

~~TOP SECRET~~

DDS&T Historical Paper

No. OSA-1
Vol. IX of XVI

DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)
History of the Office of Special Activities
 Chapter XIV continued

(PERIOD)
From Inception to 1969

DO NOT DESTROY

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
 INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
 E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2002-0049, document no. 9
 DECLASSIFICATION DATE: May 24, 2016

Controlled by : DDS&T

Date prepared : 1 April 1969

Written by : Helen Kleyla

: Robert O'Hern

~~TOP SECRET~~

C05492917

ANNEX 89

TEXT OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ADDRESS ON
COLLAPSE AT THE SUMMIT

MAY 25, 1960

Fellow Americans:

Tonight I want to talk with you about the remarkable events last week in Paris, and their meaning to our future.

First, I am deeply grateful to the many thousands of you, and to Representatives in Congress, who sent me messages of encouragement and support while I was in Paris, and later upon my return to Washington. Your messages clearly revealed your abiding loyalty to America's great purpose--that of pursuing, from a position of spiritual, moral and material strength, a lasting peace with justice.

You recall, of course, why I went to Paris ten days ago.

Last summer and fall I had many conversations with world leaders; some of these were with Chairman Khrushchev, here in America. Over those months a small improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and the West seemed discernible. A possibility developed that the Soviet leaders might at last be ready for serious talks about our most persistent problems--those of disarmament, mutual inspection, atomic control and Germany, including Berlin.

To explore that possibility, our own and the British and French leaders met together, and later we agreed, with the Soviet leaders, to gather in Paris on May 16.

Of course, we had no indication or thought that basic Soviet policies had turned about. But when there is even the slightest chance of strengthening peace there can be no higher obligation than to pursue it.

Nor had our own policies changed. We did hope to make some progress in a summit meeting, unpromising though previous experience had been. But as we made preparations for this meeting, we did not drop our guard or relax our vigilance.

Our safety, and that of the world, demand, of course, effective systems for gathering information about the military capability of other powerful nations, especially those that make a fetish of secrecy. This involves many techniques and methods. In these times of vast military machines and nuclear-tipped missiles, the ferreting out of this information is indispensable to free world security.

This has long been one of my most serious preoccupations. It is part of my grave responsibility, in the over-all problem of protecting the American people, to guard ourselves and our allies against surprise attack.

During the period leading up to World War II we learned from bitter experience the imperative necessity of a continuous gathering of intelligence information, the maintenance of military communications and contact, and alertness of command.

An additional word seems appropriate about this matter of communications and command. While the Secretary of Defense and I were in Paris, we were, of course, away from our normal command posts. He recommended that under these circumstances we test the continuing readiness of our military communications. I personally approved. Such tests are valuable and will be frequently repeated in the future.

Moreover, as President charged by the Constitution with the conduct of America's foreign relations, and as commander-in-chief, charged with the direction of the operations and activities of our armed forces and their supporting services, I take full responsibility for approving all the various programs undertaken by our Government to secure and evaluate military intelligence.

It was in the prosecution of one of these intelligence programs that the widely publicized U-2 incident occurred.

Aerial photography has been one of many methods we have used to keep ourselves and the free world abreast of major Soviet military developments. The usefulness of this work had been well established through four years of effort. The Soviets were well aware of it.

Chairman Khrushchev has stated that he became aware of these flights several years ago. Only last week, in his Paris press conference, Chairman Khrushchev confirmed that he knew of these flights when he visited the United States last September.

Incidentally, this raises the natural question--why all the furor concerning one particular flight? He did not, when in America last September, charge that these flights were any threat to Soviet safety. He did not then see any reason to refuse to confer with American representatives.

This he did only about the flight that unfortunately failed, on May 1, far inside Russia.

Now, two questions have been raised about this particular flight: first, as to its timing, considering the imminence of the summit meeting; second, our initial statements when we learned the flight had failed.

As to the timing, the question was really whether to halt the program and thus forego the gathering of important information that was essential and that was likely to be unavailable at a later date. The program went forward.

The plain truth is this: when a nation needs intelligence activity, there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed. Incidentally, from Pearl Harbor we learned that even negotiation itself can be used to conceal preparations for a surprise attack.

Next, as to our Government's initial statement about this flight, this was issued to protect the pilot, his mission and our intelligence processes, at a time when the true facts were still undetermined.

Our first information about the failure of this mission did not disclose whether the pilot was still alive, was trying to escape, was avoiding interrogation, or whether both plane and pilot had been destroyed. Protection of our intelligence system and the pilot, and concealment of the plane's mission, still seemed imperative.

It must be remembered that over a long period these flights had given us information of the greatest importance to the nation's security. Their success has been nothing short of remarkable.

For these reasons, what is known in intelligence circles as a "covering statement" was issued. It was issued on assumptions that were later proved incorrect. Consequently, when later the status of the pilot was definitely established, and there was no further possibility of avoiding exposure of the project, the factual details were set forth.

I then made two facts clear to the public: first, our program of aerial reconnaissance had been undertaken with my approval; second, this Government is compelled to keep abreast, by one means or another, of military activities of the Soviets, just as their Government has for years engaged in espionage activities in our country and throughout the world.

Our necessity to proceed with such activities was also asserted by our Secretary of State, who, however, had been careful--as was I--not to say that these particular flights would be continued.

In fact, before leaving Washington, I had directed that these U-2 flights be stopped. Clearly their usefulness was impaired. Moreover, continuing this particular activity in these new circumstances could not but complicate the relations of certain of our allies with the Soviets. Furthermore, new techniques, other than aircraft, are constantly being developed.

I wanted no public announcement of this decision until I could personally disclose it at the summit meeting in conjunction with certain proposals I had prepared for the conference.

At my first Paris meeting with Mr. Khrushchev, and before his tirade was made public, I informed him of this discontinuance and the character of the constructive proposals I planned to make. These contemplated the establishment of a system of aerial surveillance operated by the United Nations.

The day before the first scheduled meeting, Mr. Khrushchev advised President De Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan that he would make certain demands upon the United States as a precondition for beginning a summit conference.

Although the United States was the only power against which he expressed his displeasure, he did not communicate this information to me. I was, of course, informed by our allies.

At the four-power meeting on Monday morning he demanded of the United States four things: first, condemnation of U-2 flights as a method of espionage; second, assurance that they would not be continued; third, a public apology on behalf of the United States; and, fourth, punishment of all those who had any responsibility respecting this particular mission.

I replied by advising the Soviet leader that I had during the previous week, stopped these flights and that they would not be resumed. I offered also to discuss the matter with him in personal meetings, while the regular business of the summit might proceed. Obviously, I would not respond to his extreme demands. He knew, of course, by holding to those demands the Soviet Union was scuttling the summit conference.

In torpedoing the conference, Mr. Khrushchev claimed that he acted as the result of his own high moral indignation over alleged American acts of aggression. As I said earlier, he had known of these flights for a long time. It is apparent that the Soviets had decided even before the Soviet delegation left Moscow that my trip to the Soviet Union should be canceled

and that nothing constructive from their viewpoint would come out of the summit conference.

In evaluating the results, I think we must not write the record all in red ink. There are several things to be written in black. Perhaps this Soviet action has turned the clock back in some measure, but it should be noted that Mr. Khrushchev did not go beyond invective--a time-worn Soviet device to achieve an immediate objective.

On our side, at Paris, we demonstrated once again America's willingness, and that of her allies, always to go the extra mile in behalf of peace. Once again, Soviet intransigence reminded us all of the unpredictability of despotic rule, and the need for those who work for freedom to stand together in determination and strength.

The conduct of our allies was magnificent. My colleagues and friends--President De Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan--stood sturdily with the American delegation in spite of persistent Soviet attempts to split the Western group. The NATO meeting after the Paris conference showed unprecedented unity and support for the alliance and for the position taken at the summit meeting. I salute our allies for us all.

And now, and most importantly, what about the future?

All of us know that, whether started deliberately or accidentally, global war would leave civilization in a shambles. This is as true of the Soviet system as of all others. In a nuclear war there can be no victors--only losers. Even despots understand this. Mr. Khrushchev stated last week that he well realizes that general nuclear war would bring catastrophe for both sides.

Recognition of this mutual destructive capability is the basic reality of our present relations. Most assuredly, however, this does not mean that we shall ever give up trying to build a more sane and hopeful reality--a better foundation for our common relations.

To do this, here are the policies we must follow, and to these I am confident the great majority of our people, regardless of party, give their support:

1. We must keep up our strength, and hold it steady for the long pull--a strength not neglected in complacency nor overbuilt in hysteria. So doing, we can make it clear to everyone there can be no gain in the use of pressure tactics or aggression against us and our allies.

2. We must continue businesslike dealings with the Soviet leaders on outstanding issues, and improve the contacts between our own and the Soviet peoples, making clear that the path of reason and common sense is still open if the Soviets will but use it.

3. To improve world conditions in which human freedom can flourish, we must continue to move ahead with positive programs at home and abroad, in collaboration with free nations everywhere. In doing so, we shall continue to give our strong support to the United Nations and the great principles for which it stands.

As to the first of these purposes--our defenses are sound. They are tailored to the situation confronting us.

Their adequacy has been one of my primary concerns for these past seven years--indeed throughout my adult life.

In no respect have the composition and size of our forces been based on or affected by Soviet blandishment. Nor will they be. We will continue to carry forward the great improvements already planned in these forces. They will be kept ready and under constant review.

Any changes made necessary by technological advances or world events will be recommended at once.

This strength--by far the most potent on earth--is, I emphasize for deterrent, defensive and retaliatory purposes only, without threat or aggressive intent toward anyone.

Concerning the second part of our policy--relations with the Soviets--we and all the world realize, despite our recent disappointment, that progress toward the goal of mutual understanding, easing the causes of tensions and reduction of armaments is as necessary as ever.

We shall continue these peaceful efforts, including participation in the existing negotiations with the Soviet Union. In these negotiations we have made some progress. We are prepared to preserve and build on it. The Allied Paris Communiqué and my own statement on returning to the United States should have made this abundantly clear to the Soviet Government.

We conduct these negotiations not on the basis of surface harmony nor are we deterred by bad deportment. Rather we approach them as a careful search for common interests between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union on specific problems.

I have in mind, particularly, the nuclear test and disarmament negotiations. We will not back away, on account of recent events, from the efforts or commitments that we have undertaken.

Nor shall we relax our search for new means of reducing the risk of war by miscalculation, and of achieving verifiable arms control.

A major American goal is a world of open societies.

Here in our country anyone can buy maps and aerial photographs showing our cities, our dams, our plants, our highways--indeed, our whole industrial and economic complex. Soviet Attachés regularly collect this information. Last fall Chairman Khrushchev's train passed no more than a few hundred feet from an operational ICBM, in plain view from his window.

Our thousands of books and scientific journals, our magazines, newspapers and official publications, our radio and television, all openly describe to all the world every aspect of our society.

This is as it should be. We are proud of our freedom.

Soviet distrust, however, does still remain. To allay these misgivings I offered five years ago to open our skies to Soviet reconnaissance aircraft on a reciprocal basis. The Soviets refused.

That offer is still open. At an appropriate time America will submit such a program to the United Nations, together with the recommendation that the United Nations itself conduct this reconnaissance. Should the United Nations accept this proposal, I am prepared to propose that America supply part of the aircraft and equipment needed.

I hope that the United Nations will act accordingly.

As far as we in America are concerned, our programs for increased contacts between all peoples will continue. Despite

the suddenly expressed hostility of the men in the Kremlin, I remain convinced that the basic longings of the Soviet people are much like our own. I believe that Soviet citizens have a sincere friendship for the people of America. I deeply believe that above all else they want a lasting peace and a chance for a more abundant life in place of more and more instruments of war.

Turning to the third part of America's policy--the strengthening of freedom--we must do far more than concern ourselves with military defense against, and our relations with, the Communist Bloc. Beyond this, we must advance constructive programs throughout the world for the betterment of peoples in the newly developing nations. The zigs and zags of the Kremlin cannot be allowed to disturb our world-wide programs and purposes. In the period ahead, these programs could well be the decisive factor in our persistent search for peace in freedom.

To the peoples in the newly developing nations urgently needed help will surely come. If it does not come from us and our friends, these peoples will be driven to seek it from the enemies of freedom. Moreover, those joined with us in defense partnerships look to us for proof of our steadfastness. We must not relax our common security efforts.

As to this, there is something specific all of us can do, and right now. It is imperative that crippling cuts not be made in the appropriations recommended for mutual security, whether economic or military. We must support this program with all of our wisdom and all of our strength.

We are proud to call this a nation of the people. With the people knowing the importance of this program, and making their voices heard in its behalf throughout the land, there can be no doubt of its continued success.

Fellow Americans, long ago I pledged to you that I would journey anywhere to promote the cause of peace. I remain pledged to pursue a peace of dignity, of friendship, of honor, of justice.

Operating from the firm base of our spiritual and physical strength, and seeking wisdom from the Almighty, we and our allies together will continue to work for the survival of mankind in freedom--and for the goal of mutual respect, mutual understanding, and openness among all nations.

Thank you, and good night.

C05492917

ANNEX 90

~~SECRET~~C
O
P
YDPD 5262-60
30 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: The Legal Defense of Francis Gary Powers

1. For the sake of posterity recorded herewith are some events which have come to pass during the preparation of the defense of Francis Gary Powers. At the point of this writing an AP press release announcing this defense makes the following historical; but for the sake of the record, the frustrations, tribulations and travail are herein set forth.

2. During the week of June 5 the undersigned met with Mr. Larry Houston, General Counsel, CIA, Mr. Eric Hager, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, and Mr. Richard Davis, Chief, European Division of the Department of State concerning the legal ramifications in the Francis Powers case and what action, if any, should be taken by the U. S. Government concerning his defense. It was quickly agreed that we had an obligation to make definite legal overtures to the Soviets concerning the defense of Francis Powers. The Department of State had received five or six offers from various law firms and lawyers who had indicated their willingness to defend Francis Powers. We briefly discussed possible candidates for the defense without arriving at any conclusion and had mentioned the names of Edward Bennett Williams and Joseph Welch. Eric Hager had indicated that Williams' name had been thrown in the hopper by his partner, Muldoon. In response to all inquiries and offers concerning the defense counsel, the Department had taken the line that the decision rests with Mrs. Barbara Powers. Mr. Davis announced that Mr. Oliver Powers and his attorney, Carl E. McAfee from Norton, Va., had an appointment to see Mr. Kendall, the Legal Assistant to the President on Monday, 13 June, but per agreement with the Department of State, Kendall was to turn McAfee over to Eric Hager. During the course of our meeting, Eric Hager indicated that he thought he could arrange for legal defense of Powers through the Virginia State Bar Association and was to meet William P. Dickson, President of the Virginia State Bar Association in Charlottesville over the weekend to inquire of this possibility.

~~SECRET~~Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~SECRET~~

3. On 10 June, Mr. Cunningham, Mr. Houston, Mr. John Warner and the undersigned met with the Director on this subject. When advised that Edward Bennett Williams had offered his services, the Director had suggested that it would not be a good idea in view of his connection with Senator McCarthy and Hoffa. The Director stated that he was about to go on a foreign trip and requested that he be advised when we had selected the lawyers.

4. On 13 June the original cast of characters engaged in another skull session at the Department of State. At this meeting the availability of experts in Soviet law was discussed and possible candidates to assist either counsel for the defense or the State observer at the trial. We ran through the names of Lipson, Berman and Hazard and others of apparent import.

5. Hager reported on his contact with Dickson at Charlottesville and stated that all had gone well; that Dickson had an immediate grasp of the situation and it was not necessary for him to go into specific details on the case. A plan of action had been laid; Dickson would nominate two lawyers who would be retained by Barbara Powers and as principle, i. e. the individual with power of attorney from Francis Powers, it would be proper for her lawyers to prepare the defense of Francis Powers. Hence, after the two lawyers were selected we would be informed of their names, run our check, then brief Barbara as to our plan of action and legal aspects of the case.

6. By this time our friends Oliver Powers and McAfee arrived in town and were scheduled for a meeting with Mr. Davis for a short discussion and application for passports and visas. I requested that Mr. Davis stress the fact that Barbara Powers had power of attorney and as such was, so to speak, the principle in the family affairs and that it was important that Oliver Powers not take any unilateral action on his own lest he undo our actions in a different direction.

7. Mr. Mike Miskovsky of OGC, who had done legal research concerning this case, began to take an active part. He attended the meeting with Hager, Davis, Oliver Powers, and McAfee. (His Agency connection was not announced.) During the Powers/McAfee meeting things seemed to go reasonably well. Oliver Powers indicated his desire to get together with Barbara Powers in this case and conceded the wisdom

~~SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~SECRET~~

of working together. Carl McAfee, whose dreams of grandeur had run unchecked due to the apparent vacuum of other legal activity in the case, had envisioned himself as the trial lawyer in Moscow. At our request, Mr. Davis had queried Powers and McAfee as to whether they had any desire to contact CIA officials. Powers asked "What was that?" and when informed agreed to a meeting Tuesday.

8. On Tuesday, 14 June, General Cabell with Mr. Miskovsky met Oliver Powers and McAfee in Eric Hager's office at the Department of State. The meeting was limited to general terms and the obvious facts were not grasped by either Powers or McAfee. At the conclusion Powers stated that he still wondered what Lockheed Aircraft Corp. was going to do for his boy, and as a side issue indicated boyishly that this was the closest he had ever been to a general. Mr. Davis had sensed that the role of CIA in this situation had gone completely over the heads of both McAfee and Powers. Davis queried General Cabell whether or not he should clarify this point. The General replied in the negative with the statement that we keep this ace up our sleeves. The undersigned did not attend any meetings with McAfee and Oliver Powers but these events were related by Miskovsky and Davis.

9. I had called Barbara Powers the night of 13 June and indicated that she would be receiving a call from Mr. Dickson concerning two lawyers to help her in this case. I suggested that it would be a good idea if she agreed with what he proposed.

10. On 15 June an impromptu meeting was held at 4:00 in the afternoon. Eric Hager had called the shindig and blithely announced that Barbara Powers was on her way to Roanoke, Virginia, to meet the two attorneys Dickson had designated. At that time I received the names of John C. Parker of Franklin, Virginia, and Frank W. Rogers of Roanoke. Hager announced that Dickson would also be there to meet Barbara Powers and they would lay plans for the defense. I cried foul and indicated that it was necessary that I check the lawyers out and also brief Barbara beforehand. I left the meeting and caught a plane to Roanoke, with Mike Miskovsky to hold up the legal end.

Dickson met us about four minutes before Barbara's plane arrived. We briefed him of the Agency's involvement in the case and told him that we did not want the Government's affiliation with the defense to be public knowledge. He had sensed this from his discussions

~~SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~SECRET~~

with Hager and fell quickly in line. Barbara arrived and we drove with Frank Rogers to a room which the lawyers had at the Hotel Roanoke. As usual luck was with us. We arrived at the Hotel Roanoke during the Miss Virginia Contest, and had our pick of reporters and photographers. We asked Barbara to freshen up in her room while we went to a sitting room and there Mike and I conducted a briefing of Dickson and Rogers and John Parker who was waiting in the room. Miskovsky opened the discussion by assuring the financial backing for the defense. We had been led to believe by Hager that Dickson's only concern was that funds would be available. Before Mike could finish talking money, Rogers interrupted him and stated that he thought he could speak for Parker and indicated that they were honored to be considered for this case and would not think of asking for any compensation.

We then briefly outlined the funding mechanism; that we would arrange for funds to be deposited to the Virginia State Bar Association, funds would be received from private sources and the lawyers would draw from this account for their expenses. Parker indicated that it would be quite agreeable to him if they carried the expenses to the end and then would present us with a list of expenses. I stated that this would be undesirable from our point because there would be considerable expenses involved and we did not feel that it was necessary to impose financial inconvenience on any individual. At this point Barbara entered the room and the lawyers engaged in general conversation to win her confidence and to learn something of their client. Amid scotch and soda the evening wore easily.

About 1:30 in the morning we adjourned and Dickson and I walked Barbara to her room. Dickson told Barbara that if she had any reservations about the lawyers to please let him know and they would withdraw from the case. Briefly Barbara told him she was satisfied. Requesting that I fix her T. V. Barbara dismissed Dickson, and closed the door. She asked that I have a nightcap with her which ended up plural and she seemed to let loose. She seemed honestly perplexed and puzzled over the ability of a couple of folksy Virginia lawyers to handle a big Soviet case. She had envisioned a one man band who would be a Soviet law expert, a city trial lawyer and a mouthpiece all rolled into one. I explained that these lawyers may not be the trial lawyers involved but their purpose was to protect her interests here in the U. S. and to prepare the defense for Frank Powers. They would explore the field of Soviet law experts and trial lawyers and decide on the team which could handle this

4

~~SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~SECRET~~

entangled case. When she realized these men were involved primarily in the preparation of the defense and would not suddenly travel to Russia without consultation, she seemed satisfied and in fact the happiest since she arrived in the U.S. As the result of the night caps, I was happy, too, and decided to retire.

11. On the morning of 16 June, Thursday, we had another client-lawyer session. Plans were laid for McAfee and Oliver Powers to come to Roanoke so that the case could be handled as a family effort. John Parker began telephoning Soviet law experts to arrange meetings with them. Before McAfee and Oliver Powers arrived that afternoon Mike and I decided to pull out and forego further Miss Virginia publicity.

12. As history would have it, Oliver Powers and McAfee arrived and had a reasonably cooperative meeting with Barbara and Frank Rogers. Both McAfee and Powers again indicated the wisdom of a family effort in this case. McAfee on the side to Rogers made reference to a cable which Oliver Powers sent from Kingsport, Tennessee. McAfee could not recall the wording of the cable but keenly remembered it was addressed to Nikita Khrushchev. On Friday morning Barbara disappeared from the hotel but it was assumed that she had returned to Pound, Va., with McAfee and her father-in-law. This assumption was later confirmed.

13. Via phone on the evening of 16 June, Rogers indicated that the meeting had gone fairly well and it was his feeling that McAfee and Powers were in line. In the interim John Parker had traveled with Mike Miskovsky to Cambridge to meet with Harold Berman, Professor of Law at Harvard University. This meeting took place on Friday, 17 June. On Saturday, 18 June he saw John N. Hazard, Professor of Law at Columbia University. On Sunday, 19 June, Frank Rogers joined him for a morning visit with Hazard. Again they agreed that Hazard would be available to advise the trial lawyers on the case. Berman had previously stated that he would be available if required but a rather full schedule of European travel would interfere with complete devotion to the case. He stated his willingness to detour to Moscow for preliminary investigation of the trial if we deemed it advisable.

14. On Monday, 20 June, Rogers and Parker saw Art Dean while the undersigned and Miskovsky met with Ambassador Thompson to

~~SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~SECRET~~

outline briefly our progress on the case to date. Ambassador Thompson throughout the meeting seemed plagued by the thought of defection as far as Powers was concerned. He made one reference to "defection" but thereafter referred to it as "possible defection" at the trial. He stated that it might be to our advantage to have Frank Powers ask for a Soviet counsel rather than an American which would imply that he was "gotten to" by the Soviets. He asked the question "What do we do if the Soviets give him back on our promise that we never do it again?" I accepted this question as rhetorical and treated it as such. He opined that the Soviets would probably hold the trial in August in order to make full propaganda play during the opening of the General Assembly in September. Someone of the group present queried Ambassador Thompson whether the Embassy was constantly asking the Soviets for permission to see Powers. He stated that every three or four days whenever they have discussions with the Soviets, they bring this point up.

Eric Hager made reference to the Counsellors agreement (the Litvinov Agreement) whereby we would have the right to demand of the Soviets that we (the Embassy) be permitted to see Frank Powers. Ambassador Thompson was quick to say no, that the Soviets would probably ignore our requests thereby weakening the agreement. Stunned by such logic, I remained silent. He did state that he asked Khrushchev personally if we could see Powers but was ignored. Ambassador Thompson queried if we had any information as to whether or not Powers was shot down at high altitude. When informed that we could not substantiate any altitude, he stated that if Powers had not been shot down at high altitude the Soviets would not likely let him free since he would disclaim their boast that they had reached him at his highest.

15. We arranged for Frank Rogers and John Parker to see Ambassador Thompson upon their arrival in D. C. late Monday afternoon. Although not extended an obvious invitation to attend we arranged for Mike to claim a seat in the conference. During this session Ambassador Thompson played the same song re defection.

16. On Tuesday, 21 June, Mike and I arranged for Agency briefings for Parker and Rogers at the Statler Hotel in Washington. OCI personnel gave an intelligence briefing on the current Soviet situation and Jack Maury and friends of SR added their inputs. On this glorious day

~~SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~SECRET~~

we received word that the cable which McAfee had referred to on 16 June was a thank-you to Nikita Khrushchev for granting Oliver Powers a visa and a request by Oliver Powers that his attorney, Mr. Carl McAfee, be permitted to join him. As a parenthetical comment, the Office of Security has been requested to obtain the contents of this cable by Miskovsky. There was strong sentiment at this time to cut McAfee completely out of the picture, disbar him, tar and feather him, and employ any other disposal methods known to mankind. We developed our plans further concerning the trial and decided that Frank Rogers, Alex Parker, a trial lawyer from Richmond, Virginia, and brother of John C. Parker, together with John Hazard would form the team to travel to the Soviet Union, if the Soviets permitted, to defend Frank Powers. The undertones throughout these past few days had been the desire to send a cable to Nikita Khrushchev stating the Virginia State Bar Association's interest in the matter and their desire to send counsel for Frank Powers.

Mr. Eugene Kiefer of DPD met the lawyers and answered their questions concerning the technical facilities of the aircraft, the destructor and landing characteristics etc. As a result of this discussion the lawyers were convinced that the aircraft came apart at an unknown altitude due to unknown reasons and that Frank Powers had climbed out of the aircraft and parachuted to the ground.

17. On Tuesday night Alex Parker arrived in D. C. and Mike and I read him into the case. He was quick to move in and readily established himself in the planning of the case. We reworked the cable to Khrushchev and received Barbara's support on it. She asked that she be allowed to tell her father-in-law. The lawyers were somewhat reluctant to cut McAfee out of this channel in view of his potential danger to the case. To circumvent this they placed a call to McAfee which got through to him about midnight and requested that he come to Washington. He was somewhat reluctant but when advised of the importance he agreed to come first thing in the morning after clearing it with Mr. Oliver Powers.

On Wednesday, meetings were held with Hazard, more briefings of the lawyers and more rewrites of the cable took place. We worked on a release which the Virginia State Bar Association would give out and the timing of the cable. It was planned that a courier

~~SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~SECRET~~

would bring the cable draft to Richmond to have it appear on the paper and typewriter of Alex Parker's office. His secretary alone would handle the paper. The draft would be shown to McAfee who arrived late the 22nd, first thing the morning of the 23rd. It would also be shown to Hazard. Changes, if any, would be called down to the secretary in Richmond who would incorporate them into the finished product and return the cable via our courier to John Parker at the Mayflower Hotel. The secretary would then file a Western Union telegram to Khrushchev from Richmond.

18. On the afternoon of 23 June Alex Parker, Frank Rogers, and Carl McAfee would appear for a visa at the Soviet Embassy giving the Soviets a copy of the government sterile cable. As planned these arrangements came to pass. When McAfee arrived on the 22nd he was reluctant at not being invited as a full-fledged member of the Virginia State Bar Association's team. The lawyers adequately handled this situation and McAfee was pleased to learn that he would travel with the lawyers and Powers to the trial, that his role in this defense would be to acquire homey background material concerning Frank Powers from the father and his home area. This information would be used as fill-in to portray Frank Powers as a quiet unsophisticated American country boy. He indicated that his pride was hurt in not being included in the press release as a member of the team but accepted the logic that he was young and inexperienced and it would not be fitting for the Virginia State Bar Association to endorse such a nomination. McAfee suggested that the cable be signed by Mr. and Mrs. Oliver Powers as well as Barbara Powers to imply a unified family front. This suggestion was heartily endorsed. McAfee was somewhat concerned over fees and the lawyers pointed out that his source would be from the father as he is the father's attorney; however, any expenses incurred in the Russia trip would be covered by contributions to the Virginia State Bar Association.

19. Although at this reading it appears that both McAfee and Powers Senior are in line, McAfee has been a true thorn in our side. It is hard not to discount the speculation that when he was advised by Hager that the Virginia State Bar Association was moving into the case that he put the father up to sending the cable to Khrushchev requesting that McAfee go to Russia. He conveniently forgot what this cable said and throughout he has not been an example of cooperation and honesty.

8

~~SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~SECRET~~

He has indicated that he would declare Barbara Powers incompetent to handle the principal role in this case due to her "mental condition" which he later conceded was her drinking. He has advised us that he has received offers to associate with other firms in this case and made reference to a Baltimore firm which offered him \$100,000. He has implied that he could get his fees from the father because the father will have lots of money from offers. He has shown poor judgment in the case to date, has attempted to handle the case without other consultation, and in short, portrays a man who has a bear by the tail and doesn't know what to do. We remain suspicious of his cooperation but feel that as long as we can have him in sight we can control his actions.

20. As it now stands, Lawyers Inc. went to the Soviet Embassy the afternoon of 23 June and indicated their desire to go to Russia. The clerk advised them that they would have to write a letter giving their ages and other personal data. As a matter of routine he inquired whether or not they were going as tourists and they said no, it was business. He began inquiring as to what their business was and upon that the clerk was shown a copy of the cable whereby our clerk friend became so unscrewed he literally ran out of the room. He returned with the First Secretary who read and re-read the cable and became most gracious. The First Secretary advised them to please send a letter and then their request would be given normal consideration. With this accomplished the lawyers departed for their respective homes. According to plan, William Dickson, who was headed for New York on Thursday, was rerouted at our request to Virginia where he issued the press release to Norfolk, Richmond, and Roanoke newspapers indicating that the Virginia State Bar Association had offered its services to Barbara Powers who had retained its designated lawyers. This new development in the case has reawakened press interest in Virginia and after 24 hours of no comment, Alex Parker agreed to a TV interview the evening of 24 June.

(Signed)
JOHN N. McMAHON
Personnel Officer
DPD-DD/P

(Attached: Copy of Cable to
Khrushchev)

9

~~SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

C
O P Y /CABLEGRAM/

Richmond, Virginia

/23 June 1960/

Nikita S. Khrushchev
Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the USSR
Moscow, USSR

As the wife and father and mother of Francis Gary Powers and the persons primarily and principally interested in his welfare, we feel that we should have the benefit of the advice and help of legal counsel. The Bar Association of Virginia has offered the services of its members. That organization is a voluntary independent association of advocates in Francis' home state.

This offer has been gratefully accepted and the Bar Association has designated Alex W. Parker, a practicing attorney of Richmond, Virginia, and Frank W. Rogers, a practicing attorney of Roanoke, Virginia, and Professor John N. Hazard of the faculty of law of Columbia University, New York City, as its representatives for that purpose to act in conjunction with Carl E. McAfee, who had previously been selected as counsel by Mr. and Mrs. Oliver Powers and who is a practicing attorney in Wise County, Virginia, where they and their son lived.

We respectfully request that these men be permitted to come to your country to confer with our husband and son and with any Soviet advocate who may be representing him and to cooperate with his Soviet advocate in preliminary conferences and in the trial and in the exercise of any other rights that may be permitted to Francis under the Soviet law. If no Soviet advocate has yet been appointed for him, we would also hope that these men would be allowed to cooperate with Francis and with the appropriate Soviet authorities for the purpose of obtaining such appointment if that should be Francis' desire. The undersigned Oliver Powers has already requested of you that Mr. McAfee be permitted to accompany him to your country to see you and talk with you about Soviet law and the trial, and now that the Bar Association's representatives have also offered their services, we hope for an early

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

reply to the present request so that necessary travel arrangements can be made including the securing of visas.

We will be greatly comforted if our requests are granted, since it will permit our beloved husband and son to have his fellow countrymen consult with him and cooperate with his Soviet advocate in the preparation and trial of his case. We should think that such an arrangement would be welcomed by the people of all nations as proof of Soviet fairness and justice. We personally appeal to you because of our love for Francis. The lawyers of his native region, through those above named, authorize us to say that they join in this request because they wish so much to render all legal assistance permitted by Soviet law to one of their countrymen who is to be tried on a serious charge in a foreign country. We shall appreciate your reply addressed to the undersigned at Milledgeville, Georgia.

Barbara Moore Powers

Mr. and Mrs. Oliver W. Powers

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

C05492917

ANNEX 91

~~SECRET~~PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE TO STATIONS AND BASES ON POWERS TRIAL

Issue of 1 August 1960 (Bi-Weekly Guidance)

Paragraph 272

"According to an official announcement of the USSR Supreme Court, U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers will be tried on a charge of espionage in open session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court beginning 17 August. Despite repeated requests by Embassy officials to see him in accordance with a US-USSR agreement, Powers has been held incommunicado since his plane came down on 1 May. It still is unclear whether significant numbers of visas will be granted to free world reporters and other journalists who desire to attend the trial. Recently Moscow has suffered one significant setback in its efforts to exploit the U-2 incident. After the shooting down of the RB-47 reconnaissance plane, the Soviets charged that the aircraft had been caught spying over Soviet territory. They linked the RB-47 flight to the U-2 program, and claimed that it was evidence of the continuation of an aggressive, provocative policy on the part of warmongering circles in the Pentagon. However, Ambassador Lodge's speech in the UN stating categorically that the plane had been shot down over international waters, and demanding either an impartial investigation of the event or a referral of the case to the International Court of Justice cast considerable doubt on the Soviet charges. Lodge's stand was strongly supported by Great Britain. The subsequent Soviet veto of the nine to two approval of Lodge's proposal compounded the effect. During the pre-trial period the Communists have made at least two attempts to capitalize on the Powers case in the free world. The Italian Communist Party has begun to attack the Italian government and US bases in Italy using unsupported allegations that U-2 reconnaissance missions were flown from these bases. In Japan, a forged letter on US Embassy stationery has been uncovered proposing that U-2 aircraft be temporarily removed to Okinawa and later returned to Japan secretly so that overflights could be continued. The letter, supposedly signed by the US Air Attaché, was to be circulated by a national Japanese patriotic group.

Guidance

Our objective is to weaken, discredit and obscure Moscow's efforts to capitalize on the Powers trial. The USSR's efforts

~~SECRET~~Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~SECRET~~

aim at the following goals: (1) to split the US and its allies, (2) to undermine our ability to use bases in other free world countries, especially neutralist countries, (3) to denounce US aggressiveness and depict the American people as being at the mercy of Pentagon militarists, thereby portraying the US as a threat to peace, (4) to eliminate doubts which have been cast on Soviet military strength and the USSR's ability to defend itself by having Powers testify that he was shot down by a rocket at 60,000 feet or more. In addition to the approaches outlined in Bi-Weekly Guidance #249 of 20 June 1960, "The Trial of Francis Powers", we should take the following additional steps. This action should not be undertaken until after the trial begins, and should be predicated on the tactics the USSR adopts to exploit the case. If the trial is open and adequately reported to the free world, we attack all clear violations of western, humanistic concepts of justice and due process, citing them as proof of the barbaric nature of the Soviet legal system and the subservience of justice in the USSR to cynical manipulation for political advantage. If any part of the trial is held in secret, we denounce this secrecy and assert that it proves that the Soviets are trying to hide those aspects of his testimony which are unfavorable to them. If any noted lawyers, journalists or other public figures whose views are known to be either favorable to the west or honestly impartial are denied permission to cover the trial or attend as observers, we point to this as evidence that the Russians are trying to limit attendance at the trial to their trained and reliable apologists. If we can contrast the denial of a visa to an observer who might favor the west with the names of known Communist sympathizers who have been granted visas, our case will be made even stronger.

Since we have no firm evidence that Powers has been brainwashed, a general charge to this effect should be avoided until we see how the trial proceeds. It is possible that Soviets will be content with exerting psychological pressure to have Powers confirm the actual facts of the flight and the Soviet version of the shutdown. If there are any obvious errors, discrepancies or weaknesses in Powers' testimony (e.g. confessions to having dropped agents, paramilitary supplies or biological warfare material into the USSR; statements that the U-2 program was a military operation; or that the RB-47 program was similar) or if Powers goes beyond his basic area of competence as a technician and supports clearly Soviet political propaganda on the stand (e.g. that he is personally familiar with militaristic plots in the Pentagon)

~~SECRET~~Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~S E C R E T~~

we seize upon these as evidence of psychological pressure and use them to cast doubt upon all his other statements which have not been supported by real evidence or previous US government admissions. Through articles, feature stories and interviews with experts in the field, we publicize the techniques of brainwashing, emphasizing past uses of this tactic by the Communists, and stressing the fact that modern methods have become so sophisticated that anyone can be brainwashed, providing his captors have complete control of him for approximately one month. We publicize the fact that no Americans, either officials or members of his family, have been permitted to see Powers since May 1, even though this violates a long-standing agreement between the US and the USSR. We conclude that Powers' isolated detention lends a great deal of weight to free world fears that he has been brainwashed.

If Powers' statements permit we ridicule the various Soviet explanations of why the U-2 was allowed to penetrate as far as Sverdlovsk, and suggest that the only reason they were able to knock down Powers' plane was because it was forced within the range of their conventional defenses by some mechanical difficulty. We also scoff at the idea that the Soviets could view as aggression a reconnaissance flight by such a light aircraft, whose only armament was a .22 caliber pistol. We stress the fact that Powers is a civilian and that the U-2 project was not conducted by the armed forces. We cite the pre-trial propaganda of the Italian CP and the forgery in Japan as further indications that the free world CP's will go to any length of falsehood and deceit to further the ends of their masters in Moscow. Wherever possible we try to distract public attention away from the trial by exploiting any local events, incidents, speeches, etc., which will pre-empt the headlines. To help do this we can revive former cases of Soviet espionage, or stimulate heavy coverage of new cases which may arise. To support any of the above lines, such techniques as interviews with lawyers, military experts, experts on the USSR and persons with a first hand knowledge of Soviet justice should be used, in addition to press conferences and speeches in parliament where possible. Neutralist media should decry Moscow's use of the Powers trial to launch a violent propaganda attack on the west, thereby increasing world tensions and intensifying the Cold War. Such media may soften the approaches listed above, and tailor them to the tastes of their particular audiences. Where possible they should introduce the desired points of view by replaying them from other, non-neutralist media.

~~S E C R E T~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~SECRET~~

Output aimed at Soviet and other Bloc audiences should stress (a) the huge extent of Soviet espionage, (b) the emptiness of Soviet boasts that their air space is "inviolable" and (c) regret for the reckless exploitation of the trial to worsen international relations, once again isolating the people behind the Iron Curtain and reinforcing Soviet secrecy.

FOR ALL ASSETS "

~~SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

C05492917

ANNEX 92

SUMMARY OF TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL OF FRANCIS GARY POWERS
(Prepared by the CI Staff from "The Trial of the U-2")

13 October 1960

1. The only available complete transcript of the trial of Francis Gary Powers is contained in the publication "The Trial of The U-2", published by Translation World Publishers, Suite 900, 22 West Madison Street, Chicago, 2, Illinois, with introductory comment by Harold J. Berman.

2. In addition to the introductory comment by Harold J. Berman this publication is made up of:

1. Announcement of Criminal Proceedings
2. Indictment
3. Composition of The Court
4. First Day, Morning Session, August 17, 1960
 - Opening of the Trial
 - Preliminary Examination of Defendant
 - Announcement of Witnesses and Experts
 - Announcement of Composition of Court
 - Reading of Indictment
 - Examination of Defendant by Procurator Rudenko
5. First Day, Afternoon Session, August 17, 1960
 - Examination of Defendant by Procurator Rudenko
 - Examination of Defendant by Defense Counsel Grinev
6. Second Day, Morning Session, August 18, 1960
 - Examination of Defendant by Defense Counsel Grinev
 - Re-Examination of Defendant by Procurator Rudenko
 - Examination of Defendant by Presiding Judge Borisoglebsky
 - Examination of Defendant by Member of the Court Zakharov
 - Examination of Defendant by Member of the Court Vorobyev
 - Examination of Witness Asabin
 - Examination of Witness Cheremisin

Examination of Witness Chuzhakin
 Examination of Witness Surin
 Examination of Expert Alekseyev
 Examination of Expert Tyufilin
 Examination of Expert Istomin
 Examination of Expert Andreyev

7. Second Day, Afternoon Session, August 18, 1960
 Examination of Expert Voroshilov
 Examination of Expert Burmistrov-Zuyev
 Examination of Expert Prozorovsky
 Examination of Expert Zhdanov
8. Third Day, Morning Session, August 19, 1960
 Speech for the Prosecution by Roman A. Rudenko,
 Procurator-General of the USSR
 Speech for the Defense by Defense Counsel
 Mikhail L. Grinev
 Last Plea of Defendant Powers
9. Third Day, Afternoon Session, August 19, 1960
 The Verdict

3. Harold J. Berman is footnoted in this publication as "Professor of Law, Harvard University; author of 'Justice in Russia! An Interpretation of Soviet Law' (1950); 'The Russians in Focus' (1953); 'Soviet Military Law and Administration' (with Miroslav Kerner, 1955); and other books, as well as numerous articles including 'Soviet Law Reform--Date-line Moscow 1957', Yale Law Journal, 1957, vol. 66, p. 1161, and 'The Comparison of Soviet and American Law,' Indiana Law Journal, 1959, vol. 34, p. 563."

4. The information disclosed in the published transcript of the trial of Francis Gary Powers is hereinafter listed in more or less chronological order under the following headings:

1. Biographic Information
2. Contract
3. Training
4. Administration of Detachment 10-10
5. Other overflights
6. Preparation for 1 May Flight
7. Events During Flight of 1 May 1960
8. The Plane and Its Equipment
9. Testimony of The Commission of Experts
10. Names Mentioned at the Powers Trial

5. "The Trial of The U-2"

The Exclusive Authorized Account

1. BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Francis Gary Powers - Citizen of the United States. Born: 1929 at Burdine, Kentucky. Both parents are alive and reside at Pound, Virginia. Father is a shoe repairman and Mother is a housewife. Graduate from Milligan College near Johnson City (Tenn.). Married and no children. Profession is "pilot" at Detachment 10-10, Adana, Turkey. Had five sisters and no brothers. Powers' grandfather lives with his family. All of Powers' sisters are married. The oldest sister married a shoemaker and he also drives a school bus, the second married an electrical fitter. The third married an ex-teacher and who is now a postman. The fourth sister just married two months ago and Powers does not know what her husband does. Father owns a farm. Father inherited his part from his father and bought the other part from the other members of his family. Farm just produces enough for the family.

2. CONTRACT

Flight on May 1st undertaken in accordance with provisions under a secret contract which Powers signed with CIA.

Approached in 1956 - paid \$2,500 a month - part held back and paid upon completion of contract - \$1,000 held back each month - main duties fly along Soviet border and collect any radar or radio information - possibly other duties.

Powers signed contract - believed Mr. Collins signed on behalf of CIA in Powers' presence.

Liability for disclosing details of contract was 10 years imprisonment and \$10,000 fine or both.

Date Powers left the Air Force and date when signed contract were close together.

Nothing in contract about flying along Soviet border - explained to Powers before he signed.

At time signed contract with CIA unaware would have to make flights over USSR territory. Six to seven months after contract was signed learned was to be part of duties.

When signing contract with CIA aware of flights along USSR border.

Did not know character of the intelligence work required at that time. Was told there might be other duties in the future.

While serving in Air Force received approximately \$700 per month.

After signing contract with CIA given a salary of \$2,500 a month. Each month received \$1,500 minus taxes - remaining \$1,000 to be held back to be paid after successful completion of contract.

If violated the contract, in particular, refused to make 1 May flight, did not know whether would receive remaining money.

When contract renewed was aware of character of duties. April 1956 signed original contract - renewed in May 1958 for term of two years, and in January 1960 renewed for one year.

Hesitated as to whether should renew the contract with CIA. Did not want to sign. If had a job would have refused to sign. Profoundly sorry had any part in it.

3. TRAINING

Training began after the end of May 1956 and went to the first part of August 1956.

Powers was in training under the name of Francis Palmer.

During training flew T-6 and T-33 as well as F-80 (practically same thing as T-33 but with only one seat) something like 300 hours. F-84G, American Air Force fighter aircraft - roughly 400-500 hours. F-84F, later model of F-84G - approximately 100-200 hours. U-2 approximately 500 hours. T-33 approximately 200 hours. Also worked as co-pilot on a cargo-type airplane, very little time.

Were taught only how to fly U-2 plane and how to operate the equipment. Other words, were taught how to use the equipment and the pilot's cockpit, but were not acquainted with the nature of this equipment.

Powers gave detailed testimony regarding the methods used to prepare spy pilots for a sudden special espionage assignment, for which purpose they were trained under what was known as the special program of "alert flights."

After training sent to Detachment 10-10, approximately 20 August 1956.

All pilots in Detachment 10-10 received same training.

4. ADMINISTRATION OF DETACHMENT 10-10

Detachment 10-10 commanded by military personnel, but main part of personnel were civilians.

Detachment 10-10 purpose and aims - in general to gather information along the borders of USSR - conduct weather research reconnaissance to determine radioactivity.

Colonel Perry commanded Detachment 10-10 in 1956.

Head of the Detachment was a military man.

The military base at Adana where Detachment 10-10 was located was on Turkish territory and belong to Turkey. The base was peopled by Turkish as well as American personnel. There was a Turkish as well as an American commander.

Base was a classified area and only personnel who worked on it had access to it.

Powers testified that Detachment 10-10 was set up jointly by CIA and U.S. Air Force and represented a combination of these two bodies.

Detachment 10-10 was inspected in April, 1960 by General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force.

Detachment 10-10 was inspected twice by General Everest, Commander of the U.S. Air Force in Europe.

General White visited the base in April and General Everest, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Air Force in Europe, were people from high command who visited Detachment 10-10.

Cardinal Spellman visited Detachment 10-10.

Seven civilian pilots at Detachment 10-10.

5. OTHER OVERFLIGHTS

In the fall of 1956, personnel of espionage Detachment 10-10 were transferred to the Incirlik American-Turkish air base near Adana, Turkey, where the formation of this Detachment was completed and where its direct espionage work was to begin. From there pilots of Detachment 10-10 started making systematic reconnaissance flights along USSR frontiers with Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, and also in the Black Sea area, using special reconnaissance equipment.

Assignments fulfilled in Detachment 10-10 prior to 1 May flight (not exact):

1956 - one or two flights

1957 - six to eight

1958 - ten to fifteen

1959 - ten to fifteen

Four months of 1960 - about one or two

Flights made along borders of Turkey and the USSR, Iran and the USSR, Afghanistan and the USSR and along the borders of the Black Sea.

Made flights over the southern shore of the Black Sea.

Flew south of the Caspian Sea but not over it.

Powers testified that from 1956 onwards a large number of flights for intelligence purposes were made along the borders of USSR. Stated, "I consider this to be the main work of our detachment. Each year I made several flights along the borders between the Soviet Union and Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. In 1956-57 I made three or four flights over the Black Sea. In 1956 I made one or two flights. There were six or eight such flights in 1957, ten to fifteen in 1958, ten to fifteen in 1959, and for the first four months of 1960 I made one or two flights."

"All these flights were along the southern border of the Soviet Union. Other pilots of the 10-10 Detachment made flights for the same purposes. We would take off from Incirlik airfield and would fly eastward as far as the town of Van, situated on the lake of the same name. After that we would proceed to Teheran, the capital of Iran, and having passed it would fly eastward, south of the Caspian Sea. After that I usually flew to the south of Meshed, crossed the Iranian-Afghan frontier and further along the Afghan-Soviet frontier. . . not far from the eastern frontier of Pakistan a turn was made and we returned to the Incirlik air field taking the same route. Later we began making a turn earlier, after penetrating into Afghan territory for about two hundred miles."

Flights were made along the border of the Soviet Union for reconnaissance purposes in the daytime and also at night. Did not know exactly what additional equipment was in the planes, but besides the usual panels with instruments which, as a rule, were constantly in the aircraft, there were additional switches which I turned on and off during night flights.

Airfield from which flew these flights was airfield of Incirlik, near Adana.

Knew about flight along Soviet border in 1956 day before flight.

1956 - interested in Black Sea area - later interest centered more to the east.

Planes for special flights along the Soviet border were equipped with special reconnaissance equipment.

In case of accident on these border flights could use airfields in Teheran, Meshed in Iran, Peshawar in Pakistan.

Did not keep radio contact with bases during flights with exception of short time after going up and shortly before landing.

Have radio contact with Incirlik but on 1 May with Peshawar.

Distribution of work between pilots of Detachment 10-10 fairly even.

Powers testified that Colonel Perry informed the pilots of Detachment 10-10 they would also make flights over USSR.

At Bodoe once before - August of 1958. Ferried a U-2 plane from Adana to Bodoe. Met by members of Detachment 10-10 in Bodoe. While there two flights made from Bodoe airfield - U-2 planes.

In 1958 ferried a U-2 aircraft from Incirlik to air base in Bodoe. Took off in Turkey and flew over a part of Turkey, then Greece and Italy. Exact route not remembered, might have been Switzerland, France or Austria, Western Germany, and believe Denmark, and Norway.

August 1958 Powers received assignment to transfer a U-2 aircraft from Incirlik base to Bodoe airfield in Norway, very same airfield at which he was to end May 1 flight. New commander of Detachment 10-10, Colonel Berly, who held this post up to 1959, with a large ground staff awaited Powers.

Flew U-2 from base at Incirlik to base at Peshawar in June 1959.

First arrived in Peshawar in 1959 - ferried a U-2 plane there. Met by representatives of Detachment 10-10. Tower operator gave permission to land in Peshawar - local Pakistani operator. Pakistani authorities were informed on the arrival of plane in Peshawar in the summer of 1959.

Detachment 10-10 personnel at the air base in Peshawar were not allowed to leave the base itself.

Has been to air base near Wiesbaden, Western Germany, Wiesbaden base. Ferried a training plane, T33. Was there many times.

In Wiesbaden on vacation.

Ferried airplane from Hibbelstadt to New York. U-2 plane.

Powers flew from Incirlik airfield to American air base in the Wiesbaden area (West Germany) and from that air base piloted a U-2 to the U.S. Air Force air base at Plattsburg, New York State.

6. PREPARATION FOR 1 MAY FLIGHT

Francis Gary Powers - Received assignment to fly over USSR on the morning of 1 May from the commanding officer of his detachment, Colonel Shelton. Detachment located in Adana, Turkey.

Flight of May 1 only flight over Soviet territory.

Not consulted about program of spy flights over Soviet Union.

Two prepared for flight - did not know which one would go.

Could not refuse to go, was an order.

Powers received assignment to fly to USSR in Peshawar, Pakistan.

Powers arrived in Peshawar a few days before the flight, some four or five days.

Arrived in Peshawar in a cargo aircraft with roughly 20 people and Colonel Shelton. Special trip in connection with flight to USSR and assigned to deliver only our people to the airfield.

Plane took off from Adana, Turkey and landed once en route for refueling. This airfield serviced by British personnel - believe it was Bahrein.

U-2 plane brought to Peshawar airfield the night before, April 30, by another pilot.

All preparations were made morning before the flight.

Morning May 1st - awakened approximately three or four hours before flight. Told was to fly today. Two and a half hours before take-off started to breathe oxygen. Soon after that received maps and explanations were made. Few points pointed out on map that might help to navigate - possible rocket-launching site, another was pointed out as something there but did not know, some airfields, did not know how many.

Morning of 1 May 1960 Powers awakened, as many times before, while training on the "alert flight" schedule.

Powers given a special mission for which had been trained for several years. Was to make a reconnaissance flight over the USSR to collect important information on military and industrial installations. Route of flight lay from the Peshawar base in Pakistan, across the territory of Afghanistan and a considerable part of USSR and was to end at Bodoie base in Norway.

Before the flight for about two hours Powers passed through preparations for breathing oxygen for high-altitude flights and received a briefing at that time.

Briefed by Colonel Shelton.

Powers left Peshawar in the U-2 airplane, a special high-altitude aircraft prepared and designed to fly at very high altitudes.

Left Peshawar about 6:30 local time in the morning.

On 1 May flight was told to follow the route, turn switches on and off as indicated, stands to reason it was done for intelligence reasons.

Colonel Shelton particularly interested in rocket-launching sites. Mentioned one place on the map where there was a possible rocket-launching site.

Can only assume maps prepared by navigator of the detachment.

Had little time to study route and map, roughly one hour and fifteen minutes.

Powers was told by Colonel Shelton that flying at such an altitude was absolutely safe and USSR anti-aircraft defense could not hit him.

Told there was no danger of encountering Soviet fighter planes. Did see the trail of a plane, but at lower altitude. Could not tell what kind of plane.

Destination of Powers' flight was to land at Bodoie, Norway.

If had trouble in the air at beginning of flight, return to Peshawar - second half of flight, take shortest route to Bodoie. Case of absolute emergency any airfield outside USSR. Personnel from Detachment 10-10 meet Powers.

Was to contact Bodee base by calling on radio and giving call signal, "Puppy 6-8" and asking for landing instructions. Representatives from Detachment 10-10 there to meet him.

Instructed if necessary to land in USSR territory to destroy the airplane with the help of buttons and levers which were located for that purpose and to escape capture--head for the nearest border.

Colonel Shelton indicated Sodankyla airfield for Powers' 1 May flight.

1st of May had radio contact with Peshawar.

Powers felt sure that experts who study the film from his cameras know what interested the people who sent him but in his own opinion Soviet rockets interest not only us but the whole world as well. Assumed a flight like this would be to look for them. Repeated, he did not know and was only expressing his own opinion.

Realized intruding USSR airspace. Felt did country a very bad service. Felt that the people who sent him should have thought of the fact that the flight might torpedo the summit conference - provoke military conflict.

Regrets making the flight.

7. EVENTS DURING FLIGHT OF 1 MAY 1960

Powers flew directly from Peshawar airfield to Soviet border and crossed the border approximately 30 minutes after take-off.

Powers was to fly at the maximum altitude, 68,000 feet.

When took off from Peshawar on May 1 flew over a small part of Pakistan, a small part of Afghanistan - not known how much of USSR.

Did not know if permission was given to fly over Afghanistan.

U-2 crossed USSR border at 05:36 a.m. Moscow time.

Flight began approximately at 67,000 feet and as fuel burnt out rose to 68,000 feet.

Powers followed assigned flight route as close as could.

Did not know exact altitude when crossed USSR border - was lower than the altitude at which was shot down by a rocket. About 66,000 feet. Continued to climb as weight of fuel decreased and plane became lighter.

Eventually attained altitude of roughly 68,000 feet. Maybe a few above or a few below.

Flew over the USSR approximately three to three and one half hours. For three and one half hours at approximate speed of 380 miles an hour, would have been 1200 to 1300 miles inside USSR.

Not in radio communication with air bases in Incirlik and Peshawar when flying over USSR. Even if able to communicate would not because of possibility of being detected.

Flew over area of Sverdlovsk at altitude of 68,000 feet.

At altitude of 68,000 feet was struck down by something. Had no idea what it was, did not see it.

Shortly before plane hit Powers had some trouble with automatic pilot - everything else in order.

When plane struck by rocket it was at the maximum altitude, at about 68,000 feet, a few miles south of Sverdlovsk.

Felt a sort of hollow-sounding explosion. It seemed to be behind me. I could see an orange flash or an orange-coloured light behind me.

Powers testified that while flying in Sverdlovsk area at altitude of 68,000 feet, that is, more than 20,000 metres, he saw an orange flash and after that his plane began to lose altitude.

I remember that I was at a height of 30,000 feet and I realized I could not use the ejection seat.

The parachute opened automatically immediately after I left the airplane. By that time I was at an altitude of 14,000 feet.

Did not resist arrest and had no intention of resisting.

During detention treated very nice.

USSR Government gave orders to shoot down plane at 08:53 a.m. Plane shot down with a rocket at an altitude of 20,000 metres in the Sverdlovsk area, that is at a distance of more than 20 kilometres from the place it crossed the Soviet frontier.

Order to destroy U-2 on 1 May was carried out at 08:53 Moscow time. Plane entered the firing range at an altitude of over 20,000 metres - one rocket was fired and its explosion destroyed the target. The hitting of the target observed by instruments, and after a short interval posts of visual observation recorded falling plane fragments and parachuting down of the pilot who bailed out of the crashed plane.

8. THE PLANE AND ITS EQUIPMENT

Reconnaissance flights carried out both day and night. Did not know exactly what additional equipment was in planes for night flights, but besides the usual panels with instruments which, as a rule, were constantly in the aircraft, there were additional switches which Powers turned on and off.

Never told of its performance. Picked up information there were cameras installed, could not tell what size they were.

Never knew what equipment was on the plane. Loaded in secrecy - suppose while plane prepared for flight.

U-2 is an airplane of that type which is for reconnaissance as well as research work at high altitudes.

U-2 belonged to Detachment 10-10.

Had radio compass, a sextant which did not use during flight because take-off time delayed for 30 minutes, maps and an inverted periscope enabling Powers to see the earth.

Used radio compass and beamed into two or three radio stations, could not remember how many exactly. If remember correctly, one of them located near Chelyabinsk and the other near Stalinabad.

Had an instrument something like an inverted periscope which made it possible to spot a plane underneath if it should appear. This instrument used chiefly for navigation.

Knew nothing about the capability of the equipment. Knew it was used to gather information, but what information and how much had no idea.

Powers testified as to having switched on and off the corresponding controls of the special equipment installed in his plane. Altogether there were five such controls.

Not informed of results of missions and did not know whether equipment worked properly except as indicated by signal lights in the cockpit.

Colonel Shelton said such flights over USSR were absolutely safe - only thing could happen was technical failing of the plane.

Powers knew it was a reconnaissance plane - could guess purpose for which turned on and off equipment - much of general equipment did not know what it looked like except what saw there.

17th of May in the Gorki Central Park of Culture and Rest Powers was shown the remains and wreckage of plane and its equipment. Powers stated he believed it was the same "Lockheed U-2" which he flew.

Powers followed route indicated on chart and switched on and off designated equipment over places indicated.

Places marked on the chart A or B or C or numbers 1-2-3 before Powers received it.

Powers named main points of route as marked on chart:
(a) East of the Aral Sea, (b) North-west of Chelyabinsk,
(c) Before and after Kirov, (d) Points near Arkhangelsk, near the Island of Solo, near Kongoma, near Kandalaksha, south and north of Murmansk.

Powers believes the navigator of the detachment who flew with them into Peshawar, Major Dulak, made the route markings on the map.

Identified topographical maps - proven to Powers that he had four. Powers thought he had only two.

Not given specific instructions to operate equipment - turn switches on and off as indicated on the chart.

Powers made three marks on map - (a) airfield not indicated on chart, (b) huge cisterns, for oil storage and (c) big outfit indicating a lot of buildings.

Given a map before flight. Separate places pointed out which considered aids for navigation. Example - One place was told two airfields were there - the airfields not indicated on map - if saw this city with two airfields, which not on map, could have thought had lost course.

Identified chart - Red pencil indicates points on part of the route to which should have kept as close as possible. Blue was less important sections and just show the direction. Sections marked in red pencil of particular interest to CIA.

Map - section of the route from Kandalaksha to Bodoe marked in brown pencil - in case of lack of fuel or oxygen was to cut route short and follow this shortest route, only in case of emergency. Would have crossed territory of Soviet Union, Finland, Sweden, Norway.

Topographical maps were to assist Powers in getting out of USSR territory.

Sections were cut out of two of the maps - no idea who cut these sections out - maps were on cloth - words "restricted" or "confidential" and the words "USA Air Force" were cut out.

All airplanes, based in Turkey, had identification marks. Powers personally did not see identification on U-2 - did not look for any.

Identified log journal - received it from Colonel Shelton - contained overflight data - take-off time, call signals, indicated points on map and etc.

Had an instrument like a granger which was switched on just before crossing Soviet border, and remained on all the time. It was equipment to create artificial static for radar stations. Designed to distort the radar from attacking fighters, or rockets - air-to-air type of rockets.

Experts established that the U-2 fitted with special counter radar equipment designed to jam radar stations for interception and guidance of fighter planes.

Not acquainted with special apparatus on the plane.

In the tail sections of the plane were located equipment to distort radar signals aimed at the plane from radar stations on the ground and fighter aircraft.

At specified points on map turn this equipment on..

Plane was equipped with special means for its destruction.

Examination established that the remote control of the destructor unit was installed in the cockpit. The electrical control panel, among other inscriptions, has one reading "explosion." Pilot was therefore aware of the existence of a special demolition device on his aircraft and of the methods of operating it.

The plane has a special remote-controlled destructor unit manufactured by Beckman and Whitley Inc. (Model 175-10A).

Examination of the tape recorder established that it had a special demolition device designed for its destruction. Expert examination established that a part of the magnetic tape was in perfectly good condition.

Blasting device fitted to the tape recorder designed to record the signals of Soviet radar stations.

Powers testified, ". . . the Colonel also said that just in case anything should happen, he was giving me some packages with Soviet money and gold coins. They were put into my flying suit pockets. He also had a silver dollar coin which he showed me which had a pin installed in it. He said that there was no danger because no USSR aircraft or rocket could get to my altitude but in case something should happen and I was captured, the pin contained poison and if I were tortured and could not stand it I could use the pin to kill myself."

Following items were in Powers' possession and were given to him by Colonel Shelton: (a) Italian, French, German and gold money, (b) Noiseless 10-shot pistol,

(c) 205 cartridges and (d) Poison needle (in case of capture and torture).

Identified an appeal written in 14 languages - did not know appeal was in his possession. Seems that the people who helped Powers to dress put the appeal as well as other things in his pockets.

Certificate issued by NASA which certified that Powers was fit for service as a pilot of NASA planes. Powers testified, "As I personally had nothing to do with NASA, I think this document was issued to me as a cover to conceal the true nature of the intelligence detachment 10-10."

Powers identification card had both the stamp and emblem of the U.S. Defense Department.

Presented document issued in name of NASA which gave Powers authority to fly a military plane - also to conceal the real purpose of the reconnaissance detachment. Powers had no contact with NASA at all.

Never given a poison needle on flights previous to 1 May. Colonel Shelton showed how to use the needle.

Colonel Shelton gave Powers piece of black cloth. Does not know why. Shelton ordered to give piece of black cloth to representative of Detachment 10-10 who were to meet Powers in Bodoe.

9. TESTIMONY OF COMMISSION OF EXPERTS

Flight documents and documents identifying Powers were put at the disposal of the commission of experts. Commission of experts divided them into three groups:

1. Identification card No. AFI, 288,068, in the name of Francis Gary Powers, bearing the stamp of the U.S. Defense Department.
2. A medical certificate issued to Francis Powers showing that he was serving in the U.S. Air Force.
3. Rules for the use of aircraft belonging to the Air Force by test pilots of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, registered as U.S. Air Force Instruction No. 5526, signed by Chief of the U.S. Air Force Staff, Thomas White, and addressed personally to Francis Powers on January 1, 1959.

4. Two certificates entitling Francis Powers to engage in blind flying, issued by the headquarters of the Bolling Air Force Base, District of Columbia.

All of these documents indicated that Powers belongs to the Air Force of the U.S.

Second group of documents studied by commission of experts consists of flight documents referring specifically to May 1 flight.

Third group consists of flight documents of the universally accepted type that are required by flight personnel on any flight. These include: record of aerial navigation charts, checklist of apparatus on board, list of the aircraft's equipment, directory of European airfields.

Expert commission came to the following conclusions: Powers belongs to the United States Air Force - flight of 1 May 1960 was deliberate and planned in advance - charts with the route plotted and the navigational data were prepared on the ground before the flight - during flight Powers knew his location, regularly controlled the flight by means of given landmarks, carried out his flight along a previously charted route - during flight over USSR entered on map information of an intelligence character and also entered weather conditions.

Commission of experts to establish if there were identification marks on the U-2: Results of investigation revealed there were no identification marks of any kind.

Powers: Would it be possible for identification marks to be put on top of the coating and then removed? I ask this because this plane has been in Incirlik for several months and I saw identification marks on all the planes there. I cannot agree that there have never been any identification marks on this plane.

Expert: In principle, there is this possibility.

Commission of experts given following parts of photographic equipment of U-2 plane for study: a destroyed air camera magazine with four rolls of aerial film 24 cm. wide, separate destroyed elements of the aerial camera, and two rolls of film 7 cm. wide.

The altitude at which aerial photographs were taken was determined by the pictures which account of the actual focal length of the camera; according to this determination, the altitude was 20,000-21,000 metres.

The photographing of the USSR territory was made from an altitude of about 21,000 metres on a sector running from an area North of the Soviet-Afghan state border, up to the Sverdlovsk area.

Commission of experts to examine the radiotechnical apparatus and the magnetic tape recordings found in U-2.

Aviation tape recorders - one partially and the other heavily destroyed.

Six tape recorder reels with ferromagnetic tape. Part of the magnetic tape had burned up, apparently as a result of a deliberate explosion.

Commission of experts given the following for examination: a pistol, 205 cartridges in different packages, a carton with 5 phials and a tin container with lids at both ends.

Powers - Unfortunately, nobody but myself knows that I cannot kill a person even to save my own life.

Commission of experts to carry out a technical examination of the special mechanism, the destructor unit. Examination established: (1) design of the destructor unit, (2) methods of operating the destructor unit (elements of the remote control circuit were not found), (impossible to establish the time lag of the explosion since no timing mechanism was found in the wreckage), (3) explosive contained in the destructor unit and its destructive power and (4) purpose of the destructor unit.

Commission on forensic medicine: Substance contained on the needle inside the pin, judging from the nature of its effect on animals, could according to its toxic doses and physical properties, be included in the curare group, the most powerful and quickest-acting of all known poisons.

Commission of experts to study the maps, films and other materials discovered among remains of the plane: Concluded that flight of 1 May was premeditated, prepared in advance and was conducted with reconnaissance aims. Analysis

of the flight chart showed that the plane flew from Peshawar airfield to Sverdlovsk area along the route set with an average speed of some 750 kilometers an hour.

10. NAMES MENTIONED AT POWERS TRIAL

Mr. Collins - signed contract with Powers on behalf of CIA. (This is a pseudo)

Colonel Shelton - CO Detachment 10-10

General Thomas White - Com. Genl. U.S. Air Force

General Frank Everest - Com. Genl. U.S. Air Force,
European Command

Colonel Perry - CO, Detachment 10-10

Colonel Berly (Beerli) - CO, Detachment 10-10

Major Dulak (DuLac) - Navigator, Detachment 10-10

Cardinal Spellman

(Signed)

John C. Mertz
CI/SI

C05492917

ANNEX 93

C05492917

NBC WHITE PAPER #1
THE U-2 AFFAIR

NARRATOR: Chet Huntley

BROADCAST: Tuesday, November 29, 1960
10:00 - 11:00 P.M. EST

EXECUTIVE PRODUCER: Irving Gitlin
PRODUCER-DIRECTOR: Al Wasserman
WRITTEN BY: Al Wasserman, and
Arthur Barron
ASSOCIATE PRODUCER: Arthur Barron

Black

SOUND EFFECTS - Jet Engine

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

You are listening to the sound of a
jet. It is not an ordinary jet.

U-2 Takes off

SOUND EFFECTS UP

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

This is a U-2.

This is the incredible plane that pro-
jected our country into a crisis that
shook the world.

CU Powers
at trial

This is Francis Gary Powers, Pilot
of the one U-2 flight that failed.

TRIAL AUDIO:

Powers Confession.

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Washington
Scenes

Whatever the fate of Powers, the U-2
was not so much the drama of an
individual...as of a nation, this
nation, and the manner in which we
reacted to a major and unprecedented
crisis.

MS
Goldwater

GOLDWATER:

How can you negotiate with murderers?
How can you negotiate with people who
have shot down numbers of our planes?
How can you negotiate with people who
tell lies and who do not fulfill their
solemn obligations? I don't think
you can gain anything by going to
the summit with these type of people.

MS
Bowles

BOWLES:

Major elements in our government have
been caught telling blatant false-
hoods to the world, to ourselves, to
each other, and to Congressional
committees. We have not told the
truth. We have taken grave risks on
the very eve of a great and important
international conference.

MAIN TITLES:

1. NBC WHITE PAPER #1
2. THE U-2 AFFAIR
3. TIMEX BILLBOARD

THEME:

ANNOUNCER:

Timex billboard

FADE OUT:

FADE IN:

STUDIO
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

Almost six months have passed since the day of the U-2 flight and the crisis it created. But a crisis should not be filed and forgotten in a nation's archives simply because it is in the past. Now that the passions and partisanship of an election year have subsided - and because we feel that the consequences of this crisis are still unfolding and the lessons to be learned are still significant - NBC News has decided to retell and re-examine the story of that fateful flight of May first and the events that flowed from it.

Dissolve to:

Exterior Lockheed
Taxiing Shot

Second Taxi Shot,
Man Gesturing

If the story can properly be said to begin anywhere, it is with the superb airplane itself and the men who built it. This is a U-2, filmed by NBC with special permission at the place of its birth, the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in Burbank, California.

HUNTLEY (CONTINUED):

Interior Lockheed
Kelly Johnson

Here is the man who designed it,
Lockheed Vice President, Kelly Johnson.

JOHNSON:

Back in 1953 and 1954, we were studying ways and means of making fighter airplanes like the F 104 go higher and further than they did at that time. As we went further and further into these studies it soon became apparent that it would take an entirely new kind of aircraft to do the job that we wanted done.

JOHNSON (O.S.):

LS Plane

From this came the U-2.

MS Wing

We made a wing that had a very long span - over 80 feet. The wing had to carry the whole weight of the aircraft and still be very, very light. It had to be designed not only to hold a great amount of fuel, but it was designed so the wing tip acted as part of the landing gear.

CU Wingtip

On the take off, we invented what we called the pogo landing gears. These stick into sockets in the wing, and rest on the ground and keep the airplane level on take off.

Pogo

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Pilot Pre Breathing

If the design of the U-2 presented unusual problems, so too did flying it. The pilot of a U-2 must spend an hour-and-a-half before take-off relaxing and breathing pure oxygen in order to prepare himself for high altitude conditions.

CU Pilot

His helmet is airtight and sealed to his body by a cork ring; he can, therefore, neither eat nor drink before...

Exterior Lockheed
Pilot getting into
plane

or during a flight. A long flight may keep the pilot sealed up for more than eight hours.

Closer Shot,
getting into
cockpit

After such a voyage, he will emerge hungry and thirsty from his cramped cockpit, his skin chafed and raw from the tight fitting suit and helmet.

Plane Taxis to
Runway

The plane he flies will range as high as 90,000 feet - 17 miles above the earth -- far above the operating ceiling of any other jet....and during the eight hours it can stay aloft, the U-2 will half fly, half glide for nearly four thousand miles.

Take off

TAKE OFF EFFECT

HUNTLEY (O.S.) cont.

U-2 in Flight

It was evident from the start that the U-2 would be an invaluable airplane. It was--and is--employed by the Air Force and other agencies for high altitude scientific research. More recently, the Air Force has been using the planes to observe missiles in flight and to track missile nose cones on the way down. But, to the civilian Central Intelligence Agency, the U-2s ability to fly higher and farther than any interceptor aircraft made it a...

Dissolve to:

Stills

superb spy. With dark paint and a special reconnaissance equipment, the unmarked plane the Russians came to call the black lady of espionage systematically probed the borders and penetrated deep behind the iron curtain for nearly four years.

Tokyo Crash Sequence

A crash landing at a glider strip near Tokyo in 1959 provided the most dramatic breach in the secrecy surrounding

HUNTLEY (O.S.)
(CONTINUED):

the espionage activities of the U-2.
These pictures were made before the
area could be cordoned off by U.S.
security guards.

General Newspaper
Stills

Over the years other hints of the
black ladies' secret missions came
to the surface...

"Mysterious Stranger"

first in a British flight magazine...

"Mystery Crash"

then in reports of a mysterious crash
that killed Lockheed test pilot
Robert Seiker....

Misc. Newspaper

then in other newspapers and avia-
tion magazines...

Soviet Aviation

including Russian ones. In 1958 and
59 the newspaper Soviet Aviation attack-
ed the espionage flights, the men be-
hind them, and the planes they flew.

Black Plane

SILENCE

Dissolve to:

Stock
Powers Trial

This is the pilot of the one U-2
reconnaissance flight that failed...
Francis Gary Powers.

TRIAL AUDIO

This is his family.

POWERS' MOTHER
(Over Trial Footage
and on camera)

POWERS' MOTHER:

Ever since Francis was just a little boy he was interested in airplanes, and made model planes. And - a - always said he wanted to become a pilot. So he - after so long a time, he made a pilot.

Well, I wanted the boy to do what he thought best. Because it was his life. And - a - I was kind of scared, though, as I was afraid of planes - the dangers of them. Anything that goes up has to come down. So that's the reason I was kind of afraid for him - afraid he would crash, some-time, and maybe kill himself.

Dissolve to:

Stock
Incirlik Air Base
Turkey

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

trailer camp

In August, 1956, Francis Powers arrived at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, an American installation on a flat, bleak, plain 10 miles from the town of Adana. It is a normal air force base....with one exception. Isolated in a trailer camp at its western end

Trailer Camp

HUNTLEY (O.S.)
(CONTINUED):

CU Trailer

Camp

Transport Takes Off

is the top secret 10-10 reconnaissance detachment, which conducted U-2 overflights. Francis Powers and his wife moved into trailer T 1356, where, in common with seven other civilian pilots and their families they lived in mystery and seclusion for nearly four years, aloof from the rest of the base.

On Thursday, April 27, 1960, a transport plane flew Powers and other members of the 10-10 detachment from Incirlik....

Dissolve to:

Animation
Arrow Moves From
Incirlik to Peshawar

Pullback to larger
area to Show Powers'
Intended Flight Route

to the Pakistani Air Base at Peshawar. Then, when conditions were right, Powers would begin a thirty three hundred mile voyage across the Soviet Union, his equipment continuously monitoring its industry and defenses. If all went well, he would touch down at Bodo, Norway eight hours after take-off.

Dissolve to:

Globe Turning,
Day-Night Effect, Zoom
in Surface of Globe
Turning

And so, early on Sunday morning on the first of May, 1960, Francis Powers lifted off from Pakistan. Most of the western world was still in dark-

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (O.S.)
(CONTINUED):

ness and, as he crossed into Soviet territory, dawn was just breaking in Moscow.

Dissolve to:

Stock
Moscow
dawn scenes

In a few hours, the May Day parade was scheduled to begin - an annual display dedicated to the glorification of the Communist regime. Already the city was being prepared for the great event.

As Powers continued his flight, it was still the night of April 30th in the United States of America.

Dissolve to:

Night Scenes
Washington at Night
LS

Lights Go Off On
Capitol Dome

Lights Go Off At
Lincoln Memorial

White House

In Washington, D.C., at midnight, it was time for the daily ritual....
....of shutting down the city's landmarks.

At the White House, guards kept watch over an empty building. The President was away for the week-end at his Gettysburg farmhouse.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (O.S.)
(CONTINUED):

State Department

At the State Department, a few lights were burning late. A summit conference - the first in five years - was scheduled to begin in Paris in two weeks, and there were preparations to make.

Dissolve to:

Night
Exterior Washington
Post

In one section of the city there was considerable activity.

Interior
WashingtonPost
Mailing Room Scenes

The Sunday papers had just come off the presses and were being readied for delivery. Whatever news was to occupy attention that morning was already frozen in type and bound in wire. And of all those who would soon be casually scanning the morning papers, in Washington....

Dissolve to:

Stock

Moscow Newspaper
Delivery Girls Coming
Out Of Building

...and in Moscow - no one was aware that a news story that would shake the world was being born in the wreckage of an American plane, down 1,200 miles inside the Soviet Union.

Muscovites Reading
Papers

THE U-2 AFFAIR

FADE OUT

FADE IN:

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

We'll continue with The U-2 Affair
after this message from Timex.

FADE OUT:

FADE IN:

First Commercial

FADE OUT:

FADE IN:

Studio
MCU, Huntley

The circumstances surrounding the
downing of the U-2' are still largely
a mystery. American intelligence
sources have communicated a version
of what happened to several reporters
....among them, Robert Hotz, editor
of the authoritative Aviation Week
magazine.

Hotz, Plugging in
Tape Recorder

HOTZ:

He Turns to Camera

Our government knew that Powers was
in trouble almost from the moment
that it first occurred. This is
because we have a rather extensive
network of monitoring Soviet communi-
cations, and they also have a similar
network with which they monitor ours.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HOTZ (CONTINUED):

This is an example of what we get from listening to the Russians. This incident took place about two years ago.

He Turns on
Tape Recorder

Sound: Russian Fighter Pilot Conversation

CU Recorder

HOTZ (O.S.)

The Russian fighter pilots are moving in to attack. Here is the official translation of their conversation at this point...

The target is a four engine transport ...roger. 201 - I am attacking the target...the target is burning...there is a hit...the target is banking...it is going toward the fence. Open fire. 218 - are you attacking? Yes, yes. The tail assembly is falling off the target. I will finish him off, boys. I will finish him off on the run. The target is falling...yes. Form up...go home.

HOTZ Turns Off
Tape Recorder

HOTZ:

During Powers' flight across Russia our monitoring system was functioning and gained a great deal of useful

HOTZ (CONTINUED):

information. From conversation of the Russian radar crews it was evident that Powers' flight was expected and it was tracked almost from the moment he crossed the Afghan border. From conversations of fighter pilots and air defense installations it was evident that they set up relays of supersonic fighters in an attempt to shoot him down. As Powers neared Sverdlovsk, he reported a flameout in his jet engine and began to descend to the altitude at which it was possible to start this engine in the air. The last communication with Powers was about 40,000 feet. When Powers came down in the Soviet Union, our government knew the following facts....the fact that the plane had come down in the area of Sverdlovsk....the fact that it had been forced down by a mechanical failure, not shot down by a rocket at 70,000 feet as the Soviets later claimed. What our government did not know was whether the pilot was still alive

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HOTZ (CONTINUED):

and what the condition of the aircraft was when it hit the ground.

Dissolve to:

Stills of Wrecked
Plane

Stock:
Russians Inspecting
Wreck

Powers Captors

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Powers' plane had crashed in a field near the city of Sverdlovsk, some 900 miles east of Moscow. According to the Russians, the pilot had parachuted down and had been taken into custody by several local citizens. They described how they disarmed him, gave him a drink of water and a cigarette, and drove him to the local Rural Soviet, where he was turned over to security police.

Dissolve to:

Stock
Moscow May Day Footage

Kremlin leaders

In Moscow, it was 8:53 A.M. at the time of the crash. The streets outside Red Square were already crowded with spectators waiting for the May Day parade to begin.

As the Russian high command walked out of the Kremlin to take their places at the reviewing stand, they were probably still unaware of what had happened.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (O.S.)
(CONTINUED):

Various shots
Parade and reviewing
stand

Among those in Red Square watching the events of that morning was NBC News correspondent, Joe Michaels.

MICHAELS (O.S.)

Exactly at 10 A.M., as always, the May Day ceremony officially began. The first part of the parade was the military section. I watched the mobile units going by to see if there was anything new. There wasn't. Most of the time, I kept my eye on the reviewing stand. From a reporter's point of view this is the most likely place to pick up anything of interest. And at about 10:45 - three-quarters of an hour after the parade began - I did notice something most unusual. An excited Marshal Vershinin, the head of the Soviet Air Force, arrived late. He entered at the rear of the reviewing stand, went up to Khrushchev, and whispered something in his ear. Of course it's only a guess, but I am inclined to believe that this was the moment Khrushchev

MICHAELS (O.S.)
(CONTINUED):

found out that the U-2 was down.

Dissolve to:

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY

If the manner in which Khrushchev learned the news is open to speculation, so is the manner in which our own key officials learned. According to Powers' testimony, his destination was to have been....

Dissolve to:

Stock
Shots of Bodo

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

...the NATO Air Base at Bodo, Norway a small fishing town at the edge of the Arctic Circle. The plane was due at 7 A.M., Washington time on May 1st. When it failed to arrive, this information must have been communicated to....

Dissolve to:

CIA Seal on Fence
CIA Building,
Through Barbed Wire
CIA Building,
Director's Parking
Sign in F.G.

the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency in Washington. In any event, by noon, five hours after the plane was due, it is known that word had already spread among a group of top Washington officials.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (O.S.) cont'd

At C.I.A., under whose direction the overflights were conducted, Director Allen Dulles had been advised.

Pentagon

At the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Gates knew about it.

N.A.S.A. Building

At N.A.S.A. - the National Aeronautics and Space Administration - which operated the scientific weather flight program of the U-2s, Director Keith Glennan and Deputy Director Lawrence Dryden also knew.

State Department Building

And at the Department of State, Under Secretary Douglas Dillor had been informed. What they did not know was that....

Dissolve to:

Night Shots of May Day Festivities

...in Moscow, as the May Day festivities continued into the night, Francis Gary Powers, the pilot of the U-2 was alive and already confined in a cell somewhere behind the forbidding walls of Lubyanka prison.

Dissolve to:

LS Night Washington

That same night of May 1, in Washington, our government began to take action. To tell us about it....

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (O.S.)
(CONTINUED):

Bourgholtzer.

NBC News State Dep't Correspondent,
Frank Bourgholtzer.

BOURGHOLTZER:

I've been told by persons whom I believe that there was a meeting not long after the word was received that the U-2 was missing. This was a meeting at a relatively low level of those persons who normally meet to discuss such intelligence problems.

At this meeting a rather routine decision was made to go ahead and put out a cover story; that is to say, a story that would cover for the record the fact that the plane was missing without revealing anything of its true mission.

Dissolve to:

Interior,
General Phillips

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

This is Brigadier General Thomas R. Phillips, U.S. Army Retired, a former specialist in intelligence and military affairs analyst for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

PHILLIPS:

From an intelligence point of view, the original cover story seemed to be particularly inept. One gets the impression, and I believe it's a true one, that it had been in the files for a long time. And when the U-2 came down, it was just yanked out of the files and issued.

A cover story has certain requirements. It must be credible. It must be a story that can be maintained; and it should not have too much detail. Anything that's missing in a cover story can be taken care of by saying the matter is being investigated.

The most striking thing was the failure to consider, in the cover story issued, the possibility that the pilot might be alive and the airplane might be intact.

Dissolve to:

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

As the events of the week of May first were to demonstrate, the story that was issued to "cover" the disappearance of

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (CONTINUED):

the U-2 failed to serve its purpose. This failure was not immediately apparent.

The days following May first were quiet ones, and the cover story first began to come to the surface on Tuesday, May third, in Istanbul, Turkey.

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Dissolve to:
Stock
Turkish Riots

On May third, Istanbul was a city under martial law, the atmosphere heavy with tension. Turkish students were rioting in protest over the stern police policies of Premier Menderes and his ruling party. Although the government was still in control, its downfall was only a few weeks off.

NATO Meeting

At the Municipal Palace in Istanbul, troops stood guard while, inside, a meeting of the NATO countries was taking place. Attending, was Secretary of State Christian Herter and a number of his top aides in the State Department. Among those covering the developments of the day was a Turkish reporter.

MLS Herter

THE U-2 AFFAIR

Dissolve to:

MLS Goren in
apartmentGOREN:

I'm Zeyyat Goren, United Press International Bureau Manager for Turkey.

It was a Tuesday morning, May the third. I was writing a story on the NATO Council Meeting and the anti-Menderes demonstrations. A stringer

of mine called me. He said he heard a story about an American plane missing -- somewhere in eastern Turkey -- from Incirlik Air Base at Adana.

After I got the tip, I called Incirlik Air Base and talked to the information sergeant, who gave me the details of the story.

MCU Goren

The sergeant said the story is true. The plane is missing since two days. And the last they have heard from the pilot, he has trouble with his oxygen supplies somewhere over Van Lake area - which, he added, is near to the Persian border. Of course, being a native of Turkey, I know Van Lake area is also near to the Russian border, which was the angle of my story - though I didn't know that day that this story will come such a big story.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

Dissolve to:

Ticker

Sound Effects

BILL FOX:

Dissolve to:

UPI New York

I'm Bill Fox, day cable editor for United Press International in New York. I was on duty on May 3rd when we received a dispatch from Istanbul, Turkey about eight o'clock in the morning reporting that a U.S. Air Force plane, a U-2, was reported missing somewhere in the rugged mountains of eastern Turkey in the area of Lake Van, which is near the Soviet border. I have here the original dispatch which we received by radio teletype from London. Of course, at the time I didn't know what a U-2 was, nor did I realize that we had a piece of history by the tail. But, the fact that an American airplane was missing in the general area of the Soviet border, I felt was newsworthy. Consequently, I rewrote the story, adding some information that another American plane had been downed in the same

MCU Fox

THE U-2 AFFAIR

BILL FOX (CONTINUED):

Story Being
Transmitted

general area about a year previously. I checked it with the foreign editor and sent it to the News Desk. From there it was put on our transcontinental A wire for simultaneous dispatch to all UPI subscribers throughout North America.

Teletype Operator

Dissolve to:
Composing Room
Washington Post

The text of our story went like this: A single engine U.S. Air Force plane with one man aboard was missing today near the Soviet border in the rugged mountains of southeastern Turkey. The plane was one of two that took off Sunday morning from Incirlik Air Base near Adana on a weather reconnaissance mission. One plane returned but the pilot of the missing craft reported that his oxygen equipment was out of order. Three C-54 planes from Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya under the command of Major Harry E. Hayes of Clarksville, Texas were combing the area in search of the missing plane, but thus far without success.

Type Moves to Presses

Presses Rolling

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (O.S.):

MLS
Presses turning
tilt down to man
reading paper

The cover story appeared in print on the morning of May 4th. At the time, it was so unimportant that only a handful of papers across the country carried it - and only one, the Washington Post and Times Herald ran it on the front page...

CU
U-2 story
on page 1

...a small story that was eliminated in later editions to make room for a baseball headline.

Dissolve to:
Ext. Washington
Over shoulder of man
reading Washington
Post of May 4th.
PAN to street and
newsstand

In Washington, on Wednesday, May 4th, there was not much to be found in the way of news.

Dissolve to:
Ike and Republican
Congressmen

In the morning, the President had breakfast with a number of Republican Congressmen, then chatted with them on the steps of the White House.

Dissolve to:

Stock
Ike signing wheat
agreement

Later in the morning, he signed an important wheat agreement with India, and in the afternoon played a round of golf.

Dissolve to:
Stock
New York Tulip show,
Mayor Wagner cutting
ribbon; Cardinal Spell-
man standing by

In New York, Mayor Wagner presided at the opening of a tulip display. Spring was on its way.

HUNTLEY (O.S.) cont'd

Dissolve to:

Stock
Elysee Palace and
workmen

And in Paris, workmen were busy tidying
up the Elysee Palace for a summit con-
ference that would never be held.

Parisian children
playing

All in all, it was a quiet day, May 4th
- the last such day the world would
know for some time to come

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

We'll continue with the U-2 Affair
after this message from TIMEX and Miss
Julia Mead.

FADE OUT:

FADE IN:

SECOND COMMERCIAL

FADE OUT:

FADE IN:

Stock
LS Moscow

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Moscow, Thursday, May 5th. NBC News
Correspondent Joe Michaels again
reporting.

Dissolve to:

Stock
Meeting of Supreme
Soviet at which K
announces plane shot
down

MICHAELS (O.S.):

On Thursday morning, May 5th, I was
present in the Hall of the great Kremlin
Palace as the Supreme Soviet began its
three-day meeting. First on the agenda

MICHAELS (O.S.) cont'd

was a speech by Premier Khrushchev. At 10 a.m. Khrushchev began his three-and-a-half hour address. Most of it dealt with such matters as tax reform, wages, prices, currency change, and so forth. But towards the end, he suddenly introduced a new theme. To a stunned and startled audience, Khrushchev announced that an American U-2 spy plane had been shot down in the Soviet Union. He did not specify where, and he did not indicate the fate of the pilot. He went on to warn those countries harboring United States bases that they were "playing with fire" and promised a stern protest to the United States and to the United Nations. But he added, "I do not doubt President Eisenhower's sincere desire for peace. Reason must guide us."

STUDIO
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

With Khrushchev's speech, the U-2 affair had become a full-blown crisis. The world was waiting for our government to respond, and respond we did - during a two-day period of chaos.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Dissolve to:

Bourgholtzer

Scherer

He turns to camera

...NBC News State Department Correspondent Frank Bourgholtzer...

...and White House correspondent, Ray Scherer, were following the story as it developed.

SCHERER:

At the time the U-2 incident broke into the headlines, events were moving so rapidly and we were all so close to the story that none of us could really follow its ramifications. Now, with the passage of time, certain things have become clarified.

We know, for example, that following the National Security Council meeting on May 5th, the President called together a small group to discuss how to handle the situation. Two decisions emerged from this meeting; one, to continue with the cover story that had already been planted; and two, that any statement by this government on the situation would come only from the State Department. This latter decision was not implemented. In a recent discussion with Jim Hagerty, Frank Bourgholtzer and I questioned him about that.

SCHERER:

Hagerty interview

Now after you saw us on that Thursday morning and told us that the President had asked for a full investigation, you referred us to NASA and to the State Department for further information.

HAGERTY:

That is right.

SCHERER:

Now I went over from the White House to NASA upon hearing your word they would have a statement. They seemed to know nothing about it. They weren't prepared to make a statement. But they did make one later. Why was the time --

HAGERTY

Ray, I don't know. I can't answer that.

SCHERER:

Were you in on the framing of their statement?

HAGERTY:

No, I was not.

SCHERER:

Just to establish a further point, did the men at NASA, and did the men in the State Department involved in the cover

THE U-2 AFFAIR

SCHERER:(Cont'd)

story know it was a cover story, or were they simply agents?

HAGERTY:

That I cannot answer. I do not know.

Dissolve to:

Bourgholtzer

BOURGHOLTZER:

On the morning of May the fifth I was at the State Department. We were waiting with more than normal curiosity for Link White's daily briefing. He came out to see us at twelve forty-five and he read the following statement:

Stock
White Statement
May 5

WHITE:

The Department has been informed by N.A.S.A. that, as announced May three, an unarmed plane - a U-2 weather research plane based at Adana, Turkey, piloted by a civilian, has been missing since May one. During the flight of this plane, the pilot reported difficulty with his oxygen equipment. Mr. Khrushchev has announced that a U.S. plane has been shot down over the U.S.S.R. on that date. It may be that this was the missing plane. It is entirely possible that having a failure

WHITE: (cont'd)

in the oxygen equipment, which could result in the pilot losing consciousness, the plane continued on automatic pilot for a considerable distance and accidentally violated Soviet airspace. The United States is taking this matter up with the Soviet Government, with particular reference to the fate of the pilot.

Bourgholtzer

BOURGHOLTZER:

Thinking back to the answers Link White gave to the many questions we later posed...it is perfectly clear that he had not been informed of any decision to make the State Department the sole spokesman about the U-2. When reporters pressed him for details...he volunteered the information that "infinitely more detail" was being given out at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Scherer

SCHERER:

At 12:15 on May 5th, as soon as the Hagerty News Conference was over, I followed his suggestion, ran from the White House across Lafayette Park to

Scherer

SCHERER: (cont'd)

NASA. I was the first reporter to arrive. I said I have come for the statement. And they said, "What statement?" I said, "The statement that Jim Hagerty said that you were going to put out." Well that seemed to confuse them. They didn't know anything about any such statement. They finally took me into see Walt Bonney, the Information Chief. He didn't know anything about it either. There was a lot of conferring and some more confusion...Other reporters arrived. Well, I finally left and I had the impression that there wouldn't be any statement. But at 1:30 p.m., Bonney did release a statement that attempted to answer the questions reporters had been asking him.

Stock
Bonney

BONNEY:

Now, if the pilot continued to suffer lack of oxygen, the path of the airplane, from the last reported position, would be impossible to determine.

SCHERER: (Partially O.S.)

Scherer

The Bonney statement went considerably beyond that of the State Department. For instance, there were details about the supposed U-2 flight plan, how many U-2s we had, where they were stationed, and so forth. The statement was so detailed that it raised almost as many questions as it answered.

For example, Bonney contended that the U-2 had taken off from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey at 8 a.m. local time. This was considerably later than the time announced in Khrushchev's speech, and reporters were quick to notice the discrepancy.

Dissolve to:

Studio
HuntleyHUNTLEY:

One more incident occurred in Washington on that confusing May 5th which is worth noting. Late in the afternoon, a telegram was received from Ambassador Thompson, in Moscow, advising the State Department of the possibility that Powers might be alive. Despite this warning, on the following day we still seemed curiously unaware of the full potentialities of the situation.

Stock
President and
Roberts at
Exhibit

HUNTLEY (O.S.):

On the morning of Friday, May 6th, President Eisenhower attended a union industrial exhibit. Reporter Charles Roberts, of Newsweek Magazine, was there.

ROBERTS: (Partially O.S.)

On Friday, May 6th, I was standing just two feet from President Eisenhower when he gave his first public reaction to the U-2 incident. At a Union Industry Show in the Washington Armory, talking to George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, he remarked that he was going to give a hydrojet boat to Khrushchev on his trip to Russia. Then, he added the phrase, if I go. Up until then the White House had refused to comment on the U-2 incident or acknowledge in any way that it had disturbed our relations with the Soviet Union. After the show, around noon on Friday, Ike climbed into his helicopter, outside the armory, and flew to Gettysburg where, that afternoon, he played a round of golf. Some of us were surprised that he flew to Gettysburg in time of crisis - but the White House

Dissolve to:

Helicopter
leaves

Roberts
on golf course

THE U-2 AFFAIR

ROBERTS: (continued)

has always insisted that with modern communications the President can run the government from his Gettysburg farmhouse as well as he can from the White House.

Dissolve to:

Stock
Herter's return

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Later that same afternoon, Secretary of State Herter returned from abroad. Despite the crisis, it would still be two days before he and the President were to see one another.

Dissolve to:

Lincoln White
Press Conference

And at the State Department, in his press conference that day, held in a setting similar to this, it was evident that Lincoln White had still not been advised to exercise caution. In response to questioning by reporters, he said, "It is ridiculous to say we are trying to kid the world about this."

HUNTLEY (O.S.) cont.d

Later, he added, "There was absolutely no...N-O...no deliberate attempt to violate Soviet air space and there has never been."

Dissolve to:

Stock
Khrushchev's
May 7 speech

HUNTLEY (O.S.):

Saturday morning, May 7th.....
.....for Nikita Khrushchev, a day of triumph.

KHRUSHCHEV - Audio

HUNTLEY (O.S.):

Once the applause of the Supreme Soviet quieted down, Khrushchev revealed a secret that he had been keeping almost a week. He displayed photographs, which he said were taken from the captured U-2, and announced that the pilot was alive and had confessed. Then he said, of the Americans, "When they learn that the pilot is alive, they will have to think of something else...and they will."

Khrushchev
waves photos

Headlines

TICKER EFFECT

HUNTLEY:

Khrushchev's announcement had blown our cover story to pieces. Newsweek correspondent, Charles Roberts, continues with his report of developments in Gettysburg that day.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

Charles Roberts

ROBERTS: (PARTIAL O.S.)

Early Saturday morning, May 7th, a number of reporters, including myself, came up to Gettysburg to cover late developments.

Stock
Gettysburg and
Press Conference

White House News Secretary James Hagerty had promised us a story that morning, and we thought it would relate in some way to the U-2. At nine thirty-six, while the President was out playing golf, we sat down with Hagerty at a make-shift press room at the Gettysburg hotel. To our astonishment, the story he promised concerned nuclear testing.

He announced that the United States was prepared to resume nuclear testing as soon as possible - as he put it. The tests were to be for the purpose of improving means of detecting underground blasts - a step towards policing a nuclear test ban. But we were still surprised that the government would put out an announcement, while it was under fire for aerial spying, that might be interpreted as a new cold war maneuver. Hagerty still refused to discuss the U-2 incident. He said he had informed the President of Khrushchev's latest

THE U-2 AFFAIR

Roberts

speech, but that he would have no comment. Any reaction, he said, would have to come from the State Department. Meantime, Ike had been on the golf course since 9:05. He finished his round at 11:28 - score unreported. Then, he returned to the farmhouse, where he spent the remainder of the day. During that day, at the State Department in Washington, a crucial meeting was held to work out an answer to Khrushchev's latest speech. The President did not attend that meeting, but Hagerty informed us that Ike was in contact with Secretary of State Herter by phone during the day. Late in the afternoon, a statement was read to the President by phone - and he approved it without change. At six p.m. Lincoln White of the State Department read that statement to newsmen.

Stock
White Statement

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Only the previous day, Lincoln White had said, "There was absolutely no deliberate attempt to violate Soviet air space and there never has been." Now he was stating something different.

WHITE:

As a result of the inquiry ordered by

WHITE (CONT'D)

the President it has been established that insofar as the authorities in Washington are concerned, there was no authorization for any such flight as described by Mr. Khrushchev. Nevertheless it appears that in endeavoring to obtain information now concealed behind the iron curtain a flight over Soviet territory was probably undertaken by an unarmed civilian U-2 plane.

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

This one statement, agreed upon at a hastily convened meeting, represented a historic decision - our government was, in effect, admitting that we had previously lied, and that we had committed espionage - admissions no nation had ever made before.

Headlines

TICKER

Man on street
interviews

Q:

How will this incident affect the United States, do you think?

YOUTH

I feel that it will give the Americans a 'black eye' all over Europe.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

MAN 1:

My feeling is that the country did the right thing in sending these planes over - or this plane over. Because we have to keep abreast of the Russians, as far as the information is concerned.

MAN 2:

I think that if we fly over Russian territory, we take the chance of being shot down because of engaging in espionage - the same as we would do to them if they flew over our territory.

MAN 3:

I think that we ought to sink one of those submarines that have been spying off Cape Canaveral.

WOMAN:

Well, I don't think we should admit it. Yes. Yes. Never mind what the pilot said. We have a right to protect ourselves.

MAN 4:

Thinking it over, I think the State Department has really erred in the whole thing. They got a mix-up there. They don't seem to be coordinated. The one doesn't know what the other is doing.

Q:

What do you think about it?

WOMAN 2:

Well, I can only say what we were told in Church yesterday. We should pray for that boy. He needs it.

Stock
Eisenhower
Press Conference

HUNTLEY (O.S.):

On Wednesday, May 11th, President Eisenhower answered the one major question that remained: who had authorized the flights?

MCU Eisenhower

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER:

Our deterrent must never be placed in

jeopardy. The safety of the whole free world demands this. As the Secretary of State pointed out in his recent statement, ever since the beginning of my Administration I have issued directives to gather, in every feasible way, the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for defense.

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

The President himself had assumed responsibility for authorizing the program of intelligence flights. We have learned that C.I.A. Director, Allen Dulles, had offered to serve as the traditional scapegoat and to resign. However, this is not the course the President chose. This avowal of responsibility by a head of state for intelligence activities was unprecedented in the history of international relations. It is a decision that has been the subject of considerable debate. Here are the views of the Chairman of the Senate Committee that investigated the U-2 Affair - Senator William Fulbright - and of the President's Press Secretary, James Hagerty.

Fulbright

Hagerty

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HAGERTY (cont'd)

There is a great deal of puzzlement in my own mind of people that say why did the President or the government of the United States take responsibility. Well now this is something new that has been added to my world. If you gentlemen are spies, and I am not, and you get caught, I can say I never heard of you, or saw you before. But if you strap a U-2 to your back, it is a little difficult, to say the least, not to admit and assume responsibility.

Fulbright

FULBRIGHT

The President need never have avowed or disavowed is the point I make. He should have taken the position of silence in this matter and let the uh if anyone had to take responsibility, it should have been the head of the intelligence.

MCU Fulbright

Uh it should have to depend on circumstances as to who avowed or disavowed anything but it shouldn't have been the President who as I say embodies the whole sovereignty and dignity of the whole American people. I think personally this was perhaps the most serious fault in this whole operation, this whole incident.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

Studio
HuntleyHUNTLEY:

Coupled with the President's assuming responsibility for the U-2 flights, was our attempt to justify our right to engage in them.

Hagerty

HAGERTY:

As the President himself at a press conference and in speeches said, when a closed society makes threats against our very welfare, it is up to us to find out everything we can about such a closed society, whether they are preparing for war, whether they are building up, and also the determination of the members of the government that there will never be another Pearl Harbor if they have anything to do about it.

Fulbright

Fulbright:

I think one of the most serious things to uh growing out of this, was our endeavor, on the part of our people, to justify uh this-these flights. Uh, to say you need something such as intelligence in international relations certainly is no justification for it. But in the position the President took he was in fact asserting the right to

THE U-2 AFFAIR

do this and not the need. They could understand the need. They understand that espionage goes on within certain areas all the time. But they never take full responsibility for it. The head of state does not. I think that it's responsible to believe that this avowal put Mr. Khrushchev in the position where he could not proceed to treat with the man who at the same time is asserting the right to violate the sovereignty of his country, in this case, the U.S.S.R.

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

Following our avowal of the U-2 flights, one more significant question was raised during the week preceding the summit conference - the question of whether the flights would be continued. As the week began this became a source of apparently deliberate confusion.

Scherer

SCHERER:

On Monday morning May 9th, The New York Times carried a story saying, "It was learned that the President had ordered cessation of all flights over or near the borders of the U.S.S.R." Well, later that morning, at Jim Hagerty's

THE U-2 AFFAIR

SCH ERER (CONT'D)

News Conference, we asked him whether the flights had been cancelled. He said that the President had not cancelled the flights. When asked whether they had been cancelled by any order other than the President, Jim answered, "I know of no such orders." Well the impression we were left with was that despite the events of the last few days, the U-2 flights were still going on. This impression was reinforced by a statement of Secretary of State Herter, which was released by Lincoln White the same afternoon.

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

Although the administration had denied that it intended to imply that the flights would continue, this was the inference that was drawn by most observers. All these events led to an atmosphere of increasing tension as the summit conference approached.

EXHIBIT of U-2
wreckage, CU's
of equipment,
pistol, money
Power's boot

HUNTLEY: (O.S.)

In the Soviet Union, Khrushchev toured an exhibit that opened in Gorki Park. Here in a hall customarily devoted to the pasttime of chess, the Russians had put on display remnants of the plane,

HUNTLEY (O.S.) cont'd

its equipment, and the pilot's personal effects.

Stock
Khrushchev
Press Conference

Later, in an impromptu press conference, Khrushchev reacted violently to what he termed our threat to continue the flights. He cancelled his invitation to President Eisenhower for a visit to the Soviet Union that had been planned for the following month.

Stock
Senate Briefing

And in Washington, as Administration leaders explained their decision to Congress, the beginning of a major controversy, involving both this country and its allies, was already apparent.

Bowles

CHESTER BOWLES:

We have certainly lost ground. Major elements in our government have been caught telling blatant falsehoods to the world, to ourselves, to each other, and to Congressional committees. We have not told the truth. We have taken grave risks on the very eve of a great and important international conference. And we put the President in a position of not knowing who keeps score.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

Goldwater

BARRY GOLDWATER:

We have nothing to gain by going to the summit. We have nothing to negotiate at the summit. And about all we can do is to add dignity to this last beastly act of the Soviets. And I hope the President decides not to go. How can you negotiate with murderers? How can you negotiate with people who have shot down numbers of our planes. How do you negotiate with people who tell lies and who do not fulfill their solemn obligations? I don't think you can gain anything by going to the summit with these type of people. I think we ought to realize, in this country, that we're in a cold war and we better be in this war to win it - and start acting like it.

Lester Pearson

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

The former Foreign Minister of Canada:

PEARSON:

It was pretty stupid, on the part of the United States, if I may say so, for getting its self in a position, before the summit conference, that the Soviets could exploit an incident of this kind.

PEARSON: (cont'd)

In other words, I don't think they've handled the matter very well...As long as the cold war goes on, governments are going to collect intelligence, legally or illegally, and the Russians are at the forefront of that parade. But if you do this kind of thing - collect intelligence - you should do it intelligently.

HUNTLEY (O.S.):

Ike leaving for summit - helicopter lands, he gets out, walks to plane, takes off

On Saturday, May 14th, President Eisenhower left the White House by helicopter to board the plane that would take him to Paris. The trip that was to have been the capstone of his career was already foredoomed to a failure that he, least of all, would have wanted. As James Reston had written in The New York Times, "The tragedy of President Eisenhower in the spy-plane case is that he and his colleagues have created almost all the things he feared the most. He wanted to reduce international tensions and he has increased it. He wanted to strengthen the alliance and he has weakened it. He glorified teamwork and morality, and got lies and administrative chaos. Everything he was noted

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (CONT'D)

for - caution, patience, leadership, military skill, and even good luck - suddenly eluded him precisely at the moment he needed them the most.

Ike at Orly
Airport

What happened after the President's arrival has become part of the folklore of history. The conference that was ^{to be} held

Elysee Palace

at the Elysee Palace was never formally convened. After bitterly attacking the President of the United States, Premier Khrushchev stalked out of the first preliminary meeting. And before returning to Moscow...

Khrushchev at press
conference of May 18th,
pounding table
and shouting

...he began what has since become an all too familiar pattern of public performances.

KHRUSHCHEV AUDIO:

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Stock
Russian Demonstrations

The Russians now exploited to the fullest the propaganda advantage we had given them with the U-2. Whether the incident was chiefly responsible for the summit failure is still being debated: but it did provide ammunition for the Russians as they intensified cold war pressures throughout the world. Fear of Russian rockets in the months following the

British anti-
bases demonstrations

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (CONT'D)

summit made American bases the object of an increasing number of protest demonstrations.

Japanese
demonstrations

SOUND EFFECTS

The United States found itself embarrassing on the defensive - and in the riots against the Japanese-American Security Treaty, even high United States officials were caught in the storm.

SOUND EFFECT

Hagerty Interview

SCHERER:

Jim, by way of taking a longer look at this whole U-2 incident, now that the dust has settled somewhat, how do you think the United States came out of it?

HAGERTY:

Well, I think they came out very well. I think that basically the argument of an open society versus a closed society has been very well brought to the fore, has been brought to the attention of the peoples of the world. I think that is an overseas reaction. I think domestically the reaction of the American people quite frankly was "It was too bad we got caught, but we are glad we were doing it." That is the way I would sum it up.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

BOURGHOLTZER:

Do you, looking back, think that if you had it to do over again, you might have done anything in some different fashion?

HAGERTY:

No, with the exception that I think everybody admits, of the failure of the cover story. But outside of that, no.

SCHERER:

As you look back on this U-2 incident, who was in charge of our side of the thing as it developed - issuing of statements, coordination of policy, the whole aspect?

HAGERTY:

Well, I just can't answer that, Ray, I am sorry.

SCHERER:

Having had this experience, and now speaking with the benefit of hindsight, what lessons emerged from this for the future?

HAGERTY:

Don't get caught.

HUNTLEY:

At the hearings held by the Fulbright Committee, the Secretary of State, Mr. Herter, was also asked what lessons could

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY: (cont'd)

be learned from the U-2 affair. His answer was "Not to have accidents." We leave it to the American public to decide whether "Don't get caught" and "Not to have accidents" are the only lessons to be learned from U-2.

What you have seen in the past hour is an attempt at a historical evaluation of a most controversial subject, including opposing viewpoints on the matter. Over thirty responsible reporters who covered this story as it unfolded contributed to this effort. There are certain conclusions that may reasonably be drawn from the facts examined in this report.

1. The cover story was inadequate to its mission. It was hastily released, excessive in detail and failed to take account of the possibility that Powers might be alive.
2. As the U-2 crisis developed, there was a serious lack of coordination among the governmental agencies involved, which resulted in conflicting and damaging statements to the world.

HUNTLEY: (cont'd)

3. By avowing the intelligence flights, an act unprecedented in the history of nations, our government suffered the consequences of having been caught in public misstatements.

4. Nobody expects the United States, or any other nation to stop intelligence activities, but by justifying the U-2 flights and implying they would continue, we materially affected the Summit Conference. If Khrushchev intended to wreck the conference beforehand, we gave him a ready made excuse. If he intended to negotiate, we made it difficult for him to do so.

5. Throughout the whole U-2 affair, we suffered from the fact that there was apparently no one official or agency to direct our total response to this crisis.

This is not a matter for the history books, but vitally affects our ability to survive as a nation. There will be other crises that the new administration, and succeeding administrations, will have to face. In the world as it is today, we cannot afford another U-2 affair. Good night.

Fade out

C05492917

ANNEX 94

From Rudolf I. Abel
#80016

June 12, 1960

To Mr. James B. Donovan, 160 William St., New York

Dear Jim,

I received your letter of June 6th. In the past week I also received a letter from Mr. Powers, the father of the U-2 pilot. He writes as follows:

Address: Pound Va.
June 2, 1960

"Dear Colonel Abel,

I am the father of Francis Gary Powers who is connected with the U-2 plane incident of several weeks ago. I am quite sure that you are familiar with this international incident and also the fact that my son is being currently held by the Soviet Union on an espionage charge. You can readily understand the concern that a father would have for his son and for a strong desire to have my son released and brought home. My present feeling is that I would be more than happy to approach the State Department and the President of the United States for exchange for the release of my son. By this I mean that I would urge and do everything possible to have my Government release you and return you to your country if the powers in your country would release my son and let him return to me. If you are inclined to go along with this arrangement I would appreciate your so advising me and also so advising the powers in your country along these lines.

I would appreciate hearing from you in this regard as soon as possible.

Very truly yours,

Signed: Oliver Powers"

I replied to him as follows:

"Dear Mr. Powers,

Your letter of June 2nd received June 10th.

Much as I appreciate and understand your concern for the safety and return of your son, I regret to say

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM

that, all things considered, I am not the person to whom your request should have been directed. Obviously, this should be my wife. Unfortunately, by order of the Department of Justice, U.S., I am not permitted to write to my family and so cannot convey your request to them directly.

Sincerely yours,

Signed: R. I. Abel"

However, I do think that my family should be informed of this step of Mr. Powers and that copies of his letter and my reply should be sent to my wife's lawyer in East Berlin. I would like you to send a copy of the letter from the Dept. of Justice dated May 25th that you enclosed in your letter of June 6th also to this lawyer.

Regarding this latter letter, it does little more than reiterate the previous letter on this matter. The "little more" is the allusion to Powers and the matter of the fine. This has been taken care of, while the Powers affair is not in my competency and complaints about his treatment should be addressed elsewhere.

Since the Dept. of Justice regard their position as one of prison administration, the proper place to initiate court action is not with Judge Byers but with the Federal District Court here in Atlanta where the penitentiary is located. I would like you to take the necessary steps in this direction on your return from Europe.

Incidentally, there might be some benefit if you could meet my wife's lawyer when you visit Switzerland. I imagine that he would have no difficulty in doing so, and you could give him a much clearer picture of what is going on than any exchange of letters can do.

Hoping you have a good trip

Sincerely yours,

Rudolf I. Abel
#80016

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM

C05492917

ANNEX 95

~~SECRET~~Attachment to
IDEA-0189
23 February 1961Release Procedures -- Francis Gary Powers1. Situation

A. Mr. Francis Gary Powers has been sentenced to 10 years in a Soviet prison and is now serving that sentence. It is possible, however, that it might better serve Russian propaganda purposes to release Mr. Powers prior to the termination of his prison sentence. The press has speculated to this effect, and Mr. Powers has mentioned the possibility of an early release in a letter to his father. Two additional factors that have given rise to speculation about Mr. Powers' release are the return of the RB-47 crew members and the expressed Russian friendship for the new Administration. Although the United States does not have any formal or informal information indicating an early release, it appears appropriate to consider the procedures to be followed in the event Mr. Powers returns to the United States in the near future.

B. Any planning for this contingency, of course, is hampered by lack of knowledge relative to Mr. Powers' attitude and desires and the timing and circumstances surrounding Mr. Powers' release. It might be noted, in relation to Mr. Powers' attitude toward the United States Government, that he has been under Soviet control since 1 May 1960 and has mentioned in his letters that he is constantly in the company of his cellmate, whom he has not mentioned by name, apparently speaks good English and is helping Mr. Powers in his study of Russian. The cellmate could possibly be a government "plant" engaged in subtle psychological preparation for the time of release.

C. In order to formulate a plan of action, nevertheless, some basic assumptions must be made. For purposes of the below-mentioned plan, it is assumed that Mr. Powers will cooperate with the United States authorities to the extent necessary to carry out procedures outlined below. It is further assumed that Mr. Powers will be turned over to United States authorities at the United States Embassy at Moscow or possibly transported by Soviet aircraft to Berlin, where he would be turned over to United States authorities.

~~SECRET~~Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~SECRET~~

2. Press Release Policy:

A. Generally, every effort will be made to minimize press releases by United States Government authorities and Mr. Powers himself. The spokesman for the United States Government will be the Department of State with releases by the President's press secretary as deemed appropriate by the President.

B. Mr. Powers will be encouraged to make a brief statement upon his arrival in Europe, stating substantially as follows: "I am glad to be on my way back to the United States and anxious to see my wife and family. I have no particular plans for the immediate future except to visit with my family and consult with certain United States authorities. I do not desire to make any public statements in relation to the incident or my trial until I have thoroughly discussed the matter with these authorities." The Department of State will announce Mr. Powers' release in a short statement relating to the mechanics of his turnover. Such a statement might be: "Mr. Francis Gary Powers, imprisoned American flyer, was released from his Soviet prison today and turned over to the United States Embassy in Moscow. Mr. Powers will be flown back to the United States as soon as transportation is available. In the interest of Soviet-U. S. relations, for the present no press conferences will be held or further comments made by the U. S. Government relative to the U-2 incident or Mr. Powers' trial."

C. Mr. Powers will be thoroughly briefed at the United States Embassy in Moscow or Consulate in Berlin prior to meeting any members of the press. Some of the points to be covered in the briefing, the substance of which will be pouched or cabled to Moscow or Berlin as time permits, will be:

(1) The reaction of the press and the American public to Mr. Powers' return to the United States cannot be predicted and, therefore, Mr. Powers should be prepared for the worst.

(2) Despite any derogatory comments or demonstrations heard or observed by Mr. Powers on his trip home, Mr. Powers should know that these statements do not reflect the attitude of the U. S. Government.

~~SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~SECRET~~

(3) It is the recommendation of United States Government authorities that Mr. Powers make as few public statements as possible and limit these statements to brief descriptions of his state of health and treatment while in Russia. He should express his desire to proceed to the United States as soon as possible and rejoin his wife and family and at all costs avoid any statements and comments about the incident of the trial.

(4) Mr. Powers should continually bear in mind that the first statements he makes will be long remembered and widely quoted. These statements will also be misquoted and, perhaps in many cases, misinterpreted. Mr. Powers should follow the rule that the less said the better.

(5) Mr. Powers should also be aware that members of his family will also be subjected to pressures from the press and, therefore, he should refrain from discussing politically sensitive matters with them.

(6) Mr. Powers should be advised that the public, and therefore the press, is keenly interested in certain questions, the answers to which have deep political consequences and should not be answered by Mr. Powers in the interest of National Security and his own interest as well. The most sensitive of these questions are:

(a) Were you actually shot down at 68,000 feet or did you descend to a lower altitude before the incident occurred?

(b) What type of interrogation methods did the Russians use?

(c) What were your instructions in the event of capture?

(d) What are your feelings about your testimony at the trial now that you have returned to the United States?

(7) Mr. Powers should be advised of travel plans and cautioned not to enter into discussions with anyone other than his Department of State escort for the first leg of his trip back to the U.S.

~~SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~SECRET~~

(8) Mr. Powers should be reminded that his revelation of CIA affiliation was designed to identify the activity as a non-military undertaking. The protection of the extent to which the military was involved in the program is still extremely important and, therefore, Mr. Powers should avoid any discussion of military personalities or support to the program.

3. Transportation

A. If Mr. Powers is released to U. S. authorities at the U. S. Embassy in a city behind the iron curtain (Moscow appears to be the most likely city), he will be flown via commercial airliner to a European city, escorted by a Department of State consular officer. The Agency will bear the cost of this travel for both Mr. Powers and the consular officer. In the event Mr. Powers is turned over at a city in the Western world, the subsequent portions of this plan will apply, substituting the point of release for the "European city" mentioned above.

B. Transportation from the European city to the United States should be by the most expeditious and secure method. The use of a scheduled commercial airliner is not considered the optimum, since the press would have the maximum opportunity for exposure to Mr. Powers on the airliner and at the various stop-overs. More control over the press and Mr. Powers could be experienced by the U. S. Government if Mr. Powers could be flown back from the European city to Washington via a USAF Special Air Missions flight. This flight will be arranged by DPD-DD/P.

C. In the event that the Department of State or the USAF is queried about the use of a USAF aircraft for this purpose, these authorities will indicate that the airlift was requested by another (unspecified) department of the United States Government, and the request was granted by the USAF.

D. The crew of the USAF aircraft should file appropriate flight clearances, indicating the ultimate destination of the aircraft as Andrews AFB. This fact should not be given out by the crew. For diversionary purposes, the aircraft will make an unscheduled landing at Dover AFB, Delaware, where onward transportation will be available. DPD will provide a security escort, who is known to Mr. Powers as a personal friend as well as a security agent, for the USAF leg of the

~~SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

return trip to the ZI. Mr. John Gittinger, a consultant to the Agency on psychological matters, will also accompany the flight. Both Mr. White, the security escort, and Mr. Gittinger will interview Mr. Powers to determine his attitudes and desires.

E. Special arrangements for expeditious transfer of Mr. Powers from one aircraft to another, minimum press contact at layover points, and customs and immigration clearances must be made at each stop by the Agency station involved with cooperation from Department of State personnel and local officials. The Agency station will work in the background and utilize Department of State and other appropriate overt officials to make physical contact with Mr. Powers at stopover points. USAF representatives and officials will likewise remain in the background and not greet or be seen with Mr. Powers except for that minimum amount of contact necessary for boarding the aircraft.

4. Living Quarters in the ZI

A. Upon arrival in the ZI, Mr. Powers will be taken to a "safehouse" location where he will meet with his family in privacy. The most desirable location would be a rest house type facility on a military installation. Possibly a private estate that can be adequately secured by a commercial security service would serve the purpose. Arrangements for the procurement of an appropriate location will be made by IOS/OS/DDS

B. For an initial period (one week), Mr. Powers will visit with his family at the safehouse location. The family, other than his wife, who will stay with him during his entire stay at the safehouse, will be transported to and from the safehouse by Government transportation.

C. Every attempt will be made to discourage his family from attempting to meet Mr. Powers in Europe or any time prior to his arrival at the safehouse location. Contact with Mr. Powers' father will be maintained through the Department of State, while contact with his wife can be maintained directly by the Agency.

D. After Mr. Powers has visited with his family for a few days, he will be encouraged to indicate to his father and other relations that he would like to be alone with his wife for a few weeks, during

~~SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~SECRET~~

which period he plans to talk to certain U. S. Government authorities. The debriefings that take place at that time will be conducted by CI Staff/DDP and SRS/OS/DDS. Representatives of SR Division, DD/P, and DPD-DD/P will participate in debriefings pertaining to their particular areas of interest.

E. All queries by the press, in relation to Mr. Powers' whereabouts will be answered by the Department of State in a statement to the effect that "Mr. Powers is back in the U. S. visiting with his family and talking with various U. S. authorities."

5. Administration

A. Casualty Branch, Office of Personnel/DDS will handle the necessary administrative details of Powers' personal effects with him during the abovementioned debriefing period.

B. Powers' ultimate disposition will be determined by an Agency board of inquiry after debriefing reports have been prepared, disseminated, and evaluated by interested and responsible Agency senior officials.

~~SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

C05492917

ANNEX 96

~~SECRET~~

ER 61-8690

2 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Dean Rusk
The Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

SUBJECT: Powers - Abel Exchange

1. Francis Gary Powers, who is under sentence in the Soviet Union for violation of Soviet espionage laws, is under contract to the Central Intelligence Agency. He was apprehended by Soviet forces while on a prescribed mission for this Agency. After a thorough investigation based on the information available to us, we have concluded that Mr. Powers had carried out his duties as directed and, even though captured, has continued to conduct himself in a responsible manner. As far as we can determine, he has generally followed his instructions while a captive and has not communicated significantly damaging prohibited intelligence information to his Soviet captors. Therefore, this Agency is responsible to seek Francis Gary Powers' return to this country by all available means, as soon as possible.

2. While the Soviets may feel that they have fully exploited the propaganda to be gained from Powers' capture and trial, there is reason to believe that he has not disclosed to them information relating to the national interest which could be further exploited. Included is information concerning third-country overflights of a nature which could still be embarrassing to this Government.

3. From an intelligence and air operational standpoint, this Agency is most interested in interrogating Mr. Powers to learn the precise events which transpired on the first of May 1960 which resulted in his capture. He can furnish this Agency with technical information concerning his flight, behavior of the aircraft which resulted in the failure of his mission and his capture. We also desire information on his treatment and interrogation in the Soviet Union during the entire period he has been under the control of the Soviet Union.

~~SECRET~~HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM

~~S E C R E T~~

4. Since Mr. Powers' capture on 1 May 1960, this Agency has continuously worked toward the release by legal means of Francis Gary Powers. In this connection, we have worked with the Department of State and provided various types of support, including the preparation of legal briefs and working closely with civilian lawyers who worked diligently and long toward his release. This Agency has maintained Mr. Powers in a pay status and has made various provisions for the welfare of his wife. In regard to his wife, we should point out to you that she has recently been committed to a Georgia State mental hospital after being declared legally insane. Her commitment has raised serious problems of maintaining her husband's morale while a captive so that we are concerned that the information concerning his wife will not cause his Soviet captors to make new efforts to obtain more information from him. Since Mr. Powers has now been in Soviet hands almost eighteen months, we cannot be sure what his attitude would be to an exchange and his return to the United States, but his latest letters to his wife, which we have seen, indicate hope for his release and concern that the United States Government is not taking action which he believes would achieve his freedom.

5. In connection with efforts toward the release of Francis Gary Powers, the idea of an exchange of Powers for Colonel Abel has been again considered as a serious possibility since the wife of Colonel Rudolf Abel has raised the subject in a series of letters which she has written to President Kennedy and her husband's lawyer, James Donovan, in New York. The most recent letter from Mrs. Abel, which states that for the second time she has been to the Russian Embassy in Berlin, contains a key paragraph which reads as follows:

"I gathered from our Mrs. Abel/Russian Embassy talk that there is only one possible way to achieve success, that is simultaneous release of both Francis Powers and my husband, which can be arranged."

If, as we suspect, Mrs. Abel's letters are being written or guided by Soviet officials, this letter appears to open the door for direct negotiations on an exchange. It is the desire of this Agency that this avenue of communication and negotiation with the Soviet Union be continued and the release of Francis Gary Powers from the Soviet Union should be pressed for by this Government through negotiation.

~~S E C R E T~~

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM

~~S E C R E T~~

6. We realize that the release of Powers at this time through these particular negotiations must be weighed against the release of Colonel Abel. While Abel has maintained complete silence on his role within the Soviet intelligence apparatus, it is a fact that Colonel Abel was, and probably continues to be, an important cog in that apparatus. His release at this time, when he has served only a portion of his sentence, would be of value to Soviet intelligence.* On balance, however, we believe the national interest would best be served by the return of Powers even at the cost of Abel's release.

(Signed)
C. P. CABELL
General, USAF
Acting Director

* The following sentence appeared in the original OGC version of this memorandum, but was deleted at the instruction of General Cabell:

"It is painfully clear, however, that this Government is unable to determine what his exact role has been, and it is a fair conclusion that Abel's role will not be made known to this Government by him."

~~S E C R E T~~

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM

C05492917

ANNEX 97

~~SECRET~~C
O
P
Y

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 24, 1961

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

As you may know, for the past several months there has been taking place a monitored exchange of correspondence between James Donovan, court appointed attorney for Rudolf Abel, and an individual in Leipzig, Germany, identifying herself as Mrs. Abel. Mrs. Abel, possibly reflecting a Soviet Government position, has raised the possibility of a Powers-Abel exchange, one in which the CIA is interested.

The latest letter from Mrs. Abel, dated September 11, 1961 (enclosed), indicates more clearly than previously that an exchange "can be arranged." In the course of consultation with Mr. Oehmann of your office regarding the lines of a reply, Mr. Oehmann indicated that it would be helpful for you to have, in addition to the draft of a proposed reply, a statement setting forth the general views of the CIA and the Department for your consideration in weighing the various factors involved. The proposed reply to Mrs. Abel and a CIA memorandum on the subject are enclosed.

I do not believe that foreign policy considerations as such need be a factor influencing the Justice determination in consultation with the CIA as to whether we should proceed in an attempt to obtain the release of Powers in exchange for the release of Abel. While normally the Department seeks in every way to protect United States citizens incarcerated abroad, a special problem exists, of course, in connection with the Powers case. Bearing in mind the quid pro quo which would be required, and the present status of relations with the USSR, foreign policy considerations do not dictate one course of action or the other. Accordingly, in the present matter, I believe that the function of the Department of State is limited to guidance as to the form and manner of proceeding. I suggest a continuation of the Donovan-Mrs. Abel correspondence with the transmission to Mrs. Abel of a Donovan

The Honorable
Robert F. Kennedy,
Attorney General.

~~SECRET~~Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~SECRET~~

message along the lines of the enclosed draft. Should the Department of Justice and the CIA decide it to be in the net United States interest to attempt a Powers-Abel exchange and should subsequent letters from Mrs. Abel suggest more precisely the possibility of such a move, the Department will be prepared to consider with the Department of Justice and the CIA how this might most appropriately be put into effect.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed)

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. From Mrs. Abel,
dated September 11, 1961.
2. Proposed reply to Mrs. Abel.
3. CIA Memorandum.

~~SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

C05492917

ANNEX 98

~~TOP SECRET~~

NEGOTIATION OF POWERS/ABEL EXCHANGE

3 February 1962: BERLIN 7474 (IN 28235)

After negotiating controls at Friedrichstrasse S-Bahnhof with help of border guards who brought him to head of line when he indicated he had imminent appointment at Soviet Embassy, Donovan referred by receptionist at Soviet Embassy to the Soviet Consulate. There he was introduced to "Mrs. Abel", "Daughter", and "cousin of Mrs. Abel", a man about fifty-five years old, introduced as Mr. Reeves. The person portraying the role of Mrs. Abel impressed Donovan as a typical German but the daughter and cousin possibly not German nationality. After preliminary amenities regarding the welfare of Abel, Second Secretary of Soviet Embassy, Ivan Alexandrovich Shishkin (believed KGB) appeared and conducted the meeting. During the meeting the Abel family said nothing.

Donovan said he had come to Berlin on the basis of a message to the U.S. Headquarters, Berlin, conveyed from the East German lawyer Vogel via West German lawyer Stark purporting Soviet Government interest in exchanging Abel for Powers, Makinen and Pryor. Shishkin stated this proposal was entirely new to him and he would be compelled to obtain instructions from his government. Shishkin indicated he had commenced intercession on behalf of the Abel family about one year ago on the basis of a proposed exchange of Powers for Abel and this was the only proposal he was authorized to discuss. Donovan indicated that he, likewise, would be compelled to obtain instructions from his Government to discuss any other proposal than an exchange of Powers, Makinen and Pryor for Abel, indicating personal displeasure at having made the lengthy trip as a private citizen whose time was valuable if the message from Vogel purporting to be official was not in fact a genuine offer. Donovan posed the direct question to Mrs. Abel whether she had in fact suggested a three for one exchange to Vogel, but she appeared frightened and uncertain what to answer, whereupon Shishkin interceded and discussed the letter from Justice which Donovan presented in support of the validity of his claim that the U.S. was prepared to exchange Abel. Shishkin complained that the letter was "vague" but appeared satisfied with Donovan's explanation that it was deliberately so to avoid possible press leak. . . He explained that he had traveled to Berlin from London on special U.S. Government flight so his presence in Berlin was not known to any but a few government officials.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

Shishkin appeared impressed with the necessity for an early answer so Donovan could return to New York. He agreed to meet again Monday, 5 February at 1700 local. Donovan told Shishkin he could produce Abel 48 hours after agreement was reached, in Berlin, the exchange to be carried out with Donovan's personal participation, and that he must be back in the U. S. by Saturday, 10 February.

While it is difficult to predict Soviet reaction, we continue to feel there is a good possibility that they will accept a three for one exchange. While Shishkin commented toward the end of the meeting that the U. S. Government apparently wanted three for one, he seemed genuinely impressed with Donovan's response that "one artist is worth much more than three mechanics".

3 February 1962: ADIC 7388 (OUT 09034)

Opening gambit well done. Speculate as you must they may believe from the date of the Justice letter that the U. S. originally may have been ready for a one to one exchange. However overtures for a package deal were made as early as December 18 and should be no surprise to the Soviets. Therefore press for three to one stating place and details could be set at once.

If Monday reaction indicates to Donovan there is no hope of three to one, he should say he must refer back for further instructions.

The door must be left open for a one to one Powers for Abel but every effort desirable for three to one.

Seems to us advisable to softplay Vogel approach unless the Soviets appear to adopt it.

If further meeting is necessary, suggest Tuesday afternoon as we can respond quickly.

State concurs this message.

5 February 1962: BERLIN 7500 (IN 28344)

Following is Donovan account of events afternoon 5 February. Donovan returned to Soviet Embassy East Berlin at proper time (1700 hours

2

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

local). Daughter and cousin (cousin's name was spelled for Donovan upon his request and is Drews, who took a more active part this time and acted as sole interpreter in later conference with Attorney Vogel) were in the anteroom but not mother, who was "nervous" and did not attend the meeting but stayed in the hotel.

Shishkin invited Donovan to a private conference leaving the Abels in the anteroom. Donovan presented a brief note from Mr. Lightner stating authorization to proceed to East Berlin in connection with business at the Soviet Embassy. Shishkin read the note carefully and said "while not doubting Donovan's integrity on Saturday, one must be careful about such things". Shishkin inquired whether Donovan had reported to his government on the Saturday meeting and what instructions Donovan had received. Donovan replied that he had fully reported and had been instructed to return on 5 February to hear from Shishkin what, if any, further instructions he had received.

Shishkin very formally opened portfolio on his desk and read a message from Moscow. The message said that "the Soviet Government through human feelings will exchange Powers for Abel. This human act on both sides and the elimination of permanent source of anti-Soviet propaganda should contribute to better relations between countries. If the Americans are interested in freeing of Makinen who is now in Kiev, the Soviet Government is ready to exchange Abel for Makinen but the simultaneous exchange of both Powers and Makinen for Abel is impossible. It is up to Americans to make their choice. If the matter is properly concluded and better relations result, further developments could occur." (Donovan gained the impression this statement was intended to imply that the Soviets might be inclined to give clemency to Makinen at some time in the not too distant future.) As to Pryor, this matter was out of the province of Soviet authorities but could be accomplished through the East German Government. This can be done through Miss Abel and her attorney Vogel who already has received favorable consideration by the East German Government. Shishkin has no further instructions. If the American Government is willing to proceed, Donovan should discuss the plan for exchange with Miss Abel which the Soviets then will consider. However, said Shishkin, American suggestion of Glienicke Bruecke "not bad". Donovan then left with Miss Abel and cousin.

On the way, Miss Abel and Donovan discussed possible procedure and tentatively agreed on Glienicke Bridge, Wednesday evening, 7 February,

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

at 2200 hours local, with postponement to Thursday evening, 8 February, same time, same place if, due to weather or other contingency, one of three to be exchanged cannot comply.

At Vogel's office, Vogel produced a letter from the Attorney General of East Germany dated 5 February and stating to Vogel that the East German Government would honor his petition for clemency of his client (Pryor) and agree to turn over of Pryor to American officials provided Americans on their part met the "conditions with which Vogel is familiar". The letter is signed by Windisch, State Attorney. Vogel provided a certified copy of this letter at Donovan's request. In answer to a specific question, Vogel stated he could deliver Pryor at the exchange place at the proper time. In response to Donovan's questioning, Vogel stated Pryor's father was visiting his office late 6 February and Vogel requested instructions. Donovan stated he should make no reference to this conference or Donovan's presence in Berlin. He should inform Pryor's father that Vogel's petition is proceeding very favorably and that Vogel expects a decision on Friday. Vogel agreed to this procedure. Vogel meeting was friendly with no reference by Donovan to broken promises re delivery of all three for Abel.

Donovan informed Shishkin and Vogel that while he has no further instructions from his government, he will attempt to deliver a reply as soon as possible 6 February to both Shishkin and Vogel. It is the clear impression of Donovan that the Soviets are making their final and maximum concessions in response to the strong position taken by Donovan last Saturday and also realize the necessity for a prompt decision. In Donovan's opinion we have achieved the maximum possible at this time and Washington should approve unless they wish to break off negotiations for an indefinite period. Request prompt advice, and if recommendations are accepted, ask that Abel's journey be immediately arranged with arrival at Berlin early Wednesday, 7 February. If approved, Donovan will send by messenger morning 6 February letters to Shishkin and Vogel accepting proposal to carry out an exchange of Powers and Pryor for Abel on Glienicke Bridge at 2200 hours local 7 February, with explanation that if due to weather or other conditions this cannot be done, each party should notify the other, which case exchange will take place Thursday night, 8 February, same time, same place.

Also request approval procedure suggested at New York briefing by which, after exchange is completed, Powers goes directly to waiting

4

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

aircraft while Donovan makes brief announcement at press conference called by General Clay and refers all further inquiries to his government in Washington. Donovan then returns home on Powers plane. (Pryor will be taken immediately to Frankfurt with parents notified and invited to accompany him.)

(Chief of Station Comment:

Fully concur Donovan's assessment improbable that further concessions can be gained from Soviets. Recommend we proceed with plan to exchange Powers and Pryor for Abel Wednesday evening, 7 February. Will discuss press announcement with Generals Clay and Watson and Mr. Lightner the morning of 6 February and advise if local command desires modification of Donovan proposal, but in the interim we plan such an announcement by Donovan immediately following exchange since almost inevitable that exchange will attract sufficient attention and result in police leak to the press indicating something occurred which will be best countered by direct announcement. This procedure also will provide for American press release at least simultaneously with Soviet release and serve to transfer further questioning re the exchange to Washington. Will also discuss question of notifying Pryor family and arrangements to transfer Pryors to Frankfurt with local command and make further recommendations.)

5 February 1962: BERLIN 7501 (IN 28345)

The following message has just been received (about 2205 hours local) on telephone number provided Shishkin by Donovan as emergency contact channel: "Unexpected difficulties have arisen. Urgent that I discuss this with you at 1100 hours 6 February in my office. Signed Vogel."

The caller gave the above message in German after utilizing the proper agreed recognition signal on the phone and establishing in addition that he was connected with the correct number. The fact that message was in German and signed Vogel indicates that meeting desired by Vogel in his office in Friedrichsfelde (rather distant from Soviet Embassy) even though telephone contact was not provided Vogel but given only to Shishkin. While it is true that the number was passed to Shishkin in the presence of "Abel family" it seems almost certain that Shishkin passed the number

5

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

on since it appears unlikely the Abel family could have had opportunity to note the number which Donovan provided Shishkin only in writing.

The message clearly raises serious questions about the timetable for exchange. Suggest following plan:

A. Donovan proceed to Soviet Embassy between 1000 and 1100 hours 6 February and attempt to see Shishkin, clarify whether the message in fact from Vogel and if feasible have Vogel meet Donovan at the Soviet Embassy.

B. Advise Shishkin that in view of mysterious Vogel message Donovan has notified his government earliest possible exchange time is Thursday evening, 8 February, 2200 hours and must send further message to his government before any preparations will be commenced to transfer Abel to Berlin for exchange.

C. Dependent on outcome of talk with Shishkin, either converse with Vogel by phone, have him visit Soviet Embassy or visit Vogel in his office to determine "difficulties". In this connection note Vogel apparently speaks no English and Donovan requires an interpreter. Request your views regarding sending Mission officer with Donovan able to serve as interpreter.

Donovan suggests message may indicate East German desire to release Pryor independent of the Abel-Powers exchange and may not necessarily indicate any repudiation of what Donovan regards as firm commitment to release both Powers and Pryor in return for Abel.

Request comments and/or concurrence above proposals.

6 February 1962: ADIC 7422 (OUT 09115)
Ref A Berlin 7500
Ref B Berlin 7501

This is a joint State/Agency message.

Re para 6 Ref A. Approve exchange of Powers and Pryor for Abel under conditions set forth in Ref A. It apparent that East Germans may be attempting to extract more from exchange than simply giving up

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

Pryor (as indicated by Ref B). Should East Germans attach any condition to exchange, Donovan should refuse to discuss other than exchange as agreed with Shishkin and Vogel on 5 February meeting, i. e. Powers and Pryor for Abel.

Re Para 5 Ref A. Vogel should be instructed by Donovan to indicate to Pryor's father that he (Vogel) is making continuing efforts on his son's behalf. Vogel should make no commitment as to timing.

Re Paras 7 and 8 Ref A. Do not agree to proposed press conference or announcement in Berlin. Powers-Abel exchange, not Pryor, is the important issue and the present plan is that the White House will make the announcement immediately when we receive the flash that the plane is airborne with Powers aboard. As you have been informed you will receive message giving any necessary additional instructions re Pryor after we know exchange agreed and details. We do not want Donovan to have a press conference of any kind in Berlin. He can do this in New York. After White House announcement, Mission should refer all press inquiries to Washington.

Re Para 3 Ref B. Agree with suggested action except Mission officer should not accompany Donovan to East Berlin.

In arranging timing for exchange Donovan should keep in mind that approximately 48 hours required from the time when word of an exchange agreement is received in Washington to the time Abel is delivered in Berlin.

Re Para 7 Ref A. Agree Donovan return via Powers aircraft.

6 February 1962: BERLIN 7526 (IN 28428)

Following is Donovan report of events of 6 February.

Arrived at Soviet Embassy 1030 hours local and after 15 minute wait was admitted to see Shishkin who expressed surprise at the unexpected visit. Donovan informed Shishkin that after leaving his office 5 February in accordance with his suggestion Donovan had talked with Miss Abel who with her cousin took Donovan to Vogel's office. Described visit and stated that upon return to West Berlin he had reported fully to Washington. Told Shishkin that while we had expected

7

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

Powers, Makinen, and Pryor, Donovan did recommend acceptance of offer of Powers and Pryor since Donovan believed that with improvement of relations between countries mentioned by Moscow clemency for Makinen could be expected in relatively near future. To latter Shishkin nodded.

Donovan then stated his government had advised willingness to accept this offer. He next informed Shishkin of the Vogel message and how it had disrupted all plans, handed Shishkin a copy of Vogel message. He said "How very strange a message. What does it mean?" Donovan stated that this was one of his objects in visiting Shishkin that morning since the message had come to the telephone number which Donovan gave only to Shishkin. He immediately said that other people were present, but when Donovan pointed out that he had passed Shishkin a card with the number written on it, Shishkin said "Some people have sharp eyes". In any event, he continued, he knew nothing of the message.

Shishkin stated he wished to reaffirm that his government was still willing to trade Powers for Abel but Pryor was beyond his authority. He did express the personal opinion that Donovan was in a position of trader who sells the same goods to two persons. Denial by Donovan and detailed argument followed, and he informed Shishkin that if the deal agreed to 5 February is now repudiated, Donovan's recommendation to his government would be that he return to New York. Shishkin advised Donovan to proceed to Vogel's office and after discussion there return to the Embassy.

Donovan proceeded to Vogel's office where Drews present who explained that Miss Abel was taking care of mother. Drews read lengthy statement of which Donovan has a copy. Purport of statement is that Vogel visited the Attorney General the night of 5 February and was told his behavior was incorrect, that East Germany agreed to exchange Pryor for Abel and nothing more; that it cannot give its consent to exchange of one person for two persons, with one from a different country. Also, Vogel feels unable to postpone the trial of Pryor and the Attorney General informed him that in case of American refusal of the exchange of Pryor for Abel they will "start the trial and make a sensation out of it as they have enough evidence to convict Pryor which, as you understand, might have negative results for the U. S. A. and the Pryor family in particular." Lengthy argument in which Donovan accused

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

East Germany and Vogel of bad faith and stated neither his government nor he had time for such idle games. He flatly stated that the exchange of Abel for Pryor was out of the question and that unless East Germany adhered to the commitment of 5 February he must break off negotiations and report to his government.

At this point Vogel summoned an assistant into the room who reported that Vogel had just obtained an appointment with the Attorney General for further discussion of the matter. Vogel requested that Donovan remain in East Berlin while he "tried his best". Drews invited Donovan to lunch where the entire conversation consisted of probing to see whether the Pryor exchange for Abel is not feasible and specific reference was made to the prominence and political influence of the Pryor family.

During lunch also Drews volunteered without Donovan mentioning it that the night before when Vogel brought the sad news, Miss Abel remembered the telephone number she had memorized when Donovan gave it to Shishkin, and a foreigner friendly to Drews was willing to take a message to West Berlin. In response to Donovan's questions, Drews stated Mrs. Abel's first name was Lydia and Miss Abel was named Helen, with latter unmarried. Both points in conflict with previous correspondence and letters introduced in evidence at Abel's trial.

Near the end of lunch, Drews excused himself for the men's room, presumably to telephone. Shortly thereafter Vogel arrived to report a big battle but final victory over Attorney General. He stated that the entire difficulty was due to the fact that the Attorney General was angry that on 3 February Donovan visited Shishkin instead of first visiting Vogel and the Attorney General. Upon question, no explanation was given of the letter from the Attorney General delivered 5 February. He now stated East Germany was satisfied if Vogel and Donovan proceed to the Soviet Embassy and Soviet officials confirm the deal. In response to a question he stated this meant all East German objections to Pryor and Powers exchange for Abel were removed.

We proceeded to the Soviet Embassy where Shishkin treated Vogel as a stranger and received substantially the same report without comment. He then requested Donovan to have a private meeting with him. He informed Donovan that at the first meeting 3 February at which he

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

urged that Powers was sufficient for Abel, he had asked Donovan whether Powers was not a national hero in the United States. Donovan had stated that to judge by general press, Powers was not regarded as a national hero and that substantial view in the U.S. was that Abel should not be released under any circumstances. Shishkin stated that he had communicated this to his government and that he now had a new message from Moscow this afternoon stating that "since the Americans regarded Makinen as more valuable than Powers, Moscow now makes firm offer of Makinen for Abel." Donovan pointed out not only that Powers had been regarded as sine qua non and primary basis of any deal, but the Moscow message of 5 February recognized this by first unqualifiedly approving the deal and referring to Makinen as an afterthought.

Donovan reiterated his instructions were absolutely no deal without Powers. Shishkin replied that the message this afternoon replaced all others and he now unauthorized to discuss any matter except Abel for Makinen exchange. Donovan stated that after the message of 5 February and confirmation this morning, this must mean that Soviets were not seriously interested in obtaining back Abel and accused Shishkin of playing chess game since last Saturday. Donovan stated Shishkin should inform Donovan now whether 5 February deal still acceptable. If not, Donovan would report this to his own government and recommend he return home. Shishkin stated that since this was a new matter he must communicate with Moscow and requested Donovan to return on 7 February between 1400 and 1500 hours local to hear Moscow reply. Donovan stated he saw no point to this since Shishkin has Donovan's telephone number and is able to communicate the reply. Accordingly Donovan declined a personal visit on 7 February. Shishkin accepted this and said Donovan would receive a message on 7 February.

Donovan left with Drews who had waited in the anteroom and walked the entire distance to the S-Bahn with Donovan, continuously probing for Donovan reaction which he could "report to Miss Abel". Donovan told Drews his reaction was that the negotiations on the non-American side since Saturday had been conducted with irresponsibility and bad faith, that if the deal fails he would be obliged upon his return to report to Col. Abel that his "family" apparently were abandoning him and that perhaps Abel should reconsider his entire position to date.

Donovan thanked Drews for lunch and returned to West Berlin at 1640 hours local.

10

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~7 February 1962: ADIC 7455 (OUT 09203)

Congratulations to Donovan for conduct of difficult negotiations. Suspect Shishkin may come back with offer of Powers and GDR will welch on Pryor. If so, Donovan make final attempt include Pryor but if in his judgment he reaches point where Pryor problem may endanger Powers deal, he should break off and close on Powers-Abel.

If Shishkin won't offer Powers, approve Donovan return U.S. after emphasizing to Shishkin that Soviets have responsibility for breaking off negotiation which would be difficult if not impossible to reopen.

Moving Abel to New York and can deliver him in less than 48 hours if necessary.

7 February 1962: [] 50X1, E.O.13526

From Col. Geary at Wiesbaden.

Ref departure time of C-118 [carrying Abel to Berlin] recommend his take-off time be moved up tentatively NLT 0500Z on 8 Feb, or midnight local. This would put him here approximately 1700Z, 1800Z local and enable us to move him on immediately for exchange the same night. This would certainly alleviate any possible problems of housing Abel etc. Therefore if agreement reached today exchange could be made Thursday night. Foregoing is entirely feasible and suggest if you concur you info Donovan soonest. Every hour we let this thing slip just gives those so and so's an opportunity for further nonsense.

7 February 1962: ADIC 7456 (OUT 09204)

To Col. Geary, and Berlin, Frankfurt [] 50X1, E.O.13526

Airlift postponed pending final word on exchange from Berlin per BERLIN 7526.

7 February 1962: BERLIN 7537 (IN 28496)

Following message received 1515 hours local 7 Feb on Berlin Base number assigned Donovan for this purpose: "Donovan: Unfortunately we got no reply today. We hope to get it tomorrow. Will inform immediately. Shishkin." Will forward comments and recommendations after discussion of case by Donovan with Clay and perhaps Lightner later this afternoon.

11

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

7 February 1962: ADIC 7461 (OUT 09219)
Ref: BERLIN 7537

Request Donovan sit tight and wait for message from Shishkin.

Please notify us immediately when message received including content of message. If no reply within twenty-four hours please also advise negative report.

8 February 1962: BERLIN 7542 (IN 28548)

General Clay felt strongly that swift response must be given to Shishkin telephone message quoted Berlin 7537 since he viewed it as definite possibility next Shishkin message would simply request Donovan again visit Soviet Embassy for discussion. Generals Clay and Watson and Mr. Lightner unanimous in opinion Donovan should not again submit himself to East Berlin meeting. Accordingly and several hours prior to receipt of ADIC 7461, General Clay directed Mr. Lightner to send a Mission officer to East Berlin the evening of 7 February to telephone the following message on behalf of Donovan to Shishkin at the Soviet Embassy: "Received your telephone message and regret delay as unfortunately the time which I can spend here is limited. As my back still troubles me I would like to ask that you come to the residence of Mr. Howard Trivers of our Mission between 4:00 and 6:00 p.m. tomorrow Thursday, February 8th 1962. The address is 12 Vogelsang. I hope you can let me know beforehand that you will be there. However I will be there during these hours."

Mission officer Mr. Frank Meehan succeeded after some time in establishing telephonic connection with Shishkin at 2245 hours local. Shishkin extremely cordial and urged that Donovan please believe him that he was doing his best in the matter and was hopeful of the outcome. He hopes to have a reply tomorrow and will telephone as soon as he gets a reply. As to proposed meeting Shishkin not sure he could come over but will try. If unable to keep appointment he will telephone. In concluding the phone conversation he requested the Mission officer ask Donovan to please not be impatient and reiterated that he was hopeful the matter will work out satisfactorily.

The choice of Trivers' residence as a meeting spot is based on consideration that meeting with Soviet official in the Consulate would be extraordinary occurrence and would cause comment among the German

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

employees who could not be kept from learning of the event. Reference to Donovan's health was factual as he is suffering from cold in the back which is known to Shishkin.

The purpose of the meeting is to enable Donovan to receive the Soviet proposal and discuss it to the extent necessary in order to clarify the exact terms or to work out details of exchange if the Soviet proposal is acceptable.

General Clay also wishes to have brought to your attention the fact that "Miss Abel" indicated to Donovan during the 6 February meeting (as Vogel has indicated on previous occasions to "Middlemen" reporting on Vogel's behalf to the Pryor family and to the U.S. Mission, Berlin) that East German authorities have stated the death sentence is not excluded in the Pryor case. General Clay feels that the East can if it so desires, make public revelation of negotiations to date cast in a light almost certain to have unfavorable impact in various circles in the United States.

8 February 1962: BERLIN 7545 (IN 28575)

At 1204 hours local received following telephone call in English: "Donovan: I got a favorable reply. Waiting to see you at my office at 4:00 o'clock today (caller added "this afternoon") if your health allows you to come here. Shishkin."

General Clay feels in view of the indication of a favorable reply that Donovan should go and has asked the Mission spokesman to phone Shishkin stating on Donovan's behalf: "In view my health request you have car meet me at exit S-Bahnhof Friedrichstrasse to bring me to Soviet Embassy for requested meeting." Frank Meehan is enroute to accomplish this. Donovan is in full agreement and will proceed to East Berlin about 1500 hours local.

8 February 1962: ADIC 7495 (OUT 09308)

This is a joint Agency/State message.

Obviously it is increasingly difficult to avoid publicity and therefore essential to move as fast as possible. If answer on Powers is favorable we must move Abel soonest so request you send result Donovan visit today

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

as soon as he returns leaving detailed report till later. At least give us enough to make the decision whether Abel departs or stays in New York.

8 February 1962: BERLIN 7558 (IN 28602)

Donovan returned 1810 hours local from meeting and announced telephonically he had achieved "complete agreement". Stated action should be initiated to move Abel over here. Turnover scheduled for 0730 hours Saturday morning 10 February.

[] now enroute downtown to pick up Donovan and debrief. Expect fill-in cable within three hours. On the basis of agreed criteria "complete agreement" must mean East agreement to turnover Powers and Pryor for Abel.

8 February 1962: BERLIN 7561 (IN 28639)

Donovan meeting at Soviet Embassy attended only by Shishkin who served lavish refreshments and generally gave Donovan the red carpet treatment. He stated the Soviet Government had accepted Donovan's "ultimatum" and would release both Powers and Pryor in return for Abel. Only condition which emerged was that Pryor and Powers were to be released at separate points but simultaneously. Shishkin gave his word of honor "as a Soviet official" that the exchange of all three would take place and tentative planning foresees exchange of Powers for Abel at Oberbaumbruecke Sector crossing point (normally West Berliner crossing point) at 0730 on 10 February if that place is satisfactory to us, Pryor to be released elsewhere, probably Friedrichstrasse, at same time. Miss Abel allegedly will attend on Soviet side and Shishkin asked whether any of Powers family would be present which Donovan answered in the negative.

Much of the conversation was devoted by Shishkin to expressing concern for press treatment which might ensue, explaining that it might negate improvement of Soviet-US relations which should otherwise be the result of this exchange. Shishkin stated he would like to see separate announcements, first Moscow announce that Powers was released as humane response of Soviet Government to petition for clemency submitted by the Powers family. Later, perhaps several weeks later, Washington

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

would make the announcement that the President had granted clemency to Abel. Shishkin stressed throughout this discussion that press treatment was not a condition of the exchange but he merely was expressing what was desirable from the Soviet viewpoint. Donovan responded that he would recommend we seek this objective but that in realistic terms Shishkin must realize the release of Abel cannot be kept secret. Donovan especially urged that Soviet Government recognize that the United States press is not controlled and that a leak of the Abel release must not be viewed by the Soviets as bad faith in any respect affecting the prospects of clemency for Makinen at a future date. Shishkin asserted he fully understood. As to the Pryor release, it is to be treated entirely separately as East German act of clemency. Donovan emphasized that the release of Pryor 9 February, hours before the exchange of Powers and Abel would serve to keep it somewhat separate from the latter exchange but Shishkin stated while recognizing the validity of this view, his orders were to effect release of Pryor and Powers simultaneously.

Recommend give careful consideration press release in light of Shishkin suggestion.

Donovan to meet Shishkin again at 1200 hours 9 February at the Soviet Embassy to discuss details of the exchange. Will reconnoiter Oberbaumbruecke but tentatively believe 0700 or 0730 at that spot is satisfactory. Pryor could proceed by foot through Friedrichstrasse crossing point, be met by person able identify him and Mission officer, be taken away by car immediately with Mission officer notifying exchange party by radio from Checkpoint Charlie or patrol car when Pryor released whereupon identification of Powers and exchange for Abel could occur. Powers, Donovan, Murphy, and Doctor could proceed immediately to Tempelhof and depart for Wiesbaden by special flight. Pryor and parents should be flown to Frankfurt immediately by separate flight.

Donovan's assessment of this that it is a genuine offer. Advise views re turnover, other instructions.

General Clay and Mr. Lightner concur in this message.

8 February 1962: ADIC 7523 (OUT 09367)

C-118 No. 33300 departed McGuire Air Force Base 2253Zulu 8 February. ETA Wiesbaden 1100 Zulu 9 February. Passengers: Abel, Mr. Fred Wilkinson, Deputy Director of Prisons, Mr. Noah Alldredge, Justice Dept. escort, and Mr. Nicholas P. Stoiaken, Russian-speaking CIA Security escort.

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

9 February 1962: ADIC 7526 (OUT 09377)

Offer of Powers and Pryor for Abel acceptable.

Concur exchange point and procedures para 4 BERLIN 7561 but for reasons covered below would prefer 0630 hours if possible.

Shishkin proposals for handling press aspects neither acceptable or workable. Soviet change in timing from evening to early morning clearly aimed at insuring Soviets release story first. Plans for White House release immediately after exchange must remain in effect. You should arrange for radio or telephone notification from exchange point to Base Commo Room at moment exchange completed. This then will be flashed immediately to Washington for passage to White House. Please use this channel with highest precedence. Exploring use also of telephone. Will advise.

Donovan should reiterate that news of exchange can not be kept secret. Word of Powers' freedom will provoke barrage of inquiries as to whereabouts of Abel. Under no circumstances should Donovan state flatly that there will be a White House press release. He should emphasize, however, that pressures of the free press will require official announcement. Donovan can indicate that he certain any announcement will not exploit exchange to detriment of Soviet Union. Donovan should indicate these his personal views.

Since publicity matter on Powers-Abel now in better perspective we tending to view that maybe unnecessary to airlift Pryors to Frankfurt. Pryors, however, should remain in safehouse several hours after Powers departure. Mission officer should inform parents that government trusts they will be discreet in any comments to the press bearing in mind that other American citizens are still held and the government must continue to seek aid for them. In particular they should not mention Makinen. May be helpful to them in dealing with the press to know that complex negotiations regarding Powers and Abel of which they could not be informed had been under way before their son was detained. Will confirm above including comments on transportation of Pryors.

16

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

9 February 1962: BERLIN 7579 (IN 28698)

C-118 arrived Tempelhof 1525 hours local. "Package" now enroute detention site. All in order.

9 February 1962: BERLIN 7582 (IN 28699)

"Package" secured in maximum security cell at 1615 hours local.

9 February 1962 : BERLIN 7581 (IN 28701)

Donovan met Shishkin at Embassy East Berlin 1200 hours local. Reported general concurrence of our government to accept Powers and Pryor for Abel with expectation of clemency for Makinen in the near future. Shishkin stated that a review of traffic on Oberbaumbruecke this morning leads them to return to our original proposal of Glienecke Bridge. Because of the 25 mile trip for the Soviets, it could not be done before 0830 hours. Donovan sought an earlier time but Shishkin said he could not make it so Donovan agreed to 0830.

On Pryor, Shishkin argued long about release to his father in Vogel's office in East Berlin. Donovan flatly refused any site in East Berlin and Shishkin finally agreed to the release at Friedrichstrasse border point simultaneously with Powers-Abel exchange. Donovan again urged Shishkin in self interest to release Pryor today (9 February) but Shishkin replied it would be contrary to his instructions.

The principal concern of the Soviets over the official statement to be issued by the United States. Shishkin said they would not hold us responsible for what the press may do but emphasized the importance of the official statement for future relations between countries. Donovan replied that no Berlin statement was contemplated and he could assure Shishkin no propaganda by the United States Government and nothing of the official statement discrediting the USSR. Two points all-important to Soviets: First, no use of the word "exchange"; second, nothing in the official statement connecting Abel with the Soviets. Donovan replied that he would communicate these views to his government. Donovan strongly urges the official statement be drafted to avoid these precise two points. First because of the hope of early clemency for Makinen which Donovan believes can depend on the proper conclusion of this deal,

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

and second because unnecessary, since the entire press will call it an exchange and will link Abel with the Soviets. Donovan feels this is all right so long as not in the official statement. Shishkin stated that the ideal statement would mention clemency for Abel on petition of his family and because of his age, making no reference to the Soviet Union. Shishkin still would like the statement re Abel released later but Donovan refused to make any such commitment. Shishkin stated that the Soviet Government announcement will relate solely to Powers and describe clemency because of his family and the desire to improve relations between two countries. No Soviet official statement will ever refer to either Abel or Pryor.

Shishkin will attend the exchange with two other officials and Powers with two guards. He suggested the six officials meet in the center of the bridge at 0820 hours for assurance that all is well. The guards will then bring the prisoners forward and when recognized each man will be released to the opposite side. Officials will shake hands and all leave. Donovan agreed but said all must be reviewed by his government and, if any change, would communicate message to Shishkin. Upon inquiry, Donovan assured Shishkin no reporters or photographers were contemplated tomorrow at the exchange.

Donovan returned to West Berlin at 1330 hours.

9 February 1962: ADIC 7540 (OUT 09414)

Concur use of Glienicke Bridge. Reluctantly agree on 0830 hours.

Meeting at center bridge must include Murphy to identify and Lightner to receive Powers. Presumably Wilkinson, Alldredge will be with Abel; depending on his wishes, Donovan should also be present either with Abel or the officials at center bridge.

9 February 1962: BERLIN 7583 (IN 28702)

Feel certain you agree Donovan's performance here has been outstanding. General Clay, General Watson, and Messrs. Lightner and Trivers, all with first-hand experience in negotiating with Soviets, have been unanimous in spontaneous praise for tactics Donovan used

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

and feel his cool nerves, especially considering his exposed position as a private citizen alone in East Berlin, played an important part in the apparently successful outcome.

Submit for urgent consideration some mention of Donovan in official government statement, placing particular stress on the fact that Donovan undertook the mission at the request of and on behalf of the U. S. Government. Donovan has in the past week on several occasions pointed out that his role as Abel's defense counsel is widely misinterpreted in addition to which Powers is not regarded by a large segment of the American public as a hero, with the potential effect that Donovan will appear to have been instrumental in a deal more in the interest of the Soviet Union than the United States. Emphasis upon the official backing of Donovan's mission therefore is of some importance to him particularly with regard to his professional reputation.

9 February 1962: ADIC 7537 (OUT 09400)

For Col. Geary and Mr. Joe Murphy, Re: Assessment and Handling Powers.

Suggest you review together the approach to be taken in discussions with Powers. Murphy has been briefed and it is imperative you are both coordinated.

Discussions should be keyed to Powers own desire to talk, in other words let him lead.

Agree it desirable that he be prepared for mixed reaction publicity-wise. As you pointed out, this is extremely delicate. Rather than make it personal, though, you could caution him that his release will bring to the surface the May 1 incident again, which had many opponents as well as proponents and undoubtedly this affair will be rehashed somewhat again implying that the publicity will be directed to all concerned--the U. S. Government, CIA as well as himself.

You should tell him that we are anxious for him to relax, have a medical check up and be with his family. Tell him that we have arranged for him to stay in a house away from the public. At this point you can determine his desires re his family. You should also indicate that we desire of course to talk with him but he must first relax.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

9 February 1962: ADIC 7549 (OUT 09432) FLASH

White House requests test run be accomplished immediately on communications, namely total timing for radio car and/or phone call from Glienicke Bridge to Base Commo then cable to Washington.

White House expects results of test by 2200 Zulu.

Hold applicable commo circuits open until conclusion tests.

Test message should read "Message initiated at bridge at blank Zulu.

9 February 1962: FRANKFURT 7708 (IN 28708) OPIM

Tests between Berlin and ADIC 9 February all under three minutes through CIA secure staff communications circuitry. Berlin to regular Headquarters Signal Center, L Building, approximately one minute. Berlin will have acknowledgement of Headquarters receipt approximately five minutes after Berlin transmission...

10 February 1962: BERLIN 7606 (IN 28790) OPIM

Exchange Powers for Abel on Glienicke Bridge commenced on schedule with American representatives Donovan, Lightner and Murphy moving up to the middle of the bridge at 0820 local where they were met by the Soviets Shishkin, the new Soviet Political Adviser Alexeev (one of the two Soviets currently excluded from the American Sector of West Berlin), and "Cousin Drews"; "Miss Abel" did not appear. Soviets stated they had an open line direct to Friedrichstrasse and that the release of Pryor would occur precisely on schedule. Through the American Provost Marshal and West Berlin Police net, American command post at end of Glienicke Bridge likewise had an open line to Checkpoint Charlie on the west side of Friedrichstrasse. At approximately 0835 hours local received word that Mr. Frank Meehan, USBER representative, and Mr. Pryor Senior had been called to east side of Friedrichstrasse crossing point.

For more than 15 minutes, our observers (including CIA and military police representatives on the scene at Friedrichstrasse)

20

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

reported that they could observe nothing occurring on the other side. Meanwhile, the Soviets were becoming exceedingly insistent on the Glienicke Bridge because they said that through their direct line they had received word that Frederick Pryor had been released at 0835 local.

Since word had been received from our observers at Checkpoint Charlie that Meehan and Pryor Senior were in East Berlin, we then agreed to bring Abel forward to the center of the Bridge while the Soviets brought Powers, and identification was accomplished by both sides at approximately 0840. Shortly before 0850 the Checkpoint Charlie line reported positive identification of Frederick Pryor and the return of Meehan, Pryor Senior and the son. Word was immediately passed by the American Provost Marshal, Lt. Col. Sabolyk, to Mr. Lightner at the center of the Glienicke Bridge and after perfunctory handshakes the party of Powers, Donovan and Murphy came off the bridge and departed by car for Tempelhof...

Only West Berlin Police and customs officials observed the exchange on Glienicke Bridge. The press was not present at Friedrichstrasse so the first realization that Pryor was released came via Washington press statement.

10 February 1962: ADIC 7568 (OUT 09475)

From McCone. Congratulations to Berlin. A hearty well done to [] and all concerned in the Powers, Pryor, Abel exchange. All here impressed that word was given the White House for press release within three minutes of the actual turnover. Apparently allowing Washington easily to scoop Moscow on the release.

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

C05492917

ANNEX 99

~~SECRET~~

ACCOUNT OF EVENTS AT GLIENECKER BRIDGE, 10 FEBRUARY 1962

by E. Allan Lightner, Jr., U. S. Mission, Berlin

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

Excerpt from report to The Honorable Foy D. Kohler,
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Depart-
ment of State, Washington, D. C., dated February 15, 1962

On the morning of February 10 I was picked up at 7:00 a.m. and driven to the Berlin Brigade Provost Marshal's office where I found [redacted] lawyer James Donovan, Deputy Director of Prisons, Mr. Wilkinson, and the CIA chap who had come out to identify Powers, Mr. Murphy. Donovan had just had a last talk with Abel who had spent the night in one of the cells in the basement of the Provost Marshal's building. We went over the technical details of the handover and then at about 7:50 we departed for Glienecker Bridge.

Perhaps it would be useful to mention the technical details of the exchange that we agreed upon. Most of these details had already been prescribed in the arrangements that Donovan had made the day before with the Soviet representative, Second Secretary of Embassy, Ivan Alexandrovich Shishkin. The exchange was to take place at 8:30. At 8:20 Donovan, Murphy, and myself would walk out to the center of the bridge, where we would be met by three from the other side. After ascertaining that everything was in order for the exchange at the Glienecker Bridge and for the release of Pryor at Friedrichstrasse, we would signal for Abel to be brought up. The Soviets would similarly signal for Powers to come up. The two men would come up under guard and stop five meters behind our group in the middle of the bridge. At this point, Murphy would cross over to the other side where Powers was and would talk to him long enough positively to identify him. Similarly, one of the members of the other party would cross over to our side to identify Abel. At this point we understood that Abel's alleged daughter would be the person to identify him. Having satisfied ourselves as to the identity of the persons to be exchanged, we would then await news by two-way radio or over a direct telephone line that Pryor had been released at Friedrichstrasse and returned to the United States Sector. Upon receipt of this word, Abel and Powers would cross over to their respective sides, we in the center would shake hands and the exchange would be complete.

~~SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~SECRET~~

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

As indicated, shortly before 8:00 our party left the Provost Marshal's building for the Glienecker Bridge. [redacted] Donovan, Wilkinson, Murphy and myself were in two sedans. The Provost Marshal, Colonel Sabolyk, assisted by the two prison guards who had brought Abel to Berlin and a giant fellow from Sabolyk's staff, took charge of Abel. We arrived at the bridge at approximately 8:15. The car with Abel was kept in the background a short distance from the bridge. It was a beautiful morning, rather unusual for Berlin at this time of year, and we could observe several fishermen already fishing along the bank. Almost at once we saw one sedan and then another arrive on the other side of the bridge, and several civilians emerged. We saw three of them near their end of the bridge, so Donovan, Murphy and I started across. They also moved forward. Donovan commented, as we paced toward each other, that it reminded him of "High Noon", and indeed there was plenty of dramatic tension at that moment with the two groups marching toward each other across the bridge. Donovan, who had been negotiating with Shishkin during the past week, pointed him out as the towering figure in the center. It seemed a long time before we faced each other on the line in the middle of the bridge. Donovan shook hands with Shishkin, whom he introduced to Murphy and myself. Shishkin introduced one of his companions as Mr. Alekseev, a seedy looking man of medium height, maybe 50 years old, in heavy gray overcoat and slouch hat. I looked at him with unusual interest because he was of course the Political Adviser at Karlshorst, Lt. Colonel Alekseev, of the Soviet KGB and at the present time persona non grata in the American sector. The other member of the trio was Mr. Drews, a name I recognized as being one of the people with whom Mr. Donovan had been negotiating, particularly during his contacts with the East German lawyer Vogel. He was also medium height, thin, almost gaunt, fiftyish, shabby. He was supposed to be Mrs. Abel's cousin. Each of the three Russians was in civilian clothes. I'll call them Russians, although I'm not sure whether Drews was Russian or German.

Shishkin, a tall, beady-eyed, no-nonsense fellow with rimless glasses, who spoke English well, but with a strong Russian accent, immediately suggested that we proceed with the business at hand. He said the first thing that should happen would be immediately to bring up Abel and Powers. After they were properly identified, he Shishkin, would instruct the people at Friedrichstrasse by a direct line to release Pryor. He should have word that this had been

2

~~SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~SECRET~~

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

accomplished within a few minutes thereafter. Then, we could complete the exchange on the bridge. Although this was a change from the earlier agreed procedure, Donovan and I agreed that this plan was satisfactory. Because it constituted a slight change in our understanding of the arrangement, I returned to our side of the bridge and after briefly explaining the change to [redacted] asked that Abel be brought up immediately. I then returned to the center of the bridge, and the two parties escorting Abel on our side and Powers on the other side started to move forward. At this Shishkin raised a row. He said there were too many guards with Abel and that the agreement had been that each prisoner should be accompanied by only two. I'm not sure exactly what the agreement on this point was, but we had no reason to object, and so Donovan, I believe it was, shouted to Wilkinson that only one other person besides himself should accompany Abel. Sabolyk designated his man, the giant, to go along. I learned later from [redacted] that the two guards who had come out from Washington were extremely annoyed at this turn of events, but they had to take a back seat.

The exchangees came forward and stopped about five yards behind our central group. As they advanced, I nudged Murphy to ask him if it looked as if our boy was approaching, and Murphy said it sure did, and then he went over to talk to Powers to make absolutely sure. Drews did the same, going over to talk to Abel. In a very few minutes it was established that all was in order. At this point something went a bit awry because before we realized it Abel and Drews had crossed over to the Russian side and Powers and Murphy had come over to our side. This obviously was a little premature, as we had not yet received word that Pryor had been released. Shishkin signaled to his people at the end of the bridge to send word for Pryor to be released and assured us that word would come through at any moment. This was, I think, about 8:35 a.m. We waited and waited. I was particularly worried at this point because of the fact that we had prematurely permitted Abel out of our custody. Actually, we saw to it that there were always at least one or two Americans with Abel during this period of waiting. Donovan went over and talked to him for a while, as did Wilkinson. Both of them had long been associated with him, from the time of the trial, onwards. Wilkinson was his warden at Atlanta for years.

3

~~SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~SECRET~~

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

After a few minutes, Shishkin said he had word that Pryor had been released. We shouted to the other end of the bridge and got word back that there was no news of Pryor's return to our side. Shishkin said he could not understand this as his information was explicit. After another few minutes, I walked back to the end of the bridge and explained the situation to [redacted] asking that he try to get a more detailed report of what was happening at Friedrichstrasse. He was told that Frank Meehan had gone over to the other side but had not yet returned. I took this information back to Shishkin in the center of the bridge and we kept on waiting. It seemed like a long time, but I suppose the total waiting time was not more than fifteen minutes. Anyway, we finally got word that Pryor and Meehan had appeared at Checkpoint Charlie and we finished the business on the bridge. This meant that Wilkinson countersigned and dated the Presidential commutation of sentence which he had brought with him and which became effective with the handing over of Powers. He then gave the document to Abel, the six principals shook hands all around, and we then went our respective ways. The time was 8:52 a.m.

4

~~SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

C05492917

ANNEX 100

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL - Day Lead Article by Wm. J. Eaton

Dateline: Washington, D. C., 20 April 1962.

(Editor's Note: Early this year, in the middle of a bridge linking West Berlin with Communist East Germany, the United States and Russia exchanged two cold war pawns--U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers and convicted Soviet spy Colonel Rudolf Abel. Following is the first personal account of the dramatic trade.)

A gate swung open one cold night last February and a car sped away from the bleak walls of Atlanta Prison. One of the passengers was a gaunt, balding man in a new suit. The others called him "The Package". Halfway around the earth, men were preparing for a rendezvous with this package.

The spot was a wind-swept bridge connecting the East and the West in Berlin. "The Package" was the highest ranking Russian spy ever caught in the United States.

The details of how Soviet master spy Rudolf Abel was smuggled out of prison and swapped for American U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers last February 10th was disclosed today by one of the leading participants. The story was told by Fred T. Wilkinson, Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and Abel's chief American escort on his journey to freedom.

Wilkinson's account in the Prison Bureau's Newsletter said that President Kennedy commuted Abel's 30-year sentence on condition that he never return to the United States.

Jokes about hat-swapping and lawyers' delaying tactics helped reduce tension on the bridge during a last-minute hitch in the exchange, Wilkinson said. The Powers-Abel swap was held up for some minutes until word was received that a second American prisoner--Yale student Frederick L. Pryor--had been released by the East Germans at another border-crossing point.

Wilkinson recalled how three Americans and Abel faced three Russians and Powers 15 feet away:

"This was one of the most tense times in the whole project, I think, although I was armed and it didn't seem too important. At first we were a little formal. By pre-arrangement we walked across and the Russian identifier asked to have Abel take his glasses off. The same applied to Mr. Powers. He was quickly identified. But we were not yet ready to make the exchange. We were waiting for a signal on the radio that our second man had been released at checkpoint Charlie. The Russians kept telling us it was O.K. I found one big Russian in charge had a great sense of humor. We started a little by-play and finally decided we would let the men change sides. We let Abel go over to the other side and Powers came to our side with his identifier because from our point of view he was not a prisoner.

"The second Russian looked at my hat. He seemed to like it and I told Abel to tell him I wanted to trade it for the fur turban the Russian was wearing, but the other Russian wouldn't permit it. When we were about to trade, the second man scowled deeply and said 'Nix, nox!' This by-play went on for quite a while. I am sure the Russian and I both wanted to trade.

"Powers looked very good. Finally we got the signal that the other exchange had been made. My good-humored Russian friend said he would bet the exchange of Pryor was being held up because his lawyer was there and was arguing about his capitalist fees!

"I took out the Presidential document which the Russians wanted; we noted the date and the release on the document, which I signed and turned over to Abel. The document commuted his sentence provided he does not re-enter this country.

"We left the bridge and Mr. Powers was put into a car that had been waiting and was taken away."

Wilkinson got to know Abel when he was warden at Atlanta, and said he felt he had a measure of Abel's confidence. That may have been why Wilkinson was chosen for the secret mission. He and Noah Alldredge, Supervisor of Custodial Service, accompanied Abel from this country to Berlin for the exchange. Abel was fitted with new clothes on the pretext that he would confer with his attorney and federal officials in New York, Wilkinson said.

The Soviet agent was removed from Atlanta penitentiary shortly after midnight on February 8th and flown to New York City on a 2 a. m. jet from Atlanta. These precautions were taken because the federal officials did not want other prisoners--two in particular but who were not identified--to know that Abel had left the prison.

The Soviet spy was held in New York overnight before being flown to West Berlin on a secret Air Force flight. Abel was known as "The Package" in a system of codes that helped to preserve air-tight secrecy about the mission, Wilkinson said. Wilkinson and Alldredge obtained emergency passports and took a train to New York from Washington to keep their rendezvous with "The Package". During this time, Wilkinson said, he was in constant touch with another agency whose employees called each other by first names and last initials.

After several unexplained delays in departure, he said, they left to pick up Abel on a corner near 11th Street in Manhattan.

Wilkinson added: "Abel looked a little puzzled until he saw me, and then he smiled. . . I asked him if he was ready to make a little trip and he said 'yes'. Then I told him I wasn't in a position to tell him what this was, but that we might be able to help him. But he was pretty sharp and caught on. He said, 'Well, I would like to go home.'"

The party drove to a New Jersey air base and Abel was "pretty well told" during the transatlantic flight why he was being taken on the trip. But secrecy was maintained and drapes were drawn around the passenger compartment at one point when a radio repairman was called to fix the plane's radio at Wiesbaden, Germany. They arrived in Berlin on the

afternoon preceding the February 10th exchange and began talks with Army officers on details.

"There was still a lot of uncertainty about the point of exchange," Wilkinson said. "We would have it all set up and then someone would change it--probably the Russians!"

By morning, however, the Gleinicker Bridge on the road to Potsdam was selected as the place for the exchange. Wilkinson said the American party and Abel moved out to the bridge about 7:30 a. m. and sat across the road from a group of East German guards carrying rifles.

At 8 a. m., on signal, Wilkinson, State Department representative Allan Lightner, and another American who was to identify Powers walked out on the bridge with Abel.

Three Russians marched from the other side with Powers and history was made minutes later.

C05492917

ANNEX 101

C05492917

FRANCIS GARY POWERS

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
FRANCIS GARY POWERS

MARCH 6, 1962

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1962

FRANCIS GARY POWERS

TUESDAY, MARCH 6, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m., in room 318, Old Senate Office Building.

Present: Senators Russell (chairman), presiding; Byrd of Virginia, Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Ervin, Thurmond, Byrd of West Virginia, Saltonstall, Smith of Maine, Case of South Dakota, Bush, Beall, and Goldwater.

Also present: William H. Darden, T. Edward Braswell, Jr., Gordon A. Nease, professional staff; Harry L. Wingate, Jr., chief clerk; and Herbert S. Atkinson, assistant chief clerk.

Chairman RUSSELL. I have been requested by Senator Cannon, a member of this committee, who is always most diligent in attending the sessions, to announce that, due to his attendance at the War College at Maxwell Field on national security matters, he will be unable to be here this afternoon.

That will be all for these cameras.

I will ask the officers to see that that rule is enforced and that no further pictures are taken.

If you need any additional policemen for that purpose, we will summon them.

The Armed Services Committee, through the Central Intelligence Agency, has extended to Mr. Francis Gary Powers an invitation to appear here in open session this afternoon.

Before we hear from Mr. Powers, the Chair would like to make a very short statement concerning the circumstances of this hearing.

The Chair believes it can be fairly stated that this committee and its subcommittees have attempted to deal with subjects involving the Central Intelligence Agency and, indeed, all matters affecting the national security, in an unspectacular manner.

Accordingly, to some, it may appear that this hearing in the caucus room, under these circumstances, is somewhat uncharacteristic of the proceedings of this committee.

In this instance, however, the correction of some erroneous impressions and an opportunity for Mr. Powers to reveal as much of his experience as is consistent with security requirements make it apparent that a hearing of this type at this time is not only in the national interest, but is in the interest of fair play for Mr. Powers.

And if this committee needs any defense, the Chair will state that in scheduling this hearing, this committee has not been motivated by any spirit of self-aggrandizement.

Mr. Powers, after having been subjected to a public trial in Moscow, you should feel no trepidation whatever in appearing before a group of your fellow citizens and elected representatives.

I hope that you feel just as much at ease as you possibly can.

I understand from Senator Byrd that you are a Virginia boy. What part of Virginia are you from?

**STATEMENT OF FRANCIS GARY POWERS, ACCOMPANIED BY
LAWRENCE HOUSTON, GENERAL COUNSEL, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

Mr. POWERS. I spent most of my life in the southwest part of Virginia, around Pound and Grundy, Va.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were you educated in Virginia?

Mr. POWERS. Through grammar school and high school in Virginia and college in Tennessee.

Chairman RUSSELL. What did you do after you left college?

Mr. POWERS. I worked for one summer as a lifeguard at the swimming pool near my home in Virginia, joined the Air Force in October of that year.

Chairman RUSSELL. When were you first employed by the CIA?

Mr. POWERS. In May of 1956.

Chairman RUSSELL. You were an experienced pilot at the time you were employed by the CIA; were you not?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, sir. I don't remember the exact number of hours, but I have had well over a thousand hours of flying time.

Chairman RUSSELL. How much experience did you have with the U-2?

Mr. POWERS. A little better than 500 hours flying time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, Mr. Powers, we would like to have you go ahead and tell us in your own words of your mission on the 1st of May 1960.

If you could pull up the microphone a little closer I think some of the members of the committee perhaps will hear you a little better.

Mr. POWERS. I was awakened on the morning of May 1, sometime between 2 and 3 o'clock in the morning. I knew before that I might have to fly the next day but I wasn't certain at the time.

I had breakfast. The doctor looked me over. I was feeling fine. The navigator gave me a briefing either before or during the time that I was prebreathing for this flight. He showed me the maps, the route that I would take, the turning points, the different headings, and where the equipment was to be turned off and on. Later I talked to the weather forecaster who gave me the probable weather conditions along the route, the weather at destination, how high to expect condensation trails.

Then, after that, I talked to the detachment commander who told me what I was to do in case of an emergency, in case of engine trouble, or a forced landing over enemy territory. This was both before I put on my pressure suit and while I was prebreathing the oxygen.

Somewhere, I suppose about 5:30 in the morning, I finished dressing and was taken to the aircraft. I climbed into the aircraft and waited—I had to wait for signal before starting the engine and before taking off. The signal came a little late. I don't remember exactly how late, but it was later than scheduled.

I took off, climbed on course. I remember that the condensation trails were a little higher than I had been told they would be, but not much. I climbed above this layer and reached my altitude and continued on course. The weather was cloudy underneath. I couldn't see the ground for over an hour, and I drifted right off course. There was a clear area near the Ural Sea where I corrected back toward course but never did get exactly back on course before I got over the clouds again.

It was in this area that I saw two condensation trails from jet aircraft, so I knew at this time—they appeared to be paralleling my course. The first one headed in exactly the opposite direction as myself, and a few minutes later, I assume it was the same aircraft passed me going on the same heading that I was going on. He made no maneuvers that I could tell and I never did see the aircraft itself, just the condensation trail.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you estimate his altitude?

Mr. POWERS. He was well below me. I felt fairly good at the time. I was well above the condensation trail layer and I don't think he ever saw me if he was looking for me. I got back over the clouds there, made a correction for the wind, but I still drifted to the right of course. I would say approximately 200 miles south of Sverdlovsk the clouds ended, and I corrected back to course and was on course the rest of the flight. Just about the time that the clouds ended, I began having a little autopilot trouble. It wasn't very bad at the time so I just disengaged the autopilot, a few minutes later reengaged it and it worked for about 10 minutes and I had the same trouble again.

I went through this procedure two or three times and finally decided not to use it any more, and I'd say the last 15, 20, or 30 minutes was flown by hand without the autopilot.

Weather in this area was perfectly clear, visibility was excellent. I saw no other condensation trails from other aircraft. I was on very close to course all the way. I got to, I would say, within 30 or 40 miles of Sverdlovsk probably as well as I can remember southeast of the city, made a turn to the left of approximately 90°, rolled out on course, lined up on my next flight line. I was to go over the southern edge of the city—the southwestern edge of the city.

I can remember seeing an airfield there that was not on my map. After making this turn, I had to record the time that I reached this particular point, the engine instrument readings, the exhaust gas temperature, the altitude, several things, I don't remember exactly what they all were, and I was doing this at the time that I heard and felt this explosion.

It was approximately a minute after I had rolled out of this turn. I can't be sure of the times there. It is hard to recall just exactly what sensation I had at this time. I can remember feeling, hearing, and just sensing an explosion, but there was no—just a slight acceleration of the aircraft was all that I felt in the aircraft itself. I immediately looked up from the instruments and everywhere I looked was orange.

I don't know whether the whole sky was orange, or just the reflection of an orange light in the canopy, but I had never seen anything like this before, and I am sure there was an explosion. I feel that the explosion was external to the aircraft and behind me, but I really don't know. I have never been in an aircraft in which the engine

exploded or which has had an explosion on board, so I don't know exactly what that would feel like, but I am sure you could feel that through the controls or through the seat some way, and so I am almost positive it was external to the aircraft.

For a short time there—I don't know how long—time had no meaning at this particular time—I thought everything was all right. The right wing started to drop, which is normal in an aircraft, it wanders around a little, and I turned the wheel, brought the right wing back to level position, and either after it reached the level position or just before it reached that, the nose started dropping.

I could probably demonstrate this better with the model here. It was going along like this. The right wing dropped slightly, not very much. I used the controls. The wing came back up level and just before or after it got level, the nose started going down, and very slowly. So I applied back pressure to the control column and felt no resistance to the movement of the control column, and this kept going faster and faster. So I immediately assumed at the time that the tail section of the aircraft had come off, because it—a very violent maneuver happened in here. I think I reached a position about like this and I feel sure that both wings came off.

This was where the very violent maneuver took place.

Chairman RUSSELL. You were not where you could see the wings to determine whether they had come off?

Mr. POWERS. I didn't have much time to look, and I was being thrown around in the cockpit very much at this time. It had come down in this position. I had pulled the control column all the way back into my lap, and it did no good. As it came down, it kept going faster and it got like this and I feel that the wings came off then, but I really don't know. And a very violent maneuver during this time, and it ended up in a spin about this position. I know the nose was high, and I know it was turning very fast around, it seemed like around something heavy like in the fuselage. I don't know how much of the aircraft was left at the time. But all I could see by looking out of the cockpit was sky. The g. forces were very strong. I have no way of estimating how much.

I know that when I tried to get in the ejection position, it took both hands on my legs to pull my feet back into the stirrups of the ejection seat.

It was spinning very violently. I was thrown forward and up, and I was hanging onto the seat belt, not sitting in the seat.

My first reaction was to reach for the destruct switches, and I reached up. I don't know whether I touched them or not, but I thought that I had better see if I can get out of here before using this.

I knew that there was a 70-second time delay between the time of the actuation of the switches and the time that the explosion would occur.

So, after deciding that I had better check and see if I could get out before actuating the switches, I tried to get into position in the ejection seat so that I could use it. In this particular aircraft there isn't much clearance between the pilot's knees and the top of the windshield, the rail, steel rail across the top of the windshield, and I was being thrown forward, and if I had used the ejection seat at that time, I would have probably lost both legs just above the knees.

I don't know how long I tried getting back in position, but at the time I could think of no other way to get out, just the ejection seat. My mind was fixed on that one idea.

I kept glancing at the altimeter as the aircraft was falling and it was going around very fast. I remembered somewhere during this time above the altitude of 34,000 feet that a friend of mine who had had an accident in an aircraft was having trouble getting out of the aircraft, and I remembered him telling me of his experience.

He said that he told himself that he just had to stop and think, and this entered my mind at the time, so I just stopped struggling and tried to think, and this was the first time that I realized that maybe I could just open the canopy, loosen the seat belt, and climb out.

And, along in here, I saw 34,000 feet on the altimeter, and it was still moving very fast.

I immediately reached up, opened the canopy. One side came loose first—I think it was the right side. The other handle loosened the left side and it floated off—I believe it was to the left. I really don't know, but it just disappeared.

I had pulled my emergency belt out, however—I think that was one of the first things I did after this real violent maneuver—so that when I separated from the aircraft, I would have an oxygen supply while descending, but I had forgotten to unfasten my oxygen hoses—the can on my left.

I opened the seat belt, and I was immediately thrown forward and halfway out of the aircraft.

I can probably demonstrate this better than I can tell. The top of the canopy was, say, the top of this table, and I was hanging out over the front of the aircraft about like this [indicating], and I think the only thing that was keeping me in the aircraft was the oxygen hose.

If that had not have been fastened, I would probably have gone out right away, I don't know.

Well, then, I tried to get back into the aircraft so that I could actuate these destructor switches. I couldn't—the g. forces were too great and I could not pull myself back over the top of the windshield.

I tried to reach around underneath the windshield. I knew where the switches were. And I couldn't get my hand back underneath.

Also, somewhere about this time my faceplate of my flying suit frosted up completely. That is when it got into the cold air, and all I could see was just the eyes on the faceplate about an inch or so in front of my face. I knew that I was well below 34,000 feet.

I had no idea of what my altitude was. I couldn't get back in the airplane. I didn't know whether I could get those oxygen hoses loose or not. I couldn't actuate the destruct switches.

So then I decided just to try to get out. I gave several lunges and something snapped and I was floating free. It was almost immediately that the parachute opened, and this surprised me because I hadn't pulled the ripcord.

The parachute was equipped with an automatic opening device, but it has to be actuated by pulling another cord, and apparently that cord got hung on something in the airplane and pulled, because it was well less than a minute, I am sure, after leaving the aircraft that the chute opened.

A short while after that—I don't remember how long—I got to thinking that this chute was set to open at 15,000 feet or lower; that

the maximum altitude it would open would be 15,000 feet; so I knew that I could take my faceplate off, and not be in danger from the thin air.

So I removed the faceplate, just left it hanging on the hoses that were connected to the suit, and started looking around, and I was still very high—I estimate above 10,000 feet, but I have no idea of the exact altitude.

There were a lot of thoughts running through my mind at this time. It is impossible to recall them all, but I remembered I had a map in my pocket. I took this map out, looked at it, tore it into small pieces, and scattered it in the air.

I also thought of the coin with the poison pin in it. This had been given to me just prior to the flight, and it was my option whether to take this or not, and I chose to take it. I got to thinking that when I got on the ground if I were captured they would surely find this coin but maybe with just the pin lying loose in the pocket it would be overlooked, so I opened up the coin, got the pin out, and just dropped it in my pocket.

I had several other things in my pockets, but they were more or less necessary to survival if I could evade capture, so I decided not to get rid of those things. I don't remember exactly what they were. It was just some of the things that I couldn't get into my survival pack itself. I couldn't tell where I was going to land. There were a lot of wooded areas there, and there was one fairly large one that I would drift toward and then drift back away from. I was trying to guide the parachute over to this wooded area, but I had no success in that.

The winds were variable as I was coming down in the parachute, and first I would go toward the woods, later away from them.

When I got down fairly close to the ground, there was a car I could see on a dirt road. I didn't know what he was doing, but he wasn't going too fast and he seemed to be just keeping up with me, and the closer I got the closer he would get to me. He came to a little village there, turned left out to the outskirts, of the village and stopped, and I guess I was maybe 200 feet in the air at this time, and I think it was two men got out of the car.

I was descending what appeared to be very rapidly at the time, and I landed in an open field about 25 feet from a tractor with one driver on the tractor and one man standing beside the tractor.

When I hit the ground I fell down. When I looked up, one of the men, I don't know which it was, was out grabbing a hold of the parachute to try to collapse it. I remember releasing a strap on one side so that the air would spill out of the chute. A couple of these men helped me to my feet. I don't remember whether they tried to say anything to me at the time or not. I think they did, and I just shook my head. They helped me remove my parachute harness and the helmet of the flying suit. They took away the pistol and a knife that I had on my parachute. After I got my helmet off and could look around, there was a large crowd of people there, a lot of children, so apparently there was a school in this area. I don't know how many grownups but I would say there were at least 50 people. This is just a guess.

These men tried to talk to me and I would just shake my head and indicate that I couldn't understand them. One of them pointed at me and held up two fingers, and I got the impression that he was

asking if there were two of us, and I told him "No," just shook my head "No," and pointed to myself and held up one finger telling him that I was alone. And then he pointed up in the air and I looked up and saw what I think was a parachute, but I knew that I had no other parachute on board the aircraft.

I knew that it was no one that I knew, so I wasn't very interested at the time. They didn't pay too much attention to this. They just talked among themselves, one on each side of me caught my arm and led me to this car that I had seen earlier. They put me in the car in the front seat next to the driver and with a man on my right and there were three, I believe, in the back seat. They had loaded up the parachute, and I think my survival pack, in the trunk of the car.

They started driving through the village and I indicated to them that I would like to have something to drink, so he stopped in front of a house there in this small village. One of the men went inside, brought out a glass of water which I drank and they gave the glass to some of the people standing around and we left this village. It was on a very bad dirt road, a lot of ruts, a very rough ride. The car was small, and I estimate that it took about 30 minutes to get to this next village which was a larger place.

There was a paved street running through this second village.

They stopped on the side of the street that we approached the village from, got me out of the car, and there was what I took to be a policeman there.

They talked to him and he went through my pockets, not very thoroughly, led me across the street into some sort of an office, and I estimate that I stayed there about 2 hours. There were both civilian and military there. I don't know whether the military was there when I arrived or not but I know they were there during the time and before I left. One of the military men tried to speak to me in German, and I told him I didn't understand him. There was no one there that could speak English, so they didn't ask me any questions at the time.

People kept bringing in small pieces of wreckage from the aircraft. I saw several pieces of metal, some with English written on it, there was a small roll of film. They had my parachute there, the survival pack. Oh, they searched me here at this building also. They stripped me down to my underwear, went through my pockets, felt along the seams, but they didn't find the needle at this time.

They called in a doctor. She was a young woman, I would say about 30 years old. I had some scratches on my right leg which she painted and bandaged. They tried to talk to me several times, but I couldn't understand them and they couldn't understand me, and I estimate it was around 2 hours, maybe a little more, but I have no way of knowing how long I was there. They loaded me up in a military vehicle, a little larger than our jeep. There was an officer on my left, myself in the middle, and an enlisted man on my right in the back seat. The enlisted man had a carbine of some kind.

In the front seat there was a military driver and a civilian. They took me into a fairly large city which I assumed was Sverdlovsk. It was in the downtown area, into a fairly large office building, I would say about three stories high, and they took me to the second floor.

There they performed a thorough search and found the needle at this place. I tried to invent a story there that I didn't know where I was, I was off course, but they brought out the packages that I had in my survival pack or on my person with maps of the Soviet Union, Russian rubles, and several other items that indicated the nature of the mission. It was then that I decided to follow the instructions that I had received earlier and tell them that I was a member of the CIA and the nature of the mission.

It was quite obvious that they knew it anyway. I think I stayed there approximately 30 minutes. They made a lot of telephone calls. There was a man there who spoke English also and asked me several questions, and that is how I found out my story wouldn't hold up.

They seemed to be in a hurry. They made several telephone calls, talked a lot among themselves, and they gave me back my underwear and the outer flying suit but kept the pressure suit. They also gave me something similar to our poncho with two slits on each side made out of canvas. The slits were for the arms to go through. They put this on me.

One man got out a pair of handcuffs. They talked among themselves and he put them back in his pocket and they never did put them on me. We went back outside.

They loaded me in a fairly large car, limousine type, drove to an airfield, and when we got there, we stopped at the gate on one side of the terminal building, I suppose it was, and we waited there maybe 5 minutes, and there was a jet passenger aircraft in front of this building. Someone opened the gate. We drove to the front entrance of this aircraft. They made me run up the steps and led me into the front compartment which contained 10 seats. There were four men with me. I remember at least one was in uniform and one was a civilian, but I don't remember what the other two were wearing.

They asked me no questions on this flight.

I am getting ahead of myself. It seemed to me that the aircraft was waiting there for us because as soon as we got in they moved the loading ramp away and started up immediately, and through the curtains to the back, when the stewardess walked through, I could see that there were other passengers in the back, so I suppose it was a regular passenger flight to Moscow.

During the flight they asked no questions. Some of the— a couple of the men played chess. They ate, offered me food but I couldn't eat, and it was during this time that I made up my mind exactly what course I would follow during the forthcoming weeks. I knew that if these people released the news that I was there—I didn't know that they would at the time, but I knew that if they did—that there would be a lot of stuff in the papers in the States, and I also knew that they probably subscribed to every paper we have, and I wanted to make my story as close to what I thought would be released in the papers as possible.

I think the flight took about 3 hours.

We arrived at the airport in Moscow. They had me sit there for about 5 minutes, brought me out, ran me down the steps to a waiting car, and we immediately left. The car had curtains inside that they kept pulled.

You could see outside through the curtains, but I don't suppose anyone could see inside.

They took me downtown to the building that I stayed in until September 9.

There was another search performed immediately upon my arrival at this building. They took all my clothing and gave me other clothing there. There was an interrogation, I would say, within 30 minutes after my arrival there, and there were quite a few high-ranking people, many of them in uniforms, many of them in civilian clothes.

I don't remember exactly the questions they asked during this time, but I think it was mostly concerned with establishing that I was a member of the CIA, or worked for the CIA, and the purpose of the flight.

I don't know how long this lasted. I do know that Rudenko, who was the prosecutor during the trial, was more or less in charge of this interrogation session.

He offered me a Chesterfield cigarette. They asked me, I think at this time, what I knew about Moscow; what I knew about Russia; and I told them I knew very little about it.

They asked me if I would like to see Moscow, and I said "Yes." And they said, "Well, that might be arranged." Then I don't know whether I said anything or not, but, after this session was over, they took me to the prison section of this building. There I received a physical examination, not a very thorough one.

There was a lot of time spent just locked up in a room with nothing but a bench built against the wall and just waiting. The doctor came into this room and examined me there. I waited again.

They took me to a doctor's office, and it was either a different doctor or a nurse, I don't know which, gave me a shot. This was after dark; I don't know what time it was.

They immediately took me to a cell and put me in it, brought in some food which I couldn't eat, and I lay down and tried to sleep. The next morning there was an interrogation, and, for some reason or the other, this was left out of the books that they had compiled of the investigation.

I don't know why this one was left out, but it was.

Chairman RUSSELL. How do you know it was left out?

Mr. POWERS. They told me that according to the Russian law, I could review the evidence in the case before the trial.

Going through this evidence a week or so prior to the trial, I saw that one was missing, and I told this to my Soviet-appointed defense counsel, and he just shrugged his shoulders. That morning they said that in the afternoon we would take a tour of Moscow, and I was all for this because I know as long as I was riding around in a car they would not be asking questions, and I would have been willing to take a trip every day.

The real interrogation started on the morning of the 3d, and it varied, the sessions varied in length, but there were times as much as 10 to 12 hours in a single day, several times at night, but, as the time went on, they got shorter and a longer period between the interrogations.

It was somewhere in the latter part of May that I had a very bad cold, could hardly talk, that they gave me the first day off that I did not have an interrogation.

I don't remember the exact date, but it was after the 20th of May.

Through June the sessions became shorter and sometimes they would skip the whole weekend, Saturday and Sunday.

I suppose you probably have a lot of questions on this that I have gone over. Any time you want.

Chairman RUSSELL. I do have a number.

I was interested that you said a number of times that you had no way of knowing the time. I think the first time you said your parachute was coming down. Did you not have a timepiece of some kind with you?

Mr. POWERS. No.

I had the clocks in the airplane itself. I had no wristwatch. I think there was one in my pocket, but I had forgotten about it, and it probably was not wound, anyway.

From that time I do not remember seeing a clock or anything that I could tell the time by.

Chairman RUSSELL. It is rather unusual for any American not to have a wristwatch or some kind of timepiece with him after passing 14 or 15 years of age.

I was somewhat surprised that you didn't have a wristwatch or some watch with which you could tell the time.

Mr. POWERS. Well, it is very hard to wear a wristwatch over this pressure suit. It can be done, but I usually went by the watches we had in the aircraft itself.

Chairman RUSSELL. About what time of day was it when this unexplained explosion struck your plane?

Mr. POWERS. I don't remember the exact time, but I do remember it was close to the hour, I think just before the hour, but which hour I don't know. It was in the morning. I was using Greenwich time. I have no idea what the local time was. It could be very easy to find out by going back over the flight plan and following the route because I was very close to schedule.

Chairman RUSSELL. Unfortunately the Russians have all that; haven't they?

Mr. POWERS. They have all that I had with me.

Chairman RUSSELL. If you were compelled to make an estimate of the time that elapsed after you lost control of your plane until the time that you were on the ground, what would you estimate that time to be?

Mr. POWERS. I have thought about this a lot, and I really don't know. I don't know how fast the aircraft was falling. I know it was going pretty fast, but time didn't seem to mean anything. A second could have been a minute or a minute could have been a second. It seems like—

Chairman RUSSELL. I am including the time that you were in your parachute coming down. Would you estimate 1 minute, 2 minutes, 3 minutes, 4 minutes?

Mr. POWERS. It was more than that. The parachute itself, I would say, was better than 10 minutes, but I really don't know. I am just guessing this.

Chairman RUSSELL. Better than 10 minutes in the parachute?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you think it would have been longer or shorter than that after you lost control before the parachute opened?

Mr. POWERS. I would say much shorter.

Chairman RUSSELL. Much shorter. Now, these men that were in that automobile that were pursuing you or following you on this dirt road, were they civilians or in military uniform?

Mr. POWERS. They all had civilian clothing.

Chairman RUSSELL. When was the first time you saw anyone in uniform?

Mr. POWERS. At the second village where these men took me.

Chairman RUSSELL. Apparently they thought you were a Russian when they first came up to you?

Mr. POWERS. Probably so. I really don't know. It didn't take them long to take my pistol away, and the knife.

Chairman RUSSELL. They had spoken to you prior to that time; hadn't they?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, but I just shook my head, didn't say a word, so I don't know what they thought.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you ever have a jetplane flame out on you, Mr. Powers, while you were piloting?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, I have.

Chairman RUSSELL. Does it make any unusual noise or give any unusual impetus to the plane?

Mr. POWERS. Different aircraft react differently. In this particular airplane I had had flameouts before. Sometimes there is a chugging of the engine, but you know what that is. There was no kind of an explosion accompanying that, and nothing that would give an orange light.

Chairman RUSSELL. The orange light was something that was really unusual?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, and it was apparently persistent. It wasn't a flash, but all the time that I was looking out it was there, but I don't remember ever seeing it again.

Chairman RUSSELL. Has there ever been any other occasion when you were in an airplane and were the target of a ground-to-air missile or explosive or shell of any kind?

Mr. POWERS. Not that I know of.

Chairman RUSSELL. You have never seen any ground-to-air missile explode?

Mr. POWERS. No, I haven't.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is that right?

Mr. POWERS. I have seen photographs or moving pictures of some of our missiles shooting an aircraft down, but the ones I have seen, the missile hits the aircraft.

Well, I am sure that nothing hit this aircraft. If something did hit it, I am sure I would have felt it.

Chairman RUSSELL. You did say that the plane had an impetus forward when it was hit?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. When this explosion occurred evidently it occurred behind the plane?

Mr. POWERS. That was my thinking. There was definitely a slight acceleration—not much, but a push.

Chairman RUSSELL. Could you see the plane to which you referred or did you only see the markings of the jet plane in the atmosphere?

Mr. POWERS. This was at least an hour earlier, and I only saw the condensation trails themselves. I tried to see the aircraft and couldn't. They were quite a way below and I estimated 20 miles to the right, but it is hard to estimate distances in the air.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is not much range for a jet airplane though, is it, 20 miles? The main difference was the —

Mr. POWERS. The altitude.

Chairman RUSSELL. The altitude, not the distance from it?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you see any other airplanes on that mission?

Mr. POWERS. I saw no other condensation trails or airplanes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Have you ever had reason to believe that airplanes on any other mission were undertaking to reach you or to find you?

Mr. POWERS. Pardon?

Chairman RUSSELL. Have you ever had any occasion to believe on this or any mission that an airplane was attempting to attack the plane which you were piloting?

Mr. POWERS. No. On this mission I can't be sure that these two planes that I did see or the condensation trails that I did see, I can't be sure that they were looking for me, but it seemed odd that they would first parallel my course exactly in the opposite direction and then a few minutes later parallel my course in the same direction I was heading. I assume that they were looking for me but they made no turns to try to intercept or anything.

Chairman RUSSELL. You said several times that you drifted to the right of course?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. To the right of course. Not being a pilot, why is that—what is that of course, is that the prevailing wind pushing to the right?

Mr. POWERS. We usually have a forecast wind for different altitudes, and the flight plan is drawn up to take into consideration the strength of the wind, and apparently the wind information we had was a little wrong and the wind was stronger than the navigator thought it would be, and he had computed the course for a slower wind.

Chairman RUSSELL. You are not a navigator yourself, Mr. Powers?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, a pilot has to be a navigator, but I am not a rated navigator. I never was a rated navigator in the Air Force.

Chairman RUSSELL. Had you ever made a parachute descent before?

Mr. POWERS. No, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. You say they didn't find this needle until about the third time they examined you, I believe. Where was the needle hidden?

Mr. POWERS. I had just dropped it loose in the pocket.

Chairman RUSSELL. Loose in your pocket?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. I wish you would clear up the matter of the needle, Mr. Powers.

Were you under any obligation to destroy yourself if you were captured?

Mr. POWERS. Oh, no. I don't remember exactly who gave me the needle that morning, but they told me, "You can take it if you want to." They said, "If something does happen you may be tortured."

Maybe you could conceal this on your person in some way, and if you see that you cannot withstand the torture, you might want to use it."

And that is the reason I took the needle. But I could have left it. I wasn't told to take it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you have the instructions that you received that morning and that you usually received there before you—

Mr. POWERS. Do I have them?

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir; the instructions as to your course of conduct in the event you fell into the hands of any enemy, potential enemy.

Mr. POWERS. Well, it is hard to remember this long exactly what they were.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think they are there. You can read them. I think they ought to go into this record.

Mr. POWERS. Listed here are three paragraphs:

(a) If evasion is not feasible and capture appears imminent, pilots should surrender without resistance and adopt a cooperative attitude toward their captors.

(b) At all times while in the custody of their captors, pilots will conduct themselves with dignity and maintain a respectful attitude toward their superiors.

(c) Pilots will be instructed that they are perfectly free to tell the full truth about their mission with the exception of certain specifications of the aircraft. They will be advised to represent themselves as civilians, to admit previous Air Force affiliation, to admit current CIA employment, and to make no attempt to deny the nature of their mission.

That is all.

Chairman RUSSELL. Those instructions had been given you before you took off on this flight?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. You were thoroughly familiar with them?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. They were a part of your agreement with the CIA?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Powers, were you close enough to this other parachute to tell whether it was occupied by a man or whether it just had some object in it?

Mr. POWERS. No. It was very high. I don't know how high. I couldn't see what it was.

I thought at the time that—well, there were a lot of thoughts running through my mind, and I thought at the time that maybe this explosion was caused by a rocket, and, if so, maybe this parachute was used to recover, say, the first stage or something.

Actually, I have no idea what was in the parachute, but I am sure it was a parachute, very similar to mine. It was a different color. I think it had red and white markings.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were these people concerned about it? Was there any possibility that this was a Russian in that parachute and that they had shot down one of their own planes in their efforts to reach you at your high altitude?

Mr. POWERS. I really don't know.

The people just asked me if there were two of us, two Americans. I mean he just pointed at myself and asked if there were two, and I told him by sign language that there was only one, and we got in the car and left.

They didn't seem concerned at all.

Chairman RUSSELL. So they didn't even look for the other man?

Mr. POWERS. No, the ones who were with me did not.

Chairman RUSSELL. You do not know whether anyone else out there looked for him or not?

Mr. POWERS. No; I have no idea.

Chairman RUSSELL. They did not ever bring him in to where they took you?

Mr. POWERS. No.

I do know that this was not part of my aircraft or equipment.

Chairman RUSSELL. I was very much interested in that one day's interrogation that was left out of your evidence and how you knew it was left out.

You cannot read Russian, can you, Mr. Powers?

Mr. POWERS. No.

They translated the interrogations into English for me to read and to correct.

Chairman RUSSELL. And there was no evidence of that day at all in this record?

Mr. POWERS. There was definitely an interrogation on that morning, and it was definitely not in the books they gave me to review.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is what I mean: There was nothing in the book that transpired that day?

Mr. POWERS. Right.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did they threaten you at any time when they were examining you?

Mr. POWERS. There were no definite threats, but they didn't let me forget that this crime was punishable by death. Anytime they would mention that it was 7 to 15 years and death, and they wouldn't let me forget that.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you ever manifest any reluctance in answering the questions that they asked you or did you answer them immediately?

Mr. POWERS. I refused to answer several of their questions. I showed reluctance on many.

Chairman RUSSELL. Pardon?

Mr. POWERS. I showed reluctance on many, some that I couldn't see how they could be of any interest to them at all, but I was just reluctant in answering all questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. That was not exactly in conformity with your instructions there to cooperate with your captors; was it?

Mr. POWERS. Well, you shouldn't go overboard with this cooperation, I don't think.

Chairman RUSSELL. You were quoted in the press as having stated at your trial that you had made a terrible mistake in flying over Russia and apologized to the Russian people and would never do it again. Was that a misquotation or did you make that statement at your trial?

Mr. POWERS. No, that wasn't a misquotation. I made this statement on the advice of my defense counsel, and also because it was easy to say I was sorry because what I meant by saying that and what I wanted them to think I meant was quite different. My main sorrow was that the mission failed, and I was sorry that I was there, and it was causing a lot of adverse publicity to the States. But, of course, some of these things I couldn't say in that statement.

Chairman RUSSELL. Was the room in which you were confined a cell, a jail cell, or was it just an ordinary office room?

Mr. POWERS. No, it was part of a prison. It had a solid door with a peephole in it, one window with opaque glass, and bars on the outside of the glass itself. The only way I could see out was through a small crack at the top, and I could see part of the wall of the wing of the building opposite this cell, but it was definitely a prison.

Chairman RUSSELL. Was it kept reasonably clean?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, it was kept clean.

Chairman RUSSELL. How was your food that you had there at the prison?

Mr. POWERS. The food was better at the first place in Moscow there than it was at Vladimir at the prison there. I couldn't eat for a long time, and apparently they got quite worried about it and kept asking me if they could get me any special foods or anything, and I told them "No."

Later on I did start eating, but I never had much of an appetite the whole time I was there. There seemed to be plenty of the food but it is quite different from what we have here. It consisted predominantly of potatoes and cabbage.

Chairman RUSSELL. Borsch and different kinds of soups?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, at the prison in Vladimir the best part of the meal at lunch was a bowl of soup.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you ever have a roommate or did you occupy that cell by yourself?

Mr. POWERS. From May 1 to September 9 I was in solitary confinement. When I moved to the other prison I had a roommate.

Chairman RUSSELL. What had he been charged with?

Mr. POWERS. He was—they called it an article 58, which I think means crimes against the state, and he said treason. He spoke English. He spoke four languages. He was a Latvian. He spoke Latvian, German, English, and Russian.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you have any reason to believe he was planted there to spy on you or do you think he was a bona fide prisoner?

Mr. POWERS. This was always in the back of my mind, but I do not think he was a plant. He had a lot of stuff that he had accumulated over the few years that he had been there, notes that he had taken while he was studying Russian written on scraps of newspaper and a lot of other things. It took him a long time to accumulate what he had. I feel sure that he wasn't a plant.

Chairman RUSSELL. How long had he been in prison?

Mr. POWERS. He was there, I think, in April of this year will be 7 years. This is what he told me. His sentence was 15 years.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did they not periodically examine your possessions? You say he had accumulated this file of material about Russian. They didn't go through your belongings to see whether you had anything you shouldn't have?

Mr. POWERS. Not while we were there, anyway. Not while we were in the cell.

Chairman RUSSELL. Not in any instance?

Mr. POWERS. There were several inspection teams who came around the prison. They would just come in and ask through an interpreter if there were any questions, any complaints, stuff like this, but they didn't bother us very much at all.

Chairman RUSSELL. I can't refrain from saying that the Russians were much more gentle with you than I would ever have expected they would have been to one who was taken under those circumstances.

Mr. POWERS. It surprised me, also. I expected much worse treatment than I received.

Chairman RUSSELL. I rather think you got off somewhat better than a Russian spy would in this country under the same circumstances.

Mr. POWERS. I really don't know.

Chairman RUSSELL. It might depend on where he happened to land. Undoubtedly he would have a rough time in the section of the country from which I come.

Senator SALTONSTALL?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman—Mr. Powers, I think I only have one or two questions. I have listened with interest to what you have said. I have listened to what Mr. McCone has told us, what he has given out in unclassified information, and I have listened to the chairman.

My question would be this: Did I understand you correctly that when you were coming down in the parachute you threw away your instructions and threw away the map?

Mr. POWERS. No, I had no written instructions with me, but I did have a map, and I tore that up in very small pieces and scattered it out in the air as I was coming down.

Senator SALTONSTALL. So that your instructions were in your head, so to speak?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, did you have a briefcase or something else in which these other things, your special food, and these other things, were that they looked through afterward?

Mr. POWERS. Yes. I had what we call a seat pack. In this seat pack was a collapsible rubber liferaft, some food, some water, matches, several other items necessary to, say, live off the land or survival in an unpopulated area.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In other words, nothing except survival kit?

Mr. POWERS. Yes. There were also some cloth maps for escape and evasion.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Powers, I will just say this: After listening to Mr. McCone and after listening to you, I commend you as a courageous, fine young American citizen who lived up to your instructions and who did the best you could under very difficult circumstances.

Mr. POWERS. Thank you very much.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd?

Senator BYRD of Virginia. The chairman has very ably covered the ground, and I will not ask any questions.

I do want to say I join with Senator Saltonstall in expressing my opinion that the witness, Mr. Powers, has made an excellent presentation. He has been frank, and I am also very much gratified that Mr. McCone has testified before the committee that so far as he knows no action has been taken by you which was contrary to your instructions or contrary to the interests of this country.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH of Maine. Mr. Chairman, my questions have been covered, thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman; I think you have covered this matter fully. I want to ask one question.

Mr. Powers, I understand you had an attorney appointed for your trial.

Mr. POWERS. Yes, that is right.

Senator STENNIS. Did he work with you and freely advise you and counsel with you, give you advice?

Mr. POWERS. Yes. We had several meetings before the trial. But I didn't get to see him until, I would say, about 2 weeks before the trial.

Senator STENNIS. He rendered you a valuable service, did he?

Mr. POWERS. Well, I really don't know. I never did trust him any more than the rest of them.

Senator STENNIS. I mean by that that he gave you information and talked to you and you think you were better off at the trial than you would have been without his aid. What about that?

Mr. POWERS. I really don't know.

Senator STENNIS. You have understood, I suppose, that at the time this occurred there was some publicity here, not a great deal, but some that was not altogether favorable to you.

Did you know about that?

Mr. POWERS. I have heard about this since I—

Senator STENNIS. That is just a prelude for my saying this—that it is with satisfaction to me that I learn that you have been fully exonerated by the men who most know how to judge what you did, what the facts were, by your superiors and those who employed you. Not only that, but they found that you have discharged all of your obligations to your country, and it is with satisfaction to us here and I think to the American people to learn that, to know it is true.

I know it makes you feel mighty good.

Mr. POWERS. There was one thing that I always remembered while I was there and that was that I am an American.

Senator STENNIS. You are an American.

Mr. POWERS. Right.

Senator STENNIS. And proud of it?

Mr. POWERS. Right.

Senator STENNIS. That is fine. [Applause.] You felt that the American flag would finally find you and follow through and do what was good for you?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, I did.

Senator STENNIS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Case.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Powers, did you have any opportunity to see the plane or any part of it on the ground after you landed?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, I did. They took me out somewhere around the middle of May to a building in a park in Moscow. The plane was on display there.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. Was there any evidence visible or evident to you that the plane had been tampered with or changed in any way after it had been brought there?

Mr. POWERS. Well, there was quite a bit of damage. Some parts were missing completely. There were a few things that I was very

interested in looking at myself. I was particularly interested in the tail section, because I thought it might be possible that the tail of the aircraft came off and this caused the accident, but on looking at that there were no scorch marks. The paint was still intact. So I could only assume that while the engine was running the tail was on the aircraft. But as far as anything else, there was no way that I could tell whether it had been tampered with or not. There was a lot of damage to everything I saw.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. Was the tail on the plane when you saw it?

Mr. POWERS. No. It was sitting in one place by itself.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. You have referred to the incident as an explosion. Was there anything visibly noticeable about the plane that helped to form that opinion that it was an explosion, or was that simply the fact that at the time you felt the incident you were impelled forward?

Mr. POWERS. Well, I heard and felt something, and it sounded like a very dull explosion, like something "whoomp," not a real sharp sound, but dull. Then the light after this. Looking at the aircraft I noticed on one of the wings that there were holes on one side of the wings, but I don't know whether this was caused by a fragmentation or maybe when it hit the ground.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. How long were you in the Air Force?

Mr. POWERS. A little more than 5 years.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. During that time did you receive any indoctrination, so to speak, with regard to communism?

Mr. POWERS. This was really a long time ago. I have seen some films while I was in the Air Force. I think I had attended a lecture where a list of Communist organizations was pointed out. There might have been others, but I can't remember.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. Was your service in the Air Force during wartime?

Mr. POWERS. No. Well, I entered the Air Force during the Korean war, but never did get to Korea.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. With respect to this particular flight, did you have anything to do with the selection of the date for the flight?

Mr. POWERS. No.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. Do you know whether or not the timing of the flight was primarily a matter of the selection of weather and favorable atmospheric conditions or anything else?

Mr. POWERS. I would assume that it depended primarily on weather. I really don't know.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. You really don't know, but that was your assumption?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. There was nothing in your experience that would indicate anything other than that it was a timely flight because of the weather conditions?

Mr. POWERS. That is what I would think, yes.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. Did you learn from your cellmate anything about the economic or political conditions in Russia?

Mr. POWERS. We discussed quite a few things there. He seemed to be more interested in the West than I was in Russia, and we primarily talked about that.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. What was his original nationality?

Mr. POWERS. Latvian.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. Latvian.

Are you still in the employ of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, I am.

Senator CASE of South Dakota. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. What was your rank when you separated yourself from the Air Force, Mr. Powers?

Mr. POWERS. First lieutenant.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator SYMINGTON.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Powers, what do you think hit you, or nearly hit you?

Mr. POWERS. I really don't know. I just know that there was an explosion, but how it got there—I feel sure that it was external to the aircraft, but how it got there or what it was, I have no idea.

Senator SYMINGTON. Has anybody given you an opinion as to what that orange glow was?

Mr. POWERS. Well, they stressed many, many times that they got me on the very first shot of a rocket, but they stressed it so much that I tend to disbelieve it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is there any possibility that you were hit twice, once at a higher altitude, say, a near miss, and again at a lower altitude?

Mr. POWERS. No.

There was only one explosion that I know of, and they would have had to have been excellent shots to hit that thing as it fell.

Senator SYMINGTON. In the Red Star it said that—

Major Varanoff ran out and saw in the rays of the day's sun fragments of the foreign plane falling down and not far from it the pilot himself.

That could not be true if you were hit at anything like 67,000 or 68,000 feet; could it? You would be behind the pieces of the plane; would you not?

Mr. POWERS. Well, while I was descending in the parachute, I saw one piece of the plane fall. It was a flat piece. It may have been a wing or it may have been something smaller. But it was falling like a leaf falls, flipping and turning, and fairly slow, but it passed me.

I have no idea of how far away it was.

Senator SYMINGTON. Could it have been another plane that had been hit?

Mr. POWERS. No, I assumed at the time that it was part of my aircraft. If it was a wing, it was a long distance off. If it was a smaller piece, it was closer. That is all I can say about it.

Senator SYMINGTON. You did your best to destroy the plane, but, because of the g's on you at the time, you were just unable to reach the controls; is that correct?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, that is right.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to join you and other members of the committee in commending Mr. Powers for the way he handled himself in this unfortunate episode. I have no further questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bush.

Senator BUSH. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions, but I also would like to say, having heard Mr. McCone's report today and having listened to Mr. Powers' remarkable story, that I am satisfied he has conducted himself in exemplary fashion and in accordance with the highest traditions of service to one's country, and I congratulate him upon his conduct in captivity and his safe return to the United States.

Mr. POWERS. Thank you.

Chairman RUSSELL. I think I should say to the members of the committee that Mr. Powers has not yet completed his entire statement.

He stopped for a period of questions, as I understood, and then you will tell us more about your trial before you conclude, will you not, Mr. Powers?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, I will go right on until I got back, if you want to listen to it.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator JACKSON.

Senator JACKSON. Did they indicate to you whether the plane, your plane, came down near where you landed?

Mr. POWERS. No.

At one time during the investigation they showed me some kind of a map that had indicated on it where different parts of the aircraft fell, but I didn't recognize any of the landmarks that I could see on this map.

Senator JACKSON. And while you were in this particular village and later in Sverdlovsk, did they indicate at that time that they had located the plane?

Mr. POWERS. Well, people kept bringing in small pieces, pieces that could be carried, but, as far as indicating to me that they had located the main parts of it, no.

Senator JACKSON. Did they indicate later that Mr. Khrushchey had personally ordered the shooting down of your aircraft by a rocket?

Mr. POWERS. I don't think so. I don't remember that his name entered into it.

Senator JACKSON. I asked that because the story was carried, I believe, in the American press, based on, of course, a story out of Moscow from one of the official Soviet news agencies.

But they did not indicate that to you?

Mr. POWERS. No, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Do I understand after the trial you were removed to Adema? That is out about 100 miles; is it not?

Mr. POWERS. I would say about 100 or 150 miles.

Senator JACKSON. East of Moscow?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. Did they attempt, while you were there, to indoctrinate you at all into communism?

Mr. POWERS. No.

Senator JACKSON. Did they attempt to indoctrinate you into the Soviet system?

Mr. POWERS. No.

There were no lectures, no political sessions that I had to attend, but the only news source I had was communistic. There was a loud-speaker in the cell that was tuned to one of the Moscow radio stations.

I didn't understand very much of what went on, on this. But there was no direct attempt for someone to come in and talk to me about any of this.

Senator JACKSON. Did they indicate that you might be let out earlier than your sentence provided for?

Mr. POWERS. No.

Sometime—I think right after the trial—someone mentioned that there might be such things as exchanges, and I said, "Is that right?"

And he said, "Yes, but we don't have any Soviet spies in the United States."

But that is the only indication I had.

Senator JACKSON. When did you first get an idea that they had changed their mind about that?

Mr. POWERS. The first I knew about it was about 7:30 at night on the 7th of February.

Senator JACKSON. This year?

Mr. POWERS. This year, yes.

I didn't know what was going on, but I knew that something was going on. Some men came in with an interpreter and asked me if I would like to accompany them to Moscow tomorrow, and added, "Without any guards," so I immediately assumed something was going on. I didn't know what.

We got to Moscow, spent the night there, and they told me that night that we would go to Berlin the next morning. I still didn't know what was happening.

Senator JACKSON. At least you were moving west, though?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, and I was very glad to take this trip. Actually, they never did tell me that Colonel Abel was involved in this.

I am sure they knew that I would find out the minute I stepped across the line, but, up until that time, it was just the goodness of their hearts and not anything else.

Senator JACKSON. Just a voluntary act on their part?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. They did not indicate that anyone else was being exchanged?

Mr. POWERS. No.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to conclude by saying that I associate myself with the remarks previously made here. I think it is quite clear from what we have heard this morning and now that Mr. Powers has lived up to his contract.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Beall.

Senator BEALL. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions. I do want to associate myself with you and the balance of the committee in commending Mr. Powers for the very intelligent way he has handled himself.

I was at the hearings this morning, and I am convinced that he has been very frank with us and I congratulate him.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Goldwater.

Senator GOLDWATER. I have no questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Powers, you might give us a brief résumé of your trial now. Senator Jackson has already covered the exchange, but you might give us a brief résumé of the trial.

Mr. POWERS. I don't remember the exact date that they told me when the trial would take place, but when they did tell me I was very curious to know why the first day of the trial fell on my birthday, and I asked them about this. They said that it was just a coincidence. Somewhere around the 1st of August, I met the Soviet-appointed defense counsel for the first time. I had three or four sessions with him, not very long ones.

He made a lot of suggestions of things I should do. Actually it didn't seem that he did too much work or didn't seem to be extremely interested in the case, or this was my impression.

I guess most everyone here knows about the trial.

I think that has been fairly highly publicized. It was a very tense time for me.

The only good part about the whole thing was the last day, when I was allowed to see my relatives for the first time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you feel that you were treated harshly by the Russians, Mr. Powers?

Mr. POWERS. No, I was treated much better than I expected to be treated.

Chairman RUSSELL. How about the sentence that was imposed on you at the conclusion, after you pled guilty?

Mr. POWERS. I expected much worse.

Chairman RUSSELL. You expected a more severe sentence than you received?

Mr. POWERS. Up until the time of the prosecutor's speech where he only asked for 15 years, I expected death, but after he had asked for that I thought it would be 15 years or just a little under, maybe 12 to 15 years.

Chairman RUSSELL. I believe they don't have a jury in Russia.

Mr. POWERS. No. It was three judges and that is it.

Chairman RUSSELL. They have three judges who sat on the case?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did your lawyer make any argument to the judges?

Mr. POWERS. I don't think he argued with anyone. He asked a few questions, but I brought up family background.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did the prosecutor make any argument to the judges?

Mr. POWERS. It seemed to be that his case was against the United States and not against me. That is the impression I got there. He had a long speech at the end, but I don't recall what all he said.

Chairman RUSSELL. He denounced the imperialists and things of that kind more than he did you?

Mr. POWERS. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. You were rather fortunate in being put in the place of an unwitting pawn of these imperialists rather than being responsible for all of it yourself?

Mr. POWERS. Well, that might have helped; I don't know.

Chairman RUSSELL. After your conviction, was there any difference in the treatment that you received prior to your trial?

Mr. POWERS. Not until I changed prisons, and then the food was worse. The bed was much better, though.

Chairman RUSSELL. That was in Moscow?

Mr. POWERS. In Moscow this bed wasn't fit to sleep on. It was iron straps welded together with a very thin mattress on it, and it was almost impossible to sleep on it.

Chairman RUSSELL. I hope I never visit Russia under the circumstances you did, Mr. POWERS. At the time I was there I found Moscow to be exactly different. I got a good bed and very poor food, and out in the country the bed was terrible but the food was edible, so my experience was exactly the reverse of yours. I don't think I would try to visit your way, though.

Any further questions by any member of the committee?

If not, I will ask all the policemen to please see that Mr. POWERS and his CIA escort are able to get out before the rush.

Will all of you please keep your seats.

(Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.)

(The following is an unclassified summary of the results of the interrogation by the Central Intelligence Agency of Francis Gary POWERS since his release by the Soviet Union:)

STATEMENT CONCERNING FRANCIS GARY POWERS

Since his return from imprisonment by Soviet Russia, Francis Gary POWERS has undergone a most intensive debriefing by CIA and other intelligence specialists, aeronautical technicians, and other experts concerned with various aspects of his mission and subsequent capture by the Soviets. This was followed by a complete review by a board of inquiry presided over by Judge E. Barrett Prettyman to determine if POWERS complied with the terms of his employment and his obligations as an American. The board has submitted its report to the Director of Central Intelligence.

Certain basic points should be kept in mind in connection with this case. The pilots involved in the U-2 program were selected on the basis of aviation proficiency, physical stamina, emotional stability, and, of course, personal security. They were not selected or trained as espionage agents, and the whole nature of the mission was far removed from the traditional espionage scene. Their job was to fly the plane, and it was so demanding an assignment that on completion of a mission physical fatigue was a hazard on landing.

The pilots' contracts provided that they perform such services as might be required and follow such instructions and briefings in connection therewith as were given to them by their superiors. The guidance was as follows:

"(a) If evasion is not feasible and capture appears imminent, pilots should surrender without resistance and adopt a cooperative attitude toward their captors.

"(b) At all times while in the custody of their captors, pilots will conduct themselves with dignity and maintain a respectful attitude toward their superiors.

"(c) Pilots will be instructed that they are perfectly free to tell the full truth about their mission with the exception of certain specifications of the aircraft. They will be advised to represent themselves as civilians, to admit previous Air Force affiliation, to admit current CIA employment, and to make no attempt to deny the nature of their mission."

They were instructed, therefore, to be cooperative with their captors within limitations, to use their own judgment of what they should attempt to withhold, and not to subject themselves to strenuous hostile interrogation. It has been established that Mr. POWERS had been briefed in accordance with this policy and so understood his guidance. In regard to the poison needle which was prominently mentioned at the trial in Moscow, it should be emphasized that this was intended for use primarily if the pilot were subjected to torture or other circumstances which in his discretion warranted the taking of his own life. There were no instructions that he should commit suicide and no expectation that he would do so except in those situations just described, and I emphasize that even taking the needle with him in the plane was not mandatory; it was his option.

Mr. POWERS' performance on prior missions has been reviewed, and it is clear that he was one of the outstanding pilots in the whole U-2 program. He was proficient both as a flyer and as a navigator and showed himself calm in emergency situations. His security background has been exhaustively reviewed, and any circumstances which might conceivably have led to pressure from or defection to

the Russians have also been exhaustively reviewed, and no evidence has been found to support any theory that failure of his flight might be laid to Soviet espionage activities. The same is true of the possibilities of sabotage.

Accordingly, Mr. Powers was assigned to the mission that eventually occurred on May 1, 1960, and accepted the assignment willingly. It was a particularly grueling assignment across the heart of Soviet Russia and ending on the northwest coast of Norway. It was necessary to maintain extreme altitude at heights at which no other plane but the U-2 had steadily flown. So far as can be ascertained Mr. Powers followed the scheduled flight plan, making a prescribed turn to the northwest when nearing the city of Sverdlovsk where he was directly on course. According to his statement, he had settled on his new course and had Sverdlovsk in sight, perhaps 20 or 30 miles away, when he felt and heard something he describes as a push or feeling of acceleration on the plane accompanied by a dull noise unlike the sharp sound of a high explosive. This caused him to look up from his instruments, and he saw surrounding him, or perhaps reflected in his canopy, he is not sure, an orange or reddish glare which seemed to persist. He felt this phenomenon to be external to the plane but says he cannot be sure. For a moment the plane continued to fly normally, then it dipped to the right but he found he was able to control this dip and level the plane with his normal controls. Shortly thereafter, however, the plane began to nose forward, and Mr. Powers states that as he drew back on the stick he felt no control as if the control lines had been severed. The plane nosed sharply over and went into violent maneuver, at which point he believes the wings came off. The hull of the plane then turned completely over and he found himself in an inverted spin with the nose high revolving around the center of the fuselage so that all he could see through the canopy looking ahead was the sky revolving around the nose of the plane. This motion exerted g. forces on him which threw him forward and up in the cockpit. At this point he states he could have reached the destruct switches which would have set off an explosive charge in the bottom of the plane. However, he realized that this charge would go off in 70 seconds and he did not yet know if he could leave the plane. He stated that he tried to draw himself back into the seat to see if he could activate the ejection mechanism, but the g. forces prevented him from recovering his position. Being forward and out of the seat, even if he could have used the ejection mechanism, which was below and behind him, it would have seriously injured him if activated. He recalled that it was possible to open the canopy manually, and shortly thereafter he was able to do so and the canopy disappeared. His last recollection of the altimeter was that he was at about 34,000 feet and descending rapidly. To see if he could get out of the cockpit, he released his seat belt and was immediately thrown forward over the cowling of the cockpit to a position where he was held only by his oxygen tube. He tried to pull himself back in the cockpit to the destruct switches which take four separate manipulations to set and found himself unable to do so because of the g. forces, the inflation of his pressure suit, and the fogging up of his face mask which totally obscured his view. By pushing he tore loose the oxygen tube and fell free, whereupon his parachute opened almost immediately, indicating that he was probably at 15,000 feet or below at this time since the automatic mechanism was set for this height. In connection with Powers' efforts to operate the destruct switches, it should be noted that the basic weight limitations kept the explosive charge to 2½ pounds and the purpose of the destruct mechanism was to render inoperable the precision camera and other equipment, not to destroy them and the film. After he landed he was taken by commercial plane to Moscow the same day.

In the processing into the prison he was given a hypodermic injection which may well have been a general immunization, and there is no evidence of the use of truth serums or other drugs. From then until the time of the trial, about 100 days, he was kept in solitary confinement and subjected to constant interrogation, sometimes as long as 10 or 12 hours a day, but on the average considerably less than this. He had no access to anyone but his Russian guards and interrogators despite repeated requests for contact with the U.S. Embassy or his family and friends. He states that the interrogation was not intense in the sense of physical violence or severe hostile methods, and that in some respects he was able to resist answering specific questions. As an example, his interrogators were interested in the names of people participating in the project, and he states that he tried to anticipate what names would become known and gave those, such as the names of his commanding officer and certain other personnel at his home base in Adana, Turkey, who would probably be known in any case to the Russians. However, they asked him for names of other pilots and he states that he refused to give these on the grounds that they were his friends and comrades and if he gave their names they would lose their jobs and, therefore, he could not do so. He states

they accepted this position. It is his stated belief, therefore, that the information he gave was that which in all probability would be known in any case to his captors.

At his trial he had only the advice of his Russian defense counsel to go by, and he advised that unless Powers pleaded guilty to what the Russians considered a clear violation of domestic law and expressed penitence, matters would go hard for him, including a possible death sentence. These actions were consistent with his instructions from CIA. After the trial and sentencing, Mr. Powers states that there was only intermittent interrogation of little importance and that on the whole he was well treated, adequately fed, and given medical attention when required.

All the facts concerning Mr. Powers' mission, the descent of his plane, his capture, and his subsequent actions have been subjected to intensive study. In the first place, Powers was interrogated for many days consecutively by a debriefing team of experienced interrogators, one of whose duties was to evaluate Powers' credibility. They expressed the unanimous view that Powers was truthful in his account. Secondly, an intensive inquiry was made by Government officials into the background, life history, education, conduct, and character of Powers. This team included doctors, specialists in psychiatry and psychology, personnel officers, his former colleagues in the Air Force and on the U-2 project. All these persons were of the view that Powers is inherently and by practice a truthful man. Thirdly, Powers appeared before a board of inquiry and testified at length, both directly and under cross-examination. The board agreed that in his appearance he appeared to be truthful, frank, straightforward, and without any indicated attempt to evade questions or color what he was saying. In the board's judgment he reflected an attitude of complete candor. In the fourth place, when during his examination before the board a question was raised as to the accuracy of one of his statements, he volunteered with some vehemence that, although he disliked the process of the polygraph, he would like to undergo a polygraph test. That test was subsequently duly administered by an expert and in it he was examined on all of the factual phases which the board considered critical in this inquiry. The report by the polygraph operator is that he displayed no indications of deviation from the truth in the course of that examination. In the fifth place, a study of the photograph of the debris of the plane and other information concerning the plane revealed in the opinion of experts making the study no condition which suggested an inconsistency with Powers' account of what had transpired. The board noted the testimony of Russian witnesses at the trial in Moscow which dealt with the descent and capture of Powers and with technical features of the plane and the incident.

The testimony was consistent with the account given by Powers. Powers was able to identify a spot near a small village where he thought he had landed. This location checked with prior testimony given by Powers as to physical features, directions, and distances and also corresponded with earlier independent information not known to Powers that certain of the persons who captured him lived in this same small village. Some information from confidential sources was available. Some of it corroborated Powers and some of it was inconsistent in parts with Powers' story, but that which was inconsistent was in part contradictory with itself and subject to various interpretations. Some of this information was the basis for considerable speculation shortly after the May 1 episode and subsequent stories in the press that Powers' plane had descended gradually from its extreme altitude and had been shot down by a Russian fighter at medium altitude. On careful analysis, it appears that the information on which these stories were based was erroneous or was susceptible of varying interpretations. The board came to the conclusion that it could not accept a doubtful interpretation in this regard which was inconsistent with all the other known facts and consequently rejected these newspaper stories as not founded in fact.

On all the information available, therefore, it is the conclusion of the board of inquiry which reviewed Mr. Powers' case and of the Director of Central Intelligence, who has carefully studied the board's report and has discussed it with the board, that Mr. Powers lived up to the terms of his employment and instructions in connection with his mission and in his obligations as an American under the circumstances in which he found himself. It should be noted that competent aerodynamicists and aeronautical engineers have carefully studied Powers' description of his experience and have concluded on the basis of scientific analysis that a U-2 plane damaged as he described would perform in its descent in about the manner he stated. Accordingly, the amount due Mr. Powers under the terms of his contract will be paid to him.

○