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DCID No. 4/2

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 4/2<sup>1</sup>

## THE DEFECTOR PROGRAM ABROAD

(Effective 18 May 1976)

Pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 11905 and National Security Council Intelligence Directives, the following responsibilities and procedures are established.

## 1. Purpose

This directive establishes policies, procedures and practices for the inducement, exploitation and handling of defectors outside the United States, its territories and possessions. It does not apply in active theaters of war where US forces are engaged or where the President so directs.

## 2. Definitions

For the purpose of this directive, the terms listed below shall have the meanings indicated.

a. Defectors: Defectors are defined as nationals of the USSR, People's Republic of China, Albania, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Laos, North Korea, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Vietnam and Yugoslavia, who have escaped from the control of any such country, or who, being outside such jurisdiction and control, are unwilling to return thereto, and who are of special value to the US Government, because:

(1) They are able to add valuable new or confirmatory information to existing US intelligence knowledge,

(2) They are of operational value to a US department or agency, or

(3) Their defection can be psychologically exploited to the advantage of the United States.

b. Inducement: Inducement is an act committed or manifestly instigated by a US official and demonstrably intended to bring about a defection for which the US Government might, if the act were discovered, be called upon to account.

1. This directive supersedes DCID No. 4/2, effective 26 June 1959.

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WARNING NOTICE  
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
AND METHODS INVOLVED

Withheld under statutory authority of the  
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50  
U.S.C., section 3507)

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE  
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,  
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)  
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2008-049, document no. 16  
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: December 02, 2016

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c. **Potential Defector:** A potential defector is a national of the countries set forth in paragraph 2a above, who (1) is dissatisfied or potentially estranged in his allegiance to the government of his nationality; (2) may reasonably be expected to be susceptible to defection or recruitment in place, and (3) appears to meet special values criteria of a defector as set forth in paragraph 2a above.

d. **Disaffected Person:** A disaffected person is a potential defector who either through inducement or voluntary action on his part, has indicated willingness or desire to defect.

e. **Walk-In:** A walk-in is a disaffected person who presents himself to a US installation in a foreign country and requests asylum or assistance in escaping from Communist control.

f. **Refugee:** A refugee is a person who is outside of and unwilling to return to his country of nationality or habitual residence because of a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, does not possess another citizenship, has not acquired resident status in the country of present domicile and who is not a defector.

### 3. Other nationals

The provisions of this directive may be applied in whole or in part to cases involving nationals of countries other than those specifically named in paragraph 2a above, when the Director of Central Intelligence determines such action to be in the best interests of the United States.

### 4. Objectives

Exploitation of defectors shall be conducted for the following purposes:

a. To obtain information relative to the internal security of the United States, and to obtain foreign intelligence information in response to intelligence objectives established by the Director of Central Intelligence and departmental intelligence requirements.

b. To acquire operational intelligence.

c. To gain a propaganda advantage.

### 5. Operating principles of the program

a. Defection, particularly from the USSR and People's Republic of China, should be encouraged and induced whenever there is a net

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advantage to US interests. Accordingly, US Government organizations should:

(1) Encourage and induce the defection of potentially valuable individuals from the areas described in paragraph 2a above. Before any US Government organization initiates action to induce defection, it should consider whether recruitment in place would better serve the interests of the US.

(4) Take no action to encourage the departure of large numbers of nationals from countries listed in paragraph 2a above.

(5) Give priority to the satisfaction of intelligence objectives in accordance with NSCID No. 2 before engaging in psychological exploitation of defectors.

(6) Coordinate the implementation of overt publicity concerning defectors with the Department of State and the United States Information Agency.

(7) Conduct coordination, as provided herein, so as to respect the interests, capabilities and responsibilities of all departments and agencies to ensure full use of such capabilities in support of the Defector Program.

b.

#### 6. Responsibilities of local Defector Committees

A local Defector Committee shall be established abroad wherever the US has diplomatic representation.

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The committee may invite representatives of other departments and agencies and military commands as appropriate to participate. The local Defector Committee shall:

a. Meet periodically, normally at least once quarterly, to coordinate interagency aspects of the Defector Program in the area concerned. Copies of minutes of all local Defector Committee meetings shall be forwarded [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to the Interagency Defector Committee (IDC) Washington.

b. Establish local operating procedures in consonance with this directive for the implementation of the Defector Program within the committee's geographic area. Such procedures shall accomplish the following:

(1) Provide for the secure and expeditious reception and handling of walk-ins and other disaffected persons.

(2) Provide that defector status is considered for all individuals who meet the criteria established by NSCID No. 4, in each case balancing the "special value" of the defection against the risk, if any, to the political and diplomatic interests of the US.

(3) Ensure that:

(a) Information related to imminence of hostilities or threat to the security of US personnel and any US installation is procured and disseminated as a matter of immediate priority.

(b) Bona fides is established as expeditiously as possible.

(c) Each defector signs a statement that his defection is voluntary and that he requests political asylum.

(d) The resources and facilities of all participating US Government organizations are employed as fully as necessary to facilitate handling of the individual.

(e) [REDACTED]

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c. Consider and resolve mutual problems. When such problems cannot be resolved the matter shall be referred through Central Intelligence Agency channels to the Interagency Defector Committee, Washington. In such cases, representatives of other US Government organizations may communicate directly with their principals in Washington on the subjects involved. If time does not permit referral to the Interagency Defector Committee, Washington, the matter shall be submitted for decision to the senior US representative in the area.

d. Keep the Interagency Defector Committee, Washington, informed concerning each defector, including the status of exploitation. Appropriate reports on disaffected persons of potential intelligence interest also will be made to the Interagency Defector Committee, Washington.

e. Establish procedures to ensure that all members of the local Defector Committee are kept currently informed on local defector matters as well as applicable US policies and procedures.

f. Recommend to the Interagency Defector Committee, Washington, proposals for surfacing or the release of initial overt publicity concerning a defector.

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
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## 9. Responsibilities of the Senior US Representative in the area

The Senior US Representative in the area concerned will be responsible for:

- a. Determining, [redacted] the manner and degree to which actions contemplated toward a disaffected person or defector may affect the political and diplomatic interests of the US.
- b. Ensuring that appropriate US officials not covered by membership on the local defector committee, who are likely to be in contact with disaffected persons, are briefed concerning defector matters as appropriate.
- c. Providing policy guidance and further assistance [redacted] in carrying out his responsibilities under this directive.

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George Bush  
Director of Central Intelligence

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SECURITY INFORMATION

TAB - A  
To  
IAC-D-50/2

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE  
NO. 4/2 (SECOND REVISION)\*

Priority List of Critical National Intelligence Objectives  
(Revised 8/4/53)

In accordance with DCID 4/1, paragraph 3, the following list in order of priority of critical national intelligence objectives, with respect to the USSR and its Satellites (including Communist China) is established; so the highest priority shall be given to the collection of information and to the production of intelligence concerning Soviet and Satellite capabilities and intentions for:

1. taking direct military action against the Continental United States;
2. taking direct military action, employing USSR and Satellite Armed Forces, against vital U. S. possessions, areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit, and Western Europe;
3. conducting clandestine attack by mass destruction weapons against the Continental United States, vital U. S. possessions, areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit, and Western Europe;
4. interfering with U. S. strategic air attack;
5. interfering with U. S. movement of men and material by water transport;
6. production and stockpiling, including location of installations and facilities, of atomic and related weapons, other critical weapons and equipment; and critical transportation equipment;
7. creating situations anywhere in the world dangerous to U. S. national security, short of commitment of Soviet and Satellite Armed Forces, including foreign directed sabotage and espionage objectives;
8. interfering with U. S. political, psychological and economic courses of action for the achievement of critical U. S. aims and objectives.

~~SECRET~~ ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director of Central Intelligence

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