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E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2008-018, document no. 1
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: October 24, 2013

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UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

The Joint SOBE Processing Center

1961—1971

NATIONAL CRYPTOLOGIC SCHOOL PRESS

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TOP SECRET
UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

Special Series

THE JOINT SOBE PROCESSING CENTER

1961 — 1971

A Brief Overview of a Successful Experiment
Foreword

have done a great service to the Agency in putting together this informal history of the Joint Sobe Processing Center. They and all those who contributed to this work should receive a special expression of thanks from all cryptologic professionals—both those who served with JSPC and those who are here given the opportunity to learn in some detail about this unique experiment.

This work is being published as the first volume of the United States Cryptologic History, Special Series, which will include, in addition to informal histories, special histories that fall outside the province of the formal chronological histories—such as the history of the Technical Research Ships.

Vincent J. Wilson, Jr.
Chief, Cryptologic History Program
Preface

The ten year life span of the JSPC was preceded by seven years of discussion, coordination and compromise on the concept of a theater Sigint processing center in the Pacific under the operational control of the Director, NSA. Thus the idea was born not long after the establishment of NSA from the loose confederation of the Armed Forces Security Agency.

The target represented by the communications lent itself to a theater processing center concept because it was a one-theater problem. The Soviet problem, stretching from Europe to Eastern Asia and from the Baltic to the Black Sea, could not be attacked in this manner. The inconsistency between the two approaches would survive to haunt the proponents of the JSPC in later years, particularly when the theater processing assets of the individual Service Cryptologic Agencies on Soviet targets would be dissolved and concentrated at Ft. Meade. The selling of the JSPC concept involved obtaining agreement that the whole, represented by a joint services coordinated theater processing effort would be greater yet more economical than the sum of the then existing parts, represented by the separate SCA theater processing assets.

Headquarters USASA Pacific was located in Japan at the time that the JSPC concept was approved and implemented, but it was USM-3, Torii Station, Okinawa, which had assumed the status of a "super" ASA station communications target. The Naval Security Group elements were then, as they are now, without a theater processing center as such. Each NSG station engaged in collection had sufficient resources to conduct all processing and reporting up to the point where NSA took over. The Air Force Security Service theater processing assets were represented by the 6922nd Radio Group Mobile, which had moved from Japan to Okinawa and brought with them responsibility.

By the fall of 1961 Colonel Kenneth E. Rice, USA, the first Chief of JSPC, his deputy, Mr. Frank C. Smith, and Mr. George F. Wooten, Jr., the chief reporter—both from NSA, and Major Russel B. Jones, Jr., USA, their administrative assistant, were in place at Torii Station. With them were Miss Helen Nicewarner, a secretary transferred from the NSA Representative Japan office, and a small cadre of enlisted personnel. The Chief of the NSAPAC Representative, Okinawa office, Mr. Richmond D. Snow, was for a time—and until the transfer of his duties to the Chief of JSPC—collocated with this advance party to assist them during that difficult, initial period. From these modest beginnings the JSPC developed the missions and organization of its production divisions and staff elements. The human resources from SCA theater sites and from elements of NSA were gradually moved to Torii Station. The decade of progress and production had begun.

By the summer of 1962, most of the resources scheduled for assignment to the JSPC were in place. With over three hundred personnel on board, the Center was...
By 1965, the continued need for the JSPC began to come under question within NSA. A plan was being developed for modernization of intercept and processing techniques. The plan has been called alternatively the Far East Modernization Plan and the PACEMAKER Plan. The idea was that a semi-automatic intercept recording device (usually called the AG-22 and consisting of an electric typewriter with extra keys for flagging specific communications elements such as call signs, frequencies, chatter, messages, etc., and a paper tape punching capability), in combination with high-speed data links to move the mass of collected traffic to the waiting computers either at JSPC or Ft. Meade, would allow more traffic to be processed at greater speed and thereby improve the machinery of processing and reporting.

The fruition of the PACEMAKER plan was very slow in coming. Initially, the scheme was that small computers would be installed at the intercept sites. These devices were to be used to generate TECSUM-like reports from the input of AG-22 tapes, and the TECSUMs were to be forwarded electrically to JSPC for processing and reporting. This scheme gave way to an alternative of moving all of the AG-22 flagged data stream via data links to the two IBM-360 computers at JSPC, freeing the station from the requirements of data reduction. Eventually, with the expected progress of the STRAWHAT communications plan, whereby the capability would exist to move the entire AG-22 flagged data stream to the waiting computers at Ft. Meade, the JSPC was cut out of the pattern and the end was in sight.

Tracing the birth, growth and final demise of the JSPC is both fascinating and rewarding—fascinating because JSPC worked, rewarding because by the time of its demise it could claim credit for the production of over eleven thousand Sigint reports annually. History and the austerity era under which all elements of the Department of Defense must operate in these times have claimed the experiment. If the decision was wrong we will not be long in finding out, but it is not likely to prove wrong. The same dedication and zeal shown in the creation of the JSPC is evidenced in the orderly way it was disestablished. Consumers and the SCA elements at the end of the line in the Pacific have been told that the assumption by NSA of the responsibilities previously held by the JSPC would be accomplished with no loss in timeliness or quality of Sigint support. Thus far, this commitment has been upheld, and there is no reason why it should fail.
Acknowledgements

This document is acknowledged as the first attempt to assemble and convey pertinent information on the 17 or so years that the cryptologic community planned for and dealt with the concept of a Sigint processing center on Okinawa. The last ten years saw that concept come to life in the operations of the Joint Sobe Processing Center at Torii Station, Okinawa.

Over those ten years, the JSPC meant many things to many people: it encountered impassioned convictions from profound respect to hatred, from sublime appreciation to ridiculous misconception, and from pride in obvious accomplishments to fear of an equally obvious potential for even greater success.

Although thousands of projects marked the JSPC era, as did tens of thousands of orders and dictums, unfortunately not once was any comprehensive record initiated specifically for the benefit of posterity. Under these circumstances, one option would be to allow the record of those ten years to remain in the memories of all concerned and pass without official comment. This is, of course, an unacceptable option. With a final spurt of judgment, it was decided that to let all that the JSPC was and could have been pass unnoticed would be a disservice to the community of which the Center was such an important part and an injustice to all those who devoted so much energy to its success as well as to its demise.

With these convictions, during the last year of JSPC operations, operating and staff elements attempted to reconstruct the past as best they could. This document was compiled during the last three months of the Center. This account of a unique organization is informal and to some degree biased, for it was prepared at the JSPC by JSPC personnel, from scanty records and liberal memories.

We wish to thank all contributors to this document—particularly those managers, reporters and analysts who uncovered some rare old records and personal papers that survived earlier clean-up campaigns.

Withheld from public release
Pub. L. 86-36
Editors.
Contents

I. The Planning Years .......................................................... 1

II. The Early Years ....................................................................... 5
   Getting Organized ................................................................. 5
   Command and Operational Relationships .................................. 6
   Crisis on Crisis ...................................................................... 10

III. The Apex ................................................................................. 13
   The Air War ............................................................................. 13
   Support to ACRP ..................................................................... 14
   For the U.S. 7th Fleet .............................................................. 14
   Comint Weather ...................................................................... 15
   CHICOMs Across the Border .................................................... 15
   Operational Review Group ....................................................... 16

IV. The Last Years ......................................................................... 21
   ESDS to PARPRO ..................................................................... 21
   Reversion Planning ................................................................. 24
   Drawdown ............................................................................... 25

V. To Be Remembered ................................................................... 31
   Housing .................................................................................. 31
   External Support ...................................................................... 32
   Joint Action Board .................................................................. 33
   Second Echelon EDPM ............................................................ 34
   More Mission, Less Space ......................................................... 35
   Table of Distribution ............................................................... 38
   Terms of Reference .................................................................. 39
   Budget ..................................................................................... 39
   What? No Motto? .................................................................... 40
I. The Planning Years

In the fall of 1955 the Vice Director of NSA directed a committee of the Director's staff and PROD personnel to study the alternatives to exploitation of the [missing text] problem in the field. By February 1956 the committee recommended to DIRNSA that a center should be established with full responsibility for second echelon processing and reporting, control of contributing intercept facilities and for technical support to first echelon efforts at the SCA sites. Although the committee understandably favored NSA command of such a center, they concluded that unification of the Comint effort was beyond the scope of their authority, and thus adopted a modified, middle-of-the-road position. The opinion chosen was for NSA to designate one SCA as Executive Agent who in turn would select the commander of the center. The commander would be assisted by a staff jointly manned by the NSA, USASA, USAFSS and USNSG. With this initial concept formulated, negotiated with all necessary organizations began—and continued for five years until a final plan was approved and directed for implementation by OSD in January 1961.

To appreciate what the JSPC was when it was activated, and ten years later when it was deactivated, one must first look at the specific points of the committee's recommendations. The PROD committee operated under three points of guidance:

a. That it was unrealistic to adopt any concept for wartime Comint operation materially different from that in existence at the outbreak of hostilities;

b. That the minimum achievement should be collocation of all uni-service second echelon processing in the field; and
c. That because Special Weather processing in the field was not materially different from other Comint processing, the concept to be developed should apply equally to Weather and Comint.

Under the constraints of these assumptions, the committee defined three minimum objectives that presumably would make adoption of any new concept worthwhile:

a. Improve the scope and timeliness of field Comint product by placing in the field NSA technicians in numbers sufficient to substantially strengthen the existing efforts;
b. Achieve a Comint structure readily adaptable to a wartime situation; and
c. Achieve maximum use of technical expertise and production facilities in the field.

Options that would satisfy these objectives were viewed as:

a. Maintain complete service autonomy;
b. Continue the then existing uni-service counterpart operations;
c. Continue the existing concept but collocate second echelon processing of the three services;
da. Establish joint processing centers with command delegated to one service as Executive Agent;
e. Establish joint centers commanded by NSA.

During those early months of 1956, the committee emphasized that action under one of the alternatives must be taken immediately because:

a. Technical expertise in the field was not being maintained because of re-enlistment limitations and the resulting dearth of high caliber professionals. The committee cited past needs to send teams from NSA to the field during emergencies in [missing text] and forewarned of the possible need for similar action, soon, in French Indo-China. Clearly, the committee's primary concern was early warning and whether a potentially responsive capability existed or not;
b. As yet, NSA had done little to improve capabilities beyond the dispatch of one-time teams during emergencies, with routine TDY visits at other times. It was emphasized that NSA field activities could not meet field needs for technical assistance;
c. Theater wrap-up reporting had not reached a professional state in either timeliness or scope;
da. Although coordinated effort and mutual support were provided for under the present operations concept, these necessary qualities were not assured. The approximately 20 SCA units spread across 1500 miles all performing first and second echelon processing and reporting on various portions of the [missing text] problem were cited as proof that a fragmented effort existed and needed to be drawn together in the interest of cross-servicing and wrap-up reporting; and
e. Decentralization had not been accomplished for much of the second echelon reporting because field capability was not yet adequate, and fluctuating capabilities increased the possibilities that any decentralization achieved might shift back and forth between the field and the ZI during emergencies and complicated target communication changes. The consumption of 60—90 days to establish the necessary [missing text] in Korea was cited in example of delay that might be disastrous in the future.
A specific point was made by the committee: that there were no essential differences in Comint requirements during peace and war. The actions recommended to DIRNSA by the committee were expansive.

a. They proposed the establishment of three joint field processing centers, each tasked with major national targets. E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(3) Withheld from public release Pub. L. 86-36

b. Each center would have full responsibility for second echelon processing and reporting, control of contributing intercept facilities, and technical support to first echelon processing.

c. These centers would be manned with technicians from NSA and the three SCAs, and it was envisioned that the NSA personnel would be assigned in quality and quantity sufficient to insure a continuing technical proficiency.

d. Best available manpower would be grouped together for coordinated attack of targets of mutual concern because—in the words of the committee—"it is readily apparent that grouping, rather than dispersal, pays the greater dividends (and) greatly reduces training and replacement problems."

The essence of the plan was that the pooling of resources, and the consolidation and joint use of technical experience, equipment, machine facilities and services would "result in savings."

That was the imaginative concept presented to the Director and Vice Director, NSA, on 15 February 1956. But when the crucial question of designating authority to direct the center was raised, according to the committee report "political considerations began to affect operational considerations."

The next five years were consumed no less by disagreement with and debate over the NSA-proposed concept and its inherent connotation of disruption and change to ultra- and inter-SCA relationships, than between the SCAs and NSA over the issue of controlling Sigint resources. Probably no complete or adequate record of these events exists. Two points, however, were important to the later scope of JSPC authority and effectiveness. Briefly stated, they were:
a. The question of reporting echelons, or levels of processing and reporting effort. The committee and the Director debated this question and agreed that there were three echelons and only three. Yet, at that time, not all SCA activities adhered to the three echelon concept. Notably, the NSG sites incorporated first and second echelon efforts into a single level of attack that was felt by some to be the most realistic and efficient approach. However, two echelons of effort were distinguishable in the activities of the ASA site at Torii Station (USM-3), and the AFSS site at Kadena Air Base (USA-752) was uniquely a second echelon center. Both units had functioned along those lines for some time. (Irrespective of divergent views at the time, the "three echelon" concept was generally accepted and became a primary ingredient of the official JSPC Concept of Operations implemented in 1962. But ten years later, the two echelon concept emerged as first instance, theater level and national level. Ultimately, theater level was to be discontinued.)

b. The second issue was that of vertical control under the Director, NSA. The Director and the committee agreed that the Comint business worked better with a vertical command and that if the business was sufficiently responsive to military requirements, problems resulting from the command structure would work themselves out. It was recognized, however, that this feature of the concept would be problematical at best. The principal SCA objections to this approach were prognosticated by the committee to be:

1. Vertical control—exercised through a unified center, NSA technicians, and field activities—would be extended to problems theretofore decentralized and to first echelon reporting, and thus would be unacceptable to field commanders, contrary to previously expressed NSA policy, and in conflict with NSCID 9;

2. Vertical control involving non-routine matters would be exercised directly on elements of service field units in bypass of SCA headquarters, and thus would be unacceptable to the SCAs and in conflict with NSA Directive #1;

3. Vertical control would be reinitiated on problems for which full operational control already had been delegated to one of the SCAs; and

4. Vertical control that bypassed SCA headquarters would relegate those headquarters to purely administrative and logistic functions and thereby destroy their effectiveness for wartime operations.

Ultimately a plan emerged for a Joint Sigint Operations Center on Okinawa. The name soon was changed to the Joint Sigint Processing Center, other adjustments were made to the plan, and a final plan was approved by the OSD on 11 January 1961. The charter for the JSPC took the form of an attachment to OPINS 4001, dated 9 March 1961. The key features of this charter were that:

a. The Center would be a forward extension of NSA and a consolidation of the then current field efforts into one organization;

b. The entire resources of the Center would be at the disposal of a single Chief of the operation;

c. The Chief of the Center would be an NSA-assigned military officer;

d. NSA would exercise operational control over the Chief of the Center, and

e. Chiefs of the incorporated service elements would be under the operational control of the Chief of the Center.

Even with success in coordinating and promulgating OPINS 4001, there remained some serious objections to this charter by the SCAs. It did not provide for a detailed, clear-cut, universally accepted understanding within the Sigint community—or even within NSA—as to the true, legal status of the JSPC. In the words of the first Chief, JSPC, it was a question of: To what extent was it, or should it be, an "integrated" or "joint" activity? To whom did it, or should it, belong? What was or should be the mutual SCA responsibility for the fulfillment of the assigned mission? The plan approved by the SECDEF was a compromise between what the DIRNSA and SECDEF wanted and what the Chiefs of the SCAs were willing to accept. Deficiencies of the charter as pertaining to command relationships, manpower allocations and related provisions were to present acute problems for the new JSPC to struggle with, some for a number of years.

Although its era was to begin with certain important issues unresolved, positive actions were taken to get the JSPC underway. On 4 April 1961, the Deputy Chief was appointed as the Project Officer. The USASA nominated an officer of 06 rating for the Chief's position. He was officially assigned by DIRNSA on 1 May. Subsequent events are discussed in Part II, "The Early Years."

After seven years of preliminary actions, a Joint Sigint Processing Center was almost a reality.
II. The Early Years

Getting Organized

By September of 1961, the Chief, an Army colonel, was in place at Torii Station, Okinawa, home of the 51st USASA Special Operations Command (SOC) and its operations element (USM-3). Shortly thereafter, two Army majors and 11 enlisted men joined him. Action had not as yet been taken to assign the Chief as an NSA officer; this meant that he was still assigned to the USASA and therefore part of the USASA element at USM-3 which was destined to become the "US Army Element: Joint Sigint Processing Center, Okinawa." USASA General Orders Number 43, dated 24 July 1961, made the Chief and party "a separate activity (Class II) at Torii Station, Okinawa, Ryukyus Islands, under the Table of Distribution Number 86-9340."

Administrative Activation

The Chief activated the new Center for administrative purposes on 1 October 1961. An unpublished organization manual dated 15 November 1961 reveals that the initially planned organization did not at first materialize. The first plan apparently called for a four-staff, five-division structure (as later emerged), but the first official organization consisted of two staff groups, each consisting of three components. One group of components represented the genesis of JSPC-03, 04 and 05 of later years.

One salient feature of the earliest JSPC organization was that it largely paralleled most of the counterpart and parent elements of NSA, and where it did not initially, subsequent realignments were made. Unique features of
Shortcomings and deficiencies notwithstanding, the JSPC was operationally activated on 1 February, immediately following a belated electronic security sweep of the new building. All components except the Air Division were present; because communications were not adequate for the Air Division’s use, it was forced to remain at Kadena until June. Fortunately, the Chief of JSPC was officially assigned as an NSA officer on 1 February under USASA action on the presence of a ‘most senior’ officer, and narrowly escaped being designated the company commander of the USASA element of the JSPC.

NSAPAC representatives from the Pacific Headquarters office at Camp Fuchinobe, Japan, were called upon to serve as chiefs of the Intercept and Reporting groups because the civilian assignees from NSA had not arrived on Okinawa. In fact, the shortage of personnel, particularly in staff and administrative support functions, was the most exasperating single problem of those early days. But problems notwithstanding, over 90% effectiveness prevailed in EDPM-1401 use even though power problems were frequent. Morale was extremely high, and cryptologic personnel worked to compensate for the plethora of deficiencies in all areas. Of particular value was the support provided by local SCA commanders who lent personnel to the JSPC to fill critical gaps as much as they could, even under threat of censure from above.

Amidst this myriad of growing pains, the new Center was almost immediately faced with the first of two of the most demanding crisis periods encountered throughout its history. Before examining the effects of these two "flaps," the challenge inherent in command and operational relationships of the era merits comment.

Command and Operational Relationships

In the closing remarks about "The Planning Years" it has been noted that the new JSPC began operation with some vital legal issues unresolved. It appears that NSA management viewed some experience with the JSPC experiment as a prerequisite to resolving those issues. Attempts by the first Chief, JSPC, during April, May and June 1962 to obtain formal recognition of the JSPC as an NSA activity were met with the judgment that "although the feasibility of such a transformation would become increasingly apparent and documentable as JSPC developed, immediate application of this concept would be both impolitic and premature." Undaunted, in September 1962 the Chief of JSPC again reopened these issues and suggested two possible organizational plans: one provided for an integrated center organically part of NSA and
designed to have the "least attendant problems from a managerial, operational and technical standpoint"; and a second plan for a joint center which would derive its operational control from local SCA commanders on Okinawa. The Chief, JSPC, preferred the integrated concept, but acknowledged that both would work and either would be "preferable to the current situation." This fourth attempt to resolve issues germane to nearly every relationship the JSPC had with the SCAs was dispatched to DIRNSA during September 1962. It was reviewed by ADN and ADP, this time with encouraging albeit not immediate results.

ADP stated that "the effectiveness of the integrated nature of JSPC operations to date is documented and its even greater potential development is predictable." He felt that the joint plan would "...lead to little more than a collocated effort, a possibility that would be contrary to the original intent of the Department of Defense instructions." ADP endorsed and recommended the adoption of the plan for an integrated JSPC organization.

In review of the ADP position, ADN first stated that "Finalization of the present 'Plan' was an extremely difficult and time consuming process, which suggests that changes to it based on experience are preferable to a completely new Plan." Thus he opted for and recommended revision of the existing plan. His feeling was that the joint plan would not work and would be "a step backward" because it provided for the Chief, JSPC, to exercise operational control of the Center through the local SCA commanders.

ADN's comments (on a summary of problems and recommendations for their solution that had been provided by the Chief, JSPC) addressed other problematical areas. His views are noteworthy for the impetus they provided to resolve these issues, although an additional six years passed before solution was reached—on paper—and for only some of the issues.

ADN interpreted use of the word joint by the Assistant SECDEF for Special Operations as not meaning "joint" in the understood U.S. military sense. Rather," ADN said, "the Center is an activity jointly (in the dictionary sense) manned by NSA and the SCAs to be run by the Chief in accordance with (that part of) the present Plan, which says he is: 'Responsible for the operation and direction of the JSPC,' and (that part) which says that the Center is 'under the operational and technical control of the Director, National Security Agency.'"

Thus the Center is actually an extension of NSA in the field, except that the SCA personnel assigned are not in NSA spaces or billets. In this statement the unclear and difficult area of personnel assignment and management was acknowledged together with another problem area involving logistic support to the Center. His position on these issues was:

- "The Plan should state the Center is to operate as a single integrated organization under the direction of the Chief."
- "The Plan should clearly state that SCA personnel will be ordered to report to the JSPC for duty and to the local SCA commander for administration."
- "Personnel allocations should be reviewed and revised as appears necessary, utilizing the various existing procedures inherent in the OPINS 10-20-30 formulation and discussion, coordination, requesting and tasking (if required). It should not be overlooked that personnel can be added by NSA from its resources also."
- "Shortages in manning should be reported to NSA and pressure maintained to keep the Center up to allowed strength."
- Logistic support to the JSPC had been assigned to the 51st USAASC at Turi Station under the Plan for the JSPC, but this apparently was nullified by decisions of the comptrollers of Department of the Army and OSD. ADN prescribed that the subject should be reopened with ASA and steps taken to delineate and acquire this support. A final "support agreement" was eventually developed.
- On the question of semantics, ADN recommended deletion of the word joint from the title of the Center.
- Two other notable comments were included: ADN suggested that the scope of first echelon processing on the OPINS 4001 problem be reviewed by ADP and the SCAs to see that it is in fact not duplicating that which is done or should be done in the JSPC, with concomitant diversion of resources" and he indicated that agreement has been reached by ADP and ADN which gave ADP the principal staff cognizance over JSPC and NSA field activities.

Upon notification of these ADN views and that OPINS 4001 would undergo re-draft and coordination to reflect as many of these points as might survive, the Chief, JSPC, immediately assimilated the new chain of subordination through ADP and the ADN position and terminology into the daily business of the Center. But more than five years passed before the JSPC was actually provided with a new OPINS No. 4990 on 8 December 1967.

The management of JSPC saw these command and operational deficiencies as unnecessary deterrents to their task of running the Center. As a prelude to discussion of other topics in this document, it is perhaps best here to move ahead to sometime in 1966 and view what was officially recorded on this overall problem. The record involved is not precisely identified, but it consisted of brief sheets on various topics relating to the entire
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JSPC operation, and it appears to be a document provided to the NSA Inspector General during his early 1962 visit. As a comprehensive statement of the problems faced by JSPC management, the full record is quoted as follows.

Chief, JSPC has operational control and the local SCA Commanders have command and administrative control over personnel assigned to JSPC. These relationships are not clearly defined in JSPC's basic document, OPINS 4000, JSPC is guided by NSA policies and regulations; the SCAs are guided by their own separate and distinct service policies and regulations. In several areas four sets of rules are at wide variance. Only the finest of cooperation of the local SCA commanders, within their severe limitations, has allowed this situation to serve JSPC in an adequate manner. Examples follow:

1. Administration
   a. JSPC military personnel are the administrative responsibility of the following commanding officers, all of whom must be dealt with at one time or another.

   *ASA Officers & Civilians*  
   Co., 51st USASA SOC

   *ASA EM*  
   Co., Co. C., 51st USASA SOC

   *NSA/ASA Officers*  
   Co. USA Spg Grp., Ft. Meade

   *NSA/ASA EM*  
   Co., Co B., USA Spg Grp., Ft. Meade

   *NSG Officers & EM*  
   Co., NAVSECGRU ACTTJ, Okinawa

   *NSA(NSG) EM*  
   NSA, Ft. Meade

   * USAFSS Officers*  
   Co. 6927th SG

   * USAFSS EM*  
   Co., Det 2, 6927th SG

   *NSA/USAFSS EM*  
   6927th Spg Grp., Ft. Meade

   *Marines*  
   Co., Co. D., MARSHIP TB

   b. Some of the difficulties encountered can be illustrated by the differences in the handling of efficiency ratings. The Army can only indirectly affect JSPC officer personnel as efficiency ratings are forwarded through NSA channels, or directly to TAG. Air Force efficiency ratings are forwarded through the local commanders who can make comments. In the case of Navy and Marine Corps personnel, the local CO has a reporting authority; Chief, JSPC can only recommend the effectiveness ratings, which are subject to the feelings of CO, Co. D., and CO. NSGA-O, who need not accept the JSPC recommendations.

   c. Command Channel Problems. — The Brief Sheet on the CCP express general satisfaction with the various steps involved in the CCP cycle from the initial statements of JSPC requirements to DOD approval and subsequent publication of OPINS 10/20/30. However, OPINS requirements are not accurately reflected in the manning documents of the three SCAs. These latter documents should be based on OPINS 10/20/30 and clearly detail grades, skills and numbers of personnel provided to JSPC. In JSPC attempts to accomplish this, and to effect changes to existing USAFSS UMD, USAF TD, NAVSECGRU NAVPERS 576, JSPC has been informed to correspond as follows:

      *Army — ASA*  
      says to take all actions to Co. 51st USASA SOC, who will forward which he cannot accomplish through ASA channels. Final action can be taken only by HQ USASA, Washington.

      *Navy and Marines — NAVSECGRU*  
      says take all action directly to DIRNAVSECGRU as NSGA-O has no authority.

      *Air Force — USAFSS*  
      says take manning problems to 6927th SG, authorizations will be handled by HQ at Kelly.

   In actuality, the local SCA units and the SCA theatre headquarters have very little authority in the authorization/assignment of personnel. In all cases, this function is exercised centrally at NSA HQ in Zl. Therefore, under the current system, JSPC needs strong central authority at DIRNSA level to act on personnel requirements/actions. Hopefully, establishment of JSPC as an NSA organization would accomplish this end and improve reaction time within the three separate and distinct service personel authorization/assignment systems.

2. Shortages
   a. JSPC continues to be plagued with personnel shortages and it is impossible for us to accept, in light of our vital mission, that the situation must continue to some extent on the grounds that JSPC must share some of the community-wide shortage of personnel.

   b. The situation becomes most critical when tasks are levied upon JSPC with no commensurate increase in personnel. For example:

      (1) JSPC has had to provide analytic personnel to support various special intercept missions, even collection personnel to man positions, and then devote many manhours to the evaluation of all material collected.

      (2) An insufficient number of personnel were assigned to JSPC when the DRV Air problem was transferred here. Very recently, four of the five Vietnamese linguists working in the Air Division were sent TDY to USA—32 to assist in ACRP operations.

      (3) Increased ACRP collection resulted in JSPC having to process the material from those flights that recover at Kadena AB, this has been accomplished only through extensive extra efforts on the part of senior linguists.

   (4) Personnel to man the

   Ten personnel have been diverted from other duties to perform processing and reporting efforts.

   (5) The automatic distribution center became operational without adequate authorized personnel. The ADCC/DDP system continues to operate with a shortage of clerks/communications personnel by utilizing traffic analysts diverted from other tasks.

   a. Shortages exist in all tasks performed at JSPC from the vital areas of traffic analysis and linguistics to graphic arts and reproduction services.

3. Security
   a. The personnel security situation at JSPC has several phases which do not lead to an especially desirable situation. This is brought about by the fact that there are four different sets of regulations and standards utilized to govern the personnel working at JSPC. These are the NSA regulations for all personnel assigned to NSA (both military and civilian); ASA regulations for all Army personnel assigned to the 51st USASA SOC; NSGA regulations for all Navy and Marine Corps personnel assigned to NSGA-O and Co. D., MARSHIP TB; and AFSS regulations for all Air Force personnel assigned to the 6927th SG.

   b. It is necessary for the JSPC Security Officer, who is assigned to JSPC from the Office of Security, NSA, to go to each military security representative on an almost daily basis to gain knowledge of derogatory information pertaining to personnel working in JSPC on JSPC/NSA material. In many cases, the local military commands have removed the access of personnel working at JSPC while they were under investigation and upon completion of the
in the past ten years has proved that it will not work for small field activities. The smaller the unit the more critical the problem. One person normally has several jobs in a small unit, and when ordered to training, KP, Article 32 investigations, etc., the operational job is simply not done. He is a soldier first and a technician second.

In one documented case, five persons were put on leave for personal reasons and when ordered to training, KP. Article 32 investigations, etc., then the operational job is simply not done. He is a soldier first and a technician second. One person normally has several jobs in a small unit, and when ordered to training, KP, Article 32 investigations, etc., then the operational job is simply not done. He is a soldier first and a technician second.

The Chief of the JSPC was in fact placed in an almost untenable position by not having complete authority to control his personnel. This could have been avoided by doing what other organizations have done to solve the problem. The changed the name of their top manager from Chief to Commander. The USASA did the same thing. Chief of the Agency and major overseas Commands became Commanding Generals/Officers. The term Commander is entirely different from Chief and carries a higher degree of authority and
acknowledgement. It would be well to consider giving all NSA field activities a Commander vs a Chief.

It is hardly justifiable to state that JSPC management accepted the provisions of OPINS 4790 with all the enthusiasm and resolve they could muster. Management of the Center possessed all the right qualities to make any concept work that was workable at all. But command and operational relationships remained problematical until the JSPC closed on 1 July 1971. OPINS 4790 made the goal of running the Center somewhat more clear administratively, but it did not guarantee or result in full measure of cooperation from the SCAs with which the Chief had to deal. The reality of running the Center was only slightly improved. Perhaps if the provisions of OPINS 4790 had been promulgated when the JSPC was created, the Center's place in command and operational relationships could have been less troublesome.

Crisis on Crisis

The new JSPC was enmeshed with the task of getting its house in order when the first operations flap struck in June 1962. All of the line elements were in place except JSPC-3 which was in the process of moving at the time, and the then-existing staff functions were struggling to both coalesce their related tasks as well as establish clear lines of demarcation between them. The acid test of the new Center's capability began when USM-48 at Hakata, Japan, first reported that according to their radio direction finding results, it appeared that the radio facilities serving elements of the

If all the details and all the records could be gotten together, the Sigint record of events for the next ten months would fill volumes. USF-790's product for the period is available in the Agency's archives and the year-end products serial closure notices for 1962 and 1963 reveal the extent to which the new JSPC kept the community abreast of target activity. The ACOM critique of Sigint Readiness Bravo, "LAWRENCE," neatly capsulized the scope of concern that developed after June 1962.

In retrospect, and excluding Intelligence portfolio of the period, the most important aspect in this period was that the JSPC's performance did not falter during that first and most important emergency—nor did the JSPC's performance falter even as the

The new Center was barely organized, and not all of its elements were in place, yet it had to respond to the critical needs for rapid reporting based on accurate, comprehensive assimilation of technical materials. At the onset of the pre-Readiness period, intercept resources were deployed in a mix which until then had seemed most appropriate for the sites

It soon became apparent that this distribution and deployment of resources was inadequate. With the appearance of large numbers of radio groups serving the deployment of the units and the coordination and administrative control over them the fundamental challenges faced by the new Center were multi-fold:

a. All the Sigint resources and the capabilities the Center represented had to be coordinated immediately; there was precious little time for deliberation and debate about how this could best be done. Reports were coming in from the outlying sites, and the Center was expected to respond in the most accurate and timely manner possible.

b. The process of review and comparison of incoming technical materials from the sites had to be at once effective and efficient.

c. The mix of intercept capabilities at the various sites had to be rearranged. Operators and processing and reporting (P&R) personnel had to be apportioned among the sites, all of which were looking to JSPC for guidance and instruction.

d. Within the Center, a mechanism for coordinated evaluation and interpretation of reportable activity had to be established immediately to insure that all reportable information was processed and released in time to allow the daily cycle to continue. Any backlogged conditions would have proved to be disastrous.

For a few days, confusion was rampant throughout the Center. A central point of receipt for incoming material from the sites and from NSA had not yet been established, nor were the various elements of JSPC certain of what they should not receive. Within a few days and after considerable work, however, all the requirements inherent in timely reporting and follow-on
functions were necessarily geared to the unique nature of their targets with the result that, during periods of target aberration and national intelligence concern, timely correlation of source data for a common period was extremely difficult and at times virtually impossible to achieve within the preferred deadlines.

From the earliest months of JSPC's operation, the Center improved on known successes at cross-servicing. Operational elements were small. Each served as a focal point for the materials received from outlying sites, and even as the pieces of incoming data arrived, analysts contacted other analysts responsible for different but area-related targets. Reporters formulated the text of reports as analysis produced results. Managers, supervisors and staff personnel, talented in collection adjustments, processing and reporting techniques stayed in constant contact with desk analysts who produced the first evidence upon which an action could be based.

Simply put, the net result was that key people currently knew almost precisely where the effort stood along the continuum from intercept to reporting. They were able to steer and control the trend with enviable precision. When different targets concurrently produced unusual activity, the fact was quickly detected. When analysis encountered technical difficulty already surmounted by other analysts on other targets, exchange of techniques was immediate. When one target reached reportability and its activity was under draft, that action was known by those who held hits and pieces of related information, and a correlated report was produced concurrently. When these efforts did not produce the preferred results, there was at least a common assurance that the attempt had been made.

It was possible for the producers of whatever could be produced to do so with a high degree of professional confidence. Fear that some related item had been overlooked was largely eliminated and with it reluctance—an anathema to timely cryptologic action—was greatly reduced.

Such was the immediate advantage offered by the JSPC early during its first two emergency periods of international concern.
III. The Apex

The years 1962 and 1963 were initial years of growth and challenge as the new Center was activated and organized amidst unstable target conditions and pressing demands for Sigint information. But by mid-1963 these pressures had subsided, and with a relatively settled organization, and reasonably efficient internal operating and coordinating procedures, the JSPC enjoyed nearly a year of normal life. Regulations were finally written to sanction the best methods that had emerged empirically, and managers were able for the first time to examine their organizations and look ahead with plans for improvement. Professional confidence and satisfaction were high. Rapport and trust were established and paying dividends in interaction and exchange with SCA field sites. And parent elements at NSA were beginning to face the challenge of increasing JSPC autonomy—even sanctimonious belligerence, at times. By late summer of 1964, everything that the JSPC was and could be came into ever-clearer focus. During August the USS Maddox and USS Turner Joy incidents occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin signaling the start of increased U.S. military involvement in Vietnam and the beginning of a second major era of growth and expansion for the JSPC.

Since early summer of 1962, analysts and managers at the JSPC had been uneasy about reports alleging that CHICOM military personnel were active in North Vietnam. Specifically, these reports alleged that a CHICOM radio group was active in the Tien Yen and Lang Son areas, purportedly associated with extensive CHICOM logistics, construction and AAA support to the North Vietnamese. A reassessment of priorities and concentrated efforts to correlate all available Sigint and collateral was undertaken, but with all these attempts—and successes—at getting related information together and to ensure maximum exploitation of intercepted activity in China/Vietnam border area, the JSPC could not uncover hard evidence to either verify or refute the broad allegations of reports. A number of events had been noted and were watched carefully, however, and the Center made concerted efforts to report anything of even potential significance. Among those events there was obvious evidence of joint CHICOM-North Vietnamese planning.

In May 1963 Liu Shao Chi', President of the Chinese People's Republic, visited Hanoi, and in June and July a high-level NVN military mission toured important military bases in South and Southwest China (K’unming, Mengtzu, Nanning, Haikou, and Kuang-chau). In September 1963 and February 1964, two high-level NVN military conferences were held at Mengtzu, the last meeting being followed by unusual NVN–CHICOM Air Force transportation activity involving Hanoi, Dien Bien Phu, Mengtzu and Ssumao. In June and July 1964, a series of high-level conferences were held at Peiching, Hanoi, and K’unming. Following each of these meetings, developments were detected in the field of air and air defense; notably the gradual deactivation of Mengtzu Airfield in the summer of 1963, the deployment of the Mengtzu MIGs to Phuc Yen (a recently completed airfield), and the Chinese air deployment into South and Southwest China in late July and August 1964.

The Washington intelligence community, believing the CHICOM/NVN conferences to be the most significant group of indicators of possible hostile intent then evident, determined that possibly as early as 1962, the North Vietnamese and CHICOM had reached a joint decision to challenge the increased U.S. support of the South Vietnamese in their war against the Viet Cong. Cryptologic personnel believed that Sigint reflecting these events would be most likely derived from communications in the VHF spectrum requiring airborne assets as the collection sources. With USIB approval and concurrence from JCS and CINCPAC, DIRNSA instituted a formal Airborne Communications Reconnaissance Program (ACRP) in Southeast Asia early in 1965.

With this move to insure cryptologic access to vital communications activity and the intelligence it might yield, the second echelon capability of the JSPC came into immediate focus.

The Air War

Implementation of the Airborne Communications Reconnaissance Program (ACRP) in Southeast Asia (SEA), meant that the role of the JSPC—and particularly that of the Air Division, JSPC-3—was vitally important. Again, the challenge was to insure around-the-clock analytic and reporting expertise that without breakdown or delay could collate and coordinate the intercept and reporting from ground-based USAFSS
sites covering CHICOM and DRV air communications together with inputs from the ACRP program. As air strikes over North Vietnam were initiated, pressure on the PACOM cryptologic effort mounted. JSPC-3 was at once faced with continuous interaction with SCA collection and reporting units, NSA production elements following all target activity for quick response to the Washington Intelligence Community. Pacific customers from South Vietnam to Hawaii with unceasing questions concerning Sigint information, and internal JSPC elements tasked with continuing support to ever-changing needs in collection, data processing, multi-channel processing, cryptanalysis, reporting and manning.

Many important records on the details of this period are no longer available, but the essence of the JSPC role was the near-impossible requirement to:

a. Stay abreast of all activity related to and affecting the U.S. military role in SEA;

b. Respond immediately to any need or question the cryptologic and intelligence communities posed;

c. Verify SCA analysis and reporting while conducting a type of integrated and joint analysis and reporting possible only, it seemed, at the JSPC; and

d. Answer for delays, backlogs, errors, omissions or what-have-you to virtually every major NSA production element or intelligence customer that had anything whatever to do with the U.S. interest in SEA.

Support to ACRP

The ACRP program was new. In its beginning it was called QUEEN BEE DELTA in the Far East and consisted of USAFSS airborne assets operated by USA-513, primarily from Yokota Air Base, Japan. C-130B aircraft configured with ten intercept positions each and covering the electromagnetic spectrum from 2-4450 MHz flew approximately 60 missions of 10-hours duration each month in orbits from the Sea of Japan to the Gulf of Tonkin (GOT) against KORCOM, CHICOM and SEA targets. Thirty of these missions were flown in the GOT against tactical targets in North Vietnam, in South China and on Hainan Island, and the number of these missions was destined to increase significantly over future months. The value of the ACRP program was clear. Land-based collection sites could collect only a small amount of the VHF and low-VHF transmissions emanating from the target area. However, from altitudes of 30,000 feet, the collection reach was extended by at least 250 miles—and the results were invaluable.

Early in the program, intercept yielded the first evidence (May 1965) that Russian pilots were involved in tactical air activity over North Vietnam, evidence of the first joint Russian/Vietnamese GCI exercise (July 1965). insight into the "scissors" tactics implemented by North Vietnamese fighter pilots (July 1965), and the first and vital evidence of Russian controlled surface-to-air missile launches against U.S. strike aircraft (26 July 1965).

The involvement of the JSPC embraced mission scheduling, tasking, monitoring and evaluation, and included linguistic, processing, analysis and reporting functions on materials collected. A JSPC representative participated in the monthly ACRP scheduling conferences at Yokota Air Base and assisted in the formulation of the two-month scheduling plans which collated the collection requirements of NSA, USA-38 (Misawa Air Base) and JSPC and were then passed through Headquarters channels to NSA for review. As the Intercept Tasking Authority (ITA), JSPC levied specific collection tasks on USA-513 for QUEEN BEE DELTA coverage of KORCOM, CHICOM and North Vietnamese targets. To ensure that all requirements were adequately satisfied, JSPC analysts closely monitored the flying schedules daily. When high priority collection requirements arose for areas on which no coverage had been scheduled, last minute changes were made to the missions, often with as few as 12 hours notice to the operating units. All platform intercept was routinely evaluated by the JSPC, with results published every 28 days. Results consistently showed that all but a small portion of the total intercept available in the low-VHF and VHF spectrum was being collected by ACRP platforms and that this intercept was vital to the JSPC mission.

The most critical impact of the ACRP program on JSPC and theater cryptologic units was the depletion of linguistic resources. The JSPC processed all intercept from missions that recovered at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa; all missions that recovered in South Vietnam passed their collection to USA-32 at Danang Air Base, and USA-513 at Yokota processed all materials recovered at home base. JSPC’s participation in this effort was an obvious move. A limited number of linguists were available at the Center, but even fewer were available to the other units, and USA-513, in particular, needed relief.

For the U.S. 7th Fleet

Beginning in August 1965, the JSPC was tasked with the close Sigint support to U.S. 7th Fleet elements committed to military operations against North Vietnam. Timely, detailed information about the air defense systems of North Vietnam...
was needed. Specifically needed was the operating characteristics and practices of selected radar stations and filter centers and in North Vietnam, together with precise locations, types and capabilities of the units, and in general, any comment that JSPC analysts thought might be of value. To support this effort, USA-32 at Danang Air Base, SVN, and USA-57 at Clark Air Base, R.P., forwarded to the Center first heard reports which contained current case notations, callsign/RAD identifications and data on the frequencies used by the various air warning facilities.

All information as it was developed was passed electrically from the JSPC to 7th Fleet operational Sigint detachments to assist their intercept and identification of CHICOM and North Vietnamese air warning units that could be expected to track and report their own and U.S. aircraft.

**COMINT Weather**

Intercept of North Vietnamese weather data provided the only access to this information from the earliest days of U.S. operations in SEA. USA-32 at Danang and USM-808 at Phu Bai provided the information directly to MACV (SOG) and to USN-27 at San Miguel, R.P., for broadcast to CTF-77 consumers. NSA PAC Representative Vietnam (C) had seen the need to establish a special weather support program to insure that strike planners received all usable weather information as well as to provide that data that would aid the costly weather reconnaissance program. The JSPC was asked to assist in this program by providing technical consultants to NVF, and to task the sites with reporting the specific types and amounts of weather information most needed.

Subsequently, the JSPC monitored the data disseminated and assisted the reporting sites as necessary.

**CHICOMS Across the Border**

By mid-June, 1965, Sigint clearly revealed that CHICOM military forces were in North Vietnam, actively assisting the North Vietnamese in some way. Evidence suggested that at least one and possibly two CHICOM Ground Forces units or authorities were in North Vietnam.

On 21 July 1965, a special task force was activated within the JSPC Ground Forces Division (JSPC−1) to coordinate all Sigint collection efforts against these communications, to correlate SIGINT data and to provide guidance and technical support to the collection sites involved in the effort. The JSPC Technical Support Division (JSPC−4) also mounted special efforts to assist in collection and analysis of developing CFNVN communications complexes. They conducted in-depth studies of callsign usage, correlated direction finding results which were extremely important for accurate placement of elements, and performed transcription of CHICOM and North Vietnamese voice and radio printer communications. They also developed a number of special purpose machine listings and studies to aid in analysis and exploitation of this significant target.

The U.S. Intelligence Community impatiently had awaited Sigint confirmation of collateral reports about these out-of-country CHICOM forces and their mission. When Sigint information became available, it evolved first from cryptologic efforts in the field, at the JSPO and USAU units in Southeast Asia. The Sigint record of CFNVN evolution is available in many Sigint Product reports in the CCM and C(J) series.

The era of JSPC concentration of CFNVN communications was significant in a number of areas:

a. The target was of prisme concern to top level intelligence customers and therefore one on which any development of cryptologic success drew immediate attention and frequent complimentary comment.

b. It was a vastly complicated period during which plans and actions, findings and interpretations required close coordination between the JSPC, SCA units and NSA production elements.

c. Operating in essentially the same time frame as all PACOM activities, the role of the JSPC became increasingly more influential and autonomous.

d. Competition with counterpart NSA elements led to conflicting opinions, frustration, and unilateral actions on the part of the JSPC.

e. Over two years of second-echelon experience enabled the JSPC to take immediate actions with tireless confidence in many areas of collection management, technical guidance and Sigint reporting. Often in the latter products, a certain—almost clairvoyant—quality appeared, very much reminiscent of the extremely effective reporting during the 1962−63 crises.

f. Under pressure to develop and report each new bit of information on CHICOM activity in North Vietnam, and enthusiastically anxious to do so, the JSPC used its competitive esprit de corps and well-coordinated, joint capability to mount numerous studies and projects. The JSPC Charter did not authorize many of these adventures, but generally they received de facto sanction because "nothing succeeds like success." Successful, timely actions were the rule rather than the exception.

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**TOP SECRET-UMBRA**

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TOP SECRET UMBRA

Concurrent successes in exploiting the radio communications of CFNVN, International Shipping into North Vietnam, and North Vietnamese Air and Air Defense units brought the JSPC to an unprecedented peak level of capability. Prestige and frequent kudos from customers gave the Center a feeling of omnipotence. There were few who were willing to openly challenge what the JSPC said and did. One major contest over the continued need for and efficacy of the JSPC developed in the 1965, early 1966 period, with pro-JSPC forces emerging the victors. Until the B Group Operational Review Group (ORG) of 1968 surfaced its critique of B Group-JSPC relationships, the Center continued as a fairly independent vortex of cryptologic ability and NSA influence in the Pacific Theater.

The JSPC's efforts against CFNVN communications continued through the period of withdrawal of CHICOM support units from North Vietnam. Exploitation emphasis shifted as CHICOM logistic and AAA units became increasingly active in Northern Laos during 1968. CHICOM construction of primary lines of communications in northern and northwestern Laos had been alleged in collateral materials since the late 1950s, although radio communications serving these activities had never been recovered and identified. With increased North Vietnamese activity in Laos, radio communications apparently were established for the complementary CHICOM construction effort. As these communications became available, JSPC established a special task force to ensure the same concentrated attention to their exploitation that had been ensured in 1965 against CFNVN. By 1969 and 1970, CHICOM Forces Laos (CFL) replaced CFNVN in importance, and a more coordinated, less competitive, joint SIGINT effort was enjoyed by JSPC and B Group than had been present during the earlier efforts against CFNVN communications. CFL remained a primary developmental target through the last days of JSPC operation. A later section of this document focuses on the transfer of this and other functions from JSPC-1 to B Group during the drawdown.

The preceding are but examples of the expanded efforts and involvements that began in late summer of 1964 and continued until the last years of JSPC's existence. The fundamental point here is that the scheme of things at the JSPC had been baptized in the fire of two successive flaps periods in 1962 and 1963 and stood ready to respond commensurately with the onslaught of intelligence actions and activity that accompanied expanding U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. Numerous additions and changes to the JSPC mission and organization occurred in response to requirements of the era.

Operational Review Group

As early as 1965 the continuing need for the JSPC came under critical question within the NSA. This questioning was associated with planning for a modernization of collection and processing techniques, referred to alternately as the Far East Modernization Plan and PACEMAKER. By 1968 this questioning assumed a more articulate and visible form in the application of the modern management practice of organization and function appraisal to measure the attainment of selected objectives by B Group and the JSPC. Specifically, management appraisal or audit was inspired by the Chief of B Group and chartered as the Operational Review Group (ORG).

Purpose

During August of 1968 the purpose and procedure of the ORG were announced. The group was to review the overseas processing effort of the JSPC in relation to that performed within B Group, to evaluate the efficiency and economy of operations, and to measure optimum response to technical and consumer requirements. More precisely, the ORG was to:

a. Evaluate the JSPC performance on B Group targets against similar performance at NSA.

b. Consider what tasks and functions, if any, performed at the JSPC could better or more economically be performed at NSA or elsewhere.

c. Identify any modifications to the existing operations cycle on B Group targets which might be required or desired.

Composition

A group chairman, responsible only to the B Group Chief, was selected. He was assisted on a full-time basis by representatives from participating offices. The Chairman was Mr. Delmar C. Lang, then Chief of B-05. Other representatives to the group were: Mr. B6; Mr. B4; Mr. B3; Mr. B2; Mr. Robert Galloway, B5; Mr. B1; Mr. B3; Mr. Thomas Newsome, B04. For equity, JSPC provided the following representatives to the ORG: CDR Owen Engleander, USN, JSPC-2; Mr. Arthur P. Garner, JSPC-05; Mr. John S. Sharp, JSPC-5; Major James W. Hunt, USA, JSPC-04; Mr. Samuel Smart, JSPC-03.
Entrance to Torii Station—Home of the JSPC

**Method of Operation**

The appraisal was conducted in three phases. Phase I commenced at NSA, with the NSA ORG representatives in attendance. During Phase I the JSPC members remained on Okinawa and prepared for their participation in the next phase.

In Phase II the ORG visited JSPC where they conducted detailed reviews as described in the purpose and procedures charter to include a consideration of JSPC's role in the [problem]. During Phase III the ORG returned to NSA to consolidate and review on a problem-wide basis the results of Phases I and II.

Foremost during this review was the necessity to identify functions and tasks that were being performed and for which modifications were required or desired—to include those tasks not then being performed. Additionally, the ORG was to formulate modification proposals (to include OPLANS) and possible alternatives, and to list resource costs or savings for each proposed modification. All recommendations were to be provided to the Chief, B Group.

The Chief of JSPC offered to the ORG representatives some definitive guidelines on matters he felt must be discussed in detail during the study. He suggested that:

- The ORG examine NSA/JSPC Division of Effort (DOE) criteria and use that criteria as a bench mark against which measurements and value judgments should be made.

- Team members of the ORG (from both NSA and JSPC) not study their own normal operational area for review.

- The study group Chief have all necessary clearances for this study.

He then presented a very comprehensive listing of subjects, beyond the sub-element by sub-element review, which he considered to be major problem areas. Of primary consideration were at least ten areas of DOE criteria and his genuine plea for compatibility in the DOE between NSA's B and C Groups and related JSPC elements.

To assist in the ORG review, and to be sure that all facets of operation were considered in this study, NSA asked the NSAPAC Representative offices to solicit an objective and factual field station and consumer appraisal of the adequacies and need for the JSPC/B Group efforts. Specifically desired were comments, observations and recommendations for improvements, and all particulars regarding any inadequacies. Areas addressed for review included:

- a. Technical support to field stations by messages and TDY.

- b. The value of analyst-to-analyst exchanges via OPSCOMM circuits.

- c. JSPC's effectiveness as Collection Management Authority (CMA).

- d. Consumer's comments regarding the value of Sigint reporting from three levels—site, JSPC and NSA.

- e. JSPC guidance to field stations regarding reporting.

- f. Frequency of consumer use of JSPC for fulfillment of Sigint requirements.

In summary, the field sites' and consumers' comments indicated that they could not make judgments about which one place in the Sigint system should exist at the expense of another. Comments indicated that JSPC's ability to function in rapid response to field sites' and consumers' queries was primarily due to geography and available communications. Some specific recommendations were made about requirements for more technical support, depth research and TDYS, and the ORG was requested to review operations for the possible deletion of many reports produced at SCA units.
Findings

The preliminary ORG report identified these major problems:

a. Both JSPC and B Group efforts needed major modifications and re-direction.

b. JSPC competed with NSA on certain operational matters.

c. Management of sub-element resources was split between JSPC and NSA with literally no effective communication between these managers.

d. Too much staff effort existed at the JSPC.

e. There was no meaningful DOE on major portions of the JSPC Sigint mission.

f. Machine formatted materials come into JSPC from field elements. The JSPC accomplished a near-perfect data base from these materials, and subsequently used it to support term research tasks not assigned to the JSPC. Further it was noted that use of this data base at NSA was negligible, and that in sum these conditions degraded JSPC's mission and reversed the roles of JSPC and NSA on current and long term projects.

g. JSPC accomplished many tasks that were the responsibility of B Group. It was determined that this situation stemmed from the availability of processing time on JSPC computers which ipso facto aided some B Group elements who experienced difficulty in getting machine time from C Group, and thus filled voids in NSA term research that depended on computer time.

h. Some field stations and consumers depended so much on JSPC that they might become replacements for JSPC if the Center were removed or closed.

Recommendations

Some recommendations were:

a. A new DOE was required.

b. Term tasks performed at JSPC should be returned to NSA, and JSPC should respond to current tasking exclusively.

c. A turnaround schedule for tasking was proposed. The ORG stated that the best time for this schedule to begin would be when B Group could employ the AG-22/data link concept. Two phases were outlined for this realignment: Phase I for term tasks which fell within a six-month time frame—JSPC to return these tasks to NSA; and Phase II for tasks that fell within an 18-month time limit—this scheduled approach was chosen to afford C Group time to provide the required computer support and to serve as a period advantageous to the reassignment of military personnel.

d. B Group should insure that:

Conclusion

The ORG deliberations illuminated many problems concerning a more operationally sensible DOE, competitive and in many cases duplicative NSA/JSPC operations, inappropriate taskings, and a need for major modifications to and re-direction of the joint B Group/JSPC effort.

In their appraisal of the DOE between these organizations, several undesirable conditions were emphasized. Duplication of efforts was stressed. It seemed clear that in certain operational areas, NSA and the JSPC had reversed their roles as "term research" and "current operations" centers. One explanation for how these conditions most likely developed was the lack of machine time at NSA and the accomplishment by JSPC of certain data-base projects. It further seemed that NSA's need to maintain capability for immediate response to Washington-level customers—to maintain a current research posture—directly contributed to these conditions. The ORG had recommended a return to the days when term research was accomplished at NSA and current operations were the responsibility of the JSPC. They saw this to be possible through a new and more realistic division of effort, and in the availability of necessary machine time at NSA. The ORG reasoned...
that with the advent of AG-22 inputs via data links, and with the machines programmed to handle timely data at NSA, the principal raison d'être for a JSPC would no longer exist. Indeed, test evidence showed that field units could collect and forward total collection via data link to NSA on a timely and accurate basis.

The ORG's findings later served as inputs to the blueprint for the JSPC drawdown, discussed later in this document.
IV. The Last Years

The last two or three years of the JSPC’s existence can be described variously. They were years of maturity in applying lessons learned, years of gradually waning pressures on all elements of the Center except the Air Division, and they might be best described as simply what they most certainly were—hectic, final years.

When the B Group Operational Review Group (ORG) departed, it left a legacy of unprecedented introspection. This introspection tended to soften the hard lines of autonomous actions, and it made managers and analysts alike more aware of the need to work with, rather than apart from, their counterparts at NSA. As rumors of drawing down or closing out the JSPC appeared to be less rumor than imminent reality, some of the earlier dynamism and aggressiveness of the work force began to fade.

These impressions are not to imply that motivation and quality of action were lacking during this period. Those who cared the most and worked the hardest—that type of person the JSPC seemed always and abundantly blessed with, even to develop these professionals continued their efforts. But that long-present sense of urgency was fading, slowly but inexorably, and everyone was aware that it was. Fewer and fewer persons could be found at work on weekends and after hours. The targets no longer presented quite the same challenge. The impact on the Center of the scope and tempo of U.S. operations in Southeast Asia was changing. Attention seemed to be shifting to the USSR and its strengthening of forces along the Sino-Soviet borders. The Cultural Revolution had passed in Communist China, and in its aftermath there was none of the same potentially threatening anti-U.S. activity that had preceded the revolution.

Watchfulness over target communications continued, and even minor aberrations were viewed with studied suspicion. But except for the new and concentrated efforts at the JSPC on North Vietnamese General Directorate of Rear Service (GDRS) communications, and the flurry of cryptologic actions following the loss of the Pueblo and the shootdown of the EC-121, most elements of the Center conducted business as usual. Nearly all of the challenge the JSPC faced during the last few years was centered in JSPC-3, the Air Division, where GDRS and ESDS demands prevailed even into the drawdown era, and where the JSPC involvement with GDRS was to outlive the Center as a responsibility of NRYYU.

Thus the record of the last years is a record largely of JSPC’s role in supporting the Peripheral Air Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) and the CINCPAC COMMANDO MERCURY program of protecting the PARPRO.

ESDS to PARPRO

The 15 April 1969 North Korean shootdown of a U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft triggered re-examination of the U.S. world-wide aerial reconnaissance program. For approximately nine months thereafter, JSPC played a primary role in the Pacific Theater as a focal point for cryptologic support to the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO). The experience proved to be both traumatic and triumphant.

By 19 April JCS had directed a review of all data obtained from airborne collection platforms. In response, NSA began to collect precise data on each mission, the value or uniqueness of the data each mission produced (as compared with ground-based sites) and the potential frequency and priority of each mission. Concurrently, and of immediate concern, was the protection of scheduled aerial missions. U.S. air and naval forces were on full alert during the weeks that followed the shootdown, and although a number of missions were cancelled, specific fighter caps were committed to protect the most important missions. Thus, while the problem of providing sustained support and a reliable potential for protective cover to ACRP missions was being developed, the valuable ACRP program was maintained albeit at a greatly reduced level.

The necessity for airborne collection was reaffirmed. The fundamental question was one of “risk versus results.” It was evident that protection for reconnaissance flights into sensitive areas required more coordination between the Sigint community and protective operational forces.

By 22 April it had been determined that protection of all reconnaissance programs under the existing PARPRO was beyond the capability of theater resources. Under his Phase I protection plans, CINC-
PAC suggested to JCS that full PARPRO schedules should not be resumed until national level consideration had been given to the program. Required fighter and tanker support, GCI radar augmentation, use of carrier task groups with a self-contained GCI capability, and other ancillary requirements being considered, it seemed that there was no economical way to provide protection to PARPRO aircraft along 2,000 miles of the China coast.

While JCS, PACAF and CINC PAC developed and coordinated their operational plans (OPLANS), the JSPC and NSAPAC Office Japan coordinated on a message to SAF/USFJ addressing the need for Sigint sites to receive timely operational information on U.S. Air Force and Naval actions to protect PARPRO missions over the Sea of Japan. This joint message stressed the need for fighter time of launch and rendezvous points to be disseminated to Sigint sites and to the JSPC on the most timely basis possible. Timely receipt of operational reports (OPREPs) had already proved vital to the combined response of Sigint sites and the JSPC throughout the air war in Southeast Asia. Their principal value was that of guidance to the cryptologic task of concentrating attention and resources on certain targets and areas at important times. Clearly, similar information was vital to any success the cryptologic community would have in supporting the PARPRO program.

By early May the JCS had decreed that PARPRO missions could not fly closer than 50 nautical miles to the Soviet, North Korean and Chinese coastlines and that in some areas, fighter protection was mandatory. A new Condition Four warning line was therefore established. Fighter escorts were required for all reconnaissance flights within sensitive areas over the Sea of Japan, while other missions depended upon strip alert forces for protection. By the end of May PACAF Operations Plans 103-YR and 106-YR had been validated and respectively defined operational concepts and CAP/SAR support requirements for PARPRO activity along the Soviet, North Korean and Chinese peripheries in the PACOM area. Protection of these missions was to rely upon early warning radar information and fighters on strip alerts as available from:

a. A U.S. Navy CGl picket ship off the coast of North Korea.
b. Task Force 71 forces in the Yellow Sea.
c. Strip alert posture for fighters at Misawa, Japan, and at various bases in South Korea, and soon thereafter, fighters based on Okinawa and Taiwan.

As these OPLANS were implemented, Command Advisory Functions (CAFs) were activated at Osan Air Base, South Korea (314 Air Division/5th Air Force ADVON), Naha Air Base, Okinawa (313th Air Division/51st Tactical Fighter Interceptor Wing), Taipei Air Station, Taiwan (327th Air Division) and Clark AFB, Philippines (13th Air Force). These CAFs were to receive and act upon information pertaining to PARPRO missions and as required, direct protective actions. Sigint was preeminent to the success of the CAF mission.

In grossly over-simplified terms, the plans for cryptologic support stated that Sigint sites would pass intercepted reflections of PARPRO missions to the CAF in that site's immediate area. Conceptually sound as it was, fulfillment of this requirement posed a challenge. PARPRO missions typically drew reactions from target communications as the mission progressed. Since the missions of Sigint sites were target oriented and largely determined by hearability and organization of the target, more than one Sigint site would obtain reflections of a PARPRO mission—reflections of value to a CAF in an area other than the one in which the site was located. Rapid movement of this information to the concerned CAF was essential but not feasible via normal CRITICOMM channels because direct lateral communications between sites did not then exist and standard traffic routes were too slow.

With implementation of the USAF CAF system, a separate, secure communications system was planned to link each CAF with its headquarters and with appropriate Sigint units. Since this system was not immediately available, however, the cryptologic community was called upon for interim assistance. The most obvious action was for the JSPC to serve as the focal point for all PARPRO related Sigint and to ensure delivery of that information to appropriate CAFs.

Since the JSPC maintained direct OPSCOMM circuits with all USAFSS sites, these circuits would enable the JSPC to receive, filter and relay PARPRO-related Sigint to the USAFSS site closest to the CAF most concerned. The useability of OPSCOMM circuits was questioned, but their use for this relay purpose precluded their use for the informal analyst-to-analyst exchanges for which the circuits had been obtained. The CAFs first required one plot every minute on the location of the PARPRO mission as shown in intercepted target communications. Thus during a mission, the flight following and data forwarding requirement took precedence over any other OPSCOMM use. The first timely flight following provided to the CAF system was on 14 June over the Yellow Sea. Because of its route from Korea to Taiwan, it provided considerable initial insight into the nature of the challenge of providing timely Sigint service.
Authority to directly task Sigint units with direct service is inherent in INFOCON No. 4011 held by all unified and specified commands. These provisions were invoked on a mission-by-mission basis from the beginning of the program until August 1969, when tasking could be avoided. Each Air Division submitted its requests for Sigint Direct Service (SDS) to the NSA field office in the area who in turn relayed the request to the JSPC for levy on appropriate USAFSS sites. “Information” receipt of the request at the JSPC concurrent with its receipt by the NSA field office enabled the JSPC to initiate more timely tasking action, even before the request was automatically forwarded by NSA field office.

By mid-July considerable experience in SDS had been acquired both by Sigint producers and customers alike. During the PARPRO Conference at Headquarters 5th Air Force, Fuchu, Japan, on 9 and 10 July, five major points were agreed upon:

a. Sigint sites would continue to provide SDS via the JSPC circuits until unique USAFSS circuitry under the COMMAND MERCURY plan was obtained;

b. When this communications problem was solved, Sigint sites would provide information only and directly to the appropriate USAF Reconnaissance Operations Center (ROC);

c. The requirement for SDS in the form of a tracking plot every minute was reduced to one plot every five minutes unless the target overly reacted to the mission, whereupon the requirement would revert to the plot-each-minute level for both mission and hostile aircraft;

d. JSPC agreed to accept tasking every 15 days on scheduled missions to alleviate the administrative load faced by tasking commands until a long-term PACAF tasking action was formalized; and

e. The gap in SDS between 27 and 31 degrees North Latitude was divided between the 327th and 314th Air Divisions, Taipei and Osan respectively, until the 313th Air Division on Okinawa could assume responsibility for the area.

Installation of lateral OPSCOMM circuits between USAFSS sites to enable bypass of the JSPC relay function was expected soon, as was installation of the USAF CAF interconnecting command communications system. JSPC enthusiastically committed additional personnel and much administrative time to procedures that would ensure maximum SDS, but reluctantly sacrificed the concurrent loss of important technical dialogue with outlying SCA units. Comprehensive “emergency direct Sigint service instructions (EDSS)” (the first term used) were formulated and passed to all first instance reporting sites in finite definition of their and the JSPC roles.

By October 1969 it was manifestly clear that ESDS had become a primary function of the JSPC Air Division.

Analytic and related functions continued, yet with all OPSCOMM circuits with USAFSS sites preempted for ESDS, vital analyst-to-analyst exchanges were possible only on rare occasions. JSPC managers feared that this decreased contact with and support to outlying sites would have deleterious effects on the combined SCA and JSPC missions. Reaction was anticipated from the sites and the Pacific Security Region (PACSCTYRGN) headquarters in Hawaii. As concern increased at the JSPC, actions were taken to clarify and express the weakness and potential danger seen in the role of the Center. One of the more descriptive of these statements appeared in the JSPC Weekly Activity Report (WAR) during October, 1969, extracted in part below:

JSPC—The Weak Link in Emergency Direct Sigint Service
The entire community...must be made aware of the weakness existent in the Direct Sigint Service... provided on an emergency basis in support of PACAF OPLANS 103-69 and 106-69.

The weak link in the system is JSPC...no action (was taken) after the Pueblo loss to establish rapid, secure communications for command and control...until after the 15 April 1969 loss of the EC-121...As a result, the U&S Commands had only limited ability to handle information required by OPLANS 103-69 and 106-69, and no alternative to reliance upon the Sigint community's OPSCOMM network for forward and cross-tell of Sigint-derived tracking data. Therefore, finds itself serving in the role of communications relay for this U&S Command forward and cross-tell of data. Discussions in the theater indicate that, in spite of the specification in the basic JSPC tasking message, many commands are totally unaware of this JSPC role, they assume that all data is coming from the local Security Service site...ESDS has been provided on over 183 missions to date (23 October). In general, this service has been relatively flawless. The fear...is that one day, in the midst of as many as seven missions in one day for which JSPC is providing ESDS, a real emergency will occur and JSPC will find itself saturated and unable to respond, and the U&S Commands will not receive the very information needed for which this entire operation was established. The reputation of JSPC and NSA will be sullied, and we may again find ourselves on the defensive of an indictment for denying the commands Sigint required and requested. Additional people...is not the answer; improvement of...JSPC physical facilities will alleviate but not resolve the weakness...The Sigint system was not designed, programmed or tasked to do this job on a continuing basis...there is no guarantee that it can be continued on a routine basis, or that it may not fail at a critical time.

Statements such as this and reaction to them may or may not have provided much impetus to quicker acquisition of operational COMMANDO MERCURY communications, but the point had been made and resulted in cryptologic actions to alleviate the danger.

During November the Operations Officer of PACSC-TYRGN, accompanied by representatives from USAFSS and USA-513 at Yokota, visited the JSPC to review existing links as a total “BULLMOOSE-type” “stunt-boxed” USAFSS OPSCOMM network. A plan was developed for four new circuits to link...
USA-69 at Shu Lin Kou, USA-68 with USA-69, USN-69 with USA-57 at Clark Air Base, and USA-38 at Onna Point with USA-69. The 314th Air Division would be served directly by USA-31, which in turn would be linked with USA-38, USA-58 and USN-39 at Kami Seya; lateral circuits existed between USA-30 at Misawa and USA-38, between USA-38 and USA-58, USA-38 and USN-39, and between USA-38 and 5th Air Force Headquarters at Fuchu. The 313th Air Division would be served by USA-68 linked with USA-69 and the 327th Air Division would be served by USA-69 linked with USA-58, USA-68, USA-57—the latter in turn linked with USA-32 at Danang who was linked with USA-29 at Udorn.

Together, these OPSCOMM circuits would enable bypass of the JSPC in direct site-to-site forwarding and site-to-CAF reporting, while concurrently feeding data to the JSPC to enable the Center to function in a network backup role.

PACSCTYRGN insisted that its sites should provide Sigint only to the point of decision—a single point, the CAF most concerned—and that it was a CAF responsibility to cross-tell or forward-tell the information to other command units. This overall plan was fully supported by the JSPC, who recommended that an additional OPSCOMM link was required between USA-58 and USA-68.

While this systemic goal was under pursuit, the ESDS program was expanded to include U.S. Naval units. By December 1969, CINCPACFLT approved an ESDS test involving the USS Coral Sea on station in the Yellow Sea. A five-day test began on 18 December to consist of data forwarded to the JSPC by appropriate sites. JSPC was to relay the data to USA-31 who in turn would pass the data to USN-39 for broadcast via the NORSTAR (TACINTEL) net to the USS Coral Sea. Although somewhat circuitous, this plan for data forwarding appeared to be the best avenue available.

During March 1970, PACAF and CINCPACFLT ESDS requirements were combined for all CINCPAC elements. Concurrent with release of these requirements, JSPC issued a comprehensive message on the subject, defined the CINCPAC requirements and detailed procedures to be followed by USAFSS sites. This message, JSPC-3/270, 29J447Z APR 70, later served as the basic working aid for USAFSS preparation of TECHINS No. 4067.

On 1 April 1970, the USAFSS COMMANDO MERCURY site-to-site OPSCOMM system was activated. All sites were instructed to pass ESDS data via this system and to use links to the JSPC only when direct links were not available. Thus after an interim period of some nine months during which over 1100 missions were supported, the direct role of the JSPC in ESDS ended. OPSCOMM circuits connecting the JSPC with outlying SCA units returned to their primary roles of interanalyst exchange and general technical support, but by that time, the drawdown of the JSPC mission had begun.

Reversion Planning

In 1970 the U.S. and Japanese governments began negotiating the many complex issues involved in shifting administrative control of one million Ryukyuans back to Japan. The Japanese decided to resolve these kinds of problems in joint U.S. and Japanese sessions, with each side having working groups to draft required policies and working criteria.

In early 1970 the Joint Sobe Processing Center was directed by NSA to participate in U.S. working groups on Okinawa and assist in drafting protection policies that would ensure against electronic and radio frequency encroachment regarding sensitive Sigint collection sites.

was directed to follow-up JSPC/Okinawa sub-committee recommendations during related working discussions in Japan. The most important contribution made by JSPC with regard to the protection of U.S. Okinawa Sigint sites from electronic encroachment was the preparation of a package of electromagnetic and radio frequency interference protection criteria.

By way of historical background, the job of preparing these criteria was given to CINCPACREP Sub-committee Six in May 1967, and after numerous local meetings, it was decided by sub-committee members that JSPC should prepare the initial draft, since JSPC appeared to be the most knowledgeable on this subject. Engineers assisted JSPC in its preparation in May 1970 and submitted it for Okinawa sub-committee ratification. An engineering workshop was set up in December 1970 to resolve the engineering problems related to the EMI/RFI protection packages.

After appropriate modification, packages were prepared at JSPC and submitted for Okinawa sub-committee ratification. They were approved and sent to Japan in January 1971 for further discussion and approval. At the same time the Department of Defense decided that Onna Point would be retained and probably used in the future.

Another EMI/RFI package was then prepared within three days of the directive and in an additional two days
Drawdown

The fate of the Joint Sobe Processing Center was truly sealed on the 20th of February 1970 when the Chief, Colonel Graydon K. Eubank, USAF, and the Deputy Chief, [redacted] received Bravo Group telecon Item Nr. 07, Subject: Preliminary Draft of Plan for Realignment of JSPC. From that time on, planning went forward and the Joint Sobe Processing Center drew down efficiently and rapidly between June 1970 and July 1971. The initial drawdown timetables were developed by office chiefs and subelement managers within NSA and forwarded to JSPC. Thereafter, the management and operation of drawdown procedures resulted from frequent interaction between the JSPC divisions and staffs and their counterparts at NSA. The success of the drawdown, measured in terms of continuity of action, was a direct result of the factors listed below.

a. Drawdown management was exercised by subelement managers at NSA and division chiefs at JSPC, rather than a strong central or neutral authority;
b. Tasks and responsibilities were transferred after the receiving element demonstrated the ability to perform and accept them;
c. Use of a flexible timetable, rather than a rigid one, insured that tasks would not be transferred prematurely; and, most importantly,
d. NSA and JSPC personnel worked together to achieve optimum drawdown results.

Subelement management of the drawdown proved a key part of the drawdown. By separating drawdown actions by subelement, NSA allowed JSPC divisions and branches to actively participate in, and accept as a goal, each drawdown action. Thus, the subelement management control approach engaged the very people who might not have otherwise felt so personally and deeply involved, and ensured the success of the operation.

Because the direction and control of the JSPC drawdown was subelement structured, detailed descriptions of the drawdown will be by JSPC division/staffs in order that each drawdown action described can be related immediately to adjacent actions.

Ground Forces Division

Although tentatively scheduled to begin during October 1970, the drawdown of the JSPC-1, actually began during Decem-
The NSA civilian Deputy Chief of JSPC-11 was attached to USM-3 as a technical representative of B21. TEXTA and CMA authorities for the entities absorbed by USM-3 were returned to NSA during May 1971.

With the transfer of JSPC-11 to USM-3, JSPC-1 ceased to function. The staff organizations of JSPC-102/103/104/105 and the Office of the Chief, JSPC-1 were deactivated. The second echelon processing and reporting functions of JSPC-1 had been relinquished to NSA (B21).

Navy Division

NSA defined the terms of the drawdown of the JSPC-2. The schedule for the drawdown, however, was developed by JSPC-2 and received NSA's approval during July 1970. According to this schedule, the drawdown would begin during August 1970 and continue to fruition in July 1971. NSA's major consideration was the augmentation of the processing and reporting resources within B22 prior to completion of the phase-out. B22 estimated that 35 additional analysts and technicians would be needed; the JSPC-2 plan provided for the staggered transfer of 23 JSPC-2 personnel to B22 to help meet that requirement.

Although originally begun as a separate phase-out action, the return of second echelon processing and reporting tasks for JSPC-2 generally coincided and shared a common cause with the official drawdown. This phase-out planning, therefore, was incorporated into the official drawdown planning for the whole center.

The transfer began during May 1970. NSA (G7) assumed responsibility for reporting on NSA (B51) began publication of the [publication date] during June. The official drawdown began on schedule during August. NSA (B51) assumed publication of the [publication date] Summary on the 14th. The final portion of JSPC-24 responsibilities was transferred to NSA (B51) during January 1971. B51 began publication of the [publication date] on 1 January. JSPC-24 was deactivated on that date.

B22 took over second echelon Processing and Reporting tasks on the [date] during October 1970.

And in December, JSPC-212 relinquished to B22 its P and R responsibilities for JSPC-212, however, continued to monitor NSF developments until mid-April to allow for the submission of intelligence items to JSPC-05 for entry in the USF-790 Daily Sigint Summary.

During January 1971, JSPC-2 returned to B22, TEXTA and collection management authorities for all entities except those of the [entities which were returned during May]. Also in May, JSPC-2 turned over to B22 second echelon P and R responsibilities for

The second echelon processing and reporting effort against communications was assumed by B22 during June 1971.

First Echelon Processing and Reporting

In preparation for assumption of first echelon Processing and Reporting tasks for B22 by 1 January 1971, JSPC-2 transferred analysts and reporters to between September and December 1970, allocated space within the JSPC-2 area and gathered equipment for use. The newly-formed Processing and Reporting Division began operation as scheduled on 1 January 1971. The P and R Division assumed the additional tasks of transcribing, analyzing and reporting ACRP intercept of communications during February. In April, JSPC-2 transferred the task of preparing STRUM on [date].

The drawdown of JSPC-2 was completed by mid-June, slightly ahead of schedule.

During the early drawdown planning stages, NSA envisioned a residual effort at JSPC against [A]
minimum of 188 analytic and reporting billets were to remain in a current operations unit. As the drawdown progressed, however, this direction was changed in favor of a complete drawdown of the Air Division. Even though formal planning for the JSPC-3 drawdown was slow to develop, the phaseout of this division was the first to begin and the first to be completed.

North Vietnamese Air/Air Defense

During August 1970, JSPC-31, the North Vietnamese Air/Air Defense Branch, ceased publication of the North Vietnamese Radar Summary (NRS). Beginning on 18 August, NRS highlights were included in the NAS (North Vietnamese Air Summary). NSA (B31) did not continue to publish the NRS. JSPC-31 relinquished collection management and TEXTA authorities and technical support tasks for VCA/V/T communications to B31 on 1 September. B31 assumed data-base maintenance for all NVN Air/Air Defense entities during November. JSPC-31 cryptanalytic tasks for the Air Surveillance, SAM/AAA and remaining entities were transferred during November 1970, December 1970 and January 1971. Also during January, B31 assumed responsibility for the NVN SAM/MI/G Disposition of Forces effort.

JSPC-31 published the last NAS on 28 February; B31 began publishing it on 1 March. Before assuming that responsibility, B31 tech-phased the report in its final weeks; JSPC-31 reporters, assisted by the JSPC-3 Reconnaissance Specialist and the JSPC-05 Senior Reporter, prepared the NAS and reviewed NSA tech-phasing inputs. Simultaneously, USA-522 began publication of the Mission Results Technical Summary (MRTS) under the tutelage of JSPC-31 analysts. B31 assumed responsibility for the remaining P and R tasks on 1 March, thus bringing JSPC-31 operations to a close. The Chief, JSPC-31, remained with USA-522 in the ensuing months to assist in its newly formed P and R effort.

The JSPC-32, began its drawdown by transferring the responsibility for analysis, as appropriate, on 15 August 1970. On the 30th, the Weekly Inter-airfield Flight Summary (containing a recapitulation for NSA and of all inter-airfield flight activities not reported in product) was assumed by B32. On 1 September JSPC-32 transferred to B52 and B33, appropriately, the responsibility for maintaining the Technical Radar Order-of-Battle, and data base maintenance of the aforementioned entities— including the Bomber and Fighter entities. On the same date:

JSPC-32 cryptanalytic efforts on the air surveillance problem were relinquished to B34 on 1 December; B34 assumed the remainder on 1 January 1971. On 1 February, JSPC-32 transferred its CHURCHDOOR intercept processing responsibility to USA-69. B33 assumed responsibilities for the Bomber and Transport DASUMs on 15 February and the remainder of JSPC-32's P and R effort on 1 March; JSPC-32's operations ceased.

Reconnaissance Reporting

JSPC-36, the Current Operations Branch, and JSPC-31 performed all reconnaissance (RECON) reaction reporting tasks within the JSPC. JSPC-31 reported on BUFFALO HUNTER/BELFRY EXPRESS missions; JSPC-36 reported on all others.

The drawdown of reconnaissance reporting began in July with the return to NSA (B35) of 72-hour wrap-up reporting on GIANT SCALE, GIANT NAIL, CHURCHDOOR, and selected BEGGAR SHADOW and BENCH ROYAL missions. By 1 September, only BUFFALO HUNTER/BELFRY EXPRESS reporting missions remained. Those were returned to B35 on 1 March 1971. JSPC-36 also was tasked with Sigint Direct Service tasking and timely reconnaissance support. These responsibilities, except timely support to OL-RK at Kadena Air Base (GIANT SCALE flight following), were returned to NSA (B35) on 8 February 1971. B35 assumed the GIANT SCALE flight following responsibility on the 17th. The OPSCOMM circuits under the control of JSPC-36 were relinquished to NRRYU on 1 March 1971, and JSPC-36 ceased all operations.
The only remaining operational element, the Language Support Branch (JSPC-44), was redesignated on 1 July as a part of the Okinawa Support Team under NRRYU.

### Data Processing Division

The drawdown of the Data Processing Division, JSPC-5, was carried out in two phases. Each phase resulted in discontinuation of one IBM computer system; each computer was returned to the IBM Corporation. The scheduled phase-out of this division was completely dependent upon the phased closeouts of the JSPC-1/2/3 and 4 divisions since JSPC-5 provided their machine support. To insure an orderly drawdown of machine functions, JSPC-5 constructed a series of flow charts depicting the families of programs being employed, especially displaying those programs that used the outputs of one or more programs. In this way, JSPC-5 effectively isolated those programs that could be phased out independently and those that could be phased out only as parts of a family.

During November 1970, JSPC-5 sent a status report to NSA (C5) concerning the transfer or discontinuance of jobs performed on the two computer systems. The report not only detailed, by job, those programs that had been discontinued or transferred, but it also contained proposals and solicited comments on programs that would be affected as the drawdown advanced. During December, NSA accepted JSPC-5's proposals with few exceptions.

Of the 69 jobs run on the IBM 360/30 computer system deactivated during December 1970, NSA assumed 27. Forty-two jobs were discontinued. Among the major jobs that NSA assumed were the STRUM and PAG programs for JSPC-1, and the SPAR, Basic Weather Records and Weather ELFAIR program for JSPC-3.

JSPC-5 deactivated the second IBM 360/30 system during June 1971. Fifty-three jobs were performed on this computer, less those for JSPC-5 purposes only. During the second phase of the drawdown only 17 were discontinued.

NSA assumed such jobs as the Transport ELFAIR programs for JSPC-3 and the and STRUM First Heard for JSPC-4. Since JSPC-5 programs were not fully compatible with those of NSA (C5), NSA was required to write a conversion program for each software package assumed from JSPC-5.

### Staff Groups

The JSPC staff groups played a key role during the drawdown. While most of the actual drawdown scope and timetable were directed by the divisions concerned, the JSPC staffs were concerned with monitoring and paperwork management of closing the Center.
Management Staff, JSPC-02, prepared JSPC personnel for return to CONUS or reassignment elsewhere. Phased out JSPC regulations as appropriate, and continued operations such as document control and supply. The Collection Management Staff, JSPC-03, was responsible for drawing down the technical input and output to the Center by amending TECHINS 1043 annexes and the Technical Distribution Catalog. Correspondingly, on the production side, the Intelligence Staff, JSPC-05, handled incoming and outgoing product distribution drawdown actions. JSPC-07, the Security Staff, debriefed all military departees. The Operations Watch, JSPC-01, directed the diminution of the massive internal distribution system. Generally, staff actions were concerned more with the drawdown in the divisions and, with one exception, less with their own phase-out.

None of the staff's were drawn down completely. Portions of the functions remained with the NRRYU Operations Staff, the JSPC Security Staff remained intact under the Chief, NRRYU.

The JSPC-01 Staff, comprising the Executive Officer to the Chief, JSPC/NRRYU, and the Operations Watch, drew down with the Center's closure at 0900 local time on 1 July 1971 (30 June, 2400 hours Zulu Time). The Executive Officer's function was abolished with JSPCS close. Reduced Operations Watch functions were transferred to NRRYU during June with control of the OPSCOMM equipment thereafter maintained by the Operations Watch Office under NRRYU.

The NRRYU Staff absorbed the civilian and military personnel functions, the travel, supply, and document control functions of the Management Staff on 1 June. JSPC-02 relinquished its graphic arts capability to USM-3 during June 1971.

The Collection Management Staff ceased operations during June 1971. All T1043, Technical Distribution and TEXSTA matters were completed by mid-June and the appropriate machine programs supporting those efforts were returned to NSA.

The Operations Staff, JSPC-04, was absorbed by the NRRYU Operations Staff.

The Intelligence Staff, JSPC-05, comprising the Central Reference Library, the Special Projects Office and the Current Intelligence Unit, ceased operations as the Center closed on 1 July. The Special Projects functions were returned to NSA during mid-May 1971.

The BLITZEN Secure Area (Vault) was relinquished to the 6900th Security Squadron.

The Central Reference Library was relinquished to the NRRYU Operations Staff on 1 June.

The Current Intelligence unit of the JSPC-05 staff was the only JSPC staff unit actually to drawdown as an operational unit. Although responsible for maintenance of the Pacific Catalog (PACCAT) and CAG book, this unit's main function, the production of the USF-790 Daily Sigint Summary (DSS), ceased on 14 April. During the drawdown period, B Group forwarded items for submission to the DSS to JSPC-05 via OPSCOMM. B3 sent items concerning movements; B05 provided items concerning developments. JSPC-05 edited and integrated these items with those submitted by the remaining efforts in JSPC divisions. NSA (B05) assumed responsibility for productions of the DSS's successor, the on 15 April following approximately two months of internal preparation and 14 days of tech phasing of the entire As with the NAS in JSPC-31, some tech phasing reports were included in the USF-790 DSS. More limited in geographical coverage than the JSPC DSS, the new NSA provides a comprehensive treatment of developments.

The Security Staff, JSPC-07, was absorbed in toto within the NRRYU. The Chief, JSPC-07, retained his NSAPAC Security Officer functions.

**Conclusion**

If drawdown actions seem to be described in a simple, matter-of-fact style, then we have captured how it happened. Not mentioned, of course, were the hundreds of CRITICOM and OPSCOMM exchanges that occurred before, during and after each drawdown action. These exchanges insured the condition of the drawdown "that no degradation of Sigint service result therefrom."

This preeminent condition was explained in detail to PACOM customers by the Chief and Deputy Chief, JSPC, during the early planning stages of the drawdown. Some customers expressed reservations concerning the lack of an official NSA second echelon center in the PACOM area at a time when the requirements for timely intelligence information were increasing, but they understood and accepted the basic reasons for JSPCs demise.
V. To Be Remembered

The JSPC's ten year history was marked by innumerable projects and situations that seem best remembered outside the context of any particular period. Attacking these challenges, and the many others for which scanty information has survived, was the work-a-day world of the Center and the thousands who served it over the decade.

Housing

The provision of quarters for NSA civilian personnel assigned to JSPC was a controversial issue even before the Center officially opened, and the subject remained to some extent a recurring and controversial one throughout the Center's 10 year history.

As early as May 1961, NSA, through DOD, inquired about government quarters for JSPC civilian personnel. The DA responded that there existed on Okinawa a serious dependent housing shortage and recommended that NSA program for construction of its own housing. On 25 August 1961, in a Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, NSA requested that 33 houses be incorporated in the DOD World-Wide Family Housing Program as separate, extra-service, DOD requirements. The memorandum stipulated that "When constructed, this housing should be under the assignment control of the National Security Agency, but otherwise should be administered and logistically supported by the Department of the Army."

The NSA request was approved by DOD and subsequently included in an appropriations bill approved by Congress. The houses were built and provision was made for occupancy by JSPC civilian personnel. These provisions for occupancy were never forgotten by many JSPC personnel over the years because the agreement allowed integration of 33 modern and comfortable NSA-funded houses with older, appreciably less comfortable Army housing.

Preferential treatment for 33 NSA families was specified in the agreement, but specific eligibility for quarters was to be determined by the USARYIS. Thus the 33 sets of new quarters, all of which were three and four bedroom houses with central air conditioning and electric laundry, were turned over to USARYIS for allocation. Thirty-three families were to get almost immediate occupancy after arriving on Okinawa, but grade criteria including bedroom requirements were to be determined by the Army. Few NSA civilian personnel ever lived in the new quarters, although many ranking Army people immensely enjoyed them. Further, and because for years USARYIS chose to ignore the DOD military-civilian equivalency rating scale, many GS-12s were considered to be "company grade" and therefore received company grade quarters which were grossly inadequate for some families.

When NSA obtained the 33 sets of family quarters, the number was considered adequate to accommodate the anticipated civilian population of the Center. In a few years, however, the civilian population increased to over 60 with a concurrent need for more government housing. JSPC stated its requirement for up to 18 additional sets of quarters. On 4 December 1963, DIRNSA reported that the 65-69 external support requirements had been approved by the Military Department who had then informed the Assistant Secretary of Defense that every effort would be made to supply the required support. The NSA requirement for JSPC civilian personnel for FY 66-70 that was forwarded to the DA included the original 33 sets of family quarters, with occupancy priority to be determined by the Chief of JSPC, and additional family quarters, as necessary, in accordance with local command policy (estimated as 18 additional sets of quarters). On 7 June 1965, DIRNSA stated that ASD had advised that the FY 66-70 external support requirements had been approved and that any local agreement should be based on the document published, even though USARYIS might not be in possession of DA approval. G-4 USARYIS, however, would not accept these additional requirements unless specifically advised to do so by ASD/DA. A long series of meetings and exchanges of memoranda ensued, throughout which JSPC restated its requirement for access to 18 additional sets of government quarters. USARYIS was always sympathetic with the requirement, but refused to accept the responsibility. The issue finally was settled on 6 March 1967 when the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Logistics) disapproved the latter's request to suspend the requirement for the DA to provide 18 additional sets of quarters. Thereafter, USARYIS honored the JSPC requirement.
and a subsequent External Support agreement between USARYIS and JSPC provided for the civilian personnel of the JSPC to have access to a maximum of 51 sets of quarters.

Access to Army quarters for JSPC personnel remained throughout the 10 years on the same basis as all other eligible persons. Most JSPCers—like their military counterparts—were faced with the necessity to purchase washers, dryers, and air conditioners at considerable personal expense.

The bitterness that some NSA "company grade" civilians developed did not contribute constructively to their tour on Okinawa. Their feeling was that the discriminatory situation could have been astutely avoided by NSA management during the formulation of the initial housing agreement. That this view has merit is a matter of opinion. Final judgment should consider that during the early months of JSPC's existence, the relatively sudden influx of an additional complement of civilians did not help an already over-taxed housing situation. United States forces on Okinawa were expanding at a rate disproportionate to the construction of facilities to house and service them. In this environment, and recognizing that in truth NSA civilians were no more deserving of special treatment than were the military people, it might have proved irreversibly provocative and impolitic at minimum to have demanded a different set of rules for the housing of NSA civilians. What the new JSPC needed most was USARYIS's cooperation with numerous support needs, and both NSA and JSPC management involved in the original housing agreement with USARYIS were keenly aware of the need to give and take. It does appear that some over-acquiescence to USARYIS occurred, and that, for example, JSPC might easily have obtained its own community of houses from USARYIS without too many ill feelings or other disadvantage. But, again, this is a matter of opinion; the fact remains that USARYIS afforded treatment to NSA civilians no less in quality than it afforded the military families under its jurisdiction, and only a few JSPC civilian families ever were subjected to hardship other than financial as a result of the initial housing agreement. Those who were, had unquestionable reason to be displeased. It was less than fully enjoyable for a family of six to survive a tour with two bedrooms.

**External Support**

The establishment of an NSA field activity with the mission and size of the JSPC, and so far from home base at Ft. Meade meant that substantial logistic support would have to be provided by various military departments and other DOD agencies on Okinawa. On 7 April 1961, before the opening of the Center, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations sent a memorandum to the Service Secretaries, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Directors of the Defense Communications Agency and the Armed Forces Courier Service, concerning non-reimbursable support provided to NSA by the military departments and DOD agencies. The following portion of that memorandum subsequently served as a basis for establishing external support for the JSPC:

The military departments and DOD agencies will provide all types of support to the National Security Agency on a non-reimbursable basis. Any exception to this policy must be mutually acceptable to all parties concerned.

On 19 January 1962, with operational activation of the JSPC imminent, the Department of the Army sent to CINCUSARPAC, for relay to USARYIS, a message containing the following statement:
OSD has designated DA to provide administrative and logistical support to Joint Signal Processing Center (JSPC) and components.

To facilitate DA staffing request advice by 24 Jan 62 on status of USARYIS Program and Budget for JSPC for FY62 and 63. Identify manpower, cost appropriation program and/ or project financing or unfunded.

USARYIS had not programmed to support the JSPC and in response estimated the total cost of support to be $210,000 for the five remaining months of FY62 and $500,000 for FY63. USARYIS also advised DA that the FY62 requirements were not financed in the USARYIS Budget. Available records do not offer precise insight into what resulted from this USARYIS response; however, support to JSPC commenced with operational activation of the Center on 1 February 1962. Thus it is inferred that DA either accepted financial responsibility for the FY62 costs or some arrangement was made for NSA reimbursement.

The earliest available Inter-Service Support Agreement (ISSA) between JSPC and USARYIS is dated effective 1 July 1965 and signed by the Chief, JSPC, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, USARYIS. That agreement, like its successors, delineated in generalities and specific responsibilities of the parties to the agreement. The 51st U.S. Army Security Agency Special Operations Command is included as a party to the agreement, but not a signatory. The inclusion of the 51st SOC and its successor USASAFS, Sobe, in support arrangements between JSPC and USARYIS resulted from an arrangement between the two Army commands wherein USASAFS, Sobe, would act as an agent for USARYIS, since certain requirements of the JSPC could best be met by the collocated field station. Examples were the installation, operation and maintenance of telephones and the physical security of the JSPC operations area.

The interjection of the Field Station as an agent subsequently led to an ISSA between that command and JSPC in 1965. These agreements specifically stated that all funding arrangements were the responsibility of USARYIS and the JSPC.

In FY68, the ISSA with USARYIS became a tripartite agreement when, because of a realignment of Army missions on Okinawa, the USASTRATCOM Signal Group, Okinawa, assumed responsibility for communications support.

Typical of the costs involved in the support provided by USARYIS is the following budget estimate for FY68:

- Maintenance and Repair Facility: $30,000
- Utilities: $5,000
- Custodial Services: $7,000
- Family Housing: $24,800
- Bachelor Quarters: $4,800
- Transportation Support: $16,000
- Supplies: $200,000
- Other Installation Support: $26,600

**TOTAL: $429,200**

Exhibit

As part of the program for the collection and processing of data from the communications satellite system, an NSA study of possible intercept sites indicated that Okinawa was one of the several possible prime intercept locations. JSPC was informed of the results of this study in May, 1967. NSA requested that JSPC explore the possibility of obtaining 15–20 acres of land for use as an intercept site, and investigate the feasibility of locating some 250–300 civilian personnel to man the facility. Discussions were conducted with local military organizations and the requisite information was forwarded.

In December 1966 JSPC learned that the Government of Japan (GOJ) had surveyed several sites on Okinawa with a view towards establishing a satellite tracking station. One of the GOJ sites was in the vicinity of a proposed site at Onna Point. It was later...
ascertained that the equipment proposed for the Japanese installation would not interfere with operations at the [redacted] site.

An NSA Project Management team, headed by the NSA project manager, [redacted] arrived in April 1967 to visit the proposed [redacted] sites. Several of the proposed sites [redacted] were immediately eliminated for RFI reasons. Ultimately, two sites were accepted as candidates for the location of the [redacted] complex; the site in the vicinity of Onna Point and a second site in northern Okinawa. The site in the Onna Point area was to be logistically supported from the USAF while the site in northern [redacted] was to be supported from a newly constructed support complex located at [redacted]. On 13 April, the [redacted] Management Team, JSPC and the [redacted] representatives met to determine construction requirements for the respective intercept sites and logistic support areas. The requirements were forwarded to the Okinawa District Engineers Office for cost estimates to be presented NLT 1 June 1967.

On 28 May 1967, a contract RFI team arrived on Okinawa to survey the selected sites; the Onna Point site from 29 May to 3 June and 10 through 12 June, and the northern Okinawa site between 5 and 11 June. During October 1967 the JSPC was informed that the Okinawa [redacted] program had been dropped because of excessive RFI at the sites surveyed.

Joint Action Board

U.S. intelligence objectives within the framework of established guidelines and exchange limitations, JSPC, as the NSA field processing activity responsible for target-wide exploitation of a number of [redacted] targets, was vitally concerned with the GRC effort as it related to exploitation of common targets.

From the time the JSPC was activated in early 1962, the Center enjoyed a cordial but not altogether satisfactory relationship with [redacted] from 1962 to 1964 minor technical problems were resolved through correspondence and informal visits by JSPC personnel to [redacted] with...
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vyed to [redacted] without expanding or raising the level of the U.S. and [redacted] relationship.

The first meeting of the Joint Action Board was held on 10 June 1965 at [redacted]. The meeting served to codify the JAB procedures, establish the frequency and place of subsequent meetings, and in general, set forth the direction and scope of the JAB program within the agreed TOR.

JAB meetings subsequently produced nearly 300 formal recommendations and innumerable informal recommendations and actions. Over the years and in supplement to formal JAB actions, a variety of technical actions were initiated and resolved by means of OPSCOMM and CRITICOMM channels connecting JSPC and [redacted].

At 1000 hours on 8 April 1971, a historic meeting of the JAB occurred—the 45th and last in which JSPC served as the official NSA representative. Authority for organizing formal NSA inputs to the Board was passed to NSAPAC [redacted].

The close of the JSPC brought to an end nearly six years of open discussion, problem-solving, and direct interface between JSPC analysts and [redacted]. Without direct participation by personnel intimately familiar with the technical problems inherent in [redacted] Sigint materials, the JAB would not likely have proved successful. The JAB was unique as a concept because it enabled NSA Field Activities to have direct contact with [redacted].

The benefits thus gained in the communication of problems and corrective actions was well worth the efforts to gain approval of the concept.

It will remain vitally important that NSA offices and divisions, having assumed the functions of the JSPC, not fail to follow through on the groundwork laid for them in the JAB by the JSPC. Notable successes were possible through the JAB mechanism, and these are obvious future gains. The dynamic potential of dialogue between NSA analysts and managers and [redacted] personnel was stressed during the 45th JAB meeting.

[redacted] expressed his "deep gratitude and appreciation for the highly significant contribution made by JSPC to the Board’s deliberations since inception in June, 1965.” “This effort,” he reported, had been "a key factor in enabling the board to fulfill its mission and to bring about extensive improvements in the Sigint Product provided by [redacted].

On behalf of the Director, NSA, the Chief of JSPC presented the NSA position on the JAB and commitment of future actions with the following:

NSA wishes to reaffirm the importance of the JAB arrangement and to congratulate all concerned in the manner in which object-
papers per month. ELFI and ELFAIR discriminants were used by the local Okinawa CRITCOMM station, CRS-O, to select and route materials coming in from USASA and USAFSS sites to JSPC-5, where seven reperforators were available for around-the-clock operation. Model 1903 paper tape reader equipment used by JSPC-5 enabled conversion to magnetic tape at a rate of 500 characters per second for subsequent computer manipulation and production of analysts’ listings.

These first two programs were faster and more efficient than anything existing previously at PACOM Sigint units. EDPM capabilities at the new JSPC supported a type of second echelon analysis never before possible in the theater.

By 1963, ELFI had been improved as REDELFI—Reduced Electrical Forwarding Instructions—and required only a one-time punch of indicative information at SCA units. This improvement reduced punch time and groupage at the sites in favor of a computer expansion to the original format during loading of the analytic data at the JSPC.

After two years of activity, an IBM 1460 system replaced one IBM 1401 to enable faster and more flexible computer operations. The new 1460 used existing 1401 programs. The two systems were operated at an average of 500 hours each per month and continued as the basic JSPC-5 data handling system until the summer of 1967.

Late in 1965 and early in 1966, NSA implemented a standardized data recording format for cryptologic use worldwide called STRUM—Standard Technical Report Using Modules (ref. TECHINS No. 1022). Initially, B Group stated that unless C Group could provide immediate programs to handle this new format, change to the STRUM program could not be made on B Group (and JSPC) problems. After much deliberation of requirements, and some inevitable compromise between JSPC, B and C Groups, C Group modified STRUM as Fixed Field (FF) STRUM and provided the program support required by B Group. JSPC personnel participated in the development of software to produce formatted records from FF STRUM. When implemented at the JSPC and related SCA units in September 1966, FF STRUM applied only to the problem of handling of paper tapes was recognized as one of the more necessary aspects of the EDPM system, and ways of minimizing this problem were constantly searched for. Paper tape was the medium through which about 90% of all data was received for machine processing.

Nearly all (approximately 98%) incoming data for machine processing was received electrically each day in the form of about 500 messages representing some 37 different report types from 30 SCA sites. The paper tapes had to be torn at the end of each message, manually identified, logged, sorted by report type and originator, spliced and reeled. This was followed by load of paper tapes on magnetic tape and the production of error listings of the loaded data for each of 19 different jobs. Complete machine set up was required for each, as was operator knowledge of as many different sets of procedures. Simplification of these steps was one of the earliest examples of JSPC-5 ingenuity and typical of many similar actions throughout the Center’s data processing history.

Working with salvaged equipment. JSPC-5 designed and had fabricated tape winders that could automatically reel the paper tape emerging from the seven tape perforators in the Center’s Automatic Distribution Control Center (ADCC)—an operation similar to that of NSA ADP’s. These consolidated tapes were loaded on magnetic tape by one machine program that automatically identified and flagged incoming messages by report type and originator, sequenced the messages by type, then error-listed messages by computer job. This overall process was called AUTOMATE and went into effect in 1966; the GOODTIME program of a later date replaced AUTOMATE. AUTOMATE eliminated manual functions requiring about 480 man hours each week. It simplified operator training and error, and it made access to new programs and their products easier and faster for the analysts of the Center.

Further expansion of capability was achieved in June of 1967 with installation of an IBM 360/30 computer with 32K storage. The 360 system provided for multi-programming and an eventual savings of more than 2,000 hours of machine time not chargeable by the IBM Corporation. By November 1967, the 360/30 memory capability had been increased to 65K. By May 1968, the second and final IBM 360/30 computer with 65K storage was installed, and the remaining 1460 computer was released. The two 360/30 computers constituted the JSPC-5 data processing system until the demise of the JSPC in 1971.

As an example of the net worth these systems represented, in 1968 JSPC, employing all of the ad-
vantages of multi-programming techniques, operated its computers for 16,416 hours, yet the IBM Corporation was paid only for 14,141 hours. A net savings of 2,275 computer hours was realized that year from the innovative procedures conceived, tested and used at the JSPC.

In February 1969 a special purpose recording device named GOODTIME was installed to replace the seven paper tape reperforators of earlier AUTOMATE fame. GOODTIME is a high speed magnetic tape terminal connected to the communications center in CRS-O, Sohe, by one 1200 baud circuit. Data flowing into GOODTIME are multiplexed onto a magnetic tape which the computer uses to separate all material of a kind. This device finally eliminated all paper tape handling and the inherent waste of 5 hours daily as well as the need to man the reperforators throughout the day. GOODTIME is fully automatic and requires manual attention only when a tape is changed or pulled for processing. Average character count into GOODTIME during the apex of JSPC activity was four million characters daily.

During September 1970 a communications device named "DLT-5" (Data Link Terminal) was installed in the JSPC-5 computer area to correspond with a similar terminal in C Group spaces at Ft. Meade. This modified Univac device used a dedicated 600 baud line and was capable of transmitting a magnetic tape to, or receiving one from, NSA with full error detection and correction. Consequently, high precedence data reached either end of the link in a matter of minutes. Use of this link eliminated the need for bulk shipment of data via courier channels.

During August 1970, in conjunction with the planned transfer of analytic functions from JSPC to NSA, a C Group drawdown message was promulgated. In essence this message discussed the orderly transfer of computer responsibilities to NSA with the ultimate discontinuation of one 360 system on 30 December 1970 and the other on 30 June 1971. This two-phased plan was well defined, and phase one was easily and efficiently completed through the combined efforts of C5, JSPC-5 and concerned analytic elements. The first 360 system was discontinued on 30 December 1970, as scheduled, and removed from the area for ultimate shipment from Okinawa. The remaining system was removed on 30 June 1971. The door had closed on the history of unique, efficient and dedicated data processing at the JSPC. Of the 71 personnel on the JSPC-5 T/D as of 30 June 71, 35 spaces were transferred to NSA (C Group), and 36 were eliminated from the program as austerity savings.

External Involvements

By 1968 it had been decided that the

FF STRUM program. During September of that year the data systems expert assigned to the JSPC-04 staff went to Korea to assist personnel in the implementation of FF STRUM reporting from outlying

to their central processing area. The need for this staff billet had long existed but was not satisfied until January of 1968 with Change No. 23068 to the FDSR (RDS 3946). The primary mission of this new staff billet was to assist PACEMAKER (AG-22)/

implementation and to ensure coordination among JSPC elements and between JSPC and SCA units. Secondly, it was intended that this position should provide for staff actions to develop JSPC machine requirements to handle all jobs on a more timely—and from a resource viewpoint—more economical basis. To accomplish the latter function, a committee was formed during July of 1968 and entitled the JSPC ADP Advisory Group (JAAG). It consisted of the chairman—incumbent to the staff position—and a representative (either the Chief or Deputy Chief) from each JSPC division and staff group. Arrival in October of the B Group Operational Review Group (ORG) resulted, however, in the discontinuation or reduction of many then existing machine jobs; the efficacy of the JAAG was questioned, and its function was terminated.

Considerable time was spent during 1968 and 1969 in the evaluation and critique of Source TECUMS in attempts to make their outputs usable. Finally, in January 1970 the source was provided, through a revised Technical Item which was in effect a sanitized version of FF STRUM instructions. Although implementation of these instructions was slow, it constantly improved.

sources now provide a report from most of their sites which is acceptable to NSA machine programs.

During 1968 and 1969, JSPC was deeply involved with implementation of the PACEMAKER (AG-22) program. The JSPC Staff Data Systems representative assisted several sites throughout the theater in conducting collection and forwarding tests of this new mode. The first test involving electrical forwarding of data was conducted at the Shu Lin Kou complex, Taiwan, with the JSPC as receipt point and processing center. Later, as STRAWHAT high speed data links became operational, tests were conducted from Onna Point, Okinawa, Hakata, Japan, Shu Lin Kou, Taiwan, and San Miguel and Clark Air Base, Philip-
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the 6990th increased from the original estimate of 1,000 square feet to 8,255 square feet by February of 1969, and thereby brought usable JSPC space to less than 850 people than it had been for 460 people during 1962.

It is understandable in this context that all possible ways were sought to free space for operations needs. For over six years, the JSPC had accumulated records and files. Many hundreds of square feet of usable floor space were freed by a near-total records destruction program. Virtually all important historical files on administrative, organizational, operational and personnel trends found their way into incinerator ash during this campaign. But the program was reasonably successful in easing the crowded conditions in some areas, and it helped somewhat to alleviate the crush of concurrently backing chairs, colliding drawers, which analysts dealt with until the drawdown of the JSPC during 1970 and 1971.

In retrospect, the final strength of the JSPC could not have been contemplated during the planning or even the early years. Growth was inevitable with the addition of duties attendant to meeting the additional challenges of the North Vietnamese Air and Air Defense problems, the North Vietnamese Army littoral and theFFFFFF

Table of Distribution

When in 1967 B Group management developed a Table of Distribution (T/D) System, the JSPC was concurrently tasked with preparing a counterpart to the basic T/D document. This document contained the allocation of manpower resources to each element of organization by job title, COSC, category of personnel, grade range for civilian personnel, service, grade and career specialty of military personnel, subelement and current FY authorization as well as a five year program. The majority of JSPC billets were the program responsibility of various B Group subelement managers.

Based on instructions and guidelines received from NSA during December of 1967, JSPC-02 and JSPC-04 assembled data reflecting authorized program requirements. Until August 1968, when the first machine run of a T/D was produced, these staff elements continually exchanged data with one another and B Group to precisely define JSPC manpower requirements by organization and within the force structure of each SCA represented within the Center.

With the initial publication of a T/D for JSPC, the NSA Comptroller (D5) assumed management of the NSA-wide T/D System. All programming actions concerning manpower were thereafter related to specific billets and organizations delineated in the JSPC T/D. The system proved its value during the manpower decrement actions of FY71 and also in planning for the JSPC drawdown. During February 1969, primarily because of the developing relationship between the T/D system and manpower programming in the CCP, JSPC-04 became responsible for maintenance of the T/D. This responsibility continued until the Center closed.

Terms of Reference

During an early May 1962 visit to the Pacific area and the new JSPC, the Director, NSA, reviewed the overall situation on Okinawa. One of his official actions was to deactivate the NSAPAC Representative Okinawa office on 11 May, and to designate in its place the Chief of the JSPC as the senior NSA representative on Okinawa.

NSA Pacific Headquarters (then at Camp Fuchinobe in Japan) following the DIRNSA action proposed that a new Terms of Reference (TOR) be prepared which clearly defined the JSPC as an extension of NSA processing and therefore under the operational and technical control of DIRNSA, but which also stated that in the performance of its mission, JSPC was to be part of the NSAPAC structure. Subsequent actions were taken along these lines.

From December of 1966 until February of 1970, the TOR for NSA representative functions on Okinawa came under debate. A routine update of all NSAPAC TORs had been undertaken by HQ NSAPAC (by then moved to Hawaii) during late 1966 and early 1967. The JSPC had proposed, and HQ NSAPAC had agreed, that separate TORs should be written for the two distinctly separate functions of SIGINT production as the JSPC and of the NSA representation as NSAPAC REP Okinawa; the latter was correctly termed

in the proposal in view of the actual duties performed.

The dual TORs and name change were not agreed to by NSA. NSA contended that JSPC was not accredited to any specific command and two TORs were not needed. This position was reversed in response to HQ NSAPAC reclama, and a name change was agreed to by NSA in June 1967. Revised TORs did not evolve, however, until February of 1970. The delay resulted from SECDEF study and approval of a new concept of SIGINT support to military commanders during November 1967, and from a JSPC proposal of December 1967.
Approval of final versions of the TOR's was obtained from [Redacted] on matters of concern to cryptologic activities on Okinawa. The role of [Redacted] in planning for reversion of the [Redacted] is briefly mentioned in an earlier section entitled “Reversion Planning.”

Budget

An operating budget for the JSAC was programmed within the Department of Defense fiscal plans of the National Security Agency and the Department of the Army. Program development responsibility for the latter resided with the U.S. Army Ryukyu Islands (USARYIS) since that command was directed by DOD to provide inter-service support to the JSAC. Because of its integral association with the Inter-Service Support Agreement between JSAC and USARYIS, that budget is discussed briefly in the section on External Support. That portion of the JSAC operating budget developed as part of the NSA financial plan is emphasized here.

Specific and detailed records concerning budget development at and for JSAC in the first year and one-half of the Center’s existence have not been located, but it is apparent that the planning occurred at NSA and, except for some few ad hoc requirements, it did not involve JSAC contributions. In the fall of 1963 JSAC began participating in the annual development of the financial plan for NSA Field Activities and Senior U.S. Liaison Offices. On 4 September 1963 JSAC forwarded to NSAPAC for review and consolidation, budget estimates for the program period FY64–70. From the consolidated NSAPAC plan we note that the Center’s estimates for FY64 were:

- TDY Travel $47,343
- Equipment Purchases $64,081
- Rental of Data Processing Equipment $330,272
- Local Purchase Allowance $5,000
- Stock Supplies from NSA $46,000
- Facilities Alternation, Repairs & Construction $1,161,700

(a) $1,100,000 for the JSAC Building Annex
(b) $61,700 for the No-break power project

From that initial input until the closure of the Center, personnel responsible for resource management in JSAC-02 and JSAC-04 participated in the development of annual field activity fiscal plans, mid-year financial reviews and budget estimates for personnel services. The latter developed as a separate yearly submission and included such requirements as overseas quarters allowance and overtime. A pertinent comment on overtime appears in Section II, “The Early Years.” Except for extraordinary requirements, the categories for which JSAC programmed operating funds were EDP equipment rental, local purchase (imprest), stock supplies from NSA, and TDY travel. During the planning phase for the FY72 budget, TDY travel programming was assumed by NSAPAC. Budget submissions reflect programming for items such as spare incinerator parts and parts for Aids and OPSCOMM equipment, but these items were never specifically acknowledged by NSA since the list was primarily designed to prepare appropriate NSA elements for contingency requirements.

What? No Motto!

Six years after the JSAC was organized, it still had no official motto. When this deficiency was uncovered, protean action was taken to fill the void. On 30 November 1967, the Chief of the JSAC proudly announced that a contest had begun and that a winner would be chosen in 20 days.

One thousand or so copies of that official announcement were duly distributed by the Chief of JSAC-02 each complete with traditional федерале and senior officers’ PURPOSE, BACKGROUND, ELIGIBILITY, RULES and JUDGING. The winning entry would receive a $25 Savings Bond.

Eight hundred odd military and civilian personnel proved that among their many unusual qualities, they also possessed wit and imagination. Some recommendations were spicy, to be sure, but one of virgin purity emerged and won. Technical Sergeant George Edwards, USAF, of JSAC-3, submitted that profoundly accurate, beautifully poetic and now immortal aphorism “SERVING THE NATION, SUPPORTING THE FIELD.”

With yet another great achievement complete, it was rumored that a mascot would soon be chosen. Somehow, one never was.