SUBJECT: Department of the Army Comments on the 16 April 1992 Draft FY 94-95 Defense Planning Guidance

1. (U) The Army has conducted an assessment of the 16 April 92 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and recommends the following general and specific changes to improve the accuracy and clarity of the document. Army cannot concur until the specified critical comments in paragraph 3 below are addressed.

2. (U) GENERAL COMMENTS.
   a. (U) Inconsistencies with the National Military Strategy (NMS) and Mobility Requirements Study (MRS). The DPG uses language and sets guidance that differs from that found in the NMS and MRS. Recommend using the lexicon for strategic concepts set in the NMS and the ship procurement guidance established in the MRS.
   b. (U) Fully Funding Acquisition Programs. Full funding for acquisition programs should not apply to programs in the demonstration/validation phase. To explore and develop innovative technologies, we must have the latitude to complete the demonstration/validation phase before committing to production. Recommend restricting full funding requirements accordingly.
   c. (U) 0% Real Growth. Requirements to maintain 0% real growth are too specific for the DPG. Dollar resource guidance is normally set in the Program Decision Memorandum. Depending on the baseline used and the duration of the goal, the resulting requirement may be unaffordable. Recommend deleting requirements for 0% real growth for Engineering and Manufacturing Development.

3. SPECIFIC COMMENTS.
   AR-1 (U) CRITICAL Page 30, para 7. Army. Change as follows:

   "Commit to Retain in Europe a corps comprising 2 heavy divisions and an ACR, with CS capability and a base for reception and onward movement."

Rationale. Presents a more realistic and flexible way of programming to meet NATO commitments.
AR-2 (U) CRITICAL Page 31. Para 6. Correct as follows:

"Maintain 3 division headquarters, 6 heavy brigade sets, and one ACR set of combat and support equipment and an M-day shortfall package. Maintain equipment availability to support a possible future decision to preposition heavy division and additional heavy brigade sets of combat and support equipment in SWA."

Rationale. Meets CJCS and USD (P) guidance at Enclosure 1. While we see the advantages of prepositioning in SWA, we prefer ashore over afloat prepositioning for a number of reasons. Ashore prepositioning is more cost effective and is more accessible for training, exercising and maintaining. More importantly, it allows us to use fast ships to project the fighting force from CONUS to any theater. See 25 FEB 92 SECARMY response to 22 JAN 92 USD (P) Memo also at Enclosure 1.

AR-3 (U) CRITICAL Page 32, Para 3. Change as follows:

"For sealift, acquire through new construction or conversion in US shipyards additional large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships...will provide the capability to surge 2 heavy divisions from CONUS. Enhance the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) to 142 ships, through construction or conversion, or build-and-charter vessels with national defense features (including availability for afloat prepositioning) if that provides equivalent responsiveness at lower cost. Support...manning.

(U) Ships procured to meet the prepositioning and surge requirements must be capable of at least 24 knot sustained speed."

Rationale. Consistent with Mobility Requirements Study (pages IV-32 and IV-33) at Enclosure 2.

AR-4 CRITICAL. Page 27, Para 4. Add to the end of the paragraph as follows:

"The strategy also gives high priority to selected R&D to keep our qualitative edge...and distinguished R&D and procurement as separate programming priorities. For an entirely new "experimental" type of system, not currently in the base force, the OSD acquisition full funding policy will not apply until after completion of the Demonstration/Validation phase. This strategy signifies a commitment to thoroughly understand the technology, and the implications of integrating it into the..."
force, before committing to Engineering and Manufacturing Development and a meaningful level of production.

Rationale. Change consistent with discussion of R&D found earlier on pages 38 and 40, requiring the pursuit of future technological advantages with less program risk and committing to procurement only when necessary.

AR-5 (U) CRITICAL Page 40, Para 4. First Sentence. Change to read:

"Fully fund all acquisition programs continued or initiated in the POMs, in accordance with the Milestone II, Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD), baseline approved by the DAB."

Rationale. This clarification is critical and is consistent with AR-4. Services should not be required to meet full funding requirements at Milestone I, Demonstration/Evaluation Phase before the technology has been evaluated. If the technology proves itself and is selected for further development and transition to production (Milestone II, EMD), full funding rules would then apply.


"Manufacturing Technology. Fund the Manufacturing Technology program at not less than zero percent real growth per year, as projected from the FY 1992 funding level. ManTech technical priorities will be based upon thrust areas identified in the National Defense Manufacturing Technology Plan."

Rationale. The Army cannot concur with the guidance provided in the paragraph entitled Manufacturing Technology. The Army has already accepted the 0% real growth requirements for the science and technology base. Further 0% real growth requirements for manufacturing technology programs place additional restrictions on the already diminished Research, Development and Acquisition (RDA) funds. Some manufacturing technology programs are already part of the science and technology base that has been protected at 0% growth level, although these programs should compete for the overall science and technology base funding. BOTTOM LINE: 0% real growth in manufacturing technology makes the program unaffordable because the Army currently has no billpayers to fund it. If required to resource 0% growth, the Army will be forced to divert funds from the already underfunded RDA program.
"Installations not required to support the reduced-force levels or to support reconstitution will be closed in accordance with Title XXIX of PL 101-510. Accordingly, plan to resource facility investment at those remaining installations which have a high probability of retention and at those core installations which have a very high probability of retention, as documented in the 1991 Base Closure and Realignment process. Confine facility investment at non-core installations to that required to address life/safety and environmental conditions."

Fund environmental stewardship to attain and sustain full compliance with federal and state environmental laws and governing standards overseas and to minimize negative mission impacts and future costs to provide federal leadership in environmental protection, compliance, provide federal leadership in environmental protection."

Rationale. The term "core installations" connotes preselection which is a violation of Public Law and factoring reconstitution into BRAC is appropriate given it is one of the four foundations of the NMS. Comments on environmental stewardship vice compliance with federal and state regulation is better guidance for DoD's environmental policies.

"Program for 12 active, 6 reserve, and 2 cadre divisions... and sufficient support forces... for two concurrent major regional contingencies that develop sequentially."

Rationale. ... is the preferred means of meeting valid, but otherwise unsatisfied support requirements.

"For support and training assets for these forces, plan to draw to the maximum extent possible from the civil sector, the defense production base, Wartime Host Nation Support, contingency contracting..."

Rationale. WHNS and contingency contracting are primary resources to support the force and should be included.
The short notice that may characterize many regional crises requires highly responsive military forces. Active Component forces have a critical role to play in supplying combat and support forces for the initial response to contingencies that arise on short notice. Reserve Component forces will, among other roles, contribute mobility assets in short notice crises, support and sustain active combat forces and provide combat forces in especially large or protracted contingencies. In addition, mobilizing Reserve Component combat forces can provide the force expansion needed to enhance the U.S. capability to respond to another contingency.

Rationale. Clarity. The second to last sentence in this paragraph is clear and true. The last sentence is potentially confusing and does not add to the discussion of the Total Force response to crisis.

Deployable Anti-Armor: air-deployable ground force mobility and anti-armor capabilities for enhanced immediate tactical flexibility. (e.g., motorized light armor with long-range anti-tank weaponry)

Rationale. Accuracy. Example provides unnecessary detail that may be viewed as advocacy for a specific weapons system to satisfy the deployable anti-armor requirement.
LIST OF ACTIONS REQUESTED DURING PW DPG REVIEW

IMMEDIATE

Sensitive/Close Hold memo to SecDef on layaway (being revised)

PW talk to Powell about POM (done); IPS preface and

List of issues for the Secretary including SWA prep; summary of sustainability guidance indicating the significance of the change from the past

SL/PW raise with SecDef issues

Memo from General Council stating milcon language is legal

Atwood issues: Milstar (but delete); sustainability; review Atwood decision on deleting SOF force structure

SL to talk to all Service Secretaries to review disposition of their major comments; including assuring they know T&E floor is being restored to the document as Acquisition requested; Rice about placement of B-2

SL to talk to Duncan about

SL to talk to Fraser to assure he is happy with the deal negotiated with Christie on pillars and S&T language overall; and to assure they really want T&E floor language restored

Paragraph summaries of scenarios for possible consideration as an alternative to the "short scenarios"

MEDIUM TERM

S&R look at Perth for homeporting

R&P respond to SL's questions about the difference between the ships in the RRF with

S&R to do a scrub of

Starting Tuesday morning, prepare unclassified document
KEY ISSUES FOR THE ARMY

- We have changed language on a heavy corps as you requested (page 38)

- We have not changed the text as you requested to require full funding only in Milestone II and thereafter (page 27 and 40)

The requirement for full funding from the outset of the Demonstration/Validation phase (Milestone I) was stated by the Deputy Secretary last July and recently affirmed by the USDA.

We have retained language requiring (page 31)

I am flagging this issue for the Secretary -- but it is something, as you know, that USDP feels strongly about.

We have revised the language to demonstrate your preference for land as opposed to afloat prepositioning, should suitable sites be available.

- We have restored the floor on T&E funding that was in the Feb 18 draft as requested by Acquisition.

The guidance directs the Services to fund T&E facilities investment at no less than zero percent real growth with a goal of two percent real growth. (page 50)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: M. P. W. Stone, Secretary of the Army

THROUGH: PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: FY 94-99 Defense Planning Guidance--Army Comments

PURPOSE: INFORMATION--To forward the Army's nonconcurrence with the draft FY94-99 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) dated 16 APR 1992.

DISCUSSION: The Army's nonconcurrence is based on inconsistencies between the DPG and the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, as well as the Mobility Requirements Study, and significant planning and programming considerations. The attached comments summarize primary Army concerns. These comments were also identified during the review of the initial draft DPG staffed with in the Services in February 1992.

Specific areas of concern include: the requirement to "retain" vice "commit" a heavy corps in Europe; zero percent real growth requirements in Research, Development and Acquisition beyond those already in place; fails to address adequately resource facility investment and environmental stewardship.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Secretary of Defense consider the attached comments in completing the final FY94-99 DPG.

SECDEF DECISION

Approved

Disapproved

Other:

SECRET-NOFORN

"Regarded Unclassified When Separated from Enclosure"