




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NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE COMMAND



WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW (U)

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Issue No. 44/66, 4 November 1966

The WIR in Brief

**Weekly
Intelligence
Review**

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Space

SOVIETS LOOSEN SECURITY WRAPS -- A BIT TARDILY -- AT TYURATAM

Suddenly discover public-relations of main launch site.

LUNA 12 PHOTOGRAPHS THE MOON

Facsimile-type transmission apparently used.

RECCE COSMOS 130 DE-ORBITED

On Rev 127.

Portion identified as non-responsive to the appeal

Portion identified as non-responsive to the appeal

COVER: BADGER bomber (from Iceland Defense Force). (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

NOTE: Pages 28, 30, 31, 34, and 35 of this issue are blank.

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significant
intelligence
on space
developments
and trends

Soviets Loosen Security Wraps -- a Bit Tardily -- at Tyuratam

The Soviets apparently have suddenly discovered that they can exploit the public-relations value of their space and missile launches at the Tyuratam Missile Test Range without seriously endangering security.

They broke precedent last June when they invited French President de Gaulle to Tyuratam and reportedly launched a satellite and at least one ICBM in his presence. They were, of course, trying to influence him in two ways. They wanted to:

- Curry favor with him through flattery. (De Gaulle was the first known foreigner allowed to watch Soviet space and/or missile launches.)
- Impress him with Soviet military and technical prowess. (A space or missile launch witnessed at relatively close range can be singularly impressive.)

The ice broken, they repeated this performance on 19 and 20 October, according to the press, by allowing foreign Communist Party chiefs then attending an important Party conclave in Moscow to witness some space and missile launches at Tyuratam. They may have witnessed as many as 2 missile firings and 2 space launches, which occurred at about the time the press said they visited the launch center. Again, the purposes of the demonstration were to flatter and to impress the guests.

If these events are indicative of a trend, then the day may not be far off when any foreign visitor whom the Soviets wish to flatter and/or impress will be invited to Tyuratam for a firepower demonstration. And now that foreign visitors have been shown the SS-6 ICBM, the Soviets may even publish photos of this vehicle, which has launched most Soviet space vehicles to date and is still the workhorse of the Soviet space program.

This lifting of the security veil at Tyuratam may seem like a radical innovation, since the Soviets have been so secretive about their

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space and missile launches. It is, however, only a new -- but perhaps overdue -- development in a long-standing Soviet policy to display military and technical might when there is little to be lost from the security standpoint. First with their air shows and later with their missile parades, the Soviets have showed an awareness of the political advantages of public muscle-flexing. There could have been little security risk in the demonstrations for de Gaulle and the Communist Party chiefs: the event had to be witnessed, even for safety considerations alone, at a respectable distance; the visitors, it can be presumed, had little or no training or experience in missile-intelligence collection; and, it is safe to presume, the visitors carried no equipment with which to collect technical data.

Though the Soviets may drop some of their former unreasonable obsession with secrecy, it is expected that they will continue to try to shield information or high security value -- technical intelligence exploitable by other nations, and evidence of Soviet weaknesses or shortcomings. Thus, they are not likely to invite technically trained personnel to Tyuratam, and they are not likely to invite visitors to attend launches of new propulsion systems or even to be present when such systems are erected or being erected.

Finally, much time will probably have to pass before the Soviets get around to announcing space or missile launches in advance. Their secrecy on this score is dictated not by military security but by fear -- fear of failure and, even more important to them, fear of having to announce failure to the world and to their own people. Though the Communist regime in the USSR is nearly half a century old, and though the leadership and much of society are becoming more pragmatic and less dogmatic, Soviet authorities persist in the "little boy" mentality that finds admission of error intolerable. This explains why the Soviet press does not report aircraft crashes (unless foreigners are involved or the crash occurs abroad), industrial disasters, epidemics, and, until recently, natural disasters -- the latter on the theory that they should have been foreseen or prepared for. Meanwhile, until the Soviet leadership matures, the regime will continue the use of various subterfuges to avoid admission of failure:

- No specific launches or launch dates will be announced publicly in advance, so there will be no need to explain delays, postponements, or failures. No announcements will be made of aborted launches or of vehicles which explode -- or have to be exploded -- in flight.
- Interplanetary and lunar probes which fail to leave Earth-parking-orbit will be dubbed Cosmos-series research vehicles.
- Vehicles which achieve orbit but which fail in unclassified missions (which would ordinarily be announced if they were successful) will also be announced as Cosmos-series research vehicles.



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Announcements about multipurpose satellites will be couched only in general terms until the degree of success is known, at which time only those experiments or missions which are successes will be announced.

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Luna 12 Photographs the Moon

Luna 12 has become the first Soviet Spacecraft to return photographs of the Moon from a lunar orbit. On 29 October, almost four days after orbit was achieved, Tass finally admitted the photographic mission; soon thereafter two pictures of the Moon's landscape were shown on Moscow television. (Photos on page 36.)

Luna 12 is following a more elliptical orbit than did Lunas 10 and 11. The orbit was ranging between 54 and 940 nautical miles above the moon on 29 October, circling every 205 minutes, but this time the Soviets did not report its inclination to the Lunar equator. Luna 11 was on a 27-degree inclination but only came to within 86 n. m. of the Moon.

Previous press reports indicate that Luna's video system is the same type used by previous Soviet space vehicles which photographed the lunar surface, a system which photographs the surface, develops the photograph, and then transmits to Earth a scanned facsimile copy of the photo. (DIA)

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Recce Cosmos 130 De-Orbited


Cosmos 130, a military reconnaissance satellite launched from Tyuratam at about 0847Z, 20 October, was de-orbited on Revolution 127, probably impacting in the USSR at about 0650Z, 28 October. It spent nearly 8 days in orbit, a routine period for Soviet recce satellites launched during the past 3 years.

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Luna 12 Photo of Moon's Surface (from Pravda)



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