Committee Decisions and Covert Action Plans in Angola – January – October 1975

Secret financial assistance to Holden Roberto was begun in the late 1950's. Not until 1975 was the nature of our covert assistance significantly changed either as to scope or purpose.

January 22, 1975 - The 40 Committee minutes dated 8 January, 1975 state: "Covert support for Holden Roberto was approved in the amount of [redacted] (Tab A). At that time Roberto was receiving a stipend from Angolan liberation movement leaders at a level of [redacted] during 1975 (Tab B). Discussion of the Angola item came up at the very end of the 40 Committee meeting.

June 5, 1975 - CIA on 29 May circulated a proposal for "Covert Financial Support for Angolan Nationalists" (Tab C) and requested a telephonic vote. An AF/HR memorandum to Mr. Sisco recommended deferral of the item pending consideration of an USSM, or alternatively that the Department oppose the proposed funding, (Tab D). At the 40 Committee meeting of 5 June there was a discussion of the situation, but no decisions were made on Angola and no minutes covering this item were issued.

July 5, 1975 - CIA on 29 May circulated a proposal for "Covert Financial Support for Angolan Nationalists" (Tab C) and requested a telephonic vote. An AF/HR memorandum to Mr. Sisco recommended deferral of the item pending consideration of an USSM, or alternatively that the Department oppose the proposed funding, (Tab D). At the 40 Committee meeting of 5 June there was a discussion of the situation, but no decisions were made on Angola and no minutes covering this item were issued.

July 14. With the military balance among the three contending nationalist groups in Angola having shifted in favor of the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation in Angola (MPLA) after a very large influx of arms from the USSR, the 40 Committee met on July 14 to discuss a paper distributed by the CIA (Tab E) outlining plans for providing financial and arms support to the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) led by Holden Roberto and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi. After consultation by the Committee, the subject of covert action in Angola was submitted to higher authority. Mr. Sisco on July 16 forwarded to General Scowcroft a memorandum opposing a major covert operational program (Tab F).

July 18. On July 18 Higher Authority approved the expenditure of up to [redacted] from the CIA Reserve Fund for covert action as presented in the NGO task group paper "Allied Assistance to Angola" which was submitted on [redacted].
July 27. On July 27 Higher Authority approved the full program incorporated in the NSC task group paper, i.e. adding to the already authorized (memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence dated July 28; Tab H).

August 3. At a meeting of the 40 Committee on August 3 it was decided that a task group should be established to deal with the tactical details of approved operations in Angola. Each member of the Committee was to designate a representative for the group, which would be chaired by the CIA. The group was to meet weekly to consider tactics and progress, referring problems to the 40 Committee as necessary (Tab I).

August 21. Following a discussion at a 40 Committee meeting on August 20, Higher Authority approved on August 21 an additional expenditure of from the CIA Reserve Fund, bringing the total authorized to Higher Authority also authorized the DCI to initiate action to obtain an appropriation of for the Reserve Fund in anticipation of continuing operational requirements (Tab J).

September 13. The 40 Committee, after reviewing a CIA paper on Angola and Cabinda, approved several specific positions, including dispatch of more modern American arms into Angola, as necessary; training of Angolans by Americans outside of Angola; recruitment of non-American trainers/advisers for service in Angola; and avoiding encouraging Mobutu to send his own troops into Cabinda, but cooperating with him in arming and training a Cabindan contingency force. It was also agreed that if the situation deteriorated, the 40 Committee should be consulted before the Cabindan contingency force is used or Mobutu employed his own troops. The Chairman indicated he would consult Higher Authority on these positions (Tab K).

September 24. Following a request for clarification of the position taken at the 40 Committee meeting on September 13 that was made after the subsequent dispatch by Mobutu of Zairois forces to Angola, an addendum to the previous memorandum was issued. It was noted that we were to continue to advise Mobutu against quick commitments of his forces on the basis of limited intelligence, but that we also were to avoid trying to tie his hands. It was also noted that in his summation of the Committee's position at the meeting on September 23, Director Colby had stressed that if intelligence showed that the situation in Angola were worsening we would not stand in Mobutu's way (Tab L).