Soviet Nuclear Weapons Logistics Operations (U)
Soviet Nuclear Weapons Logistics Operations (U)

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Prepared by

Nuclear Weapons Branch

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PREFACE

This report presents a summary of the current analysis within DIA on Soviet nuclear weapons logistics operations. The major areas dealt with are central organization, logistics operations for each of the five military forces, weapons transport and facilities.

Questions and comments concerning this publication can be addressed to the Defense Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20301-6111. Requests for additional copies should be sent to DIA.
DIA Publications on Soviet Nuclear Weapons Logistics

1. 

2. 

3. The Soviet Aviation Nuclear Weapons Support Unit  
23 July 1984

4. Soviet Naval Nuclear Weapons Logistics  
17 June 1985

5. The Soviet Nuclear Weapons Logistics Organization  
30 May 1983

6. Soviet Nuclear Weapons Logistics in Eastern Europe  
14 June 1982

7. Soviet Nuclear Weapons Logistics — The German Depot Problem  
10 April 1980

8. Soviet Nuclear Weapons Logistics — Rail Movement into Eastern Europe  
18 May 1979

August 1982

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The 12th Chief Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (12th GUMO) is the Soviet central level organization responsible for the storage and maintenance of nuclear weapons.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

There is a Sixth Directorate within the main staff of the Soviet Navy which is responsible for nuclear weapons logistics for all naval forces.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

The Soviets normally move nuclear weapons in the USSR and into Eastern Europe by rail.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

Although rail is the preferred method of nuclear weapons transport in the USSR, it isn't the only means because flexibility and mobility are important factors in the Soviet nuclear logistics system.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

The Soviets have built an extensive system of nuclear weapons storage and handling sites to support their five military services.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)
GENERAL

The Soviet nuclear weapons logistic system has been under development since the mid 1950s. Extensive security measures, against both the Soviet populace and foreign intelligence efforts, have been successful in maintaining a veil of secrecy around most aspects of this activity. The Soviets grant access to nuclear weapons design and logistics information to only a small number of Soviet officers and senior NCOs entrusted with the maintenance, storage, preparation, and transport of these weapons.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The Presidium of the Central Committee, (CPSU) probably is the basic authority for decisions on deployment and use of nuclear weapons by Soviet military forces.

Authority for actual release of nuclear weapons, of course, would reside in the aforementioned national command authorities through the executive agent of the General Staff.
SECTION II
NUCLEAR WEAPONS LOGISTICS MOVEMENTS

RAIL MOVEMENT

Rail probably is the principal means for transport of nuclear weapons within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)
Figure 1. **Soviet Nuclear Weapons Rail Cars.**
ROAD MOVEMENT

The Soviets have traditionally used special motor transport vehicles for the road movement of nuclear weapons.

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SECTION III

SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORAGE BUNKERS

GENERAL

The Soviets use two basic designs for nuclear weapons storage bunkers, the

These two designs have many common features probably imposed by Soviet requirements for safety and survivability of these structures.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

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E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)
E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)
The nuclear weapon contains high explosive, fissile material and electrical gear. Like all weapons it is required to function with certainty if used against an enemy but otherwise be able to handle, transport and store. The nuclear weapon is always subject to special attention to ensure that a weapon accident or incident does not arise between friends or foes. The nuclear weapon is not programmed to differentiate between friend or foe, the fact that it is not programmed to differentiate this but because of its destructive power and size. Weapon design is aimed towards containing high explosive, fissile material and electrical gear.
SECRET

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SECTION IV
SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS LOGISTICS OPERATIONS

GENERAL

E. O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

1) Our understanding of present Soviet nuclear logistic doctrine and practices is obtained to some extent by examining historical data. Soviet military planning has been strongly influenced by the USSR's experiences in World War II. In that conflict the Soviets were subjected to a massive surprise attack, and their logistic system was forced to deal with the widespread disruption and destruction of lines of communication. Centers of supply and distribution were either overrun or destroyed, demonstrating the need for mobility, dispersal, and reserve stocks. Available intelligence information and Soviet military literature indicate that the Soviets have learned from their experiences in their Great Patriotic War of some 40 years ago, and are prepared to support their nuclear-capable forces utilizing dispersed, multi-echeloned, and mobile nuclear logistic assets.
In times of crisis or hostilities we would expect the Soviets to use the transport assets at the NSS, that is the dozens of special railcars and warhead vans, to move the nuclear weapons by convoy to dispersed field locations from which designated launch units could draw their initial or reserve weapons. Both-rail and road convoys would be formed to accomplish dispersal.

**NUCLEAR LOGISTICS FOR AVIATION UNITS**
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NUCLEAR LOGISTICS
FOR NAVAL UNITS

General

The Soviet Navy has a wide variety of nuclear-capable weapons systems. Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) is equipped with nuclear capable bombs and air-to-surface missiles (ASMs). Surface combatants have been reported to carry nuclear-capable SAMs, cruise missiles, rocket-assisted depth bombs, 152 mm. naval guns, and torpedoes. Sea launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), rocket-assisted depth bombs, cruise missiles and torpedoes with nuclear warheads are deployed on Soviet submarines. The nuclear weapons logistic system that supports these forces is similar to that which supports the other four services of the Soviet armed forces.

Logistic support ships of the Soviet Navy such as missile tenders, ammunition ships, and submarine tenders could be available for logistic support of nuclear-capable Soviet naval units.
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E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)