johnson and Lockheed test pilot Schumacher during their part of the TV film was transmitted to DPD for review and clearance. An NBC camera crew went to Turkey and shot about 65 feet of film in the Detachment B trailer area where Frank and Barbara Powers had lived; the film was first

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confiscated by the Base Commander because the camera crew had not cleared their activities properly through channels, but it was later released after it was checked for security implications and found to be innocuous. The hour-long program was finally shown on 29 November 1960 between 10:00 and 11:00 p. m., with Chet Huntley as narrator. The script for the program with all dialogue and narration, as well as a description of the video portion, is appended hereto as Annex 93. The Assistant Chief, DPD, Mr. James Cunningham, estimated that as many viewers witnessed "The U-2 Affair" as saw the Kennedy-Nixon "Great Debate."

#### Trouble with Barbara

On her return from Moscow and after a debriefing by project staff in Washington, Barbara Powers continued on to her mother's home in Georgia, and the hand-holding problems began again with a relay of project case officers attempting a measure of control over Barbara's activities. Some assistance in this department developed in the person of Dr. James Baugh, the family physician who had accompanied Barbara and her mother to Moscow. He kept his Agency contacts in Washington informed of Barbara's escapades and lent his own efforts in trying to keep her out of the public eye (and out of jail). Despite all efforts, her bouts with alcohol and sexual promiscuity led eventually on 22 September 1961 to a sanity hearing at the request of her sister,

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mother and brother (the latter an Air Force Chaplain) and Dr. Baugh. The result of the hearing was the sending of Barbara to the Cleckley Clinic at the Medical School of the University of Georgia at Augusta. Her brother was named her guardian and he retained an Agency-cleared lawyer in Augusta as legal adviser. The psychiatrist in charge at the Clinic, Dr. Corbett Thigpen, diagnosed Barbara as psychopathic. However, she was released from the hospital in her mother's care on 30 October. On 18 November she was recommitted after a bout of drinking which ended in delerium tremens, was treated, again released in a week to her mother. Doctors at the clinic in consultation with an Agency team of CI and legal staff were in agreement that Barbara Powers would never change her activities or interests and that her behavior would continue to follow the pattern set thus far. The Agency team therefore concluded that should Barbara attempt to seek revenge against the Agency by talking to the press or in other ways, there was little that could be done to prevent her taking such action. This resignation to the facts of the situation had barely occurred when the prospect arose that Frank Powers might soon be released by the Russians and returned to the United States.

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The Abel/Powers Exchange

As early as 2 June 1960, Mr. Oliver Powers had on advice of his attorney, Mr. Carl McAfee, sent a letter to the convicted Soviet spy, Colonel Rudolf Abel, in Atlanta Federal Penitentiary, suggesting that they work together to achieve approval from the U.S. and Soviet Governments for a prisoner exchange between Abel and Frank Powers.

Colonel Abel did not reply directly to Mr. Powers due to a restriction against his corresponding with individuals outside except through his defense counsel, Mr. James Donovan. He therefore sent the Powers letter to Mr. Donovan along with his reply to it, which indicated that the matter should be brought to the attention of Abel's wife and lawyer in East Germany. The text of the Powers/Abel letter exchange and covering note to Donovan are included at Annex 94.

Mr. Donovan duly notified the Justice Department about the letters and Abel's request that Donovan possibly arrange a meeting with the East German lawyer. Mr. Donovan also called the CIA General Counsel and asked for guidance. A meeting held 16 June 1969 with DPD, SR, and OGC representatives concluded that the letters should be sent to the East German lawyer (who was most probably in touch with the Russians). Mr. Houston, CIA General Counsel, meanwhile was to coordinate the plan with Justice and State.

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The Chief of the CI Staff of CIA was convinced that the Soviets would in no circumstances admit responsibility for Abel, or interest in his release. This view was shared by U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, Llewellen Thompson. The Chief of SR Division was interested in using the prospect for an exchange as a lever to pry information out of Abel—something his American interrogators had thus far been unable to do.

Mr. Donovan travelled to Europe on other business between 26 June and 8 July 1960, but the East Berlin lawyer, Wolfgang Vogel, did not approach him during the trip. The indictment of Powers and plans for his trial were announced on 7 July, and the Russians were obviously not ready to give up the propaganda opportunities that the trial afforded, no matter how badly they wanted to get Abel back. No action was taken on either side from July 1960 until January 1961.

On 11 January 1961, Mr. Donovan called Mr. Houston to advise that Abel's wife had written suggesting an appeal be made to the new Administration (President-elect Kennedy) for clemency for Abel. Donovan had written to Abel saying that it was not appropriate for him to do this but that his wife might appeal to the new Administration in a manner similar to the Powers family's appeal to Khrushchev.

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Abel asked Donovan to write directly to Mrs. Abel, which Donovan did, advising her that an appeal for clemency was fairly customary and that she should feel free to address a simple, non-legalistic petition to the President of the United States, after he had settled into office.

On 8 February 1961, Mrs. Hellen Abel (whose address at that time was shown as Leipzig, East Germany) did write a letter to the President asking for clemency and the release of her husband, and mentioning the fact that the USAF RB-47 fliers had been released in Russia.

The ad hoc working group on the Powers case, in view of the intimations from various sources that the Russians might consider an early release of Powers, met on 17 February 1961 and approved a set of contingency procedures in the event of such a release. This plan is attached as Annex 95. The plan was approved by the USAF Project Officer, Colonel Geary, with the following stipulation:

"In keeping with the basic cover policy of IDEALIST, that public Air Force association with the project be held to an absolute minimum, it should accordingly be clearly understood that any participation by the Air Force in the return of Powers must be directed by higher authority. Such direction should be for the public record, brief, and matter of fact." 1/ / This statement related to the possibility of airlifting Powers back to the States by special USAF flight if he were released. 7

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1/ IDEA-0220, 23 March 1961. Memo to Chief SR Division (Chairman, Powers Committee) from Assistant Chief, DPD.

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The 8 February 1961 appeal of Mrs. Abel was not answered until 3 May 1961 by the Pardon Attorney of the Department of Justice (not by the White House to whom it had been addressed) and it was in a negative vein; Mrs. Abel meanwhile on 8 May wrote Donovan that she had received no answer and asked him to expedite the matter, at the same time referring to the previous interest of Oliver Powers in an exchange.

After consultation with Mr. Houston at CIA, Mr. Donovan replied to Mrs. Abel, referring to the release of the Russian prisoner, Melekh, by the Americans and intimating that an indication of good faith on the part of the Russians was expected by the U.S. He suggested that Mrs. Abel approach the Soviet Government and determine its interest in the release of Abel, and asserted that Oliver Powers was willing to cooperate, but there should be no publicity in the matter.

Meanwhile Colonel Abel had written to his wife and suggested that she initiate action toward seeking an exchange between himself and Powers. On 17 June 1961 Mrs. Abel wrote Donovan stating that she had visited the Soviet Embassy in Berlin where it was recommended that she proceed with her efforts to obtain clemency for Rudolf Abel. She expressed certainty that if her husband were pardoned, Powers would

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be amnestied. She therefore requested that Donovan proceed with his efforts with the American authorities.

At this point the Agency CI Staff, in a summary of action to date regarding a Powers/Abel exchange, addressed a memorandum to the DCI taking the position that the Agency should oppose such an exchange, principally for CI operational reasons. The memorandum stated:

"Operationally speaking, the trade would be an exchange of everything for nothing. Powers has told all he knows and is of no further use to the Soviets except as a pawn—as he is being used in this matter. On the other hand, Abel has conducted himself in a highly professional manner. He remains resistant; he has refused to give information, even such information as his true identity. He is a person of high caliber and a potential source of information of great value, provided the proper pressures can be brought to bear. His release and deportation would be a major victory for the Soviets. In addition, his knowledge of the United States would be of considerable operational benefit to the RIS... The possibility that [redacted] [redacted] may talk may account for current Soviet interest in bringing about the release of Abel..." <sup>1/</sup>

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On 3 July 1961, Colonel Beerli, Acting Chief of DPD, advised the DD/P of the CI Staff position and expressed DPD's interest in pursuing the release of Powers by any means possible (a) to learn the true facts of his "shoot down" and treatment since his capture; (b) to learn the full scope of his debriefing and the damage resulting therefrom; (c) to deny

<sup>1/</sup> Memo to DCI from James Angleton, Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, CIA, 30 June 1961. Subject: Exchange of Rudolf Abel for Powers.

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the Soviets the opportunity for further debriefings; and (d) to fulfill the Agency's and the U.S. Government's responsibility to effect Powers' release.

On 14 July, General Cabell notified Mr. Houston that he should informally convey to the State Department the Agency's position on the exchange as follows:

- a. The U.S. Government should not take the initiative in the matter.
- b. If the question became active, the Agency generally favored the idea of the exchange of Abel for Powers.

Thus far the Justice Department had not been brought into the CIA/State discussions. On 11 September 1961, a letter to Mr. Donovan from Mrs. Abel after a second visit to the Russian Embassy in Berlin contained what was considered by the Agency as a "key" paragraph:

"I gathered from our talk that there is only one possible way to achieve success, that is simultaneous release of both Francis Powers and my husband, which can be arranged." 1/

It was suggested to the Secretary of State (Mr. Rusk) by General Cabell in his memorandum of 2 November 1961 (see Annex 96) that

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1/ ER 61-8690, 2 Nov 1961. Memo to Secretary of State from Gen. Cabell.

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"Mrs. Abel" was being instructed by the Soviet Government and the continuation of negotiations through this channel was recommended in an effort to obtain the release of Powers. The Secretary of State on 24 November 1961 wrote to the Attorney General (Robert F. Kennedy) giving him the background of the case to date, stating that foreign policy considerations need not be a factor influencing the Justice Department's decision concerning the exchange, and suggesting that the Donovan/Mrs. Abel channel be the means of consummating the agreement with the Soviets. The full text of this letter is at Annex 97.

The Attorney General gave his approval to the exchange effort the first week of January 1962 and at a meeting between State and CIA officers on 4 January it was agreed that Mr. Donovan should write to Mrs. Abel asking to meet her in Leipzig or Berlin and to be put in touch with appropriate Soviet officials. If this came to pass, he would indicate that he was authorized by the U.S. Government to negotiate the exchange. DPD was assigned responsibility for providing someone to identify Powers and arranging for the airlift. Mr. Houston reported that the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Roswell Gilpatric, had committed the Air Force to provide the airlift for this purpose.

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At this point, security of the negotiations became paramount, and CIA bases in [ ] and Frankfurt were requested to set up restricted cells for receiving communications via the HBJAYWALK channel on a very sensitive matter. Mr. John McMahon and Colonel Geary visited [ ] Germany to prepare for USAFE and CIA support which would be required. The code name ZRHOOKUP was given to the exchange plan.

Mr. Donovan wrote to Mrs. Abel that he had new information and would meet her at the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin at noon on 3 February. She was warned that all publicity must be avoided. Meanwhile Mrs. Abel's lawyer, a Mr. Vogel, had been in touch with the office of the U.S. Mission in Berlin concerning a possible package deal to include the Yale student, Frederick L. Pryor, who had managed to get himself arrested in the East Zone and whose parents were in West Berlin putting pressure on the U.S. Mission to effect their son's release. The U.S. Mission therefore asked the Department to instruct Donovan to ask first that Pryor be included in the exchange. The Department replied to the Berlin Mission that the undertaking in which it was about to be involved had been carefully planned and approved at highest levels; that the Department was fully aware of the Pryor problem; that instructions to Donovan were based on the best U.S. national interests and had already been passed to him in Washington; and that it was essential that no

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United States official should become involved in Donovan's negotiations.

Donovan's briefing had included the following guidance coordinated with State and Justice: (a) Upon being introduced to proper authorities in East Berlin he should show his letter from U.S. Pardon Attorney Reed Cozart to establish his authority to arrange Abel's release; (b) he should ask what the Soviets are willing to offer for Abel; and (c) if the Soviets offer only Powers, he should state that the U.S. expects more and mention Pryor and Makinen (another prisoner of the Soviets). Whatever the Soviet reply, Donovan should say he must communicate with his Government and arrange for a next meeting, allowing enough time to coordinate the next move with Washington.

According to plan, Donovan was airlifted from London to West Berlin on 2 February and on 3 February made his initial visit to the Soviet Consulate in East Berlin. The story of his negotiations is included at Annex 98 hereto, as it was reported by cable from the Berlin Base. Two separate descriptions of the Powers/Abel exchange in the middle of the Glienicke Bridge at the border crossing from West Berlin are also included as Annexes 99 and 100; one is by Mr. (now Ambassador) E. Allan Lightner, Jr., of the Berlin Mission,

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and the other by Mr. Fred T. Wilkinson, Deputy Director of Prisons, Department of Justice. Both of these gentlemen were members of the official U.S. party on the bridge to consummate the exchange.

On the return of Frank Powers to the States by special USAF airlift, he was established in a safehouse where he had a reunion with his wife and his family, after which he underwent a long debriefing (from which voluminous tape recordings and transcriptions now repose in OSA material at the Records Center). The essence of Powers' own story of what happened on May Day 1960 and during his imprisonment is contained in the transcript of his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 6 March 1962 (copy of which is appended as Annex 101).

A complete review of the case was made by a board of inquiry presided over by Judge E. Barrett Prettyman to determine if Powers complied with the terms of his employment and his obligations as an American. It was the conclusion of the board of inquiry and of the Director of Central Intelligence that Mr. Powers had lived up to the terms of his employment and instructions in connection with his mission and in his obligations as an American under the circumstances in

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which he found himself. On 5 March 1962 the DCI authorized the reinstatement of the contract and appointment of Powers and the payment of the salary due thereunder for "general duty status" (\$1,000 per month).

On 4 April 1962, Colonel Geary advised Project Headquarters that the Air Force agreed to the reinstatement of Powers in the Air Force provided the Agency, State and the White House agreed. All approvals were obtained and Colonel Geary was advised on 10 April. He met with Powers on 11 April for a discussion and it was agreed the reinstatement would be made effective on 1 July 1962. Meanwhile, however, Powers began legal proceedings to obtain a divorce from his wife, Barbara, and in view of the expected publicity in connection with this development, the reinstatement was postponed at USAF request until the divorce proceedings were completed.

On 25 September 1962, Powers applied to Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and was accepted for employment as a test pilot checking out U-2's following IRAN or modification. He resigned from the Agency's employ on 6 October 1962 and reported to Lockheed the middle of October where after ground school and area familiarization in the Los Angeles area, he went to Edwards Air Force Base and

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requalified in the U-2. It was his intention to work for Lockheed until the time was appropriate for him to be reinstated in the Air Force. On the settlement of his divorce case, he met with Colonel Geary on 30 March 1963, and after consideration of the personal pressures which he could expect to be faced with on his return to the Air Force, he decided it would be wiser to remain with Lockheed.

Many offers were made to Frank Powers for the publication of his story, which he duly reported to his Agency mentors. In answer to his query concerning permission to publish a book, the following decision was handed down on 27 June 1962 by the then Executive Director of CIA, Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick (recently the author of a book on his own CIA career entitled The Real CIA):

"1. On 25 June a meeting was held in the DCI's office to discuss proposals by various publishers that Francis Gary Powers write a book on his experiences. It was concluded that such a book would be undesirable, would be harmful to Powers and not in the best interests of the Agency.

"2. That same day the General Counsel and Mr. John McMahon of DPD talked to Mr. Powers on this subject and he was reluctantly receptive to our guidance.

"3. This information is for the guidance of all concerned. In the event that Mr. Powers should raise the issue again it should be stressed to him that the writing of articles or a book would only involve him in controversy in which he would most likely come out second best. Further, he should be warned that

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he will be constantly the target for possible exploitation by unscrupulous individuals who want to make money off of Powers' reputation. Third, he should be aware of the fact that literary endeavors such as have been proposed to him are inevitably less financially rewarding than they appear at first. As long as Powers is with the Agency or continues an active Air Force career, the above will continue to be the policy in regard to his writings. It should be noted that one of the arguments that has constantly been advanced for the high pay of the U-2 pilots has been that they would not have an opportunity for personal gain through writings." 1/

When Frank Powers again raised the issue of writing a book in July 1967, he was again discouraged from doing so, even though five years had passed since his release by the Soviets and he was no longer subject to either Agency or Air Force Regulations.

Intelligence Star Awarded

On 20 April 1965 in the Director's Conference Room at Langley, Virginia, Headquarters, Francis G. Powers was awarded the Intelligence Star, the presentation being made by General Marshall S. Carter, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, with the following citation:

Mr. Francis G. Powers is hereby awarded the Intelligence Star for his fortitude and courage in the performance of duty under conditions of extreme personal hazard. Mr. Powers' contribution to United States intelligence is in keeping with the finest traditions of service to our Nation and to the Central Intelligence Agency.

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1/ ER 62-4387/1, 27 June 1962, Executive Memorandum by the Executive Director.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Postscript

As a postscript to the MUDLARK\* story, it is perhaps fitting to wind up the May Day Incident's history as it was begun, with a message from the U.S. Air Attachè in Moscow. On 22 March 1963, Colonel William F. Scott cabled the following message from Moscow to Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, in the Pentagon:

"Following message from AIRA USSR C-68 quoted for your information. Theodore Shabad, New York Times, probably will submit articles on Powers, U-2. His source states that the U-2 approached the Urals undetected. When detected, missiles unable to fire because of kodovye fishki (translation: code plug). Two aircraft attempted intercept, but could not reach altitude. As U-2 was leaving SAM area, one battery came into operation. Ground unit saw only one blip on screen. Did not know their own fighters were in area. Fired salvo of three missiles. One missile hit and destroyed Soviet fighter attempting intercept. Another hit U-2 in tail. Third missile missed. Shabad thinks his source reliable, a Soviet electronics engineer who got story from an individual on missile site in Urals area..." 1/

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\* MUDLARK was the code name given to the May Day 1960 Incident.

1/ USAIRATT Moscow to Hqs USAF, Washington, 22 March 1963.

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ANNEX 82

STATEMENT BY CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV TO THE  
SUPREME SOVIET ON 5 MAY 1960  
CONCERNING SHOOTDOWN OF U-2

On April 9 a U.S. aircraft flew in from Afghanistan. Some of our comrades raised the question of warning the United States, for this was in contradiction to our talks with U.S. leaders. Such provocation is a bad prelude to a summit meeting. We discussed this question and decided to do nothing, for it usually leads to nothing. Then we instructed our military to act resolutely and stop foreign aircraft from violating our air space.

The United States, apparently encouraged by previous (incursions), crossed the Soviet frontier on May 1.

The Minister of Defense informed the Government. We said that the aircraft should be shot down, this was done. The aircraft was shot down. The investigation showed that it was a U.S. plane, but it did not carry the usual markings. It has been established that the plane flew in either from Turkey, or Iran or Pakistan. Nice neighbors!

On behalf of the Soviet Government I must tell you about acts of aggression by the United States against the USSR. I have in mind U.S. aircraft violating Soviet air space. In the past we protested against these violations, but the United States rejected them.

We decided to send a severe warning that we would take the steps necessary to insure the security of our country. I think we shall give the gravest warning to those countries which provide facilities for the United States to carry out aggression against the USSR.

Just think what would be the reaction of the United States if a Soviet plane flew over New York or Detroit. This would mean the beginning of another war. Why then do you not think that we may reply with the same measures should a foreign plane appear over our country. We think that there is no doubt in anybody's mind that we have the ability to retaliate. Of course we have no atomic bombers on patrol but we have rockets which are more reliable than bombers.

The governments of those countries providing facilities for the United States should realize that they may suffer as a consequence. U.S. violation of our air space is a dangerous sign. We are going to raise this point in the Security Council. It is difficult to comprehend such an attitude in view of the forthcoming Summit Meeting. What was it: A congratulation on May Day? No, they hoped that their aircraft would fly in with impunity and get back. It seems that the U.S. aggressive forces have of late been making every effort to thwart the Summit Meeting. Who sent the aircraft? If this was done by the U.S. Military on their own bat, this must alarm world public opinion.

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ANNEX 83

## DON'T PLAY WITH FIRE, GENTLEMEN

From the concluding Words of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev to the Fifth Session of the Supreme Soviet USSR, Fifth Convocation, on 7 May 1960

Comrade deputies, the aggressive act committed by the American airforce against the Soviet Union has justifiably incensed deputies and all Soviet people. Numerous inquiries and appeals are being received by the session and the Soviet Government. In view of this, permit me to dwell on this question once again and to furnish certain new data.

After my report to the Supreme Soviet, in which I dwelt on this fact, the U. S. State Department claimed in an official press statement that the point in question was a violation of the Soviet state frontier by an American aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type, which allegedly was studying weather conditions in the upper layers of the atmosphere in the area of the Turkish-Soviet frontier. This plane had allegedly strayed off its course because the pilot had oxygen trouble.

The State Department asserts that the pilot lost consciousness and steered by its automatic pilot, the plane flew into Soviet territory. According to the State Department, the pilot only had time to report back about the failure of his oxygen equipment to the Turkish airfield in Adana, whence it flew, an airfield which allegedly does not belong to the military, but to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

Soon after that, NASA issued a statement confirming the State Department version. This statement says:

"One of NASA's U-2 research airplanes, in use since 1956, in continuing the program of studying wind and meteorological conditions at high altitudes has been missing since about 9 o'clock, May 1 (local time), when its pilot reported he was having oxygen difficulties over Lake Van, Turkey."

Comrades, I must tell you a secret: When I was making my report I deliberately did not say that the pilot was alive and in good health and that we have parts of the plane. We did so deliberately, because had we told everything at once the Americans would have invented another version.

And now, just look how many silly things they have said--Lake Van, scientific research, and so on, and so forth. Now that they know the pilot is alive they will have to invent something else. And they will do it.

(Khrushchev then read further from the NASA press release with added comments.)

This is the official version, circulated by American officials to mislead public opinion in their country and the world. I must declare, comrade deputies, that these versions are completely untrue and circulated for gullible people.

The authors of these versions supposed that if the plane was shot down the pilot must probably perish. So there would be no one to ask how everything actually happened; there would be no way to check what sort of plane it was and what instruments it carried.

First of all, I wish to announce that the pilot of the downed American plane is alive and in good health. He is now in Moscow. Brought here also are the remains of this plane and its special instrumentation, discovered during the investigations.

The name of the pilot is Francis Harry Powers. He is 30 years old. He says he is a 1st lieutenant in the U. S. Airforce, where he served until 1956, that is, to the day when he went over the Central Intelligence Agency.

Francis Powers reported, incidentally, that while serving with the American airforce he used to get 700 dollars a month, but when he went over to the intelligence service and started carrying out spying assignments to glean secret information he began getting 2,500 dollars a month. ....

I want to tell you something about the results of the examination of the plane that has been shot down and its equipment, and results of questioning the pilot. The inquiry continues, but already the picture is fairly clear.

To start with, this was, indeed, a high altitude, lowspeed Lockheed U-2. They counted on its high altitude and believed that this plane could not be brought down by any fighter or antiaircraft artillery. That is why they thought it could fly over Soviet territory with impunity. In fact, the plane flew at a great altitude, and it was hit by the rocket at an altitude of 20,000 meters. And if they fly higher, we will also hit them!

The plane was in no way equipped for "upper atmosphere research" or for taking "air samples," as official American spokesmen assert. Not at all. This was a real military reconnaissance aircraft fitted with various instruments for collecting intelligence and, among other things, for aerial photography.

The competent commission of experts which examined the wrecked plane has established from the documentary evidence that this American plane is a specially prepared reconnaissance aircraft. The task of the plane was to cross the entire territory of the Soviet Union from the Amirs to Kola Peninsula to get information on our country's military and industrial establishments by means of aerial photography. Besides aerial cameras, the plane carried other reconnaissance equipment for spotting radar networks, identifying the location and frequencies of operating radio stations, and other special radio-engineering equipment.

Not only do we have the equipment of that plane, but we also have developed film showing a number of areas of our territory. Here are some of these photos. (Khrushchev showed the photos).....

/Additional items brought out during this speech:

Powers was attached to Detachment 10-10 at Incerlik.  
Col. William Shelton is commander and Lt. Col. Carol? Funk  
is deputy commander.  
The flight also violated the territory of Afghanistan.  
There was an explosive charge in the aircraft.  
The pilot was supplied with a poison needle.  
The pilot also had a pistol equipped with a silencer, rubles and  
other currencies, gold rings and watches.

Khrushchev warned the governments of Turkey, Pakistan, and Norway that they must be clearly aware that they were accomplices in this flight because they permitted the use of their airfields against the Soviet Union.

He also intimated that a press conference would soon be held at which the remains of the airplane would be put on display.

He said he thought it would be right to have the flier prosecuted so public opinion can see what action the United States is taking to provoke the Soviet Union and heat up the atmosphere, thus throwing us back from what we have achieved in relieving international tension.

He finished by announcing the decision of the Soviet Government to switch the Soviet Army and Navy over to rocket weapons, and the setting up of a rocket troops command with Marshal of Artillery Nedelin in command.

Above excerpted from the book  
"To the Pillory with the Aggressors"  
or  
"The Truth about the Provocative  
Invasion by an American Plane  
of the Air Space of the USSR"

A Publication of the Union of Journalists  
of the USSR, Moscow, 1960

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ANNEX 84

TEXT OF STATE DEPARTMENT RELEASE FOLLOWING KHRUSHCHEV  
STATEMENT ON THE DOWNING OF U-2

7 May 1960, 1800 hrs.

The Department has received the text of Mr. Khrushchev's further remarks about the unarmed plane which is reported to have been shot down in the Soviet Union. As previously announced it was known that a U-2 plane was missing. As a result of the inquiry ordered by the President, it has been established that insofar as the authorities in Washington are concerned there was no authorization for any such flight as described by Mr. Khrushchev.

Nevertheless it appears that in endeavoring to obtain information now concealed behind the Iron Curtain a flight over Soviet territory was probably undertaken by an unarmed civilian U-2 plane.

It is certainly no secret that given the state of the world today, intelligence collection activities are practiced by all countries, and postwar history certainly reveals that the Soviet Union has not been lagging behind in this field. The necessity for such activities as measures for legitimate national defense are enhanced by the excessive secrecy practiced by the Soviet Union in contrast to the Free World.

One of the things creating tensions in the world today is apprehension over surprise attack with weapons of mass destruction. To reduce mutual suspicion and to give a measure of protection against surprise attack, the U.S. in 1955 offered its "Open Skies" proposal -- a proposal which was rejected out of hand by the Soviet Union. It was in relation to the danger of surprise attack that planes of the type of unarmed civilian U-2 aircraft have been patrolling the frontiers of the Free World for the past four years.

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ANNEX 85

May 9, 1960

No. 254

## STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

On May 7 the Department of State spokesman made a statement with respect to the alleged shooting down of an unarmed American civilian aircraft of the U-2 type over the Soviet Union. The following supplements and clarifies this statement as respects the position of the United States Government.

Ever since Marshal Stalin shifted the policy of the Soviet Union from wartime cooperation to postwar conflict in 1946 and particularly since the Berlin blockade, the forceful takeover of Czechoslovakia and the Communist aggressions in Korea and Vietnam the world has lived in a state of apprehension with respect to Soviet intentions. The Soviet leaders have almost complete access to the open societies of the free world and supplement this with vast espionage networks. However, they keep their own society tightly closed and rigorously controlled. With the development of modern weapons carrying tremendously destructive nuclear warheads, the threat of surprise attack and aggression presents a constant danger. This menace is enhanced by the threats of mass destruction frequently voiced by the Soviet leadership.

For many years the United States in company with its allies has sought to lessen or even to eliminate this threat from the life of man so that he can go about his peaceful business without fear. Many proposals to this end have been put up to the Soviet Union. The President's "open skies" proposal of 1955 was followed in 1957 by the offer of an exchange of ground observers between agreed military installations in the U.S., the USSR and other nations that might wish to participate. For several years we have been seeking the mutual abolition of the restrictions on travel imposed by the Soviet Union and those which the United States felt obliged to institute on a reciprocal basis. More recently at the Geneva disarmament conference the United States has proposed far-reaching new measures of controlled disarmament. It is possible that the Soviet leaders have a different version and that, however unjustifiedly, they fear attack from the West. But this is hard to reconcile with their continual rejection of our repeated proposals for effective measures against surprise attack and for effective inspection of disarmament measures.

I will say frankly that it is unacceptable that the Soviet political system should be given an opportunity to make secret preparations to face the free world with the choice of abject surrender or nuclear destruction. The Government of the United States would be derelict to its responsibility not only to the American people but to free peoples everywhere if it did not, in the absence of Soviet cooperation, take such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and to overcome this danger of surprise attack. In fact the United States has not and does not shirk this responsibility.

In accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, the President has put into effect since the beginning of his Administration directives to gather by every possible means the information required to protect the United States and the Free World against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for their defense. Under these directives programs have been developed and put into operation which have included extensive aerial surveillance by unarmed civilian aircraft, normally of a peripheral character but on occasion by penetration. Specific missions of these unarmed civilian aircraft have not been subject to Presidential authorization. The fact that such surveillance was taking place has apparently not been a secret to the Soviet leadership and the question indeed arises as to why at this particular juncture they should seek to exploit the present incident as a propaganda battle in the cold war.

This government had sincerely hoped and continues to hope that in the coming meeting of the Heads of Government in Paris Chairman Khrushchev would be prepared to cooperate in agreeing to effective measures which would remove this fear of sudden mass destruction from the minds of peoples everywhere. Far from being damaging to the forthcoming meeting in Paris, this incident should serve to underline the importance to the world of an earnest attempt there to achieve agreed and effective safeguards against surprise attack and aggression.

At my request and with the authority of the President, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Honorable Allen W. Dulles, is today briefing members of the Congress fully along the foregoing lines.

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STATEMENT  
BY  
MR. ALLEN W. DULLES  
AT THE  
BRIEFING OF THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS  
MONDAY, MAY 9, 1960  
2:00 PM

Under authority of the National Security Act of 1947 which set up the Central Intelligence Agency, that Agency was then entrusted by the National Security Council with the duty of collecting intelligence essential to our national security.

Under other directives of the Council, the Central Intelligence Agency was also entrusted with certain tasks relating to meeting the menace of international communism and in particular the aggressive activities of the Soviet Union.

Since that time, and growingly in recent years, the Soviet Union behind the shield of tight security, has been arming in secret with the objective and expectation that its military power would be largely invulnerable to counterattack if they initiated an aggression.

At the Summit Conference in 1955 in order to relax the growing tensions resulting from the danger of surprise attack, the President advanced the "Open Skies" proposal.

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That proposal was summarily rejected by Moscow and Soviet security measures were reinforced.

Thus the Soviet has been arming in secret while our counter-defensive measures in the field of armaments were largely matters of open knowledge.

The ordinary means of intelligence were largely ineffective to gain the information about Soviet armaments which were essential to our survival and to the survival of the Free World.

As early as December 1, 1954, a project to construct a high-performance reconnaissance plane was initiated. The first U-2 flew in August 1955.

By this time the results of the Summit Conference were known and the likelihood of realizing anything from the "Open Skies" project became negligible.

We were then faced with a situation where the Soviet were continuing to develop their missiles and missile bases, and their bomber bases without any adequate knowledge on our part.

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This was considered to be an intolerable situation; intolerable both from the point of view of adequate military preparation on our part to meet the menace; intolerable from the point of view of being able effectively to take counteraction in the event of attack.

Any state has the duty to take the measures necessary for survival, and we received a high directive to gain vitally required intelligence by every feasible means.

Meanwhile by espionage the Soviet had been endeavoring to penetrate our nuclear and certain other secrets and observing the details of our own military establishment.

A policy decision was then reached that the U-2 should be used to obtain information with respect to vital targets within the Soviet Union as conditions permitted. As Mr. Herter has indicated, this project had competent policy approval. The details and timing of missions were left for determination by those most competent to judge the highest priority targets and the right weather, rarely available in many parts of the Soviet Union.

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Since that time there have been a considerable number of successful flights over the Soviet Union, over Communist China, and over the Satellite areas. Many square miles of strategic territory in the Soviet Union and Communist China have been photographed.

Essential information has been obtained with respect to the development of the Soviet missile threat; its bomber bases; its nuclear establishments and other highly strategic targets.

Mr. Bissell, under my direction and that of General Cabell, has been in charge of this project. He will describe the flights in more detail, and selective photographs of the results of these missions will be shown out of a total of thousands available to us.

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ANNEX 86

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CHAL-1052-60

27 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: U-2 Incident (Estimate and Analysis of  
Compromise of Agency Classified Information)

1. In accordance with your instructions, submitted herewith is an estimate of damage to Agency interests caused by the U-2 incident. It is believed that this report is essentially complete on the subject of damage. The operational and personnel security aspects of the investigation are being continued in DPD-DD/P and the Office of Security. The Office of Security is giving attention to the compilation of the names of staff, contract, and contractor personnel believed to have been compromised.

2. In making this damage assessment, the reviewing officers have taken into account that there is no valid evidence at present that the U-2 incident was brought about by sabotage, defection, or actual penetration of CHALICE. It is known, however, that radar interception of the 9 April flight over target resulted in a continuing Soviet alert after that date; that there is evidence of possible RIS activity in the vicinity of Adana and Peshawar which may have been targeted against CHALICE activity in those areas; that adverse weather conditions caused unusual delay in the launching of GRAND SLAM, resulting in two round trips by the U-2 Adana-Peshawar and a single flight Adana-Peshawar; that atmospheric conditions prevented the use of established communications channels and forced the use of open long-distance telephone lines from Wiesbaden to Adana through Athens for the transmission of clearance instructions for GRAND SLAM; that CW transmission of GRAND SLAM "GO" instructions in clear text occurred several times; and that the GRAND SLAM flight for the first time was under Soviet radar observation continuously from the border. There is no evidence that any of the above circumstances were responsible for the U-2 incident, although they could have contributed to the known "early warning" of the Soviets.

3. A definite pattern of damage to Agency interests emerges from the material and information so far assembled. In general, the classified information which must be presumed as having come into the possession of the Soviets through the U-2 incident may be attributed to the knowledge and memory of Francis G. Powers and to the captured U-2 equipment and an intelligence coordination of this information

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with intelligence data already available to Soviets through other sources. The area of compromise of Agency interests comes within the following broad categories. The scope of the damage within these categories is hereinafter more specifically stated:

- (1) Administrative procedures
- (2) Installations and bases
- (3) Personnel
- (4) Operational techniques and procedures in CHALICE
- (5) Equipment and contractual relationships
- (6) U.S. Government inter-Agency relationships
- (7) Relationships between the U.S. Government and other Governments in CHALICE
- (8) Related and successor projects to CHALICE
- (9) Miscellaneous intelligence knowledge of Powers

4. In addition to the volume of classified information which has come into the possession of the Soviets because of the U-2 incident, it must be noted that the world-wide publicity attendant upon this incident relating to the Agency sponsorship of the U-2 program and the employment of Powers, has served to make public knowledge, both limited and unlimited in scope, of Agency contractual and procedural activity.

5. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES:

- (1) CIA/AF personnel procurement methods

Use of 1007th Intelligence Group as CIA procurement and holding mechanism

Personnel

Contract terms

Salary processing

Investigation

Medical processing at Lovelace Clinic

Polygraph testing of pilots

Documentation

Terms of resignation from and reassignment to Air Force

- (2) CIA/AF training program for CHALICE

Details of flight training at the "Ranch" - Watertown, Nevada

Detachment A

Removal to Edwards AFB

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Participation of USAF (Hqs. 4080th)  
 AEC/REECO Support functions  
 Testing of CHALICE pilots periodically  
 at Wright-Patterson AFB  
 Identity of supplier groups  
 Planned utilization and training of  
 [ ] Pilots  
 T-33 transition navigation training  
 U-2 training  
 Use of C-124's, U-2's, MATS and Commercial  
 Air for movement of personnel and equipment

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## (3) CHALICE Headquarters - 1717 H Street, N.W., D. C.

Location  
 Organization  
 Personnel  
 Operations  
 Administration (Travel, Admin and Finance)

## (4) Detachment 10-10

Location  
 Establishment, organization, personnel,  
 operational and administrative procedures  
 Relationships with USAF Base Command and  
 host government

## (5) Cover mechanisms and documentation

NASA  
 NASA/AWS  
 USAF letters  
 AGO cards  
 Cover contracts with supplier companies

6. INSTALLATIONS AND BASES:

## (1) Location, use and function of:

"Ranch" - Watertown, Nevada  
 Edwards AFB, California

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[ ]  
 CHALICE Headquarters, 1717 H Street, N.W.  
 [ ]

Giebelstadt, Germany  
 Adana, Turkey  
 Atsugi, Japan

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Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Hangar #82,  
 Los Angeles, California  
 Bodoe, Norway  
 Wiesbaden, Germany

- (2) Possible knowledge of location, identity and some personnel of following CIA installations:

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[REDACTED]  
 Frankfurt Station  
 [REDACTED]

European Air Operations Division, German Station

- (3) Use of Lovelace Clinic, Albuquerque, New Mexico for U-2 pilot medical care
- (4) Schedule and flight plan of shuttle flights, Adana to Wiesbaden

7. PERSONNEL:

- (1) Knowledge of personnel assigned and participating in CHALICE at:

Operation GRAND SLAM (Also prior flights)  
 Atsugi Naval Air Station  
 Adana  
 Peshawar  
 Wiesbaden  
 Edwards AFB  
 Watertown  
 CHALICE Headquarters  
 Utilization of Dr. Randolph Lovelace and  
 General Don Flickinger, USAF  
 Manufacturers' technical representatives  
 Lockheed Aircraft Corp.  
 Perkin-Elmer Corp.  
 Hycon Manufacturing Co.  
 Eastman Kodak Company  
 Pratt & Whitney

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8. OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES IN CHALICE:

- (1) Existence and purpose, but not specific content, of TALENT Security Control System

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- (2) Extensive knowledge of CHALICE - its personnel, and its operational, administrative and support routine
- (3) CHALICE staging procedures, routes, targets, planning, implementation, support during entire functional period of CHALICE, up to and including GRAND SLAM.

## Operational concepts:

Diversionary tactics  
 Fast strike concepts  
 Use of C-124's and C-130's  
 Ferrying: EAFB, Giebelstadt, Adana, etc.  
 Mission profiles - transit and exit altitudes  
 Tactical missions - Suez, Lebanon, Egypt, Israel  
 Staging routines, including aircraft support, packing, etc. arrangements with USAF  
 Headquarters clearance

## Administrative preparations:

Visas  
 Preparatory arrangements with host governments for use of bases  
 Diplomatic clearances for support aircraft  
 Communications message sequence

- (4) Ability to effectively monitor through intimate knowledge of the operational concepts and administrative and material preparations involved in mission planning

9. EQUIPMENT AND CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS:

- (1) Pilot carried wallet containing U.S. currency and NASA identification card containing wording of AFR 55-26, dated 2 August 1959, bearing standard command line of General White authorizing NASA pilots to fly Air Force aircraft.
- (2) Standard navigation tools: green card showing navigation data; JN navigation charts covering route, containing normal navigation annotations and radio aids extracted from list of KWHAMLET radio broadcast stations; CNC chart showing entire route annotated with course lines to nearest friendly territory; pilot's aircraft checklist, and standard aircraft emergency checklist.

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- (3) Pilot possessed knowledge of return course Bodoë to Adana and ferry route Adana to Bodoë (no documents)
- (4) Escape and evasion packet containing cloth charts covering the area of operation, blood chit, assorted denominations of rubles and barter items.
- (5) Aircraft equipped with "enroute low altitude (RFC) Europe", 13 April 1960 and flight information publication terminal (high altitude), 15 April 1960. Both publications contain Aviano and Brindisi radio frequencies.
- (6) Cockpit contained standard European radio frequencies and channelization for aircraft radios.
- (7) The complete, though damaged, aircraft and equipment

Identity of designer

Design features

Construction and materials

Mission capabilities and performance characteristics

J-75 engine

Photographic gear - function and performance of tracking camera and main camera

ELINT gear and performance thereof. Pilot knowledge limited to purpose only.

Radio and radar gear

Pilot gear

Component parts of aircraft, marked either by the manufacturer or the U.S. Government, are listed in detail in  13 May 1960.

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- (8) CHALICE supplier contracts (Agency/Air Force, Agency/Navy, and Air Force) are now known to a varying degree - as such to persons involved in those contracts, and to that extent are public knowledge. These disclosures may be expected to have some detrimental effect upon existing procurement and shipping procedures.

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10. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTER-AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS:

- (1) CIA/NASA cover plan
- (2) AF/CIA joint sponsorship of CHALICE
- (3) AFCIG-5 participation in CHALICE and identities of AFCIG-5 personnel
- (4) AF materiel support to CHALICE via USAFE and  and identity of personnel involved in those areas. Through this, in addition to the simple monitoring of unclassified communications easily categorized by project priority materiel indicators: JUGHEAD, SHOEHORN, and BABYDOLL, the Soviets should soon be able to effectively monitor the entire CHALICE materiel system.
- (5) USAF/AWS participation in CHALICE, with knowledge of personnel probably limited to Base and Headquarters Weather Support elements.
- (6) Possible knowledge of USAF radar hold-down procedures as pertain to CHALICE.
- (7) Participation of USAF/TUSLOG Detachment 50 in ELINT and telemetry efforts from Incirlik AFB.
- (8) CIA relationships in CHALICE with the Department of State, and, through various Ambassadors or Chargés d'Affaires, with the Governments of those countries where CHALICE aircraft have been based, or have had either prestrike or post-strike bases. Norway, Germany, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey.

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11. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN CHALICE:

- (1) British high official cognizance and British participation in the CHALICE program through the Air Ministry.
- (2) Identity of all British pilots based at Adana who were involved in CHALICE. (Four British pilots, British Flight Planner, and British Flight Surgeon and their connection with the RAF).

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- (3) Role of the Watson AFB in the CHALICE Program.
- (4) The number of missions (USSR and Near East) flown by British pilots and the identities of those pilots.

12. RELATED AND SUCCESSOR PROJECTS TO CHALICE: (Following believed by most pilots)

(1) OXCART:

A follow-on program in progress or under construction  
 A larger aircraft with altitude over 100,000 ft.  
 Manned aircraft as opposed to unmanned vehicles  
 Boeing, Convair, or Lockheed will build  
 Two engines - turbo-jet to get it airborne  
 and ram-jet to keep it airborne  
 Speed about Mach 3  
 Great range with missions from ZI to target  
 and return  
 Will possibly require towing to get airborne  
 The "Ranch" at Watertown, Nevada, is being or  
 will be activated for the follow-on program.

- (2) Possible unofficial pilot knowledge of satellite project

13. MISCELLANEOUS INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE OF POWERS AND DAMAGE TO AGENCY INTERESTS BECAUSE OF U-2 INCIDENT:

- (1) The registration of Powers in the WAEPa and United Benefit Life Insurance programs serves to pinpoint these programs as insuring mechanisms used by CIA to insure its employees.
- (2) Pilot periodically briefed generally on Soviet capabilities regarding aircraft and missiles.
- (3) General knowledge as to existence of SAM sites and current SAM operational limitations.
- (4) General knowledge of Tyura Tam and Kapustin Yar activities and of our "Hot Shop" activity.

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- (5) Through observation of Detachment 50 aircraft pilot able to infer their engagement in ELINT and/or telemetry against Tyura Tam.
- (6) Pilot knowledge of content of various intelligence briefings during the past year concerning the area of operations, consisting mostly of Escape and Evasion matters published in area studies, and general briefings on Soviet Air Defense Systems, but not including locations of defensive elements.
- (7) Altitude and speed capabilities of current Soviet fighters as published in the Air Intelligence Digest.
- (8) ATIC studies and documents similar in nature to the above.
- (9) Limited knowledge of Soviet aircraft being equipped with AAM's.
- (10) Probable knowledge of CIA participation in the Indonesian revolt at least to the extent of CHALICE overflights.
- (11) Relationships between CIA and CAT and the employment of Allan Pope by CIA through CAT in the Indonesian revolt.
- (12) Participation of James Cherbonneaux and Carmine Vito in behalf of CIA in the Indonesian revolt. Knowledge of operational generalities, including location of base of operations and the fact that P-51 and B-26 aircraft were used.
- (13) Knowledge of the staging of CHALICE flights by Detachment C, based at Atsugi Naval Air Station in Japan.
- (14) Pilot believed to have an awareness that CIA is engaged in other clandestine air operations, but the specifics of his knowledge in this regard are unknown at the present time.

14. It is an inescapable conclusion from the foregoing information that the damage to Agency interests, installations, personnel, and equipment in CHALICE by reason of the U-2 incident is serious and far-reaching. In many respects the

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damage is complete insofar as any effective future clandestine use of CHALICE assets is concerned. It must be noted for future reference that much of the compromise of information can be attributed to a failure to follow through with a concept of complete compartmentation within the Project of pilot personnel who might be subject to capture.

15. Many after-the-fact recommendations could be made upon the basis of the above data but such recommendations would be academic in light of the developments in the U-2 incident. We would recommend only one thing, that in all highly sensitive projects the necessary compartmentation should not exclude the continuing advice and assistance of specialized components of CIA.

(Signed)



Withheld under statutory authority of the  
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50  
U.S.C., section 403g)

CONCUR:

Sheffield Edwards  
Director of Security

Stanley W. Beerli  
Colonel, USAF  
Acting Chief, DPD-DD/P

S. H. Horton  
Acting Chief, CI Staff

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ANNEX 87

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DISPATCH

BOOK DISPATCH NO. 1996

15 June 1960

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To: Chiefs of Certain Stations and Bases

From: Director of Central Intelligence

Subject: U-2 Incident

Action: For information

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1. Over the past month, CIA has been the subject of an unprecedented volume of publicity centering around the U-2 project. The press in this country and abroad has devoted an enormous amount of space to reporting and analyzing all aspects of the incident on 1 May. We are glad that the publicity is now diminishing and believe that it will continue to do so.

2. Undesirable as exposure is, we can take comfort from the fact that in this country and in other free world areas, there has been a gratifying recognition of the Agency's efforts and, even more important, an awareness of the continuing need for intelligence activities.

3. On the whole, domestic opinion has been overwhelmingly favorable to the Agency. The leaders of Congress have generally praised the Agency's role; responsible newspapers have supported the need to collect intelligence; and hundreds of private citizens have written directly to express their support. There has been some adverse criticism, of course, but this has been concentrated on incidental parts of the operations or against policy decisions which did not involve the Agency.

4. We have achieved two principal things. One, the results of this collection effort have significantly benefited national security. Two, we have demonstrated to the world that such an operation can be conducted in secrecy for over four years. All of the people involved, and this includes representatives of all of the intelligence components in our government, have performed efficiently and securely and they are to be highly praised.

5. I am enclosing a copy of my statement made in Executive Session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A similar

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statement was made before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. This statement has not been made public and it should not be disclosed. It should be closely held by you and your immediate staff. There are also enclosed statements by the President, Representative Clarence Cannon and Senator Lyndon B. Johnson.

6. The official inquiries are about completed, and it is now time to look ahead. The past month has not changed any of the priority targets for intelligence collection. The Communists stand exposed to the world as obsessed with secrecy, and as still motivated by a hostile attitude toward the United States. It now falls on all of us to increase our efforts and to bring all our ingenuity to bear in devising new methods to collect the intelligence which is vital to our national security.

(signed)

ALLEN W. DULLES

Attachments:

1. Statement before Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
2. Excerpts from President's Press Conference 11 May 1960.
3. Remarks of Representative Cannon before House,  
10 May 1960.
4. Statement of Senator Lyndon B. Johnson before Senate,  
10 May 1960.

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STATEMENT BY  
MR. ALLEN W. DULLES  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
to the  
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE  
ON 31 MAY 1960

The duty of the Central Intelligence Agency under statute and under National Security Council directives pursuant to statute, is to provide the President and the National Security Council with evaluated intelligence relating to our national security.

The Agency has no policy or police functions.

In addition, however, the Agency has the duty, within policy limitations prescribed by the President and State Department, to do whatever is within its power to collect and produce the intelligence required by the policy makers in government, to deal with the dangers we face in the world today, a nuclear world.

Increasingly over the past ten years, the main target for our intelligence collection has been the U.S.S.R., its military, its economic, and its subversive potential.

The carrying out of this task has been rendered extremely difficult because the Soviet Union is a closed society.

Great areas of the U.S.S.R. are curtained off to the outside world. Their military preparations are made in secret. Their military hardware, ballistic missiles, bombers, nuclear weapons, and submarine forces, as far as physically possible, are concealed from us. They have resisted all efforts to realize mutual inspection or "open skies."

The ordinary tools of information gathering, under these circumstances are not wholly adequate. These ordinary tools include both the normal overt means of obtaining information, and the classical covert means generally referred to as espionage.

It is true that from these sources and from the many Soviet defectors who have come over to the Free World and from disaffected and disillusioned Soviet nationals, we obtain very valuable information.

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However, these sources and other sources developed through the application of various scientific techniques, while very helpful, did not give us the full intelligence protection this country required against the danger of preparation for surprise attack against us, from bases which might remain unknown and by weapons, the strength and power of which we might not be able adequately to evaluate.

Almost equally serious had been our lack of knowledge of Soviet defense measures against our retaliatory striking power.

Shackled by traditions, we were seeing the power of attack grow while the ability to secure the intelligence necessary for defense against attack was slipping, bound down in part by tradition.

For example, while Soviet spy trawlers can lurk a few miles off our shores and observe us with impunity, the Soviets cry "aggression" when a plane, invisible to the naked eye, flies over it some fifteen miles above the ground.

Either, theoretically, could carry a nuclear weapon. The trawler could deal a much more serious nuclear blow than a light reconnaissance plane.

But, of course, as we well know, no one would think of starting a nuclear war with either an isolated plane or ship.

In this age of nuclear peril we, the Central Intelligence Agency, felt that a new approach was called for in the whole field of intelligence collection.

\* \* \* \* \*

This was the situation, when in 1954, almost six years ago, consultation was initiated on new intelligence collection techniques. We consulted with a group of highly competent technicians in and out of government. From our discussions there emerged the concept of a high-flying, high performance reconnaissance plane. In the then state of the art of aeronautics, it was confidently believed that a plane could be designed to fly unintercepted over the vitally important closed areas of the Soviet Union, where ballistic, nuclear, and other military preparations against us were being made.

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We also believed, as a result of these consultations, that the art of photography could be so advanced as to make the resolution of the pictures taken, even at extreme altitudes, of very great significance. On both counts the accomplishments exceeded expectations.

While the developmental work for this project, pursuant to high policy directive was in process, there came the Summit Conference of July 1955.

Here, in order to relax the growing tensions resulting from the danger of surprise attack, the President advanced the "open skies" proposal. Moscow summarily rejected anything of this nature, and Soviet security measures continued to be reinforced.

Accordingly, the U-2 project was pushed forward rapidly, and about a year after the 1955 summit meeting the first operational U-2 flight over the Soviet Union took place. For almost four years the flight program has been carried forward successfully.

Speed in getting the program underway had been a top priority. We were then faced, that is in 1955-1956, with a situation where the Soviets were continuing to develop their missiles, their heavy bomber and bomber bases, and their nuclear weapons production without adequate knowledge on our part.

This was considered to be an intolerable situation; intolerable both from the viewpoint of adequate military preparation on our part to meet the menace; intolerable from the point of view of being able effectively to take countermeasures in the event of attack.

It was recognized at the outset that this U-2 project had its risks and had a limited span of life due to improvement of counter measures; that a relatively fragile single-engine plane of the nature of the U-2 might one day have a flame-out or other malfunction in the rarified atmosphere in which it had to travel. If that resulted in a serious and prolonged loss of altitude, there was danger of failure and discovery.

To stop any enterprise of this nature because there are risks would be, of course, in this field to accomplish very little.

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While air reconnaissance is an old and tried method of gaining intelligence, a peacetime operation of this particular type and on this scale was unique.

But I submit that we live in an age when old concepts of the limits of "permitted" techniques for acquiring information are totally outdated. They come from the horse and buggy days.

I see no reason whatever to draw an unfavorable distinction between the collection of information by reconnaissance at a high altitude in the air and espionage carried on by individuals who illegally operate directly within the territory of another state.

In fact, the distinction, if one is to be drawn, would favor the former. The illegal espionage agents generally attempt to suborn and subvert the citizens of the countries in which they operate. High level air reconnaissance in no way disturbs the life of the people. It does not harm their property. They do not even notice it.

I believe these techniques should be universally sanctioned on a mutual basis and become an accepted and agreed part of our international arrangements.

The USSR has known a good deal about these flights for the last four years. It has studiously refrained from giving the people of the Soviet Union the knowledge they now admit they had.

\*\*\*\*\*

With respect to the U-2 project, I am prepared to support and document these conclusions:--

First, that this operation was one of the most valuable intelligence collection operations that any country has ever mounted at any time, and that it was vital to our national security.

Second, that the chain of command and authority for the project was clear.

Third, that every overflight was carefully planned, fully authorized, and, until May 1, 1960, effectively carried out.

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Fourth, that the technical and logistic support was prompt and efficient.

Fifth, that the security which was maintained for this project over a period of more than five years has been unique.

I shall deal with these points in the inverse order in which I have presented them.

First - security. The project was run by a small, closely knit organization at headquarters and in the field. Knowledge of the operation was restricted to a minimum. Over more than five years, since the inception of the project, there has never been any damaging disclosure to interfere with the program.

The existence of the U-2 aircraft was, of course, well known, though its full capabilities, particularly the altitude and range were not disclosed. It had important weather and air sampling capabilities which were effectively used and which afforded natural cover for the project. These weather capabilities were open and publicized.

For example, as far as I know the U-2 is the first aircraft that has ever flown over the eye of a typhoon. It was used very effectively out in the Far East to learn about typhoons which cause so much damage, and we have a very extraordinary series of pictures of the U-2 looking right down at the eye of a typhoon from several miles above the top of it. Of course, the U-2 also had very valuable characteristics as a reconnaissance plane for peripheral flights.

With regard to technical and logistic support:--from the inception of the project, CIA has called on the United States Air Force for support in the form of technical advice and assistance in those fields where the Air Force has the most expert knowledge. These included advice on aircraft design and procurement, operational training of air crews, weather, aero-medicine and communications. I may say the Air Force liberally gave all this support to us.

The CIA also drew on the technical knowledge and advice of those members of the United States Intelligence Board with particular competence in the field of intelligence priorities -- targeting and the like. Each mission was carefully planned with respect to the highest priority requirements of the Intelligence Community.

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The project has been directed by a senior civilian in CIA with high competence in this area of work. He was responsible directly to me and, of course, to General Cabell.

Since the inception of CIA - going back for ten years - personnel from the military services, including the Air Force, have been detailed to CIA for tours of duty. We have had as many as 8 or 9 hundred of them at one time. These personnel take their orders from CIA, not from their parent service, during their period of detail. The U-2 project, under its civilian director, drew upon both the military and civilian personnel of the Agency. They were assigned to duties in headquarters and in the field staffs which were responsible for carrying out the technical functions of the program. They were chosen in view of their particular qualifications for this particular project.

Third, every overflight, from the inception of the project, and every phase of it, was carefully planned and staffed.

From time to time intelligence requirements were reviewed, and programs of one or more missions were authorized by higher authority.

Within the authority thus granted, specific flights could then be carried out on the order of the Director of Central Intelligence, as availability and readiness of aircraft and of pilot and as weather conditions permitted.

On the afternoon of 30 April last, after carefully considering the field report on the weather and other determining factors affecting the flight then contemplated, and after consultation with General Cabell and other qualified advisors in the Agency, and acting within existing authority to make a flight at that time, I personally gave the order to proceed with the flight of May first.

There was no laxity or uncertainty in the chain of command in obtaining the authority to act or in giving the order to proceed. With respect to the flight authorized on April 30, the same careful procedures were followed as had been followed in the many preceding successful flights.

Now I wish to discuss the value to the country of these flights from the intelligence viewpoint and from the

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viewpoint of national security considerations. I shall do this within the limitations of what I think both you and I feel are the necessary security restrictions.

Under the law setting up the Central Intelligence Agency, as Director, I am enjoined to protect "intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." Naturally I recognize this Committee as an authorized body to whom disclosures can properly be made that should not be made publicly. In so doing I wish to keep within the bounds of what I believe you would agree to be in the national interest to disclose, even here.

I feel that you should share the facts which I confidently believe justified the obvious risks of this project. Such risks were recognized and evaluated at all stages of the project.

For many years, the United States Intelligence Community has been directing its efforts to provide the information which would help to meet the threat of surprise attack. Every available means in the classical intelligence field have been utilized, and over recent years these have been valuably supplemented by the highly technical electronic and other scientific means to which I have referred.

Our main emphasis in the U-2 program has been directed against five critical problems affecting our national security. These are: the Soviet bomber force, the Soviet missile program, the Soviet atomic energy program, the Soviet submarine program. These are the major elements constituting the Soviet Union's capability to launch a surprise attack. In addition, a major target during this program has been the Soviet air defense system with which our retaliatory force would have to contend, in case of an attack on us and a counterattack by us.

Today, the Soviet bomber force is still the main offensive long range striking force of the Soviet Union. However, the U-2 program has helped to confirm that only a greatly reduced long-range bomber production program is continuing in the Soviet Union. It has established, however, that the Soviet Union has recently developed a new medium bomber with supersonic capabilities.

The U-2 program has covered many Soviet long-range bomber airfields, confirming estimates of the location of

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bases and the disposition of Soviet long-range bombers. It has also acquired data on the nuclear weapons storage facilities associated with them.

Our overflights have enabled us to look periodically at the actual ground facilities involved.

With respect to the Soviet missile test program -- this I shall illustrate graphically by showing you the photograph of these facilities, including both their ICBM and their IRBM test launching sites which could, of course, also become and may well be, operational sites.

Our photography has also provided us valuable insight into the problem of Soviet doctrine regarding ICBM deployment. It has taught us much about the use which the Soviets are making of these sites for the training of troops in the operational use of the short and intermediate range ballistic missiles.

The program has provided valuable information on the Soviet atomic energy program. This information has been included in the estimate which we give periodically to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, but without referring to the actual source of our data. This has covered the production of fissionable materials, weapons development and test activities, and the location, type, and size of many stockpile sites.

The project has shown that, despite Mr. Khrushchev's boasts that the Soviets will soon be able to curtail the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, the Soviets are continuing to expand fissionable material capacity.

The Soviet nuclear testing grounds have been photographed more than once with extremely interesting results. The photography has also given us our first firm information on the magnitude and location of the USSR's domestic uranium ore and uranium processing activities, vital in estimating Soviet fissionable material production. We have located national and regional nuclear storage sites and forward storage facilities.

In general, the program has continued to give useful data on the size and rate of growth of Soviet industry.

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The material obtained has been used for the correction of military maps and aeronautical charts.

Among the most important intelligence obtained is that affecting the tactics of the United States deterrent air strike force. We now have hard information about the nature, extent, and in many cases, the location of the Soviet ground-to-air missile development. We have learned much about the basic concept, magnitude, operational efficiency, deployment, and rate of development of the Soviet air defense system, including their early warning radar development.

We have obtained photographs of many scores of fighter air fields previously inadequately identified, and have photographed various fighter types vainly attempting to intercept the U-2. All of this has proved invaluable to SAC in adjusting its plans to known elements of the opposition it would have to face.

As a result of the concrete evidence acquired by the U-2 program on a large number of targets in the Soviet Union, it has now been possible for U.S. commanders to make a more efficient and confident allocation of aircraft, crews and weapons.

U-2 photography has also made it possible to provide new and accurate information to strike crews which will make it easier for them to identify their targets and plan their navigation more precisely.

We have obtained new and valuable information with regard to submarine deployment and the precise location of their submarine pens.

In the opinion of our military, of our scientists, and of the senior officials responsible for our national security, the results of the program have been invaluable.

The program has had other elements of value. It has made the Soviets less cocky about their ability to deal with what we might bring against them.

They have gone through four years of frustration in having the knowledge since 1956 that they could be overflown with impunity, that their vaunted fighters were useless against such flights, and that their ground-to-air missile capability was inadequate.

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Khrushchey has never dared expose this to his own people. It is only after he had boasted, and we believe falsely, that he had been able to bring down the U-2 on May 1 by a ground-to-air missile while flying at altitude, that he has allowed his own people to have even an inkling of the capability which we possessed.

His frustrated military, many of whom know the facts, are far less confident today than they otherwise would have been.

At the same time, in competent military circles among our allies, the evidence of American capability demonstrated by the present disclosure of the U-2 flights has given a new and better perspective of our own relative strength as compared with that of the Soviet Union.

\* \* \* \* \*

At this point I propose to show you some photographs to support my presentation regarding the intelligence value of the project.

Now I shall present the facts with regard to the dispatch of the May 1 flight and the ensuing developments insofar as the intelligence aspects are concerned and insofar as they are known to us.

As to the timing of the flight, there is, of course, no good time for a failure.

I have already presented the circumstances under which I assumed direct responsibility for dispatching this flight.

If this flight had been a success, we would have covered certain targets of particular significance and we would, in the normal course, have wished to analyze its results before scheduling a further mission. When it failed, it was obvious even before we received instructions that we would not try again before studying the cause and effects of failure. In either event, success or failure, after this flight we were not preparing to fly again for several weeks and until further policy guidance was received.

With respect to the timing of the flights, the President, in his speech of May 25, had this to say: "As to the timing, the question was really whether to halt the

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program and thus forego the gathering of important information that was essential and that was likely to be unavailable at a later date. The decision was that the program should not be halted.

"The plain truth is this: when a nation needs intelligence activity, there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed. Incidentally, from Pearl Harbor we learned that even negotiation itself can be used to conceal preparations for a surprise attack."

I would point out, also, that if you turn off all flights for months before international meetings and then for some time after such meetings and before trips to the Soviet Union of high American officials or trips here of Soviet officials; if you also estimate that in times of tension flights should be stopped because they might increase the tension, and in times of sweetness and light they should not be run because it would disturb any "honeymoon" in our relations with the Soviet Union; if, on top of this, you take into account that in much of the Soviet Union most days of the year are automatically eliminated because of weather and cloud cover and low Arctic sun, - then you can understand the problem of timing of flights.

If you asked me whether or not a flight would have been made after this particular flight, I cannot give you the answer because I do not know. At the time, we had no authority for any mission other than the one that was then undertaken.

With respect to the flight itself, when the aircraft did not reach its destination within the flight time and fuel capacity given it, it was presumed to be down. But at first we did not know where. It could have been within friendly territory, in hostile desert, or in uninhabited territory or within hostile territory where if alive the pilot would have been quickly apprehended as was the case. We did not know whether the plane was intact or destroyed, the pilot alive or dead.

I shall deal in a moment with the statements which were issued during this period of uncertainty.

The question of course arises as to what actually happened to cause this aircraft to come down deep in the heart of Russia.

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Let me remind you first that the returns are not yet all in, and so our picture is not complete. However, we do have a considerable body of evidence that permits a reasonable judgment with a high degree of confidence.

Our best judgment is that it did not happen as claimed by the Soviets. That is, we believe that it was not shot down at its operating altitude of around 70,000 feet by the Russians. We believe that it was initially forced down to a much lower altitude by some as yet undetermined mechanical malfunction. At that lower altitude, it was a sitting duck for Soviet defenses, whether fighter aircraft or ground-to-air fire or missiles.

As to what happened at the lower altitude, we are not sure. The pilot may have bailed out at any time or he may have crash landed. The aircraft was equipped with a destruction device to be activated by the pilot as he leaves the aircraft. Again we do not know whether or not he attempted to do so. It should be noted, however, that no massive destruction device capable of ensuring complete destruction could be carried in this aircraft as weight limitations were critical, and every pound counted.

Thus, whether or not the destruction device was used, one might expect sizeable and identifiable parts of the aircraft and its equipment to remain.

As to the nature and cause of the suspected malfunction, we are not prepared to pass judgment. But let me remind you that this aircraft and this pilot had proven their high degree of reliability in many technically similar flights, inside and outside friendly territory. When operating as in this case, about 1200 miles within unfriendly, heavily-defended territory, there can be no cushion against malfunction.

There has been much comment and questioning with regard to the pilot and his behavior after apprehension. Of course, we only have the Soviets' report on all of this, and we should accept it with caution.

All of the pilots engaged in this enterprise were most carefully selected. They were highly trained, highly motivated, and, as seemed right, well compensated financially. But no one in his right mind would have accepted these risks for money alone.

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Since the operational phase of the program started, the reliability record of the plane, for a craft of this character, was little short of phenomenal. It was a tribute to the high skill of the designer, the maintenance crews, and the pilots. Until the May first flight, over about a 4-year period of operations, no plane had been lost over unfriendly territory in the course of many, many missions. Several were lost during the training period at home and in friendly territory abroad.

Francis Gary Powers, the pilot on the May 1 flight, is a fourth generation American citizen, born in Jenkins, Kentucky, about 31 years ago. He received a BA degree from Milligan College, Tennessee, in September 1950. Scholastically he was high average. He joined the Air Force in the fall of 1950, as a private and served in an enlisted status until November 1951, when he was discharged as a Corporal in order to enter the Aviation Cadet School to train as a pilot. He attended the Air Force Basic and Advance Pilot Training School at Greenville, Mississippi. Upon completion of this training in December 1952, he was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant.

His first duty assignment was as an F-84 Commando Jet Pilot with the 468th Strategic Fighter Squadron at Turner Air Force Base, Georgia. He resigned his Air Force Reserve Commission under honorable conditions in May 1956. The reason for such resignation was to join the project we are discussing.

His record with the Air Force had been uniformly good. He was given a special security screening by the Air Force and also a supplemental check by the security office of the CIA.

During his Air Force career, he received training with respect to his behavior and conduct in event of capture, and after entering the employ of the Agency, he took the Agency's escape and evasion course at our training station here in the United States in June of 1956. He had subsequent training in escape and evasion after his assignment to his overseas post in August 1956.

An Air Force Major Flight Surgeon assigned to CIA who worked with the U-2 pilots during their training in the United States and continuously during their stay overseas,

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had this to say in regard to Francis Powers, "...During the period of my assignment as Flight Surgeon at Adana, I not infrequently shared a room with Mr. Powers and participated in social, flying, and mission duties with him. In my opinion Mr. Powers was outstanding among the pilots for his calmness under pressure, his precision, and his methodical approach to problems. I have flown considerably in jets with Mr. Powers. I would consider him temperate, devoted, perhaps more than unusually patriotic, and a man given to thinking before speaking or acting."

It should be remembered that Powers was a pilot, navigator, a well-rounded aviator trained to handle himself under all conditions, in the air or if grounded in hostile territory. He was not trained as an "agent" as there were no foreseeable circumstances, even the present ones, where he would act as such. Furthermore, such training would have been incompatible both temperamentally and with the strenuous technical demands of his flight mission.

The pilots of these aircraft on operational missions, and this was true in the case of Powers, received the following instructions for use if downed in a hostile area:

First, it was their duty to ensure the destruction of the aircraft and its equipment to the greatest extent possible.

Second, on reaching the ground it was the pilot's first duty to attempt escape and evasion so as to avoid capture, or delay it as long as possible. To aid him in these purposes and for survival he was given the various items of equipment which the Soviets have publicized and which are normal and standard procedure, selected on the basis of wide experience gained in World War II and in Korea.

Third, pilots were equipped with a device for self destruction but were not given positive instructions to make use of it. In the last analysis, this ultimate decision has to be left to the individual himself.

Fourth, in the contingency of capture, pilots were instructed to delay as long as possible the revelation of damaging information.

Fifth, pilots were instructed to tell the truth if faced with a situation, as apparently faced Powers, with

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respect to those matters which were obviously within the knowledge of his captors as a result of what fell into their hands. In addition, if in a position where some attribution had to be given his mission, he would acknowledge that he was working for the Central Intelligence Agency. This was to make it clear that he was not working for any branch of the armed services, and that his mission was solely an intelligence mission.

These instructions were based on a careful study of our experience in the Korean war of the consequences of brainwashing and of the extent of information which could be obtained by these and other means available to the Soviets.

Whether or not in this instance the pilot complied with all of these instructions, it is hard to state today with the knowledge we have. However, a careful review of what he has said does not indicate that he has given to the Soviets any valuable information which they could not have discovered from the equipment they found upon the pilot's person or retrieved from the downed aircraft.

I would warn, of course, against putting too much belief in what Powers may say, particularly if he is later put on trial. By that time they will have had a more thorough opportunity for a complete brain-washing operation which might well produce a mixture of truth and fiction.

I will now deal with the "cover story" statements which were issued following May 1.

When a plane is overdue and the fact of its takeoff and failure to return is known, some statement must be made, and quickly. Failure to do so, and, under normal conditions, to start a search for the lost plane, would in itself be a suspicious event.

Thus, when the U-2 disappeared on May first and did not return to its base within the requisite time period after its takeoff, action was required.

For many years, in fact since the inception of the operation, consideration has been given to the cover story which would be used in the case of the disappearance of a plane which might possibly be over unfriendly territory.

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Because of its special characteristics, the U-2 plane was of great interest to the U.S. weather services and to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the predecessor of NASA. NASA was very much concerned with the scientific advances which operations of these U-2s could make towards greater knowledge of the upper atmosphere and for other scientific purposes. As already indicated, U-2s have now undertaken many weather and related missions and their functions in this respect have been publicized by NASA, and this publicity has been distributed freely to the world.

It was therefore natural that NASA's operations be used to explain the presence of U-2s at various bases throughout the world, although NASA did not participate in the development of intelligence devices, nor did they participate in the planning and conduct of any intelligence missions.

Accordingly, when the May first flight was lost, an initial statement was issued on May 2nd by the Base Commander at Adana that a U-2 aircraft, engaged in upper air studies and operating from the base was down, and oxygen difficulties had been reported. This was identified in the press as a NASA plane. A search for the plane was initiated in the remote areas of eastern Turkey.

On May 5, early in the day by our time, Khrushchev made his claim that "an American aircraft crossed our frontier and continued its flight into the interior of our country...and...was shot down." At that time, Khrushchev gave no further details of significance.

Apparently as an attempt at deception, Khrushchev followed up his speech the next day by distributing photographs of a pile of junk--according to experts, pieces of an old Soviet fighter plane--possibly for the purpose of making us think that the U-2 plane had been effectively destroyed. Since the fake wreckage was quickly identified for what it was, this particular ruse had no effect.

The NASA statement which followed the Khrushchev speech of May 5 developed somewhat further the original cover story. Also on May 5, the Department of State issued a further release which generally followed the cover story. Mr. Dillon has covered this in his testimony before this Committee on May 27.

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At this time--on 5-6 May--we still did not know whether the plane or any recognizable parts of it or the pilot were in Soviet hands, or whether the pilot was dead or alive. Furthermore, then we did not know whether Khrushchev desired to blow up the incident as he later did, or put it under the rug and spare his people the knowledge that we had been overflying them.

Hence, in this situation, there seemed no reason at that time to depart from the original cover story.

These two press releases attributed to NASA were worked out in consultation between CIA and NASA and after conferring with the Department of State.

These statements did not come out of any lack of forethought or attention to their preparation or lack of coordination. The basic cover story had been developed some years ago for the exigency of a failure, and this original cover story was on May 5 modified to meet our then estimate of what was best to say in the light of what little we knew about the details of the May 1 flight failure.

Subsequently, on May 7, Khrushchev adduced evidence that he had the pilot alive, and quoted his purported statements. He also produced certain of the contents of the plane and later various parts of the plane itself. This clearly disclosed the true nature of the mission on which the plane was engaged.

The cover story was outflanked.

The issue then was whether to admit the incident but deny high level responsibility, or to take the course that was decided upon and clearly expressed in Secretary Herter's statement of May 9 and in the President's statement of May 11, and his address of May 25.

In Mr. Herter's appearance before this Committee, he has dealt with the statements which were issued during the period after May 6, except for the two statements involving NASA which I have covered.

I would only add that in my opinion, in the light of all the factors involved, the decision taken to assume responsibility in this particular case was the correct one. Denial, in my opinion, over the long run would have been tortuous and self-defeating.

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Those who took this decision knew that I was ready to assume the full measure of responsibility and to cover the project as a technical intelligence operation carried out on my own responsibility as Director of CIA. This alternative, too, was rejected because of the many elements making it hardly credible over the longer run.

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## PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON U-2 INCIDENT

11 May 1960

President Eisenhower: Good morning. Please sit down. I have made some notes from which I want to talk to you about this U-2 incident.

A full statement about this matter has been made by the State Department and there have been several statesmanlike remarks by leaders of both parties.

For my part, I supplement what the Secretary of State has had to say with the following four main points. After that I shall have nothing further to say--for the simple reason I can think of nothing to add that might be useful at this time.

The first point is this: The need for intelligence-gathering activities. No one wants another Pearl Harbor. This means that we must have knowledge of military forces and preparations around the world, especially those capable of massive surprise attack.

Secrecy in the Soviet Union makes this essential. In most of the world no large-scale attack could be prepared in secret, but in the Soviet Union there is a fetish of secrecy and concealment. This is a major cause of international tension and uneasiness today. Our deterrent must never be placed in jeopardy. The safety of the whole free world demands this.

As the Secretary of State pointed out in his recent statement, ever since the beginning of my Administration I have issued directives to gather, in every feasible way, the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for defense.

My second point: The nature of intelligence-gathering activities.

These have a special and secret character. They are, so to speak, "below the surface" activities. They are secret because they must circumvent measures designed by other countries to protect secrecy of military preparations.

They are divorced from the regular visible agencies of government which stay clear of operational involvement in specific detailed activities.

These elements operate under broad directives to seek and gather intelligence short of the use of force--with operations supervised by responsible officials within this area of secret activities.

We do not use our Army, Navy or Air Force for this purpose, first to avoid any possibility of the use of force in connection with these activities, and second, because our military forces, for obvious reasons, cannot be given latitude under broad directives, but must be kept under strict control in every detail.

These activities have their own rules and methods of concealment which seek to mislead and obscure--just as in the Soviet allegations there are many discrepancies. For example, there is some reason to believe that the plane in question was not shot down at high altitude. The normal agencies of our Government are unaware of these specific activities or of the special efforts to conceal them.

Third point: How should we view all of this activity?

It is a distasteful but vital necessity. We prefer and work for a different kind of world--and a different way of obtaining the information essential to confidence and effective deterrents. Open societies, in the day of present weapons, are the only answer.

This was the reason for my "open skies" proposal in 1955, which I was ready instantly to put into effect--to permit aerial observation over the United States and the Soviet Union which would assure that no surprise attack was being prepared against anyone. I shall bring up the "open skies" proposal again at Paris--since it is a means of ending concealment and suspicion.

My final point is that we must not be distracted from the real issues of the day by what is an incident in the world situation today.

This incident has been given great propaganda exploitation. The emphasis given to a flight of an unarmed, non-military plane can only reflect a fetish of secrecy.

The real issues are the ones we will be working on at the Summit--disarmament, search for solutions affecting Germany and Berlin and the whole range of East-West relations, including the reduction of secrecy and suspicion.

Frankly, I am hopeful that we may make progress on these great issues. This is what we mean when we speak of "working for peace."

And as I remind you, I will have nothing further to say about this matter.

REMARKS OF CONGRESSMAN CLARENCE A CANNON (MISSOURI),  
CONCERNING U-2 INCIDENT, BEFORE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
10 May 1960

MR. CANNON. Mr. Chairman, on May 1 the Soviet Government captured, 1,300 miles inside the boundaries of the Russian Empire, an American plane, operated by an American pilot, under the direction and control of the Central Intelligence Agency, and is now holding both the plane and the pilot.

The plane was on an espionage mission authorized and supported by money provided under an appropriation recommended by the House Committee on Appropriations and passed by the Congress.

Although the Members of the House have not generally been informed on the subject, the mission was one of a series and part of an established program with which the subcommittee in charge of the appropriation was familiar, and of which it had been fully apprised during this and previous sessions.

The appropriation and the activity had been approved and recommended by the Bureau of the Budget and, like all military expenditures and operations, was under the aegis of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, for whom all members of the subcommittee have the highest regard and in whose military capacity they have the utmost confidence.

The question immediately arises as to the authority of the subcommittee to recommend an appropriation for such purposes, and especially the failure of the subcommittee to divulge to the House and the country the justifications warranting the expenditure and all details connected with the item at the time it was under consideration on the floor.

The answer of the subcommittee is absolute and unavoidable military necessity, fundamental national defense.

During the Second World War the United States succeeded in breaking the Japanese naval code. Through this incredible good fortune the U.S. commanders were able to read every order transmitted from Tokyo and all inter-fleet communications. This advance and intimate information had much to do in preparing the way and increasing the effectiveness of our great victory in the Battle of Midway which broke

the power of Japan in the Pacific. But some incautious member of a congressional committee or its staff leaked the information to a reporter, and 30 minutes after the next edition of his newspaper hit the street Japan changed her naval code and all further advantage was lost.

This appropriation, and its purpose, is justified by honored and established precedent. This subcommittee, including the same personnel with the exception of two members who have since died, was the same committee which for something like 3 years provided in the annual appropriation bills a sum which finally totaled more than \$2 billion for the original atomic bomb. Session after session the money was provided, and the subcommittee visited Oak Ridge where the work was in progress without any Member of the House with the exception of the Speaker of the House being aware of this tremendous project or the expenditure of the money. According to the testimony of all military authorities that bomb ended the war and saved the lives of not less than half a million men who would have had to be sacrificed in the conquest of Japan. No one has ever said that the subcommittee was not justified in expending an amount that eventually aggregated more than the assessed valuation of some of the States of the Union for that purpose.

Espionage has been throughout recorded history an integral part of warfare. Before occupying the Promised Land Moses "by the commandment of the Lord" sent out from the wilderness of Paran 10 men under the direction of Joshua to spy out the land.

And no nation in the history of the world has practiced espionage more assiduously than Russia. The United States and every other allied nation today literally swarms with them. Within the last few weeks we sent to the Federal Penitentiary at Atlanta a Russian spy convicted at Federal Court who was regularly transmitting information directly to Moscow every night. Their spies stole from us the secret of the atomic bomb. Every Russian Embassy and Consulate has today time and again the number required for routine diplomatic and consular service. When we were at Oak Ridge we were told there were so many Russian spies there that only by a policy of strictest compartmentalism were they able to maintain the integrity of their work.

The need for espionage in this instance was exceptional and compelling. At the close of the world war in which we had saved Russia from complete subjugation we were surprised to learn that while all other nations were disarming and

returning to a peacetime status as rapidly as possible, Russia was feverishly driving her factories and continuing to increase her armament at top speed. Simultaneously they announced that communism and free enterprise could not live in the same world.

Every effort has been made by American administrations to reestablish conditions under which we could discontinue excessive expenditures for armament and divert these vast sums to business and humanitarian purposes. But each year Russia has become more arrogant and threatening and more demanding.

Under our American ideals and system of government, a declaration of war against any nation, however provocative, is unthinkable. Our military authorities have no choice but to give any enemy the advantage of first attack and then depend on massive retaliation for defense. The Communists have taken every advantage of this situation.

In modern warfare surprise is a tremendous advantage. Less than a week before the Communist attack on Korea a congressional committee from this House returning from Seoul reported that permanent peace had been established and the land was returning to prosperity. There was no shadow of war; not the slightest cloud appeared on the horizon. The sudden rush of a vast army of well armed, well trained, and well munitioned communists across the border made it necessary for us to throw precipitately into battle raw and untrained troops who were wholly unable to protect themselves or hold their positions. And there followed one of the most disastrous periods in the history of American arms.

During the hearings on this appropriation for the last 2 or 3 years, I have each year asked the CIA representative before the Committee, "How could the enemy mobilize an army of such size and accumulate hundreds of tons of supplies and munitions and the transportation facilities necessary for its movement without our learning that such an attack was in prospect?"

And each year we have admonished the Authority, the CIA, that it must meet future situations of this character with effective measures. We told them, "This must not happen again, and it is up to you to see that it does not happen again"; that the American forces must be apprised of any future preparation of attack in time to meet it. And the plan they were following when this plane was taken is their answer to that demand.

And I want to take advantage of the opportunity to compliment and thank Director Allen W. Dulles and his remarkable corps for the admirable way in which they have met the situation through these later years.

They are entitled to the highest commendation by the Department, the Congress, and the American people.

We cannot permit another Korea. We cannot take the risk of carnage and national devastation which might involve every American city. We cannot take the risk of the consequences which would follow a similar attack from across the Russian borders. And since the Russians refuse to cooperate in our efforts to establish permanent peace--refuse even to agree to ethical standards of warfare--we have no choice but to protect our nation and our people through the age-old methods of defense so long in use by the Communists themselves, lest we wake tomorrow, or do not wake tomorrow, as a result of our failure to know in time what they are planning against us.

The world has been appalled by the vicious vindictiveness of Khrushchev's denunciation. He yesterday characterized the policy of the United States as stupid and blundering. His fury is incited by the fact that it is neither stupid or blundering. On the contrary it has been infinitely successful and effective.

When we have answered his threats--and he has been very free with them on all occasions, even when he was here as our guest in our own country. When we have answered his threats by basing our Strategic Air Command in a position to defend ourselves and our allies, he has boasted that he could stop them at the border. That is why we are now so earnestly developing our submarines so that if he ever is able to neutralize our Strategic Air Command then we will have to take its place a fleet of nuclear-driven missile-firing submarines that will be just as effective a halter upon him as SAC is today.

His discovery that since 1956, for 4 years, CIA has been sending planes across his border--is the occasion for this outburst. It completely disproves his vaunted ability to stop SAC at the border.

The only reason he was able to apprehend even this plane or its pilot was that it developed some unforeseen and unavoidable mechanical or physiological defect, the first in

four years. He was unable to hit it or to overtake it at its cruising height of 70,000 feet. So in order to leave the impression that he captured this plane he distributed a picture of a pile of rubbish which those who know the plane recognized as absolutely spurious. The plane and the pilot were evidently taken comparatively uninjured. That completely destroys his claims of invulnerability against American attack. So he as usual resorts to subterfuge.

And now the most gratifying feature of the entire incident.

The world has always recognized the remarkable success of our form of government. It has been the wonder and admiration of mankind. But they have said that it was at a great disadvantage in a war with an authoritarian dictatorship.

We have here demonstrated conclusively that free men confronted by the most ruthless and criminal despotism can under the Constitution of the United States protect this Nation and preserve world civilization.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR LYNDON B. JOHNSON  
BEFORE THE SENATE  
10 May 1960

MR. JOHNSON of Texas: Mr. President, this is certainly a time in which Americans--and people everywhere-- must keep their heads. We cannot afford hysteria, panic, or hasty and ill-advised action.

There are many unanswered questions about the incident of the American plane that was shot down over the Soviet Union. There are serious questions which will have to be considered very carefully by Congress and by the American people.

But it is doubtful whether the answers will be forthcoming immediately. There are too many facts which are not available and which will be available only when the Soviets permit a cool and realistic appraisal of what happened in their airspace.

Furthermore, it is always difficult to come to objective conclusions in an atmosphere of sanctimonious statements and threats against other nations. It is ridiculous for Nikita Khrushchev to profess such shocked surprise over efforts to gather information.

When Mr. Khrushchev visited this country last year, I do not think he impressed any of us as being a man who is naive. By that, I mean naive about what his own country has been doing for many, many years.

The incident, of course, will be assessed with great care and all of its implications will be explored carefully. But meanwhile, we cannot lose sight of the overriding reality which confronts us immediately.

It is whether this incident will become an excuse and an alibi for sabotaging the Summit Conference.

Within a very few days, our country is going to enter negotiations with the Soviet Union in an effort to relax the very tensions that have brought about this kind of an incident. It is difficult to imagine those negotiations as having much success if they are to be conducted in this kind of an atmosphere.

If Nikita Khrushchev is going to spend his time taunting the United States over what he considers the blunders it has made and threatening other countries on the basis of facts which have not been clearly established, there will be little time to talk about the real problems which divide the world.

Those problems cannot be traced back to the fact that nations seek to extract information from each other. Espionage and intelligence gathering are not something that cause the cold war. They are merely byproducts of the cold war--something that follows logically when nations cannot trust each other.

Whatever may be his motivations, it is obvious that Nikita Khrushchev has handled this incident in such a way as to draw attention away from the real problems. We must get back to those problems--of people, of armaments, of respect for the integrity of smaller nations--if the Summit Conference has any meaning.

If blunders have been made, the American people can be certain that Congress will go into them thoroughly. But this is something that should be done objectively and not merely as a panicky reaction to Soviet charges.

And I think that one point should be crystal clear. Nikita Khrushchev cannot use this incident in such a way as to divide the American people and to weaken our national strength. The American people are united in a determination to preserve our freedoms and we are not going to be shaken from that course, or we are not going to be divided in this critical hour.

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MR. DIRKSEN: The Senator from Texas has made a forthright statement, and I concur in it. This is not a time for us to retreat or walk backward; and I, for one, absolutely refuse to do so. To be sure, there is nothing that we need conceal particularly. Certainly, ever since civilization began, there have been intelligence activities and espionage of a kind; and in proportion as civilization has become more complex, obviously the intelligence activities have become more complex.

During World War I, we set up the Office of Strategic Services. I had opportunities to examine their installations in many parts of the world. So, Mr. President, as the majority leader has well put it, we would indeed be naive if we did not view this matter objectively and realistically; and we so stated yesterday when this matter was discussed on the floor of the Senate

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ANNEX 88

August 12, 1960

WRITTEN AND ORAL COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN  
THE US, USSR, AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN  
CONNECTION WITH THE U-2 INCIDENT

On May 3, 1960 the US Air Force in Turkey reported that a U-2 weather plane from the US air base at Adana, Turkey, was missing. Addressing the Supreme Soviet on May 5, Khrushchev asserted that an American plane had been shot down over the USSR, but gave no details of the locale, circumstances, or fate of the pilot. In Washington, on the same day, a brief State Department press release reported that a weather plane belonging to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was missing. NASA on May 5 also issued a press release, a lengthy announcement giving the route of the "weather plane" in Turkey and stating that the pilot had reported oxygen difficulties. On May 6 a US note to the USSR asked for information on the plane and its pilot. This note was the first of a series of official communications, both written and oral, exchanged between the US, the USSR, and other governments in connection with the U-2 incident.

This paper presents, in chronological order, the texts of all such communications. Press releases and other unilateral statements are not generally included unless of particular significance. For convenient reference, this paper is also broken down on a country-by-country basis. An unclassified addendum presents the texts of Department of State press and radio briefings relating to this subject.

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I. USSR

- May 6 US note refers to Khrushchev's May 5 Supreme Soviet Statement and US May 3 announcement on missing aircraft and asks information on plane and pilot. (Document No. 1)
- May 7 Khrushchev, addressing Supreme Soviet again, announced that U-2 pilot was alive and had confessed the plane's reconnaissance mission. (Text not included)
- May 9 Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky warns that in event of future flight the USSR would retaliate against countries from whose bases they took off. (Excerpt, document No. 2)
- May 10 US note request permission for Embassy officer to interview U-2 pilot. (Document No. 3)<sup>1</sup>
- May 10 Soviet note protests "aggressive" U-2 flight, warns of "retaliatory measures" if similar acts repeated. (Document No. 4)
- May 12 US note in reply to Soviet May 10 note denies flight for intelligence purposes had aggressive intent. (Document No. 5)
- May 13 Vershinin letter (dated May 12) to General White (USAF) "postpones" former's scheduled visit to US until "a more suitable time." (Document No. 6)

1. Further correspondence regarding the pilot (including the US aide memoire of July 11, the US note of July 30, and the Soviet note of August 4) were published in the Department's Press release No. 433 of August 6.

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May 16 Soviet note denounces US "policy of aggression and provocation" and warns that not only will future intruding aircraft be shot down but bases from which they come will be struck against. (Document No. 7).

## II. PAKISTAN

### A. Pakistan - USSR

May 13 Soviet note to Pakistan charges that U-2 took off from Peshawar airport in Pakistan, refers to the "dangerous policy" of allowing foreign armed forces to use Pakistani territory and warns that repetition would necessitate "retaliatory measures." (Document No. 8)

May 24 Pakistani note to the USSR denies participation in preparation of flight, notes US assurance that no such incident would be allowed to take place in the future, and refers to Soviet violations of Pakistani airspace. (Document No. 9)

June 22 Soviet note to Pakistan rejects claim that GOP unaware of intention of flight from Peshawar, rejects "groundless" claim that Soviet violated Pakistani airspace, rejects statement about US assurance with reference to "mendacious" assertions by US in connection with U-2, and states that USSR will hit bases in event of future flights. (Document No. 10)

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B. Pakistan - US

- May 14 Pakistani aide memoire to US states that if plane which had taken off from Peshawar had been diverted to USSR, Pakistan would have cause for "bitter complaint."  
(Document No. 11)
- May 19 Pakistani note to US states that May 14 aide memoire might be considered a complaint from GOP. (Document No. 12)
- May 22 US note to Pakistan gives requested assurance. (Document No. 13)

C. Pakistan - Afghanistan

- May 16 Afghan note to Pakistan protests the use of a Pakistani airfield for a flight violating Afghan airspace, and states that RGA awaiting elucidations and assurance that no such violations would be allowed in the future. (Document No. 14)
- June 4 Pakistani note to Afghanistan denies allegation that flight originated from Peshawar with the cooperation of the GOP, and that if flight did take place it was without the knowledge of the GOP. The note recalls the GOP note of November 10, 1959, protesting to Afghan Government about frequent and repeated violations of Pakistani airspace. (Document No. 15)

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June 21 Afghan note to Pakistan states that Pakistan's reply was unsatisfactory and deviated from the facts, that failure to give assurance for the future was evidence of ill will of GOP and that earlier protest once more confirmed.  
(Excerpt, Document No. 16)

### III. TURKEY

#### A. Turkey - USSR

May 13 Soviet note to Turkey notes that plane had been permanently based in Turkey, and warns of retaliatory measures in the event of repetition. (Document No. 17)

May 26 Turkish note to the USSR states that Turkish airspace not used for the overflight and that Turkey was responsible only for its own airspace, reaffirmed Turkey's right as a sovereign state to put its air bases at the disposal of its allies for purely defensive purposes, and notes that there had been complaints of Soviet overflights in Turkey. (Document No. 18)

### IV. NORWAY

#### A. Norway - USSR

May 13 Soviet note to Norway states that despite Norway's earlier assurance that under Norwegian rules allied planes were not allowed to fly across Norway east of 24 degrees latitude Norway was an accessory to the US overflight,

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and warns of possible countermeasures if such flights continue. (Document No. 19)

May 27 Norwegian note to the USSR states that no Norwegian authority had cooperated with the flight, denies that Norwegian territory was at the disposal of the US Air Force for overflights. (Document No. 20)

B. Norway - US

May 13 Norwegian pour memoire to US protests that permission to land U-2 at Bodoe had not been requested and that landing of U-2 at Bodoe would have been against principles followed by Norwegian authorities in granting permission for landing foreign reconnaissance planes, and asks US to take steps to prevent similar incidents in the future. (Document No. 21)

May 16 US pour memoire replies that permission for a U-2 landing had not been requested, and that if such a landing had been made it would have violated the principles followed by Norwegian authorities. US will continue to abide by those principles. (Document No. 22). Department telegram to Oslo 1124 authorized US ambassador "to state to Lange that final sentence in PM is designed to be responsive to Norwegian request that 'American authorities take all necessary steps to prevent similar incidents in future.'"

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V. AFGHANISTANA. Afghanistan - US

- May 18 Afghan note to US protests violation of Afghan airspace by the U-2, and requests assurance that such action would not be repeated. (Document No. 23)
- May 20 US reply regrets that RGA interpreted a certain ex parte version of the flight as an unfriendly action. With regard to assurance requested, note quotes President Eisenhower to the effect that flights would not be resumed. (Document No. 24)

B. Afghanistan - Pakistan

- May 18 Afghan note to Pakistan protests the use of a Pakistani airfield for a flight violating Afghan airspace, and states that RGA awaiting elucidations and assurance that no such violations would be allowed in the future. (Document No. 14)
- June 4 Pakistani note to Afghanistan denies allegation that flight originated from Peshawar with the cooperation of the GOP, and that if flight did take place it was without the knowledge of the GOP. The note recalled the GOP note of November 10, 1959, protesting to Afghan Government about frequent and repeated violations of Pakistani airspace. (Document No. 15)
- June 21 Afghan note to Pakistan states that Pakistan's reply was unsatisfactory and deviated from the facts, that

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failure to give assurance for the future was evidence of ill will of GOP and that earlier protest once more confirmed. (Excerpt, document No. 16)

VI. US - JAPAN

- May 9 Department informs MacArthur, US prepared to (1) conclude specific undertaking with GOJ no intelligence missions will be flown over non-Japanese territory from US facilities in Japan without prior consultation GOJ, (2) give Kishi assurances U-2 in Japan used only for legitimate scientific purposes, (3) make public statement to this effect. (Document No. 25)
- May 10 MacArthur informs Vice Foreign Minister Yamada substance of US proposal. Kishi and Fujiyama felt it unnecessary to enter into formal agreement for consultation in case of intelligence overflights, suggest simple "legitimate and normal purpose" statement by US. (Document No. 26)
- May 10 US issues "legitimate and normal purpose" statement. (Document No. 27)
- May 11 MacArthur transmits text of US May 10 announcement to GOJ. (Text not included)
- May 12 Fujiyama acknowledges by note receipt of text of US May 10 announcement. (Document No. 28)

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- May 21 Fujiyama informs MacArthur of new Soviet note to Japan protesting security treaty and illegal overflights by US aircraft. Requests assurance that no US plane (U-2 or other) has conducted overflights of Soviet territory from Japan. (Document No. 29)
- May 28 Department informs MacArthur he can give assurances to Kishi or Yamada that there have been no overflights of Soviet territory by U-2 or other US plane from Japanese territory. (Document No. 30)
- June 2 Vice Foreign Minister Yamada given verbal assurance by MacArthur of no US overflights from Japanese territory. (Document No. 31)
- July 11 Foreign Minister Fujiyama told a press conference that the government had been informed that the U-2 planes had been withdrawn from Japan. (Text not included)
- July 21 Chief of Intelligence Japanese Air Self Defense staff shows MacArthur forged US document regarding U-2 overflights from Japanese territory. (Document No. 32)  
Verbatim text of forgery (Document No. 33)
- July 21 Embassy Tokyo issues statement denouncing forgery. (Document No. 34)

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VII. ITALYA. Italy - US

May 20 Department replies to Italian Ambassador's inquiry stating that U-2 pilot had no instructions to the effect that he might in an emergency use an Italian airport.  
(Document No. 35)

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Annex No. 1

Document No. 1US Note to the Soviet Union - May 6

The US Government has noted the statement of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, in his speech before the Supreme Soviet on May 5 that a foreign aircraft crossed the border of the Soviet Union on May 1 and that on orders of the Soviet Government, this aircraft was shot down. In this same statement it was said that investigation showed that it was a US plane.

As already announced on May 3, a United States National Aeronautical Space Agency unarmed weather research plane based at Adana, Turkey, and piloted by a civilian American has been missing since May 1. The name of the American civilian pilot of the missing aircraft is Francis Gary Powers, born on August 17, 1929, at Jenkins, Kentucky.

In the light of the above the US Government requests the Soviet Government to provide it with full facts of the Soviet investigation of this incident and to inform it of the fate of the pilot.

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Annex I

Document No. 2Excerpt from Malinovsky Speech of May 9

We reply to you firmly, gentlemen American imperialists: no you will not fly over our land! We are not your Guatemala, Turkey, Pakistan or South Korea. We shot down and will shoot down any violator who dares to violate our airspace and will adopt all measures necessary for protecting the integrity of our state frontiers! We also warn the countries countenancing these evil doings, lending their territory and airfields for the flights of similar pirate planes over our country's borders -- think before it is too late. Technology is now so perfected that it can show us without fail the airfields from which such violators are flying. We have the right to take any measures in such a case against those bases and airfields and can raze these bases, so that nothing remains of them.

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Annex No. I

Document No. 3US Note to USSR of May 10

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and has the honor to refer to the public statements of the Soviet Government indicating that an American civilian, Francis Gary Powers, is under detention in Moscow. The Embassy requests that an officer of the Embassy be permitted to interview Mr. Powers.

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Annex No. I

Document No. 4USSR Note to US of May 10

On May 1 of this year at 5 hours 36 minutes Moscow time a military aircraft violated the boundary of the USSR and intruded across borders of the Soviet Union for a distance of more than 2,000 kilometers. The Government of the USSR naturally could not leave unpunished such a flagrant violation of Soviet state boundaries. When the intentions of the violating aircraft became apparent, it was shot down by Soviet rocket troops in area of Sverdlovsk.

Upon examination by experts of all data at the disposal of the Soviet side, it was incontrovertibly established that the intruder aircraft belonged to the United States of America, was permanently based in Turkey and was sent through Pakistan into the Soviet Union with hostile purposes.

As Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N. S. Khrushchev made public on May 7 at the final session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, exact data from the investigation leave no doubts with respect to the purpose of the flight of the American aircraft which violated the USSR border on May 1. This aircraft was specially equipped for reconnaissance and diversionary flight over territory of the Soviet Union. It had on board apparatus for aerial photography for detecting Soviet radar network and other special radio-technical equipment which form part of USSR anti-aircraft defenses. At disposal of Soviet expert commission which carried out the investigation, there is indisputable proof of the espionage-reconnaissance mission of the American aircraft: Films of Soviet defense and industrial establishments, a tape recording of signals of Soviet radar stations and other data.

Pilot Powers, about whose fate Embassy of United States of America inquired in its note of May 6, is alive and, as indicated in the aforementioned speech of Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev, will be brought to account under the laws of Soviet State. The pilot has indicated that he did everything in full accordance with the assignment given him. On the flight map taken from him there was clearly and accurately marked the entire route he was assigned after take off from city of Adana (Turkey: Peshawar (Pakistan) - the ural sea-Sverdlovsk-Archangel-Murmansk, followed by a landing at Norwegian airfield at Bude. The pilot has also stated that he served in subunit Number 10-10 which under the cover of National Aeronautics and Space Agency is engaged in high altitude military reconnaissance.

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This and other information revealed in speeches of the head of Soviet Government completely refuted the US State Department's concocted and hurriedly fabricated version, released May 5 in an official announcement for press, to the effect that the aircraft was allegedly carrying out meteorological observations in upper strata of atmosphere along Turkish-Soviet border.

After complete absurdity of the aforementioned version had been shown and it had been incontrovertibly proven that the American aircraft intruded across borders of Soviet Union for aggressive reconnaissance purposes, a new announcement was made by the US State Department on May 7 which contained the forced admission that the aircraft was sent into Soviet Union for military reconnaissance purposes and, by that very fact, it was admitted that the flight was pursuing aggressive purposes.

In this way, after two days, the State Department already had to deny version which obviously had been intended to mislead world public opinion as well as public opinion of America itself.

The State Department considered it appropriate to refer in its announcement to the "open skies" proposal made by the Government of the United States of America in 1955 and to the refusal of the Soviet Government to accept this proposal. Yes, the Soviet Government, like the governments of many other states, refused to accept this proposal which was intended to throw open the doors of other nations to American reconnaissance. The activities of American aviation only confirm the correctness of the evaluation given to this proposal at the time by the Soviet Government.

Does this not mean that, with the refusal of a number of states to accept this proposal for "open skies" the United States of America is attempting arbitrarily to take upon itself the right "to open" a foreign sky? It is enough to put question this way, for the complete groundlessness of the aforementioned reference to the United States of America's "open skies" proposal to become clear.

It follows from the aforementioned May 7 announcement of the United States State Department that the hostile acts of American aviation, which have taken place numerous times in relation to the Soviet Union, are not simply the result of the activity of military commands of the United States in various areas but are the expression of a calculated United States policy. That which the Soviet Government has repeatedly declared in its representations to the Government of the United States of America in connection with violations of the USSR national boundaries by

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American airplanes has been confirmed, namely, that these violations are premeditated. All this testifies that the Government of the United States of America, instead of taking measures to stop such actions by American aviation, the danger of which has more than once been pointed out by the Soviet Government, officially announces such actions as its national policy.

Thus, the Government of the United States of America, in the first place, testifies to the fact that its answers to representations of the Soviet Government were only for sake of form, behind which was concealed an effort to avoid the substance of the issue, and that all violations by American aircraft of the National boundaries of USSR represented actions conforming to US policy.

In the second place, and this is the main point, by sanctioning such actions of American aviation, the Government of the United States aggravates the situation even more.

One must ask, how is it possible to reconcile this with declarations on the part of leading figures of the United States of America, that a government of the United States like the Soviet Government, also strives for improvement of relations between the USSR and US, for relaxation of international tension, and the strengthening of trust between states. Military intelligence activities of one nation by means of intrusion of its aircraft into the area of another country can hardly be called a method for improving relations and strengthening trust.

It is self-evident that the Soviet Government is compelled, under such circumstances, to give strict orders to its armed forces to take all necessary measures against the violation of Soviet boundaries by foreign aviation. The Government of USSR regretfully states that, while it undertakes everything possible for normalization and improvement of international situation, the Government of the United States of America follows a different path. It is impossible to exclude the thought that, apparently, the two governments view differently the necessity for improving relations between our countries and for the creation of a favorable ground for the success of the forthcoming summit meeting.

The Soviet Government, as well as all of the Soviet people, considered that personal meetings and discussions with the President of the United States of America and other American official figures which Chairman of the Council Ministers of the USSR had during his visit in the United States of America, made a good beginning in the cause of normalizing Soviet-American

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relations and therefore the improvement of the entire international situation as well. However, latest actions of the American authorities apparently seek to return the state of American-Soviet relations to the worst times of the "cold war" and to poison the international situation before the summit meeting.

The Government of the USSR cannot avoid pointing out that, the State Department's statement, which is unprecedented in its cynicism, not only justifies the provocative flights of aircraft of the armed forces of the United States but also acknowledges that such actions are "a normal phenomenon" and thus in fact states that in the future the United States intends to continue provocative invasions into confines of airspace of the Soviet Union for the purpose of intelligence.

Thus the Government of the USSR concludes that the announcement of the State Department that a flight was carried out without knowledge and permission of the Government of the United States does not correspond to reality, since in the very same announcement the necessity for carrying on intelligence activities against the Soviet Union is justified. This means that espionage activities of American aircraft are carried on with the sanction of the Government of the United States of America.

The Government of the Soviet Union made an emphatic protest to the Government of the United States in connection with the aggressive acts of American aviation and warns that, if similar provocations are repeated, it will be obliged to take retaliatory measures, responsibility for consequences of which will rest on governments of states committing aggression against other countries.

The Soviet Government would sincerely like to hope that the Government of the United States recognizes in final analysis that interests of preserving and strengthening peace among peoples including interests of American people itself, whose striving for peace was well demonstrated during the visit of head of Soviet Government N.S. Khrushchev to the United States, would be served by cessation of aforementioned dangerous provocative activities with regard to the USSR, by cessation of the "cold war," and by a search through joint efforts with the Soviet Union and with other interested states for the solution of unsettled international problems, on a mutually acceptable basis, which is awaited by all peoples.

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Annex No. I

Document No. 5US Note to USSR of May 12

The Embassy of the United States of America refers to the Soviet Government's of May 10 concerning the shooting down of an American unarmed civilian aircraft on May 1, and under instruction from its Government, has the honor to state the following.

The United States Government, in the statement issued by the Department of State on May 9, has fully stated its position with respect to this incident.

In its note the Soviet Government has stated that the collection of intelligence about the Soviet Union by American aircraft is a "calculated policy" of the United States. The United States Government does not deny that it has pursued such a policy for purely defensive purposes. What it emphatically does deny is that this policy has any aggressive intent, or that the unarmed U-2 flight of May 1 was undertaken in an effort to prejudice the success of the forthcoming meeting of the Heads of Government in Paris or to "return the state of American-Soviet relations to the worst times of the cold war." Indeed, it is the Soviet Government's treatment of this case which, if anything, may raise questions about its intentions in respect to these matters.

For its part, the United States Government will participate in the Paris meeting on May 16 prepared to cooperate to the fullest extent in seeking agreement designed to reduce tensions, including effective safeguards against surprise attack which would make unnecessary issues of this kind.

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Annex I

Document No. 6

Letter From Vershinin to General White  
Dated May 12

Dear Mr. General:

As you know in my letter of April 29 this year I accepted with thanks your invitation to visit US as guest of USAF.

In connection with recent events known to you, I have considered it necessary to reconsider question of my journey to US and would like to state frankly my reasons therefor.

I think you will agree with me that at present time unfavorable circumstances have been created for successful accomplishing of purposes envisaged in exchange of visits of this kind.

In this atmosphere it is my opinion that it would be more appropriate to postpone my visit to US until a more suitable time.

Dear General, you will distinctly understand the motives which guide me in writing this letter to you.

Respectfully.

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Annex No. I

Document No. 7USSR Note to US of May 16

In connection with the note of the US Embassy, May 12, 1960, USSR declares the following:

In the said note US Government admits that the illegal intrusion by American planes into the confines of the Soviet Union and other states for the purpose of military espionage represents official policy of the United States. The U. S. Government, before the whole world, thereby proclaims as its political course in relations with other states a policy of conscious provocation, a calculated gross violation of international law and sovereignty of states, including one of its chief principles -- territorial inviolability of states.

Such a policy leads not only to an intensification of tension, suspicion, and mistrust in relations among states but also creates an atmosphere dangerous to the cause of peace. The statement by the secretary of State of May 9, to which reference is made in the Embassy note, just as subsequent public statements by US leaders, is an attempt to justify hostile actions which are permissible only in relations between states which are at war with each other.

A shameless incursion into the bounds of another state, whether it be by land, water, or air, cannot be viewed otherwise than as an act of aggression, and the attempt to justify and legalize these actions is nothing other than a sermon of aggression. There can be no doubt that such a policy of the US Government, which brushes aside the elementary norms of international law and order and the principles of the UN Charter, will be decisively condemned throughout the world.

The question inevitably arises: How, in the light of these proclamations of such a policy by the US Government, can one believe its statements on aspirations for peace and an easing of international tension? In general, what talk can there be of trust in the foreign policy of the US Government while it remains in the position of justifying and preaching aggression?

The USSR Government considers it necessary to warn once again with all clarity that in the event of new attempts at an aggressive intrusion into the airspace of the Soviet Union, the intruding aircraft will be immediately annihilated. The policy of aggression and provocation proclaimed by the US Government

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renders vulnerable also those states whose governments, disregarding the interests of their peoples, provide their territories as sites for American bases from which are sent out aircraft to intrude into the airspace of our country; for, with regard to these states, the requisite measures will be taken by the Soviet Union, not excluding a blow at the aforementioned bases.

As far as the statement of the US Government is concerned, regarding the fact that the USSR will be prepared at the conference of heads of government in Paris to seek agreements directed at a reduction of international tension, the Soviet Union considers that the time has come for the US Government to display concern for this not in words but in deeds, and, first of all, to condemn the provocative action of its aviation with regard to the Soviet Union, and to reject the policy of aggressive intrusion into the airspace of other states proclaimed by it, a policy most dangerous to the cause of peace.

The Soviet Government continues to support the restoration of good relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. It depends on the US Government, and on it alone, whether the obstacles which have now arisen on the road to this objective will be removed.

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Annex No. II

Document No. 8USSR Note to Pakistan, May 13

A military aircraft violated the USSR frontier at 0536 hours, Moscow time, on May 1 of this year and penetrated more than 2,000 kilometers within the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government, naturally, could not leave such a gross violation of the Soviet state frontier unpunished. When the intentions of the intruder plane became clear, it was shot down by Soviet rocket troops in the Sverdlovsk area.

Expert investigation of all the data possessed by the Soviet side has irrefutably established that the intruder plane belonged to the United States of America, was permanently based in Turkey and sent via Pakistan with a hostile mission into the Soviet Union.

The detailed results of the investigation, as announced by the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikita Khrushchev at the final May 7 meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet session, leave no doubt as to the purposes of the American plane which violated the Soviet border on May 1. This aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type was specially equipped for an intelligence and subversion flight over Soviet Union territory. It was equipped with apparatus for aerial photography and for detecting the Soviet radar network and other special radiotechnical means included in the Soviet Union's anti-aircraft defenses. The Soviet expert commission which carried out the investigation possesses irrefutable proof of the American plane's espionage mission: films with photographed Soviet defense and industry targets, tape-recorded signals of the Soviet radar stations, and other materials.

It has been established that the plane in question was based at the American-Turkish air force base of Incirlik near Adana, whence it flew on April 27 to the Peshawar airport in Pakistan. The flight map taken from the American spy pilot Powers, who survived, clearly shows the entire course he had to fly after leaving the Turkish city of Adana: Peshawar; the Ural Sea; Sverdlovsk; Archangel-Murmansk; and then the Norwegian airport of Bodoe, where he was to land.

The spy pilot divulged that he serves with the American unit 10-10, stationed in Turkey and engaged in high altitude intelligence, and that he, for one, has flown more than once along the Turkish-Soviet border with a view to studying the Soviet Union's anti-aircraft radar defense system.

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Confronted with these irrefutable facts, the US State Department was compelled to admit that the American plane, which violated the Soviet border on May 1 of this year, was sent into the Soviet Union on an intelligence mission. It was thereby admitted that this flight pursued aggressive purposes.

The USSR Government cannot disregard the part played in the preparation and implementation of this act, which was hostile to the Soviet Union, by Pakistan, from whose territory the provocative intrusion of the American plane into the Soviet airspace was undertaken.

In its statements of December 26, 1958, February 20, 1959, and March 25, 1959, the Soviet Government has already called attention of the Pakistani Government to the grave consequences connected with loaning Pakistani territory to establish foreign war bases, and their use by third powers for aggressive purposes against the Soviet Union and other peace-loving states.

The takeoff from Pakistani territory of a US Air Force plane, which penetrated into the Soviet Union on May 1st of this year, again confirms with ample clarity what a dangerous policy the Pakistani Government pursues by allowing foreign armed forces to use its territory.

The Government of the Soviet Union protests with the Government of Pakistan in connection with the granting of Pakistani territory to the United States for the commitment of aggressive actions against the USSR by the American air force and warns that if such actions are repeated from Pakistani territory, it will be compelled to take proper retaliatory measures. It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union possesses means to render harmless in case of need the war bases used for aggressive actions against the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that the responsibility for the consequences will be borne both by the governments of the States committing aggression against other nations and by the governments of the countries which are accomplices in it.

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Annex No. II

Document No. 9Pakistan Note to the USSR, May 24

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations presents its compliments to the Embassy of the USSR, and with reference to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, note dated the 13th of May, 1960, has the honour to state as follows:

The Government of Pakistan denies that it has played any part in the preparation and execution of the flight of any aircraft for the purpose of military intelligence over USSR. Pakistan has never given any facilities to any foreign aircraft known to be engaged in collecting intelligence and has no intention in the future of departing from its firm policy in this respect.

After due inquiry it has been ascertained that no aircraft took off from Peshawar airfield in the direction of the USSR. It was publicly stated by the Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan that in case any American plane, taking off from Peshawar had been diverted to USSR in the course of its flight, without knowledge of Pakistan and when Pakistan authorities had no control over it, Pakistan has cause for bitter complaint against the Government of the United States.

A formal protest was lodged later, demanding that the Government of the United States must assure the Government of Pakistan that no such incident would be allowed to take place in the future.

An assurance to that effect has been received from the Government of the United States of America.

The Government of the USSR has reiterated its oft-repeated allegation that the Government of Pakistan has military bases on its territory. It has also attested that these bases are used for aggressive purposes. The Government of Pakistan wishes again to point out, as it has done on many previous occasions, that there are no foreign military bases in Pakistan and therefore the question of their being put to aggressive purposes does not arise.

While sympathizing with the desire of the Government of the USSR to safeguard its air space against unfriendly intrusions, the Government of Pakistan deems it necessary to point out that its own air space in West Pakistan has been violated several

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times in recent months. The type of aircraft used in these operations and their direction of flight indicate that these must have been Soviet airplanes. The Government of Pakistan hopes that flights of this nature over Pakistan territory will not re-occur in the future.

The Government of Pakistan wishes to make it plain that Pakistan desires nothing but peace and friendliness with all its neighbors. It has no aggressive designs. Its own territory

is its only concern, and to guard it, is its sacred duty. This duty, it will perform in all circumstances. The Government of Pakistan assures the Government of USSR that Pakistan wishes and intends to live in peace and friendship with USSR.

The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of USSR the assurances of its highest consideration.

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Annex No. II

Document No. 10

USSR Note to Pakistan, June 22

In connection with the reply of the Government of Pakistan dated May 24 of the current year to the note of the USSR Government dated May 13 about the fact that Pakistan made its territory available for the carrying out by the US Air Force of aggressive actions against the USSR, the Government of the USSR deems it necessary to state the following:

In its reply the Government of Pakistan reports that it made an official protest to the US Government and demanded from the latter assurances that "not a single similar incident would be allowed in the future." In doing so, the Government of Pakistan admitted that a US aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type had been based on Pakistani territory and had taken off from there traveling deep into Soviet territory. At the same time, trying to evade responsibility for participation in this aggressive act, the Government of Pakistan tries to raise doubts as to whether the US aircraft was dispatched on its intelligence-diversionist flight from Peshawar airport and to contend that it had no connection with this flight.

This attempt by the Government of Pakistan contradicts accurately established facts which are confirmed not only by statements of US spy pilot Powers and the flight route map taken from him, but also by admissions by the US Government itself.

The facts, however, are these: A US military aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type arrived at Peshawar airport April 27 from the Incirlik air force base on Turkish territory and remained at the Pakistani airport for three days. There final preparations for its flight were made. On May 1 this aircraft took off from Peshawar airport and flew into the USSR. It is common knowledge that this aircraft had no markings and could for that reason alone not help but to attract the attention of the relevant Pakistani authorities, who should have forbidden both the arrival of such an aircraft on Pakistani territory and its departure, taking into account that the Pakistani authorities must exercise proper control over their territory. But this was not done by the Government of Pakistan.

If one were to deny the facts and suppose that the claims of the Government of Pakistan contained in its note, that it did not know anything about the intended flight of the US aircraft over

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USSR territory from Peshawar airport and had not participated in preparations for such a flight, somehow correspond to reality, one could not help conclude that the United States controls Pakistani airports as though they were its own military bases and does not have to account to Pakistani authorities. But these claims by the Government of Pakistan cannot be reconciled with its other statements, particularly its statements to the effect that there are no US military bases on Pakistani territory.

Thus, the facts make it completely obvious that between April 27 and May 1 of this year the US aircraft was being prepared on Pakistani territory for penetration into the USSR. With the cooperation of Pakistani authorities, and that the Government of Pakistan has thus assumed the role of accomplice in this matter.

The government of Pakistan, apparently trying to extricate itself from the situation in which it found itself as a result of its participation in the carrying out by the US Air Force of an aggressive act against the USSR, points to some kind of violations of Pakistani airspace by Soviet aircraft. Wholly rejecting these groundless claims, the Soviet Government states that, in contrast to the United States, which violates generally accepted norms of international law, the USSR has always respected and continues to respect the national sovereignty and independence of other states, including Pakistan.

As for the claims by the Government of Pakistan of its wish to have good relations with the USSR, it is essential to note that Pakistani leaders have also made such statements previously, yet the present state of Soviet-Pakistani relations by no means points to a desire by Pakistani leaders to turn their words into practical deeds. Nor is this confirmed by the aforementioned note of the Government of Pakistan, in which, instead of giving a clear answer about the prevention in the future of the use of Pakistani territory by the US Air Force for aggression against the USSR, the Government of Pakistan tries to evade responsibility, referring to some kind of assurances by US authorities.

The value of these assurances, one would have thought, are well known to the Government of Pakistan. It cannot help knowing that, under the impact of the facts, the mendacious assertions by the US Government in connection with the flight of the US aircraft into the USSR were refuted one by one. Taking this into account, the USSR Government cannot help conclude that the Government of Pakistan underestimates the full seriousness of the question and the danger which threatens Pakistan as

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a result of the use made by the United States of airports of its military bloc allies, particularly if one takes into account that the calculations of US militarist circles rely on the fact that their allies would, in case US aggressive circles provoke a military conflict, take the main burden of the first blow.

The USSR Government reaffirms the position it outlined in its note dated May 13 and reiterates that if in the future provocative flights by aircraft are made against the USSR from Pakistani territory, the Soviet Government will, with a view toward guaranteeing the security of the Soviet people, be forced to take the necessary steps, to the point of dealing blows at bases which may be used for carrying out such flights.

Using this opportunity, the USSR Government reiterates that it would like to have friendly relations, based on the principles of peaceful coexistence, with Pakistan as its close neighbor. Such relations would best meet the interests of the peoples of the USSR and Pakistan and would be a worthy contribution to the cause of the struggle for world peace. But such relations can arise only when both parties aspire to building them and when the Government of Pakistan appreciates the full danger of making Pakistani territory available as an arsenal to be used by US militarist circles for carrying out aggressive acts against the USSR.

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Annex No. II

Document No. 11The Pakistan Aide Memoire to the US, May 14

Our enquiries show that no aircraft has taken off from Peshawar airfield in the direction of Soviet Russia. In case any American plane taking off from Peshawar has been diverted to Soviet Russia in the course of its flight, and Soviet allegation that American aircraft which has been brought down in Soviet Russia took off from Peshawar is correct, we have cause for bitter complaint. The American authorities must realize the delicacy of our situation and ensure that all concerned refrain from such activities in future.

We are making a statement to the press to this effect.

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Annex No. II

Document No. 12Pakistan Note to the US, May 19

The Ambassador of Pakistan presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to refer to the Aide Memoire left with Mr. Frederic P. Bartlett, Director of South Asian Affairs by Mr. K.M. Kaiser, Minister of this Embassy on Saturday, the 14th of May, 1960. Under instructions from the Government, the Ambassador of Pakistan wishes to state that this Aide Memoire may be considered as a protest from the Government of Pakistan. In view of the circumstances mentioned in the Aide Memoire the Government of Pakistan shall be grateful for an assurance that any facilities that may be made available to the United States Government by the Government of Pakistan would not be used for any such purposes in future without the knowledge and concurrence of the Government of Pakistan.

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Annex No. II

Document No. 13US Note to Pakistan, May 22

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Pakistan and has the honor to refer to the Ambassador's note of May 19 regarding the use of airfields in Pakistan by American aircraft. In this connection the Government of the United States is pleased to give the assurances requested by the Government of Pakistan.

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Annex No. II

Document No. 14Afghanistan Note to Pakistan, May 18

From irrefutable information about the forcing down of an American U-2 plane in the vicinity of Sverdlosk, USSR, and from the confessions of Mr. Powers, the pilot of the said plane, and also on the basis of the map recovered from the pilot which shows the route of the flight, it becomes apparent that the said plane had the illegal duty of espionage in the Soviet Union, and that the plane flew from a military base of Pakistan and after an illegal and unauthorized flight over Afghanistan entered the Soviet Union.

This flight which took place from military bases of Pakistan with the permission of the Government of Pakistan involves the Government of Pakistan in this undesirable violation which is absolutely in contravention of international law and contrary to accepted international practice, and damages the atmosphere of peace in this area and aggravates international tension.

As regards the violation of the air space of Afghanistan, perpetrated with the permission of the Government of Pakistan and from its military bases by a third country with unlawful motives, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly protests and places on the Government of Pakistan responsibility for the great danger resulting from its attitude.

The Royal Government of Afghanistan is awaiting necessary elucidations and also assurance from the Government of Pakistan that no opportunity will be provided in future for such a violation by the said government.

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Pakistan Note to Afghanistan, June 4

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations presents its compliments to the Royal Afghan Embassy with reference to the Note No. 947, dated the 18th May, 1960, handed over to the Ambassador of Pakistan at Kabul, has the honour to state that the allegation contained in the above note that a flight of the US plane, which was brought down in the USSR originated from Peshawar airfield in Pakistan with the cooperation of the Government of Pakistan, is incorrect. In this context the attention of the Royal Afghan Government is invited to the following statement issued on the 14th May, 1960, in London by Mr. E. Ikramullah, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Government of Pakistan: -

"Our enquiry shows that no aircraft has taken off from Peshawar airfield in the direction of Soviet Russia. In case any American plane taking off from Peshawar has been diverted to Soviet Russia in course of its flight, and Soviet allegation that American aircraft which has been brought down in Soviet Russia, took off from Peshawar is correct, we have cause for bitter complaint. The American authorities must realize the delicacy of our situation and ensure that all concerned refrain from such activities in future."

It will be obvious from the above statement that if such a flight took place it was without the knowledge and approval of the Government of Pakistan. Under these circumstances there is no valid reason for the protest lodged by the Royal Afghan Government and the said protest therefore is hereby rejected.

The Government of Pakistan, however, wishes to draw the attention of the Royal Afghan Government to the Note No. AF.(I)/1/54/59, dated the 10th November, 1959, delivered to the Royal Afghan Embassy in Karachi protesting against repeated and frequent violations of Pakistan air space and Pakistan territory by unauthorized flights of aircraft from Afghanistan. The Government of Pakistan regrets to note that no assurance has so far been received from the Royal Afghan

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Government that such flights would cease and while again renewing a strong protest on those flights expresses the hope that they will not be permitted to recur in the future.

The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.

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Annex No. II

Document No. 16Afghanistan Note to Pakistan, June 21 (Excerpt)

Because of real facts and evidence that is clear to everyone, Ministry Foreign Affairs considers (Pakistan reply) not only unsatisfactory but intentional deviation from facts of case. It also considers this conduct of Government of Pakistan and its denial of assurance that such flights, which endanger peace of this region and that of the world, will not take place in the future, as indication of ill-intentions Government of Pakistan. Therefore the earlier Afghan protest is once more confirmed.

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Annex No. III

Document No. 17

USSR Note to Turkey, May 13

A military aircraft violated the Soviet border at 0536 hours, Moscow time, on May 1 of this year, and penetrated more than 2,000 kilometers within the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government, naturally, could not leave such a gross violation of the Soviet state frontier unpunished. When the intentions of the intruder plane became obvious, it was shot down by Soviet rocket troops in the Sverdlovsk area.

Expert investigation of all the data possessed by the Soviet side has irrefutably established that the intruder plane belonged to the United States of America, was permanently based in Turkey, and sent via Pakistan into the Soviet Union on a hostile mission.

Detailed results of the investigation, as announced by the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikita Khrushchev at the final May 7 meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet session, leave no doubt as to the purposes of the American plane, which violated the Soviet frontier on May 1. This aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type was specially equipped for an intelligence and subversion flight over USSR territory. It carried apparatus for aerial photography and for detecting the Soviet radar network and other special radiotechnical means included in the Soviet anti-aircraft defense system. The Soviet expert commission which carried out the investigation possesses irrefutable evidence of the American plane's espionage mission: films with photographed Soviet defense and industry targets, tape-recorded signals of the Soviet radar stations, and other materials.

It has been established that the plane in question was based at the American-Turkish air force base of Incirlik near Adana, from where it flew on April 27 to the airport of Peshawar, Pakistan. The flight map taken from the American spy pilot Powers, who survived, shows clearly the entire course he had to fly after leaving Adana: Peshawar; the Aral Sea; Sverdlovsk; Archangel; Murmansk; and finally the Norwegian airport of Bodo, where he was to land.

The spy pilot divulged that he served with the American unit 10-10, stationed in Turkey and engaged in high altitude intelligence, and that he, for one, made repeated flights along the Turkish-Soviet frontier in order to study the anti-aircraft radar system of the Soviet Union.

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Confronted with these irrefutable facts, the US State Department was compelled to admit that the American plane, which violated the Soviet border on May 1 of this year, was sent into the Soviet Union on an intelligence mission. Thereby it was admitted that this flight pursued aggressive purposes.

The Soviet Government cannot disregard the part played in the preparation and implementation of this hostile act against the Soviet Union by the Turkish Republic, in whose territory the American intruder plane was based and prepared for the flight.

The Soviet Government deems it necessary to state to the Government of Turkey that by lending its territory to the United States for setting up war bases and for carrying out aggressive acts against the Soviet Union by the US Air Force, it becomes an accomplice in such acts and thereby has a grave responsibility for the possible dangerous consequences of such actions. All this by no means agrees with the statements of Turkish leaders about their desire to help consolidate peace, ease international tension, and improve Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government earlier warned the Government of Turkey about the danger of the situation when Turkish territory is used as a military place d'armes by third powers. The Soviet side has drawn attention to this fact when the Soviet airspace was violated by foreign planes and balloons from Turkish territory. In the light of the above, the Soviet Government cannot help concluding that the Government of Turkey has not heeded these warnings of the Soviet Union dictating concern for the preservation of peace and a desire to improve Soviet-Turkish relations.

The Government of the Soviet Union protests to the Government of the Turkish Republic against the opportunity given to foreign warplanes to use Turkish territory for preparing and carrying out intrusions into the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government deems it necessary to warn that if such provocations are repeated from the territory of Turkey it will be compelled to take proper retaliatory measures. It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union has means to render harmless, if necessary, the war bases used for aggressive actions against the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that all responsibility for the consequences will be borne both by the governments of the states committing aggression against other countries and the accomplices in this aggression.

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Annex III

Document No. 18

Turkish Note to the USSR, May 26

The Turkish Government has studied, with all the attention which it requires, the Note which the Soviet Government has been pleased to deliver to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, with the date of May 13, 1960, on the subject of the American aircraft knocked (abbattu) down within the Soviet airspace on the first of May, 1960.

The Turkish Government considers it necessary from the outset to convey to the Soviet Government the knowledge that the incident relative to the overflight of Soviet airspace by an American aircraft and the dispute which has resulted therefrom cannot be the object of a discussion between the Turkish and Soviet Governments.

On the other hand, the Turkish Government does not intend to render a judgement upon this event, which has already been submitted to the jurisdiction of the United Nations.

The Turkish Government also desires to draw the attention of the Soviet Government to the fact that the airplane in question did not penetrate into the Soviet airspace, based on the statement of the competent Soviet authorities themselves, until three days after having departed from Turkish soil. This clearly proves that the Turkish airspace was not utilized for the overflight of Soviet airspace.

Moreover, the Turkish Government is also in a position to declare in a categorical manner that Turkey has never accorded to any aircraft whatever the authorization to pass from its airspace into the Soviet airspace without the aircraft in question having obtained the requisite permission. The Turkish Government likewise desires to state moreover, that the American authorities have never submitted such a request.

In view of the preceding, the Turkish Government desires to convey the following clarifications:

The responsibility of the Turkish authorities can not go beyond the limits of Turkish airspace. It is evident that authorizations granted to foreign aircraft overflying Turkish airspace

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are not granted except in conformity with the provisions of international law controlling the matter. In that which concerns flights outside of Turkish airspace, the Turkish Government fails to see how it can be held to assume responsibility except when it concerns authorized flights of aircraft of Turkish nationality.

Consequently, the Turkish Government is unable to accept in any manner the accusation put forward in the above-mentioned Note of the Soviet Government with regard to its responsibility arising from the fact that the American aircraft in question had utilized the air base at Incirlik prior to its departure for a destination in a third country other than the USSR.

With respect to the remark made by the Soviet Government relative to the use of certain Turkish bases by third governments and particularly by the Government of the United States, the Government of Turkey hastens to bring to the attention of the Soviet Government that as a sovereign state Turkey has the right, in conformity with the principles and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, to put its air bases at the disposal of its allies with a purely defensive aim. Otherwise said, the Government of Turkey has never granted and will never grant to the aircraft of allied or other powers the right to use its bases or its air space with an aggressive aim which could prejudice the security or tranquility of its neighbors.

Furthermore, the Turkish Government can even declare to the Soviet Union that the arrangement existing between itself and the American Government does not permit American aircraft to fly in Turkish airspace without the authorization of the competent Turkish services and subjects them in this respect to the authority of the Turkish Government.

Under these conditions it is easy to understand that the Turkish Government can only reject the accusations and remarks brought to its attention in the Note of the Soviet Government.

With respect to the previous cases of overflights of Soviet territory to which reference was made in the above-mentioned Note, the Turkish Government had at the time clearly explained to the Soviet Government the reasons for which also in these cases no part of the responsibility whatsoever could be attributed to it.

On the other hand, the Turkish Government wishes to point out in this connection that the Turkish authorities had found themselves compelled on several occasions to formulate complaints on the subject of unauthorized overflights of Turkish airspace by Soviet aircraft.

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The Turkish Government is of the opinion that all these incidents should be resolved in conformity with the customary rules and principles of international law. Demarches which exceed this frame are certainly not of a nature to serve the interests of the parties and to contribute to the safeguarding of peace.

Before finishing the Turkish Government wishes to bring to the attention of the Soviet Government that Turkey, which has always founded its policy on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, has never ceased to devote itself to the establishment of the best relations with its neighbors, and that it has adhered only to those alliances which have a purely defensive character, with the aim of assuring its independence and contributing to the safeguarding of peace. And these alliances can never be considered to be of a nature to prevent Turkey from having the best of relations with countries which are not members of these alliances (but) which nourish the same desires with regard to Turkey and the same attachment to the ideal of peace.

Turkey would be very happy to see all its neighbors inspired by the same principles and showing as much solicitude as it does for the establishment of relations of good neighborliness.

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Annex IV

Document No. 19

USSR Note to Norway, May 13

A military aircraft violated the Soviet frontier at 0436 hours Moscow time, May 1, and flew over 2,000 kilometers deep into the Soviet Union. The USSR Government could not, naturally, have left such a gross violation of the Soviet national frontiers unpunished. As soon as the intentions of the intruding plane became obvious it was shot down by Soviet missile forces in the vicinity of Sverdlovsk.

An expert examination of all the vidence at the Soviet Union's disposal has put it beyond dispute that the invading plane belongs to the United States of America, was permanently based in Turkey, and was sent to the Soviet Union via Pakistan for hostile purposes.

The exact findings of the investigation, as reported by the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, at the closing meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet session May 7, leave no room for doubt as to the purposes behind the flight of the American plane which violated the Soviet frontier on May 1. This plane, of the Lockheed U-2 type, was expressly equipped for reconnaissance and subversory flight over Soviet Union territory.

The plane carried equipment for aerial photography and the detection of Soviet radar networks and other special radio-engineering facilities of the Soviet antiaircraft defenses. The Soviet expert commission, which made the inquiry, has incontrovertible evidence at its disposal of the spying and reconnaissance mission of the American plane: rolls of film showing Soviet defense and industrial establishments; a tape recording of the signal of Soviet radar stations; and other evidence.

It has been established that the plane in question was based at the American-Turkish airbase at Incirlik, near Adana, from where it flew to the Peshawar airfield in Pakistan, April 27.

The route map taken from the surviving American spy flyer, Powers, clearly and distinctly indicates the entire route which he was instructed to follow after taking off from the Turkish city of Adana: Peshawar, the Aral Sea, Sverdlovsk, Archangel, and Murmansk, with subsequent landing at the Bodoe airfield in Norway. The spy flyer reported that he was serving with the American 10-10 unit stationed in Turkey and engaged in high altitude aerial reconnaissance, and that he had, notably, made repeated flights along the Turkish-Soviet frontier for the purpose of studying Soviet antiaircraft radar networks.

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In the face of these incontrovertible facts, the US State Department has had to admit that the American plane, which violated the Soviet frontier May 1, had been sent into the Soviet Union for military reconnaissance. This meant recognizing that the flight had aggressive purposes.

The American pilot testifies that in the course of thorough preparation for his flight over USSR territory, made well in advance, he had, on the instructions of his command, made a preliminary flight from Turkey to Norway via Greece, Italy, and the Federal German Republic, and stayed there for two to three weeks studying landing conditions at the Bodoe airfield.

It should be recalled in this connection that as early as January 1959, the Soviet Government, having received exact and verified information about deliberate reconnaissance flights to Soviet territory by American military planes from Norwegian territory, and specifically the Bodoe airfield, already told the Norwegian Government that such a state of affairs was intolerable. In its reply, the Government of Norway did not deny that planes of third countries received permission from the Norwegian authorities in isolated cases to spy on Norwegian territory temporarily, allegedly for joint flights with aircraft of the Norwegian air force.

The Government of Norway said that these flights were made only with the permission of the Norwegian authorities and that, under Norwegian rules, allied planes were not allowed to fly across Norwegian territory east of the 24th degree Eastern longitude. But already it was clear that these assurances were an attempt to exonerate Norway's partners in the aggressive NATO bloc and to whitewash their actions which are a threat to peace and security in the north of Europe, actions for which Norwegian territory, too, is used. Now, the provocative flight over Soviet territory by an American plane which was to land on the Norwegian airfield at Bodoe proves irrefutably that the Norwegian Government did not heed the warnings of the Soviet Government. Moreover, it has in fact become an accessory to provocative actions by the United States against Norway's neighbor, the Soviet Union.

In view of the aforesaid, the question is posed: What is the real worth of the Norwegian Government's repeated assurances that the territory of Norway will not be made available in peacetime for the stationing of foreign armed forces, if this territory is already being used by planes of the US Air Force making aggressive flights into the confines of the Soviet Union? The Soviet Government calls attention to the Government of Norway to the fact that it is difficult to regard these actions otherwise than as unfriendly to the

Soviet Union and incompatible with the normal good neighbor relations between the two countries, and considers it necessary to stress that the Government of Norway bears a not inconsiderable share of the responsibility for the aggressive acts undertaken by the American air force with regard to the Soviet Union.

The Government of the Soviet Union protests strongly to the Government of Norway against allowing foreign military aircraft to use Norwegian territory for the preparation and commissioning of intrusions into Soviet airspace.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to warn that if such provocations continue from the territory of Norway, it will be obliged to take appropriate measures in reply. It will be recalled that the Soviet Union has the means which, if necessary, will make it possible to fully incapacitate the military bases used for the commissioning of aggressive actions against the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that the responsibility for the consequences will rest both with the governments of the states committing aggression against other nations, and the governments of the countries which are their accomplices.

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Annex No. IV

Document No. 20

Norwegian Note to USSR, May 27

The Norwegian Government has closely examined the contents of the note from the Government of the Soviet Union of May 13 and would like to communicate the following:

In its note the Government of the Soviet Union draws the attention of the Norwegian Government to the violation of the frontiers of the Soviet Union by an American aircraft, which flew over parts of the territory of the Soviet Union. Based upon the information that the pilot of the aircraft was equipped with a map indicating Bodo airfield as his destination, the Soviet Government protests against foreign aircraft being given the opportunity of using Norwegian territory in order to prepare and to carry out penetrations into the Soviet Union.

In this connection the Norwegian Government would like to make the following observations:

In its declarations to the "Storting" on May 9 and May 13, the Norwegian Government made it clear that no Norwegian civil or military authority had cooperated in any way in the execution of the flight in question. In these declarations the Government stated its reaction to this incident and explained the steps taken in the matter. Reference is made in this respect to the Foreign Ministers press release of May 19. The government has thus in the "Storting" openly presented the available information regarding this matter. The contents of the two declarations have also been brought to the knowledge of the Soviet Government on the understanding that the relations between our two countries must be based on frankness and sincerity.

In its note of May 13 the Soviet Government assert that the aircraft incident on May 1 diminishes the value of the Norwegian assurances regarding the stationing of foreign armed forces in Norway. This assumption is made on the grounds that Norwegian territory "already now is put at the disposal of aircraft of the United States Air Force penetrating into the Soviet Union for aggressive purposes". As is evident from the statements made by the Norwegian Government, there is no basis for such assumptions.

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It has been and still is the policy of the Norwegian Government never to permit the use of Norwegian territory for acts violating the territory of another country.

The Norwegian Government fully recognizes the need of the Soviet Union to safeguard its interests and its national security. Norway for its part has the same needs which the Norwegian Government endeavours to satisfy in the most appropriate way. The Government is fully conscious of the considerations which in this connection must be given to all legitimate interests of Norway's neighboring countries. It is thus essential to ensure that the good and confident neighborly relations with the Soviet Union are not endangered by the fact that Norway has safeguarded its security by participating in a regional defense alliance. It will always be a major aim of Norwegian foreign policy to maintain and strengthen these neighborly relations.

Against this background the Government of the Soviet Union will no doubt understand that the Norwegian Government must regret the warnings of measures against Norwegian territory contained in the Soviet note of May 13. The Norwegian Government cannot see that any steps have been taken by Norway in connection with this incident which can in any way be interpreted as unfriendly acts towards the Soviet Union, or which in any other way justify such warnings.

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Annex No. IV

Document No. 21

The Norwegian Pour Memoire to US, May 13

On the basis of the information available to Norwegian Government it seems evident that an American aircraft of type Lockheed U-2 which according to Soviet sources was shot down over USSR on May 1, 1960, was bound for Bodoe Airfield. Norwegian authorities had not received any request for permission to land this particular aircraft. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that in this case landing on a Norwegian airfield would have been contrary to principles followed by Norwegian authorities in granting permission for landing of foreign reconnaissance aircraft.

The Norwegian Government must lodge its protest, and at same time ask that American authorities take all necessary steps to prevent similar incidents in the future.

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Annex No. IV

Document No. 22

US Aide Memoire in Reply to Norwegian Protests,  
May 16

The US Government confirms that Norwegian authorities had not been requested to grant permission for American aircraft of type Lockheed U-2, which according to Soviet sources was shot down over USSR on May 1, 1960, to land at Bodoe airfield. Had such a landing been made on a Norwegian airfield, it would have been contrary to principles followed by Norwegian authorities in granting permission for landing of foreign aircraft.

The United States will continue to abide by those principles.

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Annex No. V

Document No. 23

Afghanistan Note to US, May 18

From irrefutable information about the forcing down of an American U-2 plane in the vicinity of Sverdlosk, USSR, and from the confessions of Mr. Powers, the pilot of the said plane, and also on the basis of the map recovered from the pilot which shows the route of the flight, it becomes apparent that the said plane had the illegal duty of espionage in the Soviet Union, and that the plane flew from a military base of Pakistan and after an illegal and unauthorized flight over Afghanistan entered the Soviet Union.

The Foreign Ministry of the Royal Government of Afghanistan considers this flight, in addition to being an act completely contrary to International Law and contrary to accepted relations between states and an unfriendly action part of United States Government and also considers such an act which takes place from a military base of another country in this area as disturbing to peace and a cause of increasing tension and conflict in this area as well as in international spheres.

In regard to the violation of Afghan air space by the American plane the Foreign Ministry of the Royal Government of Afghanistan strongly protests to the Government of the United States of America and awaits the necessary explanation as well as an assurance that such a violation of Afghan air space will not be repeated by the United States of America.

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Annex No. V

Document No. 24

US Note to Afghanistan, May 20

The Embassy of the United States Government refers to the Royal Government of Afghanistan note of May 18 concerning the forcing down of the American unarmed civilian aircraft on May 1 in the USSR and has the honor to state the following:

The United States Government notes with regret that the Royal Government of Afghanistan has interpreted a certain ex parte version of flight as unfriendly action by the United States Government. The United States Government entertains and has entertained only friendliest sentiments toward the Royal Government of Afghanistan and has never taken a course of action in the contrary sense. It is believed unnecessary to invite the attention of the Royal Government of Afghanistan to the history of US-Afghan relations to demonstrate the validity of this point.

With respect to the assurances desired by the Royal Government of Afghanistan and without prejudice to the exception taken by the United States Government to the charge of unfriendly action, the attention of the Royal Government of Afghanistan is invited to the public statement made on May 16, 1960 in Paris by President Eisenhower with respect to such flights. Quite apart from the route which this or any particular plane might have taken, the President said: "In point of fact these flights were suspended after the recent incident and are not to be resumed."

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Annex No. VI

Document No. 25Department's Instruction to MacArthur of May 9

1. In light your estimate situation in Japan, we are prepared to conclude specific undertaking with GOJ that we will not rpt not in absence armed attack against Japan fly any intelligence missions over non-Japanese territories from US facilities in Japan without rpt without prior consultation with GOJ. We desire to conclude this undertaking within framework Consultation Agreement. We would also give public assurances that lacking consent of GOJ we would not rpt not undertake such flights contrary to express wishes of GOJ.

2. With respect to past performances you may give Kishi assurance that U-2 equipment has been utilized only for legitimate scientific purposes. Realize such assurance will be accepted with some doubt in view recent happenings but our posture will certainly be none the worse for giving this assurance even with respect to past performance.

3. We also consider that it would be strongly in our interest to make public statement soonest along following lines: QTE US Government has given GOJ assurances that U-2 aircraft, flying from air bases in Japan, have been utilized only for legitimate normal and no intelligence overflight missions.

Under the new Treaty arrangements, the US Government has agreed to a specific consultation arrangement. If the GOJ requests such, US Government is prepared to make a further agreement clarifying that under this consultation agreement intelligence missions over non-Japanese territory from air bases in Japan will not rpt not be undertaken without prior consultation with the GOJ and in such consultation the US will not act contrary to views of Japanese Government. This formal undertaking will come into effect once the new Treaty arrangements are ratified by both Governments. UNQTE -- Department Telegram to Tokyo 2599.

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Annex No. VI

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Document No. 26MacArthur Report on Talks with Yamada, May 10

1. I deeply appreciate swift and constructive instructions which you sent me in REFTEL, which have been tremendously helpful.

2. I met privately early this morning with Vice ForMin Yamada and conveyed to him for Kishi and Fujiyama substance of REFTEL, including public statement we propose to make. Yamada expressed great appreciation and left at once to meet with Kishi and Fujiyama.

3. I have just returned from second private meeting with Yamada, who had just come from meeting with Kishi and Fujiyama. He first asked that Kishi's deep and heartfelt thanks be expressed to President and to you for our constructive proposal, which was greatly appreciated. He said Kishi and Fujiyama both wished us to know that they understood that US had to undertake intelligence activities and that such intelligence activities were important for security of US and its friends and allies. They did not rpt not wish to create problems for US in our intelligence activities but on other hand they had very difficult problem to handle in term of public opinion. While they appreciated scope of statement we were prepared to make on our willingness to expand "prior consultation" to include intelligence overflights, Kishi and Fujiyama felt it unnecessary, at this juncture, to enter into new formal and official agreement re consultation in cases of intelligence overflights. In fact, if we mentioned in our statement prior consultation for intelligence overflights from Japanese bases, GOJ, for public opinion purposes, would be obliged to say that it would not rpt not authorize such overflights. Kishi did not think this would be helpful from our viewpoint.

4. Therefore Kishi proposed that we make simple statement along following lines based on first sentence of statement in para 3 of REFTEL:

Begin Draft Statement: The US Government has given the GOJ assurances that U-2 aircraft flying from air bases in Japan have been and will continue to be utilized only

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for legitimate and normal purposes and not for intelligence overflight missions. End Draft Statement.

Kishi said that although Socialist would cast doubt on good word and faith of U.S., he believed such statement would hold situation and therefore would not propose expanding "prior consultation" arrangement for overflights at this time.

5. Kishi strongly hopes Secretary or State Dept. can issue such statement as soon as possible. After statement is issued in Washington, he might, for public relations purposes in Japan, also wish to have me convey it formally to FonMin under first person note.

6. I strongly recommend that statement proposed above by Kishi be issued soonest in Washington, which I will subsequently transmit in first person note to Fujiyama if Kishi so desires. I feel that from our point of view Kishi's proposal is actually preferable to proposal in REFTEL.

Again, my deep appreciation for great speed with which such constructive action was taken on this very important matter. -- Tokyo Telegram to Department 3603.

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Document No. 27

Department's Instruction to MacArthur on Statement  
of May 10

Department issuing statement as you request noon EDT May 10. If Kishi considers would be helpful his purposes you authorized pass first person note following similar language. FYI We assume Kishi understands our offer of specific undertaking on consultation remains available to him should subsequent events require such undertaking. -- Department Telegram to Tokyo 2610.

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Annex No. VI

Document No. 28Japan Note to US Dated May 12

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note date 11 May 1960 in which was transmitted the text of the official statement made by the Department of State in Washington at 12:00 noon, Eastern Daylight Time, 10 May 1960, and to express my appreciation for your Excellency's prompt action in communicating the assurances of the United States Government concerning the missions of U-2 aircraft flying from air bases in Japan.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Aiichiro Fujiyama.

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Document No. 29Japan Informs MacArthur of New Soviet Note, May 21

Foreign Office has just informed us of new Soviet note to Japan protesting security treaty and illegal overflights by US aircraft. GOJ intends delay formal reply for few days but Foreign Office spokesman will issue informal statement later this afternoon. Vice Foreign Minister Yamada told us line not yet firm but he thought it would make following points:

- (1) Reiterate Japan-US security treaty purely defensive;
- (2) Note US assurances that U-2's based in Japan have not engaged in intelligence overflight missions; and
- (3) State that GOJ fully respects forms and obligations of international law and practice.

Yamada said two points in Soviet note presented great difficulties for GOJ during present widespread agitation re security treaty. Soviet note:

- (A) Obviously refers to intelligence overflights not only by U-2's but also by other US aircraft based in Japan; and
- (B) States US government has been warned by Soviet Union more than once before re such intelligence overflights.

Yamada asked as matter of great urgency for information to assist GOJ in preparing its formal reply to Soviet note which would have to be made soon. In particular GOJ believes statement that none of our planes has conducted or will conduct overflights is important together with information re alleged previous Soviet warnings.

While Diet Lower House has passed security treaty, Kishi's position is extremely difficult and he is in trouble. State of public opinion is such that major political crisis could build swiftly. As reference telegram emphasized, Kishi must be in position to make clear that none of our aircraft based in Japan has been engaged in, or

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will in future carry out, illegal overflights from bases in Japan. I again strongly urge, if we are in position to do so, that we make this clear at once in public statement to be issued by State Department (perhaps as comment on Soviet note). Also request Department send me soonest any background re Soviet allegation re previous warnings to US to which Soviet note refers so that I may pass this on to Foreign Office. If there were previous Soviet warnings did we in our replies deny overflights, admit we had overflown or what? -- Tokyo Telegram to Department 3784

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Annex No. VI.

Document No. 30Department's Instruction to MacArthur, May 28

You may inform Kishi or Yamada that in reply to his query regarding overflights of Soviet territory other than by U-2's from bases in Japan, we have been making a most thorough search of all flight records pertaining to bases in Japan and, having gone back several years as far as accurate records are still available, we can now state there have been no such overflights from Japanese territory. Assurances contained para one Deptel 2599 apply here, i.e., nor will there be any such overflights from Japanese territory in future without prior consultation GOJ. (You should point out that commitment to prior consultation in future is for confidential information Japanese Government and in accordance its wishes will not rpt not be publicized. Strongly hope in any reply to Soviets, GOJ will not rpt not reveal confidential commitment on prior consultation with respect to future.) As regards U-2's we have already stated publicly that the United States Government has given the Government of Japan assurances that U-2 aircraft flying from air bases in Japan have been and will continue to be utilized only for legitimate and normal purposes and not for intelligence overflight missions.

As regards previous Soviet warnings to the United States Government re border violations in the past ten years the Soviet Government has alleged in approximately half a dozen cases that U.S. aircraft intruded into Soviet air space in neighborhood of Japan. In most of these cases, allegations were that American aircraft were intercepted by Soviet fighters, that Soviet fighters either signaled American aircraft to leave Soviet air space or that American aircraft opened fire on Soviet interceptors, and that the incidents ended in alleged disappearance of American aircraft. In one or two cases, there was no allegation of interception. In only one of these cases has Soviet government made specific charges of an intelligence mission with respect to these flights.

The Soviet Government in its notes never made it a point of issue where the planes were based. Soviet charges

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of firing by American aircraft on Soviet planes or deliberate violation of Soviet air space, or in the one instance of specific reference to reconnaissance, have been rejected as untrue by American side and Soviet government has been invited to litigate issues of law and fact in International Court of Justice. This the Soviets have consistently refused to do. FYI Of these cases of intrusions four involved U.S. aircraft based in Japan. This to be used only if pressed by Japanese and in context these not overflights per our rejection Soviet protest. End FYI.

The foregoing summary excludes Korean war questions and aircraft under UN command in the Korean conflict.

Department does not repeat not wish to comment publicly on Soviet note to Japan and prefers not repeat not to make any further press statement on issues raised by Yamada. -- Department Telegram to Tokyo 2826.

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Annex No. VI

Document No. 31MacArthur Reports on Talk with Yamada, June 2

Substance REFTEL communicated to Vice FonMin Yamada. We emphasized that having gone back as far as records were available for past several years we could state none of our aircraft based in Japan has engaged in illegal overflights from bases in Japan, and we reviewed record previous Soviet warnings as presented REFTEL. We informed Yamada our willingness give assurances there would be no such overflights in future from Japanese territory without prior consultation. As Yamada did not press for additional details re Soviet protests we did not mention info that Soviet allegations in four cases involved US aircraft based in Japan.

Yamada has just informed us Kishi and Fujiyama are most grateful for our assurances and consider their position in forthcoming Upper House discussions on security treaty has been materially strengthened. GOJ most appreciative offer re prior consultation for any future intelligence overflights, but for reasons set out in EMBTEL 3603 does not wish at this time formal and official agreement, whether classified or public, expanding scope of prior consultation commitment to cover overflights from Japanese bases.

In view use of U-2 affairs Soviets are continuing make in their propoganda on foreign bases and attempts by Kishi's opponents to link new treaty with intelligence overflights, Kishi and Fujiyama believe it is indispensable for them to be able to state, without any qualification, that none of our aircraft based in Japan has carried out, or will in future engage in, illegal overflights from bases in Japan. Verbal assurances we have given them, they now believe, fully meet their present Diet and public opinion problem. If asked specifically in Diet whether GOJ would authorize any overflights from bases in Japan, GOJ will of course reply in negative.

Yamada said FonOff has been attempting draw heat from U-2 charges and quiet public agitation on issue as much as possible (EMBTELS 3953 and 3954). For this reason FonOff

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now does not plan make immediate reply to Soviet note on U-2 of May 20 (EMBTEL 3784) but will wait for week or so and make one reply to this note and to earlier April 22 Soviet note protesting security treaty (EMBTEL 3452). Yamada said difficult to predict how soon U-2 issue will die down here as both Soviet propaganda broadcasts and those Japanese leftists under Communist control are determined to make situation as difficult as possible at this time. For all these reasons assurances we have now given GOJ are of vital importance to Kishi and Fujiyama, and Yamada reiterated their appreciation.

Yamada recalled that summary of previous Soviet protests we had communicated per REFTEL had excluded Korean war questions and aircraft under UN command in Korean conflict. He asked whether there were now in Japan any aircraft under UN command which were not covered by assurances we had given. We replied our understanding was there were no such UN aircraft based in Japan; that exclusion of "aircraft under UN command" from scope of our assurances was limited to Korean conflict prior to Korean armistice; and that all US operated aircraft flying from bases in Japan were covered by our present assurances. Would appreciate specific confirmation that our understanding is correct, since any other understanding of our assurances would raise grave problems involving continued use of our air bases here. -- Tokyo Telegram to Department 3986.

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Annex No. VI.

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Document No. 32Colonel Makino Informs MacArthur of Forgery; July 21

This afternoon Colonel Makino (Chief of Intelligence Japanese Air Self Defense Force Staff) called on Colonel Robert G. Emmens (Air Attache) with Yomiuri Assistant Editor and produced photostat of memorandum on Foreign Service stationery from Colonel Emmens to Ambassador marked Top Secret and dated May 7, 1960. Memo stated that U-2s based in Japan had been used to overfly Laos, Cambodia, Viet Nam, Communist China, Soviet Union, and North Korea and recommended that we trick the Japanese by temporarily removing planes from Japan to Okinawa and return them secretly after hullabaloo over U-2s and anti-Kishi demonstrations died down.

Memorandum is extremely clever forgery as we informed Colonel Makino.

Ambassador had copies made of photostat and called personally on Vice ForMin Yamada requesting that Japanese police authorities undertake immediate investigation with view to trying to apprehend perpetrator of forgery. Yamada assured him that competent authorities would be asked to begin investigation immediately.

Ambassador also discussed public handling of forged document. Since it seemed apparent that story might break during the night and since subsequent denials never catch up with initial story, Yamada, who was having press conference at 6:30 p.m. this evening Japan time, said he would announce to press conference that Ambassador had called to acquaint him about forged document and had requested him to have Japanese authorities undertake immediate investigation with view to bringing guilty party to justice. Yamada will also say that persons who are circulating forged document are obviously trying to create further difficulties in Japanese-American relations in wake of difficulties already created by extremists which led to cancellation of President's visit.

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Embassy Press Attache is also making statement along similar lines to American and other correspondents. Line he will take is included in second following telegram.

Immediately preceding telegram was drafted before above information came into our possession. It strongly recommended that we give new Ikeda Govt assurances that US bases in Japan have been and will continue to be utilized for only legitimate and normal purposes and not for any intelligence overflight missions. Forged memorandum mentioned in this telegram lends added importance to recommendation in preceding message since it is clear pro-Communists intend to do utmost to keep overflight issue alive. -- Tokyo Telegram to Department 228.

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Annex No. VI.

Document No. 33Text of Forged US Document

(Forged Memo was on blue seal Foreign Service Stationery, marked Top Secret, headed from Office of the US Air Attache, Tokyo, Japan, Memorandum To: Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, From: Colonel Robert G. Emmens, dated 7 May 1960.)

In connection with the report which I made to you personally, I am pleased to comply with your request for a written summary of the information we have obtained from Japanese military quarters with respect to the possible reactions of the Kishi Govt. to Khrushchev's statement on the Lockheed U-2 incident.

According to our sources the Govt. of Japan is greatly concerned about Khrushchev's statement that the USSR is prepared to knock out military bases from which our U-2s operate. The reason, as you know, is that our U-2s based at Atsugi and Tachikawa in addition to making flights over Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, have operated over important military and industrial zones in Communist China, the Soviet Far East and Northern Korea as well. As a result, Japanese officials are of the opinion that the threat of Soviet retaliation represents a real danger to Japan.

Moreover the Japanese Government is under severe popular pressure since information concerning our U-2 operations has become widely known. Chief of the National Safety Agency Akagi has directed our attention to the fact that as early as December 1 of last year Socialist Deputy Ichiro Akukata, in a statement at a meeting of the Lower Chamber, mentioned the U-2 aerial photograph of coastal zones in China and Siberia. Then again on April 14 and 15 of this year, this question was touched upon in the discussion of the sources used in drawing up air planning charts for the Japanese National Safety Agency. Mr. Akagi has been informed that the Japanese opposition is about to launch a more vigorous and broader campaign against us and the Kishi regime.

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In view of the predicament in which the Japanese Government now finds itself -- and which has been further complicated by the mass demonstrations against the security treaty -- it is prepared to make official demands in the nearest future, perhaps by the 10th of this month, that the US Government withdraw all reconnaissance planes from its territory. If such a demand is made, it will seriously undermine our prestige and would also set off a chain reaction in other allied countries.

I consider it my duty to stress that the danger of such a demand being presented is real since Kishi, it is reported, very much fears that he may share the fate of Mr. Syngman Rhee. For this reason, I believe we should distract Japanese public opinion from the issue by stating that we have stopped our U-2 flights from Japanese territories and that such planes are no longer located at the Atsugi and Tactikawa bases. At the same time, we should temporarily transfer all U-2 planes from the main islands to Okinawa where we can conceal our operations much better. When the anti-Kishi demonstrations die down, we could return our planes to Japan proper in line with our geographic and strategic interests.

To prevent discovery of this maneuver by the Japanese public, AF headquarters is prepared not to use natives at the NW U-2 location sites and to strengthen security measures. Our military authorities will also tighten censorship over communications between Okinawa and the main islands.

At this point, I should like to comment briefly concerning the situation on Okinawa itself.

According to information received from the island, disaffection among the natives, including land owners, is mounting in view of our continued requisition of the property and the low rental fees which they receive. This disaffection may easily develop into big mass demonstrations against our bases, and stir up similar agitation throughout Japan. In order to avert further trouble it seems to me that we should double or treble our rental payments. This way the Japanese would have much less objection to our requisition of their property.

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At the same time we should strengthen our propaganda on Okinawa by pointing out that the expansion of our military bases will stimulate the building of new railroads, ports, medical centers, the development of agricultural and marketing facilities and the increase of employment for the natives -- in other words, we could show that the Japanese have more to gain than the Americans.

The substance of this memorandum has been communicated to the US Air Force headquarters.

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Annex No. VI.

Document No. 34Embassy Tokyo Statement on Forgery, July 21

A friendly news source this afternoon deliberated to the Embassy a photostatic copy of a forged document on stolen Embassy stationery that purported to be a memorandum from Colonel Robert G. Emmens, the Embassy Air Attache, to Ambassador Douglas MacArthur, II. The memorandum, labeled "top secret", was dated May 7 and alleged that U-2 airplanes based in Japan had made intelligence overflights of Laos, Cambodia, Viet Nam, Thailand, Communist China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea. This forged document also recommended that the U-2 aircraft be temporarily removed from Japan and later secretly reintroduced into Japan so that overflights could continue. The forgery was circulated under cover of a memorandum signed by "the Japanese patriotic group," which obviously is designed to stir up anti-American sentiment in Japan.

In connection with this fraudulent document it will be recalled that well over two months ago the United States Government affirmed that U-2 planes which had been based in Japan had never engaged in any intelligence overflights and would never be used for any such purposes. It was announced on July 11 that the two U-2 planes that had been stationed in Japan had been dismantled, crated, and shipped back to the United States, and will not be returned to Japan. The Embassy immediately transmitted to the Japanese Foreign Office a copy of the false document and requested the Foreign Office to have the appropriate Japanese authorities undertake an immediate investigation so the perpetrators of this fraudulent and illegal act could be apprehended and brought to justice. From the paper used, (which was not Air Attache's but purloined Foreign Service stationery), the language and composition of the forged text, it is evident that the drafter was unfamiliar with Embassy procedures and practices. The Foreign Office assured the Embassy that an investigation would be undertaken immediately. It is obvious that the persons who were responsible for stealing Embassy stationery and perpetrating the forgery are trying to create new difficulties in Japanese-American relations in the wake of the difficulties already created by certain extremist groups receiving encouragement from abroad which led to the cancellation of the President's visit to Japan.

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RD, State-Wash., D.C.

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Annex VII

Document No. 35

State Department Statement to Italian Ambassador  
May 20

Italian Ambassador called on Department (White) May 20 and indicated GOI had info from "plausible source" that U-2 pilot, Powers, had instructions to use airfields at Aviano and Brindisi in emergency. GOI desired know whether any truth to this information.

After careful checking White informed Italian Embassy (Perrone) May 21 that U-2 pilot had no repeat no instructions, written or oral, stating that in case emergency he could utilize any Italian airport. Referring to press reports that PCI deputy Pajetta had exhibited during Chamber Foreign Affairs Committee meeting photocopy of document allegedly found in U-2 listing radio beacons at Aviano and Brindisi, White said we would be interested in any information indicating alleged document is other than or excerpt from unclassified flight information publication entitled "Flight Information Publication Terminal (High Altitude)" which is customarily available in all airbase operations and carried in all aircraft.

Perrone expressed appreciation this information and said his government did not attach much importance to move by communists.  
--Department telegram to Rome, 3537.

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ADDENDUMExcerpts from Transcripts of Department of State  
Press and Radio News Briefings

The excerpts in this addendum contain statements and questions and answers concerning the U-2 incident which have bearing on our relations with other countries, and which are not available in Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, May 27, 1960, "Events Incident to the Summit". Pertinent material from the transcripts of the Departmental news briefings published in the Hearings is as follows:

- May 5 - Initial Departmental Statement (pp. 178-179)  
 May 7 - Departmental Statement (p.187)  
 May 9 - Statement by the Secretary of State (p. 193)

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## DEPARTMENTAL PRESS BRIEFING

MAY 10, 1960

.... I have one brief statement to make: The United States Government has given the Government of Japan assurances that U-2 aircraft flying from air bases in Japan have been and will continue to be utilized only for legitimate and normal purposes and not for intelligence overflight missions.

Now, let me quickly point out that by "legitimate and normal purposes" is meant the NASA Weather Observation Project.

Q. How was this assurance given, Link?

A. Through our Embassy to the Government.

Q. Had they requested or made inquiries, or what?

A. I suppose inquiries were made.

Q. Your use of the word "legitimate" implies that intelligence overflight missions are illegitimate, does it not?

A. We have made statements on this. What I point out to you is the purposes of these planes are weather observations.

Q. Is there a procedure which limits them from the Soviet and Chinese Communist borders by any set distance?

A. I do not know.

Q. I think the Commander in Tokyo informed the Japanese Government that there was a 20-mile limit.

A. I am just not familiar with those details.

Q. Does this mean the Soviet and Chinese Communist airspace will not be violated?

A. This is strictly for weather observation, Spence (Davis).

Q. Does this apply to our planes in Japan only or to other places too?

A. I am directing myself to Japan.

Q. Do we have any information about Soviets conducting bi-weekly flights off the Japanese coast for photographing purposes?

A.

May 10, 1960 (Cont.)

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A. I am just not prepared to go into that at this moment.

Q. Link, can you give us the normal course of these planes on weather observation patrol from our bases in Japan?

A. No, I don't have those details.

Q. The assurances refers only to a special type of plane.

A. That is right.

Q. Are these similar flights, Link, that were involved in those planes that were shot down off or rather close to the Soviet border?

A. No, no; these are U-2's.

Q. Link, the point that John (Scali) made are bound to be raised by many people, because your statements put out previously have gone out of their way to make the point that the flights that were made were legitimate. This does seem to imply that we have changed our point of view. Can you say this changes our previous statements?

A. No, it changes in no way, shape or form anything previously stated. It is simply to indicate that these planes will be used for strictly weather observation purposes, period.

Q. Link, perhaps you would like to substitute another word for "legitimate", perhaps get rid of it?

A. You can make it "normal", normal weather observation flights.

Q. The point is weather observation only. You said in explanation that it was, but why doesn't the statement say that? You said in explanation of the statement that it was normal weather observation.

\* A. That is right.

Q. Why don't we change it this way, Link?

Q. Now wait a minute. Are we changing it or is Link changing it?

A. I am perfectly happy to stand on it. If you people wish to change ---

....Q.

May 10, 1960 (Cont.)

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....Q. Do you mean that these planes do not conduct weather observation over Soviet or Chinese Communist territories?

A. That is my understanding, certainly.

Q. Mr. White, does that answer mean that for observation research purposes these planes never approach the Soviet and Chinese Communist territories?

A. I don't have the precise details as to how far away they stay, but I emphasize that they are for weather observation purposes.

Q. These assurances only apply to the U-2 and not any other aircraft.

A. Well, that is what they are out there for.

Q. My question is does this statement apply only to the U-2 and not other aircraft.

A. Mike (O'Neill), this refers to the U-2's. Now, I refer you back to what has previously been said, that we are not closing our eyes to surprise attack from any direction.

Q. This, then, would not apply to any U-2's operating from air bases in Okinawa or Taiwan.

A. We will keep our eyes open, Bill (Downs), you can be sure of that.

Q. Did we volunteer these assurances to the Japanese or did they raise them?

A. I assume this results from an inquiry by the Government.

Q. Link, can you say we have given similar assurances to any other country, or if there have been similar inquiries from any other country?

A. To my knowledge there have not been any from any other country.

Q. Link, on another point, Premier Khrushchev had some things to say last night about American Allies which might allow their bases to be used for intelligence overflights, and he specifically said that "if they allow others to fly from their bases to our territory, we shall hit at those bases." Do you have any comment on that?

A.

May 10, 1960 (Cont.)

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A. It is typical that the Soviet Government singles out as the objective of its threats those smaller countries of the free world who bear no -- N-O, no -- responsibility for the recent incident.

Q. You are saying that such countries as Pakistan and Turkey bear no responsibility for the launching of aircraft which may fly into the Soviet Union?

A. That is correct, for the recent incident.

Q. Link, are you finished with the statement?

A. Yes.

Q. What would we do if they undertook any such effort to hit at those bases?

A. About the only thing I can add here is that the United States has undertaken certain commitments in the multilateral and bilateral arrangements for the common defense existing between this Government -- that means the United States -- and those -- that means the other governments -- which once again appear to be subjected to a policy of intimidation by the Soviet Government. There should be no doubt -- N-O, no; D-O-U-B-T, doubt -- that the United States will honor these commitments!

Q. Link, in the light of that statement, can you tell us whether or not at this stage we do or do not accept the Soviet claim that this flight did go from Turkey to Pakistan with a target to end up in Norway?

A. I can add nothing to the statements that have already been issued.

Q. Link, Soviet Premier Khrushchev was also quoted as saying last night that if we send further planes over Russia, the Soviets are going to shoot them down. Do you have any comment at all on that?

A. I haven't fainted yet.

Q. Link, just for clarification, your statement mentioned commitments without specifying. These are commitments to come to the defense of any nations which are attacked?

A.

May 10, 1960 (Cont.)

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A. Those countries with which we have security arrangements.

Q. Can you say anything, Link, about the call yesterday of the Norwegian Ambassador? Can you say anything more about the call?

A. No; I think he explained this thing.

Q. Link, the Norwegian Ambassador was quoted as saying yesterday that he gathered that Secretary Herter did not know where this flight was going. Is that correct?

A. I can't specifically answer that. If the Ambassador said that, I am sure that he was being perfectly honest with you.

....Q. In your statement on Japan, was that assurance given as part of the consultation which we have agreed upon?

A. I don't know the circumstances of it, Spence (Davis). I assume they asked us about it and this is what we gave them.

....Q. Link, back on the statement you made originally about the U-2 flight to Japan, this implies that there has not been any order to ground these U-2 weather reconnaissance planes.

A. I don't know the specifics of that. The purpose of this statement is to assure the Japanese that these planes are being used for weather observation purposes.

Q. Thank you, sir.

A. You are very welcome.

## DEPARTMENTAL PRESS BRIEFING

MAY 11, 1960

....Q. Link, while we are in this same general area, a Toronto newspaper yesterday said that U-2 flights have taken off from Canada's bases for surveillance of Russia. Do you have anything to say on this?

MR. WHITE: Yes, I am in a position to categorically deny this report.

Q. Who made this report?

Q. A Toronto newspaper, the Globe and Mail.

Q. What was that report about?

Q. That an American U-2 took off from Canadian bases.

Q. Are there any weather reconnaissance flights by U-2's from Canada?

A. The spokesman for the Canadian Defense Ministry has said: "A U-2 aircraft made a forced landing north of Prince Albert on March 15, 1960. This aircraft was on a routine flight, the purpose of which was upper atmosphere meteorological and radiological sampling. The plane was returning from a point over Liverpool Bay, near the mouth of the Mackenzie River. It has not proceeded beyond North American airspace. The flight in question was one of a series of scientific flights flown to obtain precise information about clean air turbulence, upper air cloud formations, jet stream and radiation in the upper atmosphere. The aircraft were unarmed and all flights were cleared in the normal manner."

Q. Link, does this mean there have been series of U-2 flights from Canadian bases?

A. No. The Canadian Defense Minister, Mr. Pearkes, has also made a statement. He said: "No U-2 mission has ever flown from a Canadian base. The only U-2 landing ever made in Canada was on March 15."

Q. These flights have taken off from American bases, is that it?

A. That is right.

Q. This long statement you gave was all from the spokesman of the Canadian Defense Ministry?

A. That is right.

Q.

May 11, 1960 (Cont.)

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Q. You are endorsing this full statement?

A. I am certainly raising no questions about it.

Q. Link, these flights took off from American bases?

A. I would assume so.

Q. They went up into Canadian airspace with Canadian permission, and then flew back to the United States, is that it?

A. Well, one of them landed in Canada. The only one that ever landed up there was this one on March 15.

Q. It doesn't say why it was forced to land?

A. I don't know.

Q. Could we find out about that? This might give us a clue as to why --

MR. REAP: I think the press story on that said it landed on an icy lake and made minor repairs and then took off again.

Q. Could anybody give us a clue as to what went wrong? This might give us a clue as to what went wrong over Russia.

MR. WHITE: I don't have any information on that other than what has been said by the Canadians.

Q. They haven't said anything about this plane as to the cause.

A. No.

## DEPARTMENTAL PRESS BRIEFING

MAY 12, 1960

....Q. Do you have any further clarification of the function and mission of the U-2's in Japan in view of these Communist charges and Japanese Socialist charges that they were so engaged in espionage? The question that comes to mind is why was Japan singled out as a base from which they were not flying these flights?

A. There is no truth to reports that a U-2 aircraft conducted intelligence missions from Japan, period.

....Q. Link, the Pakistan Ambassador called today, I think, in reference to this business of whether Pakistan territory was used. Do you know what was told to him?

A. I don't have anything to add to what he said to you fellows when he came out.

Q. He said it had not yet been determined whether this plane actually had taken off from Pakistan territory as Khrushchev claimed. May we assume from that that the State Department doesn't yet know where this flight originated?

A. I think he said they were investigating.

Q. Who was investigating?

A. The Pakistanis.

Q. Well, isn't the United States Government also investigating?

A. I say I have nothing to add to what the Ambassador said.

## DEPARTMENTAL PRESS BRIEFING

MAY 18, 1960

....Q. Anything new on the Pakistan protest that was reported yesterday?

A. Well, let me clarify the situation if I can. I think I recalled to you yesterday the Pakistan Ambassador's call on the Secretary of May 12, following which the Ambassador said to the press that he had lodged no protest. It now appears that the President of Pakistan was referring to an aide memoire handed to the Department on May 14, transmitting the statement released to the press by the Pakistan Government on that day. We are in contact with the Government of Pakistan on this matter and this communication is under study.

Q. Well, this communication is not a protest?

A. The statement by the Government on that day said that "Our inquiries show that no aircraft has taken off from Peshawar airfield in the direction of Soviet Russia. In case any American plane taking off from Peshawar has been diverted to Soviet Russia in the course of its flight, and Soviet allegation that American aircraft which has been brought down in Soviet Russia took off from Peshawar is correct, we have cause for bitter complaint. The American authorities must realize the delicacy of our situation and ensure that all concerned refrain from such activities in the future."

Q. Does the American Government realize the delicacy of their situation?

Q. Is the United States planning a reply to this?

A. The matter is under study in the Department.

Q. This says "we are in contact with the Government of Pakistan on this matter." Is that here, or in Pakistan, or both?

A. I would assume both. I don't know specifically, but I would assume both places.

Q. The matter is under study; we didn't answer the aide memoire as yet?

A. Not to my knowledge.

## DEPARTMENTAL PRESS BRIEFING

May 19, 1960

....Q. What is the status of the protest, Link, back and forth -- who owes whom a letter?

A. First off, let me say that the United States has delivered a reply to the Norwegian Government's oral protest and has given assurances in response to the request of the Norwegian Government.

Q. What are the assurances?

A. I have to confine myself to that. We have received a protest from the Afghan Government, and it is under study at the present time. We have not received the text, although we know that the Czechs have given us an oral statement referring to Secretary Herter's statement of May 9.

That is the situation as it now stands.

Q. How about the Pakistan protest that allegedly has been sent?

A. Just nothing new on that.

Q. I don't think we ever acknowledged receiving it.

A. Yes, yesterday I pointed out what that situation was.

Q. Link, this is asked out of ignorance. Have we received one from the Turks as well?

A. No.

Q. What did the Afghan's protest protest? What was the protest?

A. I don't have the text of it here. I understand they released it.

Q. Ambassador Willis in Oslo is reported to have said the assurances we gave the Norwegians were that the flights had been discontinued. Why can't you say that?

A. I wasn't aware she had said that, John (Scali). If she has, her word is good enough for me.

Q. Are you going to publish the text of that reply?

A. No, sir.

Q.

Q. The communication that Ambassador Willis had with the Norwegian Government is the one you are referring to here, or is there a separate note that went directly to the Norwegians?

A. As I pointed out, this was a reply to the Norwegian Government's oral protest. Maybe you didn't catch that.

Q. When you say the United States has delivered a reply, you are talking about what Ambassador Willis delivered.

A. That is correct.

Q. Link, was our reply oral too?

A. That is correct.

Q. Was there an aide memoire with the oral reply?

A. I just don't have that information; I don't know.

DEPARTMENTAL PRESS BRIEFING

May 26, 1960

....Q. Link, about ten days ago we got a note from the Czechs. You remember that, I think. The last time you said it was still under study.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you have something to say on that?

A. Actually it was an aide-memoire. But let me say, in answer to your question, that in view of the false accusations and abusive and intemperate language of this aide-memoire, it -- that is, the aide-memoire -- is not considered worthy of reply.

## DEPARTMENTAL PRESS BRIEFING

June 1, 1960

....Q. Link, is anybody going to say anything about Mr. Malinovsky's kind words?

A. I have no comment on it, other than to recall to you what I had said a week or ten days earlier (May 10).

Q. Which was --

A. When the first threat was made -- I don't happen to have it with me, but the essence of it was that this is typical of Soviet tactics in an attempt to intimidate governments which are absolutely blameless in this situation; and that we had agreements with countries for our mutual protection, and let there be no mistake that those commitments would be lived up to. That was the essence of it.

Q. Link, is there any feeling around here that Malinovsky's threats in the speech the other day created a new element of danger or uncertainty in the East-West relationship?

A. Well, John (Hightower), all we have had here for months out of the Soviet Union and all I expect we will hear for months in the future is a relaxation of tensions; and I would hardly put the General's speech into any category of relaxing tensions.

Q. Do you expect to go on hearing about relaxation of tensions from Moscow?

A. I hope in a different tune.

....Q. Link, I think the Soviets have complained to West Germany, alleging that there have been some West German bases used for overflights into Communist-controlled territory.

A. My recollection is that the Germans replied to that yesterday. I have nothing to add.

DEPARTMENTAL PRESS BRIEFING

July 7, 1960

.....Q. Do you have any comment on his Khrushchev's statement that the U.S. bases in Italy violate Austrian neutrality?

A. This is another in a series of recent heavy-handed Soviet statements obviously made in an attempt to intimidate our friends. Period.