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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
~~EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY~~

January 2, 1975

General:

Formerly, we were required to consult with the Brits before using nuclear weapons based in the UK with forces assigned or earmarked to SACEUR/SACLANT, [redacted]. Under the new text (see clip at Tab A) the reference to these forces being earmarked or assigned to SACEUR/SACLANT is removed. Thus we would now have to consult prior to the use of nuclear weapons by ^{our} U. S. forces based in the UK, in UK waters (a new addition) [redacted].

The additional requirement to consult prior to using U. S. forces in or around the UK [redacted] even though they are not earmarked or assigned to a NATO commander, may not be significant, but I believe we should know how significant it is; that is, how many U. S. ships/squadrons operate in or around the UK which are not earmarked or assigned to a NATO commander. I am under the general impression that very few of our forces are assigned; a larger number is earmarked, but that many are in neither category. The DPQ response could tell us fairly easily. I asked Denis to do that, but he felt that the spirit of the undertaking should govern and that regardless of its being broader we should have no objection to consultation. He may be right, but I believe we should know a little more about what we are getting into.

Rem
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Portions denied are S-FRD and thus outside of the jurisdiction of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
~~EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY~~
date dept 8/4/00

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

(Outside System)

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
~~EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY~~

INFORMATION

state dept 8/4/00

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: A. Denis Clift *ADClift*

SUBJECT: US-UK Consultations on Use of Nuclear Weapons

Prime Minister Wilson has proposed to President Ford that the US and UK Governments reaffirm the Memorandum of Understandings regarding consultations on the use of nuclear weapons (attached package).

In principle, the proposal is fine. The one issue requiring close attention is the proposed UK revision of Paragraph 3 of the Memorandum. In my opinion, the UK proposal is acceptable. They are seeking to pin down U.S. agreement to reach a joint decision on use of nuclear weapons by U.S. forces operating from the U.K. land bases, in U.K. territorial waters [REDACTED] without the somewhat ambiguous current reference to SACEUR and SACLANT in the memorandum as presently drafted.

I do not know whether you or Secretary Kissinger have discussed this proposal with the British. To me, from the policy/political level it makes sense, for the reason that NATO procedures call for consultations. While most U.S. forces operating from the U.K. are "earmarked" for NATO rather than "assigned", we have to go through the NATO alert process -- which involves Presidential decision and consultation -- before they are assigned.

Accordingly, I have drafted the attached package recommending acceptance of the proposed new U.K. language.

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If the attached package is acceptable, there is also the question of advising Defense -- either at the Secretary or Chairman, JCS, level -- of the updated Memorandum of Understandings.

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