III. Programming for the Base Force

A. Introduction

1. Guidance. The Department will formulate the Program Objectives Memoranda (POMs) for the FY 1994-99 program planning period based on the foregoing strategy and policies and the programming guidance in this section, as well as the Illustrative Planning Scenarios and the Fiscal Guidance published separately.

2. Overall Program Priorities. The Department's overall programming aim is to profoundly reduce our defense establishment, yet think beyond mere across-the-board cuts, and so restructure our forces and programs to support our new regional defense strategy and help shape a new security environment. Under current plans, force structure reaches minimum acceptable "base force" levels (for strategic deterrence, crisis response forces, and forward presence levels alike) by around FY 1995 for most forces, so retaining adequate force levels is a strategic imperative. Programming and managing this base force at high readiness for deterrence and timely regional crisis response is similarly imperative. Sustainability sufficient for the intensity and duration of regional crisis response operations is also of great importance. We must give high priority to selected research and development to keep our qualitative edge in systems and in doctrine. However, a profound slowing in the former Soviet modernization that long drove our programs enables greatly reduced emphasis on systems procurement; hence we have adopted a fundamentally new approach to defense acquisition. Finally, the Department will vigorously pursue reductions and management efficiencies in defense infrastructure and overhead, to reduce our cost of doing business and direct our shrinking resources to ensuring a very high quality, ready force structure and rigorous technical and doctrinal innovation.
B. Strategic Nuclear Deterrence and Defense

1. Nuclear Deterrent Forces. Program for base force levels as follows, pursuant to the President's Nuclear Initiatives of September 1991 and January 1992. This force would provide sufficient capability to support US deterrent strategy, assuming CIS forces are reduced to START levels, the strategic environment continues to improve, and our modernization goals are attained. With partial downloading of the Minuteman ICBMs, this force will conform with the START treaty. (Bombers, including those shown here, will increasingly play roles in conventional crisis response. Bomber figures are total aircraft inventory.)

2. Defense. Within a refocussed SDI program, develop for deployment defensive systems able to provide the U.S., our forces overseas, and our friends and allies global protection against limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source.
Ensure that strategic and theater defense systems, as well as offensive and defensive systems, are integrated.

C. Conventional Forces for Forward Presence and Crisis Response

Program for overall base force levels as follows while meeting readiness and sustainability guidance and remaining compliant with arms control agreements.

Program forward presence forces to retain the flexibility to adapt rapidly to changes within regions, and to provide joint support and reinforcement among regions. CJCS commission a study in consultation with USD(P) to review forward presence policy and guidance, to be completed by 1 Nov 92.
1. **Army.** Within total end strength of 536,000 AC, 567,400 RC:

- Retain in Europe a corps comprising 2 heavy divisions and an ACR, with combat support capability and a base for reception and onward movement.

- Retain one heavy division (-) in Korea, including associated support.

2. **Navy/Marine Corps.** Within total end strength of 501,200 AC, 117,800 RC (Navy) and 158,800 AC, 34,900 RC (Marine Corps):

- Program for 12 carrier battle groups based on a force of 12 aircraft carriers (plus one training carrier) and 13 airwings (11 AC/2 RC). Program for about 150 major surface combatants. Maintain sufficient ASW, surveillance and combat logistic support forces for forward presence and regional contingencies.

- Program for 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces. Program for amphibious lift for 2.5 MEBs.

- Program to support a flexible naval forward presence that is adaptable to regional developments. Support overall presence within established OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO guidelines. Identify...
options for additional overseas homeporting where cost-effective, to ease rotation base and readiness requirements. Also, plan to be capable of alternative presence postures.

3. **Air Force.** Within total end strength of 430,300 AC, 200,000 RC:

- Program for 26.5 FWEs (15.25 AC/11.25 RC, including recce/SSAD).

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**D. Mobility and Prepositioning**

Implement the Secretary of Defense-approved mobility and prepositioning recommendations of the Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) as follows.

1. **Airlift (Air Force).**

2. **Sealift (Navy).** Acquire through new construction or conversion in U.S. shipyards additional large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships with a capacity of 3 million square feet.
of cargo space (which, plus the current SL-7 fast sealift ships, will provide adequate capability to surge heavy forces from CONUS). Acquire 46 ships for enhancement of the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) through construction or conversion, or build and charter vessels with national defense features (including availability for afloat prepositioning) if that provides equivalent responsiveness at lower cost. Support readiness enhancements for the RRF to maintain 36 RO/ROs in a 4-day reduced operating status; 27 ships in RRF 5-day status; and 41 ships in RRF 10 and 20 day status. Support implementation of the Merchant Mariner Reserve program to provide for availability of manning.

3. Prepositioning.

Navy/Marine Corps: acquire through new construction or conversion in US shipyards additional ships for afloat prepositioning providing at least 2 million square feet of capacity for Army combat equipment (at least a heavy brigade equivalent) and support. Support the current 3 Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons.

4. CONUS Infrastructure (Army). Program CONUS infrastructure improvements per the approved Mobility Requirements Study recommendations, including a West Coast containerized ammunition facility and capabilities to move units "from fort to port."

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E. Readiness

Forward Presence and Crisis Response generally require high levels of readiness for most forces, given short warning times for regional threats; but readiness must be higher for certain missions and forces than for others, as reflected below. Readiness programming will reflect the "first to fight" principle. Specifically, priority for resources to maintain manning, training and equipment readiness will be accorded to units, regardless of component, according to each unit's peacetime deployment roles and the most demanding of its deployment or employment time(s) for regional conflicts.

1. Readiness Levels. Program resources necessary to maintain unit readiness levels as follows, applying the "first to fight" principle:

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Reserve component reinforcing forces that would be deployed/employed with these AC forces (e.g. associated roundout and support units) will maintain comparable readiness levels.

- Other RC combat forces, and their associated support forces, will maintain readiness levels commensurate with their contingency missions.

2. **Personnel Quality.** Structure and resource robust recruitment, retention and quality of life programs at levels expected to maintain roughly current high levels for the major aggregate personnel quality indicators across the force. Provide adequate resources for military institutions of higher education.

3. **Training.** Place increased emphasis on joint and combined exercises that stress interoperability, joint warfighting doctrine, and rapid deployment (including use of prepositioned materiel). Provide programs of realistic instrument-evaluated joint training such as "Red Flag" and the National Training Center. Increase emphasis on use of simulators in training to most efficiently provide a well-trained force. The President's nuclear initiative calls for dramatic cuts in tactical nuclear weapons, but consistent with the initiative, we will retain such weapons for land-based aircraft, and could if required in a crisis reintroduce them onto naval vessels. Accordingly, maintain requisite proficiencies for selected forces necessary to deliver limited theater nuclear strikes. Also maintain requisite proficiencies for forces that could have to operate in a nuclear/biological/chemical environment.

4. **Maintenance.** Do not permit Intermediate and Depot maintenance unfunded requirements (as adjusted for programmed force reductions) to exceed levels in the FY 93-97 defense program. Retain sufficient core maintenance infrastructure to sustain future programmed forces after initial deployment.
F. Sustainability

1. War Reserve Inventories.

For the near term, particularly in light of the need to restore our sustainability posture following Operation Desert Shield/Storm, war reserve material objectives are to (1) repair critical assets that would be needed for a near-term contingency, (2) reposition returned assets to maximize contingency responsiveness at minimal cost, and (3) procure only those assets demonstrably required in addition to existing assets to meet sustainability requirements below.
2. **Industrial Surge**

Program for industrial preparedness measures to permit surge production of munitions, critical troop support items and spares where this is a cost-effective alternative to full war reserve inventories for a portion of the above guidance. Program for support and spares surge and mobilization requirements for each major defense acquisition program achieving Milestone III during the program period.

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**G. Modernization and Investment**

1. **New Approach to Defense Acquisition.**

   a. **Threat/Requirements.** The end of the Soviet threat and the expected pronounced slowdown or even halt in Russian modernization programs profoundly alter US modernization requirements. For our new strategy, investment requirements must reflect the different nature and sophistication of regional threats, and resulting
changes in priority among defense missions and means of executing them, as well as the enduring strategic requirement for technological superiority. Most US weapons on hand are technologically superior to those of potential enemies and have years of useful life left. Therefore, weapons systems no longer must progress from R&D to the field at the pace or in the numbers they previously have. Strategic and fiscal changes will permit funds only for critical procurement absolutely warranted by (1) safety or cost efficiency in view of force aging or attrition, (2) increasing sophistication of a specific threat, or (3) an unusually promising force multiplying opportunity (including development of new operational doctrine). We must be able to equip the future base force, but gaps in expected production needs will warrant some gaps in the industrial base. The urgency of production of advanced systems is much reduced, but vigorous R&D remains a strategic imperative, to ensure superiority both in actual technology in the future base force and in potential technology for further future (including possible reconstituted) forces.

b. R&D Emphases. Aggressively pursue advanced technologies for application in future weapon systems, to preserve our science and technology base and our forces' technological advantage, and to reduce system life cycle costs and lengthen service lives. Increase development and evaluation of prototypes and technology demonstrators, to demonstrate and validate advanced technologies and, where warranted, producibility, operational performance and associated doctrine. Incorporate advanced technology into existing or new systems only when the technology and subsystems are thoroughly proven; technical, production and operational risks are minimized; the production program is cost-effective; and the system is absolutely needed. Greatly reduce concurrency among the acquisition stages. Emphasize government-supported R&D as necessary to support our technology base. More effectively and efficiently evaluate systems and subsystems using such tools as modeling and simulation to augment system field testing.
2. Defense-Wide Investment Programs.

a. Science and Technology:

Fund the science and technology program (6.1, 6.2, and 6.3a, exclusive of SDI funding) at not less than 0% real growth per year, with a goal of 2% real growth per year, from the FY 1993 President's Budget. In devising the S&T program, take into account the potential European and Japanese contributions.

Balance the S&T program between (1) a core of broad sustaining programs, and (2) the following specific thrusts which contribute directly to high priority defense needs:

- Global warning, navigation, surveillance and communications, focused on a theater of operations with sufficient fusion and planning assets.
- All-weather air superiority and defense against very low observable cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.
- Sea control and undersea superiority against potential regional threats posed by advanced, stealthy nuclear and non-nuclear submarines and stealthy cruise missiles, and by undersea mine warfare.
- Rapidly deployable, all-weather, day/night, survivable, mobile and lethal ground combat capability.
- Technology for Training and Readiness, including embedded training, distributed simulation and virtual environment depiction.
- Application of advanced technology for improving design, test and manufacturing processes to improve performance and reduce life cycle cost and schedule throughput time.

b. Manufacturing Technology Program. Program not less than zero percent real growth per year from a baseline predicated upon the FY 1992 funding level. ManTech technical priorities should be based upon thrust areas identified in the National Defense Manufacturing Technology Plan.

c. Test & Evaluation Assets: In the FY 94-99 program:

- Fund test capability investment needs and optimize investment strategy to support R&D emphases, including the high priority defense S&T thrusts, identified above, recognizing the increasing complexity of weapons systems to be tested.
- Reduce operating and maintenance costs for new T&E capabilities significantly when compared to similar existing facilities. Reduce or eliminate duplication or overlap in test capabilities and efforts.
- Enhance susceptibility, vulnerability and lethality assessment programs for combat systems and munitions.

d. Command and Control.
3. Force Modernization Programs

Fully fund all acquisition programs continued or initiated in the POMs, in accordance with the baseline approved by the DAB. In particular, fully reflect any agreements between the Defense Acquisition Executive and a Military Department Secretary that
resulted from the Under Secretary for Acquisition's and the Deputy Secretary's affordability initiative.

a. Strategic Deterrence and Defense

Program resources to maintain the adequacy of strategic deterrent forces consistent with postulated threats and arms control constraints, and to develop the capability to defend against accidental launches and third world ballistic missile threats. Also program for expected implementation costs of arms control agreements and initiatives.

(1) Nuclear Deterrent Forces.

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Withheld from public release under statutory authority of the Department of Defense
b. Conventional Forces.

(1) **Priority Mission Areas.** Selectively focus investment on and within the following high-priority areas, which derive from assessment of programmed regional contingency capabilities (including evaluation of Persian Gulf War experience):

- **Deployable anti-armor:** air-deployable ground force mobility and anti-armor capabilities for enhanced immediate tactical flexibility.

- **Combat Identification Friend or Foe (IFF):** enhanced capability to identify friend, foe, allied and neutral ground combat vehicles, aircraft and ships, particularly in support of air/land battle doctrine, with joint exercises to refine interoperability procedures.
- **Mine Warfare**: improved naval and land mine clearance ability (including rapid minefield location and improved killing mechanisms, including against scatterable mines), with emphasis on support of amphibious operations; also, assault obstacle-breaching capabilities, and offensive land and naval mine capabilities.

- **Chemical/biological**: improved chemical and biological detection and warning systems (ground vehicles and air recon), protection systems (individual and collective) and medical support and decontamination systems; and consideration of CB effects in development of equipment that may be used in a CB environment; also necessary are implementation of expected CW agreements and destruction of chemical munitions.

- **Anti-tactical ballistic missile**: improved timely intelligence and operational capabilities to track, identify, target and strike mobile ballistic missiles/launchers. (See also the related guidance in the strategic sections.)

- **Precision Air Strike**: improved all-service joint air operations planning systems and procedures, including timely selective target assignment; increased ability, particularly munitions stocks, for Navy and Marine Corps aircraft to use precision guided munitions against ground targets, during day or night and in all weather, to an extent comparable to other Services; improved identification, targeting and conventional munitions to strike selected high-value hard/deep underground targets and mobile targets.

- **Tactical C3I**: improved integration of national, theater and tactical intelligence and C3 systems; better and more survivable all-weather day/night reconnaissance and target identification capabilities (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles); improved sensor-to-shooter integration and near-real-time weapon targeting;
forward deployable C3I assets minimizing lift requirements; modernized secure, interoperable and jam-resistant tactical communications (including for SOF); improved C2/management of combat service support operations.

H. Reconstitution Capability

1. General Principles.

Reconstitution should be an "economy of resources" area of the defense program; higher priority should go to base force capabilities and to preserving our enduring strategic requirements of alliances, technology, quality personnel and core competencies. Programs for the base force will also provide considerable latent reconstitution potential. Still, modest but high-leverage reconstitution-specific investments can provide a valuable low-cost hedge, particularly as our Cold War investments become opportunities for selective "smart lay-away" of long-lead elements of forces or production capability.
Active and reserve units would take part in deterring or responding to any threat that might require reconstitution. Such units (particularly the RC) would require "generation" to reach combat readiness; additional new forces beyond these could be reconstituted from the following types of assets:

c. **Manpower Assets.** From the outset of any reconstitution effort, plan to use reassigned active component personnel and Ready Reserve training or volunteers, and place maximum reliance on increased recruiting and retention (including civil service support, and retention of personnel in recallable statuses). Plan
for maximum recall and use of retired military personnel for reconstitution. Plan for necessary use of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Use annual IRR screening and training authority to ensure members' availability. Update projections of IRR size and of requirements for IRR members to fill AC, SelRes, and cadre-type units and, if necessary to support reconstitution guidance below, program for measures to support an enlarged IRR. Maintain plans for use of conscription to meet an extreme and imminent threat.

2. Force Reconstitution Programs. Reconstitution choices must reflect both "smart lay-away" opportunities and long-term reconstitution needs, and must reflect periodic assessments of the possibility of reconstitution threats, now focussed on long-term threats that may not be precisely definable. Regeneration assets offer relatively short response times and availability in the immediate future, yet would also be useful for projected long-response reconstitution requirements at generally low cost. Production restart capability likely could prove a timely and longer-term reconstitution approach given expected warning times, and could offer enhanced capabilities, but likely at greater investment costs. Reconstitution investment must reflect these tradeoffs.

The DoD program includes many elements that, although designed for forces in being, also provide latent reconstitution capacity beyond the necessarily fixed benchmarks below, and must be evaluated and documented as such. The following levels are for reconstitution-specific assets as indicated.

a. Land Forces: Heavy division equivalents using the most cost-effective combination of:
- The 2 reserve component heavy cadre divisions, each with essential equipment and minimal SelRes O&M and manning (including minimal necessary full-time support);

- Equipment exiting active or reserve units and placed in long-term storage; and/or

- Industrial restart, surge and/or new production capability including, if appropriate, lay-away of production facilities and perhaps component stockpiling or other industrial preparedness measures (consider particularly for MIA1).

Include in the POM a study/evaluation of, and as warranted resources for, the ability for reconstituted units to use equipment left by units deploying to POMCUS sets previously identified in the prepositioning section. (These units would contribute to meeting the above guidance.) Include exploration of innovative training measures to prepare reconstituted units in advance of POMCUS units' vacating their equipment sets.

b. Naval Forces: Surface combatant and aircraft carrier capability, using the most cost-effective combination of:

- An Innovative Naval Reserve including up to 32 frigates and up to 8 training frigates with minimal necessary full-time support/training crews and augmentation/nucleus crews and O&M;

- The training carrier, backfilled in the training role by a deactivated but recallable carrier within an acceptable time; and/or

- Other ships in inactive but recallable status.

c. Air Forces: Fighter and/or bomber wing equivalents with supporting airlift/tanker squadrons, using the most cost-effective combination of:
- Airplanes exiting active or reserve units and placed in inviolate storage;

- Industrial restart, surge and/or new production capability including, if appropriate, lay-away of production facilities and perhaps industrial preparedness measures (consider particularly for F-16, F-117); and/or

- Particularly for airlift/tanker squadrons, innovative measures involving, as appropriate, dual-use and/or refittable airframes, and possibly civil reserve status.

d. Support and Training: If necessary for timely training and support for reconstituting units, program for selected training assets and cadre-type support units or stored support equipment; however, wherever possible identify and plan to draw such assets from the civil sector, defense production base, or government holdings or otherwise use resources made available after strategic warning.
III. Programming for the Base Force (U)

A. Introduction (U)


2. (U) Overall Program Priorities. We will profoundly reduce our defense establishment, yet think beyond mere equal across the board cuts to restructure our forces and programs to support our regionally oriented defense strategy for shaping the future environment. Under current plans, force structure reaches minimum acceptable "base force" levels (for strategic deterrence, crisis response forces, and forward presence levels alike) by around FY 1995 for most of the force, so retaining adequate levels of force structure is a strategic imperative. Programming and managing this base force at levels of readiness (training, manning, equipping and maintenance) adequate for deterrence and timely regional crisis response is similarly imperative. Sustainability sufficient for the intensity and duration of regional crisis response operations is also of great importance. We must give high priority to selected research and development to keep our qualitative edge in systems and in doctrine. However, a profound slowing in the former Soviet modernization that long drove our programs enables greatly reduced emphasis on production; hence our new approach to defense acquisition. Finally, we will vigorously pursue reductions and management efficiencies in defense infrastructure and overhead to reduce the Department's cost of doing business.

B. Strategic Nuclear Deterrence and Defense (U)
1. [**Nuclear Deterrent Forces.**] Program for base force levels as follows, pursuant to the President's Nuclear Initiatives of September 1991 and January 1992. This force would provide sufficient capability to support US deterrent strategy, assuming CIS forces are reduced to START levels, the strategic environment continues to improve, and our modernization goals are attained. With partial downloading of the Minuteman ICBMs, this force will conform with the START treaty. (Bombers, including those shown here, will increasingly play roles in conventional crisis response. Bomber figures are total aircraft inventory.)

2. [**Defenses.**] Within a refocussed SDI program, develop for deployment defensive systems able to provide the U.S., our forces overseas, and our friends and allies global protection against limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source.
Ensure that strategic and theater defense systems, as well as offensive and defensive systems, are integrated.

C. Conventional Forces for Forward Presence and Crisis Response (U)

Program for overall base force levels as follows while meeting readiness and sustainability guidance and remaining compliant with arms control agreements.

Program forward presence forces to retain the flexibility to adapt rapidly to changes within regions, and to provide joint support and reinforcement among regions. CJCS commission a study in consultation with USD(P) to review forward presence policy and guidance, to be completed by 1 Nov 92.
1. Army. Within total end strength of 536,000 AC, 567,400 RC:

--- (C) Retain in Europe a corps comprising 2 heavy divisions and an ACR, with combat support capability and a base for reception and onward movement.

--- (C) Retain one heavy division (-) in Korea, including associated support.

2. Navy/Marine Corps. Within total end strength of 501,200 AC, 117,800 RC (Navy) and 158,800 AC, 34,900 RC (Marine Corps):

- (C) Program for 12 carrier battle groups based on a force of 12 aircraft carriers (plus one training carrier) and 13 airwings (11 AC/2 RC). Program for about 150 major surface combatants. Maintain programming for attack submarines pending results of the DepSecDef-directed study of Submarine Forces for the Future. Maintain sufficient ASW, surveillance and combat logistic support forces for forward presence and regional contingencies.

- (C) Program for 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces. Program for amphibious lift for 2.5 MEBs.
3. Air Force. Within total end strength of 430,300 AC, 200,000 RC:

- Program for 26.5 FWEs (15.25 AC/11.25 RC, including recce/SEAD).

4. Special Operations Forces.
D. Mobility and Prepositioning (U)

(U) Implement the Secretary of Defense-approved mobility and prepositioning recommendations of the Mobility Requirements Study as follows.

1. *(S/NF) Airlift (Air Force)*.

2. *(S/NF) Sealift (Navy)*. Acquire through new construction or conversion in U.S. shipyards additional large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships with a capacity of 3 million square feet of cargo space (which, plus the current SL-7 fast sealift ships, will provide the capability to surge 2 heavy divisions from CONUS). Acquire 46 ships for enhancement of the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) through construction or conversion, or build and charter vessels with national defense features (including availability for afloat prepositioning) if that provides equivalent responsiveness at lower cost. Support readiness enhancements for the RRF to maintain 36 RO/ROs in a 4-day reduced operating status; 27 ships in RRF 5-day status; and 41 ships in RRF 10 and 20 day status. Support implementation of the Merchant Mariner Reserve program to provide for availability of manning.

3. Prepositioning.
- (S) NAVY/Marine Corps: acquire through new construction or conversion in US shipyards additional ships for afloat prepositioning providing at least 2 million square feet of capacity for Army combat equipment (at least a heavy brigade equivalent) and support. Support the current 3 Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons.

4. (U) CONUS Infrastructure (Army). Program CONUS infrastructure improvements per the approved Mobility Requirements Study recommendations, including a West Coast containerized ammunition facility and capabilities to move units "from fort to port."

E. Readiness (U)

Forward Presence and Crisis Response generally require high levels of readiness for most forces, given short warning times for regional threats; but readiness must be higher for certain missions and forces than for others, as reflected below. Readiness programming will reflect the "first to fight" principle. Specifically, priority for resources to maintain manning, training and equipment readiness will be accorded to units, regardless of component, according to each unit's peacetime deployment roles and
the most demanding of its deployment or employment time(s) for the regional conflicts depicted in the Illustrative Planning Scenarios at Annex A.

1. Readiness Levels. Program resources necessary to maintain unit readiness levels as follows:

Other RC combat forces, and their associated support forces, will maintain readiness levels commensurate with their contingency missions.

2. Personnel Quality. Structure and resource robust recruitment, retention and quality of life programs at levels
expected to maintain roughly current high levels for the major aggregate personnel quality indicators across the force. Provide adequate resources for military institutions of higher education.

3. **Training.** Place increased emphasis on joint and combined exercises that stress interoperability, joint warfighting doctrine, and rapid deployment (including use of prepositioned materiel). Provide programs of realistic instrument-evaluated joint training such as "Red Flag" and the National Training Center. Increase emphasis on use of simulators in training to most efficiently provide a well-trained force. The President's nuclear initiative calls for dramatic cuts in tactical nuclear weapons, but consistent with the initiative, we will retain such weapons for land-based aircraft, and could if required in a crisis reintroduce them onto naval vessels. Accordingly, maintain requisite proficiencies for selected forces necessary to deliver limited theater nuclear strike. Also, maintain requisite proficiencies for forces that could have to operate in a nuclear/biological/chemical environment.

4. **Maintenance.** Do not permit Intermediate and Depot maintenance unfunded requirements (as adjusted for programmed force reductions) to exceed levels in the FY 93-97 defense program. Retain sufficient core maintenance infrastructure to sustain future programmed forces after initial deployment.

F. **Sustainability** (U)

1. **War Reserve Inventories.**

   For the near term, particularly in light of the need to restore our sustainability posture following Operation Desert Shield/Storm, war reserve material objectives are to (1) repair critical assets that would be needed for a near-term contingency, (2) reposition returned assets to maximize contingency
responsiveness at minimal cost, and (3) procure only those assets demonstrably required in addition to existing assets to meet sustainability requirements below.
2. Industrial Surge

Program for industrial preparedness measures to permit surge production of munitions, critical troop support items and spares where this is a cost-effective alternative to full war reserve inventories for a portion of the above guidance. Program for support and spares surge and mobilization requirements for each major defense acquisition program achieving Milestone III during the program period.

G. Modernization and Investment (U)

1. New Approach to Defense Acquisition.

a. Threat/Requirements. The end of the Soviet threat and the expected pronounced slowdown or even halt in Russian modernization programs profoundly alter US modernization requirements. For our new strategy, investment requirements must reflect the different nature and sophistication of regional threats, and resulting changes in priority among defense missions and means of executing them, as well as the enduring strategic requirement for technological superiority. Most US weapons on hand are technologically
superior to those of potential enemies and have years of useful life left. Therefore, weapons systems no longer must progress from R&D to the field at the pace or in the numbers they previously have. Strategic and fiscal changes will permit funds only for critical procurement absolutely warranted by (1) safety or cost efficiency in view of force aging or attrition, (2) increasing sophistication of a specific threat, or (3) an unusually promising force multiplying opportunity (including development of new operational doctrine). We must be able to equip the future base force, but gaps in expected production needs will warrant some gaps in the industrial base. The urgency of production of advanced systems is much reduced, but vigorous R&D remains a strategic imperative, to ensure superiority both in actual technology in the future base force and in potential technology for further future (including possible reconstituted) forces.

b. (U) R&D Emphases. Aggressively pursue advanced technologies for application in future weapon systems, to preserve our science and technology base and our forces' technological advantage, and to reduce system life cycle costs and lengthen service lives. Increase development and evaluation of prototypes and technology demonstrators, to demonstrate and validate advanced technologies and, where warranted, producibility, operational performance and associated doctrine. Incorporate advanced technology into existing or new systems only when the technology and subsystems are thoroughly proven; technical, production and operational risks are minimized; the production program is cost-effective; and the system is absolutely needed. Greatly reduce concurrency among the acquisition stages. Emphasize government-supported R&D as necessary to support our technology base. More effectively and efficiently evaluate systems and subsystems using such tools as modeling and simulation to augment system field testing.

c. Production & Fielding Emphases. Withheld from public release under statutory authority of the Department of Defense FOIA 5 USC §552(2)(C)
2. Defense-Wide Investment Programs.

a. (U) Science and Technology:

(U) Fund the science and technology program (6.1, 6.2, and 6.3a, exclusive of SDI funding) at not less than 0% real growth per year, with a goal of 2% real growth per year, from the FY 1993 President's Budget. In devising the S&T program, take into account the potential European and Japanese contributions.

Balance the S&T program between (1) a core of broad sustaining programs, and (2) the following specific thrusts which contribute directly to high priority defense needs:

- Global warning, navigation, surveillance and communications, focused on a theater of operations with sufficient fusion and planning assets.

- All-weather air superiority and defense against very low observable cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.

- Sea control and undersea superiority against potential regional threats posed by advanced, stealthy nuclear and non-
nuclear submarines and stealthy cruise missiles, and by undersea mine warfare.
- Rapidly deployable, all-weather, day/night, survivable, mobile and lethal ground combat capability.
- Technology for Training and Readiness, including embedded training, distributed simulation and virtual environment depiction.
- Application of advanced technology for improving design, test and manufacturing processes to improve performance and reduce life cycle cost and schedule throughput time.

b. (U) Manufacturing Technology Program. Program not less than zero percent real growth per year from a baseline predicated upon the FY 1992 funding level. ManTech technical priorities should be based upon thrust areas identified in the National Defense Manufacturing Technology Plan.

c. (U) Test & Evaluation Assets: In the FY 94-99 program:

- Fund test capability investment needs and optimize investment strategy to support R&D emphases, including the high priority defense S&T thrusts, identified above, recognizing the increasing complexity of weapons systems to be tested.
- Reduce operating and maintenance costs for new T&E capabilities significantly when compared to similar existing facilities. Reduce or eliminate duplication or overlap in test capabilities and efforts.
- Enhance susceptibility, vulnerability and lethality assessment programs for combat systems and munitions.

d. (U) Command and Control.

Withheld from public release under statutory authority of the Department of Defense FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(5)
e. (U) **Facilities and Infrastructure.** Installations not required to support the reduced force levels will be closed in accordance with Title XXIX of PL 101-510. Accordingly, plan to resource facility investment only at those "core" installations which have a very high probability of retention, as documented by the 1991 Base Closure and Realignment process. Confine facility investment at non-core installations to that required to address life/safety and environmental conditions. Fund environmental compliance, restoration and pollution prevention sufficient to achieve sustainable compliance with federal and state environmental laws and governing standards overseas; and to minimize negative mission impacts and future costs and to provide federal leadership in environmental protection. To maintain access to space and enable spaced-based support to terrestrial forces, provide necessary space launch capabilities and infrastructure.

3. Force Modernization Programs

(U) Fully fund all acquisition programs continued or initiated in the POMs, in accordance with the baseline approved by the DAB. In particular, fully reflect any agreements between the Defense Acquisition Executive and a Military Department Secretary that resulted from the Under Secretary for Acquisition's and the Deputy Secretary's affordability initiative.

a. **Strategic Deterrence and Defense**
Program resources to maintain the adequacy of strategic deterrent forces consistent with postulated threats and arms control constraints, and to develop the capability to defend against accidental launches and third world ballistic missile threats. Also program for expected implementation costs of arms control agreements and initiatives.

(1) Nuclear Deterrent Forces.

Withheld from public release under statutory authority of the Department of Defense
FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(5)
(3) **Command, Control and Communications (C3):** Continue to evolve the strategic C3 system toward a joint global structure, keeping it at least as survivable as the forces it supports. Develop a follow-on to the current DSP tactical warning/attack assessment system that provides global coverage, increased survivability, and better discrimination, particularly for short-range ballistic missiles.

b. **Conventional Forces.**

(1) **Priority Mission Areas.** Selectively focus investment on and within the following high-priority areas, which derive from assessment of programmed regional contingency capabilities (including evaluation of Persian Gulf War experience):

- **Deployable anti-armor:** air-deployable ground force mobility and anti-armor capabilities for enhanced immediate tactical flexibility (e.g. motorized light armor with long-range anti-tank weaponry).
- **Combat Identification Friend or Foe (IFF):** enhanced capability to identify friend, foe, allied and neutral ground combat vehicles, aircraft and ships, particularly in support of air/land battle doctrine, with joint exercises to refine interoperability procedures.

- **Mine Warfare:** improved naval and land mine clearance ability (including rapid minefield location and improved killing mechanisms, including against scatterable mines), with emphasis on support of amphibious operations, particularly in shallow water and beach areas; also, assault obstacle-breaching capabilities, and advanced force-multiplying offensive land and naval mine capabilities.

- **Chemical/Biological:** improved chemical and biological detection and warning systems (ground vehicles and air recon), protection systems (individual and collective) and medical support and decontamination systems; and consideration of CB effects in development of equipment that may be used in a CB environment; also necessary are implementation of expected CW agreements and destruction of chemical munitions.

- **Anti-tactical ballistic missile:** improved timely intelligence and operational capabilities to track, identify, target and strike mobile ballistic missiles/launchers. (See also the related guidance in the strategic sections.)

- **Precision Air Strike:** improved all-service joint air operations planning systems and procedures, including timely selective target assignment; increased ability, particularly munitions stocks, for Navy and Marine Corps aircraft to use precision guided munitions against ground targets, during day or night and in all weather, to an extent comparable to other Services; improved identification, targeting and conventional munitions to strike selected high-value hard/deep underground targets and mobile targets.
- Tactical C3I: improved integration of national, theater and
tactical intelligence and C3 systems; better and more survivable
all-weather day/night reconnaissance and target identification
capabilities (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles); improved sensor­
to-shooter integration and near-real-time weapon targeting;
forward deployable C3I assets minimizing lift requirements;
modernized secure, interoperable and jam-resistant tactical
communications (including for SOF); improved C2/management of
combat service support operations.

H. Reconstitution Capability (U)

1. General Principles.

Reconstitution should be an "economy of resources" area of
the defense program; higher priority should go to base force
capabilities and to preserving our enduring strategic requirements of alliances, technology, quality personnel and core competencies. Programs for the base force will also provide considerable latent reconstitution potential. Still, modest but high-leverage reconstitution-specific investments can provide a valuable low-cost hedge, particularly as our Cold War investments become opportunities for selective "smart lay-away" of long-lead elements of forces or production capability.

(U) Active and reserve units would take part in deterring or responding to any threat that might require reconstitution. Such units (particularly the RC) would require "generation" to reach combat readiness; additional new forces beyond these could be reconstituted from the following types of assets:

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c. **Manpower Assets.** From the outset of any reconstitution effort, plan to use reassigned active component personnel and Ready Reserve training or volunteers, and place maximum reliance on increased recruiting and retention (including civil service support, and retention of personnel in recallable statuses). Plan for maximum recall and use of retired military personnel for reconstitution. Plan for necessary use of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Use annual IRR screening and training authority to ensure members' availability. Update projections of IRR size and of requirements for IRR members to fill AC, SelRes, and cadre-type units and, if necessary to support reconstitution guidance below, program for measures to support an enlarged IRR. Maintain plans for use of conscription to meet an extreme and imminent threat.

2. **Force Reconstitution Programs.** Reconstitution choices must reflect both "smart lay-away" opportunities and long-term reconstitution needs, and must reflect the relative likelihood of various reconstitution threats, focussed on long-term threats that may not now be precisely definable. "Regeneration" assets offer relatively short response times and availability in the immediate future, yet would also be useful for projected long-response reconstitution requirements at generally low cost. Production restart capability likely could prove a timely and longer-term reconstitution approach given expected warning times, and could offer enhanced capabilities, but likely at greater investment costs. Reconstitution investment must reflect these tradeoffs.
Reconstitution scenario at Appendix A (in addition to generating all AC and RC units). We cannot predict the level at which an actual adversary's reconstitution would stop, so neither can we assume we would stop at some reconstitution target. But the DoD program includes many elements that, although designed for forces in being, also provide latent reconstitution capacity beyond the necessarily fixed benchmarks below, and must be evaluated and documented as such. The following levels are for reconstitution-specific assets as indicated.

a. **Land Forces:**

using the most cost-effective combination of:

- The 2 reserve component heavy cadre divisions, each with mission essential equipment for training and minimal SelRes O&M and manning (including minimal necessary full-time support);

- Equipment exiting active or reserve units and placed in long-term storage; and/or

- Industrial restart, surge and/or new production capability including, if appropriate, lay-away of production facilities and perhaps component stockpiling or other industrial preparedness measures (consider particularly for MIA1).

Include in the POM a study/evaluation of, and as warranted resources for, the ability for reconstituted units to use equipment left by units deploying to POMCUS sets previously identified in the prepositioning section. (These units would contribute to meeting the above guidance.) Include exploration of innovative training measures to prepare reconstituted units in advance of POMCUS units' vacating their equipment sets.

b. **Naval Forces:**

using the most cost-effective combination of:

**SECRET/MOFOR/MCLOSE HOLD -- DRAFT**
- An Innovative Naval Reserve including up to 32 frigates and up to 8 training frigates with minimal necessary full-time support/training crews and augmentation/nucleus crews and O&M;

- The training carrier, backfilled in the training role by a deactivated but recallable carrier within an acceptable time; and/or

- Other ships in inactive but recallable status.

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**c. (N) Air Forces:**

using the most cost-effective combination of:

- Airplanes exiting active or reserve units and placed in inviolate storage;

- Industrial restart, surge and/or new production capability including, if appropriate, lay-away of production facilities and perhaps industrial preparedness measures (consider particularly for F-16, F-117); and/or

- Particularly for airlift/tanker squadrons, innovative measures involving, as appropriate, dual-use and/or refittable airframes, and possibly civil reserve status.

d. (N) Support and Training: If necessary for timely training and support for reconstituting units, program for selected training assets and cadre-type support units or stored support equipment; however, wherever possible identify and plan to draw such assets from the civil sector, defense production base, or government holdings or otherwise use resources made available after strategic warning.