Mr. Secretary:

I would draw your attention in particular to page 12 of the attached draft. Therein, Paul and I have adopted the formulation that America must plan forces for major contingencies critical to our interests that would enable us to act where prudent and practical even "where very few others are with us," and "with only limited additional help." These formulations vary from claims that we would act "unilaterally" or "alone." However, we believe that these formulations are more defensible, that there are no major contingencies (and I suspect very few minor ones) where we would not have at least political support from some limited number of countries, and that these formulations enable us to buy every single plane, tank, ship, etc., that we would otherwise want. Moreover, it emphasizes the point that we need to be able to support Israel, Korea, Saudi Arabia and others even in situations where no one else (let alone the UN) is willing to do so.

As this will undoubtedly be noticed publicly, we wanted to draw your attention to these paragraphs.

Sincerely,

MAR 30 1992

cc: Admiral Lopez
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

SUBJECT: Draft Defense Planning Guidance (U)

(U) Attached for your review is a draft of the DPG. It is as near to an unclassified text as possible at this stage of drafting. The overall text is classified to protect potentially classified material in the draft while we work it and make a final decision whether to go unclassified.

(SNF) At TAB A is the portion dealing with strategy and regional policies. This draft follows the structure of the March 5 draft you have already reviewed (but is quite different from the initial Feb 18 version). However, the text has been significantly reworked for clarity and to emphasize the themes you struck in your testimony, including shaping the environment and providing U.S. leadership within a system of democratic alliances.

- We also reflect the importance of striving to extend this system of collective security to the East European countries and the nations of the former Soviet Union.
- We have added a discussion of the considerations which lead to our need to plan forces to enable us to act with only limited help from others, if necessary.
- We have noted our critical interests in Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf, and in areas such as freedom of the seas and honoring historic or alliance commitments -- for example, Latin America and (silently) Israel.

(S) At TAB B is a first cut at a declassified version of the original, Secret programming guidance that would normally be part of the DPG (although there was not such a section in the first DPG two years ago). A copy of the classified version is at Tab C. Assuming that the unclassified strategy and policy sections represent the
complete guidance in those areas, there are several ways we might handle this heretofore always-classified guidance. We are evaluating the following options -- each of which contemplate keeping an additional part of the DPG, the Illustrative Planning Scenarios, fully classified:

• Keep the programming guidance fully classified, including only a brief, unclassified articulation of the Base Force and our core priorities with the public, strategy-policy document; or

• Sanitize the programming guidance much like TAB B (leaving its inside-the-Pentagon format and tone to lend authenticity) with the objective of disclosing as much of the guidance as possible by glossing over sensitive specifics which would be published to the Department in a short, classified memorandum; or

• Substantially rewrite the programming guidance in terms more readily understandable to the public (again with a short, classified adjunct for internal use).

Attachments
A/S

K Lewis Libby
3
ORANGE

TAB B
We have entered a new strategic era. In large measure this new era reflects the appeal of our democratic ideals and the success of past policies that demonstrated our willingness to stand by those ideals and protect our interests in the world. This new era presents new challenges, but it also offers a compelling opportunity to adopt a fundamentally new defense strategy and to meet our defense needs at lower cost. As we do so, we must not squander the position of security we achieved at great sacrifice through the Cold War, nor eliminate our ability to shape the security environment in ways favorable to us and those who share our values.

Our strategic position and choices benefit from the historic, positive changes of the last few years. The Warsaw Pact has collapsed, the Soviet empire has disintegrated, and Communism has been discredited as an ideology with global pretensions and influence. The new international environment also has been shaped by the victory of the United States and its Coalition allies over Iraqi aggression, the first post-Cold War conflict. The victories in both the Cold War and the Gulf War highlight the importance of a strong defense, of cooperative arrangements to counter aggression and of U.S. leadership.

Our response to this new strategic era has been prompt, farsighted and substantial in scope. In August 1990 President Bush announced a new, regionally-oriented defense strategy to achieve our national security objectives in light of the demise of a global military challenge we faced during the Cold War, the increase in regional military threats, and the improved...
capabilities of many of our friends and allies. This new defense strategy has since been incorporated in the Department's Annual Report, the National Military Strategy and our budget presentations to Congress. Pursuant to the new defense strategy, we have initiated a major restructuring of our defense establishment and a substantial reduction in our conventional and nuclear forces to levels consistent with the promise and uncertainties of the evolving environment. The resulting Base Force will continue to protect national security while significantly reducing the resources the Nation will devote to its defense.

This Defense Planning Guidance furthers the efforts to restructure our military for this new era. It provides guidance to the military services and defense agencies in a period of continued dramatic change in the international security environment. Program proposals for the FY 1994-1999 planning period should reflect the new regional defense strategy and the guidance provided herein.

DEFENSE POLICY GOALS

The national security interests of the United States are enduring, as outlined in the President's 1991 National Security Strategy Report: the survival of the U.S. as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure; a healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad; healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations; and a stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.

From these national security interests we derive our long-term defense policy goals:
To deter or defeat aggression against the U.S. and its forces.

To strengthen and extend the system of defense arrangements that binds democratic and like-minded nations together in common defense against aggression, builds habits of cooperation, and provides security at lower costs for all.

To preclude hostile, nondemocratic domination of a region critical to our interests, and also thereby to strengthen the barriers against the reemergence of a global threat to the interests of the U.S. and its allies.

To help otherwise to further democratic progress and an open, peaceful international security environment conducive to our interests, to include maintaining access to world markets and resources, the oceans and space; limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; stemming the flow of militarily significant technology to potential adversaries; combatting international terrorism and traffic in illegal drugs; and protecting the safety of U.S. citizens abroad.

Through pursuit of these goals, we can build upon the peaceful framework in which democracy has prospered for forty years despite the enormous external threat once posed by Soviet Communism. With care, this framework will help to consolidate the extraordinary democratic gains of the past few years, providing a peaceful and secure environment in which the new democracies can establish themselves. In time our continuing efforts, coupled with the growing strength of our friends and allies, can lead to a security community that extends to all peace-loving nations, including the new democracies of Eastern Europe and a democratic Russia, Ukraine, and other democracies of the former Soviet Union. Our goal is to build a world in which democratic freedoms prosper and aggression that might threaten those freedoms meets with a forceful common response. The alternative would be to leave our
critical interests and the security of our friends dependent on individual efforts that could be duplicative, competitive or ineffective.

Our continuing pursuit of our long-term goals builds today on two sources of great strength -- a tradition of U.S. leadership; and our skilled, dedicated and professional Armed Forces. Recent improvements in the security environment have been achieved not by chance, but rather through clarity of purpose, commitment, and U.S. leadership. At the end of World War I, and again at the end of World War II, the United States as a nation made the mistake of believing that we had achieved a kind of permanent security, that a transformation of the security order that had been achieved through extraordinary American sacrifice could be sustained without our leadership. Today, we can hope to preserve the more secure environment that we now enjoy with less effort than we needed to achieve it; but if we fail to lead, a much more dangerous environment could emerge.

And we cannot lead if we fail to maintain the effectiveness of our forces as we reduce and restructure. As a Nation we have never before succeeded in pacing reductions without endangering our interests. We must proceed expeditiously, but at a pace which maintains effectiveness, ensures fair treatment of those who contributed to the victories which made downsizing possible, and avoids breaking the force or sending the wrong signals about our intentions to friends or potential aggressors.

The choices we make will set the direction of our security policy into the next decade. If we reduce our forces carefully, we will be left with a force capable of implementing the new defense strategy. We will have given ourselves the means to lead common efforts to shape the future environment in ways that will give us greater security at lower costs.
The demise of the global threat posed by Soviet Communism leaves America and its allies with an unprecedented opportunity to preserve with greater ease a security environment within which our democratic ideals can prosper. We can shift our defense planning from a focus on the global threat posed by the Warsaw Pact to a focus on the less demanding regional threats and challenges we are most likely to face in the future. In this way, we can work to shape the future environment and to preclude hostile nondemocratic powers from dominating regions critical to us. This same approach will also work to preclude the emergence of a global rival that could challenge our interests more broadly.

In this more secure international environment there will be enhanced opportunities for political, economic, environmental, social, and security issues to be resolved through new or revitalized international organizations, including the United Nations, or regional arrangements. The U.S. will want to be an active participant in these efforts and our military may be asked to play specialized roles where merited by our interests. But if we stand back and allow a new global threat to emerge or leave the security of critical regions dependent on a balance among contending powers, it will become much harder to achieve the enhanced international cooperation that we hope for.

Underlying Strategic Concepts

The Department of Defense does not decide when our Nation will commit force. However, decisions guiding the development of defense forces and programs for the next six years not only determine a future President’s options when a crisis occurs, but may actually shape the course of events by precluding hostile, nondemocratic domination of a critical region and thereby make
greater crises less likely. As we design our defense program, it
is important to appreciate three concepts that illuminate the
relationship between the decisions we make today about the forces
we build and the future environment in which those forces will
operate.

Defense Planning Horizon and Uncertainty. An
unavoidable challenge for defense planners is that we must start
development today of forces to counter threats still so distant
into the future that they cannot be confidently predicted. Events
of the last few years demonstrate concretely how quickly and
unexpectedly political trends can reverse themselves. Our ability
to predict becomes even worse as the time frame becomes longer.

Yet decisions about military forces cannot be based on a
short-term planning horizon. The military capabilities that we
have today and the ones we will have for the next few years are
largely the product of decisions made a decade ago. Much of the
capability that we are cutting now cannot be restored quickly and
cuts that are too precipitous will do long-lasting damage even to
the capabilities that remain. Thus, even if we had great
confidence in our projections of the security environment for the
next two or three years, we cannot base defense planning on such a
relatively short time horizon.

Given the magnitude of recent changes in the security
environment, we build defense forces today for a future that is
particularly uncertain. Fundamentally, we are striving to provide
a future President with the capabilities 5, 10 or 15 years from
now to counter threats or pursue interests that cannot be defined
with precision today.

Shaping the Future Security Environment. America cannot
base its future security on just a shaky record of prediction or a
prudent recognition of uncertainty. Sound defense planning seeks
to help shape the future. Our strategy seeks to anticipate and to
shape trends to advance U.S. security objectives in the future. This is both within our means and critical to our future security. That is what the President's regional defense strategy seeks to do.

The containment strategy we pursued for the past forty years successfully shaped the world we see today. The liberation of Eastern Europe and the phenomenal changes under way in the former Soviet Union are in large measure the result of the fundamental flaws of Communism and the resilience of the human spirit against tyrannical subjugation. But we and our allies shaped a world in which Communism had to confront its contradictions by our refusal to be intimidated by the enormous buildup in Soviet military power during forty years of Cold War and our willingness to match that buildup. Moreover, our joint efforts with our friends and allies to build a democratic security community and our deployment of forces forward in Europe and the Pacific shaped an environment that allowed democracy to develop and flourish in so many parts of the world that remained free of Communist domination.

One of the primary tasks we face today in shaping the future is carrying old alliances into the new era, and turning old enmities into new cooperative relationships. If we and other leading democracies continue to build a democratic security community, a much safer world is likely. If we act separately, many other problems could result. If we can assist former Warsaw Pact countries, including republics of the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia and Ukraine, in choosing a steady course of democratic progress and reduced military forces subject to responsible, civilian democratic control, we will have successfully secured the fruits of forty-years effort.

In many respects, our alliance structure is perhaps our nation's most significant achievement since the Second World War. It represents a "silent victory" of building long-standing alliances and friendships with nations that constitute a
prosperous, largely democratic, market-oriented zone of peace and prosperity that encompasses more than two-thirds of the world's economy. Defense cooperation among the democracies has not only deterred external threats, it has provided an environment in which we and our allies have peacefully developed and prospered.

Cooperative defense arrangements among democracies remain critical to our efforts to shape the future security environment. These arrangements enhance deterrence and defense, while reducing the defense burden of individual members below that which any of us would bear if we each tried on our own to provide for our own security. The day-to-day practice of collective security has helped disparate nations to reconcile conflicting interests, formulate common objectives, constrain regional armaments, minimize potentially destabilizing pressures toward renationalization of security policies, and cooperate effectively in crisis management and response.

In the absence of effective defense cooperation, regional rivalries could lead to tensions or even hostilities that would threaten to bring regions critical to our interests and those of other democracies under hostile domination. It is not in our interest or those of the other democracies to return to earlier periods in which multiple military powers balanced one another off in what passed for security structures, while regional, or even global peace hung in the balance. As in the past, such struggles might soon force the U.S. to protect its interests at much higher cost and counter the potential development of a new global threat. One of our achievements in the Persian Gulf is that our friends are now able and willing to base their security on cooperation with the United States and others of like mind rather than on the shifting balance between Iraq and Iran which has proven so dangerous in the past.

Sustained U.S. leadership of collective defense arrangements is critical to world peace and to our ability to shape the future
international security environment, and thereby preclude a return to patterns which have proven dangerous and costly in the past. Our fundamental belief in democracy and human rights gives other nations confidence that we will use our significant military power only as a force for peaceful democratic progress. Continued U.S. engagement to protect our interests, inherent in both the formulation of the new defense strategy and the Base Force, not only secures strong allies for the common defense but also remains the best barrier against a return to either global confrontation or the evolution of multiple, competing, nondemocratic military powers that would also jeopardize our interests in a peaceful international order.

The collapse of Communism and the emergence of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and in Russia, Ukraine and other republics of the former Soviet Union offers historic opportunities to promote democratic consolidation and transform formerly adversarial relationships. The stability and structure provided by the NATO alliance in Europe also supports the development of democracy in states formerly under Communist domination. It is no accident that leaders of these new democracies are among the strongest proponents for NATO and a substantial U.S. presence in Europe. They take comfort in our presence as a factor for stability and a hedge against an uncertain future. Expanding our military-to-military contacts and seeking other means of opening the door to greater cooperation and dialogue on security issues should help in fostering democratic philosophies of civil-military relations, transparency, and defensive military doctrines and postures. Our goal should be to bring a democratic Russia and the other new democracies into the defense community of democratic nations, so that they can become a force for peace not only in Europe, but in other critical regions of the world.

We must plan to help shape our future environment and hedge against both anticipated threats and uncertainty. The defense
programs for FY 1994-1999 should build upon our strengths to preserve our ability to shape the future.

**Strategic Depth.** With the end of the Cold War and the passing of the Soviet threat, America's strategic position is stronger than it has been for decades. Massive Warsaw Pact forces poised at the inner-German borders once threatened to lead with little warning to global war. In the last three years, that threat first receded hundreds of miles eastward and has since transformed into the promise of a new era of strategic cooperation. Today democracy faces no hostile, global challenger. There are no significant alliances hostile to our interests. To the contrary, the strongest and most capable countries in the world are our friends. Except with respect to the strategic nuclear forces of the former Soviet Union, no country is our match in military technology or the ability to apply it. A global challenger to our security would have to overcome our formidable alliances and the qualitative advantages that we displayed so impressively in Operation Desert Storm.

Not only has our position improved markedly with respect to the passing of a global challenge, but we have in fact won great depth for our strategic position in a regional context as well. Today, no region of the world critical to our interests is under hostile, nondemocratic domination. Near-term threats in critical regions are small relative to our capabilities and those of our friends and allies.

The first major conflict of the post-Cold War era preserved our strategic position in one of the regions of the world critical to our interests. Our success in organizing an international coalition in the Persian Gulf against Saddam Hussein kept a critical region from the control of a ruthless dictator bent on developing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and harming Western interests. Instead of a more radical Middle East under Saddam's influence, Saddam and Iraq's dangerous military have been
weakened, our ties with moderate states are stronger, and Arabs and Israelis have for the first time in many years met to discuss peace.

The demise of the Soviet Union and the increasing strength of our allies permit us to define our regional interests selectively and to safeguard those interests in separate regional contexts and at lower resource levels. The former Soviet Union maintained enormous forces and supported surrogate challenges in various regions as part of a global challenge to us and our allies. This meant that developments even in some relatively remote parts of the globe could affect the balance of power between us. We need no longer be concerned that an otherwise remote conflict will provide a forward base for further aggression by a global challenger. The United States remains a nation with global interests, but the end of the Cold War has given us greater flexibility in determining whether and to what extent regional challenges engage our national interests.

The events of the last three years have therefore provided America with strategic depth in which to defend our national interests. We bring to this task our considerable moral influence as the world’s leading democracy and the full scope of our political and economic means, as well as our defense efforts. The increasing strength of our allies and friends and our common interests in many areas present widening opportunities for common efforts in the context of the United Nations, existing alliances, or ad hoc coalitions, such as that involved in the Persian Gulf. DoD may be called upon to help address sources of regional instability or promote peaceful, democratic ends through security assistance, military-to-military contacts, and humanitarian assistance. Where important U.S. interests so merit, the U.S. might participate in collective responses to aggression or injustice; but as a rule we should not plan to carry the sole, or even the greater part of the international burden. U.S.
preference and steady policy is to continue to press others to share more fully the burdens of cooperative defense.

However, there remain matters of such concern to us that we must retain the capability to lead, should the international reaction otherwise prove sluggish or inadequate. The U.S. retains critical interest in regions such as Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf, whose hostile domination would greatly reduce the strategic depth we have won and in short order could come to pose a broader threat to U.S. security. In addition, we retain critical interests in such areas as freedom of the seas and honoring historic commitments to allies and close friends. There may well be instances involving such critical interests where only firm U.S. leadership, backed by significant U.S. capabilities, can bring a coalition together; and there might be instances where we cannot count in advance on the international community to provide the preponderence of forces necessary to protect our concerns. A future President will need to have options that will allow him to lead or, where prudent and practical, to act to protect our critical interests even in cases where very few others are with us. We must plan sufficient forces and programs within current fiscal constraints to provide such options. We will not be the world's policeman; but we will retain the ability to play a responsible role in conjunction with others where the situation merits, and we will not ignore the importance of our being prepared to protect our critical interests and honor our commitments with only limited additional help, if necessary.

As a Nation, we have paid dearly in the past for letting our capabilities fall and our will be questioned. There is a moment in time when a smaller, ready force can preclude an arms race, a hostile move or a conflict. Once lost, that moment cannot be recaptured by many thousands of soldiers poised on the edge of combat. Our efforts to rearm and to understand our danger before World War II came too late to spare us and others a global conflagration. Four short years after our resounding global...
victory in World War II, we were nearly pushed off the Korean peninsula by a third rate power. We erred in the past when we failed to plan forces befitting our role in the world. Our errors were costly.

Our defense program for FY 1994-1999 must provide the ready forces, the mobility, the forward presence and strength to preserve our alliances and preclude potential aggressors from beginning regional arms races, raising regional tensions, or gaining a dangerous foothold toward hostile, regional domination. Guided by our regional strategy, and working together with our allies, we can preserve at lower cost and even expand on the depth to our strategic position that our past efforts have won.

Enduring Requirements

The new defense strategy with its regional focus continues the need to pay special attention to three enduring requirements of our national security posture. Each requires careful, long-term attention, the investment of defense resources, and supportive operating practices; each represent key strengths that cannot be readily restored should they be lost.

Alliances and Coalitions. As we move into the post-Cold War era, we must recognize our alliances remain profoundly important. Working with countries that share our fundamental values and concerns helps protect vital U.S. national interests and provides greater security for all at lower cost. The U.S. will maintain and nurture its friendships and alliances in Europe, the Far East, Southwest Asia, Latin America and elsewhere.

The growing strength of our friends and allies will make it possible for them to assume greater responsibilities for our mutual security interests. We will work with them towards this end. More reciprocal, more mature security relationships will be more sustainable over time and will advance our interests.
alliance partners and other friendly nations acquire more responsibility for their own defense, the U.S. will be able to reduce its military forces stationed overseas without incurring significant risks. There will remain, however, a significant role for U.S. forward presence, including stationed forces, and changes must be managed carefully to ensure that they are not mistakenly perceived as a withdrawal of U.S. commitment.

Although our preference is to confront aggression with the institutional support available in a formal alliance, certain situations like the crisis leading to the Gulf War are likely to engender ad hoc coalitions that may include allies, nations with whom we have longstanding defense relations, and perhaps some with whom we have not previously cooperated. Some coalitions may entail only general agreement over the objectives to be accomplished. We should plan to maximize the value of such coalitions. This may include specialized roles for our forces as well as developing cooperative practices with others and techniques for rapidly coordinating efforts with forces of nations with whom we have less prior dealings.

Our long-standing alliance relationships further our efforts to deter conflict and shape the security environment. This is especially true with NATO. Shared trust and expertise developed over 40 years of collective security will be essential to secure the stable and lasting peace in Europe we all seek in this new era. History has shown too often for us too ignore that our own security is inextricably bound up with that of Europe.

Events in Central and Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union over the last year or more have greatly advanced the prospects for dramatically expanding our cooperative defense efforts with these and other nations. Some of the strongest supporters for strong trans-Atlantic bonds and a continued U.S. presence in Europe are the newly emerging democracies of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. We have begun
international cooperative training programs with these nations and
started military-to-military exchanges and a regular defense
dialogue. Liaison relations exist between them and NATO. We
should plan to encourage and continue such efforts. Each of these
nations faces economic, ethnic or regional security challenges;
but there is progress being made.

If democracy matures in Russia, Ukraine and other states of
the former Soviet Union, there is every possibility that they will
shoulder their role to further peace in Europe and beyond. Such
democratic states will have more in common with us than in
conflict. We could well imagine that in a crisis like Operations
Desert Shield/Storm years from now, we will have not merely
political, but military support from Russia, Ukraine, or other
states of the former Soviet Union. We have begun security
discussions with states of the former Soviet Union, as well as
cooperative efforts to stem proliferation of weapons and
technology and to lessen future risks by destroying nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons of the former Soviet Union. We
must plan to build on and expand these and other early efforts at
cooperation with these nations.

Recent events have affected our critical security relations
in Asia, as well. For decades, the very real security threat from
the Soviet Union had served as the primary rationale for the U.S.-
Japan security relationship. Even as the Soviet threat passes,
however, the need for strong U.S.-Japan ties persists; and the
U.S. remains committed to Japan’s security. In addition, we have
active mutual security agreements with the Republic of Korea, the
Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, and have established non-
treaty security relationships with several other countries. Given
our historic commitment to the region and its enormous economic
and strategic importance to us, these continued security ties will
be vital, particularly as China, Vietnam and North Korea sort out
the implications for them of the demise of Soviet Communism, and
As our efforts continue to moderate North Korea's disturbing nuclear program and its excessive military investments, the Gulf War has greatly enhanced our security relations in that region and underscored their continued importance. Taken together, many facets of this experience -- combat forces, logistical support and financial participation -- and our subsequent cooperation on forward presence of U.S. forces promise continued close ties with nations of the region on which we can build.

**Quality Personnel.** Our victory in the Gulf War reminded us again of the importance of high-quality personnel and effective leaders. The highly-trained, highly-motivated All-Volunteer Force we have worked so hard to build is the key to maintaining our future military competence. We also require quality career civilians in the managerial, scientific and technical fields, to maintain the pace of innovation and perform many of the challenging tasks of the Department.

Many aspects of the Gulf War tested the training, discipline, and morale of our military forces and they performed superbly. To continue to attract the highest quality people, we must provide challenging and rewarding career opportunities. This includes realistic training and the benefits of advanced training techniques such as interactive simulation. We must also provide the quality of life they and their families deserve, including keeping the amount of time military units are deployed away from home at reasonable levels.

Quality personnel also require quality leadership. Our success in the Gulf reflected outstanding military leadership. We must continue to train our military leaders in joint operations and, as noted above, in cooperative efforts with the forces of many different nations. They must also be given the opportunity...
and encouragement to pursue innovative doctrine for operations and new approaches to problems.

Identifying the core military competencies that will be most important in the future and retaining the lead in them will be among the highest priorities of our military leadership. Future challenges will require the continued mastery of critical areas of warfare, but we may also require mastery of different capabilities, perhaps replacing core competencies that are critical today. A critical task will be to begin preparing for tomorrow's competencies, while gaining an appreciation of those we need no longer emphasize.

Maintaining and refining our core competencies is a responsibility that resides primarily within the Service organizations. But the Service leaders must search broadly for inputs and understanding; static approaches to warfare will not serve our longer-term interests. It is not enough to simply buy new equipment or develop new prototypes. Our understanding of warfare and the way we intend to defend our interests as a Nation must continually develop and evolve in the military-technical revolution that lies ahead.

**Technological Superiority.** The onset of a new military-technical regime presents continued challenges not only in the realm of technological superiority but also in the way we organize, train, and employ our military forces. The Gulf War made clear the early promise of this new regime, emphasizing the importance of recent breakthroughs in low-observable, information, and other key technologies.
Our investment in innovation must reach and be sustained at levels necessary to assure that U.S.-fielded forces dominate the military-technological revolution.

Robust research and development alone will not maintain our qualitative advantage. New technologies must be incorporated into weapons systems produced in numbers sufficient for doctrine and tactics to be developed. To do this without large-scale production will require innovations in training technologies and the acquisition process. We need to be able to fight future forces through simulation before we buy them. We need the ability to experiment with continuous, virtual and real R&D prototyping on future electronic battlefields, linked to key training ranges and competing, integrated design and manufacturing teams, if we are to reduce the time to get technology from the lab into the field, and if we are to concurrently develop the joint doctrine necessary to employ our combined forces. We must encourage defense industry to invest in new manufacturing processes, facilities, and equipment as well as in R&D. This will be increasingly important as procurement declines.

To make certain the best technology is available...
Elements of the Regional Defense Strategy

The regional defense strategy seeks to protect American interests and to promote a more stable and democratic world. It does so by adopting a regional focus for our efforts to strengthen cooperative defense arrangements with friendly states and to preclude hostile, nondemocratic powers from dominating regions of the world critical to us, and also thereby to raise a further barrier to the rise of a serious global challenge. To accomplish these goals, we must preserve U.S. leadership, maintain leading-edge military capabilities, and enhance collective security among democratic nations.

The regional defense strategy rests on four essential elements:

- **Strategic Deterrence and Defense** -- a survivable strategic nuclear deterrent capability, and strategic defenses against limited strikes.

- **Forward Presence** -- forward deployed or stationed forces (albeit at reduced levels) to strengthen alliances, show our resolve, and dissuade challengers in regions critical to us.

- **Crisis Response** -- forces and mobility to respond quickly and decisively with a range of options to regional crises of concern to us.

- **Reconstitution** -- the capability to generate wholly new forces to hedge against renewed global threats.

**Strategic Deterrence and Defense.** Even though the risk of a massive strategic nuclear attack has decreased significantly with the rise of democratic forces and the collapse of the former Soviet Union, deterring nuclear attack will remain the highest defense priority of the Nation. It is one area where our survival could be at risk in a matter of moments. U.S. nuclear targeting policy and plans have changed, and will continue to change, to
account for the welcome developments in states of Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. Nonetheless, survivable U.S. strategic nuclear forces are still essential to deter use of the large and modern nuclear forces that will exist in the former Soviet Union even under a modified START regime. Our strategic nuclear forces also provide an important deterrent hedge against the possibility of an unforeseen global threat.

Fundamental changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have all but eliminated the near- or mid-term danger of large-scale war in Europe that could escalate to a strategic exchange and require that we plan for a new era in nuclear forces. This was evidenced in the President's recent nuclear initiatives, which made major unilateral changes in our tactical nuclear posture and strategic nuclear deterrent forces.

The reform leaders of the newly independent states have clearly voiced their interest in reducing strategic forces inherited from the former Soviet Union. They recognize we are not a threat and rightly view these forces as diverting scarce resources from rebuilding their troubled economies and complicating the improvement of relations with the West. We have tried to give the new leaders every incentive to make substantial reductions in these strategic forces to a level consistent with the absence of any threat from the West.

If both sides agree on the President's recent bilateral proposals, there will be even more dramatic changes to both sides' nuclear deterrent forces. For us these include earlier reductions to START levels; fewer ICBMs, with only one warhead apiece; and fewer warheads on our ballistic missile submarines. In addition, a substantial number of bombers would be oriented primarily toward conventional missions. In the end, the actual number of warheads would be roughly half of what we planned to have under START. The military departments should undertake measures now to prepare for this outcome.
We must also examine more innovative ways of providing strategic deterrent forces.

A successful transformation of Russia, Ukraine and other states of the former Soviet Union to stable democracies should clearly be our goal. We could then foresee the strong possibility of a time when remaining elements of the once massive Soviet nuclear arsenal would no longer threaten the United States and its Allies, and we would no longer need to hold at risk on a day to day basis what future Russian leaders hold dear. But we are not there yet. Our pursuit of this goal must recognize the as yet robust strategic nuclear force facing us, the fragility of democracy in the new states of the former Soviet Union, and the possibility that they might revert to closed, authoritarian, and hostile regimes. Our movement toward this goal must, therefore, leave us with timely and realistic responses to unanticipated reversals in our relations and a survivable deterrent capability.

Strategic forces will also continue to support our global role and international commitments, including our trans-Atlantic links to NATO. Collective defense allows countries to rely on the contributions of others in protecting their mutual interests in ways that lessen the risks and the costs for all. The nuclear umbrella that the U.S. has extended over our allies has defended the nuclear peace and lessened the risks of war without requiring our allies themselves to match the threat posed by the former Soviet nuclear arsenal. This has been a risk-reducing and cost-
saving measure for us all; it is one we can afford fiscally to continue and one that our interests cannot afford to let lapse.

The threat posed by the global proliferation of ballistic missiles has grown considerably and the threat of an accidental or unauthorized missile launch remains. The new technology embodied in the SDI program has made ballistic missile defense capability a realistic, achievable, and affordable concept. We need to deploy missile defenses not only to protect ourselves and our forward deployed forces, but also to have the ability to extend protection to others. Like "extended deterrence" provided by our nuclear forces, defenses can contribute to a regime of "extended protection" for friends and allies and further strengthen a democratic security community. This is why, with the support of Congress, as reflected in the Missile Defense Act of 1991, we are seeking to move beyond the ABM Treaty toward the day when defenses will protect the community of nations embracing democratic values from international outlaws armed with ballistic missiles.

Limited deployment of defenses will also be an integral element of our efforts to curtail ballistic missile proliferation. Defenses undermine the military utility and thus the cost effectiveness of such systems and should serve to dampen the incentive to acquire ballistic missiles.

In the decade ahead, we must adopt the right combination of deterrent forces, tactical and strategic, while creating the proper balance between offense and active defense to mitigate risk from weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
whatever the source. For now this requires retaining ready forces for a secure nuclear deterrent, including tactical forces. In addition, we must complete needed offensive modernization and upgrades. These offensive forces need to be complemented with early introduction of limited ballistic missile defenses.

**Forward Presence.** Our forward presence helps to shape the evolving security environment. We will continue to rely on forward presence of U.S. forces to show U.S. commitment and lend credibility to our alliances, to deter aggression, enhance regional stability, promote U.S. influence and access, and, when necessary, provide an initial crisis response capability. Forward presence is vital to the maintenance of the system of collective defense by which the U.S. has been able to work with our friends and allies to protect our security interests, while minimizing the burden of defense spending and of unnecessary arms competition.

We should plan to continue a wide range of forward presence activities, including not only overseas basing of forces, but prepositioning and periodic deployments, exercises, exchanges or visits. Important too are host nation arrangements to provide the infrastructure and logistical support to allow for the forward deployment of forces when necessary. Our forward forces should increasingly be prepared to fulfill multiple regional roles, and in some cases extra-regional ones, rather than being prepared only for operations in the locale where they are based. Moreover, as in the Gulf war, our forward presence forces must be ready to provide support for military operations in other theaters. Our maritime and long-range aviation forces enable us to exert a presence in areas where we have no land-based forces. In addition, through forward presence, we can prosecute the war on drugs; provide humanitarian and security assistance; advance military-to-military contacts to strengthen democratic reforms; and protect U.S. citizens abroad.
The changes in Europe allow us to scale back our presence significantly to a smaller, but still militarily meaningful contribution to NATO's overall force levels. In this new environment, a substantial American presence in Europe will provide reassurance and stability as new democracies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union seek to be integrated into a larger and evolving security architecture. Such a presence provides options for selected actions should future American leaders decide it to be in our interest. Notably both our new friends in Eastern Europe and the leaders of the states of the former Soviet Union consider a continued U.S. presence in Europe and a strong NATO to be essential to overall European stability. American presence will also allay Western European concerns as those countries seek a new identity through integration and the emergence of a common foreign and security policy.
Forward deployed U.S. forces continue to have an important role to play in East Asia and the Pacific. These contributions have allowed us to initiate a plan for carefully reducing our level of forces in the region, and to work successfully with our allies to increase their own role in providing for regional security and stability—provided we avoid a disengagement or abrupt drawdown that would weaken that stability. The changes in our defense posture in the Pacific will be far less extensive than in Europe, because the threat has changed much less here. We anticipate that more than 25,000 U.S. troops will be pulled out of bases in East Asia by December 1992. This includes the withdrawal from the Philippines. However, plans to remove additional forces from South Korea have been suspended while we address the problem posed by the North Korean nuclear program. The U.S. does not intend to withdraw from Asia and will keep substantial air and naval forces forward deployed in Asia for the foreseeable future.

In the Persian Gulf region, we are striving with friends and allies to build a more stable security structure than the one that failed on August 2, 1990. We have major interests in that part of the world and, consistent with the wishes of our friends in the area, we must remain engaged to protect those interests. Therefore we will increase our presence compared to the pre-crisis
We are continuing to explore similar arrangements with other friendly countries in the region. Longer-term U.S. presence in the region will depend upon a host of factors, including the evolving regional balance and the prospects for a lasting Middle East accord.

We will face new difficulties maintaining a ground presence in Latin America. In accordance with the provisions of the Panama Canal treaty, we would retain no major bases in Central or South America beyond the turn of the century. The general trend toward democratization and peace in Latin America and the dramatic reductions of former Soviet and East European aid to Cuba are long sought developments. Nonetheless, potential regional problems, including the potential for instability in Cuba and elsewhere and the continuing challenges of stopping trafficking in illegal drugs from this region, will demand a forward role for our peacetime forces.

Crisis Response. The ability to respond to regional or local crises is a key element of the regional defense strategy. The regional and local contingencies we might face are many and
varied, both in size and intensity, potentially involving a broad range of military forces of varying capabilities and technological sophistication under an equally broad range of geopolitical circumstances. Highly ready and rapidly deployable power projection forces remain key elements of precluding challengers, of protecting our interests from unexpected or sudden challenges, and of achieving decisive results if the use of force is necessary.

Our response to regional crises must be decisive, requiring the quality personnel and technological edge to win quickly and with minimum casualties. In regional conflicts our stake will appear less immediate than we faced against a Soviet threat to overrun Europe. Political and strategic considerations will require a decisive outcome, which in certain instances will mean the overwhelming use of force. When we choose to act, we must be capable of acting quickly. We must be confident of the outcome before an operation begins. We must be prepared to make regional aggressors fight on our terms, matching our strengths against their weaknesses. This requires maintaining a broad range of capabilities and a continuing emphasis on technological superiority and doctrinal innovation.

The short notice that may characterize many regional crises require highly responsive military forces. Active Component forces have a critical role to play in supplying combat and support forces for the initial response to contingencies that
arise on short notice. Reserve Component forces will, among other roles, contribute mobility assets in short notice crises and support and sustain active combat forces and provide combat forces in especially large or protracted contingencies. In addition, mobilizing Reserve Component combat forces can provide the force expansion needed to enhance the U.S. capability to respond to another contingency.

Mobility forces must be capable of accomplishing a major force deployment within current planning parameters.

As a result, our regional adversaries may be armed...
with capabilities that in the past were limited only to the superpowers.

Political turmoil and economic distress in the states of the former Soviet empire may increase the risk of potentially dangerous technologies getting into the hands of irresponsible governments and individuals. The diffusion of advanced conventional technologies developed by the Soviets could tilt regional balances against our interests.

Finally, the Gulf War provides a host of lessons that should guide future crisis response planning. Our crisis response forces must incorporate the relevant lessons of the Gulf War as identified in the Conduct of the War Study and other subsequent reports. Our understanding of the war and its implications for forces will continue to evolve for some time to come.
Reconstitution. With the demise of the Cold War, we have gained sufficient strategic depth that potential global-scale threats to our security are now very distant -- so much so that they are hard to identify or define with precision. The new strategy therefore prudently accepts risk in this lower probability area of threat, in order to refocus reduced defense resources both on the more likely near-term threats and on high priority investments in the long-term foundations of our strategic posture.

Nevertheless, we could still face in the more distant future a new global threat or some emergent alliance of hostile, nondemocratic regional powers. For the longer term, then, our reconstitution strategy focuses on supporting our national security policy to preclude the development of a global threat or the hostile domination of a critical region contrary to the interests of the U.S. and our allies.
Regional Goals and Challenges

We can take advantage of the Cold War's end to shift our planning focus to regional threats and challenges, and in this way, work with our friends and allies to preclude the emergence of hostile, nondemocratic threats to our critical interests and to shape a more secure international environment conducive to our democratic ideals. The future of events in major regions remains uncertain. The new defense strategy, with its focus on regional
matters, seeks to shape that future and position us to retain the
capabilities needed to protect our interests.

Europe. We confront a Europe in the midst of historic
transformation, no longer starkly divided by military blocs of
East and West. We are hopeful of achieving a Europe "whole and
free."

We must strive to aid the efforts in the former Eastern bloc
to build free societies. Over the long term, the most effective
guarantee that the former Soviet empire's successor states do not
threaten U.S. and Western interests is successful democratization
and economic reform. In doing this, we must recognize what we are
so often told by the leaders of these new democracies — that
continued U.S. presence in Europe is an essential part of the
West's overall efforts to maintain stability even in the midst of
such dramatic change. NATO remains the essential means by which
the U.S. remains involved in Europe's security future.

The breakup of the former Soviet Union presents an historic
opportunity to transform the adversarial relationship of the Cold
War into a relationship characterized by cooperation. It already
has reduced significantly our defense requirements. The U.S. has
a significant stake in promoting democratic consolidation and
peaceful relations between Russia, Ukraine and other republics of
the former Soviet Union. A democratic partnership with Russia,
Ukraine, and the other republics would be the best possible
outcome.

Our increasing military-to-military contacts with Russia,
Ukraine and the other republics should help in fostering
democratic philosophies of civil-military relations, legislative
control, transparency, and defensive military doctrines and
postures. If democracy matures in Russia and Ukraine there is
ever possibility that they will be a force for peace not only in
Europe, but in other critical regions where previously Soviet
policy aggravated local conditions and encouraged unrest and conflict. A democratic Russia will have more in common with us in the pursuit of peace and democratic order than in conflict. It may even open the door to future military cooperation.

The U.S. can also further our concerns and those of our allies by assisting the efforts of Russia, Ukraine, and the other republics to reduce dramatically the military burden on their societies, further reduce their forces, convert excess military industries to civilian production, maintain firm command and control over a vastly reduced inventory of nuclear weapons, and prevent leakage of advanced military technology and expertise to other countries. Military budget cuts in Russia and other republics will significantly improve the chances of democratic consolidation first and foremost by freeing up resources for more productive investments and thus improving the chance of economic success. Free markets in these countries also can provide motivation to those whose vested interests might otherwise lead them to pursue disruptive policies at home or abroad.
The end of the Warsaw Pact and the emergence of democratic states in Eastern Europe is a development of immense strategic significance. It is critical to U.S. interests in Europe and those of our allies that we assist the new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe to consolidate their democratic institutions, establish free market economies and safeguard their national independence. Regional security challenges work to divert their efforts from these ends and endanger their progress. The continued ascendency of democratic reformers in Russia, Ukraine and other states of Eastern Europe is the surest counter to concerns raised by the long history of conflict in the region.

Ultimately, we face many uncertainties in Eastern Europe, recognizing that future developments there have potential to threaten our interests and those of our allies. It is incumbent upon us, at this time, to avoid undertaking initiatives that would
for close us and our allies from future policy options. It serves to strengthen democratic processes in the region if there is a common understanding that the potential for strong collective response to aggression remains.

U.S. engagement in Western European security remains essential. It is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western defense and security, as well as the channel for U.S. engagement and participation in larger European security affairs, even as we work increasingly with the other institutions emerging in Europe. Our policy should encourage the broadening of European institutions to include the democracies of Eastern Europe.
East Asia/Pacific. East Asia and the Pacific hold enormous strategic and economic importance for us and our allies. Japan and Korea together represent almost 12 percent of the world economy; China alone holds a quarter of the world's population. In addition, East Asia remains an area of enormous concentration of military power, actual and latent, nuclear and conventional, including some of the largest armies in the world: those of China, India, the two Koreas, and Vietnam, as well as deployed U.S. and Russian forces.
We will retain significant security interests in Southeast Asia. The emergence of ASEAN as an increasingly influential regional actor has been an important strategic development. Southeast Asia is a region of increasing economic strength -- ASEAN's population of 320 million is almost twice that of Japan and Korea combined. By the end of the century, the combined ASEAN economies are forecasted to reach $800 billion, over $100 billion larger than China. Aside from its economic potential, Southeast Asia is an area of potential strategic competition among regional powers. The South China Sea remains an area of significant unresolved territorial disputes. The prospects for settlement of the Cambodian conflict remain uncertain, and growing instability in Burma may impact on neighboring states.

ANZUS will remain an important component of our security architecture in the Pacific, although security guarantees to New Zealand are presently suspended. Our goal is to strengthen our partnership with Australia and work to remove obstacles to reintegrating New Zealand as a full partner in ANZUS.

We must endeavor to curb proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles. Where appropriate, as on the Korean peninsula, we can explore selective conventional arms control and confidence building measures, but we must avoid proposals that would erode U.S. naval strength critical to our forward deployed posture. We should pursue our cooperation with friendly regional states, including assistance to combat insurgency, terrorism and drug trafficking.
friends meet their legitimate defensive needs with U.S. foreign military sales without jeopardizing power balances in the region. We will tailor our security assistance programs to enable our friends to bear better the burden of defense and to facilitate standardization and interoperability of recipient country forces with our own. We must focus these programs to enable our regional friends to modernize their forces, upgrade their defense doctrines and planning, and acquire essential defensive capabilities.
The infusion of new and improved conventional arms and the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction during the past decade have dramatically increased offensive capabilities and the risk of future wars throughout the region. We will continue to work with all regional states to reduce military expenditures for offensive weapons; slow the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and long-range missiles; and prevent the transfer of militarily significant technology and resources to states which might threaten U.S. friends or upset the regional balance of power.

The presence of drug production and trafficking and instances of international terrorism in the Middle East and Southwest Asia complicates our relations with regional countries. We will contribute to U.S. counter-terrorism initiatives and support the efforts of U.S. counter-narcotics agencies in the region in their mission to curtail the drug trade.

**Latin America and the Caribbean.** In Latin America and the Caribbean, the U.S. seeks democratic progress and a stable security environment. As in the past, the focus of U.S. security policy is assisting nations in the region against the threat posed by insurgents and terrorists, while fostering the development of democratic institutions. In addition, the U.S. must assist its neighbors in combating the instability engendered by illicit
drugs, as well as continuing efforts to prevent illegal drugs from entering the United States.

The situation in Central America will remain a concern. In El Salvador, we seek the successful implementation of the agreement reached by the Salvadoran government and the FMLN. We also seek peaceful resolution of the conflict in Guatemala. In Panama, we seek to foster stability. Our programs there must also provide the capabilities to meet U.S. responsibilities under the Panama Canal Treaties, including defense of the Canal after 1999.

Countering drug trafficking remains a high priority. Our programs will focus on attacking drug trafficking at the source, in the producing and refining countries, and along the transit routes to the U.S. In particular, we should assist Peru in its efforts to overcome a serious and growing drug-linked insurgency.
Our programs must provide the capability to detect the flow of drugs from source countries to the U.S., and for providing that information via secure communications to enforcement agencies.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

THROUGH THE UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY)

Attached is a new draft of the Defense Planning Guidance. We have sought to respond fully to your guidance, making the front section in particular sharper and tighter in writing style and organization.

I. Lewis Libby

Attachment: as stated
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From time to time, we may be called upon by friends to help address sources of regional instability or promote peaceful, democratic ends and adherence to international law in problems that involve important, but not critical U.S. interests. The United States remains a nation with global interests; but the end of the Cold War and the growing strength of our allies has given us greater flexibility in determining to what extent regional challenges engage our national interests. The new era presents widening opportunities for common efforts in the context of the United Nations, existing alliances, or ad hoc coalitions, such as that involved in the Persian Gulf. We should press others to share more fully the burden of responsibility within the framework of collective defense arrangements. DoD should plan to provide support through security assistance, military-to-military contacts, humanitarian aid and intelligence assistance. In addition, we should plan forces when important U.S. interests or obligations are involved to participate in collective responses to keep the peace or defeat aggression. Our planning should recognize that the international community will also have responsibilities to carry its share of the burden, and that we have a major role to play.

In sum, we will not be the world's policeman. There are many situations in which others will bear the responsibility for international security. But we will not ignore the need to be prepared to protect our critical interests and honor our commitments with only limited additional help, or even alone, if necessary. We will also retain the ability to lead in situations where our interests demand it and no other nation can do it.

As a nation, we have paid dearly in the past for letting our capabilities fall and our will be questioned. There is a moment in time when a smaller, ready force can preclude an arms race, a hostile move or a conflict. Once lost, that moment cannot be recaptured by many thousands of soldiers poised on the edge of
Building Strategic Depth. America's strategic position is stronger than it has been for decades. Today, there is no global challenger to a peaceful democratic order. There are no significant hostile alliances challenging the democratic order. To the contrary, the strongest and most capable countries in the world remain our friends. The threat of global, even nuclear war, once posed by massive Warsaw Pact forces poised at the inner German border, first receded hundreds of miles east and has since transformed into the promise of a new era of strategic cooperation.

Not only has our position improved markedly with respect to the passing of a global challenge, but we have in fact won great depth for our strategic position in regional contexts as well. Today, no region of the world critical to our interests is under hostile, nondemocratic domination. Near-term threats in critical regions are small relative to our capabilities and those of our friends and allies. Soviet Communism no longer exacerbates local conflicts, and we need no longer be concerned that an otherwise remote problem could affect the balance of power between us and a hostile global challenger. We have won great depth for our strategic position.

The first major conflict of the post-Cold War era preserved our strategic position in one of the regions of the world critical to our interests. Our success in organizing an international coalition in the Persian Gulf against Saddam Hussein kept a critical region from the control of a ruthless dictator bent on developing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and harming Western interests. Instead of a more radical Middle East/Persian Gulf region under Saddam's influence, Saddam and Iraq's dangerous military have been weakened, our ties with moderate states are stronger, and Arabs and Israelis have for the first time in many years met to discuss peace.
The national security interests of the United States are enduring, as outlined in the President’s 1991 National Security Strategy Report: the survival of the U.S. as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure; a healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad; healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations; and a stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.

From these national security interests we derive our long-term defense policy goals:

• To deter or defeat aggression against the U.S. and its forces.

• Working with our allies and friends to preclude hostile, nondemocratic domination of a region critical to our interests, and also thereby to strengthen the barriers against the reemergence of a global threat to the interests of the U.S. and its allies.

• To strengthen and extend the system of defense arrangements that binds democratic and like-minded nations together in common defense against aggression, builds habits of cooperation, and provides security at lower costs and with lower risks for all.

• To help otherwise to further democratic progress and an open, peaceful international security environment conducive to our interests, to include maintaining access to world markets and resources, the oceans and space; limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; stemming the flow of militarily

We have entered a new strategic era. Democratic ideals and our willingness to stand by them helped to shape this new era. Guided by a fundamentally new defense strategy, we have today a compelling opportunity to meet our defense needs at lower cost. As we do so, we must not squander the position of security we achieved at great sacrifice through the Cold War, nor eliminate our ability to shape the future security environment in ways favorable to us and those who share our values.

Our strategic position and choices benefit from the historic, positive changes of the last few years. The Warsaw Pact has collapsed, the Soviet empire has disintegrated, and Communism has been discredited as an ideology with global pretensions and influence. The new international environment has also been shaped by the victory of the United States and its Coalition allies over Iraqi aggression, the first post-Cold War conflict. The victories in both the Cold War and the Gulf War highlight the importance of a strong defense, of cooperative arrangements to counter aggression and of U.S. leadership.

Our response to this new strategic era has been prompt, farsighted and substantial in scope. In August 1990 President Bush announced a new, regionally-oriented defense strategy to achieve our national security objectives in light of the demise of a global military challenge we faced during the Cold War, the increase in regional military threats, and the improved capabilities of many of our friends and allies. This new defense
strategy has since been incorporated in the Department's Annual Report, the National Military Strategy and our budget presentations to Congress. Pursuant to the new defense strategy, we have initiated a major restructuring of our defense establishment and a substantial reduction in our conventional and nuclear forces to levels consistent with the promise and uncertainties of the evolving environment. The resulting Base Force will continue to protect national security while significantly reducing the resources the nation will devote to its defense.

This Defense Planning Guidance furthers the far reaching efforts of the past two years to transform our operating practices and planning and to restructure our military forces for this new era. In a period of continued dramatic change in the international security environment, it provides broad guidance for the conduct of peacetime operations for the next few years by the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) consistent with the direction of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in the National Military Strategy and other relevant documents; it provides guidance to the Military Services; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; CINCs; and Defense Agencies for the development of programs for the FY 1994-1999 planning period.

To that end, this guidance outlines defense policy goals, the new regional defense strategy and the strategic concepts that underlie the new strategy, summarizes the regional implications of the strategy, and provides program planning guidance implementation of that strategy with the Base Force through the end of the decade.
DEFENSE POLICY GOALS

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• To strengthen and extend the system of defense arrangements that binds democratic and like-minded nations together in common defense against aggression, builds habits of cooperation, and provides security at lower costs and with lower risks for all.

• To help otherwise to further democratic progress and an open, peaceful international security environment conducive to our interests, to include maintaining access to world markets and resources, the oceans and space; limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; stemming the flow of militarily
significant technology to potential adversaries; combatting international terrorism and traffic in illegal drugs; and protecting the safety of U.S. citizens abroad.

Through pursuit of these goals, we can build upon the peaceful framework in which democracy has prospered for forty years despite the enormous external threat once posed by Soviet Communism. With care, this framework will help to consolidate the extraordinary democratic gains of the past few years, providing a peaceful and secure environment in which the new democracies can establish themselves. In time our continuing efforts, coupled with the growing strength of our friends and allies, can lead to a security community that extends to all peace-loving nations, including the new democracies of Eastern Europe and a democratic Russia, Ukraine, and other democracies of the former Soviet Union. Our goal is to build a world in which democratic freedoms prosper and aggression that might threaten those freedoms meets with a forceful common response. The alternative would be to leave our critical interests and the security of our friends dependent on individual efforts that could be duplicative, competitive or ineffective.

Our continuing pursuit of our long-term goals builds today on two sources of great strength -- a tradition of U.S. leadership; and our skilled, dedicated and professional Armed Forces. Recent improvements in the security environment have been achieved not by chance, but rather through clarity of purpose, commitment, and U.S. leadership. At the end of World War I, and again at the end of World War II, the United States as a nation made the mistake of believing that we had achieved a kind of permanent security, that a transformation of the security order that had been achieved through extraordinary American sacrifice could be sustained without our leadership. Today, we can hope to preserve the more secure environment that we now enjoy with less effort than we needed to achieve it; but if we fail to lead, a much more dangerous environment could emerge.
And we cannot lead if we fail to maintain the effectiveness of our forces as we reduce and restructure. As a nation we have never before succeeded in pacing reductions without endangering our interests. We must proceed expeditiously, but at a pace which maintains effectiveness, ensures fair treatment of those who contributed to the victories which made downsizing possible, and avoids breaking the force or sending the wrong signals about our intentions to friends or potential aggressors.

The choices we make will set the direction of our security policy into the next decade. If we reduce our forces carefully, we will be left with a force capable of implementing the new defense strategy. We will have given ourselves the means to lead common efforts to shape the future environment in ways that will give us greater security at lower costs.

II. THE REGIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

A. Regional Focus

The demise of the global threat posed by Soviet Communism leaves America and its allies with an unprecedented opportunity to preserve with greater ease a security environment within which our democratic ideals can prosper. We can shift our defense planning from a focus on the global threat posed by the Warsaw Pact to a focus on the less demanding regional threats and challenges we are most likely to face in the future. In this way, we can work to shape the future environment and to preclude hostile nondemocratic powers from dominating regions critical to us. This same approach will also work to preclude the emergence of a hostile power that could present a global security threat comparable to the one the Soviet Union presented in the past.
In this more secure international environment there will be enhanced opportunities for political, economic, environmental, social, and security issues to be resolved through new or revitalized international organizations, including the United Nations, or regional arrangements. But we must not stand back and allow a new global threat to emerge or leave the security of critical regions dependent on a balance among contending powers. If we do so it will be much harder to achieve the enhanced international cooperation that we hope for.

B. Underlying Strategic Concepts

The Department of Defense does not decide when our nation will commit force. However, decisions guiding the development of defense forces and programs for the next six years not only determine a future President’s options when a crisis occurs, but may actually shape the course of events by precluding hostile, nondemocratic domination of a critical region and thereby make greater crises less likely. As we design our defense program, it is important to appreciate four concepts that illuminate the relationship between the decisions we make today about the forces we build and the future environment in which those forces will operate.

Planning for Uncertainty. An unavoidable challenge for defense planners is that we must start development today of forces to counter threats still so distant into the future that they cannot be confidently predicted. Events of the last few years demonstrate concretely how quickly and unexpectedly political trends can reverse themselves. Our ability to predict becomes even worse as the time frame becomes longer.

Yet decisions about military forces cannot be based on a short-term planning horizon. The military capabilities that we have today and the ones we will have for the next few years are largely the product of decisions made a decade ago. Much of the
capability that we are cutting now cannot be restored quickly and cuts that are too precipitous will do long-lasting damage even to the capabilities that remain. Thus, even if we had great confidence in our projections of the security environment for the next two or three years, we cannot base defense planning on such a relatively short time horizon.

Given the magnitude of recent changes in the security environment, we build defense forces today for a future that is particularly uncertain. Fundamentally, we are striving to provide a future President with the capabilities 5, 10 or 15 years from now to counter threats or pursue interests that cannot be defined with precision today.

**Shaping the Future Security Environment.** America cannot base its future security on just a shaky record of prediction or a prudent recognition of uncertainty. Sound defense planning seeks to help shape the future. Our strategy seeks to anticipate and to shape trends to advance U.S. security objectives in the future. This is both within our means and critical to our future security.

The containment strategy we pursued for the past forty years successfully shaped the world we see today. By our refusal to be intimidated by Soviet military power, we and our allies shaped a world in which Communism had to confront its contradictions. At the same time, within the democratic security community that we built with our allies and friends in Europe and the Pacific, democracy was able to develop and flourish in an environment of peace and security.

One of the primary tasks we face today in shaping the future is carrying old alliances into the new era, and turning old enmities into new cooperative relationships. If we and other leading democracies continue to build a democratic security community, a much safer world is likely. If we act separately, many other problems could result. If we can assist former Warsaw

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Pact countries, including republics of the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia and Ukraine, in choosing a steady course of democratic progress and reduced military forces subject to responsible, civilian democratic control, we will have successfully secured the fruits of forty-years effort. Our goal should be to bring a democratic Russia and the other new democracies into the defense community of democratic nations, so that they can become a force for peace not only in Europe, but in other critical regions of the world.

Cooperative defense arrangements enhance deterrence and defense, while reducing the defense burden for everyone. In the absence of effective defense cooperation, regional rivalries could lead to tensions or even hostilities that would threaten to bring critical regions under hostile domination. It is not in our interest or those of the other democracies to return to earlier periods in which multiple military powers balanced one another off in what passed for security structures, while regional, or even global peace hung in the balance. As in the past, such struggles might eventually force the U.S. at much higher cost to protect its interests and counter the potential development of a new global threat.

Maintaining highly capable forces is critical to sustaining the U.S. leadership with which we can shape the future. Such leadership supports collective defense arrangements and precludes hostile competitors from challenging our critical interests. Our fundamental belief in democracy and human rights gives other nations confidence that we will use our significant military power only as a force for peaceful democratic progress.

We must plan to help shape our future environment and hedge against both anticipated threats and uncertainty. The defense programs for FY 1994-1999 should build upon our strengths to preserve our ability to shape the future.
Our strategy is designed to preserve this position by keeping our alliances strong and our threats small. Our tools include political and economic steps, as well as security efforts to prevent the emergence of a non-democratic aggressor in critical regions. We bring to this task our considerable moral influence as the world's leading democracy, and the full scope of our political and economic means, as well as our defense efforts. We can provide more security at a reduced cost. If a hostile power sought to present a regional challenge again, or if a new antagonistic superpower or alliance emerged in the future, we would have the ability to counter it. But the investments required to maintain the strategic depth that we won through forty years of the Cold War are much smaller than those it took to secure it or those that would be required if we lost it.

Continued U.S. Leadership. U.S. leadership, essential for the successful resolution of the Cold War, remains critical to achieve our long-term goals in this new era. U.S. preference is to address hostile, nondemocratic threats to our interests wherever possible through collective security efforts that take advantage of the strength of our allies and friends. However, sustained U.S. leadership will be essential for maintaining those alliances and for otherwise protecting our interests.

A future President will need to have options that will allow him to lead and, where the international reaction proves sluggish or inadequate, to act to protect our critical interests. The U.S. retains critical interests in regions such as Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East/Persian Gulf, whose hostile domination would greatly reduce the strategic depth we have won and in short order could come to pose a broader threat to U.S. security. In addition, we retain critical interests in honoring historic commitments to allies and close friends and in maintaining freedom of the seas. We must plan sufficient forces and programs within current fiscal constraints to provide a future President with the options he will need.
combat. Our efforts to rearm and to understand our danger before World War II came too late to spare us and others a global conflagration. Four short years after our resounding global victory in World War II, we were nearly pushed off the Korean peninsula by a third rate power. We erred in the past when we failed to plan forces befitting our role in the world. Our errors were costly.

Our defense program for FY 1994-1999 must provide the ready forces, the mobility, the forward presence and strength to preserve our alliances and preclude potential aggressors from beginning regional arms races, raising regional tensions, or dominating regions critical to our interests. Guided by our regional strategy, and working together with our allies, we can preserve at lower cost and even expand on the depth to our strategic position that our past efforts have won.

C. Enduring Requirements

The new defense strategy with its regional focus continues the need to pay special attention to three enduring requirements of our national security posture. Each requires careful, long-term attention, the investment of defense resources, and supportive operating practices; each represent key strengths that cannot be readily restored should they be lost.

Alliances and Coalitions. In many respects, our alliance structure is perhaps our nation's most significant achievement since the Second World War. It represents a "silent victory" of building long-standing alliances and friendships with nations that constitute a prosperous, largely democratic, market-oriented zone of peace and prosperity that encompasses more than two-thirds of the world's economy. Defense cooperation among the democracies has not only deterred external threats, it has provided an environment in which we and our allies have peacefully developed and prospered. The U.S. will maintain and nurture its friendships
and alliances in Europe, the Far East, the Pacific, the Middle East/Persian Gulf, Latin America and elsewhere.

The growing strength of our friends and allies will make it possible for them to assume greater responsibilities for our mutual security interests. We will work with them towards this end, including reductions in U.S. military forces stationed overseas. There will remain, however, a significant role for U.S. forward presence, including stationed forces, and changes must be managed carefully to ensure that they are not mistakenly perceived as a withdrawal of U.S. commitment.

Our long-standing alliance relationships further our efforts to deter conflict and shape the security environment. This is especially true with NATO. Shared trust and expertise developed over 40 years of collective security will be essential to secure the stable and lasting peace in Europe we all seek in this new era. History has shown too often for us to ignore that our own security is inextricably bound up with that of Europe.

In Asia as well, even though the Soviet threat is gone, the need for strong U.S.-Japan ties persists; and the U.S. remains committed to Japan's security. We also have active mutual security agreements with the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, and have established non-treaty security relationships with several other countries. Given the enormous economic and strategic importance of this region, these continued security ties will be vital, particularly as China, Vietnam and North Korea sort out the implications for them of the demise of Soviet Communism, and efforts continue to moderate North Korea's disturbing nuclear program and its excessive military investments.

The collapse of Communism and the emergence of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and in Russia, Ukraine and other republics of the former Soviet Union offers historic opportunities to promote democratic consolidation and transform formerly
adversarial relationships into cooperative defense efforts. The stability and structure provided by the NATO alliance in Europe also supports the development of democracy in states formerly under Communist domination. Leaders of these new democracies are among the strongest proponents for NATO and a substantial U.S. presence in Europe. They take comfort in our presence as a factor for stability and a hedge against an uncertain future. We have begun international cooperative training programs with these nations and started military-to-military exchanges and a regular defense dialogue. Liaison relations exist between them and NATO. We should plan to encourage and continue such efforts. Greater cooperation and dialogue on security issues should help in fostering democratic philosophies of civil-military relations, transparency, and defensive military doctrines and postures.

We have begun security discussions with states of the former Soviet Union, as well as cooperative efforts to stem proliferation of weapons and technology and to lessen future risks by destroying nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of the former Soviet Union, are valuable first steps that will encourage further cooperation with these nations. If democracy matures in Russia, Ukraine and other states of the former Soviet Union, these states will have more in common with us than in conflict. We could well imagine that in a crisis like Operations Desert Shield/Storm years from now, Russia, Ukraine, or other new democracies could be active military partners in a coalition.

Finally, the Gulf War has greatly enhanced our security relations in the Middle East/Persian Gulf region and underscored their continued importance. Taken together, many facets of this experience -- combat forces, logistical support and financial participation -- and our subsequent cooperation on forward presence of U.S. forces promise continued close ties with nations of the region on which we can build.
Beyond our formal alliances, certain situations like the crisis leading to the Gulf War are likely to engender ad hoc coalitions that may include allies, nations with whom we have longstanding defense relations, and perhaps some with whom we have not previously cooperated. Some coalitions may entail only general agreement over the objectives to be accomplished. We should plan to maximize the value of such coalitions. This may include specialized roles for our forces as well as developing cooperative practices with others and techniques for rapidly coordinating efforts with forces of nations with whom we have less prior dealings.

**Quality Personnel.** Our victory in the Gulf War demonstrated impressively the importance of high-quality personnel and effective leaders. The highly-trained, highly-motivated All-Volunteer Force we have worked so hard to build is the key to maintaining our future military leadership. We also require quality career civilians in the managerial, scientific and technical fields.

The Gulf War tested the training, discipline, and morale of our military forces and they performed superbly. To continue to attract the highest quality people, we must provide challenging and rewarding career opportunities. This includes realistic training and the benefits of advanced training techniques such as interactive simulation. We must also provide the quality of life they and their families deserve, including keeping the amount of time military units are deployed away from home at reasonable levels.

Quality personnel require quality leadership. Our success in the Gulf reflected outstanding military leadership. We must continue to train our military leaders in joint operations and in cooperative efforts with the forces of many different nations. They must also be given the opportunity and encouragement to pursue innovative doctrine for operations and new approaches to problems.
Identifying the core military competencies that will be most important in the future and retaining the lead in them will be among the highest priorities of our military leadership. It is not enough to simply buy new equipment or develop new prototypes. Our understanding of warfare and the way we intend to defend our interests as a nation must continually develop and evolve in the military-technical revolution that lies ahead. Future challenges will require the continued mastery of critical areas of warfare, but we may also require mastery of different capabilities, perhaps replacing core competencies that are critical today. A critical task will be to begin preparing for tomorrow's competencies, while making hard decisions about those we need no longer emphasize.

**Technological Superiority.** The onset of a new military-technical regime presents continued challenges not only in the realm of technological superiority but also in the way we organize, train, and employ our military forces. The Gulf War made clear the early promise of this new regime, emphasizing the importance of recent breakthroughs in low-observable, information, and other key technologies.
Robust research and development alone will not maintain our qualitative advantage. New technologies must be incorporated into weapons systems produced in numbers sufficient for doctrine and tactics to be developed. To do this without large-scale production will require innovations in training technologies and the acquisition process. We need to be able to fight future forces through simulation before we buy them. We need the ability to experiment with continuous, virtual and real R&D prototyping on future electronic battlefields, linked to key training ranges and competing, integrated design and manufacturing teams, if we are to reduce the time to get technology from the lab into the field, and if we are to concurrently develop the joint-doctrine necessary to employ our combined forces. We must encourage defense industry to invest in new manufacturing processes, facilities, and equipment as well as in R&D. This will be increasingly important as procurement declines.

D. Elements of the Regional Defense Strategy

The regional defense strategy seeks to protect American interests and to promote a more stable and democratic world. It does so by adopting a regional focus for our efforts to strengthen cooperative defense arrangements with friendly states and to preclude hostile, nondemocratic powers from dominating regions of the world critical to us, and also thereby to raise a further barrier to the rise of a serious global challenge. To accomplish these goals, we must preserve U.S. leadership, maintain leading-
edge military capabilities, and enhance collective security among democratic nations.

The regional defense strategy rests on four essential elements:

- **Strategic Deterrence and Defense** -- a survivable strategic nuclear deterrent capability, and strategic defenses against limited strikes.

- **Forward Presence** -- forward deployed or stationed forces (albeit at reduced levels) to strengthen alliances, show our resolve, and dissuade challengers in regions critical to us.

- **Crisis Response** -- forces and mobility to respond quickly and decisively with a range of options to regional crises of concern to us.

- **Reconstitution** -- the capability to generate wholly new forces to hedge against renewed global threats.

**Strategic Deterrence and Defense.** Even though the risk of a massive strategic nuclear attack has decreased significantly with the rise of democratic forces and the collapse of the former Soviet Union, deterring nuclear attack will remain the highest defense priority of the nation. It is one area where our survival could be at risk in a matter of moments. U.S. nuclear targeting policy and plans have changed, and will continue to change, to account for the welcome developments in states of Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. Nonetheless, survivable U.S. strategic nuclear forces are still essential to deter use of the large and modern nuclear forces that will exist in the former Soviet Union even under a modified START regime. Our strategic nuclear forces also provide an important deterrent hedge against the possibility of an unforeseen global threat.

Fundamental changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have eliminated the threat of massive Soviet aggression.
launched from the heart of Germany that required heavy reliance on the threat of nuclear weapons for deterrence. This permits us to move into a new era in nuclear forces. This was evidenced in the President's recent nuclear initiatives, which made major changes in our tactical nuclear posture and strategic nuclear deterrent forces designed to eliminate unnecessary weapons, further reduce the possibility of accident or miscalculation, and encourage corresponding reductions in the nuclear posture of the former Soviet Union.

The reform leaders of the newly independent states have clearly voiced their interest in reducing strategic forces inherited from the former Soviet Union. They recognize we are not a threat and rightly view these forces as diverting scarce resources from rebuilding their troubled economies and complicating the improvement of relations with the West. We have tried to give the new leaders every incentive to make substantial reductions in these strategic forces to a level consistent with the absence of any threat from the West and to eliminate weapons that increase the risks of miscalculation, in particular land-based MIRVs.

If both sides agree on the President's recent bilateral proposals, there will be even more dramatic changes to both sides' nuclear deterrent forces. For us these include earlier reductions to START levels; fewer ICBMs, with only one warhead apiece; and fewer warheads on our ballistic missile submarines. In addition, a substantial number of bombers would be oriented primarily toward conventional missions. In the end, the actual number of warheads would be roughly half of what we planned to have under START. The military departments should undertake measures now to prepare for this outcome.
A successful transformation of Russia, Ukraine and other states of the former Soviet Union to stable democracies should clearly be our goal. We could then foresee the strong possibility of a time when we would no longer need to hold at risk on a day-to-day basis what future Russian leaders hold dear. But we are not there yet. Our pursuit of this goal must recognize the as yet robust strategic nuclear force facing us, the fragility of democracy in the new states of the former Soviet Union, and the possibility that they might revert to closed, authoritarian, and hostile regimes. Our movement toward this goal must, therefore, leave us with timely and realistic responses to unanticipated reversals in our relations and a survivable deterrent capability.

Strategic forces will also continue to support our global role and international commitments, including our trans-Atlantic links to NATO. Collective defense allows countries to rely on the contributions of others in protecting their mutual interests in ways that lessen the risks and the costs for all. The nuclear umbrella that the U.S. has extended over our allies has defended the nuclear peace and lessened the risks of war without requiring our allies themselves to match the threat posed by the former Soviet nuclear arsenal. This has been a risk-reducing and cost-saving measure for us all; it is one we can afford fiscally to continue and one that our interests cannot afford to let lapse.
The threat posed by instability in nuclear weapons states and by the global proliferation of ballistic missiles have grown considerably. The threat of an accidental or unauthorized missile launch remains and may actually increase through this decade. The new technology embodied in the SDI program has made ballistic missile defense capability a realistic, achievable, and affordable concept. We need to deploy missile defenses not only to protect ourselves and our forward deployed forces, but also to have the ability to extend protection to others. Like "extended deterrence" provided by our nuclear forces, defenses can contribute to a regime of "extended protection" for friends and allies and further strengthen a democratic security community. This is why, with the support of Congress, as reflected in the Missile Defense Act of 1991, we are seeking to move toward the day when defenses will protect the community of nations embracing democratic values from international outlaws armed with ballistic missiles.

Limited deployment of defenses will also be an integral element of our efforts to curtail ballistic missile proliferation. Defenses undermine the military utility and thus the cost effectiveness of such systems and should serve to dampen the incentive to acquire ballistic missiles.

In the decade ahead, we must adopt the right combination of deterrent forces, tactical and strategic, while creating the proper balance between offense and active defense to mitigate risk from weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, whatever the source. For now this requires retaining ready forces for a secure nuclear deterrent, including tactical forces. In addition, we must complete needed offensive modernization and
upgrades. These offensive forces need to be complemented with early introduction of limited ballistic missile defenses.

**Forward Presence.** Our forward presence helps to shape the evolving security environment. We will continue to rely on forward presence of U.S. forces to show U.S. commitment and lend credibility to our alliances, to deter aggression, enhance regional stability, promote U.S. influence and access, and, when necessary, provide an initial crisis response capability. Forward presence is vital to the maintenance of the system of collective defense by which the U.S. has been able to work with our friends and allies to protect our security interests, while minimizing the burden of defense spending and of unnecessary arms competition.

We should plan to continue a wide range of forward presence activities, including not only overseas basing of forces, but prepositioning and periodic deployments, exercises, exchanges or visits. Forward basing of forces and the prepositioning of equipment facilitate rapid reinforcement and enhance the capability to project forces into vital strategic areas. In regions of the world where we do not have a land-based presence, maritime forces, including maritime and afloat prepositioning of equipment; long-range aviation; and other contingency forces allow us to exert presence and underscore our commitment to friends and allies, and, when necessary, aid our response to crises. Exercises, exchanges and visits build trust, cooperation and common operating procedures between militaries. Important too are host nation arrangements to provide the infrastructure and logistical support to allow for the forward deployment of forces when necessary. Our forward forces should increasingly be prepared to fulfill multiple regional roles, and in some cases extra-regional ones, rather than being prepared only for operations in the locale where they are based. Moreover, as in the Gulf war, our forward presence forces must be ready to provide support for military operations in other theaters. In addition, through forward presence, we can prosecute the war on drugs:
provide humanitarian and security assistance; advance military-to-military contacts to strengthen democratic reforms; and protect U.S. citizens abroad.

The changing security environment suggests significant adjustments to our forward presence in four regions in which we have critical interests.

The changes in Europe allow us to scale back our presence significantly to a smaller, but still militarily meaningful contribution to NATO’s overall force levels. It is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western defense and security, as well as the channel for U.S. engagement and participation in larger European security affairs, even as we work with other institutions emerging in Europe. Maintaining strong ties with our West European allies strengthens alliance cohesion, and prevents the renationalization of security policies. In this new environment, a substantial American presence in Europe will also provide reassurance and stability as new democracies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union seek to be integrated into a larger and evolving security architecture. Leaders of the
new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are among the strongest proponents for NATO and a substantial U.S. presence in Europe.

Forward deployed U.S. forces continue to have an important role to play in East Asia and the Pacific.

These contributions have allowed us to initiate a plan for carefully reducing our level of forces in the region, and to work successfully with our allies to increase their own role in providing for regional security and stability — provided we avoid a disengagement or abrupt drawdown that would weaken that stability. Even though we start from a much lower base than in Europe, our overall reduction will be roughly 25,000 by the end of 1992. Plans to remove additional forces from South Korea have been suspended while we address the problem posed by the North Korean nuclear program. Even as we adjust and reduce our overall force structure in the region, U.S. forces in Asia must remain strong, capable, and well-positioned.
In the Middle East/Persian Gulf region, we are striving with friends and allies to build a more stable security structure than the one that failed on August 2, 1990. We have major interests in that part of the world and, consistent with the wishes of our friends in the area, we must remain engaged to protect those interests.

We will face new difficulties maintaining a ground presence in Latin America. In accordance with the provisions of the Panama Canal treaty, we would retain no major bases in Central or South America beyond the turn of the century. The general trend toward democratization and peace in Latin America and the dramatic reductions of former Soviet and East European aid to Cuba are long sought developments. Nonetheless, potential regional problems, including the potential for instability in Cuba and elsewhere and the continuing challenges of stopping trafficking in illegal drugs from this region, will demand a forward role for our peacetime forces.

Crisis Responses. The ability to respond to regional or local crises is a key element of the regional defense strategy.
The regional and local contingencies we might face are many and varied, both in size and intensity, potentially involving a broad range of military forces of varying capabilities and technological sophistication under an equally broad range of geopolitical circumstances. Highly ready and rapidly deployable power projection forces remain key elements of precluding challengers, of protecting our interests from unexpected or sudden challenges, and of achieving decisive results if the use of force is necessary.

Our response to regional crises must be decisive, requiring the quality personnel and technological edge to win quickly and with minimum casualties. When we choose to act, we must be capable of acting quickly. We must be confident of the outcome before an operation begins. We must be prepared to make regional aggressors fight on our terms, matching our strengths against their weaknesses. This requires maintaining a broad range of capabilities and a continuing emphasis on technological superiority and doctrinal innovation.

The short notice that may characterize many regional crises require highly responsive military forces. Active Component forces have a critical role to play in supplying combat and support forces for the initial response to contingencies that arise on short notice. Reserve Component forces will, among other roles, contribute mobility assets in short notice crises and support and sustain active combat forces and provide combat forces.
in especially large or protracted contingencies. In addition, mobilizing Reserve Component combat forces can provide the force expansion needed to enhance the U.S. capability to respond to another contingency.

Mobility forces must be able to quickly deploy and sustain major combat forces.

As a result, our regional adversaries may be armed with
capabilities that in the past were limited only to the superpowers.

Finally, the Gulf War provides a host of lessons that should guide future crisis response planning. Our crisis response forces must incorporate the relevant lessons of the Gulf War as identified in the Conduct of the War Study and other subsequent reports. Our understanding of the war and its implications for forces will continue to evolve for some time to come.

Reconstitution. With the demise of the Cold War, we have gained sufficient strategic depth that potential global-scale threats to our security are now very distant -- so much so that they are hard to identify or define with precision. The new strategy therefore prudently accepts risk in this lower probability area of threat, in order to refocus reduced defense resources both on the more likely near-term threats and on high priority investments in the long-term foundations of our strategic posture.
Nevertheless, we could still face in the more distant future a new global threat or some emergent alliance of hostile, non-democratic regional powers. For the longer term, then, our reconstitution strategy focuses on supporting our national security policy to preclude the development of a global threat or the hostile domination of a critical region contrary to the interests of the U.S. and our allies.
Regional Goals and Challenges

We can take advantage of the Cold War's end to shift our planning focus to regional threats and challenges, and in this way, work with our friends and allies to preclude the emergence of hostile, nondemocratic threats to our critical interests and to shape a more secure international environment conducive to our democratic ideals. The future of events in major regions remains uncertain. The new defense strategy, with its focus on regional matters, seeks to shape that future and position us to retain the capabilities needed to protect our interests.

_Europe._ We confront a Europe in the midst of historic transformation, no longer starkly divided by military blocs of East and West, and increasingly hopeful of achieving a Europe “whole and free.” We are striving to aid the efforts in the former Eastern bloc to build free societies. Over the long term, the most effective guarantee that the former Soviet empire’s successor states do not threaten U.S. and Western interests is successful democratization and economic reform.
The consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation are of direct and material concern to us, as they are to all other Council of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) states under the commitments of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. We must recognize what we are so often told by the leaders of the new democracies—that continued U.S. presence in Europe is an essential part of the West's overall efforts to maintain stability even in the midst of such dramatic change. U.S. engagement in West European security remains essential. History has demonstrated that our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. It is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western defense and security, as well as the channel for U.S. engagement and participation in larger European security affairs, even as we work increasingly with the other institutions emerging in Europe.

Our common security in this new era can best be safeguarded through the further development of a network of interlocking institutions and relationships, constituting a comprehensive architecture in which the NATO alliance, the process of European integration, and the CSCE are key elements. Our efforts to ensure stability in peace and freedom will recognize the political, economic, social and ecological elements of security, along with the indispensable defense dimension. The alliance, the European Community, the West European Union, the CSCE and the Council of Europe are key institutions in this endeavor. Emerging frameworks of regional cooperation also will be important. Our policy should encourage the broadening of appropriate European institutions to include the democracies of Eastern Europe.

All of the republics of the former Soviet Union (with the exception of Georgia) are members of Europe-centered security institutions such as CSCE and the North Atlantic Cooperation
Council (NACC), and Russia and other Slavic republics have traditionally been part of the European system of states. The Central Asia republics also can be regarded as part of the Middle East/Persian Gulf area, by virtue of geography and cultural affinity with the states of the region.
The end of the Warsaw Pact and the emergence of democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe is a development of immense strategic significance. It is critical to U.S. interests in Europe and those of our allies that we assist the new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe to consolidate their democratic institutions, establish free market economies and safeguard their national independence. Regional security challenges work to divert their efforts from these ends and endanger their progress. The continued ascendency of democratic reformers in Russia, Ukraine and other states of Eastern Europe is the surest counter to concerns raised by the long history of conflict in the region.

The breakup of the former Soviet Union presents an historic opportunity to transform the adversarial relationship of the Cold War into a relationship characterized by cooperation. It already
has reduced significantly our defense requirements. The U.S. has a significant stake in promoting democratic consolidation and peaceful relations between Russia, Ukraine and other republics of the former Soviet Union. A democratic partnership with Russia, Ukraine, and the other republics would be the best possible outcome.

Our increasing military-to-military contacts with Russia, Ukraine and the other republics should support the peaceful resolution of differences among them and help in fostering democratic philosophies of civil-military relations, legislative control, transparency, and defensive military doctrines and postures. If democracy matures in Russia and Ukraine there is every possibility that they will be a force for peace not only in Europe, but in other critical regions where previously Soviet policy aggravated local conditions and encouraged unrest and conflict. The U.S. can also further our concerns and those of our allies by assisting the efforts of Russia, Ukraine, and the other republics to reduce dramatically the military burden on their societies, further reduce their forces, convert excess military industries to civilian production, maintain firm command and control over a vastly reduced inventory of nuclear weapons, and prevent leakage of advanced military technology and expertise to other countries. Military budget cuts in Russia and other republics will significantly improve the chances of democratic consolidation first and foremost by freeing up resources for more productive investments and thus improving the chance of economic success.

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East Asia/Pacific. East Asia and the Pacific hold enormous strategic and economic importance for us and our allies. Japan and Korea together represent almost 16 percent of the world economy; China alone holds a quarter of the world’s population. U.S. two-way trade with the region stands at $310 billion, approximately one third more than the total of our two-way trade with Europe. In addition, East Asia remains an area of enormous concentration of military power, actual and latent, nuclear and conventional, including some of the largest armies in the world: those of China, India, the two Koreas, and Vietnam, as well as deployed U.S. and Russian forces.
The emergence of ASEAN as an increasingly influential regional actor has been an important positive development. Southeast Asia is a region of increasing economic strength -- ASEAN's population of 320 million is almost twice that of Japan and Korea combined. By the end of the century, the combined ASEAN economies are forecasted to reach $600 billion, over $100 billion larger than China. The United States shares an interest with the ASEAN countries in precluding Southeast Asia from becoming an area of strategic competition among regional powers.

ANZUS will remain an important component of our security architecture in the Pacific, although security guarantees to New Zealand are presently suspended. Our goal is to strengthen our partnership with Australia and work to remove obstacles to reintegrating New Zealand as a full partner in ANZUS.

We must endeavor to curb proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles. Where appropriate, as on the Korean peninsula, we can explore selective conventional arms control and confidence building measures that enhance stability. We should pursue our cooperation with friendly regional states, including assistance to combat insurgency, terrorism and drug trafficking.

The Middle East/Persian Gulf and South Asia.

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We can help our friends meet their legitimate defensive needs with U.S. foreign military sales without jeopardizing power balances in the region. We will tailor our security assistance programs to enable our friends to bear better the burden of defense and to facilitate standardization and interoperability of recipient country forces with our own. We must focus these programs to enable our regional friends to modernize their forces, upgrade their defense doctrines and planning, and acquire essential defensive capabilities.
The infusion of new and improved conventional arms and the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction during the past decade have dramatically increased offensive capabilities and the potential danger from future wars throughout the region. We will continue to work with all regional states to reduce military expenditures for offensive weapons; reverse the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and long-range missiles; and prevent the transfer of militarily significant technology and resources to states which might threaten U.S. friends or upset the regional balance of power.

The presence of drug production and trafficking and instances of international terrorism complicates our relations with regional countries. We will contribute to U.S. counter-terrorism initiatives and support the efforts of U.S. counter-narcotics agencies in the region in their mission to curtail the drug trade.

**Latin America and the Caribbean.** In Latin America and the Caribbean, the U.S. seeks to sustain the extraordinary democratic progress of the last decade and maintain a stable security environment. As in the past, the focus of U.S. security policy is assisting the efforts of the democratic nations in the region to defend themselves against the threat posed by insurgents and terrorists and foster democratic consolidation. In addition, the U.S. must assist its neighbors in combating the instability...
engendered by illicit drugs, as well as continuing efforts to prevent illegal drugs from entering the United States.

The situation in Central America will remain a concern. In El Salvador, we seek the successful implementation of the agreement reached by the Salvadoran government and the FMLN. We also seek peaceful resolution of the conflict in Guatemala. In Panama, we seek to strengthen their democratic institutions. Our programs there must also provide the capabilities to meet U.S. responsibilities under the Panama Canal Treaties, including defense of the Canal after 1999.

Countering drug trafficking remains a high priority. Our programs will focus on attacking drug trafficking at the source, in the producing and refining countries, and along the transit routes to the U.S. Our programs must provide the capability to detect the flow of drugs from source countries to the U.S., and
for providing that information via secure communications to enforcement agencies.

Sub-Saharan Africa.

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