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NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE COMMAND

# WIR

## WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW (U)

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







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# NORAD Weekly Intelligence Review



Issue No. 40/66, 7 October 1966



## The WIR in Brief



Portion identified as non-responsive to the appeal



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Space



SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM IN DOLDRUMS -- BY ACCIDENT OR DESIGN?

May be accident of scheduling, or standdown pending important event(s).



SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT MAY BE DELAYING MANNED FLIGHTS: INTERIM MEASURES MAY BE TAKEN

Useful flights could be performed now with Vostoks or Voskhods; Moscow pushing development of new series vehicles instead.



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COVER: Missile-armed patrol boat from Ogonek) (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

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[redacted]

## Probable SS-9 ICBM Fails Shortly After Launch to Pacific Impact Area

A probable SS-9 ICBM apparently failed in flight some 4 minutes after being launched from the Tyuratam rangehead at about 0257Z, 27 September; it apparently was intended to impact in the Pacific in a previously announced area 4500 n.m. from Tyuratam. This was the first test in a series of firings to the Pacific which the Soviets announced would take place between 26 September and 25 October.

Three Soviet missile-range instrumentation ships were in the impact area at the time, apparently to monitor the terminal phase of the flight. [redacted] an absence of RADINT, and negative observation by US collectors in the impact area indicated an early inflight failure.

Test objectives of the current Pacific tests may involve normal system upgrading of the SS-9 with a heavy payload variant. This is the largest operational Soviet ICBM; it is being deployed at hard sites.

A second ICBM was launched successfully from Tyuratam to the 3400-n.m. Kamchatka impact area at about 0531Z, 27 September. This was an SS-7, probably involving troop training and limited R&D testing. (DIA)

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## New or Modified Vehicle Tested on the Kapustin Yar Range

An apparently new or highly modified ballistic vehicle was launched to the 1,020-n.m. area of the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range at 0645Z on 27 September.

The trajectory was similar to that of the KY-6 solid-propellant three-stage missile now being tested at KYMTR. [redacted] this vehicle is the same type as the one launched on 9 September. The 9 September vehicle was reported as a possible new SRBM; not reflected by US radar in Turkey, it was assumed to have flown a distance of less than 300 n.m. (WIR 37/66). It is now evident that the 9 September firing was intended for 1,020-n.m. range but probably failed early in flight.

[redacted] the type of propellants (liquid or solid) or number of stages employed cannot be determined. (DIA)

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significant intelligence on space developments and trends

## Soviet Space Program in Doldrums -- by Accident or by Design?

The Soviet space program was in the doldrums in September, for reasons unknown. They successfully orbited only one space vehicle that month -- an unannounced vehicle which may have tested an orbital bombardment system (p. 13, last week's WIR). In addition, telemetry indicates a possible attempt to launch a reconnaissance satellite occured on 16 September. This is below the monthly average of 3.4 launches for the past 35 months. This slowdown contrasts even more sharply with the launch rate of 4.4 per month which the Soviets maintained for the first eight months of 1966.

It is not clear whether the recent decrease in activity was accidental or intentional.

It is possible that individual components of the over-all space program, through an accident of scheduling, were in phases wherein most of them simply did not call for any launches in September. There is no reason to think, for example, that launches of weather, communications-relay, research, or Proton satellites or of deep space probes were due or overdue. The most notable exception was the lack of a successful military reconnaissance operation in September, in contrast with the rate of two per month which marked the first eight months of 1966. Less significantly, the Soviet manned space program and multiple-payload Cosmos program in September continued their record lulls -- 18 months for the former, 12 months for the latter. (See next WIR item.)

It is also possible that the over-all Soviet space program is experiencing a deliberate standdown, in preparation for, or to highlight, some impending space event or series of events of import. The Soviets have been known in the past to schedule space events for maximum propaganda impact. The most propitious time for such an event in the near future would probably have some association with the approaching (7 November) annual celebration of the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.

The Soviets have not consistently timed notable space events to precede or coincide with the 7 November celebrations, and the 49th anniversary this year would not seem to call for any unusual effort. But 7 November 1966 will mark the commencement of the 50th year of Communist rule in the USSR, and it is known that the Soviets are planning that this will be a big year in terms of announcements of major technical, economic, and social achievements. It may be recalled that during the 40th year of Communist rule in the USSR the Soviets announced the world's first successful firing of an ICBM, launched the world's first two Earth satellites, unveiled new transport aircraft -- including what was then the world's largest (the TU-114), and wound up the year by staging their first major missile parade in Moscow.

The apparent slowdown during September may well indicate that some major space event or series of events will probably be attempted in the near future. Possibilities: a lunar probe or manned vehicle(s). (See next article.)
(NORAD)
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## Systems Development May Be Delaying Manned Flights; Interim Measures May Be Taken

The last Soviet manned space launch took place 18 March 1965, more than 18 months ago. This has been the longest lull yet in the Soviet man-in-space program. Because of the obvious importance of the manned space effort, both in terms of systems development and the national image, this delay is not considered to have been programed, nor is it believed to be acceptable to the Soviet leadership. The Soviets, on the contrary, would probably like to recapture the lead that they have lost to the US in a number of areas of manned space flight.

The Soviets could at any time accomplish useful missions with their previously used Vostok and Voskhod manned spacecraft; the fact that they have not done so suggests that they have counted instead on early operational capability for a large, advanced manned spacecraft. The lull, then, has probably been occasioned not by a lack of any vehicles at all but by delays in developing and testing the large new payloads and the requisite propulsion systems. A secondary reason may be a concern for difficulties experienced with the one EVA undertaken by the Soviets and for physiological problems encountered in the past by a number of Soviet cosmonauts.

The Soviet man-in-space program right now should probably be focused on the selection and training of men to work in space for periods of weeks and on the development and mastery of the techniques for executing complex EVA (including, particularly, the transfer of crewmen from one vehicle to another), maneuvering, rendezvous, and docking. Some or all of these techniques may be required for a manned lunar landing and for

launch and maintenance of manned orbiting laboratories and observatories.

Soviet intentions in this direction are evidenced not only by copious space literature on these subjects but also by the flight of the biosatellite Cosmos 110 (in which two dogs orbited the Earth for 22 days before being de-orbited and recovered); by the use of a new, large 2-stage booster to launch the 12-ton Proton research vehicles; and by the test in July 1966 of an inflight-restartable propulsion unit and an advanced orientation system on Cosmos 125. (It has been estimated that the primary purpose of the Proton launches was to test the large SL-9 space booster system).

The Soviets, it is believed, would like very much to launch a large, advanced space vehicle carrying several cosmonauts in coming months, possibly with a view to:

- Registering some sort of space triumph in connection with or shortly after the start of the 50th year of Communist rule in the USSR (7 November 1966) (see preceding article).
- Reducing the prestige impact of the US's upcoming series of 3-man Apollo flights, the first of which is now slated for launch late this year.

Prospects for such an event would now appear to be fading, in view of:

- The failure of an SL-9 launch in March. (The present score of 3 successful launches out of 4 attempts may not be quite good enough for a manned flight.)
- None of the Proton payloads launched to date has been de-orbited.

The Soviets, however, are in a hurry to bring the SL-9 to operational readiness. This is evident in the unusually heavy telemetry associated with the last (6 July) launch; no previous space launch system has been as heavily instrumented.

If the USSR should decide to launch a manned vehicle soon with the SL-9, the West should have a few clues. As in the past, the Soviets will first launch and de-orbit similar type vehicles, unmanned but carrying all of the inflight systems and, probably, live animals or an appropriate number of dummies.

If an SL-9 manned launch before the end of the year is out of the question, the Soviets may fall back on their Vostok- or Voskhod-series spacecraft with flights of some type which would reap suitable propaganda rewards. Simultaneous flights by several vehicles and/or prolonged flights would probably be the most useful, unless rendezvous could be accomplished, in which case transfers of crewmen might be executed.

Next year, however, should be a different story. If the SL-9 is fully man-rated then, the Soviets can be expected to carry out several complex missions which would enhance their image before the celebration on 7 November 1967 of the 50th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. (NORAD; FTD)
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