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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON D C 20301

FEB 16 1980

Dice
Dear General Ellis

(S) I appreciate the update on your efforts to plan for the implementation of the Nuclear Targeting Policy Review (NTPR) recommendations. I will issue a revision to our current policy for the employment of nuclear weapons in the near future, along the lines of the NTPR recommendations, that will provide definitive guidance and direction to your planning efforts.

(S) After you have had time to review this new policy guidance, I would be glad to discuss with you the translation of this guidance into operational plans. In the meantime, I encourage you to continue the dialogue you have established at the Slocombe-Lawson level. Walt Slocombe and perhaps Bob Komer too intend to visit Offutt in March to discuss with you a number of targeting-related topics associated with the implementation of NTPR recommendations which were approved for action. I view this as an excellent opportunity for a preliminary discussion of points that should be covered at our meeting at a later date.

Harold Brown

General R.H. Ellis
CINCSAC/CC
Offutt AFB
NE 68113

cc: CJCS
Declassify on 15Feb86


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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301 I-35048/80
15 February 1980

R2C

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Nuclear Targeting Policy Review Activities

(U) General Ellis has suggested that you visit JSTPS at Offutt within the next month to discuss Nuclear Targeting Policy Review actions and the translation of policy into operational plans. Attached is a proposed reply, which holds off Ellis until you can review the new draft NUWEP.

~~(C)~~ On 29 January 1979, you directed us to revise the DoD policy for the employment of nuclear weapons (NUWEP). We expect to complete this effort by 1 April 1980. Until you have had a chance to comment and provide your views on the draft revised employment policy, Walt and I feel that it may be premature to discuss implications of the guidance with General Ellis. Let us set the stage first.

(U) To this end, Walt Slocombe is already planning to visit JSTPS at Offutt in March 1980 to discuss the points raised in General Ellis' letter, and others. I may go too, having not been back to SAC in about 20 years. As Ellis mentioned, we have had a continuing dialogue with JSTPS through General Lawson, OJCS/J-5. Therefore we prefer continuing to use this forum to get the job done and see no immediacy in your meeting with General Ellis that cannot be delayed until after the NUWEP is issued.

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

Attachment

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Dear General Ellis

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General R.H. Ellis
CINCSAC/CC
Offutt AFB
NE 68113

cc: CJCS

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE
NEBRASKA
68113

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

8 February 1980

2/11
RTB

Honorable Harold Brown
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr Secretary

(S) In response to the direction contained in your NTPR implementation memorandum of 29 January 1979 to the Chairman, JCS, greater flexibility is being built into the SIOP by applying recommendations of the Nuclear Targeting Policy Review. The current revision of the SIOP (effective 1 October 1979) incorporates a launch under attack option and includes rudimentary building blocks through restructuring of Selected Attack Options (SAOs). The next SIOP revision (effective 1 October 1980) will contain additional attack options which are responsive to your direction on building blocks. For subsequent SIOP revisions (effective 1 October 1981 and beyond) we have developed a new SIOP structure which seeks to place the attack options available to the NCA in a more flexible framework.

(S) Our initial efforts, in accordance with JCS guidance, have been geared to developing the substantial flexibility you addressed in your January 1979 memorandum. These steps are intended to provide the NCA with a flexible range of options that would enable a countervailing strategy to be employed in a selective and measured way. As I indicated in my January report to you, however, implementation of the new targeting policy recommendations may be outpacing our C³ and attack assessment capability. Selection of the appropriate initial response and subsequent responses requires the capability to correctly and rapidly characterize the attack and quickly communicate that decision to the forces. Moreover, the ability to fill shortfalls in the attack or to negotiate termination of hostilities on favorable terms requires a timely assessment of the success of the option selected. Therefore, in order to provide a timely assessment capability, there exists a need for a strike assessment system capable of day/night, all-weather imaging that is survivable in the nuclear environment as well as real time dissemination of strike data to a surviving command element. In short, the

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assessed strengths and weaknesses of our systems as well as the ability of the Soviets to correctly perceive our intentions should be strong considerations in policy determinations regarding development of small scale and building block attack options.

(S) NTPR implementation is one of the highest priority items being worked by both the JSTPS and SAC staffs. Additionally, in view of its complexity and importance, I believe that it is an appropriate area for addressal by the JSTPS Scientific Advisory Group (SAG). As you know, this group is a body of eminent scientists and technical experts who provide advice to the JSTPS on selected SIOP planning matters. The SAG will convene its twenty-sixth meeting on 1 April 1980 here at Offutt. The theme of this meeting is "Targeting Soviet Political and Military Control Networks and Associated Command, Control and Communications" which, as you may recall, received considerable emphasis in the Nuclear Targeting Policy Review. The SAG will examine C³ analyses by various government agencies with the aim of providing an assessment of the Soviet C³ system and how US offensive weapons systems can best be targeted and employed against this system. At the April meeting, I also plan to task the SAG to examine "NTPR Implementation in Light of Current Soviet and US C³ and Assessment Limitations" and to present their preliminary findings at the twenty-seventh SAG meeting this fall.

(S) As we translate desirable policy into hard operational plans, it is becoming possible to assess usefulness and practicality from the decision maker's point of view. We have continued to keep your and the Joint Staffs, at the Slocombe-Lawson level, informed on our progress. But, I believe it is now time for you to evaluate progress and future direction. By the end of this month, the JSTPS will be prepared to present an overview in sufficient detail for you to make necessary judgments. Half a day or less should suffice and, in order to have necessary staff expertise available, I suggest it be accomplished at Offutt.

Respectfully


R. H. ELLIS
General, USAF
Director

Copy to: CJCS

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SD

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON D C 20301

JAN 29 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Implementation of the Nuclear Targeting Study (U)

(S) The purpose of this memorandum is to assign specific tasks for the implementation of selected recommendations contained in the recently completed Nuclear Targeting Policy Review. I want to move as promptly as possible to implement those recommendations of the Targeting Study that are within the purview of the Department of Defense. In this memorandum and the accompanying ones to other DoD offices, the major tasks to be undertaken within DoD, assignments of responsibilities and establishment of a specific schedule of actions are described.

(S) Effective implementation will require close coordination between policy levels in OSD, OJCS, affected Services and others responsible for development and procurement programs necessary to support our employment policy. I am asking the Under Secretary for Policy to assume overall responsibility for coordinating the follow-on work, not only for the nuclear targeting study, but also the closely related PD-18 study of the C I support requirements for the Secure Reserve Force which was addressed in my memorandum of 25 October 1978.

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(S) Under the overall direction of the Under Secretary for Policy, primary responsibility for developing more flexible targeting plans will rest with the JCS; primary responsibility for developing specific programs to enhance endurance will rest with USDRE and PA&E.

(S) As enumerated in the attached implementation instruction, I would like you to proceed at a deliberate pace to carry out the tasks outlined regarding the following:

- Target planning
- Data base development
- Targeting of China
- Launch Under Attack option for ICBMs
- Non-SIOP options and Crisis Management

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(U) I realize that schedules may have to be altered and additional guidance required as the work progresses. I want to be informed whenever you need such guidance or when you believe major changes in the established deadlines are required. In addition I expect your staff to work closely with the Under Secretary for Policy and his staff in resolving day to day problems.

Harold Brown

Attachment
a/s

cc: USD/P
USD/RE
ASD/PA&E

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IMPLEMENTATION INSTRUCTIONS (U)

(S) Our employment policy will make its maximum contribution to deterrence--our basic strategic objective--if our employment policies make a Soviet victory, as seen through Soviet eyes, as improbable as we can make it, independent of Soviet employment policy and of any particular scenario. These plans should include targeting options against Soviet military forces, command and control, and military support that would maximize the threats to the objective targets, while minimizing collateral damage. We should also have a capability to threaten escalation. To lend credibility to a US threat to escalate, we need employment options and supporting capabilities which the Soviets might perceive to be advantageous to us.

(S) Among the most important characteristics that we should build into our strategic plans and capabilities are flexibility and endurance. These characteristics are defined in general terms in the Targeting Study. A precise definition of requirements for flexibility and endurance will be achieved only by developing specific plans and programs, and subjecting these plans and programs to review and discussion followed by subsequent decisions and action. This should be a major focus of the follow-on effort. I want to start this process at once and move forward as rapidly as possible.

(S) To this end I am asking the Under Secretary for Policy, in consultation with the Joint Staff, the Services, the Under Secretary for R&E, and the Assistant Secretary for PA&E to develop a long-range plan for phasing in changes in both operational plans and capabilities for the implementation of a revised employment policy along the lines recommended in the Targeting Study. The purpose of this plan is to assure that operational planning for nuclear forces on the one hand and development and procurement planning on the other move ahead in parallel and that both are consistent with our overall strategic policy. I intend to use this plan as a management tool to monitor the implementation of changes in employment policy. The plan should identify major milestones at which desired adjustments in operational plans (including revised plans for the SRF) and improved capabilities to support these plans can be meshed. I would like to receive an initial version of this long-range plan no later than 31 May 1979.

(S) I recognize that this is a complex task, but it is important that we have an initial plan before the next round of budget decisions is upon us. I expect the revision of our employment policy to be an evolu-

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tionary process, and involve close and more consistent interaction than heretofore between OSD and JCS. The plan will have to be adjusted as we proceed and many of the improvements in planning that are envisioned in the targeting study will have to await improvements in capabilities, particularly C.I. However, the plan should identify what we can do with existing capabilities as well as in the longer-term. To this end, every effort should be made to identify low cost, short leadtime measures that will permit us to improve force endurance as much as possible over the next two years to incorporate greater endurance into strategic planning.

(S) TARGET PLANNING: The Targeting Study describes a building block approach to targeting in general terms (see particularly Annex E). The concept involves developing packages of targets whose destruction would accomplish a specific military, political or economic objective, and being able to combine these packages in different ways to accomplish multiple objectives. Specific damage criteria will be established for each building block on the basis of JCS recommendations. The JCS should flesh out this concept, consulting as necessary with the Under Secretary for Policy and his staff. Annex E of the Targeting Study should be used as a point of departure for the development of building blocks, but the structure outlined in Annex E is intended to be illustrative rather than prescriptive. The objective of the approach is to provide the President with a broader (but still manageable) range of options if he should have to consider execution of the SIOP. I want JCS recommendations as to the best way of implementing this targeting approach, taking into account operational problems involved in developing, coordinating and executing the SIOP. While the goal of the building block approach is greater flexibility, we cannot compromise our ability to execute the full SIOP, if necessary. The first phase of this effort should be based on the existing DIA Automated Installation Intelligence File (AIF) and its Target Date Inventory (TDI) subset. As new data is developed, building blocks may be refined and modified. I hope that we can make some initial changes in plans to incorporate greater flexibility during 1980, and be in a position to make substantial changes, if this seems warranted, in 1981. At a minimum, by October of 1979, I would like to have an initial LUA option developed (see further guidance below) and there should be a restructuring of the SAOs along lines already under consideration by the JCS so that we have an additional option based on the current data base for attacking [redacted] with military capabilities that pose a threat to NATO Europe. By October of 1980, our plans should be revised to include the following objectives: a) coverage of additional [redacted] that are not covered in the current SIOP as they are identified; b) prioritize the [redacted] on the assumption that the Soviets have and use warning as discussed in the study; c) identify an initial target package of [redacted] with minimum collateral damage, [redacted] d) have an initial revision of the target list for the SRF along the lines suggested in the Targeting Study and the SRF

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study that will include (but not be limited to) targets [redacted]

[redacted] 25X5, E.O.13526 [redacted]

I recognize that revision of this target list may depend on the availability of an improved data base as discussed below.

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(S) I also would expect you to proceed with the planning of LNOs in support of NATO and the options for targeting [redacted] so that initial plans are in place during the next 12 months. I would like a preliminary report outlining your recommendations for revision of targeting plans by 30 April 1979, and I also desire a status report every six months thereafter.

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(S) TARGET DATA: The modifications in targeting recommended by the Targeting Study will necessarily require changes to the target data base. I recognize that the design and maintenance of a responsive data base will be a complex but crucial task. Using the study's recommendations as a point of departure, I want the JCS to provide a plan for revising the data base. Priorities to be accorded the several elements of this task are as listed on pages 60-61 of the Targeting Study. At a minimum, we should, within the next year drawing on the latest TDI: (a) expand the data base on the [redacted] to include their identified alternate locations and supporting C³ facilities, (b) revise the data base to facilitate [redacted] on the assumption they have warning as discussed in the study, (c) develop an initial limited set of [redacted]

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[redacted] would have a prompt effect on the war effort and estimate collateral damage as a result of attacking this set of targets, and (d) develop an initial [redacted]

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[redacted] The plan should provide milestones, resource requirements, and data development costs. At least two alternative data development estimates should be provided. One will assume current production capability and priorities for this requirement. The second will assume increased priority and resources. Your estimates should include information on the availability of raw data, collection efforts to be initiated for data base improvements, analysis problems related to this task, and identify any supporting research requirements. An initial plan should be submitted to me by 30 April 1979. Work on the plan should not inhibit the initiation of those improvements which can be readily accommodated.

(S) MODIFICATIONS TO CHINA TARGETING: The Nuclear Targeting Policy Review recommends that our employment policy with respect to China be modified to reflect current political and military realities. While major changes in policy will require Presidential approval, I would like you to initiate steps that will permit us to adjust our targeting plans with the overall aim of handling China targeting through non-SIOP options and the Secure Reserve Force should the President confirm this approach.

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(S) These tasks should be addressed now and a report with recommendations should be submitted to me by February 1980. Planning for these recommendations should proceed so that implementation can be initiated in as timely a manner as possible depending on the outcome of NSC deliberations.

(S) LAUNCH UNDER ATTACK (LUA): An LUA option or options utilizing ICBMs only should be developed. As noted in the targeting study, LUA cannot be a substitute for measures to reduce ICBM vulnerability. However, the President should have available to him an option or options which would permit him to launch ICBMs rapidly against a set of military targets (including defense support facilities) with minimum collateral damage to other targets, and to conserve more survivable forces for follow-on attacks or coercion. To the extent we can develop such an option or options that are militarily effective and not de-stabilizing, I see them as an interim measure designed principally to strengthen deterrence.

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The designated targets for LUA should include at a minimum those facilities noted in the recommendations of the Nuclear Targeting Policy Review. The attack should be designed to minimize fatalities while still achieving the objectives of the attack. Several variations should be developed which demonstrate the trade-off between damage expectancies and fatalities in attacks on target sets of various sizes and types.

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(S) The LUA options should be ready for implementation during the 1981-1982 period, and should, by then, be consistent with the building blocks that are developed to support SIOP planning. An initial LUA option that would partially meet the above objectives should be completed by October 1979.

(S) THE SECURE RESERVE FORCE: I want to initiate actions to improve our capabilities to support the Secure Reserve Force. This will require programmatic actions to improve the endurance of these forces as well as the supporting C³I so that at any stage in a prolonged nuclear war our

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(S) To this end, the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering is developing a long-term acquisition program for strategic forces and related C³I with appropriate milestones to be implemented over time and incorporated into the FYDP. This program will be essential to the successful upgrading of our Secure Reserve component over the long run. In the meantime, however, even with existing C³I and retargeting capability, we can still take measures to strengthen the concept by devoting more of the most survivable and enduring portion of the TRIAD to the SRF

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(S) Short-term adjustments to our plans should be undertaken in two phases. In the first phase -- which should be completed by September 1979 -- alternative target sets should be developed for pre-selected options taking into account targets of likely continuing high value. During this phase some changes of the weapons mix in the SRF should be considered to acquire an optimum match of weapons to targets as well as maximum SRF endurance within existing capabilities. In the second phase, adjustments to the composition of the SRF should be undertaken which reflect emphasis on maintenance of the most survivable and enduring forces in the SRF. The implementation of this latter change must be related to the more basic modifications to targeting policy (e.g., the development of building blocks) which are being pursued concomitantly. Recommendations on the SRF composition should be available by February 1980.

(S) It is essential that the second phase of this effort and follow-on work of the SRF study be closely coordinated with the C³I improvement programs being conducted by the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering.

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(S) NON-SIOP OPTIONS, ESCALATION CONTROL AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT: The Targeting Study recommends that we continue a policy of escalation control to include non-SIOP options, and suggests the need to develop plans, including appropriate diplomatic actions, to complement limited and regional nuclear options and to integrate more closely the political and military aspects of an escalation control strategy. I agree with these recommendations,

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(S) Taking into account the general guidance above, I would like the JCS to develop a plan which incorporates the military aspects for improving our escalation control strategy along the lines suggested in the Targeting Study (see especially pp. 29-34 and 48-50). This plan should include a schedule of exercises and political-military simulations designed both to improve our understanding of non-SIOP options and to familiarize senior officials both in DoD and other key agencies with current plans and capabilities. To the extent this plan requires cooperation with and/or participation of other government agencies, the JCS should consult with the Under Secretary for Policy.

(S) One means for accomplishing the above objectives is to increase the frequency and variety of political-military simulations and CPXs specifically dedicated to considering the issues associated with various options. Such exercises could be used to familiarize interagency decision-makers with the requirements of politically and militarily useful options. Such a process would provide an opportunity to develop and evaluate escalation control concepts in simulated crisis environments.

(S) As a starting point, various techniques should be used (e.g., political-military simulations, crisis decision seminars, CPXs) to look at the following areas of concern:

- decision-making issues and considerations associated with employment of non-SIOP options.
- development, modification, and refinement of non-SIOP options in a particular situation.

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- CINC nuclear contingency planning capabilities, especially ad hoc planning and plan modification procedures.

The JCS should evaluate the utility of this approach in conjunction with interested OSD offices, making recommendations regarding such matters as the desired frequency and scale of such exercises, and the extent to which interagency participation is useful. This discussion of issues and requirements for considering a methodology for development of non-SIOP options is not intended to preclude other additional requirements that might be incorporated. A plan to carry out the program, including recommendations, should be developed and submitted to me by 30 June 1979.

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