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NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE COMMAND

WIR

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW (U)

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

ВЛАДИВОСТОК, БУХТА ЗОЛОТОЙ РОГ, 9 МАЯ 1965 ГОДА. Боевые корабли на параде, посвященном пр
Победы.

Фото К. КУЛИЧЕНКО. (Снимок принят по фототеле

Red Star 10 May

24-65
11 June 1965

[redacted]

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WIR 24/65
11 Jun 1965

NORAD Weekly Intelligence Review

Issue No. 24/65, 11 June 1965

The WIR in Brief

Portion identified as non-responsive to the appeal

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Space

COVER: KYNDA-Class destroyer with missile-launchers elevated (from Red Star) (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

NOTE: Pages 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 38, 39, 42 and 43 of this issue are blank.

Portion identified as non-responsive to the appeal

Missile Range Firing Log

US radar detected the following space/missile launches during the period 24 May - 7 June 1965:

Approximate Time & Date of Launch	Launch Vehicle	Launch Site	Range
1050Z, 25 May	Cosmos 67*	Tyuratam	Orbital
1648Z, 25 May	Unknown	Kapustin Yar	650 n.m.
1529Z, 26 May	Unknown	Kapustin Yar	650 n.m.
1730Z, 26 May	KY-2	Kapustin Yar	450 n.m.
0223Z, 28 May	SS-7 ICBM	Tyuratam	3400 n.m.

*Launched by SS-6 ICBM booster-sustainer, injected into orbit by heavy Venik upper stage.

Two firings not reported in previous logs:

- Launch of an SS-1C (SCUD B) SRBM at about 0800Z, 15 May, from Kapustin Yar to the 150-n.m. impact area.
- Launch of missile of unknown type at about 1415Z, 26 April, from Kapustin Yar to the 650 n.m. impact area.

The SS-7 ICBM launch of 28 May is believed to have involved troop training or limited research and development.
(Diyarbakir & Shemya RADINT)
~~(SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION -- Releasable to US, UK & Canada)

Portion identified as non-responsive to the appeal



significant intelligence on space developments and trends

Missile Fired Toward Path of Cosmos 67

The Soviets on 26 May, at about 1530Z, fired a missile of unidentified type from the Kaupstin Yar missile test range toward the path of one of their photoreconnaissance satellites, Cosmos 67, which was then making its 19th orbit of the Earth. The missile made its closest approach to Cosmos 67 about 3 minutes after launch, approaching within about 31 n.m., ± 2.7 n.m. The missile at this time was northeast of and nearly level with the satellite; the missile was still climbing, reaching apogee 1-2 minutes later. (Map on page 41.)

It is not known whether the proximity of the two aerospace vehicles was deliberate or coincidental. If the proximity was deliberate, then the event may have had any one or more of several possible purposes:

- The missile may have "inspected" the satellite, in a test of satellite inspection techniques. Inspection would have occurred during or after closest approach, as the missile neared or reached its apogee. It would not have occurred before closest approach, since Cosmos 67 was then coming out of an evening sun, which could have "confused" the sensor aboard the missile.
- The satellite may have tested a device for detecting the approach of an antisatellite warhead or an inspection satellite.
- The satellite may have tested a system for photographing objects in space. The resolution of such a system in this case would probably have been about 1.5 feet.
- There is a very low likelihood that this event was a test of an interception of a satellite. Such an operation more likely would have been conducted from Sary Shagan, where the Soviets apparently test their antiballistic-missile missile systems, than from Kapustin Yar, from which surface-to-surface missiles of 2000

n.m. range or less are fired. If an antisatellite test was conducted, it would have been only marginally successful, in view of the miss distance of 31 n.m.

- The most likely possibility is that the satellite was testing an IR (infrared) device for detecting missile launches. The satellite, at the moment of missile lift-off from Kapustin Yar, was within line of sight (6.8 degrees above the horizon) of the launch site and at a slant range of 627 n.m. from it. Thus, Cosmos 67 could have been used to determine the IR signature of an SSM during launch and powered flight as well as during ballistic or free flight.

The Soviets may have taken a necessary preliminary step toward such a test with the launch of Cosmos 45 last fall: the chief of the Soviet delegation to a space symposium held in Chicago last month revealed that Cosmos 45 carried instrumentation for collecting IR radiation emanating or reflected from the Earth. An IR-type missile-launch detector would have to be able to distinguish IR radiation emanating from the missile from the Earth's background IR radiation.
(SPADATS; Diyarbakir RADINT; NORAD)
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Soviets Cooperate in Eliminating Radio Interference with Gemini 4 Flight

Radio interference from various Soviet ships and stations was experienced on Gemini 4 circuits in the Pacific area during the period 0445-1225Z, 4 June 1965. The Soviet transmitting activities transferred operations to other frequencies as a result of combined efforts of CINCPAC's Radio Frequency Monitor and Intercept Control Center and the US State Department.
(US Defense Communications Agency)
~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

France Proposes Collaboration in Space with Soviets

France apparently took the initiative in suggesting a French-Soviet cooperative space program.

Premier Pompidou told Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko when the latter was in Paris in April that he hoped scientific collaboration could be extended to cover technological and commercial cooperation in the space field. Gromyko replied that this was a very interesting suggestion which he would discuss with Premier Kosygin on his return to Moscow.

The French National Space Studies Center (CNES) then recommended that France cooperate with the USSR in order to acquire technical data from Soviet rocket experts, to have French satellites propelled into space by Soviet rockets, and to work toward a joint satellite television system.

Although the French Foreign Ministry is apprehensive over the political risks involved, the CNES recommendation was well received by President de Gaulle and Minister of Information Peyrefite, perhaps because it provides de Gaulle an opportunity to give practical substance to a rapprochement with the Soviets. (See Insight, last week's WIR.) At the same time, the French could gain political as well as commercial advantages in the color television field by insuring de Gaulle's policy of freedom of French TV from US influence.
(DIA)
(~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION -- Releasable to US, UK and Canada)

Newer Cosmonauts Better Educated, Says Gagarin

The newer members of the Soviet cosmonaut detachment have better educational backgrounds than the original members, according to an article by Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin in the 11 April issue of Red Star. "They are not," he said, "like those who crossed the threshhold of Star Town (colloquial for the cosmonaut training center) in the spring of 1960." Some of the new men, said Gagarin, are graduate students working on dissertations for advanced academic degrees.

Gagarin spoke also of the new breed of cosmonaut-scientists and cosmonaut-technicians, predicting that the range of specialties of such cosmonauts is certain to broaden. He added, however, that the pilot's seat of spacecraft will still be occupied by the pilot-cosmonaut, whose services will be essential for landing on the Moon or on Venus.
(Red Star)
(UNCLASSIFIED)

Western intelligence has anticipated that the newer Soviet cosmonauts would be better educated than the first ones. Such men can work and communicate more efficiently with the scientists, physicians, engineers, and technicians who make manned space flight possible, and they will project abroad a better image of the USSR and the Soviet citizen when speaking to international scientific assemblages. US astronauts appear to have lent better impressions before such groups than did Soviet cosmonauts. (NORAD)
~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

LUNA 6 is 4th Soviet Lunar-Probe Attempt this Year

The Soviets launched Luna 6, their 4th lunar-probe attempt this year, from the Tyuratam missile test range at about 0740Z, 8 June 1965. As has been true of all Soviet lunar attempts since early 1963, the vehicle was first sent into parking orbit and then injected into transfer trajectory toward the Moon. The latter event occurred at about 0906Z, over the approximate location 2300N-2400E.

Shemya radar detected the vehicle at 0758Z, Diyarbakir at 0909Z, -- 3 minutes after initiation of injection into transfer trajectory. Diyarbakir radar apparently successfully tracked the probe, during its early post-injection phase for about 9 minutes, or until about 0918Z. This is the first time that a US sensor has been able to track a Soviet lunar or deep-space probe after injection into transfer trajectory.

Parameters. The parking orbit into which Luna 6 was initially injected was typical of past parking orbits for lunar vehicles, according to SPADATS data:

Inclination	64.75 degrees
Period	88.6 minutes
Apogee	248.7 kilometers (134 n.m.)
Perigee	165.6 kilometers (89 n.m.)

Initial evaluation of transfer trajectory, based on Diyarbakir's data, indicates that Luna 6 will miss the moon by about 26,000 kilometers (14,000 n.m.) if no midcourse guidance maneuver is executed. Such a course correction is within Soviet capabilities if it is made early enough.

The probe should reach the Moon at about 1530Z, 11 June.

Propulsion. Luna 6 was launched by the same propulsion system that the Soviets have used to launch all lunar probes since 1963 and all their interplanetary probes. The SS-6 ICBM booster-sustainer launched the vehicle, the heavy Venik upper stage injected it into parking orbit, and the Soviets' "interplanetary" stage injected it into transfer trajectory toward the Moon. The vehicle undoubtedly also carries propulsion for making a midcourse guidance correction.

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Mission. TASS has not announced any specific mission for Luna 6, only that it is a lunar probe. All indications are that Luna 6 is a repeat of the Luna 5 mission, which was apparently intended to soft-land a payload on the Moon but which crashed with little or no slowing of velocity by the probe's landing rockets.

Indications of Pressure. Luna 6 is the Soviets 4th lunar probe attempt in 4 months -- the most intensive assault yet that the Soviets have mounted against the Moon. The men who manage Moscow's lunar program appear to be under more than moderate pressure to put back on schedule a program that initially enjoyed remarkable successes (in 1959) but which has now suffered eight consecutive known failures within the past 30 months.
(SPADATS; various ELINT sensors; TASS; NORAD)
~~(SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION -- Releasable to US, UK & Canada)

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

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