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Friday, March 10, 1961

United States Senate,
Subcommittee to Investigate the
Administration of the
Internal Security Act and Other
Internal Security Laws
of the
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:50 o'clock
a.m., in Room 2300, New Senate Office Building, Senator James
O. Eastland (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Eastland (Chairman), Cork, Muskie, Cotton, and Keating.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, Chief Counsel; Ralph
Horton, Assistant Counsel; Benjamin Mandel, Research Director;
Robert McManus, Research Assistant; and Frank W. Schroeder,
Chief Investigator.

Chairman Eastland. The Committee will come to order.

Do you want to have the witness sworn?

Mr. Sourwine. Yes.

Chairman Eastland. Do you solemnly swear that the
testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Hill. I do.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT C. HILL
THE BOULDERS, LITTLETON, NEW
HAMPSHIRE

Mr. Sourwine. Would you give your name, sir, your
position, your official position, if any, and your business
or residence address?

Mr. Hill. Robert C. Hill. I reside at The Boulders
in Littleton, New Hampshire. Presently, I am a member of
the House of Representatives in the State of New Hampshire.
I am also director of a few companies in New York and Boston.

Mr. Sourwine. You are a former United States Ambassador
to Mexico?

Mr. Hill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Have you held other diplomatic positions?

Mr. Hill. Yes, sir. I was Vice Consul in the Diplomatic
Service in Calcutta, India, in 1944 and 1945. I came back
to Washington, where I was Clerk of the Banking and Currency
Committee in 1947. I was then Vice President of the W.R.
Grace and Company, and in 1953, I became Ambassador to
Costa Rica; then Ambassador of the United States to El Salvador.

In 1956 and part of 1957, I was Assistant Secretary of
State in charge of Congressional relations. From May 1957 until
January 3, 1961, I was Ambassador of the United States in Mexico.

Mr. Sourwine. You are one of our bilingual diplomats, are you not?

Mr. Hill. No, I am not, sir. I wish I could say I spoke the language perhaps as fluently as necessary to discharge one's duties. But I have the command of the language so that I could get along socially without any difficulty.

Mr. Sourwine. You are here in response to a subpoena, are you not?

Mr. Hill. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. The Committee has engaged in a series of hearings on the threat to the security of the United States through the Caribbean. We hope that while you are here this morning, you will give us any information you have which bears on this general subject.

Before I ask you to do that, however, and to volunteer any information, there are some particular questions I would like to ask you.

The Committee has had testimony with regard to one William Wieland, W-I-E-L-A-N-D. Are you acquainted with this gentleman?

Mr. Hill. Yes, I have met Mr. Wieland.

Mr. Sourwine. Who is he?

Mr. Hill. Mr. Wieland has held different positions in
the Department of State during the eight years I served President Eisenhower. I came to know him during the period of time that he was Officer in Charge of the Caribbean countries and Mexico.

Mr. Sourwine. What has been your experience with Mr. Wieland, sir, personally?

Mr. Hill. My experiences have been very unsatisfactory.

Mr. Sourwine. Will you explain that, please?

Mr. Hill. Well, I knew of Mr. Wieland's -- I knew of Mr. Wieland's reputation as a, well, I think the best way you might describe him is a lush in the Department of State, a happy-go-lucky public relations-minded type of diplomat. When I first had contact with him, I did not think he had any basic knowledge of the area that I had responsibility.

Senator Keating. When was that?

Mr. Hill. I first talked with him in relation to my responsibilities in Mexico. That was in, I would say, May of 1957. I had my first official contact with him then. I was aware of the background of the fellow as far as being considered a playboy and more interested in the events after dark than responsibilities of office, so I did not have any actual business with him during my tour of duty in Mexico at that instance.

While he was in charge of the Mexican area, I think it might be interesting to note that I heard from him only twice
during my tour of duty as Ambassador of the United States to Mexico.

Mr. Sourwine. Which covered a period of how long?

Mr. Hill. Three and a half years, but technically, he was one of my bosses. He visited Mexico a couple of times during my period as Ambassador of the United States to Mexico, and his visits always unsatisfactory.

Mr. Sourwine. In what way?

Mr. Hill. He would always try to undermine my position as Ambassador of the United States to Mexico. Then, too, the last time I had contact with him, I believe, was in August of 1959, when he accompanied Dr. Eisenhower to Mexico.

Mr. Sourwine. That is Milton Eisenhower?

Mr. Hill. Dr. Milton Eisenhower. That was a serious period of time in the relations between the United States and Mexico, a very serious period of relations throughout the hemisphere for the United States, and we had looked forward to Dr. Eisenhower's visit to Mexico because we were so concerned as to what was happening in Cuba and what was happening in the Latin Americas that we knew we could not hold the line in Mexico unless we had some positive action on the part of the State Department in Washington in dealing with the Cuban problem. So we welcomed Dr. Eisenhower.

Dr. Eisenhower was agreeable to letting us brief him on the problems of Mexico and the problems of Cuba affecting
Mexico. Mr. Wieland was not about to allow us to present our facts to Dr. Eisenhower.

Mr. Sourwine. Who participated in that briefing?

Chairman Eastland. Wait a minute now, let us go into that a little more.

How do you know he did not want you to?

Mr. Hill. It was very obvious, because he said that he had had an opportunity to discuss this matter with Eisenhower.

Chairman Eastland. Wieland already had?

Mr. Hill. That is right, the Department of State.

Dr. Eisenhower was in Mexico to discuss Mexico.

Senator Cotton. He said this to you?

Mr. Hill. He said this to me; he was not at all disagreeable about it, but he just thought it was extraneous material for the Embassy in Mexico to discuss Cuba.

Chairman Eastland. You thought it was an attempt to cover up?

Mr. Hill. No, I did not at the time. But after consideration, and on the trip to Mazatlan, I wondered what was going on.

Senator Hruska. Did the briefing later transpire with Dr. Eisenhower?

Mr. Hill. Yes, I went to Dr. Eisenhower and told him I was aware of the fact that his brother, the President of the United States, was very sympathetic to Mexico and hopeful
that the relations would continue to exist, and that the relations were in jeopardy because of the inroads of Castroism in Mexico. I told him I thought the situation was going -- was becoming so critical that if we could ask his pleasure to talk with him for an hour or two about Castro and Cuba and how it affected Mexico, it might be useful to him. The Doctor said to me that he would be delighted to hear our point of view.

We arranged that we would talk on our plane, the Air Attache's plane, on route from Mexico City to Mazatlan. I took with me on my trip the most knowledgeable man in this area, Mr. Raymond Leddy, Counsel for Political Affairs in Mexico, a man of integrity and good judgment, and a man of wide experience in Latin American affairs.

Chairman Eastland. Where is he now?

Mr. Hill. He is presently in Mexico City as Counsel of the Embassy for Mexican affairs. He was with the FBI, he was with the CIA, he was Political Officer in the Department of State for a number of years, and when I went to Mexico, I asked Mr. Dulles if I could bring this competent officer with me.

Senator Hruska. Mr. Hill, you said there were efforts on the part of Mr. Wieland to undermine your status as Ambassador. Is it this instance of which that consists, or are there other ways in which that evidenced itself?
Mr. Hill. No, I was a political appointee, Senator, and a political appointee, if he does not have horsepower in Washington, does not have a chance in his mission, because the boys in the Department of State -- it is a very exclusive club. There has been a concerted effort to make this exclusively a career organization. When I went to Mexico, I asked Mr. Dulles, as one of the stipulations of my accepting the assignment, if I could take my own staff, my own top level in the Embassy. It was very unusual for an Ambassador to make such a request, but it was granted. That was my protection, the reason I lasted three and a half years in Mexico.

Mr. Wieland never overtly attacked me to my knowledge, but the Embassy cocktail circuit, there are always a few little remarks here and there regarding the competency of the Ambassador, how he is getting along, etc. Mr. Wieland would use the old technique of praise and criticism in dealing with me. I am under the impression that when you are commissioned by the President of the United States to take on assignments, personalities then cease.

Senator Cotton. May I ask a question? When you reached the period in which this conference took place on the plane, up to that time, had you heard enough about this man or his attitude toward so that you were then conscious of any antagonism to him or bias against you?

Mr. Hill. I think whatever opinion Wieland had of me
are unimportant. I think the issue is what did Wieland have
to do with the fantastic catastrophe of Cuba.

Senator Cotton. I was asking not about his feelings to-
ward you, but your feelings toward him at that point.

Mr. Hill. My feelings would be classified as correct.
I always treated him courteously when I met him, but had no
consultation with him, and he sought none with me, because he
was aware of the fact that I did not trust him or respect
his judgment.

Senator Cotton. Was this feeling on your part a confirmed
feeling when you first accepted your appointment to Mexico,
or did it gradually become confirmed in your mind after your
going down there?

Mr. Hill. Well, I had known of Wieland when I was back
in the Department of State as Assistant Secretary. He was
not regarded as, by men that I had confidence in, as a compe-
tent Foreign Service Officer.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Hill, who participated in this briefing
of Dr. Eisenhower on the airplane?

Senator Keating. Could I ask a question, Mr. Chairman,
before you come to that?

Did Mr. Wieland ever say anything directly to you which
gave you, which caused you to have the appraisal of him which
you did have?

Mr. Hill. I was warned by men that I have confidence in
the Foreign Service to be very careful in anything I told to Mr. Wieland, that it would be used against me, so I only conducted myself in the presence of Mr. Wieland in the manner of social chatter, and then got on about my business. I was told he was not to be trusted.

Senator Cotton. Mr. Chairman, I just want, acquainted as I am with Mr. Hill through many, many, many years in knowing his complete, his ability to work with people in a measure that few men have ever, I think perhaps the object of my question was not clear; I did not make myself clear to Mr. Hill.

What I was sure was the situation, and that I wanted to put on the record in response to a question, was when this event occurred that you are approaching, at that time, you were not conscious of any particular feeling of bitterness or bias against this man other than your general analysis of his worth? I mean, you were not --

Chairman Eastland. Nothing personal; that is what you mean?

Mr. Hill. I have nothing personal against Mr. Wieland, but I do not respect his judgment, and I do not respect his knowledge of Latin American Affairs. It is not any personal animosity that any overt acts between the two of us would cause to be a personal issue. I do not consider this man qualified to be in the service of the United States.
Mr. Sourwine. Can you tell us who participated in this briefing, Mr. Hill?

Mr. Hill. To the best of my knowledge, present on the airplane, that participated in the conversation with Dr. Eisenhower was Colonel Glawe, G-L-A-W-E, the Air Attache in Mexico City. I think his nickname is Ben, but I think it is Benoit Glawe.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. Hill. He is located at the Pentagon. One of the finest officers I have served with from the Pentagon in my career.

Mr. Sourwine. Who else?

Mr. Hill. Raymond Leddy, Counsel for Political Affairs in Mexico City.

Mr. Sourwine. Who else?

Mr. Hill. And myself. There were others on the airplane, but I am restricting myself to the conference we had with Dr. Eisenhower.

Mr. Sourwine. Where on the airplane was this conference held?

Mr. Hill. In the middle of the airplane. Dr. Eisenhower had with him, I believe, his assistant, Mr. Keither Spaulding.

Mr. Sourwine. Was this an ordinary commercial airplane?

Mr. Hill. No, it was an Air Force DC-3. It was a very heated argument. You would have to have ear plugs in if you
had not heard what took place.

Mr. Sourwine. How were you seated? Sort of in a circle?

Mr. Hill. Well, the plane, as you know, has a divan in the middle of the plane.

Mr. Sourwine. That is a circular divan?

Mr. Hill. No, it is a rectangular divan, similar to this table. Dr. Eisenhower was seated, if I recall correctly, in the middle, with Raymond Leddy on one side and Mr. Wieland on the side with Mr. Leedy. Then Clowe had to sit on the floor, and I was seated in one of the bucket seats across from the divan.

Mr. Sourwine. Was anyone else within earshot that you know of?

Mr. Hill. Possibly my secretary. I think it was Jimmy Johnson at the time.

I might say I have had a letter from Dr. Eisenhower's secretary, Mr. Spaulding, referring to a speech I made in Concord, New Hampshire, where I made reference to trying to brief Dr. Eisenhower, and without success because of the interruptions by Mr. Wieland. Mr. Spaulding, whom I know very well, based upon his several trips to Mexico with Dr. Eisenhower, said he did not recall any such conversation. I wrote Mr. Spaulding a letter and refreshed his memory, and I said in there that we had already given this information to the FBI and that I suggested he enlighten Dr. Eisenhower.
of the seriousness of this matter, as I had at the time that it took place; that if this were pursued any further, I would tell the story as I recall it, and I have heard nothing from Dr. Eisenhower.

Mr. Sourwine. Was Spaulding in this group that was in hearing?

Mr. Hill. No, he was on the plane, but did not participate in the conversation.

Mr. Sourwine. What was this conversation and what part did Mr. Wieland take in it? Tell us as nearly as you can recall.

Mr. Hill. We had been planning on Dr. Eisenhower's visit for several weeks. The staff in Mexico City had been concerned about the ascent to power of Mr. Castro and the dangers that it offered the United States of America. We had continually sent cables and memorandums to Washington warning them of Castro, long before he came into power. We were taking this opportunity in 1959 as sort of a last resort, trying to tell Dr. Eisenhower how serious this matter was, hoping the Doctor, because of his influence with the President of the United States and the high regard the President held his brother in, would return to Washington and reverse the unfortunate policies of Ambassador Bonsal and the State Department in the handling of Castro. So we were well prepared for the briefing. We had with us all intelligence reports
submitted from the United States Embassy in Mexico, under proper safeguards that allowed us to take them from the Embassy property on the plane.

We had with us the intelligence reports from the Pentagon, the intelligence reports from the CIA, the intelligence reports from the FBI and from the State Department, so that if Mr. Wieland attempted to whitewash what we were going to tell Dr. Eisenhower, we would have the documents to support our briefing.

As I recall what happened, we waited until about 30 minutes out, and I spoke to Dr. Eisenhower and I said:

"When I talked with you at the Residence the other evening, you said you would welcome an opportunity to have our point of view regarding the seriousness of Castro in Cuba. You said you would be delighted to hear our story, that President Eisenhower was very, very concerned about Castro, and that it would be helpful to have the benefit of our advice."

Mr. Leddy was asked to present the picture as he saw it, and as Mr. Leddy started to trace the history of Castro, going back into his youth, following through college, his exile in Mexico, his activities in Bogota, the infiltration of Communists into the Cuban Government, at each instance, when Leddy would make a telling point, Wieland would say, "that is not true."
I finally turned to Wieland, whom I had no respect for, and I said:

"I do not recall asking you to be in on this conversation. Dr. Eisenhower has agreed to listen to men of integrity and experience in Latin America. As far as I can see, you do not qualify, because what Mr. Leddy is discussing at the moment comes from the Joint Intelligence Report, the June Joint Intelligence Report regarding Communist infiltration in Cuba."

Wieland said, "there is no evidence of Communist infiltration in Cuba."

With that, Colonel Glawe, "you are either a damned fool or a Communist."

That was when the meeting became very heated. Dr. Eisenhower lost some of his enthusiasm to have us proceed. I insisted that he continue to hear the story of Mr. Castro, and I pointed out that unless something was done, I could not be expected to maintain the type of relations that President Eisenhower wanted with Mexico because of the infiltration of Castroism in Mexico.

Wieland tried to pooh pooh what I started to say, and I brushed him off again, and finally, Dr. Eisenhower said he did not want to hear any more at this time. That ended the conversation. But it lasted I would say, for one hour and a half.

At each instance, when Glawe would try to make a point
or Leddy would try to make a point, Wieland would disagree on the question of infiltration of Communists in Cuba.

Chairman Eastland. He took the position that Castro was not a communist.

Mr. Hill. He said Castro was an idealist, that he knew him personally, that there had been lots of charges and misrepresentations, but that there was no evidence in the State Department's files to confirm Mr. Leddy's point of view.

Right there, we pulled out the documents. We didn't show the documents to Dr. Eisenhower, because Dr. Eisenhower recognized that tempers were beginning to enter the picture and he dismissed the conference.

Chairman Eastland. You had security documents from the State Department?

Mr. Hill. Yes.

Chairman Eastland. And you had security documents from your own agency?

Mr. Hill. And our own documents, yes.

Senator Hruska. What did he say with reference to Communist personalities being active in Cuba and in connection with Castro's actions, did he deny there were any of those in Cuba?

Mr. Hill. You would have to know Mr. Wieland to know how he would handle something like this. He is a tall, well built fellow with a big bush moustache. He makes a very
impressive appearance. He keeps a very calm attitude. The reason he joined in the conversation without any invitation from the Ambassador of the United States was to whitewash any attempt of the United States Embassy in Mexico to present facts to Dr. Eisenhower. Our objective was to present these facts to Dr. Eisenhower, and we urged him, even after it a little like wheedling, to please give our views to his brother, the President of the United States.

Senator Hruska. You did not say that Wieland denied that Castro was a communist. You did say he said he was an idealist. Did he go so far as to say none of his associates was communist?

Mr. Hill. He would not agree that communism was a problem in Cuba. That was August 1959.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall the date?

Mr. Hill. Well, Dr. Eisenhower came to Mexico immediately after he returned from Moscow with Vice President Nixon, and he stayed with me three weeks. I would say it was about the end of August.

Senator Cotton. May I ask a question? You mentioned to the Chairman these documents that you had, your own and from various agencies. Did you get an opportunity to exhibit any of them to Dr. Eisenhower? Did either you or the Colonel or Mr. Leddy attempt to do so, or to read from them?

Mr. Hill. Yes, Mr. Leddy, I believe, had in his hand at one time some of the intelligence documents, but each time
that he would try to present this important information, Mr. Wieland would interrupt and Mr. Leddy is a gentleman; he would let Mr. Wieland take over and he would never get back to the point. Each time that Mr. Leddy would try to say, in such and such a document, it is right here in my briefcase, Wieland would say:

"Really, I think this is most unfortunate to take Dr. Eisenhower's time to discuss this issue. He has had the opportunity to be briefed in the Department of State regarding this. We are in Mexico to try to further the good relations between the two countries," and so forth.

Chairman Eastland. But you had CIA intelligence reports, FBI, the State Department --

Mr. Hill. That is right, and the Pentagon.

Chairman Eastland. And the Pentagon, and you had your own intelligence reports from Mexico?

Mr. Hill. Right, properly signed out in the Embassy so we were not violating any security regulations.

Chairman Eastland. Now, your Embassy intelligence reports, they had been sent to the State Department, had they not?

Mr. Hill. That is true.

Chairman Eastland. They would go to Wieland when they got to the State Department?

Mr. Hill. Well, they would go to the Department of State
and Wieland would receive a copy as one of the officers in charge of the area.

Chairman Eastland. So he knew all those intelligence reports?

Mr. Hill. If he read them.

Chairman Eastland. And they all showed that Castro was a communist and his government was communist?

Mr. Hill. Showed that Castro had communist leanings; showed strong evidence that he was a communist, that his brother was a communist, that Che Guevara was a communist, and we could not get satisfactory answers from Wieland involving any of the personalities.

Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Wieland at any time during the briefing use the words, "that is a lie?"

Mr. Hill. I recall that at one point, when he became very excited, that did take place and Mr. Leddy took offense to it and they stood up.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall what the question was to which Mr. Wieland made that charge -- what the statement was to which he made that charge?

Mr. Hill. It I recall, it had something to do with somebody in the Castro government being a communist.

Mr. Sourwine. You do not recall who?

Mr. Hill. No.

Mr. Sourwine. But somebody told Dr. Eisenhower, naming
an individual, that that individual was a communist?

Mr. Hill. That is correct.

Mr. Sourwine. And it was then stated or charged by Mr. Wieland that that was a lie, using those words?

Mr. Hill. Yes.

It I may as the Chairman, I think it might be helpful if, at this point, and it is agreeable with the Committee, let me just give a little review of events that I saw before the meeting in Mazatlan that might be helpful to this Committee.

Chairman Eastland. All right, sir.

Mr. Hill. In January of 1957, the Secretary of State, the late Foster Dulles, spoke to me informally one morning at the Department and asked me if I would accept an appointment as Ambassador of the United States to Mexico.

At that time, there were several Senators in the United States evidencing concern about the deterioration of relations between the United States and Latin America. Senator Mansfield had gone to Secretary Dulles and said:

"There is only one man that should fill Henry Holland's position in the Department of State, and that is Bob Hill."

When Secretary Dulles asked me if I would accept the appointment to Mexico, he said, "do you have your heart on being Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs?"

I said, "Mr. Secretary, I would not accept it if it were offered."
He said, "why?"

I said, "the situation is so critical in Latin America that unless I have the support of Dr. Eisenhower, I have not got a chance."

Mr. Dulles was a very discreet man, and he did not answer me. He said:

"Well, if it is the Assistant Secretaryship that you are interested in, I do not want you to have it under pressure from the United States Senate."

But he said, "President Eisenhower wants you to go to Mexico."

I said, "will you give me some time to think about it?"

He said, "how much time do you need?"

I said, "well, I should talk to my wife, because we just bought a house in Wesley Heights. We have two small children and we need to think about this rather seriously, to uproot them again from school."

He said, "give me your decision when I return from Bonn."

When he returned from Bonn, he called me at the office and asked if I had made up my mind. I said:

"Yes, I accept the position in Mexico and I am very honored, because I recognize the importance of the appointment."

He said, "I am delighted. I cannot release you until after Congress adjourns."
This was in 1957.

I said, "fine."

The CIA reported a few weeks later that there were demonstrations being planned to embarrass my predecessor in Mexico, Francis White. So it was that my appointment, my nomination, my hearings and my going to Mexico were expedited in order to save embarrassment for Ambassador White and embarrassment to the United States Government.

During the period of time that I was preparing to go to Mexico --

Chairman Eastland. Those were communist demonstrations?

Mr. Hill. That is correct, sir.

I was keeping my ears open in the Department of State as to what was going on, and I started to hear the rumbles that Batista had to go. One day, Mr. Dulles called me to his office, and he asked me to take the nomination of Chip Bohlen to Lyndon Johnson and Everett Dirksen as Ambassador of the United States to Cuba. I must say I was somewhat concerned, but it was not my prerogative to comment. But by reticence, I caused Mr. Dulles to say, "what is the matter?"

I said, "Mr. Secretary, you know that there is a group in the State Department that has decided that Batista has got to go. I think if you bring Bohlen over here from Moscow, you are inheriting some difficulties with the Senate. You are getting along well with both sides of the aisle at the
present time. It is my responsibility to keep it that way. But Bohlen is controversial with certain members of my party, and I think you should very carefully evaluate the fact that they are trying to unseat Batista, and perhaps give consideration for someone else."

He said, "well, shall talk with you in a few days."

So I came back at his request a few days later. He said, "the President is not going to submit Bohlen's name as Ambassador to Cuba; we are going to send Earl Smith. Do you know him?"

I said, "yes, I know Mr. Smith. I met him at the convention at San Francisco in 1956. But," I said, "Mr. Secretary, this is a very serious situation in Cuba, based upon the information that I picked up here in the Department, and through my contacts in Latin America, and I think it puts Mr. Smith under a very serious -- in a very serious situation, where he has had no previous diplomatic experience."

I had the type of relationship with Mr. Dulles where I could exchange ideas with him, but he was not open on this particular occasion for any suggestions from me. So I took Mr. Smith's nomination to Congress.

As soon as it was announced, Mr. Smith telephoned me and said he wanted to see me. I invited to go to the Chevy Chase Club and have lunch with me on a Saturday afternoon. I said:
"Earl, you are going to preside of the liquidation of Batista; you should not take this assignment."

He said, "why?"

"Because," I said, "you will be blamed for the downfall of Batista and you will be blamed for the rise of the man who is going to take his place, expected to take his place, Mr. Castro."

Chairman Eastland. When the plan in the State Department was to liquidate Batista, in reality, that was to enthrone Castro, was it not?

Mr. Hill. That is my understanding. That is direct intervention in the affairs of the Cuban government, the policy that supposedly the United States frowns upon.

Well, I had a long talk with Mr. Smith and I said, "you have made up your mind to go to Cuba. Let me give you some advice. You make the same arrangements with Secretary Dulles as I have made to go to Mexico; take your own staff with you or you are going to have your throat cut."

Those are quotes. My wife is a witness.

He said, "can you help?"

I said, "I can help you pick a minister, but you should go to Allen Dulles and you should go to the Pentagon for your attaches, men that you have confidence."

I suggested to Mr. Smith that he take this one and that one that I knew would be helpful in furthering the interests
of the United States. All the men that I suggested turned
down the assignment. They came to me privately and said:

"Bob, I do not know the Ambassador, but I do know the
problem in Cuba and that Batista is on the way out. I have
a family; I do not want to be associated with it."

Naturally, it aroused my curiosity. I went on to Mexico,
Smith went on to Cuba. Smith did not follow my advice. I
told him not to go outside the United States Embassy, to get
to know everyone in that Embassy and not to take any trips
in Cuba. I think the record shows what happened when he went
outside the Embassy.

Chairman Eastland. What happened?

Mr. Hill. He went down to a place, I think Santiago
de Cuba, and supposedly they put the fire hoses on some Cuban
ladies who were demonstrating against Batista, and they Ambas-
sador make a statement in favor of the ladies that were hosed
by the Batista forces. I immediately the New York Times
praised Ambassador Smith for his bravery, etc., but that was
the beginning of the end of Mr. Smith.

I then was in Mexico City and the staff that I took with
me, most of them had had FBI experience. It is obvious why
I chose them, because they had that experience and they were
men that I could trust. They were men that were not trying
to cause any trouble for the United States; they were only
to present the true picture of the seriousness of the situation.
in Latin America, which was being sadly neglected by the Eisenhower Administration; not because of lack of interest of the President or the Secretary of State, but it was just one of those things that happened, where they were continually being fed in the Department of State, that all was well below the border. Those that lived below the border knew that there were grave problems that were going to explode.

Moving along, Castro came to power and that night, the night Castro assumed power, I had dinner with Dick Rubottom at his residence in Wesley Heights. It was New Year's Eve, and I was with my wife and Mrs. Rubottom. I like Dick Rubottom, and I respect him. He was a victim of circumstances, in my opinion.

Mr. Sourwine. What was his position?

Mr. Hill. Assistant Secretary of State. I said:

"Dick, your problems are just beginning. This fellow is a communist; he is a bad actor."

Mr. Sourwine. Referring to whom?

Mr. Hill. Referring to Mr. Fidel Castro.

Mr. Rubottom did not answer me, but when he received the phone call that Batista was out and Castro was in, it broke up our dinner and I went to the Sulgrave Club with my wife.

I went off to Europe. I visited Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, Russia. When I got to Finland, I received a telegram from Cecil Gray, who had been Cordell Hull's assistant...
for nine years, who was Charge in Mexico. He said:

"Bob, you must come back very soon, because the Ambassadors are to meet in El Salvador" -- I think it was April 10 or 11 -- "to discuss the problem of Castro and its influence in the Caribbean."

I immediately went to London and sailed for New York.

When I got to Mexico City, I sat down with Joe Gray and Win Scott, who is the CIA representative, Mr. Leddy, counsel for political affairs, the attaches, from the Pentagon, and we discussed the Ambassadorial meeting to be held in El Salvador.

I said, "I am not going to go."

Mr. Gray, "you have to go."

I said, "Mr. Bonsal is going to try to sell Castro to this distinguished group of Ambassadors, and I will not be a party to it."

The reason that I felt that that would be the case was I had been reading the cables from Embassy Havana, where the Embassy was reporting the progress being made and the fine intentions of Mr. Castro. It did not support the evidence we had in Mexico City.

Mr. Sourwine. This was what date, now?

Mr. Hill. I returned to Mexico in April of 1959.

Nevertheless, I listened to Mr. Gray, because of the great respect I have for him, and I went to El Salvador, but I had feeling that we would have difficulty.
When I got to El Salvador, I talked with my friend Tom Whalen, who was Ambassador in Managua. He had been there ahead of me, and I asked him what he thought would be accomplished by the meeting. He said:

"Well, of course, you know that Ambassador Bonsal feels that Castro is a great man and is just what is needed in Cuba. Let us wait and listen to his presentation."

Mr. Sourwine. What position did Mr. Bonsal hold at that time?

Mr. Hill. Ambassador of the United States in Cuba and the chief architect of the disaster in Cuba since Castro came into power, because he has consistently, behind the scenes, supported Castro until he left Cuba a few months ago -- I think June of 1960.

Senator Dodd. Where is he now?

Mr. Hill. On temporary assignment, I understand, at the Organization of American States.

At this meeting with the following Ambassadors; the to Guatemala, Lester Mallory; the Ambassador to Honduras, Mr. Newbegin; Ambassador to Salvador and my host, Kalyarvi; Ambassador to Nicaragua, Mr. Whalen; Ambassador to Panama, Julian Harrington; the Ambassador to Colombia, Jack Cabot; the Ambassador to Venezuela, Joe Sparks; the Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, Joe Farland, from West Virginia; the Ambassador to Haiti, Gerald Drew; the Ambassador to Cuba,
Mr. Bonsal, and myself. Mr. Wieland was also present, Allen Stewart, another advisor in the Department of State on Caribbean Affairs was present, and miscellaneous secretaries and so forth. The meeting chaired by Low Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary of State, and Mr. Rubottom, Assistant Secretary of State.

Mr. Sourwine. What was Mr. Whalen's official position at that time?

Mr. Hill. Mr. Whalen held the position of Officer in Charge of the Caribbean and Mexico.

Mr. Sourwine. Was that an area directorship?

Mr. Hill. That is true, sir, but a very important directorship.

When we get down to business, a communique was handed out five minutes after the meeting opened of what we were to say two days later, and I said:

"Just a moment." I said, "I have not come here to do anything but try to serve my country, and I assumed everyone else was here for the same purpose, but this is not a kangaroo court and this is not a stacked directors meeting. You are asking me to issue this communique and we have just met for five minutes and we are going to issue it two days from now? No."

Actually, the trouble had started, but the communique was withdrawn.
Senator Muska. Who submitted it?

Mr. Hill. It was submitted by Mr. Rubottom. Naturally, some of them decided we might be in for perhaps an unpleasant meeting. It was not my intention to make it unpleasant, but I think to have a communique passed out to United States Ambassadors of what took place, to be issued two days later, five minutes after you meet, was -- I read the communique and it was a whitewash.

Mr. Sourwine. Of whom?

Mr. Hill. Of Castro and Cuba.

Senator Cotton. Could you give us briefly what it said?

Mr. Hill. All it said was the Ambassadors had met in El Salvador and discussed the serious problem in Caribbean. You know State Department communiques; they issue such things that do not stir troubled waters, and it said nothing. So the communique was withdrawn.

Then, if I recall correctly, Mr. Bonsal was asked to tell the Ambassadors and those from Washington the situation in Cuba as he saw it. I recall this very vividly, because I was attacked by Ambassador Bonsal at this meeting, vilified, and so forth.

Ambassador Henderson stood up for me -- Secretary Henderson; Mr. Rubottom did. But the end of about one hour and a half of very skillful presentation of the situation in Cuba,
Mr. Bonsal stopped and the meeting was open for question. I believe I was the third or fourth Ambassador at this side of the table. When they came to me, I said:

"Mr. Chairman, I would like to congratulate Ambassador Bonsal for the presentation, but I want the record to show I am in 100 percent disagreement with Mr. Bonsal. Castro is a Communist; he is leading the United States into a trap and into one of the most serious boobytraps in the history of foreign relations of the United States."

Mr. Bonsal kept his voice down and started to cross examine me. I remember one thing very vividly. I said:

"Mr. Bonsal, Mr. Castro continues to vilify the personalities in the United States, including the President of the United States, the Vice President, the Secretary of State. Have you heard him ever criticize Khrushchev?"

Mr. Bonsal said to me, "I do not consider the question relevant."

"Well," I said, "I do."

Arguments ensued. Ambassador Willauer, Whiting Willauer, Ambassador of Costa Rica -- I think I forgot to include him as attending the meeting -- also raised questions of trying whitewash Castro at this meeting.

Well, we went on discuss other matters. Sitting around the table were three men, Willauer, Whalen, and Hill, whose combined tour of duty in Central America and Mexico totalled
about 18 to 20 years. Yet Mr. Whalen and Mr. Willauer and I were not asked to serve on any committee discussing these important matters. It was left to men new in the area or with little previous experience in the area. In other words, the political appointees were left on the outside until Willauer demanded to be seated on the Communique Writing Committee.

Well, the day that they were to break up the meeting, on a Saturday, the communique was handed out and I had my own communique which pointed out the danger of Castro. Mr. Rubottom said:

"Can we take five minutes to look over the communique?"

And I said, "may I see a copy?"

It was handed to me and I said, "it will take a half hour to study it; may we have a recess?"

So we recessed. When we came back, I said, "I cannot go along with the communique. It is a whitewash of Castro. You are going to discourage every country in Latin America that fears the Castro menace. There are certain aspects of the communique that I believe are helpful, but I cannot go along with this communique."

They said, "that is too bad," and Bonsal said:

"If you cannot be a team player, why do you not resign?"

I said, "Mr. Bonsal, I do not think you have the prerogatives to discuss my resignation. I think that rests with the President of the United States and with the Secretary of State."
I said, "now that you are getting sarcastic, I shall read my amendment to this communique. We shall put some teeth into it so that the dedicated Foreign Service personnel all over this hemisphere will know the Ambassadors met and did something other than attend cocktail parties and whitewash Castro."

It was decided we would recess, so I could discuss my own communique with Mr. Henderson and Mr. Rubottom. It got so disagreeable before we recessed to talk privately, I said:

"If you boys do not want to recess, you go ahead and release your communique, but I shall release my own to the press."

Of course, that caused a great deal of furor. But nevertheless, they recessed, and we went to another room and Secretary Henderson and Mr. Rubottom --

Chairman Eastland. Is that Loy Henderson?

Mr. Hill. Loy Henderson, a great patriot.

Chairman Eastland. He is.

Mr. Hill. He read my agenda, where I said that all information regarding Communism in Cuba and Communism among the leaders in Cuba should be submitted immediately to the Secretary of State, to be submitted to the Organization of American States Peace Committee to take appropriate action. They called in Ambassador John Dreier, who was then Ambassador to the Organization of American States, and Secretary Henderson,
with great courage, said:

"I think we can live this."

Mr. Rubottom said, "I think it should be done. Will you take this back and read it to the other ambassadors?"

I was not present in the room, but I have heard from other Ambassadors present that Ambassador Bonsal seriously objected to my inclusion in the communiqué that all evidence of communism should be submitted to the Secretary of State and then to the Organization of American states. He said it would make his work in Cuba intolerable. There were charges that I was trying to run Latin American affairs from Mexico City.

The only other Ambassador that defended my position was Ambassador Willauer.

We returned to the committee room and Secretary Rubottom said, "I believe this should be included in the communiqué; it is so ordered."

One Ambassador, I think Ambassador Drew of Haiti, said, "I want you to know I will go along only because you requested that it be included."

Ambassador Bonsal remained quiet. I knew that day that I probably had sealed the last part of my casket in the Department of State. Ambassador Whalen said to me a few hours later that Ambassador Bonsal approached him in the hotel and said:
"I noticed you did not go along with Hill." I was never referred to as Ambassador Hill, because I was a political appointee.

He said, "look, Whalen you have connections with the Republican National Committee. How about helping us get rid of Hill and Willauer?" They went back to Washington and tried to torpedo me with Secretary Herter as a result of my saying that I would not go along with any endorsement of Castro.

Now, the interesting thing is this. There were minutes taken of the meeting. You look in the files of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and you will not find them. I wrote Secretary Rubottom and demanded a copy of those minutes. He sent them to me. The only reference to the real meat of the meeting was that a lively exchange took place between Ambassador Bonsal and Ambassador Hill.

I wrote Mr. Rubottom back and said, "normally, these minutes go to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Here are 15 or 16 corrections to your minutes of the meeting in El Salvador. As written, your minutes happen to be a whitewash, and I will not be a party to it. If you do send this report to the Capital, I respectfully request that my letter be included."

Let us move along a little bit. We move into 1960. By that time, there were many Cubans coming to Mexico, and
they were complaining about the situation in Cuba and that they were not being given the help that they thought they deserved by the Embassy. That is not unusual for the Latins to complain about the United States. We would not listen to any criticism of our Ambassador from Cubans or anyone else. I am speaking of Ambassador Bonsal, because he was accredited representative of the United States, and our disagreement was in the privacy of the meeting El Salvador and should not be generally discussed with anyone.

But they started coming to Mexico City, personnel from the Embassy in Havana, begging me to go to Washington to try to clear up the situation, because the Embassy was considered pro-Castro. As late as May of 1960, I saw a cable under the signature of Ambassador Bonsal, which indicated that Fidel Castro still wanted to get along with the United States and that he was hopeful.

I saw a cable as late as September from the Pentagon -- from Cuba to the Pentagon -- saying that there was, in the opinion of the reporter, still a pro-Castro cell in the Embassy of the United States in Havana.

Mr. Sourwine. What was the source of that?

Mr. Hill. Navy intelligence, top secret to Admiral Burke.

Mr. Sourwine. A Castro cell in our Embassy?

Mr. Hill. A Castro cell in the Embassy of the United States in Havana, and this was as late as September 1960.
Now, let us go back a little bit to February of 1960. I made one more attempt to try to put this thing in perspective. I was having dinner one night with Tom McCabe. I think he is President or Chairman of the Board of Scott Paper Company in Philadelphia. There were some important business men there, and they were telling me how concerned they were -- this is February of 1960 -- about the rise of Castro and the ineffectiveness of the United States Government, and what was wrong, were there communists in the State Department.

I said, "not to my knowledge."

"Well, how can these things happen?"

"Well," I said, "Tom, you used to be a Republican National Committeeman; you are highly regarded by the Administration. Why do you not go and talk to the Secretary of State?"

"Well," he said, "I do not have the facts that you do."

I said, "well, if you arrange for me to come to Washington to once again discuss this issue, I shall be happy to."

I received a telephone call from him a few days later that he had met with Douglas Dillon in Philadelphia, at some foreign policy meeting, that he had urged Mr. Dillon to once again have my view presented to the Secretary of State.

I came to Washington. I met with Secretary Herter and Allen Dulles, and Colonel J. C. King from the CIA, and
Mr. Rubottom. Rather an unsatisfactory conversation took place. I think partially, it was my own responsibility, because I knew that the atmosphere was not such that we could progress with any substantive matters, and I preferred to wait until I could talk to Mr. Herter privately.

While I was waiting to talk to Mr. Herter privately, Senator Fulbright asked me if I would appear in Executive Session before the Foreign Relations Committee. I urge you gentlemen to get a copy of the Foreign Relations Committee testimony, at which Dick Rubottom, Tom Mann, Ambassador Bonsal and I were representatives of the State Department. I recall that Senator Fulbright asked Bonsal what he felt should be done. Bonsal plead to go back to Cuba.

He said, "by sending me back to Cuba, I think I can put this thing back into focus."

I recall Senator Smathers saying, "you will not live long enough, Ambassador Bonsal, to resolve the problems in Cuba."

It began to be a heated exchange, because Bonsal started to become sarcastic with me again.

I made my mind up, after the cable of May 28, I think it was, 1960, that the election was coming up in November. I had spent nearly eight years, this tour of duty, in the State Department. I saw this terrible unfold in Latin America. I told Vice President Nixon about it long before it started, long before he made his trip to Latin America. I had pled with
Secretary Dulles, I have talked with his brother, Allen Dulles, talked with General Willems at the Pentagon, talked with General Trudeau, that used to be the head of G-2, and I had made up my mind that I would come back home with my family and forget it. If any of that background is useful to you.

Chairman Eastland. You do not think there is any question but that the State Department is responsible, or that it was a policy of the State Department to overthrow Batista and install Castro in Cuba?

Mr. Hill. There is no doubt in my mind that individuals in the State Department, with the help of the New York Times, put Fidel Castro in power.

Chairman Eastland. Who were those individuals in the State Department? There was Bonsal?

Mr. Hill. Bonsal, you see, at the time was serving somewhere else. I think he was in Bolivia. I say he was the architect of the disaster in Cuba after he became Ambassador. He encouraged the Secretary of State and I think the President that he could work it out. He must be sadly disillusioned at this moment.

Chairman Eastland. Who were the individuals?

Mr. Hill. The ones that had the responsibility in the area that I know about would be Secretary Rubottom, Mr. Wieland, Mr. Stewart, John Drier at the Organization of American States -- they were certainly important people. Whether or
not they favored the fall of Batista, I do not know, because I do not have any responsibility in the area. All I got was the gossip and rumor that Wieland was very anxious to see Castro in power.

Now, there are plenty of officers that served in the area and served in Cuba that can enlighten the Committee as to who was pro-Castro and who was anti-Batista. But you understand, the minute Earl Smith went down and made his statement that was anti-Batista, all was well. But the minute Smith started reporting that maybe Batista was not so bad and that Castro was an evil man and possibly a Communist, he signed his death warrant.

I have been told by a responsible official of the Embassy in Havana that there was [representative in Havana that was pro-Castro.]

Chairman Eastland. We have sworn testimony to that same effect.

Mr. Hill. I have heard also from the same individual that the Counselor for Political Affairs was pro-Castro. But I am saying to you that as late as September 1960, I was privy to a cable that said there was still a pro-Castro cell in the Embassy in Havana.

I say to you, Mr. Chairman, I am not here to cause you gentlemen any inconvenience and trouble. But someone is responsible for this act. In business, if you are responsible
for a company losing money, you lose your job, and I think someone has the responsibility to find out, and I assume that is the responsibility of this Committee, what this is all about. If my testimony will not bear up in court, then I should pay the penalty.

Senator Hruska. Mr. Hill, what was the approximate date of that Executive Session of the Foreign Relations Committee to which you refer?

Mr. Hill. It was February of 1960. If you will recall, Ambassador Bonsal, at the request of Senator Fulbright, was asked to remain in Washington and then after a few weeks went by, he went back to Cuba and further disaster ensued until he finally came home.

Senator Keating. When was it that Ambassador Bonsal was up here on that temporary tour of duty, was recalled here temporarily and during what period --

Mr. Hill. I think President Eisenhower decided to break relations with Cuba and to bring Ambassador Bonsal back in June of 1960, and Bonsal then was assigned to the Organization of American States after John Drier resigned.

Senator Keating. But Bonsal was back here before that for a one-month or approximately one-month interval do you remember when that was? And then went back to Cuba again?

Mr. Hill. Bonsal was here at the request of the Secretary of State in February of 1960, at the same time I was asked
to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator Keating. Then he went back to Cuba.

Mr. Hill. And he was pushing, pushing, pushing to go back to Cuba, because he said he could handle the situation with patience, and to let him return and he would work this matter out. I heard him say that.

Senator Keating. Did he return then?

Mr. Hill. Yes, he did.

Senator Keating. I had a conversation with Ambassador Bonsal while up here, and I was trying to fix the time of that; that must have been the time it was.

Mr. Hill. I want this record to show that to my knowledge, Ambassador Bonsal had no responsibility before Castro came into power. He was elsewhere in the Foreign Service. But after he went to Cuba, he was the chief architect of maintaining the policy of trying to get along with Castro.

Senator Keating. Well, it was uphold Castro. He was the architect of that policy.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know what his instructions were in that regard?

Mr. Hill. I do not. But I do know this, that while he was Ambassador to Cuba, we continued to get slanted intelligence reports from Washington from Ambassador Cummings' office, that were slanted pro-Castro. These intelligence reports went to all chiefs of mission around the world. And one of them...
back in 1959 or 1960, was brought to my attention by the Naval Attache in Mexico City and was so pro-Castro that I wrote Ambassador Cummings and asked for an explanation. Something like three months went by before I received a reply. I received a four-page reply, which tried to excuse these reports, saying they came through some young members of the Research and Intelligence Unit of the Department of State who were writing these reports, that they would watch it more carefully.

Senator Cotton. Subsequent to that conversation on the plane, did you ever see or have contact with or more exchange or intercourse whatsoever with Mr. Wieland?

Mr. Hill. I never paid any attention to him again.

Senator Cotton. Did you ever see him again?

Mr. Hill. I might have seen him in the corridors of the Department of State, but he avoided me like the bubonic plague.

Senator Cotton. After that conference, did you have any further opportunity, or, to your knowledge, did Mr. Leddy or the Colonel, Colonel Clawe, have any opportunity or chance to talk further with Dr. Milton Eisenhower on that subject?

Mr. Hill. I think that I saw Dr. Eisenhower again in September of 1960. He was with us in Mexico. I had given up then. It was a waste of time. He was there. I had already made up my mind to resign and come back to the United States;
I was wasting my time. And I was losing Mexico in the process; I could not hold it.

Senator Cotton. Did Dr. Eisenhower ever refer to that incident to you again?

Mr. Hill. No.

Senator Keating. Was not that September 1959? May I interrupt?

Mr. Hill. You were down -- were you not down in --

Senator Keating. I was there when he was not. It was not this year, it was last year.

Mr. Hill. No, I am speaking, did we not have the 100th Anniversary meeting September, last fall? Yes, when Senator Dodd came down and your good self, and the Congressman from Texas.

Senator Keating. I guess you are right; I am wrong.

Mr. Hill. Governor Herter was there, and you remember there was some difficult moments because of what happened in Mexico. But I do not recall mentioning it to Dr. Eisenhower.

Chairman Eastland. Mr. Ambassador, you say that you were losing Mexico in the process. What do you mean by that?

Mr. Hill. I mean, Mr. Chairman, we are Anglo-Saxons. Latins are very different. They watch the Anglo-Saxon very carefully, and if they see any element of weakness, they will take advantage of it. This could never be made public, gentlemen, if you publish any document, because it would
jeopardize our relations to have any former official to make such a statement. But it is true. When they saw the United States allow Castro to come into power, it revived old hatreds in Mexico of the United States. But remember, the burning issue in Mexico today is the fact that they lost one third of their territory to the United States in the war of 1846 and 1848. The Communists, for years, have been trying to split Mexico away from the United States, for obvious reasons. So with the United States showing no leadership in Latin America and allowing Castro in power, it encouraged the leftists, it encouraged the nationalists, it encouraged the communists to start to pull away from the United States, to move toward a neutral position. And I could see, as I told the Secretary of State, our vacillations and our weaknesses undermining the previous strong position that we had in Mexico because of the respect for President Eisenhower and the wish of the former President of Mexico, Cortinas, to maintain good relations with the United States.
Lopez Mateos, by training, was sympathetic to the Castro cause. When he saw the United States allow Castro to thrive and the United States assist in putting Castro power, it encouraged Lopez Mateos, in my opinion, to take certain, make certain moves, regarding foreign investments of the United States and certain moves in the United Nations, and the Organization of American States which have been contrary to their previous position in dealing with the United States.

Now, I respectfully request that this part not be published.

Chairman Eastland. Yes, sir. That will be protected.

Mr. Ambassador, Mr. Wieland, and I hope that counsel will correct me now if I misquote him, has stated under oath to this Committee that he knew Castro was a Communist and had always opposed his rise to power in Cuba.

Is that correct?

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, the record would speak. I am not sure that Mr. Wieland said he knew him as a Communist. He said he knew he had Communist leanings, and knew he was surrounded by Communists.

Chairman Eastland. Would you care to comment on that?

He said he had always opposed his rise to power.

Mr. Sourwine. He did, yes.

Mr. Hill. If he said that to this Committee under oath, I am saying also under oath that if he knew that, he should have
pointed it out to Dr. Eisenhower.

Chairman Eastland. The point is he took the opposite position to Dr. Eisenhower --

Mr. Hill. That is correct.

Chairman Eastland. (continuing) -- that Castro was not a Communist --

Mr. Hill. That is correct.

Chairman Eastland. (continuing) -- and he was defending Castro and defending his rise to power in Cuba.

Mr. Hill. That is correct.

Mr. Sourwine. I had a few questions --

Mr. Hill. While this is still in my mind, I think it was December 2, 1958, the day after President Lopez Mateo assumed power. I was riding in the car with Secretary Dulles, and Mr. Rubottom, to the airport when Secretary Dulles turned to Rubottom and said:

"I am very, very concerned about the situation in Cuba, Dick. We have to do something. Is there not someone that can talk to Batista?"

Mr. Dulles said, "Why do we not call upon Ambassador Portuando, my old friend who was former Ambassador to the United Nations from Cuba?"

He said, "I have a high regard for him; he is anti-Communist, a personal friends of mine, a man I admire."

I recall Secretary Rubottom saying, "Mr. Secretary, he is
a very fine man, but Mr. Wieland feels that Mr. Portuando had been a party to the actions that have taken place in Cuba which have led to the difficulties of Batista, closely associated with Batista, and that he would not be the man to have any conversations with Batista, because they have had a falling out."

Mr. Dulles said, "Well, we must do something. We have got to send a missionary to Cuba to talk with Batista to see if we can get him to make an orderly retreat from his office so that we can try to bring about a democratic government or a responsible government in Cuba."

At that time, you will recall Secretary Dulles was dying of cancer and he was a very sick man. Before he got on the plane, I went to him and I said:

"I do not care what Mr. Wieland said. I have no respect for Wieland. I believe that Portuando is all that you say and he might possibly be of help to the United States in going down and having a heart to heart talk with Batista."

The Secretary said, "I shall give some more thought to it."

Senator Hruska. Who was it said that to the Secretary?

Mr. Hill. I did.

Chairman Eastland. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record)

Chairman Eastland. You testified that you had a very
high regard for Mr. Rubottom.

Mr. Hill. That is correct.

Chairman Eastland. Would you explain it, in the light of your other testimony?

Mr. Hill. I have lived in Washington, off and on, for 20 years. After the war, I worked for W.R. Grace and Company in New York. I had occasion to go to the State Department performing some of my duties for W.R. Grace and Company many times. During those years, 1949 to 1953, I had occasion to meet Mr. Rubottom socially. I met Tom Mann at that time. They were considered bright young officers in the Department of State. I liked Mr. Rubottom and I respected Mr. Mann for his abilities.

When I was Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, one day I was in the office of Herbert Hoover, Jr. John Hollister was then Director of the International Cooperation Administration, and he was present, and Loy Henderson.

Mr. Hoover was a personal friend of mine, and he turned to me and said:

"Bob, John Hollister wants to send Dick Rubottom to Korea. He has done an outstanding job in Madrid as Economic Counsel of the Embassy, and Director of the ICA program."

He said, "What do you think of him?"

I said, "Mr. Hoover, he is a fine gentleman, and John Lodge has told me he has done a great job in Spain. But do not send him to Korea."
Mr. Hoover asked, "Why?"

I said, "He is a young man with a family of children. It means he cannot take his wife with him, he cannot take the children. He has had a great deal of experience in Latin America. Why send someone who has spent most of his career in Spanish-speaking countries to Korea?"

Loy Henderson, I believe, at the time, "I think Bob has a point."

The next time I heard of Rubottom, Henry Holland brought him back to the Department of State as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. It was at the time Henry Holland was phasing out of his position as Secretary of State.

I believe in ambition and Dick Rubottom has ambition and his wife has ambition. Finally, Henry Holland, when he resigned, went to Mr. Dulles with several names that he thought should succeed him as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. I think one of them was a chap named -- well, it is the man that headed the International Development Program, from Ohio -- Brand -- I can get the name for you later. Tom Mann was one of the names, Dick Rubottom was one of the names.

When I went to Mexico, Dick Rubottom was named Assistant Secretary of State. Then I saw a great deal of him -- not so much in the office as I did at Embassy functions around the city when we had occasion to fraternize after you finished
your work at the Department of State.

In addition to that, Dick Rubottom is a lay preacher, and I have done some preaching myself. We belonged -- not belonged, but used to attend some international Christian Fellowship breakfasts together. I think you men in the Senate have a club here. Oftentimes, Dick would give the prayer on a Sunday morning.

I knew he was a Christian.

As far as his knowledge of Latin America is concerned, he has been exposed to Latin America. But remember, gentlemen, you do not get ahead in the Department of State if you stick your neck out. No one that is presently holding an important position that I know if that is a career officer, will gamble by taking a strong stand.

Chairman Eastland. Do you think he was influenced -- now, he was Wieland's superior.

Mr. Hill. I am coming to that, sir. Excuse me.

Chairman Eastland. All right, sir.
Mr. Hill. When he was Assistant Secretary of State, he picked his staff or he had a staff already there. He brought certain people back and he sort of ran it like a military office. I mean, if a man had the responsibility for the Caribbean or Mexico, he said Castro should be in power, Rubottom was apt to take the advice of his subordinates. Of course, he was always very cautious in his relations with Dr. Eisenhower.

Now, I do not know whether Dr. Eisenhower entered into the Cuban situation or not. But I do think he was influenced by his subordinates.

Chairman Eastland. But you do think that Wieland was the architect of the overthrow of Batista?

Mr. Hill. I think he was one of them.

Chairman Eastland. And installing Castro.

Mr. Hill. I think he was one of them, and I think John Dreier was another.

I will say right at this point this question of the problem you men are searching and seeking into as to how these disasters in foreign policy can continue, what is behind it, I have thought about it for a long time. Who is the mysterious fellow who brings this about? I can say to this Committee that I think one witness you should call here, if I may make a suggestion, is the present Ambassador to Ireland, Scott McLeod. When I was Assistant Secretary, Scott was in charge
of security. As he left for Dublin, he said to me one day:

"I have a list of about 75 fellows that I cannot clear on security grounds. But the Secretary of State has overruled me."

I would be most interested to see that published some day, to see if any of these fellows that had anything to do with Castro's coming into power were on Mr. McLeod's list.

I spent about an hour with J. Edgar Hoover the other day. I had some business with him, and when I left, I told him that I might be called before the Committee, and the Director told:

"Well, you have an obligation to tell the truth and present facts."

He said, "I know you will do that."

"But," he said, "I shall tell you of my experience. We consistently reported to the Department of State for years information of communist affiliation and association of the Castro brothers. We knew he was a pervert. We sent these reports to the Department of State. Much to my surprise, after the situation became so dangerous and the President became very concerned about what had happened in Cuba, I was asked to come and talk with Mr. Herter. He said he had not seen one single report that I had sent to the Department of State."

He said, "I was shocked. He called me the next day and said:
"Mr. Hoover, I apologize. I have read some of these reports and did not realize the situation was so serious."

I ask you, gentlemen, what happened to the reports? What happened to my reports?

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know, Mr. Hill?

Mr. Hill. I do not. But I will accept the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's word that Mr. Herter said he had not seen them until Mr. Hoover brought them to his attention. Now, how can you make policy on Cuba unless these reports from the field are being submitted to the high officials in the State Department?

I want this Committee to know that I was neither briefed nor debriefed before going to Mexico and on my return from Mexico. You men be the judge about whether or not I have been considered to know something about Latin America.

Mr. Sourwine. You mean when you came back from that job, you were not asked about your impressions or the knowledge that you should pass on?

Mr. Hill. I was asked nothing, and the newspapers had been referring to me in a rather complimentary fashion about knowledge and experience in Latin America. I was not debriefed when I came back from El Salvador. Yet I was sent to El Salvador by the President, and I have a letter signed by Secretary Dulles saying I was being sent to El Salvador to backstop Ambassador Norman Armour in Guatemala because of my
long experience in Latin American affairs. I think it is incredible that an Ambassador be sent to a post as important as Mexico and not be briefed.

Senator Cotton. Has it been your impression that that is the attitude toward other non-career Ambassadors?

Mr. Hill. Yes, sir.

Senator Cotton. All of them?

Mr. Hill. I would not say all of them. But I know some that have had similar experiences.

Senator Cotton. But would you say that is the usual attitude toward non-career employees?

Mr. Hill. I could not answer as to all of them. I know one or two who have had the same experience. One or two political appointees have asked to be debriefed for their own protection.

Senator Cotton. Mr. Chairman, may I have one minute, because I may have to leave?

Chairman Eastland. Certainly.

Senator Cotton. I would like to put into the record of this Subcommittee as a member of this Subcommittee the fact that, as Junior Senator from New Hampshire, I am very proud that former Ambassador Hill has responded to the subpoena to come before this Subcommittee. I take a great deal of pride in the presentation he has made.

I have known Bob Hill since he was, well, in college, I
think. I have known his father and his mother and his brothers. He grew up in the county in which I reside. It is unnecessary to say to this Committee, but I take pride in saying, that Robert Hill has the complete confidence of everyone who knows him. His integrity, his loyalty, his fearlessness, as well as his tact and ability, have long been recognized. He has come in here today and some things that might be construed as hitting at some rather important people in the political party to which I belong, and Administration which I supported and which he supported. It is characteristic that he would tell this Committee the facts and his opinions regardless of where the chips might fall. And if Senator Bridges my senior colleague, were here, he would, I know, corroborate what I have to say, and that is that I want to go on record as assuring my colleagues on this Committee that for many, many years of association with Robert Hill, we have complete, implicit confidence in the utter simplicity and stark truth of anything he testifies before us.

Mr. Hill. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman Eastland. Well, I am certainly sure you are right.

Mr. Hill. Gentlemen, I do not want to delay you any longer. If you would be interested in an off the record five minutes, I don't think this should be put in the record, although at such time as you want it in the record, I am prepared to come forward. But it may not be germane.
Senator Hruska. It was about a year ago that there was a meeting of the Organization of American States. Was that in Costa Rica or El Salvador?

Mr. Hill. There was a meeting of the Organization of American States, sir, in Chile.

Senator Hruska. That was with reference to Castro and the Dominican Republic?

Mr. Hill. And there was considerable praise for that meeting. But all it was was a get-together meeting so that the Foreign Ministers of Latin America could meet the new Secretary of State. But it was called to discuss the Castro issue.

Then they met again in Costa Rica, and that is when they condemned Trujillo, but did not have the courage to condemn the menace in the Caribbean, Communism and Castro.

Senator Hruska. Then did they not have a meeting in Costa Rica?

Mr. Hill. No.

Senator Hruska. Then you would have --

Mr. Hill. It was a very important meeting; a very important meeting. But as a result, it was a disaster.

Senator Hruska. I am speaking of the results, rather than the importance of the occasion.

Mr. Hill. The opportunity for us to do something about Castro was great.
Senator Hruska. But the fruits of that meeting were meager?

Mr. Hill. In my opinion, it was a disaster. Once again, remember, gentlemen, I am a member of the Republican party and I am proud to call President Eisenhower a friend, and he has been kind to me. Secretary Dulles has been like a father. Nothing I am saying is aimed at these two men. They had grave responsibilities. But the disaster in Latin America unfolded, it started earlier than President Eisenhower being in power, because the Communists have been at work in Latin America since the end of World War II -- very active, but during this eight-year period many things have happened.
Moving back to the Costa Rica meeting once again, the cry was out to get rid of Trujillo, and we were going to appease Betancourt in Venezuela, Figueroa in Coast Rica and Munoz Marin.

But let me ask you. Has Trujillo caused anyone but Betancourt any difficulties? It makes me laugh to see news items about Trujillo trying to bump off Betancourt. How many times have Betancourt and Figueroa tried to bump off Trujillo? The record shows they killed Somozo in Nicaragua. We embarrassed a man who has supported us, but we did not have the courage to condemn a man who has caused all the trouble in Latin America, Castro.

Chairman Eastland. We did not even condemn the man who has been a cause of a great deal of trouble in the United States.

Mr. Hill. This business of an embrazo for a democrat and a handshake for a dictator has caused so much talk among Latin Americans that we are a laughing stock south of the border.

Senator Hruska. In that connection, Mr. Chairman, I do feel if there will be any disposition on the part of the Subcommittee to release this testimony at any time, that Mr. Hill should be given ample opportunity to go over it and make such deletions or corrections or additions as he deems wise for purposes of publication.

Chairman Eastland. Oh, certainly.
Mr. Hill. Could I tell you a story, Mr. Chairman? It will take me five minutes.

Chairman Eastland. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Sourwine. You spoke, Mr. Hill, of former Ambassador Smith having, signed his death warrant when he took an anti-Castro position. I understand you to mean his political death warrant or his diplomatic death warrant?

Mr. Hill. His diplomatic death warrant.

Mr. Sourwine. You did not mean he put his life in danger?

Mr. Hill. No.

Senator Hruska. His effectiveness ceased as of that moment?

Mr. Hill. Yes. Poor Smith is -- he is being ridiculed in the press. I feel sorry for this fellow, Smith, to tell you the truth. He is a nice fellow. He told me at the White House, when I was there, the last time I saw him, when Lopez Mateos was in the United States on a state visit, the Ambassador was there and George Gardner and his wife were invited. I had not know him except by reputation.

Smith came up to me and was in an alarmed state of affairs. He said:

"My reputation is being destroyed."

He said, "Bob, you know who the fellows are, as I do, who were responsible for the rise in power."
He said, "You know what Bonsal told me the other day?"

This was in October of 1959. He said, "He described Castro as an immature Franklin Roosevelt," and he said, "I gasped."

I mean, this thing is an incredible series of events. This is 1959, describing Castro as an immature Franklin Roosevelt.

Chairman Eastland. You think we have had one diplomatic disaster after another since the war? And that it is being played up to the American people as diplomatic victories? Is that your opinion?

Mr. Hill. That is my opinion, and I want this Committee to understand that politics do not enter into this statement. I hate to admit this is true, but it is true.

Chairman Eastland. Of course, that includes both Republican and Democratic Administrations.

Mr. Hill. That is correct.

Senator Hruska. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Sourwine. May I ask a question off the record, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Eastland. Certainly.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Sourwine. On the record, Mr. Chairman.

You spoke of a pro-Castro cell in the United States Embassy in Havana?
Mr. Hill. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. The word, "pro-Castro," when you used that, were you speaking of people who are Castro agents, or simply Americans who favored the Castro view?

Mr. Hill. Americans who are favorable to Castro.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any knowledge of this?

Mr. Hill. I have no knowledge. I saw the cable and I saw the high priority. The man who showed it to me tried to pledge me to secrecy on it, and I said, "I am awfully sorry; you took the liberty to show me the cable, and if I ever have an opportunity, I will say that I read it."

Mr. Sourwine. I ask this question because the Committee has information that the Castro people in Havana used to boast that they got information from our Embassy. We have been told by departmental sources that they had reports about that all the time, and I wondered if this stemmed back to this pro-Castro cell you were talking about.

Mr. Hill. We continuously heard the same reports in Mexico. We have had responsible Cubans come to the Embassy, like Marquis Sterling, one or two others that I can furnish the names of, and said, "You have a leak in your Embassy in Havana."

We said, "Gentlemen, this is not the place to make your report. We have officials in the Embassy in Havana who have been cleared for security and we cannot accept any information
here. We suggest you tell this to the Director of the FBI, and we shall make arrangements for you to tell him."

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have and could you furnish the Committee a copy of your letter to Rubottom with regard to the minutes of the Ambassadors' meeting?

Mr. Hill. No, for this reason. I had to sign a piece of paper before I left Mexico that I was not carrying any classified documents away from the post. What I did was this. I took my files, which are voluminous, which would support anything I said to this Committee today. I listed the date and the classification and the number that we have. But the strange thing is that I spent 14 hours going through my files, and it is not there. I do not know what has happened to it. I am still looking. But if I have that, I will submit it to the Committee, Mr. Chairman, with your permission.

Chairman Eastland. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Hill. Because that is the identification of what we sent to Washington.

Chairman Eastland. This is reports of what existed presumably should exist today?

Mr. Hill. That is correct.

Chairman Eastland. Did Mr. Wieland ever visit the in Mexico?

Mr. Hill. Yes, sir.

Chairman Eastland. Was he a guest there?
Mr. Hill. He was a guest at the receptions we had at the Embassy.

Chairman Eastland. Did he ever live at the Embassy?

Mr. Hill. No, sir, I would not have him in the house over night.

Chairman Eastland. Why not?

Mr. Hill. He is a fellow that drinks too much, talks too much. He is someone I do not have confidence in.

Senator Cotton. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Hill. I knew Wieland was one of the pro-Castroites in the Department of State and I did not want to associate with him. I was warned to have no conversation with him because he would take it and use it against you.

Mr. Sourwine. I have three questions that have been asked other witnesses, sir.

Are you aware of the security problem which is presented in government by homosexuality?

Mr. Hill. I am.

Mr. Sourwine. Have you any knowledge as to whether this problem exists, and if so, how serious it is in the State Department?

Mr. Hill. I am aware of the problem. When I left to go to Mexico, Mr. McLeod once again told me that the list was now over 1,400 members of the Foreign Service that have been severed
for homosexual tendencies and Lesbian tendencies. That was in 1957. That is over 1,400.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you ever have experience with this problem in your own Embassy?

Mr. Hill. Yes, sir, in Mexico City we had the problem. We had a security officer named Ken Knoff. I had been in Mexico about three weeks, and he came to me and said:

"Mr. Ambassador, I have been on the trail of a homosexual in Tokyo, in Manila, and now he is here in Mexico. I just want you to know about it, because I am trying desperately to catch him."

(11)
He said, "If we catch him it may lead us to something we have been on the trail of for a long time."

I said, "Tell me, Ken, how are you approaching it?"

"Well," he said, "I am trying to gain his confidence."

I said, "I am aware of how these fellows operate because I have been in the foreign service and have come up against it. Has he invited you to his apartment?"

He said, "Yes; I would not dare go there."

I said, "The next time he invites you, why do you not go?"

He said, "It is a pretty good idea."

He went to the apartment on the invitation of the officer he had been trailing in Tokyo and in Manila. Within ten minutes after he went in the room, he was accosted by this officer. He grabbed him. He confessed on six others in the Embassy, and they were fired and Knoff was promoted and sent to Austria. He hooked seven of them just by going to his apartment. It happened in Mexico City.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know Mr. Robert Lee?

Mr. Hill. Who?

Mr. Sourwine. Robert Lee.

Mr. Hill. No, sir, not to my knowledge.

Mr. Sourwine. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Eastland. Any further questions, Gentlemen?

Mr. Hill. Let me tell you another problem that comes to my mind. When I went to Mexico, there was a fellow named
Stepansky; to spell it I think it is S-T-E-P-A-N-S-K-Y.

He was considered an authority on labor relations. One of the first things that happened to me on my arrival in Mexico was that [ ] came to me and said, "Do not trust Stepansky."  

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

The FBI man came to me and said, "Do not trust Stepansky."

The political officer came to me and said, "Do not trust Stepansky."

Then I said, "Why do we have Stepansky in Mexico City?"

They said, "Well, he is under investigation."

Stepansky was finally moved a short time after I arrived in Mexico City. As a matter of fact, at the time they were warning me, he had received his orders to move.

Chairman Eastland. He was under investigation for what?

Mr. Hill. For subversive activities. He went back to Washington, and we found, at least the CIA informed me, that Stepansky had taken the confidential biographical file of the President of Mexico, Lopez Mateos, and made it available to Lopez Mateos, so Lopez Mateos knew exactly what was in the record regarding him.

The CIA showed me a picture of supposedly Stepansky entering the Soviet Embassy. All this material went to Washington.

FBI agents and security officers came and talked to personnel in Mexico City. Stepansky was holding down the position
as labor attaché for all of Latin America. Exhaustive investigation took place. Nothing happened. I am told that one officer, now the Ambassador in Burma, Mr. William Snow, personally appeared before the Security Board and testified to the reliability of Mr. Stepansky. Yet I can present just as reliable witnesses, if not more reliable witnesses, that will tell the story of Stepansky.

Do you not think that a man should be reprimanded if it is proven that he has given confidential information to the President of Mexico?

Chairman Eastland. Oh, certainly.

You say they had his picture going into the Soviet Embassy?

Mr. Hill. They have a picture that is supposedly Stepansky. It is not very clear. The sent it on to Washington, and I do not know the outcome, but I do know that Stepansky was spending more time getting left wingers visas to the United States than he was doing his job in Mexico.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Hill, you spoke earlier of a number of homosexuals in India that you ran into there. Do you know the identities of any of those people?

Mr. Hill. Well, the blowup came through a fellow named my roommate, a graduate of Cornell University, and from the family out in your part of the
world, Senator Hruska.

Senator Hruska. 

Mr. Hill. 

I not only beat him up, but his roommate, a fellow named from down in Virginia. It is my understanding that he was later dismissed from the Foreign Service.

They used to have Sunday meeting, to which I was invited -- I was a bachelor at the time -- given by a fellow named At those meetings, these young fellows would go and then get in bed with I went over there one day and there were four or five of them from the Consulate in bed with the; has been dismissed.

But as a young fellow coming out of New Hampshire, traveling 14,000 miles away from home, running into this situation, it caused me to raise my eyebrows.

Chairman Eastland. You say when you went to San Salvador, the wife of one of the officials in the Embassy got drunk and fell on the floor and barked like a dog?

Mr. Hill. No, she got down on the floor and barked like a dog.

Chairman Eastland. In the presence of people from that country?

Mr. Hill. Yes.

Senator Hruska. Was this on your first assignment there?
Mr. Hill. Yes.

Senator Hruska. What was your capacity?

Mr. Hill. Ambassador.

Senator Cotton. You said that was your first night there as Ambassador?

Mr. Hill. That is right, and I received a cable from Managua, from Ambassador Whelan, saying, "I am sorry to report your wife was dead drunk in my Embassy. She passed through Managua and you had better watch out."

Senator Cotton. What did you do about it?

Mr. Hill. I did not have enough horsepower to do anything about it at the time. But he was brought back to Washington some months later, and he is. I am told that his wife has gotten hold of herself.

I do not wish her any ill will or harm. She had a problem in those days. I do not see why, in a hundred countries that we have representatives around the world, we cannot have representatives that represent the United States, that can go out and conduct themselves as ladies and gentlemen, and put the best foot forward of the United States.

In Mexico City, within ten days after I arrived, the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps came to me and said, "I want to register a protest."

It is not very pleasant to this young lady present.
I said, "Mr. Ambassador, what is the problem?"

He said, "I am officially here in behalf of the Corps to complain about your second Secretary, who is having an affair with the [BLANK] wife."

I said, "You mean [BLANK]"

He said, "Yes. Charming fellow. But he goes to Cuernavaca at night and stays with [BLANK] and it is common knowledge in the Diplomatic Corps. It is very embarrassing."

I called in [BLANK] and he said it was not true.

The next thing I knew the FBI came to me and said [BLANK] was on the way to New Orleans transporting marijuana cigarettes with a double-gaited bullfighter impresario, and what not, odd, queer, and that their son was traveling with them and they were going to try to catch them with the marijuana coming into New Orleans.

To my knowledge they did not catch them.

I said [BLANK] is done. I called him into my office. He gave his confession and told of 21 intimacies with the [BLANK] wife.

He was brought back to Washington. This is not how to become popular in the Department of State, to do things like this. His pay was docked for ten days, and he was then promoted to Consul for Political Affairs in [BLANK] number one man in the Political Section in [BLANK] where he is today.
Mr. Sourwine. But he did have a ten day suspension.

Mr. Hill. Yes, he lost ten days' pay. But think of the situation that brought about the ten day suspension.

Senator Cotton. He was at least normal.

Mr. Hill. Yes. The lady is now deceased, and that would be embarrassing, but it is common knowledge in Mexico. The Ambassador is my personal friend, so I hope nothing will be done to embarrass him. His wife has passed away; she had a cerebral hemorrhage.

Why do these things happen, gentlemen?

Mr. Sourwine. May I respectfully suggest, Mr. Chairman, that this record today be classified secret?

Our executive sessions are always classified confidential.

Chairman Eastland. Off the record.

Mr. Sourwine. Will you classify the record as secret?

Chairman Eastland. Oh, sure.

Mr. Sourwine. All right, Mr. Hill.

Mr. Hill. This is a report that Chester Bowles and Robert Kennedy asked me if I would be willing to prepare, regarding the Latin American situation; to sum up my recommendations, 23 in toto, and under four principal heads:

1. Improve the caliber of Foreign Service personnel in Latin America and raise the level of key officials in the Department of State to ambassadorial and ministerial
2. Rotate Foreign Service personnel more widely between Europe and Latin America.

3. Raise their Spanish and Portuguese language skills by a new program which includes incentives, and reinstitute the Spanish Language School in Mexico City or some other appropriate place.

4. Administer personnel with firmer discipline and enforce respect for all ambassadors, whether career or political appointees.

5. Recognize the difference in policy requirements and priorities for each Latin American country.

6. Create a group mechanism for advance preparation of basic policies in order to avoid a recurrence of foreign policy by crisis.

7. Stop distinguishing between so-called democratic and dictatorial regimes as a basis for policy.

8. Coordinate the intelligence services more closely with the policy-making level of the Department of State, gearing together what must be done about our number one problem, the Communist Castro movement.

9. Suppose our Latin American armed forces at reasonable levels and improve their capabilities to maintain domestic order.

10. Update the relationship of these forces to current
military concepts.

You understand, these countries, the only way you can control them is through the military. It is the police system.

11. Bring Canada into the Inter-American System and broaden the function of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to include Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere. That is so Cuba cannot play Canada off against the United States, as they are doing at the present time. There is a seat in the Organization of American States for Canada, and it has been vacant for years.

12. Appoint a strong representative with the rank of ambassador with the Organization of American States, and resist the trend to supersede the Organization of the American States by the United Nations.

13. Study the proposal for an Inter-American defense force as a means to preserve peace in Latin America. That is Senator Smathers' proposal.

14. Defend vigorously the $10 billion of United States investments left in Latin America.

15. Coordinate our economic assistance with political objectives, eliminate dreams of buying Latin American friendship.

16. Adopt controls to eliminate grafting by Latin
American officials in connection with our economic aid.

17. Assist agrarian reform while channeling any financing by United States to private banking institutions.

18. Undertake a broad review of Latin American needs, planning in advance the general role the United States may play.

19. Examine critically the effectiveness of the ICA programs.

20. Weigh the USIA performance and take action to improve it.
21. Use our influence to revise the tax laws. Few people in the know in Latin America pay the full extent of their taxes.

22. Utilize the vast sources of information of Americans residing in Latin America. They are anxious to help their country, but receive little in guidance and encouragement.

23. Consider the establishment of a Foreign Service Academy, not based on scholastic achievements alone.

Mr. Sourwine. To whom were these recommendations made?

Mr. Hill. They were given to Robert Kennedy, at the request of President Jack Kennedy.

Mr. Sourwine. When was this?

Mr. Hill. I spoke to Governor Bowles and Robert Kennedy at a luncheon I was invited to in January, 1961.

Mr. Sourwine. Would you want to offer the whole paper for this Committee's use?

Mr. Hill. Yes, sir. It is the only one I have.

Mr. Sourwine. It can be returned to you.

May we do that, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Eastland. Oh, sure. You can get it photostated and return it to him in a very little time.

Mr. Sourwine. We shall do that.

Referring to the man who received a 10-day suspension and went back to work at a higher grade, the Committee has received
statements respecting members of the Foreign Service who had been caught in affairs with NKVD women, and yet were permitted to remain in the Service. Do you have any knowledge of any such instance?

Mr. Hill. I only have knowledge of two instances, one involving _______ and _______ in Moscow. I had the unpleasant task, as Assistant Secretary of State, to have to come to the Senate and discuss it with Lyndon Johnson and with Senator Bridges.

Then the matter was handled at a higher level than myself, and I do not know the circumstances. But allegations were made against _______ and _______ from Moscow, returned to Washington, and I saw the photographs, because Mr. Hoover showed them to me.

He lived in the residence of the Ambassador in Moscow, and evidently they have an infra-red camera -- the Russians -- and he was photographed in a compromising position with a Russian maid. Then he was hauled in by the NKVD, and they said, "Squeal and squawk, we are going to release these."

He ran for the airport and came back here. It is a very muddled case, but it caused some concern, the _______ incident and the instance in Moscow.

Mr. Dulles took it over, and I do not know the outcome, or whether these allegations are true against _______ or not,
Mr. Sourwine. Are they still in the Service?

Mr. Hill. Ambassador [ ] I believe, is Ambassador in [ ] He is a personal friend of mine, and I met him many years ago, about the time he went out to [ ] with George Marshall.

He has a brilliant career in the Service. I just had to be the one who had to take the photostats up to the Capitol and was allowed to read them. I cannot judge whether it was a true story or blackmail.

Mr. Sourwine. What was the nature of the charge, specifically, against Ambassador [ ]?

Mr. Hill. An anonymous letter was mailed, I think from Bonn, Germany -- marked Cairo, Egypt, but mailed from Bonn -- to President Eisenhower, making allegations. The Department of State showed the man sending allegations was a Communist.

It got into a DeCourcy report in London, which is a financial paper that goes out to international financiers around the world, that the United States position in Egypt was being compromised because our Ambassador was being blackmailed by Nasser. A Senator from New York -- I think Senator Lehman at the time -- was going on the floor of the Senate to expose this whole allegation in the DeCourcy papers. So what we had in the Department of State I rushed up to the Capitol with, and Senator Lehman did not make this speech, and later
I saw that Ambassador [redacted] was transferred to [redacted], and later to [redacted].

It is the type of thing that does happen in the Service. The Russians and Communists are always trying to find areas to blackmail American diplomats. You fellows know, in this business, you can blackmail anybody, if that is what you have your mind made up to do.

Ofttimes, if a man is guilty, he is easy to blackmail.

Mr. Sourwine. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Cotton. Mr. Chairman, I cannot help calling the Chair's attention to the fact -- I think we very wisely agreed to leave one certain story that has been told here to consider in executive session. But to me, the most impressive statement -- I mean personally -- one of the most impressive statements that Mr. Hill has made is not on the record.

I do not think there is any reason why it should not be on. If the record is going to be sent down to the President of the United States for such information he is going to get from it, I think it should be on.

Chairman Eastland. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Cotton. Mr. Chairman, I am wondering if Ambassador Hill would put into the record, if he recalls it, a statement he made about our policy in Latin America which was a part of a statement which is not, up to this point, on the record.
Mr. Hill. I would be very happy to, Mr. Chairman.

I commented that unfortunately, there were officials in our Government and newspapers in the United States that were sounding the bell that all dictators in Latin American must go. We saw evidence of an attempt by Latin American countries to overthrow Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. The newspapers often refer to the necessity for more liberalization in the governments of Nicaragua and Paraguay. I can only give you the benefit of my 12 years in Latin America, that there is no such thing as a democratic government south of the Rio Grande, according to our standards; that knowing Latins that are acquaintances and friends of mine, they have thought it was a very damaging position for the United States to fall into the trap of trying to see that the countries become more democratic, and that we encourage the overthrow of dictators.

Because it is generally considered in Latin America that there is not a democratic government from Mexico to Argentina, according to the United States standards.

The control of governments in Latin America is primarily through the power and influence of the military. Now, when you make public statements that you will give an embrazo to a democrat and a handshake to a dictator, all you will be doing is shaking hands with dictators in Latin America.

Now, you have heard a great deal about democratic Costa Rica. I served there. They are moving towards democracy, a
democratic form of government.

You hear about the democracy and democratic form of government in Uruguay. But they are far from the democratic type of government we know in the United States. And when you overthrow a democratic government in Costa Rica or Nicaragua or the Dominican Republic, when you go so far as to overthrow the dictator, you must have a man who is going to succeed these men, or you will put three Castros in power. It is as simple as that.

We are the laughing stock of knowing people in South American for falling into this fallacy that dictators must go.

I will cite an example. Is anyone calling for Charles de Gaulle's overthrow. It is one of the tightest dictatorships in Europe. But look at what Charles de Gaulle has done in France.

They are yelling for the scalp of Salazar and for the scalp of Franco. But what would happen to Spain and Portugal if they did not have strong men at the top in this critical hour in our history? It is utter nonsense to talk of overthrowing these dictators.

Chairman Eastland. I certainly agree with you.

Senator Hruska. It is in direct contradiction of our alleged policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of these various governments.

Mr. Hill. If you assist in the overthrow, as we have
done as a result of the Costa Rican meeting, in trying to
drive Trujillo from power -- I am not defending Trujillo --
and you have not a plan of putting a strong democratic leader
in in the Dominican Republic, you have chaos.

Senator Hruska. However, there is some distinction in
that case, inasmuch as that was the action of the Organization
of American States and not of our country?

Mr. Hill. Led by Romano Betancourt, the President of
Venezuela, who has had a personal vendetta with Trujillo for
years.

Chairman Eastland. Are there any further questions,
gentlemen? If not, that will be all.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 o'clock p.m., the committee adjourned.)