MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Israel's Nuclear Program

Ambassador Rabin called on me October 15 to deliver his government's responses to the three requests I put to him on July 29 with respect to Israel's nuclear program. As you will recall, those requests were for (a) a report on the results of the Israel Government's study of the NPT question, (b) an assurance that when Israel says it will not introduce nuclear weapons it means it will not possess such weapons, and (c) an assurance that Israel will not produce or deploy the Jericho strategic missile. A full record of my October 15 meeting with Ambassador Rabin is enclosed.

Israel's reply with respect to the NPT says in effect that this question is on ice until after the forthcoming Israeli elections. Israel's reply on what "introduction" of nuclear weapons means is not directly responsive to our request, but we will need to examine its nuances carefully to determine whether it in fact represents any advance toward the kind of assurance we seek. The reply with respect to the Jericho missile, in saying that there will be no operational deployment for at least three years, is in effect confirmation of Israel's present intentions ultimately to deploy such missiles.

Elliot L. Richardson

Enclosure:
Memorandum of Conversation
SUBJECT: Israeli Nuclear Programs

PARTICIPANTS: Lt. General Yitzhak Rabin; Ambassador of Israel
Shlomo Argov, Minister, Embassy of Israel
Moshe Raviv, Counselor, Embassy of Israel

The Under Secretary
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Country Director, Israel and
Arab-Israel Affairs

Ambassador Rabin said he had been instructed to reply as follows to the three questions put to him by the Under Secretary on July 29, 1969:

1. The Government of Israel is in no position to make further clarifications about the NPT until a new government will be formed after the elections. The new government will continue to study this problem, bearing in mind its importance as expressed by the President during his talk with the Prime Minister.

2. It is the view of the Government of Israel that introduction means the transformation from a non-nuclear weapon country into a nuclear weapon country.

3. As a result of the French embargo and other factors there will be no operational deployment of missiles in Israel for at least three years from now.

Ambassador Rabin elaborated on the foregoing only to the extent of noting that the response in paragraph 2 conformed to the language used in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

The Under Secretary thanked Ambassador Rabin and said that the Government of Israel's reply was both responsive and succinct. He would
not attempt to comment in detail at this time. By way of preliminary observations, the Under Secretary noted that the Israeli response to the first question was self-explanatory; we might wish to pursue this point further after formation of the new Israeli Government following elections. With respect to the response to the question about "introduction" of nuclear weapons, the Under Secretary said we would want to consider its implications carefully. The response about deployment of the Jericho missile was helpful in providing an understanding of the facts of the situation in this period of particular tension in the area.
March 28, 1969

Dear Mel:

I have your letter of March 17 and Dave Packard's of March 14 regarding the Israeli nuclear weapons problem.

We are inclined to doubt that the acquisition of the second CDC 6400 would significantly affect the time span for completion of the design phase for a nuclear weapon, or materially influence the capability of the Israelis to acquire such a weapon. However, there is enough of a difference of view about the facts of this matter to indicate that it should be studied further before making a final decision.

I suggest, therefore, that there be an urgent inter-agency review where all information on the facts which are available to the agencies concerned can be considered in order to facilitate an evaluation of the significance of any added computers for Israel at this phase of its nuclear program. Such a review might be carried out on an urgent basis within the ACEP structure.

I agree with Dave's idea that the present procedures for clearance of sensitive export items related to nuclear weapons and strategic delivery systems should be reexamined. We are currently preparing a proposal for a complete redraft of NSAM 294, the drawing up of more comprehensive guidelines covering critical countries and items, and the establishment of a mechanism to see that the policy is effectively implemented. Alex Johnson's office has been

The Honorable
Melvin Laird,
Secretary of Defense.

[Signature]

[Stamp] Sec Def 1616

[Stamp] 1, APR 1969
in touch with Defense on this question, and we plan to suggest that the problem be considered by the Interdepartmental Political/Military Group within the very near future.

I certainly share your view on the seriousness of the problem which would be created for the United States by introduction of nuclear weapons into the Middle East. I have asked Elliot Richardson to have this item placed on the agenda for early discussion by the Under Secretaries Committee.

Sincerely,

William P. Rogers

cc:
Secretary of Commerce
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
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Sincerely,

William P. Rogers

cc:
Secretary of Commerce
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
National Security Study Memorandum No. 40

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program

April 11, 1969

The President has directed the preparation of a policy study on the Israeli nuclear weapons program.

As a background for this study, a thorough intelligence study should be provided, describing our best estimate of the current state and future prospects of the Israeli program. The intelligence estimate should be provided on a selected basis to the named individuals of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Review Group and of the National Security Council listed below.

The policy should (a) discuss as specifically as possible the implications of Israel's nuclear weapons program for U.S. objectives in the Middle East, in arms limitation and in non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and (b) describe the principal policy alternatives for the U.S. and the full range of possible U.S. actions in the situations we are most likely to face. For instance, the paper might consider alternatives (a) in the present situation, (b) in a situation where Israel is known to us but not by the Arabs to have completed a nuclear device, and (c) in a situation where Israel is known by us and by the Arabs to be ready to deploy nuclear weapons. After analyzing alternatives, the paper may state a viewpoint on a preferred course.

The President has directed that this study be prepared by an Ad Hoc Group chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State and including representatives of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The paper should be submitted by April 25, 1969, to an Ad Hoc Committee of the NSC Review Group comprised of Elliot L. Richardson, Under Secretary of State; David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense; Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence; General Earle C. Wheeler, Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The special committee of the National Security Council will be comprised of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: National Security Study Memorandum #40

Mr. Harry H. Schwartz, DASD/NESA, is designated as representative of the Secretary of Defense on the Ad Hoc Group described in paragraph 4 of subject memorandum.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
May 30, 1969

TO: The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
    The Deputy Secretary of Defense
    The Director of CIA
    The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program - NSSM 40

Herewith are a memorandum of issues raised in the Ad Hoc Group preparing a study of Israel's nuclear weapons program and the basic study.

John P. Walsh

Enclosures:
1. Memorandum of issues
2. Basic study
TO: NSC - Dr. Kissinger
   U - The Acting Secretary
FROM: NEA - Rodger P. Davies
SUBJECT: Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program - Issues and Courses of Action

Attached there is a policy study on the Israeli nuclear weapons program as requested in NSSM 40.

The following major issues emerged during meetings of the Ad Hoc Group.

1. Israel's Nuclear Capabilities and Intentions

We know that Israel is in the process of deploying a nuclear-capable surface-to-surface missile system (range of about 300 miles); there is circumstantial evidence indicating Israel has acquired fissionable material; there are unconfirmed reports that Israel has begun to construct nuclear weapons.

Department of State representatives believe more evidence is necessary and that Israel is aware that actual production and deployment of nuclear weapons could place severe strains on US-Israel relations.

TOP SECRET/NODIS
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
2: Israel's Assurances on Nuclear Weapons and Relation to Delivery of F-4 "Phantom" Aircraft to Israel

Quite aside from the question of whether the U.S. should impose or threaten to impose this sanction in an attempt to limit Israel's nuclear weapons program, we must face the sensitive issue of carrying forward on deliveries

providing an aircraft which could serve as a nuclear delivery system

and publicly.

Israel has committed to us that it will not be "the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area", but there are grounds for believing that Israel does not construe production of a weapon to constitute "introduction." During negotiations in November, 1968 for the sale of the "Phantom" F-4 aircraft to Israel, Ambassador Rabin expressed the view that introduction would require testing and making public the fact of possession of a nuclear weapon. In accepting as condition for the sale Israel's reaffirmation that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East and agreement that it would not use any aircraft supplied by the United States as a nuclear weapons carrier, our reply stated:

In this connection, I have made clear the position of the United States Government that the physical possession and control of nuclear arms by a Middle East power would be deemed to constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons.

Inasmuch as our reply also made clear that we consider that "unusual and compelling circumstances" requiring cancellation of the F-4 agreement would exist in the event of "action inconsistent with your policy and agreement as set forth in your letter," the door was left open to suspend or cancel the deliveries of the aircraft if Israel by our definition "introduced" nuclear weapons into the area.
TOP SECRET/NODIS

3: Will Raising this Issue with Israel now Complement or Undercut our Diplomatic effort to Achieve an
Arab-Israel peace Settlement?

Since we are already having a crisis of confidence with Israel over our peace efforts, will the renewal of
the dialogue on the nuclear issue cause the Israelis to dig in even harder on their peace terms? It can be argued that
the nuclear issue is overriding and that in any event a settlement is unlikely. On the other hand, progress
toward peace would probably be the single most decisive factor making the nuclear issue easier to handle.

In defining options, the NSSM 40 study covers a range of pressures that the U.S. might apply to Israel -- for
any purpose. If we choose to use the maximum option on the nuclear issue, we may not have the necessary leverage
left for helping along the peace negotiations. We are proceeding with our bilateral exchanges with the Soviets
on the nature of a settlement with the expectation that Israel will find the outcome difficult but not impossible
to accept and that some pressure will be necessary to bring Israel into line. If there is a real possibility that
pressure will be needed, these would not differ substantially from those in the study. Use of leverage on the NPT/nuclear
issue may seriously detract from our capability to influence Israel on the settlement issue. On the other hand, if we
decide to defer using pressure on the nuclear question so as to preserve leverage on a possible peace settlement,
we must ask how long we are prepared to do this in the face of Israel's rapidly advancing program, and the
knowledge that the longer we put off making Israel feel the seriousness of our purpose, the harder it will be to
arrest Israel's program.

4. Should we Move Directly into a Confrontation with Israel on the NPT/Nuclear Weapon Issue on the basis
of Supply of F-4's and other pending Arms Deliveries or Should we Follow a Graduated Approach Relying
Primarily on Political Suasion but Maintaining the Flexibility to Move to more Coercive Policies if Israel is Unresponsive

The Department of State believes that a policy of pressure has a fundamental built-in contradiction and
involves difficulties for the U.S. that should be carefully
examined. A threat to cut off Israel's supply of conventional arms could build military and psychological pressures within Israel to move rapidly to the very sophisticated weaponry we are trying to avoid. Moreover, to deny Israel arms needed for its defense would be most difficult to justify in the face of continuing Arab threats and commando attacks. Israel would see from the outset that we would be under considerable pressures not to sustain this position and we would have expended much leverage and good will needlessly.

State believes that for the present we should continue the course of using political argumentation, leaving implicit and for future decision possible sanctions if Israel does not respond to our initial representations and proceeds with its weapons program. Our actions on the nuclear issue should be timed so as to complement or at least not undercut our diplomatic efforts to achieve a peace settlement. Our objective would be Israeli signature of the NPT with (a) the tacit understanding that as long as Israel did not complete manufacture of nuclear explosive devices, we would regard this as being within the terms of the Treaty and, (b) a commitment that Israel would negotiate the IAEA safeguards agreement, and (c) an understanding that we will support the Israelis in a reasonable interpretation of Article III consistent with the difference we have drawn between maintaining and exercising the option to manufacture nuclear explosives, provided Israel assures us it will not produce weapons and will consult with us to define this concept in detail.

The Department of Defense (ISA and the Joint Staff) believes that pressures can be applied by the threat to cut off conventional weapons supply and assurances from Israeli received with a reasonably good chance (say 75%) of avoiding a public confrontation. Important groups in Israel surely will want to avoid such a confrontation, and the military certainly will not wish to exchange assured conventional weapons supply from this highly preferred source for nuclear-armed missiles. Moreover, it will be difficult, to put it mildly, for Israel publicly to challenge our position on this issue - for our position can be easily and clearly presented as acting in the U.S.

\footnote{J/PM differs with this view: see footnote on page 6.}
interest without jeopardizing Israel's security. (This would not be the case if, for example, we attempted to withhold arms supplies to achieve Israeli concessions to Arabs; our position would be more difficult to defend and sustain publicly in that instance.)

Defense believes that it is important, if we are to stop Israel from going ahead with missiles and nuclear weapons, to demonstrate to the Israelis the seriousness of our purpose so that Israel itself can see the desirability of avoiding confrontation. Israel will surely not stop its long range-nuclear weapons and missile programs unless it is made to feel that the United States is truly prepared to adopt policies which would adversely effect Israel's security with respect to more immediate threats. Moreover, the speed with which Israel is proceeding dictates that we must take steps very soon if we are to stop Israel's nuclear and missile activity before it is publicly known.

Defense recognizes that we cannot obtain absolute guarantees that Israel will forego strategic missiles and nuclear weapons over the long-run; we can, however, make it more likely that missiles and nuclear weapons will not be used by stopping their production now and by creating a political obstacle -– the necessity to renounce agreements and risk confrontation with the United States — to their later use.

5. Should we Attempt to Obtain Israeli Assurances that it will halt its strategic missile as well as nuclear weapons program?

Defense believes that in addition to signature of the NPT and assurances of nuclear weapons restraint, we should seek Israeli assurances that it will not produce, further acquire, or deploy strategic missiles. They argue that since the present Israeli "Jericho" missile is not militarily cost effective as a means of delivering a high explosive warhead, the assumption will be made that they are designed for nuclear warheads, and the practical result may be the same whether or not the nuclear weapons actually exist.

The Department of State, on the other hand, believes that getting the Israelis to abandon their SSM program will be very difficult to achieve, given the program's already
advanced stage. Trying to obtain assurances on missiles would therefore seriously compound the difficulty of obtaining assurances on what must be our main objective—the non-production and non-deployment of nuclear weapons.

6. Courses of Action

A. The Department of State holds the following view:

1. A dialogue with Israel on the nuclear question can and should be initiated immediately. We believe this will not affect adversely our current efforts to achieve a peace settlement. We should move to reaffirm our opposition to proliferation as soon as possible preferably at the Ambassadorial level both here and in Jerusalem and underscore that the U.S. Government considers it has a firm commitment in this respect from Israel. We believe strongly that we should not at this juncture link this approach to a suspension or slowing down of shipments of conventional weapons to Israel. This possibility should be reviewed prior to September in the light of Israel's response and further intelligence on the progress of Israel's program.

2. At an early occasion a high-ranking U.S. official—preferably the Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense—should make a public statement on our global non-proliferation objectives and, in particular, our hope that nuclear weapons can be kept out of sensitive areas such as the Middle East. Such a statement should note Israel's assurances to us that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area and urge Israel to sign the NPT.

J/PM, while in general agreement with the other formulations identified as the State position in this paper, differs with NEA on this point. J/PM believes:

(a) The implications of Israel's possession of nuclear weapons are serious enough for US interests to warrant reminding the Israelis at the outset of the terms of the Warnke letter, and informing them of the possibility that we might not be able to carry through with deliveries of the F-4 and other aircraft if Israel pursues its weapons program;

(b) Unless this warning is conveyed, the Israelis are not likely to pay much attention to our representations.
B. The Department of Defense holds the following view:

1. There should be an early meeting with Ambassador Rabin of Israel for the purpose of conveying to Israel (a) the seriousness with which the U.S. views Israel's missile and nuclear developments, and (b) specific U.S. demands that Israel stop certain of its activities and give us assurances to this effect.

2. The assurances we require from Israel are:
   (a) private assurances (with inspection rights) that Israel will cease and desist from development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and strategic missiles, and
   (b) public assurances in the form of a NPT signature and ratification.

3. We should reiterate, on behalf of this Administration, that the American definition of "introduction" applies (e.g., the State of Israel will not physically possess nuclear weapons, including the components of nuclear weapons that will explode).

4. Rabin should be called in by the President, or by the Secretaries of State and Defense. Although the negotiations with Israel will be especially difficult, they will be less difficult if our demands for assurances are unequivocal and made at the highest level.

Drafted by:
State/Defense 5/29/69
I. ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR WEAPON INTENTIONS

There is no conclusive evidence that Israel has fabricated a weapon. 

Given the impact of this decision on U.S. and world opinion, as well as the domestic political problem it would pose, this final step is one we believe the Labor Alignment in Israel would like to avoid. The fierce determination to safeguard the Jewish people, however, makes it probable that Israel would desire to maintain the ultimate weapon at hand should its security again be seriously threatened.

Last fall the Departments of State and Defense recommended making the supply of F-4 aircraft contingent upon the halting by Israel of its nuclear weapons and missiles program, but President Johnson did not approve the recommendations to that effect. We did, however, during the F-4 negotiations with Israel, accomplish at least three things: (1) we put Israel on notice that the USG is aware of what Israel is doing in the missile and nuclear field; (2) we identified a significant difference between U.S. and Israeli interpretations of what constitutes "introduction" of nuclear weapons (Israeli Ambassador Rabin said that "introduction" would not occur until a weapon had been tested and its existence publicly known; Assistant Secretary of Defense Warnke made clear that the American definition is that mere possession of nuclear weapons constitutes "introduction"); and (3) we deliberately and explicitly left open the possibility that this Administration would reconsider the F-4 sale in light of Israel's nuclear programs.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

The implications of Israel becoming a nuclear power need examination from several different aspects.

A. Arab Reaction

The Arabs are aware that Israel's capability in the nuclear field is well-advanced, but the fact of Israel's adding nuclear weapons to its arsenal would have profound political and psychological effect throughout the area.

Although operational nuclear weapons in the Israeli inventory would have a generalized deterrent effect upon the Arabs, it would not guarantee Israel against a wide range of military actions by the Arabs. Israeli nuclear weapons would do nothing to reduce Arab commando activity or the kind of sporadic across-the-lines shooting exchanges between the regular armed forces that we see today. This type of activity could well increase because of the Arab conclusion that, since Israel has a stronger weapon to use against organized forces, Arab strategy should concentrate on guerilla and limited engagement tactics to raise Israeli casualties and to wear Israel down over the long run. We would expect no dramatic change in the Arab-Israel military impasse but some added impetus to Arab government support for guerilla tactics.

The appearance of nuclear weapons in Israel would probably cause the Arabs to withdraw from the NPT and to announce they were compelled to embark on a nuclear weapons program of their own.

The problem for the Arabs would not be money but the acquisition of technical knowledge and fissionable material. We do not believe that the USSR would provide either completed weapons or technical assistance in nuclear weaponry to the Arabs. We also believe it highly improbable that Communist China would provide such assistance. It would be possible, however, for the Arabs to hire on private contract a broad range of scientific and technical personnel from Western Europe.
The acquisition of sufficient quantities of weapons grade fissionable material would be a greater obstacle since the Arabs have neither power reactors which might produce Pu for crude "dirty" devices, nor the necessary chemical reprocessing plants nor uranium enrichment plants. It is generally agreed that even with major external assistance it would take the Arabs at least ten years to develop nuclear weapons.

The appearance of nuclear weapons in Israel would reduce even further whatever remaining prospects there may be for an Arab-Israel settlement. It would deepen the Arab sense of military inferiority and their fatalistic belief that the only solution to the Arab-Israel situation is military conflict at some distant date when the Arabs manage to surpass Israel in strength. Deeply rooted in the Arab psyche is the concept that a settlement will be possible only when there is some parity in strength with Israel. A "kamikaze" strike at the Dimona facilities cannot be ruled out; President Nasser in the past has said that this would be the UAR reaction.

The Arabs would also be thrown into greater military and psychological dependence on the USSR providing the latter with wider opportunities to expand its influence among the Arab states. US interests in the Arab states would suffer proportionately. Even if we did not have to face accusations that we actively helped Israel to develop the bomb, we would be held responsible in many Arab quarters for "allowing Israel to go nuclear". It would add to the strain in our relations with those Arab states in which we still have important interests. The general effect would be to add to the polarization of the Arab-Israel conflict along cold war lines.

B. Soviet Reaction

We believe that the Soviet Union is generally aware of Israel's nuclear weapons program, although we do not know to what extent. The fact that the Soviets have not made an issue with us on this subject may indicate that they feel that this is a US problem; it may also mean the Soviets are undecided as yet how to proceed. Israeli production of nuclear weapons would deal a sharp blow to the prospects for nuclear non-proliferation.
and specifically for the NPT, in which the USSR is obviously interested. The Soviets, who profess desire to defuse the situation in the Middle East, view introduction of nuclear weapons as making it even more dangerous and unpredictable. The USSR would be faced, also, with the difficult problem of responding to Arab demands for some form of protection against this threat.

The theoretical range of Soviet actions in reaction to Israeli possession of nuclear weapons might be as follows:

(a) The Soviets might turn over nuclear weapons to the Arabs.

(b) The Soviets might give the Arabs assistance in their own nuclear weapons program.

(c) The Soviets might announce that they were targetting a certain number of their own IRBM/MRBM or nuclear missile carrying submarines on Israel and that any use by Israel of nuclear weapons against the Arabs could bring retaliation.

(d) The USSR might accept an Arab invitation to station Soviet nuclear capable forces (aircraft or missiles) on Arab soil, targeted on Israel but remaining under Soviet control.

(e) The USSR might make known that it had concluded a security guarantee with the Arabs providing that the USSR would come to their assistance in the event of any attack against them.

(f) Assuming that Israel deploys its MD-620 missile system, the USSR might offer to give the Arabs assistance in developing comparable missiles, perhaps accompanied by an arrangement under which nuclear warheads would be held nearby in Soviet custody.

(g) The Soviets might provide the UAR with a large nuclear reactor for peaceful purposes under Soviet safeguards.

(h) The Soviets might offer the Arabs general assurances of support while avoiding any specific commitments.
(i) The Soviets might privately promise the Arabs a substantial liberalization of its arms policy toward them, both in terms of price and of providing first-line conventional equipment.

The Soviets will feel compelled to take some action to politically neutralize Israeli possession of nuclear weapons, if their position in the Arab world is to be maintained. However, it is extremely unlikely that the USSR would go so far as to turn over nuclear weapons to the Arabs or give direct assistance to an Arab weapons program. We would also judge it unlikely that the USSR would agree to the kind of specific commitment suggested in (d) or (e) either of which would limit Soviet flexibility to avoid a war which could be started by the Arabs themselves (there is every evidence that the Soviets were thoroughly surprised and alarmed by Nasser's actions in May 1967). Soviet assistance for an Arab SSM program is more likely than assistance on nuclear weapons, but still improbable. A more or less explicit threat that IRBMs/ MRBMs in the Soviet Union might be used to retaliate against Israel in the event of Israeli use of nuclear weapons against the Arabs is a distinct possibility. An interesting possibility is provided in (g); this would please the Arabs, leave control in the hands of the USSR, and yet alarm the Israelis that the Arabs might have, on their territory, a potential source of plutonium for at least some crude nuclear explosive devices. On balance, we believe that a combination of (c), (h) and (i) is the most likely Soviet response. An immediate surge in the flow of first-rate Soviet arms to the Arab states could be expected. The US would quickly come under pressure to perform in similar fashion for its Arab clients, particularly Jordan. The Soviets would undoubtedly seek to get as much propaganda mileage out of the development as they could with strongly-worded but vague public assurances of support.

C. Implications for US Non-Proliferation Objectives

Because Israeli officials continue to state privately and publicly that Israel does not possess nuclear weapons and does not intend to acquire them unless some other Near Eastern state does so first, Israel's delay in adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its nuclear program have not yet had much impact on the attitudes toward non-proliferation of countries outside the Near East.
If Israel should announce a decision not to adhere to the NPT, or should remain unwilling to sign after most countries have done so, the Arab states will refuse to ratify the Treaty. A number of other African and Asian countries will probably follow the Arab lead.

The Israeli decision to establish an operational nuclear capability in the Israeli Defense Force would have more serious repercussions, both regional and worldwide.

In the region, the UAR would almost certainly proclaim its determination to acquire nuclear weapons. However, in the absence of direct assistance from one of the existing nuclear weapons states, it is doubtful that the UAR would be able to establish even a rudimentary military nuclear capability in less than fifteen years. At a minimum, however, all the Arab states will refuse to ratify the NPT and some will declare their intention to acquire nuclear weapons whether they are able to do so or not.

Outside the region, both India, Japan and perhaps Australia would probably find in the Israeli decision a new argument for not signing the NPT. On the other hand, the German decision regarding the NPT will continue to evolve mainly on the basis of other considerations. Israel could well be the bellwether of the smaller non-aligned nations who will be watching for clues to the strength of US views on non-proliferation and arms control measures. Once it became clear that nuclear weapons could not be kept out of the Middle East, it would become extremely difficult, if not impossible, to halt nuclear proliferation elsewhere.

The existence of nuclear weapons in the IDF operational inventory would also by itself increase the danger of nuclear war in the region to some extent. The uncertainties in the Middle East, including the irrational element in Arab policy, would not necessarily preclude an Arab attempt to engage the Israelis in a conventional war of attrition despite the fact that the Israelis have a nuclear capability. Such a situation might greatly increase pressures in Israel to resort to nuclear weapons.
D. Are Nuclear Weapons a Deterrent for Israel?

If the possession of nuclear weapons offered an ultimate deterrent for Israel we would perhaps be prepared to conclude that, whatever other disadvantages this development might have, its contribution to Israel's security, especially with the prospect of continuing Arab hostility, was in the US interest.

Israel wants nuclear weapons, as was both explicit and implicit in our conversations with Rabin, for two reasons: first, to deter the Arabs from striking Israel, and second, if deterrence fails and Israel were about to be overrun, to destroy the Arabs in a nuclear Armageddon.

To deter, Israel believes it would need a nuclear force which is publicly known and, by the large, invulnerable, i.e., having a second strike capability. Israel is now building such a force -- the hardened silos of the Jericho missiles. As Rabin said in November 1968

"...there must be public acknowledgment. The purpose of nuclear weapons is not to use the weapon itself, but to use their deterrent power. I don't believe any powers that have nuclear weapons plan to use them, although you cannot ever be sure."

But it is not really possible to deter Arab leaders -- and certainly not the fedayeen -- when they themselves represent basically irrational forces. The theory of nuclear deterrence that applies between the US and the USSR -- a theory that requires a reasoned response to provocation, which in turn is made possible by essentially stable societies and governments -- is far less applicable in the Near East. Israel would never be able to rule out the possibility that some irrational Arab leader would be willing to sustain great losses if he believed he could inflict decisive damage on Israel.

In making known its possession of nuclear weapons, Israel would also be taking some risk that the Arabs would decide this was the moment for a preemptive attack, before Israel could produce more nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the acknowledged introduction by Israel of strategic missiles or nuclear weapons would probably compel the USSR to take compensating and neutralizing actions.
Finally, the limited effectiveness of nuclear weapons as a general deterrent would last only until the Arabs themselves succeeded in developing their own nuclear weapons. Even in this interim period, the intended value of nuclear weapons could be greatly reduced by offsetting actions of the USSR.

E. Strategic Implications for US

Although US and Soviet interests are in conflict in the Middle East, the Soviets appear anxious to avoid a repetition of major Arab-Israel hostilities, particularly as this could lead to confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Neither the USSR nor the US have formal security arrangements with the Arab states or Israel, and neither power views the Arab-Israel theatre as one where its vital security interests are at stake. But both powers also realize that the danger of their becoming directly involved is high when the survival of their respective area clients is threatened. The possession of nuclear weapons by the area states would tend seriously to reduce the margin of safety for us both. Both the US and the USSR would tend to be drawn slowly into playing greater protective roles for their respective clients. In doing so the dangers of confrontation would become that much greater.

F. Conclusion

Israel's possession of nuclear weapons could (a) significantly reduce the possibility of stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons worldwide and make less likely the successful conclusion of the NPT; (b) increase somewhat the danger of US-USSR nuclear confrontation as the result of an Arab-Israel war; (c) further damage US interests in the Arab states and open corresponding opportunities for an expansion of Soviet influence in this area. The disadvantages to US global interests are such that a major US effort to induce Israel not to produce nuclear weapons is justified.
A. US Policy Objectives

If we assume that (a) Israel is proceeding with plans to place a nuclear capability into the operational inventory of the IDF within the next 18 months, but has not yet done so, and (b) it is in our interest to prevent the Israeli Government from proceeding on this course, there are three possible objectives toward which the US Government can exert whatever influence and leverage it has.

These are to get the Israelis:

(a) to abandon their efforts to maintain a technical option to design and complete manufacture of nuclear explosive devices together with strategic missile delivery systems; or

(b) to refrain from completing manufacture of nuclear explosive devices -- and placing them into the IDF inventory -- without, on the other hand, either challenging or approving the maintenance of a technical option by the Israelis to do so, or the ballistic missile program now underway.

(c) to refrain from completing manufacture of both nuclear explosive devices and strategic missiles.

The first of these alternative objectives probably cannot be attained in the absence of a definitive Arab/Israeli peace settlement because (a) whatever differences of view there are in the assessment of the precise state of the Israeli program it is clearly far advanced and the internal political implications for Israel would make it seem highly unlikely that Israel would be willing to abandon it completely; and (b) it is not enforceable (we cannot force the Israelis to destroy design data and components, much less the technical knowledge in people's minds, nor the existing talent for rapid improvisation).

The second objective, while difficult, is not beyond attainment because (a) it meets what appears to be the principal Israeli objective, namely, to maintain the option
of having an operational military nuclear capability on short notice; and (b) it could be consistent with the NPT by accepting a liberal interpretation of what is "manufacture" of nuclear explosives (and would in any event leave the Israelis the "supreme interests" escape clause).

The argument for including SSM's in our objective is that, since they are not militarily cost effective as a means of delivering a high explosive warhead, the assumption will be made that they are designed for nuclear warheads, and the practical result may be the same whether or not the nuclear weapons actually exist. On the other hand, getting the Israelis to refrain from completing manufacture of their "Jericho" program may be very difficult to achieve and may therefore compound the difficulty of achieving forebearance on nuclear weapons. Israel has already invested an estimated $100 million in R&D for this missile, has started fabricating components on a production line basis, and would argue that if the US agrees that Israel can retain its "technical option" to produce nuclear weapons, it should also have in readiness a fool-proof means of delivering them.

B. Alternative Courses of Action

Our options run from, at one extreme, adopting a "hands off" policy on the thesis that Israel would probably not move to an operational nuclear weapons system unless there developed a critical security situation, to using the maximum pressure at our disposal to induce Israel to adhere to the NPT and to undertake not to complete manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. Between these extremes, the following courses of action might be considered:

(a) Continue our past policy of seeking to induce Israel to refrain from producing nuclear weapons through persuasion rather than coercive tactics, making it clear that this development would have adverse impact both on US global security interests and on US/Israel relations.

(b) Seek to get Israeli assurances to desist on its nuclear weapons and strategic missile programs as a quid pro quo for a US assurance that it would meet all future Israeli needs in conventional weapons.
(c) Inform Israel that we would have to cut off further shipments of conventional weapons if Israel opts to go the nuclear route.

(d) Offer Israel a security guarantee.

(e) Approach the USSR with the proposition that if it is willing to agree to a limitation of conventional arms shipments to the Arab states, we will try to persuade Israel to give up its nuclear and SSM program and sign the NPT.

We believe only two considerations are likely to induce the Israelis not to produce or deploy nuclear weapons. The first would be a definitive peace settlement with the Arabs; or secondly, if the US upon which Israel depends for arms, financial support, and its ultimate security makes this a major issue in its relations with Israel.

A commitment to underwrite Israel's conventional military requirements, as suggested in (b), might help to postpone completion of Israel's weapons program but would not of itself have a decisive effect on Israel's nuclear policy. Israel has managed to obtain all of its important arms requirements from the US and probably estimates it can continue to do so in the future. This course alone does not offer Israel much that it does not already have.

A threat to stop further deliveries of military equipment would give Israel pause. It is now heavily dependent on the US as a major supplier of conventional arms and other sources have proved undependable. However, there is the distinct possibility that the more hard-pressed Israel became in conventional capability, the more likely it would move to develop the sophisticated weapons it now has the capability to produce. In addition, depriving Israel of armament supply in the face of increased
Arab and Palestinian militancy would be hard to defend even on the nuclear issue.¹

A security guarantee from the United States would be welcomed by Israel but would not substitute for Israel's own deterrent strength. Since 1967, Israel has expressed skepticism about the value of big power assurances and it is doubtful if any offer along these lines would have a decisive influence upon Israel's policies. In any case, a security guarantee with Israel involves grave disadvantages for the US. We would be entering an open-end commitment without control over Israeli actions. The repercussions upon our interests in the Arab world would be serious. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to envisage Congress, given its present mood about foreign involvements, as looking favorably upon such a commitment.

¹In place of this paragraph, the Department of Defense prefers the following formulation:

A threat to stop further deliveries of military equipment, if seriously made, would cause Israel great concern. It is now heavily dependent on the US as a major supplier of conventional arms, and other sources have proven undependable. There is an apparent contradiction here: the more we deny Israel access to conventional weapons, the more important the advanced weapons become to Israel. It is, of course, in our interest to assure Israel's conventional weapons superiority. But for the present Israel's military superiority is complete and it will remain so for at least a year; we are therefore able to withhold US equipment from Israel, bringing pressure to bear on that government without endangering appreciably Israel's security, if that should be necessary to achieve Israeli commitments on missiles and nuclear weapons. Also, there will be important groups in Israel, including many of the military, who will be greatly concerned with the prospect of losing their conventional weapons supplies, particularly aircraft, and this will work to an advantage. The contradiction, therefore, is for the present more apparent than real.
A possible approach to the Soviets on arms limitation in the Near East is not a true policy alternative but rather a course that can be pursued concurrently with most of the alternatives above. Our probes of the Soviets on this possibility have not so far given us reason to believe that they would be interested in such an arrangement in the absence of an Arab-Israeli settlement. Recent manifestations of increased Soviet concern about tension in the Middle East might make the Soviets somewhat more receptive to this proposal.

C. Preferred Course

Of the policy alternatives suggested above, and assuming we see it in our interest to try to dissuade Israel from its current policies, the feasible courses of action available to us are basically two: (a) a policy based essentially on persuasion; (b) a policy which is prepared to use pressure in sufficient measure to achieve the objective.

The disadvantage of a policy limited to persuasion alone can be simply stated: it is the policy we have followed in the past, it has not worked, and there is no reason to believe it will be more effective in the future. We strongly doubt that tactics relying mainly on persuasion or incentives can prove sufficient of themselves to induce Israel to modify its nuclear policy, even to the extent of signing the NPT while maintaining its option to produce nuclear weapons at short notice. Israel will probably not move on this issue unless it is made to feel that the US is ultimately prepared to adopt policies that could affect its security in equally important ways.

On the other hand, the Department of State believes a policy prepared to use pressure has a fundamental built-in contradiction and involves difficulties for the US that should be carefully examined. If we tell Israel that its decision to further develop nuclear

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2The Department of Defense (DOD and JCS) differs in important respects from this section and prefers the formulation set forth on page 12.
weapons will oblige us to cut off the supply of arms from this country, and we are then forced to carry out this threat; we will be in a difficult position. To cut off Israel's supply of conventional arms could build military and psychological pressures within Israel to speed up production and deployment of the very sophisticated weaponry we are trying to head off. This contradiction will be obvious to the Israelis, leaving considerable doubt from the outset as to the credibility of our tactic. Moreover, to deny Israel its supply of arms would be difficult to justify in the face of continuing Arab commando attacks on Israel. In short, Israel would see from the outset that we would be under very considerable pressures not to sustain the policy that we had said we would move to.

For these reasons the Department of State does not think it would be either wise or effective to move directly into a confrontation with Israel on the question of the F-4s or their other pending arms requests. On the other hand, if our policy is to have any impact on Israel, it is essential that we manage our tactics in such a manner as to leave the Israeli Government strongly concerned that we would be prepared to move to more coercive policies if Israel is unresponsive. We believe the best course is a graduated approach, by which we begin with essentially persuasive tactics but maintain the flexibility to move to tougher policies depending on the Israeli response. This should be timed so as to complement or at least not undercut our diplomatic effort to achieve a peace settlement. However, if our action is to be effective, it obviously cannot be postponed indefinitely.

As an initial step, we should resume our dialogue with the Israelis, preferably at the Heads of Government or Foreign Minister level, in which we would make clear to them (a) that we consider it to be a matter of vital US interest that there be no operational nuclear capabilities in the Middle East because the introduction of such capabilities would increase the risk of a US/Soviet nuclear confrontation; (b) that the increase in the risk of such a confrontation in itself is bound to undermine the credibility of the US commitment to Israel; and (c) that an Arab-Israeli nuclear arms race would, in
the end, leave the Israelis in a strategically vulnerable position. We would additionally say that we consider we have a firm commitment from Israel not to develop operational nuclear capabilities, and that should Israel break this commitment, it would have profound repercussions on US-Israel relations, including our policies in support of Israel's security.

We would insist on Israeli signature of the NPT with (a) the tacit understanding that as long as the Israelis do not complete manufacture of nuclear explosive devices, we would regard them as being within the terms of the Treaty; (b) a commitment on their part that they will negotiate the IAEA safeguards agreement required by Article II to apply to material "in all peaceful nuclear activities" on Israeli territory; and (c) an understanding that we will support the Israelis in a reasonable interpretation of Article III - consistent with the difference we have drawn between maintaining and exercising the option to manufacture nuclear explosives provided they will assure us that they will stop short of completing manufacture of nuclear explosives and will engage in bilateral consultation with us to define this concept in detail and verify its implementation.

The Department of State believes that, while it would be desirable if possible to obtain Israeli assurances of forebearance on strategic missiles as well as nuclear weapons, this will be difficult to achieve and would seriously compound the difficulty of obtaining assurances of Israeli restraint on the nuclear question. In terms of what we can realistically expect to get with the leverage we can bring to bear, to include missiles would be overloading the circuit. Moreover, while the Department of State would grant the point that the deployment of nuclear-capable missiles will vitiate to some degree international confidence that Israel has decided not to exercise the nuclear option, it also feels that signature of the NPT, plus acceptance of the international inspection and safeguards provided for in the NPT, would accomplish the main task of providing credible assurances on the status of Israel's nuclear program.

If the Israelis are unresponsive to the approach outlined above, we should make it clear to Israel that if it elects to pursue a weapons program, it will be imposing a major strain on US-Israel relations, with serious risk to
US ability to continue to meet Israel's conventional arms requirements. On the other hand, if Israel were to sign the NPT (while preserving its technical option to produce nuclear weapons), the US would see to it that Israel received military equipment to maintain its conventional superiority over Arab forces.

As an adjunct to a decision to move into this phase, a high-ranking US official could give a public speech setting forth a reasoned statement of our concern over the Israeli program. This would preempt a possible Zionist campaign to try to undermine the Administration's position, and at the same time, make it clear to the Israelis that the USG was prepared to defend its policy in public.

While these discussions were continuing, the US would have the option to slow down or suspend entirely shipments of conventional weapons to Israel, including the undelivered F-4s. It would also be possible to probe the Soviets again on their willingness to consider a conventional arms limitation accord as quid pro quo for an Israeli stand down on its weapons program.

D. The Department of Defense (ISA and JCS) Preferred Course

The Department of Defense believes that we must move more swiftly, place more demands on Israel, and adopt from the outset a more determined attitude, than the Department of State proposes. The Department of Defense believes that, if Israel continues its present course, confrontation is inevitable: Israel will have "introduced" nuclear weapons and we must then invoke the sanctions called for in our agreement (i.e., cancel the F-4 contract).

But the issue is not, as we see it, persuasion versus confrontation, but whether or not to demonstrate to the Israelis the seriousness of our purpose so that Israel itself can decide to avoid confrontation. It is Israel, after all, that made an agreement that it would not do what it now seems to be doing. Israel will surely not stop its nuclear weapons and missile production unless it is made to feel that the United States is ultimately prepared to adopt policies that could adversely affect its security in equally important ways.
The Department of Defense recognizes negotiations with Israel on this matter will be especially difficult. By placing demands on Israel to stop making nuclear weapons, a public confrontation with the government is possible. But we believe that a confrontation is only likely if (a) they think we are bluffing, or (b) they believe they could reverse our position by so doing. They could use their full range of assets in the United States to persuade us to abandon our demands. They would not, however, enter lightly onto such a course, because the introduction of nuclear weapons by Israel will not be an issue on which they could expect the kind of uncontested American support they have achieved on other issues and because, if they failed to reverse our policy, the long range effects could be very bad indeed. There will very likely be considerable pressures within Israel not to confront the United States and world opinion on the matter of missiles and nuclear weapons.

The speed with which Israel is proceeding dictates that we must take steps very soon if we are to stop Israel's nuclear and missile development. We must meet with the Israelis at a high level. The first demarche should be made by the President, or by the Secretaries of State and Defense together. Such high level participation is needed to convey the strength of our purpose.

We agree with State that a public assurance in the form of an NPT signature is essential (although we do not agree that the IAEA safeguards agreement should apply only to nuclear material "in all peaceful nuclear activities," for this would undermine the inspection arrangements). But we should also demand private assurances from Israel that it will cease and desist from further development or acquisition of both nuclear explosive devices and strategic missiles. It is important that we stop Israeli missile production as well as nuclear production for the reasons cited: we will thereby have stopped one means of nuclear (and chemical) weapons delivery; and we can have greater confidence in Israeli nuclear assurances. Also, if missiles are deployed by Israel, it will be assumed that they have nuclear warheads, and the political results may be the same as though the existence of the nuclear warheads was acknowledged.

It is obvious we cannot obtain absolute guarantees that Israel will forego strategic missiles and nuclear weapons.
forever; we can, however, make it more likely that missiles and nuclear weapons will not be used by stopping their production now and by creating a political obstacle — the necessity to renounce agreements and risk confrontation with the United States — to their later use.
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

6/18/69
5:45 p.m.

Col. H --

Capt. Wilson of the Deputy's office personally delivered the attached. He indicated that this copy, and the copy which the Deputy's office has, are the only copies at this level. ISA felt the paper should be handled without control, and held close, per Capt. W.
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Under Secretary of State Richardson
Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard
Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Wheeler
Director of Central Intelligence Helms

SUBJECT: Meeting of Ad Hoc Committee on NSSM 40

There will be a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Review Group on NSSM 40 at 4:45 p.m., June 20, in the White House Situation Room to consider the paper distributed by the Department of State on May 30.

Jeanne W. Davis
Secretariat
SUBJECT: NSSM 40 - Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program

BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION: The President directed the preparation of a policy study on the Israeli nuclear weapons program. To carry out this directive, Mr. Kissinger created two new groups: an Ad Hoc (Working) Group chaired by Assistant Secretary of State Risco (NEA), and including representatives of ISA, the Joint Staff, State, CIA and the NSC Staff; and an Ad Hoc Committee of the NSC Review Group, chaired by Mr. Kissinger and including Mr. Richardson, Mr. Packard, General Wheeler and Mr. Helms. A copy of the President's Directive (NSSM No. 40) is at Tab A.

The Working Group has completed its study. Its report, for consideration by the Ad Hoc Committee, is at Tab B. The Israeli nuclear weapons program is the most vital issue affecting US interests in the Middle East. We recommend, particularly because of State's reluctance to accept it, that the Ad Hoc Committee be given a full briefing on the pertinent intelligence as the first order of business.

The Working Group agreed generally on a number of points: that Israel is making rapid progress on its missile and nuclear programs; that nuclear weapons would not be a real deterrent for Israel; that the USSR would be forced to play a more protective role vis-a-vis the Arabs and to offset, in one way or another, Israel's nuclear "advantage;" that the introduction of nuclear weapons by Israel would adversely affect U.S. interests, and would pose greater risks to the security of the U.S.; and that a major U.S. effort to induce Israel not to produce nuclear weapons is justified. It was also agreed that without such a major effort Israel would not stop its present programs.

It is important to note also an acknowledged disagreement between the U.S. and Israeli Governments as to the meaning of Israel's repeated pledge not to be the first Middle East Power "to introduce nuclear weapons into the area." Ambassador Rabin, in discussions last fall, defined "introduction" to require both public announcement and testing. This clearly is an unacceptable definition, and as part of the F-4 agreement (Tab C) we made clear that our definition applies, i.e. physical possession constitutes "introduction".

There is disagreement between State and Defense (ISA/JCS) on a number of points. These differences are adequately presented in the study and the covering memo. Briefly they are:

- The Working Group concluded that Israel is making rapid progress on its missile and nuclear programs.
- Nuclear weapons would not be a real deterrent for Israel.
- The USSR would be forced to play a more protective role vis-a-vis the Arabs and to offset, in one way or another, Israel's nuclear "advantage;" that the introduction of nuclear weapons by Israel would adversely affect U.S. interests, and would pose greater risks to the security of the U.S.; and that a major U.S. effort to induce Israel not to produce nuclear weapons is justified.
- Without such a major effort, Israel would not stop its present programs.
- There is an acknowledged disagreement between the U.S. and Israeli Governments as to the meaning of Israel's repeated pledge not to be the first Middle East Power "to introduce nuclear weapons into the area."
1. What if Israel already has nuclear devices? State believes Israel would be reluctant to push its nuclear weapons program to the point of actual production because Israel fears the effects in the U.S. The evidence is strongly to the contrary.

Defense believes that the US objective should be to stop Israel from obtaining nuclear weapons if possible but, in any case, to prevent missiles and nuclear weapons from becoming part of Israel's military inventory.

2. Should we try to stop missile production also? Defense believes we should. State is doubtful. The Defense position is based on the following arguments: (a) Israel intends to arm at least some missiles with chemical (probably nerve gas) and nuclear warheads. (b) Stopping strategic missile production and deployment is intimately connected with stopping the nuclear weapons program. The U.S. can more easily monitor Israeli missile progress and, by stopping missile development, can have greater assurance that Israel is not secretly proceeding to produce nuclear weapons. (c) The missiles are not militarily cost-effective with conventional warheads (they have a CEP of about one-half mile); continued Israeli production of missiles would suggest Israeli intention to use non-conventional warheads. (d) Once the missiles are deployed it will be widely believed that the missiles do in fact have nuclear warheads, and the political results may be the same whether or not the nuclear warheads actually exist.

3. Relationship between the present U.S. efforts to get peace talks underway and the missile/nuclear weapons problem. State (NEA) is heavily committed to the bilateral (US-USSR) and 4 Power talks aimed at reaching agreement on the terms of a peace settlement. NEA does not want to do anything to interfere with this effort. Defense believes, given the odds against any immediate "peace" and the rapidity with which Israel is moving toward nuclear weapons and missile deployment, that the nuclear issue is overriding, and that serious discussions with Israel cannot await conclusion of the peace talks.

4. How to approach Israel? State recommends Ambassadorial-level discussions here and in Israel. Talks at this level have been undertaken for many years now without success, and there is no reason to believe they would be more successful now. Israel surely will not stop either its missile or nuclear weapons programs unless this Government seriously demands it do so. Defense recommends that the President, or the Secretaries of State and Defense together, call in Israeli Ambassador Rabin and convey to him the seriousness with which the United States views Israel's actions and the assurances the U.S. requires from Israel that it will stop missile and nuclear production. Although not mentioned in the Report, Defense believes we should offer and agree, in the course of negotiations with Israel, to assure Israel of adequate-conventional arms supply if the U.S. demands are accepted.
The report by the Working Group is considered an adequate presentation of the issues, the threat to U.S. security interests, and the alternatives available to the U.S. in meeting that threat. The differing Departmental views are fairly and adequately presented. The Defense position reflects the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this issue.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

1. That you urge an early meeting at the highest level with Ambassador Rabin, to put before the Government of Israel certain demands concerning their nuclear and missile programs.

2. That these demands include: (a) Israel's signature of the NPT and (b) private assurances from Israel that it will cease and desist from further development or acquisition of both nuclear explosive devices and strategic missiles.

3. That we make clear in our request for assurances that failure to comply will affect our ability to continue the present U.S. relationship with Israel, and particularly the delivery of combat aircraft.

4. That you recommend the Working Group Report be forwarded, in its present form, for consideration by the Special Committee of the NSC and that you advocate the Defense/JCS position as the preferred course for the President.

**APPROVED:**

[Signature]
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

[Signature]
Director, Joint Staff
In reply refer to: 1-35535/69

27 June 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

This is in response to your request, conveyed to me through Captain Wilson, for information on where the U.S. Government stands with respect to early delivery of F-4s to Israel.

In January 1969, President Johnson told Prime Minister Eshkol at the ranch that if the decision were made as late as December 1968 to sell F-4s to Israel, the U.S. Government would put itself in a position to be able to deliver, at the rate of four a month, starting in January 1970 (this would mean almost cutting in half the usual lead-time for F-4s). In December 1968 the decision was made to sell the F-4s, and the Israelis asked for an even earlier delivery. Although there were some objections to this -- particularly from the Air Force, who did not believe the Israelis would be ready to maintain the aircraft earlier -- the decision was made to start delivery, at the rate of four a month, in September 1969. There is attached an exchange of letters between Mr. Varnke and General Rabin to this effect. You will note that in Mr. Varnke's letter he makes two points in addition to the agreement on early delivery. The first point is: "Unforeseen developments could, of course, necessitate a change in this delivery schedule." Secondly, he said that the "U.S. Government is not recommending that Israel take delivery of any of the F-4s prior to the time such personnel are adequately trained to operate and maintain them."

On 18 June 1969, General Rabin, the Israeli Ambassador, wrote a letter (attached) to Secretary Laird, stating that McDonnell Douglas was able to deliver earlier than September and requesting that the planes be delivered to Israel "as they become available from the factory." We know from the factory that this means August. Less formally, the Israelis have told us that if we cannot agree to the delivery of four in August, that they would appreciate receiving eight in September. This request of General Rabin's has not been answered.

We understand from the Air Force that it may be technically possible to make the earlier deliveries the Israelis now request, but we also understand that the Israelis are behind schedule in their maintenance training. One of the things that we worried about last year with respect to such early delivery as September was that the Israelis would possess the planes but be unable to...
maintain them sufficiently to fight them and, in a crisis, ask us to send Air Force technicians to assist them at what would be the worst political time for us to do so.

Given this background, I believe that

1. We have the right to delay delivery through the promised September data, drawing on two arguments as necessary:
   a. The "unforeseen developments" clause in Mr. Warnke's letter, and
   b. The inadequacy of maintenance training.

If actual deliveries are delayed much beyond October, however, we will then begin to run the risk of public knowledge of this fact, due to press queries, etc.

Rodger Davies of the State Department is preparing a draft "scenario" at the request of you, Mr. Kissinger, and Mr. Richardson, for onward transmission to Mr. Laird, Mr. Rogers, and the President. Hopefully, this scenario will cover the subject much more comprehensively than this memorandum pretends to do. It should be in your hands, and Mr. Laird's, by the end of next week. As you have requested, I will continue to represent Defense in this endeavor.

3 Attachments

DISTRIBUTION
Orig - DepSecDef
cc: ASD/ISA/Mr. Nutter
     JCS/Gen Doyle
     NESA/Gen Baer
TOP SECRET/NODIS
(CONFIDENTIAL WITHOUT ATTACHMENT)

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Secretary of State Rogers
Secretary of Defense Laird
Chairman, JCS, General Wheeler
Under Secretary of State Richardson
Director of Central Intelligence Helms

SUBJECT: Paper for July 16 NSC Meeting (NSSM 40)

Attached is a paper describing a possible course of action which represents a consensus of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Review Group on NSSM-40.

The discussion at the meeting of the special committee of the NSC on Wednesday, July 16, will be based on this paper, along with the basic paper distributed by the State Department on May 30 and the Policy Alternatives paper considered by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Review Group on June 26.

Jeanne W. Davis
Secretariat

Attachment
SCENARIO FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAELIS ON THEIR NUCLEAR PROGRAM

A. US Objectives

1. Our objectives are to persuade Israel to:
   
   a) Sign the NPT at an early date (by the end of this year) and ratify it soon thereafter.
   
   b) Reaffirm to the US in writing the assurance that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Near East, specifying that "introduction" shall mean possession of nuclear explosive devices.*
   
   c) Give us assurances in writing that it will stop production and will not deploy "Jericho" missiles or any other nuclear-capable strategic missile.

2. Early signature and ratification of the NPT must be our minimum objective. The NPT provides the best basis for international confidence in Israel's intentions.

Bilateral assurances are equally important. They are also a desirable adjunct to the NPT because of the time factor. The Treaty does not enter into force until the three nuclear signatories and 40 others sign and ratify (present score is one nuclear and about 20 others) and this may take another six months to a year. Even after the Treaty is in force it gives a signatory six months to enter negotiations with the IAEA for a safeguards arrangement, and it gives the signatory an additional 18 months to conclude those negotiations. We need the bilateral assurances to cover the interim and we should do our best to get them.

*In presenting our requirements to the Israelis, we would not go beyond this formulation. For our own internal purposes, we would decide that we could tolerate Israeli activity short of assembly of a completed nuclear explosive device.
Israeli agreement to stop production and not to deploy strategic missiles is important because the deployment of a delivery system that is militarily cost effective only as a nuclear weapons carrier would seriously vitiate confidence in Israel’s adherence to the NPT. We should therefore make a determined effort, at least initially, to achieve this objective. However, if the Israelis show a disposition to meet us on the nuclear issue but are adamant on the Jericho missiles, we can drop back to a position of insisting on non-deployment of missiles and an undertaking by the Israelis to keep any further production secret.

B. Scenario

1. General Approach. The venue for our negotiations with the Israelis should be kept in Washington. Ambassador Barbour in Tel Aviv would be kept informed in detail of the negotiations as they proceed and would be asked to reinforce our representations to Rabin whenever this appeared desirable.

2. First Meeting. Ambassador Rabin would be asked to call upon Under Secretaries Richardson and Packard meeting jointly. The Under Secretaries would say that in connection with Israel’s request to advance the delivery date for the first Phantoms to August, we wish to tie up loose ends left after the Warnke-Rabin negotiations in October, 1968, which led to our agreement to sell the aircraft. Accordingly, we would like to open discussions in Washington on Israel’s adherence to the NPT and related questions concerning Israel’s intentions with respect to nuclear weapons.

The Under Secretaries would stress the importance the US attaches to Israel’s adherence to the NPT. Israel told us last December it was studying the implications of adherence to the NPT; we would be interested to hear what conclusions the GOI has reached. The Under Secretaries would also refer to the Warnke-Rabin exchanges last November and say we feel there are some unanswered questions concerning Israel’s assurances to us on nuclear weapon forebearance. Specifically, we would wish to have Israel’s confirmation that possession of nuclear weapons as well as testing and deployment would constitute “introduction” of nuclear weapons. We would also like to pursue the question of the purpose of Israel developing and deploying a nuclear weapons delivery system — the “Jericho” missile — which can only cast doubt on its nuclear assurances.
At the first meeting with Rabin the US side would not explicitly link deliveries of the F-4s to the Israeli response on the nuclear question, but our reference to the request for early deliveries and the Warnke-Rabin talks would clearly convey the direction of our thinking. Rabin’s tactic will probably be to test how serious we are by refusing initially to go beyond the line Israel has taken with us in past meetings: that the GOI has not made up its mind about the NPT; that it has already given us assurances that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area, and nothing further is required. If he is unresponsive in this fashion, the Under Secretaries would make clear their dissatisfaction and ask Rabin to call again in five or six days time to continue the dialogue.

3. Second Meeting. If Rabin tries to stonewall us at the second meeting the US side would tell him that Israel’s uncommunicativeness on the nuclear question does not strike us as consistent with the high level of cooperation which Israel expects of us in support of its security. Israel’s nuclear policy also impinges directly on US worldwide security concerns and responsibilities. By the end of the meeting we should lay before Rabin precisely what we need, as outlined in section A above. We would make it clear to Rabin that a lack of response on Israel’s part raises a question regarding our ability to continue meeting Israel’s arms requests.

4. Subsequent. Having presented our needs, we would let the GOI formulate its response in its own time, allowing the approaching date for delivery of the F-4s to produce its own pressure on the GOI. Whenever and wherever the Israelis raised the subject of the F-4s, the response would be that, given the terms of the sales agreement and the uncertainties surrounding Israel’s nuclear intentions, there are serious doubts about our ability to proceed with deliveries of the F-4s so long as the matters under discussion with Under Secretaries Richardson and Packard remain unresolved.

This would have the effect of turning down the Israeli request for advancing delivery to August. However, no decision would be taken to alter the scheduled September delivery of the F-4s until we get an initial reading on Israeli attitudes and intentions.

5. Mrs. Meir’s Visit. When Prime Minister Meir gets here the President and other senior US officials would bear down on
this subject, stressing that Israel's decisions in the nuclear weapons field have an important bearing on US security and global interests, and reinforcing our objectives as they have evolved in the meetings between Rabin and the Under Secretaries. The possibility should also be kept in mind that Mrs. Meir may make a special appeal to the President, saying that it is impossible for her government to sign the NPT or give us a bilateral commitment on non-possession of nuclear weapons until after the elections in Israel this October, and that in the meantime non-delivery of F-4s in September would hurt the Labor Alignment's chances. Our response to such an appeal would have to be decided in the light of the way the earlier negotiations had gone with the Israelis.

6. Public Confrontation. The USG would take no initiative to make this a public issue. In the event that the Israelis maintain an unresponsive line with us and show signs of going to Congress in an attempt to undermine our position on deliveries of the F-4s, we should have ready a range of actions that the Administration might take to counter this move.
### TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Tab A**  
Dep Sec Def Memo, Subject: Israeli Nuclear Program  
Sub-tab 1 – Scenario for Discussions with Israelis on their Nuclear Program, and NSSM 40  
Sub-tab 2 – Harry Schwartz memo to Dep Sec Def, 27 Jan 69

**Tab B**  
Director, CIA, memo to Dep Sec Def, Subject: Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program - NSSM 40, 11 July 69
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Israeli Nuclear Program

I recommend you sign the attached memorandum to the Secretary on this subject, which he will discuss with the President, Secretary Rogers, Henry Kissinger, and Dick Helms, at 10:00 a.m., on Wednesday, 16 July.

[Signature]

Attachment a/s
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Israeli Nuclear Program

I recommend you sign the attached memorandum to the Secretary on this subject, which he will discuss with the President, Secretary Rogers, Henry Kissinger, and Dick Helms, at 10:00 a.m., on Wednesday, 16 July.

(Signed) G. Warren Nutter

Attachment a/s
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Israeli Nuclear Program

The attached represents the general consensus of Henry Kissinger, Elliot Richardson, General Wheeler, Dick Helms, and myself as to how we should deal with the Israelis on this subject. I believe you are sufficiently familiar with this matter for the scenario to be self-explanatory. There are a few points, however, which I believe should be explicitly mentioned.

a. Certain important aspects of our conclusions and agreed objectives have been deliberately omitted from the written material for the President; I believe we should discuss before the meeting.

b. There have been no differences on this subject in this Department. There have been differences, however, in State. While Elliot Richardson and I have been in accord, Joe Sirico has been lukewarm at most toward our recommendations because of the alleged effect on his peace-seeking efforts. We do not yet know Bill Rogers' attitude.

c. The choice of decision before the President is to lean on the Israelis or not to lean on them. In my opinion, not to lean on them would, in effect, involve us in a conspiracy with Israel which would leave matters dangerous to our security in their hands.

I am also attaching a copy of a memorandum to me from Harry Schwartz, describing where we stand with respect to Ambassador Rabin's request to you for August -- rather than September -- delivery of the first Phantoms.

2 Attachments
1. State Scenario (75/NODIS)
2. Memo for DepSecDef dtd 27Jun69
   (75/NODIS -- 1-35535/69)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

August 12, 1969

Attached is a copy of the letter sent by the President to Chancellor Kissinger and confirming the continued validity of arrangements made by the Johnson Administration concerning consultations on use of nuclear weapons. This communication is of utmost sensitivity and is to be made known only to the absolute minimum number of senior officials in this Government who have a clear need to know about it.

Henry A. Kissinger

Attachment
August 12, 1969

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

Pursuant to our conversations in Washington during your recent visit, I wish to state that the undertakings concerning consultation between our two governments on the use of nuclear weapons contained in President Johnson's letter to you of September 9, 1968 remain in full effect under my Administration.

I further confirm the understanding that knowledge of these undertakings is to be limited exclusively to our two governments and is not to be made public and that if any public statement on this matter should become necessary, it will be the subject of prior agreement between our governments.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

His Excellency
Kurt Georg Kiesinger
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Bonn
MEMO FOR MR. LAIRD

August 19, 1969

So far, only you and Mr. Packard have been given the attached materials. Recommend we distribute the memo and letter to:

Chairman, JCS  
Not now

ASD, ISA  
Not now

Asst. for Atomic Energy  
Not now

Distribution by memo  
and in sealed

Robert E. Pursley  
Colonel, USAF
Military Assistant

No log brief  

X-44156
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Israel's Nuclear Program

During a meeting today with Israeli Ambassador Rabin, the Ambassador alluded to my approach to him of July 29 about Israel's nuclear intentions, noting this was one item he assumed would be on the agenda for Prime Minister Meir's visit next month.

I said we were interested in hearing Israel's response and asked whether the Ambassador had anything to say now or whether we could expect anything before the Prime Minister arrives. The Ambassador said he believed the Government of Israel would postpone a response. Speaking personally, the Ambassador expressed the opinion that this was a difficult subject for his government to deal with a month before elections.

I noted that there was a difference between what Israel said publicly and what it said to us privately. The questions of missile deployment and of Israel's definition of what is meant by "introduction" of nuclear weapons would not appear to depend upon elections. The Ambassador said only that in Israel's democratic system there were no secrets.

I concluded by noting that, since this question would apparently not be resolved before Mrs. Meir arrives, the Ambassador could assume that it would be on the agenda for her visit.

Elliot L. Richardson
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY

Mel,

I do not believe this subject should be discussed at the Understetinct Meeting. Dick Helms agrees.

[Signature]
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - NODIS

MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
INR - Mr. Hughes
J/PM - Mr. Farley

SUBJECT: NSSM-40 - Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program

The Secretary has designated Mr. Joseph J. Sisco of the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group to prepare a policy study on the Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program. Mr. Sisco has undertaken to prepare and circulate a first draft of a proposed response early in the week of April 21 and to convene a meeting of your designated representatives shortly thereafter.

I would appreciate your informing Mr. Sisco of the name of your representative on the Ad Hoc Group.

Elliot L. Richardson

[Signature]

19 APR 1969

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - NODIS
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

2015

Sec Def Cont Br. L
OSD COPY 1
04/178A
The attached document is of the highest sensitivity and no additional distribution may be made without the prior approval of the President or the Secretary of State.

This document should be returned in a sealed envelope to my office, Room 7224, by hand, within 48 hours of receipt.

John P. Walsh
Acting Executive Secretary

THIS COVER SHEET WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENT SHOULD BE HANDLED AS CONFIDENTIAL
4 January 1969

In reply refer to:
1-20020/69

His Excellency
Major General Yitzhak Rabin
Ambassador of Israel
Embassy of Israel
Washington, D.C. 20003

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I wish to confirm my telephone assurance of yesterday to Minister Argov that the United States is prepared to deliver F-4 aircraft in Israel beginning in September 1969 at the presently anticipated rate of four per month, in accordance with our existing and expected understandings and agreements. Unforeseen developments could, of course, necessitate a change in this delivery schedule. Although prepared to begin deliveries in September you should also be aware that, in agreeing to this delivery schedule, the United States Government is not recommending that Israel take delivery of any of the F-4s prior to the time such personnel are adequately trained to operate and maintain them.

If Israel determines that it needs assistance in the maintenance of F-4 aircraft, the United States will not object if Israel obtains such assistance from a U.S. contractor.

I would hope that no additional publicity will be given this decision beyond the State Department press statement of 27 December 1968.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

[Stamp: Sensitive]

[Stamp: Secret Sensitive]
Dear Mr. Secretary:

I wish to thank you very much for your letter dated 4 January 1969 confirming that the United States Government will begin to make available to Israel F-4 aircraft beginning in September 1969 at the rate of four per month. I should like to confirm on my part that we shall indeed be accepting delivery of the first planes at the beginning of September and that all the necessary steps are being taken to ensure that.

May I take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation of the successful finalization of our negotiations and the splendid cooperation which we have received from you personally throughout.

Sincerely yours,

Y. Rabin
Lt. General Y. Rabin
Ambassador

The Honorable
Paul C. Warnke
Asst. Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon - Room 5E808
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am taking the liberty of addressing myself to you on a matter which is of primary importance to us. According to our information, the F-4C Phantom planes ordered by Israel will come off the production line at McDonnell Douglas Corporation ahead of schedule.

In the agreement between the Government of Israel and the Government of the United States on the F-4C Phantom, delivery schedule was fixed in accordance with production availability. We would therefore request that the delivery of the planes to Israel be authorized as they become available from the factory.

I should like to add that the Israeli Air Force will assume full responsibility for the immediate absorption of the planes as they are delivered. Early delivery will also enable us to advance the necessary preparation for the absorption of all the aircraft ordered by us.

I trust that our request will be favorably considered.

Sincerely yours,

Lt. General Y. Rabin
Ambassador

The Honorable
Melvin R. Laird
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C.
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM 7/3/69
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY

Mr. Packard:

Reference your discussion with Mr. Richardson and Dr. Kissinger on Israel: The attached paper is being given to all principals both to confirm that it accurately represents your discussions and also to provide a basis for a memo to the President. You may wish to assure its accuracy and check with other principals to agree on any changes before it goes to the President. The ISA action officer on this is Mr. Harry Schwartz.

[Signature]

Sec/Def Cont No. 3643
Copy of 2 of 2 copies
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Stopping the introduction of Nuclear Weapons into the Middle East

As I have reported to you, from all of the available intelligence and from my rather intensive conversations with Ambassador Rabin in the fall of 1968,

Conversations on this subject with Ambassador Rabin were interesting and revealing and are attached at Tab A. At no time did the Ambassador seek to deny that Israel is engaged in the development and production of these weapons and of a [redacted] as well.

My associates and I concluded that the Israelis believe that if times grow hard for them, they can somehow deter irrational Arabs from attacking. (This, of course, would imply that they consider the Fedayeen as no serious threat.)

Whatever the validity of Israel's position from its own standpoint, it does not coincide with the interests of the United States and, in fact, constitutes the single most dangerous phenomenon in an area dangerous enough without nuclear weapons.

The problem is how to stop this development. If the Israelis complete the development of a nuclear weapon within the next 3 to 6 months -- we will be powerless to do more than invoke sanctions, i.e., cease delivery of F-4s after the "introduction" of nuclear weapons into the area. Such a negative course would take us nowhere. The Israelis would be unable and unwilling to put the genie back in the bottle. Moreover, their requirement for conventional strength would be greater, not less, and the likelihood of our actually invoking the sanctions would not be great in such circumstances.

Furthermore, at any time prior to such events, or certainly not long thereafter, we may well be faced with public knowledge of the essential facts. So far these facts have remained in the category of vague, unsubstantiated, and not fully accepted rumors; but we are depending primarily on luck. Once the public is made aware of the situation the Administration's delicate task will become even more difficult.

As you know, we were aware of the Israeli advanced weapons activity last autumn when we negotiated with them for the sale of 50 Phantoms. Because
of certain factors of which I have apprised you, we were unable at that
time to extract from the Israelis agreement to sign the NPT and guarantee
a cessation of work on nuclear weapons and strategic missiles. They did
however, renew their agreement that Israel "will not be the first power
in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons," and "not to use any
aircraft supplied by the United States as a nuclear weapons carrier." It
was further made clear in the agreement that the American definition
of "introduction" would apply. (The agreement consists of an exchange
of letters between Ambassador Rabin and myself dated 22 and 27 November
1968, respectively, copies attached at Tab B.) Furthermore, the govern­
ment of Israel recognized our right "under unusual and compelling circum­
stances, when the best interests of the United States require it, to
cancel all or part of its commitment to provide F-4 aircraft and related
equipment and services at any time prior to the delivery of these defense
articles or performance of these services." Such "unusual and compelling
circumstances" would, under the terms of this agreement, not only exist
were Israel to produce or possess nuclear weapons but at any time in our
opinion that their activities constitute a danger to the security to
the United States.

My extreme concern about the gravity of the risk leads me to urge that
you consider another serious, concerted, and sustained effort to persuade
Israel to cease and desist its work on strategic missiles and nuclear
weapons. Some of the factors to be considered and my views on them, are:

1. It would be preferable to have the negotiations in Washington
(not Tel Aviv). Better control over the operations will exist here; it is
extremely difficult for any Ambassador to convey fully the serious purpose
of the U.S. Government and to be as tough as will be required in this case.

2. The first demarche might best be made by the President, or by
you and the Secretary of State together. Because the U.S. Government tried
once unsuccessfully, high level participation is needed to convey the
strength of our purpose. Moreover, a Defense Department representative
should be present at all negotiations.

3. An Israeli request for a formal U.S. Security Guarantee as a
quid pro quo can be expected. To accede to such a request would be
tantamount to placing all of our chips in the entire area on Israel for
an indefinite period and surely without commensurate control over Israel's
policies or actions.

4. We may have to offer, through an exchange of letters, to
supply Israel with conventional weapons in such quantity and kind as to
assure them superiority over any combination of Arab foes. However, we
are more or less in this position now.

5. Because of probable resort to delaying tactics, a time limit
should be set, after which we would stop supplying F-4s and related ser­
vices.
Israel's resistance to this proposition will be of a high order and all our influence would be required to overcome it. This influence is probably neither so great as other governments think nor so weak as those who have long dealt with Israel believe. But we could not hope to succeed if, as we have done in the past, we concurrently placed equal emphasis on changing Israel's policies with respect to other matters of importance to her -- for example, to give up the militarily important Sinai to a hostile Egypt, to be generous with Jordan over Jerusalem and the West Bank, to give up her policy of retaliation, to adopt a negotiating stance with Ambassador Jarring which suits our taste, etc.

If you agree with this course of action, you may want to discuss it with the Secretary of State with a view to approaching the President jointly. Although the President may wish to discuss the matter with the NSC members -- without putting it on the agenda -- this extremely delicate operation would best be undertaken outside the regular NSC machinery.

Ralph Earle and Harry Schwartz, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs, are fully familiar with this matter.

2 Enclosures:
1. Tab A - MemCons
2. Tab B - Ltrs - 22 & 27 Nov 68
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Stopping the Introduction of Nuclear Weapons Into the Middle East

From all of the available intelligence and from the intensive conversations here in Defense with Ambassador Rabin in the fall of 1968, I do not believe this coincides with the interests of the United States, and, in fact, constitutes the single most dangerous phenomenon in an area dangerous enough without nuclear weapons.

The problem is how to stop this development. If the Israelis complete the development of a nuclear weapon within the next three to six months -- which is quite possible -- we will be powerless to do more than invoke sanctions, i.e., cease delivery of F-6s after the "introduction" of nuclear weapons into the area. Such a negative course would not take us very far. The Israelis would be unable and unwilling to reverse their course. Moreover, their requirement for conventional strength would be greater, not less, and the likelihood of our actually invoking the sanctions would not be great in such circumstances. Furthermore, at any time prior to such events, or certainly not long thereafter, we may well be faced with public knowledge of the essential facts. So far these facts have remained in the category of vague, unsubstantiated, and not fully accepted rumors; but we are depending primarily on luck. Once the public is made aware of the situation the Administration's delicate task will become even more difficult.

I believe we should meet very soon to consider how to proceed on this, followed by an early meeting with the President. Because of the sensitivity and complexity of this issue, I suggest this not be dealt with through the regular NSC machinery.

[Signature]

OSD Reu No. 2

See Def Cont No. 1010
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Stopping the Introduction of Nuclear Weapons Into the Middle East

The question of Israel's introduction of nuclear weapons into the Middle East is being proposed for NSC consideration in two different contexts: first, as part of an overall review and up-dating of the National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) series of the last Administration; and second, as part of a response to NSAM 13 concerning ways to obtain signatures on the NPT from various governments.

As you know from your conversations with Paul Warnke and from his memorandum to you on this subject of 15 February, our view is that this issue is too sensitive and too difficult to handle through the large machinery of the NSC. Paul Warnke reported to you in that memorandum his belief, which we share by direct intercession at the highest levels with the Government of Israel.

We recommend two things:

1. That Defense take the position that the issue of Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons not be addressed through the NSC machinery.

   [Approval signature]

   FEB 27 1980

   DISAPPROVE

2. That you suggest an early meeting on this subject with Secretary Rogers, Mr. Kissinger, and Mr. Helms. A memorandum to this effect is attached for your consideration and signature.

   [Approval signature]

   FEB 27 1980

   DISAPPROVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Stopping the Introduction of Nuclear Weapons into the Middle East

Background

All available evidence suggests that The latest DIA assessment will be separately provided through SAD channels. I would add to this assessment three further indications of Israeli intentions. First, at no time during the extensive discussions on this subject is it said to Ambassador Rabin of Israel last November and December did Rabin attempt to deny that Israel was second, the recent evidence of Israel's acquisition of strategic computers; and third, Israel's unwillingness to sign and ratify the NPT.

As you know from prior ISA memoranda and your conversations with Paul Warnke, the Defense Department tried and failed last year to make the supply of F-4 aircraft contingent upon the halting by Israel of its nuclear weapons and missiles program. President Johnson did not approve the Defense recommendations. It is of course possible to cancel any contract with another government, including the F-4 contract, as an act of sovereignty; more specifically, however, all contracts for the sale of U.S. military equipment include a provision that "under unusual and compelling circumstances" the United States reserves the right to cancel all or part of any contract not delivered. What the Defense Department did in negotiating the F-4 agreement was (a) to put Israel on notice that the USG is aware of what Israel is doing in the missile and nuclear field; (b) make an explicit connection between the "unusual and compelling" clause and Israel's assurances concerning the introduction of nuclear weapons--in effect, raising the possibility that this Administration would reconsider the F-4 sale in light of Israel's nuclear programs; and (c) identify a significant difference between US and Israeli interpretations of what constitutes "introduction". (Israeli Ambassador Rabin said that "introduction" would not occur until a weapon had been tested and its existence publicly known; Warnke's letter to Rabin made clear that the American definition is that mere possession of nuclear weapons constitutes "introduction").
Indicators

In summary, intelligence reports indicate the following:

1. Initial development of the MD-620 missile by the French for Israel under a 1963 contract with Avions Marcel Dassault.

2. The MD-620 missile is capable of carrying a 2200 pound warhead to ranges of 270 nautical miles—it could strike the Arab capitals of Cairo, Amman, Damascus, and Beirut.

3. Of the initial buy of 25 missiles, two have been delivered to Israel, five more are due in, and the remaining 18 were expanded in tests in France.

4. Missile R&D, production, test, and training facilities are now in Israel.

5. Preparation of storage facilities for mobile deployment and recent construction of silos is believed to be under way.

6. [25X1 and 6, E.O.13526] (There is, however, no hard specific evidence from our technical collection resources nor from our annual inspections of the Dimona nuclear reactor to confirm their development of nuclear weapons.)

The Tools Available to Stop Israel's Missile and Nuclear Efforts

a. Grant or Withhold the Supply of Weapons from the U.S.

The kinds of actions which are both available and effective in stopping these developments depend on our control over the most important arms and
components on which Israel now relies. There is a wide range and increasing amount of military items constantly flowing to Israel both from the Department of Defense and from commercial suppliers. The most significant of these items now are combat aircraft, i.e., the A-4 Skyhawk and the F-4 Phantom. (We sold to Israel 48 A-4s in 1966; in 1968 we sold an additional 52 A-4s, for a total of 100, of which 42 have been delivered to date, and the balance are being delivered in monthly increments between now and November 1970. Delivery of 50 F-4 Phantoms will begin in September of this year and continue through 1970).

Because Israel's military strategy in the event of renewed hostilities is necessarily a pre-emptive air strike, a dependable supply of aircraft from the United States is essential to them; and for this reason, the threat to withhold these aircraft (i.e., to cancel or suspend deliveries) or the offer of additional aircraft and related items can be powerful inducements in our negotiations with Israel on nuclear weapons and strategic missiles.

We could also, at an appropriate point in the negotiations, offer to meet Israel's future conventional military equipment requirements. (We have already become, with the withdrawal of France, Israel's principal source of arms supply.) It is in our interest that Israel has a military capability sufficient to win any future war—and win it quickly—for the chance of U.S. or Soviet involvement increases otherwise.

b. U.S.-Israel Mutual Security Treaty

In theory at least, we could offer to Israel a mutual security pact. It may be that, in any case, Israel will request this sort of nearly unlimited U.S. guarantee of its security before abandoning its nuclear and missile programs. It is not to our advantage, however, either to make or to accept such a proposal: (1) A treaty is not necessary for the protection of Israel; Israel will have for the foreseeable future a marked military superiority over its Arab opponents. This can be assured by a continuing flow of arms from the United States. (2) We would have no control over the circumstances which would lead to the invocation of the treaty; we cannot control the actions of either Israel or the Arabs, and could not prevent renewed hostilities. (3) A treaty would establish a new and unwanted precedent in our relations with other near-nuclear states. (4) New obligations which could require the use of U.S. forces are unlikely to win the support of the Congress or the American people.

c. Diplomatic and Economic Possibilities

There are other forms of influence we can wield, but these are less easily managed and may even be disadvantageous for us. We could, for example, threaten to take diplomatic positions contrary to Israel's interests on
various issues, particularly on the settlement proposals; or we could, by
various devices, restrict the flow of American capital to Israel. It is
not at all clear that either of these steps would be effective but it is
fairly clear that such actions would place this Government in a more vul-
erable position if and when we are required publicly to defend them.

4. U.S.-Soviet Middle East Arms Limitation Talks not a
Substitute for Unilateral U.S. Actions.

The President has publicly stated his interest in discussing with the
USSR arms limitation for the Middle East. Now that the Senate has ratified
the SALT, and with Israel as one of the most easily remarkable non-
signatories of the treaty, the subject will almost automatically raise
itself in any discussion with the Soviets. Whatever is discussed or agreed
with the Soviets, however, it is only the U.S. that can make the Israelis
cease their development of these weapons; the connection between our
negotiations with the Israelis and our negotiations with the Soviets will
probably be only to see what we can obtain in the way of additional Soviet
limitations on arms supplied to the Arabs in payment for what we have to
do in our own interests in any case; i.e., stop Israeli production of
nuclear weapons.

Conclusions

The object of our efforts is to stop now the development and production
of strategic missiles and nuclear weapons by Israel. This is the most
important and most urgent of our objectives in the Middle East. What we
have done so far is simply to suggest to Israel the possibility of imposing
sanctions after the event. This is inadequate. It is clear, moreover,
that Israel is continuing its work on missiles and nuclear weapons despite
the risk of sanctions, and that

its missile and nuclear program now under the threat of an arms embargo
if they fail to comply and the promise of assured conventional military
supplies if they do. Other kinds of actions are either ineffective or
impractical. Specifically we should seek to:

1. Gain private assurances from Israel (with inspection privileges)
that it will cease and desist from development or acquisition of nuclear
weapons.

We should, nevertheless, seek the right
to inspect in principle.)
2. Gain private assurances from Israel that it will cease and desist from further development or acquisition of strategic missiles, i.e., those capable of reaching most Arab capitals from Israel proper. (Although stopping missile production and deployment is second in priority to stopping nuclear weapons, it is important that we stop the missiles because (a) we will have stopped one means of nuclear weapons delivery and can have greater confidence in Israeli nuclear assurances, and (b) if missiles are deployed by Israel it will be assumed that they have nuclear warheads, and the practical results may be the same whether or not the nuclear warheads actually exist.)

3. Gain public assurances from Israel that it will not acquire nuclear weapons by signing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Recommendation

I recommend you propose, to Secretary Rogers and the President, an early meeting with Ambassador Rabin of Israel with the object of stopping Israel's missile and nuclear weapons programs and obtaining from Israel necessary assurances to this effect.

Rabin should be called in by the President, or by you and Secretary Rogers. Although the negotiations with Israel will be especially difficult, they will be less difficult if our demands for assurances are unequivocal and made at the highest level. The kinds of assurances we require are as indicated above. It is obvious we cannot obtain absolute guarantees that Israel will forego strategic missiles and nuclear weapons forever; we can, however, make it more likely that missiles and nuclear weapons will not be used by stopping their production now and by creating a political obstacle—the necessity to renounce agreements and risk confrontation with the United States—to their later use.

Our more detailed comments on the proposed negotiations are at Tab A. A draft exchange of letters between the President and the Prime Minister of Israel is at Tab B. This could, in modified form, represent the end product of the negotiations, and is illustrative of the demands we would make of Israel and the things (i.e., assured military supplies) we would offer in return.

Attachments

Dr. Tucker and Dr. Walske concur.
Considerations in the Negotiations with Israel

1. The talks should be held in Washington, not Tel Aviv. Better control over the operations will exist here; it is extremely difficult for any ambassador to convey fully the serious purpose of the United States Government and to be as tough as will be required in this case. Furthermore, we are unlikely to find anyone in Israel more honest than Ambassador Rabin.

2. The first demands might best be made by the President, or by you and the Secretary of State together. High level participation is needed to convey the strength of our purpose.

3. The subsequent talks should be disassociated from the peace settlement negotiations in order to avoid a direct connection between the two by which Israel could claim we are aligning ourselves with the Arabs and the Soviet Union to their detriment. Defense representatives should of course be full participants in the preparation for and during the actual negotiations.

4. We should from the outset put the onus on the Israelis. We should dispel any illusions Israel may be under that the theory of nuclear deterrence that applies between the U.S. and Russia can apply between Israel and its emotional and irrational enemies. The Israelis are the ones who are introducing a new and vastly more dangerous element into the Middle East. They, not we, are raising the possibility of nuclear war. They are the ones endangering the security of the United States. They are the ones who threaten the failure of the NPT. It is they who risk a confrontation with the United States. They are the ones making our position in support of Israel untenable. As soon as they halt their missile and nuclear programs, our relationship can return to normal.

5. The earlier we begin the better, for the closer Israel gets to nuclear weapons and missiles, the harder it will be to get them to stop. Moreover, we may soon lose control of the situation, for it will almost surely enter the public consciousness in the very near future; in fact, it is already starting to do so.

6. Our demands must be unequivocal. Moral suasion and prolonged discussion does not work with Israel. We must set some time limits. The Israelis present an unusually coherent and aggressive front when pursuing their objectives. Israel almost certainly will try to delay formal discussions and a decision as long as possible, stalling for time as it rushes to complete its programs.

7. Negotiations with Israel on this matter will be especially difficult. By placing demands on Israel to stop making nuclear weapons, a public confrontation with that government is possible—although only
likely if (a) they think we are bluffing, or (b) they believe they could
reverse our position by so doing. They could use their full range of
assets in the United States to persuade us to abandon our demands. They
would not, however, enter lightly into such a course, because the intro-
duction of nuclear weapons by Israel will not be an issue on which they
could expect the kind of uncontested American support they have achieved
on other issues and because, if they failed to reverse our policy, the
long range effects could be very bad indeed.

8. The kinds of demands we must make of Israel are:

a. unequivocal written assurances by them that they will stop
developing or manufacturing, and will not otherwise acquire, strategic
missiles or nuclear weapons; and that they will not test or deploy those
strategic missiles they now have;

b. that Israel will sign and ratify the NPT within a certain
specified period; and

c. that the United States will be offered the opportunity to
"visit" (inspect) appropriate sites in Israel on a periodic basis.

9. There are several problems with the proposal for inspection rights
that we have not yet resolved. What sites, for example, should we inspect?
We believe we can identify their missile facilities, but we have not
located a nuclear weapons facility. We believe it is possible for Israel
to develop nuclear weapons in secrecy which we would not be able to detect
with our technical collectors or with inspection privileges. (For a
judgment of the level of assurance that we could continue to detect such
developments by clandestine means, we recommend that you ask Dick Helms.)

10. It is important that we seek assurances from Israel for halting
both strategic missiles and nuclear weapons programs: (1)

(2) The missiles are of little or no
value with high explosive (HE) warheads except as terror weapons similar
to the German V-2 rockets. They are not militarily cost-effective (they
have a CEP of about one-half mile); aircraft would be far more effective
and efficient for conventional weapons delivery. It would be out of
character for Israel to ignore the cost-effectiveness relationship.
Continued Israeli production of missiles would suggest Israeli intention
to use non-conventional warheads. (3) Stopping strategic missile production
and deployment is intimately connected to stopping the nuclear weapons
program. We can more easily monitor Israeli missile progress and, by stopping missile development, can have
greater assurance that Israel is not secretly proceeding to produce
nuclear weapons. (4) Once the missiles are deployed it will be generally
assumed that the missiles do in fact have nuclear warheads, and the
practical results may be the same whether or not the nuclear warheads
actually exist.
11. It is obvious we cannot obtain absolute guarantees that Israel will forego missiles and nuclear weapons forever; we cannot take away their capability. The key point is, however, that we would make it more likely that nuclear weapons would not be used by stopping their production now and by creating a political obstacle—the necessity to renounce agreements and risk confrontation with the United States—to their later use.
Draft/21 March 1969

Dear Madam Prime Minister:

My colleagues and I have met with Ambassador Rabin on the issue of Israel's missile and nuclear weapons programs, and the relationship of these programs to Israel's security and military needs and American security interests. As you well know, the U.S. Government, my predecessors and I have a consistent fundamental interest in the well being of Israel; this will be true of future American Governments also, for it represents the beliefs of the American people, and has been reflected in both our public and private statements and actions since the rebirth of Israel in 1948. I do not have to recall for you the strong associations of our two countries over these past years. It is because of this deep commitment of the American Government and people to Israel and Israel's security that we have been assisting in the maintenance and improvement of her military posture, despite the adverse political consequences this entails for American interests in the Middle East and the difficulties I believe this poses for the working out of a settlement in the Near East.

There is, however, an issue of overriding importance to the security interests of both our countries about which understandings between us must be reached: the issue is Israel's development of strategic missiles and nuclear weapons. It appears that your Government is proceeding with the acquisition and production (and perhaps anticipates testing) of strategic missiles, and has taken long strides toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons. I know of no reason that requires such a step by Israel. Your conventional capabilities...
are now and will continue to be markedly superior to the Arab capabilities. The Egyptian missile program is insignificant, and their nuclear capability non-existent.

We have had many long years of experience with nuclear weapons. They cannot be measured solely in kilotons of destructive power or abstract theories of deterrence in the Middle East. You cannot count on the rationality of your opponents when they themselves represent basically irrational forces. The use of nuclear weapons would affect the very fiber of society, and would involve not just Israel and her Arab opponents, but all countries and all peoples. The introduction of either strategic missiles or nuclear weapons into an area so unstable and so volatile as the Middle East vastly complicates the security problems of all nations and greatly endangers the security interests of Israel and the United States. The course you are embarked upon is extremely dangerous for all of us. You run great risks and by so doing you involve directly the security of the United States. You make the position of the United States in support of Israel and as principal supplier of Israel's conventional military arms quite untenable. It is for these reasons that I must insist on certain assurances.

The assurances we require are the agreement that your Government will not test or deploy those strategic missiles now in Israel; will not acquire or produce additional missiles; will not develop, manufacture, produce or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons; and will sign and ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In order to insure a feeling of mutual trust between our countries on this subject, I ask that United States representatives be
briefed fully on the missile/warhead program of Israel and that they be permitted to visit related facilities. Such visits would follow the pattern of our visits to your installation at Dimona. These conditions are difficult for you I realize; however, the consequences of nuclear proliferation are so devastating, and so dangerous to both our countries, I must put them forward as essential.

We for our part are prepared to see that Israel will continue to receive sufficient conventional military equipment to meet its legitimate security needs. Our willingness to sell F-4 aircraft—the most modern fighter/bomber in the world now in active service—and to engage in discussions of future Israeli military equipment requirements make this quite clear.
Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of April 1969, and have studied carefully the detailed reports of the conversations in Washington. I wish to assure you that my Government now fully understands the position of the United States with respect to the introduction of nuclear weapons and strategic missiles into this area. I wish to reaffirm to you the prior assurances of my Government that Israel will not be the first to introduce strategic missiles or nuclear weapons into the area, and that we will not develop, test, manufacture, or otherwise acquire strategic missiles or nuclear weapons without prior consultation with the United States, and will provide to the United States full information on our present strategic missile and nuclear programs and the opportunity to visit quarterly the sites in Israel related to these programs. As you know, my Government has today signed and will soon ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

My Government further understands that it is the intention of the United States Government to meet Israel's legitimate conventional security needs, and to this end it is our understanding that representatives of the United States Government will meet at an agreed early date with representatives of the Government of Israel to begin discussions of Israel's requirements for conventional military equipment during the next five years.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Negotiations with Israel - F-4 and Advanced Weapons

Participants:

**Israeli Side**

Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy
Major General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force
Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attaché
Mr. J. Shapiro, Director, Ministry of Defense Mission, New York

**United States Side**

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Director, MESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray

Time: 1400 - 1445, 4 November 1968

Place: Assistant Secretary Warnke's Office, Pentagon

Ambassador Robin opened the conversation by referring to his meeting on 30 October with Ambassador Hart, in which Hart had asked Rabin to write a proposed Memorandum of Understanding incorporating the provisions Israel considered necessary to the F-4 sale. This was written and delivered to Ambassador Hart. "We put in it what we thought was necessary, following the precedent of the prior agreement (A-4 aircraft)." Last Friday, 1 November, Rabin said he received a call from Department of State to the effect that "in principal, the answer is yes" with regard to Israel's request for F-4s and that he was to get in touch with Mr. Warnke. Ambassador Rabin said that today he would like to set agreement on how we proceed but not go into details.

Mr. Warnke said that he would like at the outset to set forth the United States' position. The President agrees in principal to the sale. It is a difficult decision, not because we are not interested in Israel's security,
but precisely because we are interested. Therefore, we have avoided becoming the principal arms supplier to Israel. Wherever possible we have urged that Israel acquire its arms from other Western countries. We felt that this was to our mutual benefit for it lessened the risk of US-USSR confrontation in the Middle East and therefore lessened the dangers to the security of the United States and Israel. We would prefer to continue that policy; however, the Europeans apparently have opted out, and the French particularly seem reluctant to supply the Mirage aircraft Israel has purchased.

Mr. Warnke stressed that with a decision to go ahead on the sale of F-14 aircraft we will have a different set of circumstances concerning our supply relationship to Israel. We will henceforth become the principal arms supplier to Israel, involving us even more intimately with Israel's security situation and involving more directly the security of the United States.

Mr. Warnke reminded Ambassador Rabin that Secretary Rusk had talked with Foreign Minister Eban about the problems and the dangers of strategic missiles and nuclear weapons. Mr. Warnke referred specifically to the paragraph in the standard sales contract which permitted cancellation "under unusual and compelling circumstances"; he suggested that Israeli acquisition of strategic missiles and nuclear weapons would comprise such circumstances. Mr. Warnke told Ambassador Rabin that because the security of the United States was clearly involved we must seek from the Government of Israel certain assurances:

(1) that Israel will not test or deploy strategic missiles,
(2) that Israel will not develop, manufacture, or otherwise acquire strategic missiles or nuclear weapons,
(3) that Israel will sign and ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

At a subsequent point in the conversation, Mr. Warnke mentioned the inspection arrangement at Dimona as a precedent that might be required here.

Mr. Warnke noted that we had not sought such specific assurances in our prior agreements because, based on the information we had at that time, these developments were not imminent. Our present information, however, indicates that Israel is on the verge of nuclear weapons and missiles capability. This development would seriously and adversely affect the security interests of the United States; it involves the Soviet Union and risks a US-USSR confrontation; it dramatically changes the situation in the area.

(Ambassador Rabin did not dispute in any way our information on Israel's nuclear or missile capability, nor did he comment directly on the assurances we requested. He did not seem particularly surprised or upset at Mr. Warnke's presentation. He referred to the fact that the Israeli position on the question of Israeli nuclear and missile programs had been conveyed to Ambassador Barbour.)

Ambassador Rabin observed that this question (of missiles and nuclear weapons) had been raised two weeks ago, and that an answer was given by the Israeli Government to the United States Embassy in Israel. "I don't have anything to add to my Government's position." Rabin said he was asked to draft a
Memorandum of Understanding which he had done and which we have. Rabin said that "if you wish to suggest changes or additions to that memorandum you of course may do so." Rabin remarked that, when he saw Secretary Rusk on Sunday, the Secretary said that the American acceptance in principal "did not mean that we accept your draft Memorandum of Understanding."

Commenting more generally, Ambassador Rabin said that Israel did not come to the United States for military equipment when it could go elsewhere; with other governments Israel did not have the problem of "conditions" that it has with the United States. In any case, we do not see, said Rabin, that your selling us 50 Phantoms changes things appreciably.

Mr. Warnke said that it is not just 50 Phantoms, but 50 Phantoms plus 100 Skyhawks plus the great variety of other equipment that Israel is requesting that makes the policy we are entering upon a distinct change from our prior policy. Nevertheless, the United States is interested in doing what is necessary to assist Israel. Opinions vary on how best to do this, but our goal is the same. It is for this reason that we are so concerned with Israel's missile and nuclear plans and intentions and this is why we need to "up-date" your assurances to us on these matters.

Mr. Warnke told Ambassador Rabin that we would prepare by tomorrow for his review a revised Memorandum of Understanding incorporating the kinds of assurances we require. Mr. Warnke asked if there were other questions that Ambassador Rabin would like to speak about today.

Ambassador Rabin said that he would like to call to our attention the current Israeli intelligence appreciation of the build-up of Soviet aircraft in Egypt and Syria. He said that the figures General Weizman had presented us in September 1967 had proven to be entirely too low. The inventories that Weizman had projected for those two countries by 1970 had in fact already been exceeded on 1 November 1968. The Ambassador undertook to provide details separately. Rabin went on to say that a number of technical terms needed going into, for example, Israel would like a certain number -- the more the better -- of F-4E delivered in the first half of 1969 (he later put the number at 25 aircraft). He attributed the urgency to "what was happening on the other side." Rabin said that they would like credit arrangements if possible, preferably on the same terms as the first Skyhawk sale (10 per cent down, 3% per cent interest, 10 years repayment). Rabin said they would like the F-4E configuration generally, but wish to include in the 50 aircraft 6 RF-4Es. Ambassador Rabin and General Hod asked if they could begin discussions on the F-4E with the Air Force.

Mr. Warnke said he would inform them when this was possible.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Negotiations with Israel - F-4 and Advanced Weapons

Participants:

Israeli Side

Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
Major General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force
Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attaché
Mr. J. Shapiro, Director, Ministry of Defense Mission, New York

United States Side

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Director, NIEA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray

Time: 1:10-1:40, 5 November 1968

Place: Assistant Secretary Warnke’s Office, Pentagon

Mr. Warnke told Ambassador Rabin that what he had done was to set out in a Memorandum of Agreement the points discussed yesterday. Mr. Warnke then passed the memorandum to Ambassador Rabin to read.

Ambassador Rabin, having finished reading the memorandum said: "As I understand it you put three basic conditions to the sale of F-4s."

Mr. Warnke said that the word "understandings" would perhaps be more appropriate.

Ambassador Rabin said "I prefer to put it in my words: First, Israel will not test or deploy strategic missiles; second, we will not acquire strategic missiles or nuclear weapons; and third we would sign and ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. You also ask to make inspections, making a fourth condition." Ambassador Rabin asked: "Is this the official United States position, that without these conditions we do not get Phantoms?"
Mr. Warnke: "That would be my recommendation." Ambassador Rabin said he was not in a position to give his Government's answer.

Mr. Warnke said we understood that. He would like to say that the words of the memorandum were his. It is the assurances we seek, not the form.

Ambassador Rabin restated that he could not give his Government's position, but that his reaction was: "I don't believe Israel is going to accept conditions within a Memorandum of Understanding about selling the Phantoms. We were told more than once that there would be no conditions -- at least not those kinds of conditions." The Ambassador then added, haltingly: "It would be a pity --- all these conditions on paper --- just for 50 Phantoms."

Mr. Warnke said that he did not consider what was being discussed was "just 50 Phantom aircraft." He said that if we sold these 50 Phantom aircraft to Israel, our position would have changed markedly to one of the principal supplier of arms to Israel and he thought that the significance of this change is something that should be thought about very carefully by the Israeli Government as well as by our own. It is of great importance to Israel on the one hand and it is of significance to the United States on the other because it means that the security of the United States is more closely involved in the area. It is this larger matter which should be considered concurrently with the assurances for which we have asked.

Ambassador Rabin said that it would be possible to have discussions on each of the items. But he again said, as his personal reaction, that "to have these conditions just for selling of 50 Phantoms, I don't think it is right."

Mr. Warnke repeated that the Department of Defense would consider any other form which would give us similar assurances that Israel would care to propose. Ambassador Rabin asked for time to study the memorandum more carefully. He asked also whether, in the meantime, it would be possible for Major General Hod to talk with the U.S. Air Force.

Mr. Warnke said that he had spoken with Mr. Hoopes, Under Secretary of the Air Force, who agreed to arrange for a F-4E briefing for General Hod and would expect a call from Hod tomorrow.

Mr. Warnke said that we had drafted the Memorandum of Agreement so that Israel could see clearly the things that trouble us. Whether the assurances we receive are contained in separate documents or whether we come to separate understandings is, to our way of thinking, irrelevant. We feel we must know what missile and nuclear developments are going on in the Middle East. These vitally affect the national security interests of the United States. There has been a long and strong relationship between our two countries. We must
have mutual trust and confidence. We have not had mutual understandings and therefore the facts as we now know them have frankly come as a surprise and shock to us. Ambassador Rabin asked: "What, may I ask, comes as a shock to you?" Mr. Warnke replied:

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(Ambassador Rabin made no reply. "After a moment", he said: "General Hod will call Mr. Hoopes tomorrow.")

Mr. Warnke said that he would be gone for the next several days, but if it was necessary to have further discussions in this period that the Ambassador should contact Mr. Mitze or Mr. Schwartz.

Prepared by:

Robert J. Murray

 Approved by:  

Paul C. Warnke  
The Assistant Secretary  
of Defense (ISA)

Date: 5 November 1968

(Signed)
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Negotiations with Israel - F-4 and Advanced Weapons

Participants:

Israeli Side

Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy
Major General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force
Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attaché

United States Side

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Director, NESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Hurley

Time: 10:10-10:40, 8 November 1968

Place: Assistant Secretary Warnke’s Office, The Pentagon

Ambassador Rabin began the conversation by asking whether Mr. Warnke had changed his mind with respect to the assurances we had requested of the Israeli Government. Mr. Warnke replied in the negative.

Ambassador Rabin, saying his words might not be diplomatic, read from a prepared talking paper as follows:

"I wish to address myself first to Article 3 of your proposed Memorandum of Agreement. I am now in a position to confirm that my original personal reaction upon first reading this paragraph -- namely, that it is completely unacceptable to us -- is indeed my Government's official position. We have come here for the purpose of purchasing 50 F-4s. We have not come here in order to mortgage the sovereignty of the State of Israel, not even for 50 F-4s. Furthermore, I wish to state that we consider Article 3 to be in the nature of a very major condition precedent to the sale of aircraft and it is therefore not acceptable to us also as
a matter of principle. My Government's position is that the matters raised in Article 3 are extraneous to the question before us, namely, the terms for the sale of 50 F-4 aircraft. These matters have been the subject of separate discussions between our two Governments. Most recently, 22 October 1969, we submitted through the U.S. Ambassador to Israel a comprehensive statement concerning these issues, the contents of which I can make available to you now.

"Accordingly, I should like to propose that Israel's assurances in connection with the theoretical question of the use of the planes for the delivery of nuclear weapons remains as submitted to you in our original proposal, namely, that the Government of Israel agrees not to use any aircrafts supplied by the U.S. as a nuclear weapons carrier. I am also authorized to reaffirm, in this connection, that it is Israel's long-standing policy not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. Assurance to that effect can be incorporated into the agreement.

"May I also comment on the Preamble to Article 3 and state that the Government of Israel does not consider itself qualified to express an opinion on that constitutes an endgame of the security interests of the U.S. This is the exclusive prerogative of the Government of the U.S. Similarly, with reference to sub-section 2 of Article 2, the Government of Israel does not feel that it is qualified to comment on what is or is not a major tenet of U.S. policy. Again, this is the exclusive prerogative of the U.S. Government.

"This is my Government's position and the only limits on which we consider it possible to conduct negotiations for the purchase of military equipment -- in this case, 50 Phantoms."

Ambassador Robin, having finished reading from his prepared text, observed that paragraph 1 of the American draft Memorandum of Agreement is an exact wording of the 1962 Memorandum of Understanding, and therefore says nothing new. He restated that Israel did not believe that they were qualified to comment or to make judgments concerning the points covered in Article 2. Ambassador Robin also thought that Article 5 on secrecy was not even as favorable as the paragraph on secrecy in the A-4 Agreement, which he thought was "more natural." Robin said, however, that this was not a major point.

(At this point, Ambassador Robin passed to Mr. Vennick a copy of the Government of Israel's statement which had been given to Ambassador Harbur on 25 October 1969. Mr. Vennick glanced at it, confirmed that he already had a copy, and returned it to Ambassador Robin.)
Ambassador Rabin said that General Hod had met with the Air Force. General Hod said that, while he had one briefing, nothing more was being done, the Air Force was waiting for Mr. Hoopes. Mr. Schwartz explained that Mr. Hoopes had forwarded the Israeli requests to Mr. Warnke, but, because Mr. Warnke had just returned from Europe, he had not yet seen Mr. Hoopes' memorandum.

Ambassador Rabin said: "So there we are." Mr. Warnke said: "Yes, Mr. Ambassador. We have managed to isolate a major difference."

Mr. Warnke said he would like to take issue with two points raised by the Ambassador: first, that our request for assurances in connection with the sale of the F-4 aircraft is extraneous. What Israel does with strategic missiles and nuclear weapons affects the national security of the United States. "It is the national security of the United States that I am charged with protecting. By law I am required to consider the impact of the sale on the United States. You, from your vantage point, do not have to accept my judgments, but I am required to make them." Second, the assurances we have requested are not, and are not intended to be, an invasion of sovereignty. All international agreements imply an absolute sovereignty. Our request is no different than other international agreements.

Mr. Warnke said that however these negotiations came out he has felt that this dialogue has been useful. "I have felt it was important to get across to you how we feel about Israeli's acquisition of strategic missiles and nuclear weapons. As you know, there is a provision in our sales contract that permits cancellation of the contract by the United States for 'unusual and compelling circumstances.' To me, if Israel goes ahead with its missile and nuclear programs this would involve that paragraph and while I can not speak for the next administration, I feel sure they will feel the same way too. Therefore, to a considerable extent, the arguments we are having about the wording of assurances are mere words and not substance. The substance remains the same."

Ambassador Rabin said: "I can understand you would like to have assurances about the way your hardware is going to be used -- not as a nuclear weapons carrier." But in Article 3 you ask for all the rights to know and for us to give agreement for you to inspect in our country. We were very careful not to use the word 'inspect' with respect to Elms. We see in the two words quite a difference. The word 'inspect' means you are a guest in our country -- not an inspector.

Mr. Warnke said: "I would be prepared to accept an amendment to our memorandum substituting 'visit' for inspection."

Ambassador Rabin said: "We have an agreement today."

Mr. Warnke said: "Yes, but that applies only to Elms, not to the sites where missiles are being produced" (nervous laughter from Israelis).
Ambassador Rabin asked: "What do you call strategic missiles in the Arab-Israeli context?" Mr. Warnke replied: "Those capable of reaching the Arab capitals." Rabin agreed, saying: "At least we have the same definition." He also commented that the missiles "would not reach all the Arab capitals."

Mr. Warnke observed that the F-4 aircraft would be part of Israel's total defense environment; that they would be used, as the General well knew, to protect strategic missile sites as well as other possible targets. It is the totality of Israel's defense that we are involved in; it is not just a question of aircraft.

Ambassador Rabin said: "You are only selling arms. How do you feel you have the right to ask all these things?"

Mr. Warnke said: "I think I do. Otherwise I wouldn't bring it up."

Ambassador Rabin said: "We have promised not to carry nuclear weapons and that we do not would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East."

Mr. Warnke replied: "We will think about what you have said and talk with Secretary Clifford and Secretary Mitze. I will talk with you again tomorrow."

Prepared by: [Signature]

Robert J. Morrey

Approved by: (signed: Paul C. Warnke)

Assistant Secretary of Defense

Date: 8 November 1968
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Negotiations with Israel - F-4 and Advanced Weapons

Participants:

Israeli Side

Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy
Major General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force
Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attache

United States Side

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Director, NESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray

Time: 1530 - 1630 12 November 1968

Place: Assistant Secretary Warnke's Office, The Pentagon

Mr. Warnke opened the meeting by saying that, as he had indicated in a previous discussion, we are interested in substance and not form in the matters we have been addressing. We believe it is your feeling that Israel will not and cannot accept our request for advance assurances concerning strategic missiles and nuclear weapons as preconditions to the contract. You propose alternative formulations to be included in the contract which are essentially reaffirmations of earlier agreements: not to use American aircraft to carry nuclear weapons, and not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area. In our discussions I believe I have made clear to you our interpretation of "unusual and compelling circumstances" which would require that we cancel the F-4 contract. The contract would provide that action inconsistent with these assurances would constitute such circumstances. On these bases I believe we can draft an agreement that will be acceptable to you and which will meet your requirements - although not fully meeting mine.

Mr. Warnke observed that he could not find in the record any understanding of what Israel means by the provision: "Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area." Mr. Warnke asked the Ambassador what was meant by this term.
Ambassador Rabin said that "it means what we have said, namely, that we would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons." Mr. Warnke asked what specifically was meant by the word "introduce." Ambassador Rabin said, "you are more familiar with these things than we are. What is your definition of nuclear weapons?" Mr. Warnke said that there are two aspects to the question: the definition of what is and what is not a nuclear weapon, and what is and what is not introduction into the area. Regarding the first, if there are components available that could be assembled to make a nuclear weapon -- although part A may be in one room and part B in another room -- then that is a nuclear weapon. As for introduction, that is your term and you will have to define it. Does it mean no physical presence? Ambassador Rabin said, "I suppose so."

Mr. Warnke said: "what if you have access to nuclear weapons that are in another country? Is that then 'introduction'?” Ambassador Rabin asked if we believed that this was the situation. Mr. Warnke replied that he was just trying to find the Israeli definition. He noted that the same situation could apply the other way around: for example, what if another country in the area had access to nuclear weapons but had not brought them in? Ambassador Rabin said, continuing the example, that if China said they had nuclear weapons for Egypt stored in China, he didn't know what the Israeli reaction would be. He hasn't given the matter a great deal of thought. He believed that "introduction" would require their physical presence in the area.

General Hod asked if the term "introduction" had an accepted usage in international law. Mr. Warnke replied that it had not. General Hod said that throughout the world the experience was that introduction of a weapon could only mean after testing. You could not introduce a weapon until after it actually became a weapon.

Ambassador Rabin asked: "Do you consider a nuclear weapon one that has not been tested, and has been done by a country without previous experience”? Mr. Warnke: "Certainly. China with a strategic missile capability would be assumed to have nuclear weapons even if it not tested these weapons." Ambassador Rabin said: "All nuclear powers -- the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China -- have tested nuclear weapons. Do you really believe introduction comes before testing?” Mr. Schwartz said that what the Ambassador was talking about is reliability. Ambassador Rabin disagreed saying that based on his experience with conventional weapons, he would not consider a weapon that had not been tested to be a weapon.

Mr. Warnke asked whether if the UAR had missiles with nuclear war heads but had not actually tested them, would Israel consider that the UAR had not introduced nuclear weapons? He said that testing by other nuclear powers is very relevant to a potential nuclear power if the latter is developing weapons based on existing technology.
Ambassador Rabin said that, "weapons serve policy, not vice versa. Since the UAR's goal is to destroy us I would take it with very great concern. Our policy is not to destroy the UAR. You must combine the weapon with the policy."

General Hod observed that a very good example of introduction was when Egypt introduced missiles into the area in 1963, claiming they were capable of hitting anything south of Beirut. Ambassador Rabin said: "My concern with Egypt is with missiles with chemical rather than nuclear war heads. If Egypt were to hit our densely populated areas, even in a limited way, it could be disastrous."

Mr. Warnke said, as he understood it, Ambassador Rabin applied two prerequisites to the word "introduction" -- notoriety and pre-testing.

Ambassador Rabin, saying that "I don't know what the Prime Minister said, but" there must be public acknowledgment. The purpose of nuclear weapons is not to use the weapon itself, but to use their deterrent power. "I don't believe any powers that have nuclear weapons plan to use them, although you cannot ever be sure." Ninety-nine per cent of their value is deterrence. Mr. Schwartz said: "You mean deterrence against governments, to deter governments from specific actions." Ambassador Rabin agreed: "The fact that you have got it must be known."

Mr. Warnke said that the Ambassador also introduced the factor of intent: if the UAR has missiles, Israel would be concerned; if Israel has them, there is no cause for concern. The purpose of strategic missiles for Israel would be for deterrence.

Ambassador Rabin said: "You are trying to combine strategic missiles and nuclear war heads. This is not necessary in the Middle East. To my mind, in the Middle East, missiles with war heads which are not nuclear weapons can play a role."

Mr. Warnke asked, "What sort of role?" Ambassador Rabin said: "It depends on the other side. What we are concerned about in Egypt is their chemical warfare capability. As I explained in 1963 when I was here, one of our thoughts was that Egyptian missiles, even with conventional war heads, might contribute to their success if they made a surprise attack on our cities. They could interfere with the mobilization system under such circumstances, and this might play a great role in deterring the outcome. Seventy per cent more or less of Army capability, although less for the Air Force, is based on mobilization, not just on manpower but vehicles, transport, supplies, and so forth. During the six day war we had mobilized so much of the resources of our cities that we had to devote a portion of our military effort to resupplying the cities."

General Hod observed that Egypt has sea borne (Styx) missiles with 35 mile range and may have or may be receiving even more sophisticated missiles. Although these have a short range, they can be used sea-to-shore as well as sea-to-sea, and therefore can raise havoc with coastal cities such as TelAviv.

Ambassador Rabin said that they had heard of a plan, although they could not know for certain, to sell to Egypt missile destroyers with missiles of about 100 miles range which, although normally sea-to-sea, could also be used sea-to-shore.

Rabin said Israel was worried that Egypt might launch sea borne missiles during the six day war, "but they did not dare to do this." Rabin said he also understood...
Mr. Warnke concluded the discussion by saying that he would talk with Mr. Hoopes, that we would have a Memorandum of Understanding prepared within a few days incorporating the provisions we have discussed, and that General Hod could in the meantime meet with the Air Force to continue the technical discussions that we are at this time prepared to go ahead with. Mr. Warnke said that we ought to continue these discussions so that we might try to arrive at some understanding between us as to the problems of missiles and nuclear weapons. At this time, with respect to "introduction," Mr. Warnke said there was not much clarity and no agreement.

Prepared by

Approved by

Robert J. Murray

(Signed)

Paul B. "O"

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

Date 12 November 1968
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Negotiations with Israel - F-4 and Advanced Weapons

Participants:

Israeli Side

Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy
Major General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force
Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attaché
Mr. J. Shapiro, Director, Ministry of Defense Mission, New York

United States Side

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Director, NSA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray

Time: 1740 - 1815, 22 November 1968

Place: Assistant Secretary Warnke’s Office, The Pentagon

Ambassador Rabin said that he had received his Government’s reaction to the US-proposed Memorandum of Understanding (referring to the draft Memorandum of Understanding sent to the Israeli Embassy on 19 November 1968). He said that there is a paragraph in that memorandum which looks to the Government of Israel as “quite awkward.” Rabin said that the awkwardness was "not because of its practical implications" but because of the way it is worded.

Ambassador Rabin read a portion of the paragraph in question: “It is understood by the Government of Israel that action contrary to any of the understandings specified in paragraph II of this memorandum shall constitute ‘unusual and compelling circumstances’ and shall permit the United States to recover any aircraft already delivered under this Agreement.” Rabin said that his Government could not accept that the United States could ask for such language. "There is no precedent. It creates something that I..."
don't believe that exists anywhere." Rabin said that the paragraph implied that the United States considered Israel "the bad guy" and that it did not believe the undertakings made by the Government of Israel; and therefore this paragraph was worded as it is.

Mr. Warnke took issue with Ambassador Rabin's statement. Mr. Warnke said that he had talked with Mr. Clifford, and Mr. Clifford in turn with Mr. Rusk, and the United States Government clearly did not put such a construction on this paragraph. The United States does believe the undertakings made by the Government of Israel. "I believe you and what you have said." It is quite natural, however, that Israel would look after its own national security requirements. It would be understandable for Israel to enter into an F-4 agreement now and later feel-compelled to change its mind for reasons existing at that time. It would not be unusual in international agreements for undertakings previously made to prove improvident in the future. But the United States for its part must look after its own national security interests; if Israel were to decide at some point that it could not adhere to the provisions of the agreement, it would revert to status quo ante. That is the purpose of this paragraph.

Ambassador Rabin said he couldn't understand why, for example, the United States could ask in ten years for these aircraft to be returned. Mr. Warnke said: "Suppose you deliver nuclear weapons in those aircraft in ten years time?"

Mr. Warnke said that what was put in the Memorandum of Understanding, after all, represents only the summation of our discussions. Ambassador Rabin said that he had not agreed to commitments in the contract; he said that Israel had agreed to reaffirm its previous understandings — that they would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons or carry nuclear weapons on U.S. aircraft. "Why do you want us to do this?"

Minister Argov said: "We feel we are on parole." The Israeli Government is giving assurances, said Argov, but the paragraph presumes we will not live up to them. Ambassador Rabin said that it isn't the standard paragraph.

Mr. Warnke disagreed that there was a "presumption" in the contract that Israel would not live up to its assurances. Mr. Warnke also disagreed with Ambassador Rabin's statement that this wasn't a standard paragraph. "There is no such thing as a standard contract." Each one varies. A past contract is not a binding precedent for future contracts.

Ambassador Rabin, somewhat apologetically, said that his instructions were to follow the former wording. He said also that, although he agreed with the form of the U.S. proposal (i.e., a memorandum of understanding), "my Government has had second thoughts" and prefers the same format as in the Skyhawk Agreement: "I send you a letter, you send me a letter."
Mr. Warnke observed that we had the form of a Memorandum of Understanding before, in the Skyhawk Agreement. Ambassador Rabin said he thought not. Minister Argov said that yes, at the time in 1965 of the visit of Mr. Harriman and Mr. Komer, there was a Memorandum of Understanding: "You participated in its development Mr. Ambassador." Ambassador Rabin agreed and said that that was the Harriman Mission, which was a different matter.

Mr. Warnke observed that that was the point he was trying to make: there are different matters and different circumstances that now exist. Mr. Warnke said that he understood that what Israel wanted now wasn't a Memorandum of Understanding but an exchange of letters; for this he had no instructions, and would have to discuss the matter with Secretary Clifford. Mr. Warnke also asked the Ambassador whether he had a letter to submit. The Ambassador passed him the Israeli letter (attached).

Mr. Schwartz suggested that Ambassador Rabin not press the A-4 analogy too far, that it consisted of a number of documents, not just an exchange of letters, and that it was negotiated under different circumstances. For example, it contained an agreement that Israel would not come back to the United States for planes for five years.

General Hod observed that the President, when Prime Minister Eshkol was here, was willing to overlook the five year clause. Ambassador Rabin said that the United States didn't say anymore that it would not be a major supplier; the formulation of the communique issued at the Ranch in 1968 was different from that of 1965. In 1965 it said that the United States would not be a major supplier; it did not say that in 1968, but said instead that the United States would keep Israel's defense requirements under review in light of the situation in the area.

Mr. Warnke said that the Ambassador's remarks were not inconsistent with what Mr. Schwartz had just said. Mr. Schwartz said that the 1965 precedent (of the Skyhawk) didn't apply.

Mr. Warnke said he would discuss the latest Israeli proposal with Mr. Clifford. Mr. Warnke asked Ambassador Rubin if he wished to sign the letter. Rubin did.

Ambassador Rubin said that there is a third problem. He laughingly said that he assumed we would overcome the "technical difficulties" of getting a satisfactory agreement in an acceptable form. Rubin said: "Everyone has his own superiors." Rubin asked if we could proceed with the technical talks while waiting to sort out the basic agreement.
Mr. Warnke said that the problem won't arise, for he expects to respond to Ambassador Rabin the first of next week. General Hod interjected that what he needs to know is what specific equipment can be included on the F-4 aircraft and its approximate cost, so that he can draw up a list of his specific requirements for the USAF, and they in turn may prepare a letter of offer.

Mr. Murray said that he would review this and call General Hod on the telephone.

Prepared by: Robert J. Murray

Approved by: Robert J. Murray

Date: 22 November 1968

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: F-4 Negotiations with the Government of Israel

On November 26, Ambassador Rabin called me and reported that he had received my letter in reply to his letter requesting that the United States Government sell 50 F-4 Phantoms to Israel. Ambassador Rabin said that the letter posed no problems for him except for the reference to the interpretation of the United States Government as to what would constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons by a Middle East power.

Ambassador Rabin said that he understood from our second conversation that we would not incorporate a definition of this term. I pointed out that this discussion had occurred in the context of an anticipated Memorandum of Understanding, to be subscribed by both parties. With a Memorandum of Understanding it would be necessary to arrive at an agreed-upon interpretation and our conversation had made it clear that this was unlikely. I commented further that the existence of such differences of opinion had, as I understood it, been the reason for his proposal of an exchange of letters in lieu of a Memorandum of Understanding. I also commented that, as Ambassador Rabin had noted in our last conference on Friday, neither of us was responsible for the content of the other’s letter.

I pointed out further that the interpretation of the United States Government was not directed exclusively at the circumstances under which Israel would be deemed to have introduced nuclear weapons into the Middle East but that it applied equally to the eventuality of such action by any other Middle Eastern power. In the event that another Middle Eastern power should acquire possession and control of nuclear weapons then this would relieve the Government of Israel from the restrictions of its announced policy.

Ambassador Rabin said that he recognized that our position was equally applicable to other Middle Eastern powers and asked again if I thought this paragraph should remain in the letter. I said that I did and Ambassador Rabin said “all right.”

In response to my question as to how the negotiations are proceeding, Ambassador Rabin said that General Hod had met yesterday with Mr. Schwartz and had presented a list of the items desired in order that an appropriate letter of offer could be prepared. He also commented that he might want to talk with me at the end of the week with regard to the delivery schedule. I said that I would be free to see him on Friday.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Negotiations with Israel - F-4 and U.S. Intelligence Requirements

Participants:

**Israeli Side**

Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy
Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attaché

**United States Side**

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Director, NESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray

Time: 1630 - 1730 29 November 1968

Place: Assistant Secretary Warnke's Office, The Pentagon

Ambassador Rabin began by saying he had three subjects to discuss. The first concerned the definition of "introduction" in Mr. Warnke's letter to him of 27 November 1968. Rabin said "some people" in Israel are not happy that the definition appears in the letter; they feel that it may imply that Israel accepts that definition, and that nothing in the correspondence makes it clear enough that Israel has its own definition.

Mr. Warnke said that he could not see any ambiguity in the situation. The letter clearly states that this is the American definition and the last sentence was changed to preclude the construction that Israel agrees with it.

Ambassador Rabin said that some people say that by failing to comment on it, we in fact accept it. Mr. Schwartz suggested that, in order properly to clarify that issue, Israel should write down its own definition. Ambassador Rabin said that he would have to send Mr. Warnke another letter. Mr. Warnke said: "I can not of course stop you from sending me a letter." Ambassador Rabin laughingly replied: "Yes, I know, but I want you to answer it."

Mr. Warnke suggested that the Ambassador draft a letter to him and show it to him "and I'll tell you what my response would be." Ambassador Rabin agreed.
Ambassador Rabin said that the second problem concerned publicity. The Ambassador mentioned an article in today's Baltimore Sun and a recent Finney article. Mr. Warnke said that he doubted that this was recent information. Ambassador Rabin said that publicity in this case should be different than in the A-4 negotiations. In this case, it was public knowledge that F-4 negotiations were going on, as was clear from the President's announcement. The Ambassador said he was concerned about future leaks and that, while he didn't want to give the numbers of aircraft involved, he would like to say something. The Ambassador said that, "political figures are involved" and it wasn't fully under his control.

Mr. Warnke said that the press knew already that negotiations were underway, and that there really wasn't much more to be said that could satisfy them without giving the full details. Mr. Warnke asked what the Israelis wanted to say.

Minister Argov said that he gets three to four calls a day from the press, and he finds it difficult to keep repeating the same thing day after day. He would like to say a deal has been consumated. Mr. Warnke said that that would not be appropriate; no contract has been signed, no final arrangements made, and there are a variety of loose ends to tidy up. Mr. Warnke said that he would think about it and let the Ambassador know.

Mr. Schwartz asked if the requirement for publicity was in Israel. The Ambassador replied: "Not only in Israel, but also here." The Ambassador thought that if we could say that in principle a positive decision had been taken, it would take the pressure off. Mr. Warnke said that this wasn't a problem for the Defense Department alone, that he would have to check with others including the White House, but that he would let the Ambassador know.

The Ambassador next raised the problem of delivery of F-4 aircraft. The Ambassador said: "We think we have justified reasons for earlier deliveries. Six or eight or ten aircraft by the middle of 1969 should not be too much of a problem for the big U.S. Air Force." Rabin said that he had spoken with General McConnell who had said there are two problems, one is the political and the other is technical. Rabin said that McConnell is working on the technical problem, but the two were related. "If a political decision can be made" said Rabin, "then this would help along the technical decision."

Mr. Schwartz said that the Air Force was concerned about the technical difficulties of rapid introduction of this very sophisticated aircraft without adequate preparation. Mr. Schwartz said that the Air Force had had similar difficulties in Australia and Iran. Ambassador Rabin suggested that we not compare Israel with Australia and Iran. Israel has great technical capabilities. He noted that Israel was already flying the MIG aircraft without any assistance and without spare parts.

Mr. Schwartz noted that Israel under this plan would be able to fly the aircraft, but could not maintain the electronics systems or use the weapons systems. Ambassador Rabin said: "You give them to us and we'll use them." Rabin said that what was wanted was "six to twelve" aircraft by mid-1969. Rabin said he realized that there were some differences between our intelligence people on numbers of Soviet aircraft, but even so, the numbers in the Arab inventory were large. Rabin noted that since the June war Israel had not received one additional supersonic aircraft although it had lost four or five.
Ambassador Rabin said that he had also raised the question of delivery with General Wheeler. Ambassador Rabin said, in reference to General Wheeler, "what he had to say at the Ranch was the most favorable from our point of view. When I met him again in May 1968, he (Wheeler) said Israel's situation depends on two things: if we get the MIRAGEs, and the rate of Soviet shipments." On the first, said Rabin, "although we don't like it, there is no sign" of delivery. On the second, Soviet shipments (to the Arab states) have been faster than expected.

Mr. Warnke said that he could not give an answer now but that he would look into the problem.

The Ambassador said he had a fourth problem. The fourth problem, the Ambassador said, concerns technical negotiations. He asked whether we could now proceed to such negotiations?

Mr. Murray said that we were already doing this, that Generals Roth and Carmon and others met with the Air Force on Wednesday and that the Air Force was now in the process of arranging follow-on briefings. Mr. Murray said that it was our understanding that these negotiations were proceeding satisfactorily.

General Carmon said that they had had useful discussions on Wednesday but that they had not obtained certain information on weapons systems, mentioning specifically the Sparrow missile. Mr. Schwartz said the Air Force was authorized to discuss with Israel all the systems that we are now prepared to release; that there were certain systems which Israel could not have because they are not releasable to anyone and were used only by the U.S. military forces, and these of course the Air Force was not permitted to discuss; and there was a third category of items we were prepared to talk about but for which no final decisions on releasability have been made. Mr. Murray said that we are prepared to continue these discussions and that the Air Force was now preparing a briefing schedule to this end. Mr. Warnke said that we could not release full information on systems as to which we had not taken a decision to release. He commented that it might not be in Israel's interest to push for immediate decisions on these unresolved items.

General Carmon agreed that there were no serious problems in this connection at this time.

Prepared by

Approved by

Assistant Secretary of

Date

29 November 1968
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: F-4 Agreement

Participants:

Israel Side

Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. - Ambassador Rabin
Deputy Commander IAF - B/General Peled
Defense and Armed Force Attaché - B/General David Carmon

United States Side

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) - Paul C. Warnke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (NESA) - Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Director, Near East & South Asia Region, ISA - Robert J. Murray

Time: 1710-1730, 20 December 1968
Place: Assistant Secretary Warnke’s Office, The Pentagon

Ambassador Rabin said he had called to review the status of the F-4 agreement. He said that the political side was finished with his exchange of letters with Mr. Warnke. The negotiations with Mr. Schwartz are also finished. Ambassador Rabin asked if they may start tomorrow to develop a letter of offer. Mr. Schwartz said that they could.

Ambassador Rabin said that the answer on financing had been given to Mr. Kuss; Israel would only take government credit. Rabin said: "If someone asks why our reserves in the United States go down, this is it." General Carmon said that the overall package would cost about $300 million. Some of this would be on credit with the remainder a "dependable undertaking."

Mr. Schwartz said he had just learned that Israel had decided to buy 6 RF-4C aircraft now and, working with the company, have the engines changed to make it compatible with the F-4Es. General Peled confirmed that this was their decision.
Ambassador Rabin said there was still one problem: early deliveries. Mr. Warnke said that we had done our work and sent the facts to the President. He said that the decision rests with the White House. Ambassador Rabin observed that there were two aspects: political and technical. He said the President would of course decide the political. He asked, however, whether Mr. Warnke could tell him whether early deliveries were possible on the technical side. Mr. Warnke said anything was possible; it was a question of whether it was desirable.

General Peled said that he had talked with everyone he could in the Air Force about how the IAF would handle early deliveries. He complained that the USAF people would not engage him in a discussion -- they just listened. Peled asked whether we thought he had been convincing. Mr. Warnke said he did not appear to have convinced the Air Force. He said that while General Peled's sincerity in pleading his case was not at all doubted, it was a difference of professional judgment. General Peled asked if he may talk further with the Air Force people. Mr. Warnke replied that he could and that General Larson was the man to talk to. Mr. Warnke said that it would be the President who made the decision in any case.

General Carmi suggested that a draft letter of offer be completed for General Peled to take back to Israel with him. Israel could then make decisions and these decisions could be communicated to the United States after the holidays. Mr. Warnke agreed.

Ambassador Rabin asked the question of publicity and said, somewhat unhappily, that he presumed that we wanted to continue to say the same thing as before. Mr. Warnke said yes. We would say only that negotiations were continuing. Mr. Schwartz suggested this was a matter primarily for the Department of State.

Ambassador Rabin asked Mr. Warnke if he would like to sign the agreement in Israel. Mr. Warnke said he would like to very much but was not sure he would be able to do so.

Prepared by: Robert V. Murray
Approved by: The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Date: 22 Dec 1969
22 November 1968

Dear Mr. Warnke:

In accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding dated March 10, 1965, in which the Government of the United States reaffirmed its concern for the maintenance of Israel's security and renewed its assurance that the United States firmly opposes aggression in the Near East and remains committed to the independence and integrity of Israel, and:

Pursuant to the joint statement of January 7, 1968 by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Israel in which "the President agreed to keep Israel's military defense capability under active and sympathetic examination and review in the light of all relevant factors, including the shipment of military equipment by others to the area";

I should like to request hereby that the Government of the United States sell to the Government of Israel 50 "Phantom" aircraft, together with related armament, ammunition, training, spare parts and other services to be specified in Annexes, which will be considered an integral part of this agreement.

On its part the Government of Israel reaffirms its long-standing policy as laid down in the Memorandum of Understanding of March 10, 1965, that it will not be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons and agrees not to use any aircraft supplied by the U.S. as a nuclear weapons carrier.

The Government of Israel understands that the United States reserves the right, under unusual and compelling circumstances when the best interest of the U.S. requires it, to cancel all or part of its commitment to provide.
SECRET

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRET -2- 22 November 1968

F-4 aircraft and related equipment and services, at any
time prior to the delivery of these defense articles or
performance of these services. The Government of Israel
further understands that the United States accepts the
responsibility for all costs directly resulting from such
cancellation.

The Government of Israel agrees to full secrecy on
all matters concerning this sale until the Government of
the United States decides to make the matter public and
will cooperate fully with the Government of the United
States with respect to the timing and method of public
disclosure.

Sincerely yours,

Lt. General Y. Rabin
Ambassador

The Honorable
Paul C. Warnke
Asst Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C.
27 November 1968

S E C R E T

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

In reply refer to:
1-26174/68

His Excellency
Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
Ambassador of Israel
2916 Chesapeake Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

This will acknowledge and respond to your letter of 22 November 1968, requesting on behalf of the Government of Israel that the United States sell to the Government of Israel fifty Phantom aircraft and related equipment and training. The Government of the United States agrees to sell to the Government of Israel fifty F-4 Phantom aircraft and related equipment and services in accordance with this exchange of letters and technical and financial annexes to be negotiated separately. This transaction is subject to the provisions of the Foreign Military Sales Act and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of July 23, 1952.

The United States Government, for its part, accepts the assurances given by the Government of Israel as stated in your letter:

"On its part the Government of Israel reaffirms its long-standing policy as laid down in the Memorandum of Understanding of March 10, 1965, that it will not be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons and agrees not to use any aircraft supplied by the United States as a nuclear weapons carrier."

In this connection, I have made clear the position of the United States Government that the physical possession and control of nuclear arms by a Middle Eastern power would be deemed to constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons.

I wish also to confirm the understanding of the Government of Israel as set forth in the fifth paragraph of your letter of 22 November 1968. Such unusual and compelling circumstances would exist in the event of action inconsistent with your policy and agreement as set forth in your letter.

The agreement contained in the last paragraph of your letter concerning the secrecy of this undertaking is satisfactory to us.

S E C R E T

S E N S I T I V E
It is understood that we can now proceed to negotiate the technical and financial details of this transaction.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Paul C. Warnke