MEMO FOR Mr. Libby

SUBJECT New Policy Directions in DPG

Santo:

Attached is a comprehensive set of excerpts indicating where the DPG draft set new policy directions.

General Vesser reviewed this last night.

Dave

A "T" in right margin indicates similar language was in DWP testimony.

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL.
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP No. 2008-008, document 4
New Policy Directions
Noted in Draft Defense Planning Guidance

Policy and Strategy Section

- Preclude hostile, nondemocratic domination of regions [Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf] critical to our interests, and thereby strengthen the barriers against the reemergence of a global threat (pp.3 and 12; see also pp.19, 31, and 39).

- Lead to a security community that extends to all peace-loving nations, including the new democracies of Eastern Europe and a democratic Russia, Ukraine, and other democracies of the former Soviet Union (p.3; see also pp.7, 32 and 33).

- It is not in our interest or those of the other democracies to return to earlier periods in which multiple military powers balanced one another off in what passed for security structures, while regional, or even global peace hung in the balance (p.8).

- The demise of the Soviet Union and the increasing strength of our allies permit us to define our regional interests selectively and to safeguard those interests in separate regional contexts and at lower resource levels (p.11).

- A future President will need to have options that will allow him to lead or, where prudent and practical, to act to protect our critical interests even in cases where very few others are with us. We must plan sufficient forces and programs within current fiscal constraints to provide such options... (p.12).

- A critical task will be to begin preparing for tomorrow’s [core] competencies, while gaining an appreciation of those we need no longer emphasize (p.17).

- U.S. forces must continue to be at least a generation ahead in those technologies which will be decisive on future battlefields. Future generations must have at least the same qualitative advantages over their opponents as our forces did in the Gulf War (p.18).

- We need to be able to fight future forces through simulation before we buy them... (p.18).

- Our strategic nuclear forces...provide an important deterrent hedge against the possibility of an unforeseen global threat (p.20).
We must...examine more innovative ways of providing strategic deterrent forces...We might also find ways of ensuring that some of our forces can be more effective by going to lower alert levels for some portions of the force... (p.21).

Further, we should find methods of being more effective by going to lower alert levels for some portions of the force...

[We must explore] new ways of operating [forward presence] forces in peacetime.

We might also consider increased use of Reserve Component units overseas, additional homeporting...

Our forces must remain able to respond rapidly to a second major regional crisis or to expand an initial crisis deployment in the event of escalation... (p.27). (First time specific guidance on second major regional contingency to be given in unclassified context.)

Mobility must be capable of accomplishing a major force deployment within current planning parameters... (p.28).

Reconstitution now focuses on a 7-8 year warning time, and drops the exclusive focus on, but still notes the valuable "hedging" opportunities now available (p.30).

Our challenge is to maintain our collective capacity to defend against an aggressive regime in such a way that we do not disrupt future cooperation with a democratic state or weaken the chances of successful reform...

Our policy should encourage the broadening of European institutions to include the democracies of Eastern Europe... (p.35).
We should encourage the [censored] states to play a positive role in stability and democratic consolidation.

While continuing the opening [censored] should also have the means to defend itself. In this sense, the U.S. should enforce the [censored] and provide [censored] with modernized armaments to be used in its defense (p.37).

Programming Section

- Strategic forces guidance requires and addendum to the Service POMs detailing the changes that would be required if [censored] accepts PNI II proposals (p.2).

- Forward presence guidance adjusts the levels approved last summer to retain more robust CentCom presence, and requires a [censored] of naval presence requirements (pp.4-5; and p.3).

- Prepositioning guidance requires Army to retain another [censored] brigades of equipment for possible future prepositioning, as recommended by [censored].

- Sustainability guidance requires, for each of the two most demanding Major Regional Contingency scenarios, 1) "threat-oriented" munitions to kill [censored] and 2) "level of effort" sustainment for [censored] of operations (p.10).

- Reconstitution guidance sets force levels of reconstitution capability for the Services to provide at low cost through equipment stockpiles or production capability (pp.22-23).

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