(U) The following set of Illustrative Planning Scenarios constitutes guidance for the FY 94–99 Defense Program. These scenarios reflect the changing security environment and the new defense strategy. They embody the change in focus from the former Soviet global war scenario to an array of possible regional contingencies.

(U) These scenarios are not predictions of future events. They by no means exhaust the range of possible threats to US interests in the planning period and beyond. They do not imply any strategic or programming priority among regions. Nor do they constitute a commitment or policy decision to respond in any particular way should events such as they depict actually occur.

(U) Rather, the scenarios are illustrations for technical analytical purposes. They depict plausible future events illustrating the types of circumstances in which the application of US military power might be required. Consistent with the new strategy, each scenario involves plausible threats to US interests, and corresponding achievable military objectives. While not exhaustive, they illustrate a substantial range of the kinds of capabilities US forces might have to employ in various regions of the world. Although changing world events make some individual scenarios decidedly less probable than others, all are useful for planning under the new strategy.

(U) The uncertainty of the international security environment (see the "Uncertainty" discussion in the strategy section) makes it difficult -- in some respects, impossible -- to project or estimate the circumstances under which US military power might be employed; the size of US, allied/coalition, and adversary forces that could be involved; and the details of how such operations would be conducted and supported. The detailed characterizations and data in the scenarios address possible future events that are in fact unknown. Rather, their precision is necessary to provide precise guidance for programming, and a common "yardstick" for the various Defense Components to use in formulating and evaluating the defense programs.

(U) These scenarios are to be used as an analytical tool for the formulation and assessment of defense programs. The scenarios are not the basis for sizing overall force.
structure or the Base Force -- the overall force is sized to support the elements of the new defense strategy. Rather, these scenarios enable planners and programmers to examine defense programs for appropriate levels of combat power, mobility, readiness and sustainment. The FY 94-99 Program Objectives Memoranda should (within fiscal guidance) reflect requirements derived largely but not solely from this scenario set. Although these scenarios focus primarily on Crisis Response and, in one case, Reconstitution, each of the four elements of our strategy involve other requirements which are not fully addressed in this scenario set and yet require programming actions and analysis -- for example, strategic deterrence, forward presence, and operations in widely varying climates and terrains.

(U) This scenario set is not intended to constrain planners from adjusting to future changes in the strategic environment. Subsequent to its publication as guidance for formulation and assessment of the FY 94-99 program, continued evolution in the strategic environment, or emerging requirements for scenarios for other applications, may require the development of additional or more detailed scenarios. If necessary, the data presented in this set should be updated for future applications until superseded by the next DPG scenario set. However, strategic concepts and assumptions presented in this scenario set should generally be retained in any scenarios developed for other applications.

(U) The U.S. Forces listing in each Major Regional Contingency identifies, in addition to those forces that would be required to conduct fully effective counteroffensive operations (listed as Deploy-to-Fight Forces), extra forces (listed as Overwhelming Forces) whose optional employment would reduce US and allied casualties and achieve victory more quickly and decisively. If the NCA determined that the presence of these forces was required, major counteroffensive operations would be delayed until these forces could be delivered to the conflict.

(U) Any detailed analysis of this DPG's scenario set should use the information in the more detailed version from which these scenarios were derived.
ANNEX A

ILLUSTRATIVE PLANNING SCENARIOS (U)

PREFACE (U)

(U) The following set of Illustrative Planning Scenarios constitutes guidance for the FY 94-99 Defense Program. These scenarios reflect the changing security environment and the new defense strategy. They embody the change in focus from the former Soviet global war scenario to an array of possible regional contingencies.

(U) These scenarios are not predictions of future events. They by no means exhaust the range of possible threats to US interests in the planning period and beyond. They do not imply any strategic or programming priority among regions. Nor do they constitute a commitment or policy decision to respond in any particular way should events such as they depict actually occur.

(U) Rather, the scenarios are illustrations for technical analytical purposes. They depict plausible future events illustrating the types of circumstances in which the application of US military power might be required. Consistent with the new strategy, each scenario involves plausible threats to US interests, and corresponding achievable military objectives. While not exhaustive, they do illustrate a substantial range of the kinds of capabilities US forces might have to employ in various regions of the world. Although changing world events make some individual scenarios decidedly less probable than others, all are useful for planning under the new strategy.

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structure or the Base Force — the overall force is sized to support the elements of the new defense strategy. Rather, these scenarios enable planners and programmers to examine defense programs for appropriate levels of combat power, mobility, readiness and sustainment. The FY 94-99 Program Objectives Memoranda should (within fiscal guidance) reflect requirements derived largely but not solely from this scenario set. Although these scenarios focus primarily on Crisis Response and, in one case, Reconstitution, each of the four elements of our strategy involve other requirements which are not fully addressed in this scenario set and yet require programming actions and analysis — for example, strategic deterrence, forward presence, and operations in widely varying climates and terrains.

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(U) Any detailed analysis of this DPG scenario set should use the information in the more detailed version from which these scenarios were derived.
(U) The following set of Illustrative Planning Scenarios constitutes guidance for the FY 94-99 Defense Program.

(U) These scenarios reflect the dramatically changing security environment, and our new defense strategy. The move to use of multiple scenarios is a major innovation in defense planning for a new strategic era. It supports the more flexible approach we must take to the more uncertain environment we face, and it tangibly embodies our change in focus from the former Soviet global war scenario to an array of possible regional contingencies. For years we have generally assumed that regional contingencies required only "lesser-included capabilities"—subsets of the requirements of the one massive scenario that was our focus. Now, absent the margin of safety that was provided by those larger forces, we need more nuanced examination of the broad range of possible regional requirements. These scenarios provide one basis for such examination.

(U) These scenarios are illustrations to be used for technical analytical purposes only. The scenarios:

• are not predictions of future events;
• by no means exhaust the range of possible threats to US interests in the planning period and beyond;
• do not constitute a commitment or policy decision to respond in any particular way should events such as they depict actually occur;
• do not imply any strategic or programming priority among regions; and
• are not the basis for sizing the overall Base Force structure.

While not exhaustive, the scenario set does illustrate a substantial range of the kinds of capabilities US forces might have to employ in various regions of the world. Although changing world events make some individual scenarios distinctly less probable than others, all are useful for planning under the new strategy.
(U) The uncertainty of the international environment (see the "Planning for Uncertainty" discussion in Section II.B.) makes it difficult -- in some respects, impossible -- to project or estimate either the circumstances under which US military power might be employed; or the size of US, allied/coalition, and adversary forces that could be involved; or the details of how such operations might be conducted and supported. The characterizations and data in these scenarios depict events in decidedly greater detail than can in fact be known. Rather, the scenarios include such detail simply to provide precise guidance for programming, and a common "yardstick" for the various Defense Components to use in formulating and evaluating the defense programs.

(U) Accordingly, these scenarios are to be used as an analytical tool where necessary for the formulation and assessment of specific defense requirements and programs. In particular, these scenarios enable planners and programmers to devise and examine defense programs for appropriate levels of mobility, readiness, sustainment, and modernization, and other elements of the capability to employ decisive combat power. They thereby help ensure balance and consistency among types of forces, and across various Components' supporting programs.

(U) (Detailed analysis based on this DPG scenario set -- for example, formulation and evaluation of specific requirements where necessary -- should draw as appropriate on the information in the more detailed version of the scenario set issued by , from which these scenarios were derived.)

(U) However, although these scenarios focus primarily on Crisis Response (and in one case, Reconstitution), each of the four elements of our strategy involve other requirements that are not fully addressed in this scenario set and yet also require programming actions and analysis -- for example, strategic deterrent forces; forward presence, including such activities as humanitarian assistance and combatting drug trafficking; and other crisis response requirements such as operations in widely varying climates, terrains and environments.

(U) Accordingly, the scenarios are not the basis for sizing overall force structure or the Base Force -- the overall force is sized to support all the elements of the new defense strategy. Given the need, explained above, for a more nuanced examination of the full range of possible regional requirements facing a force now sized with less "margin of error" for regional crises, the Department's analyses should evaluate the level of risk inherent in carrying out the new strategy with that force in various regional contexts. Scenarios are a useful tool to assist such evaluation by illuminating capabilities and identifying possible
deficiencies, and by complementing -- as well as tangibly incorporating -- experienced professional judgment. But for this purpose, maximum flexibility is desirable; force capabilities should be evaluated using the widest possible range of assumptions, although we must understand at minimum how the force performs with respect to the main areas of capability required, as depicted in this scenario set.

(U) This scenario set is not intended to constrain planners from adjusting to future changes in the strategic environment or evaluating as is needed the adequacy of forces to meet other possible threats. After this set is published and used as guidance for formulating and assessing the FY 94-99 program's continued evolution in the strategic environment, or the need for scenarios for other applications, may require the development of additional or more detailed scenarios. If necessary, the information presented in this set should be updated or revised for future applications until superseded by the next PPBS scenario set. However, the fundamental strategic concepts and assumptions underlying this scenario set -- as described in the new defense strategy and policies set forth above -- should remain the basis for any scenarios developed for other applications.

(U) The list of U.S. Forces in each Major Regional Contingency (MRC) identifies a basic force package that would be able to prevent the enemy from achieving his objectives: to stabilize the situation; and to conduct the counteroffensive operation and/or enable the arrival of additional units. Such an additional force package that the NCA might order to the operation is also shown. These forces' employment would make the counteroffensive phase shorter and more decisive with fewer casualties, although their delivery to the conflict would entail a delay in starting that counteroffensive (greater than the reduction in the counteroffensive's duration), during which forces in theater would continue to be subject to combat operations.

For the program planning purposes of these scenarios, (do/don't) include the additional force in each scenario's programmatic requirement.

(U) The list of U.S. Forces in each MRC includes only above-the-line (macro-level) combat forces, while the listings for Lesser Regional Contingencies provide somewhat more detailed information on U.S. forces. Planners and programmers should make appropriate assumptions regarding combat support and combat service support force, and below-the-line combat force, in their evaluations for capability requirements.

(U) Lesser Regional Contingency (LRC) scenarios are provided to evaluate U.S. military requirements in circumstances that demand a more rapid delivery of the complete (but much smaller) U.S. force package into theater than do MRCs. Additionally, LRCs place greater emphasis on capabilities for...
some types of operations that would be of less relative importance in MRCs -- for example, non-combatant evacuation, hostage rescue, and counter-insurgency operations.

(U) A Concurrent Contingencies scenario is provided to reflect the strategy's recognition that when the U.S. is engaged, perhaps in concert with others, in responding to a substantial threat, potential aggressors in other areas may be tempted to capitalize on our preoccupation -- and that for both deterrence and defense, we must not leave undue vulnerability. This scenario illuminates the strategic choices and tradeoffs inherent in providing adequate response capability in the event of concurrent contingencies.

(U) A Reconstitution scenario is provided to assist in planning for capabilities to build additional new forces to help preclude or respond to any future hostile adversary who might threaten U.S./allied interests on a global scale. The overarching aims for reconstitution strategy, and objectives for reconstitution programming, are set forth in DPG Sections II.D. and IV.B.
(U) The following set of Illustrative Planning Scenarios constitutes guidance for the FY 94-99 Defense Program.

(U) These scenarios reflect the dramatically changing security environment, and our new defense strategy. The move to use of multiple scenarios is a major innovation in defense planning for a new strategic era. It supports the more flexible approach we must take to the more uncertain environment we face, and it tangibly embodies our change in focus from the former Soviet global war scenario to an array of possible regional contingencies. For years we have generally assumed that regional contingencies required only "lesser-included capabilities" -- subsets of the requirements of the one massive scenario that was our focus. Now, absent the margin of safety that was provided by those larger forces, we need more nuanced examination of the broad range of possible regional requirements. These scenarios provide one basis for such examination.

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