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OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

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26 MAR 1992

POLICY

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LIBBY

SUBJECT: Extracts from 18 Feb 92 DPG Draft

Attached are two sets of extracts from the 18 February 1992 DPG draft that are not reflected in the current working draft or which have changed substantively as the draft has evolved.

Tab A identifies those issues I believe merit reconsideration for inclusion in the final draft. After each extract, I suggest why it may provide additional clarity or introduce a sufficiently worthwhile concept so as to warrant reconsideration.

Tab B lists those extracts that I believe were properly deleted or reworked sufficiently to provide a more accurate statement of intended policy. I suggest you quickly review these extracts, but would add that little more need be done with them.

The items I propose for reconsideration are summarized below:

- the criterion for defining critical regions.
- forward basing, its importance and changing nature.
- linkages between crisis response strategy, required forces and programming.
- intelligence requirements to identify possible reconstitution threat.
- reference to low-intensity conflict.
- regionally focused arms control.
- preservation of NATO's integrated command structure.

Consideration of these items, along with our other comments to the current working draft would, in my view, provide for a more comprehensive document. I am available to discuss these matters or provide specific editorial recommendations if you like.

UR
Dale A. Vesser

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL.
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP No. 2008-003, document 9

07-11-1928-41
31 MAR 1992 Doc#13

A

Extracts from 18 February 1992
Draft Defense Planning Guidance
Meriting Further Consideration

• p.2, "...prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources [and population] could, under consolidated control, generate global power." I think it is important to define what we mean by critical region, lest we provide others the opportunity to define the term for us. Of the several definitions I have seen, this is as thorough and concise as any.

• p.11, "Forward basing, of necessity, must become more flexible to accommodate changing regional configurations and to allow for a more dynamic character in our alliance relationships [and crisis response capabilities]. This is true for our withdrawal from the Philippines, but it will be true elsewhere as well, including Panama. Basing and access arrangements will evolve as our regional commitments evolve, but must remain oriented on providing visible, though unobtrusive, presence and a forward staging area for responding to [and supporting] crises, large and small." The 25 March draft leans more in the direction of covering forward bases, but I think the subject merits separate coverage along these lines. As much as anything, it is our forward basing structure that allows us to maintain global interests at acceptable cost. Maintaining an adequate forward base structure is critical to executing our strategy.

• p.31, "The most demanding aspect of the new strategy is the need to maintain the capability to respond decisively to a major regional contingency. This serves as the foundation for structuring and evaluating the bulk of the defense program, but it places particular emphasis on several areas: high readiness to enable rapid response to short warning regional contingencies; sufficient munitions and spares to sustain a major regional conflict; enhanced mobility to enable us to deploy sizable forces a long distance on short notice; and a number of specific force enhancements growing out of lessons learned from Desert Storm." The crisis response section would benefit from a concluding summary paragraph along these lines that draws specific links between strategy, force, and resource requirements. Our case is significantly strengthened by these types of linkages.

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• p.7, "Arms control, once the centerpiece of US-Soviet Cold War relations, will take on new forms in this post-Cold War era. There are likely to be more regionally focused initiatives to grapple with the enforcement of obligations under such agreements as the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Innovation in approach and stricter enforcement of requirements will be the hallmark features of the international dialogue in this area, growing out of a perception that the international community has a major stake in controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced delivery systems." The reference to arms control was recently deleted from the introduction to the regional section. I would urge that it be reincorporated.

• p.18, "While the United States supports the goal of European integration, we must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO, particularly the Alliance's integrated command structure." A reference to maintaining NATO's integrated command structure is necessary even in a brief discussion of our policy objectives in Europe.

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25 March 1992

Extracts from 18 February 1992
Draft Defense Planning Guidance
Not Reflected in Current Working Draft

Defense Strategy Objectives

- p.2, There are three additional aspects to this [first objective] objective: First, the US must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that can convince potential competitors not to pursue a more aggressive posture to secure their legitimate interests. Second, in non-defense areas, we must sufficiently respect the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain mechanisms, in concert with our allies, to deter potential aggressors from aspiring to a larger regional or global role.
- p.2, The second objective is to address sources of regional conflict and instability in ways that promote increasing respect for international law, limit international violence, and encourage the spread of democratic government and open economic systems.

Warning

- pp.5-6, Ambiguities over warning in the new strategic environment pose a difficult, dual-faceted problem. At one extreme, many regional and local conflicts with potential to challenge US interests will develop with little or no notice, or the circumstances preceding conflict will be sufficiently ambiguous as to limit preparations or effectively prevent initiation of deterrent measures which might forestall aggression. At the other extreme, a resurgent global threat or general remilitarization of the international environment would take several years to materialize and likely would be accompanied, at first, by very subtle indicators. The challenge of warning, therefore, is to be poised to detect regional and local threats that could develop on very short notice while at the same time remaining alert to the potential for a resurgent global threat or general remilitarization --and to define mechanisms that would alert timely responses for either case.

Strategic Deterrence and Defense

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Deterrence also rests on

maintaining a range of options that provide, should deterrence fail, the hope of terminating conflict at the lowest level of violence.

Forward Presence

- p.12, ...pressures to reduce our forces and access to bases [in the East Asia/Pacific region] will constrain our presence options.
- pp.12-13, In other regions, as the need for our military presence continues or as we see that some new or additional form of presence might further stability, we will increasingly rely on periodic visits of air, ground, and naval forces, training missions, access agreements, prepositioned equipment, exercises, combined planning, and security and humanitarian assistance. These more subtle but no less important forward presence operations most tangibly reflect the evolving commitment of US military forces that we can expect in a dynamic global environment. This implies a more fluid role for our presence forces rather than an appreciable increase to the overall level of activity. Indeed, absent a global challenge, we might broadly anticipate a general decline in the overall level of activity recognizing a more selective use of military forces in overseas missions.

Crisis Response

- p.13, Certainty that in a crisis US forward deployed forces will be reinforced quickly and carry the ultimate threat of theater and strategic nuclear weapons is an inescapable element of any would-be aggressor's strategic calculus.
- p.14, Highly ready and rapidly deployable power projection forces, including effective forcible entry capabilities, remain key elements of protecting our interests from unexpected or sudden challenges. We must be ready to deploy a broad array of capabilities, including heavy and light ground forces, tactical aviation forces, naval and amphibious forces, and special operations forces.
- p.14, ...our forces must remain able to respond rapidly to a second major regional crisis or to expand an initial crisis deployment in the event of escalation, also on short notice. This too has major implications for the mix and readiness of our forces, as well as potential apportionment of forces by theater. Preparing for operations in differing combat theaters places special training demands on the operating forces and necessitates maintaining a wide array of combat and support capabilities. In the event of concurrent contingencies, major or minor, force allocations and priorities will be determined by the National Command Authority....
- p.15, If quick victory is not possible or the protracted nature of a conflict threatens to exhaust our forces our our national

will, an opponent must remain convinced that US strategic assets may be employed leaving no possibility of victory at acceptable risk.

- p.15, ...crisis response capabilities depend on our ability to secure the global posture necessary for timely regional action. This demands that all forward presence forces be structured in a way to support major regional crises, even outside their traditional theaters of operation.

- p.5, The actual use of weapons of mass destruction, even in conflicts that otherwise do not directly engage U.S. interests, could spur further proliferation which in turn would threaten world order. Thus, the US may be faced with the question of whether to take military steps to prevent the development or use of weapons of mass destruction. Possible steps could include threatening punishment for use of such weapons through a variety of means, preempting an impending nuclear/biological/chemical attack through conventional means, or punishing the attackers if deterrence failed. Preemption or punishment could involve the destruction of nuclear, biological or chemical warfare facilities. The requirements for preemption would be very demanding including adequate intelligence, targeting data, and appropriate weapons and delivery systems.

Reconstitution

- p.15, Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor.

- p.25, In the very near term, the former Soviets' large treaty-limited equipment stocks, military industrial base and recently demobilized forces could provide some residual capability for rebuilding their forces if they so decided.

- p.26, Region-wide domination of Europe, East Asia, the former Soviet Union, or Southwest Asia would give such an aggressor a strategic base from which to pursue global expansionist aims. The military capability to pursue such aims would require a combination of modern defense industrial and technological capacity, and a sizeable population base.

- p.26, ...planned reconstitution forces should not "mirror image," in size or type, those of an aggressor. For example, the aggressor would face the more demanding requirements for an offensive strategy, while our strategic requirements would be to maintain adequate force ratios for a defensive strategy.

- p.27, ...consistent with NATO alliance policy, we will retain nuclear capabilities as an option of truly last resort, which is perhaps particularly relevant for deterrence or defense against a reconstitution-type threat.

- p.27, Force reconstitution includes activities analogous to the three "phases" of graduated mobilization response activity (peacetime planning and preparations, measured responses to a crisis, and large scale force expansion). However, reconstitution strategy subsumes and expands upon such established concepts and capabilities as full and total mobilization and graduated mobilization response. The potential of reconstituting new types of forces is one such difference. We should investigate innovative reconstitution measures that may become increasingly useful in the future, such as new types of more producible but militarily useful equipment (and accompanying doctrines), and abilities to rapidly move next-generation systems into production.

Regional Goals and Challenges--Introduction

- p.3, The demise of the Soviet Union has resulted in increasingly desperate conditions for the remaining true-believer Marxist regimes, which no longer enjoy the lavish Soviet economic assistance to which they were accustomed and, more importantly, are no longer able to count on Soviet support in a crisis.

- p.3, Both Cuba and North Korea seem to be entering periods of intense crisis --primarily economic, but also political-- which may lead their governments to take actions that would otherwise seem irrational. The same potential exists in China.

- p.4, An additional source of instability may derive from the break-up of multinational states that have lost their ideological or other *raison d'etre*.

- p.4, ...new conflicts may arise from population and environmental pressures.

Europe

- p.3, ...for the foreseeable future the continued fragmentation of the former Soviet state and its conventional armed forces have altered so fundamentally the character of the residual threat as to eliminate the capacity of the Commonwealth or its member states to wage global conventional war. An attack against Western Europe appears beyond the Commonwealth's capabilities without a time consuming reversal and several years of reconstitution. Even to threaten East/Central Europe with a limited objective attack would provide at least several months of warning.

- p.17, Increasingly Russia is acquiring the attributes of the center, including the former USSR's Security Council seat in the United Nations and responsibility for Soviet forces still stationed outside the territory of the former Soviet Union. Yet, to date, the CIS has shown itself to be remarkably adaptable.

- p.17, ... democratic change in Russia is not irreversible, and that despite its current travails, Russia will remain the

strongest military power in Eurasia and the only power in the world with the capability of destroying the United States.

- pp.17-18, We should encourage Moscow to undertake significant unilateral conventional force reductions beyond those already negotiated in CFE. We should ensure that future negotiations or unilateral Western reductions do not create disparities unfavorable to the West. In any future negotiations with Moscow, we should ensure that an adequate NATO theater nuclear capability in Europe is not jeopardized. We should ensure that any agreement on further conventional force reductions does not preclude US reinforcement of Europe or the US ability to respond to regional crises using assets in Europe.

With regard to the residual Soviet/Russian presence and possible ambitions outside of the territory of the former Soviet Union, our goals are ensuring the completion of Soviet/Russian troop withdrawals from Germany and Poland, integrating the independent Baltic states and those former Soviet republics that become peaceful democracies with markets and respect for individual rights into overall European economic and security institutions, and preventing Russia, should it seek to do so, from reestablishing a hegemonic position in Eastern Europe.

Outside Europe, the former Soviet threat in Southwest and Southeast Asia has been significantly reduced by the Soviet/Russian withdrawals from these areas and the impending end of military and economic assistance to former clients. The announced withdrawal of Soviet military elements from Cuba is another important step in Moscow's retreat from its former overseas empire. We should continue to press Moscow to disengage completely from the remaining Communist regimes.

- p.18, ...our support for European integration should be conditioned on the premise that, as democratic consolidation continues in Europe, Western European institutions should be broadened to include all democratic European nations. We should resist moves to merely deepen integration among the current members of European institutions in ways that exclude the admittance of appropriate new participants.

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- p.19, The new threat environment in Europe will require a more flexible US force posture, with greater reliance on air and naval forces and force projection capabilities, particularly strategic lift.

• p.20, East/Central European membership in the EC at the earliest opportunity, and expanded NATO liaison are key to this process.

• p.20, The US could also consider extending to the East/Central European states security commitments analogous to those we have extended to Gulf states. These commitments could be extended after consultations with our NATO allies and preferably in cooperation with other NATO states. Such commitments would bring the East/Central European states into the Western security network and help to stabilize the region. The provision of a defense guarantee to East/Central European states would have important implications for the US force structure in Europe.

• p.20, Should there be a reemergence of a threat from the Soviet Union's successor state, we should plan to defend against such a threat in Eastern Europe, should there be an Alliance decision to do so.

East Asia/Pacific

• p.21, Our foremost security requirement is to be able to defend effectively Hawaii, Alaska, US territories and the Freely Associated States (Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands).

• p.21, [Maintaining preeminent military status in the region] will enable the US to continue to contribute to regional security and stability by acting as a balancing force and prevent emergence of a vacuum or a regional hegemon.

• p.21, We must pay particular attention to the former [redacted]

• p.22, We need better intelligence yielding improved strategic warning to permit us to benefit from greater economy of force.

Middle East/Southwest Asia

• p.22, In the Middle East and Southwest Asia (SWA), our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve US and Western access to the region's oil.

• p.22, ...it remains fundamentally important to prevent a hegemon or alignment of powers from dominating the region. This pertains especially to the Arabian peninsula.

• p.23, We must focus these [security assistance] programs to enable them to modernize their forces, upgrade their defense doctrines and planning, [redacted]

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• p.23, A substantially increased US military presence, especially naval and amphibious forces, more combined exercises to improve interoperability and command and control, increased US arms sales, and security assistance coordinated through a forward USCENTCOM command element will help deter potential threats to our friends.

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Latin America

• p.24, ...our programs must provide capabilities to meet a variety of potential Cuban contingencies which could include an attempted repetition of the Mariel boatlift, a military provocation, although with limited capabilities, against the US or an American ally, or political instability and internal conflict in Cuba.

• p.24, ...we need to help stabilize and bolster the counter-insurgency capabilities of the government of [redacted] which is facing a serious and growing drug-linked insurgency.

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