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INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL.
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP No. 2011-002, Document 3 Date OCT 24, 2013

Mr. Kramer

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

The enclosed material is sent to you in response to your request.

From
ADUSD(PR)

08-M-0543

TOP SECRET Mr. Kramer

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON D C. 20301

JAN 29 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PA&E

SUBJECT: Implementation of the Nuclear Targeting Study (U)

(S) PURPOSE: The purpose of this memorandum is to assign specific tasks for the implementation of selected recommendations contained in the recently completed Nuclear Targeting Policy Review. This memorandum describes the major tasks to be undertaken within DoD, the assignments of responsibilities and the schedule of actions.

(TS) Our employment policy will make its maximum contribution to deterrence--our basic strategic objective--if our employment policies make a Soviet victory, as seen through Soviet eyes, as improbable as we can make it, independent of Soviet employment policy and of any particular scenario. These plans should include targeting options against Soviet military forces, command and control, and military support that would maximize the threats to the objective targets, while minimizing collateral damage. We should also have a capability to threaten escalation. To lend credibility to a US threat to escalate, we need employment options and supporting capabilities which the Soviets might perceive to be advantageous to us.

(TS) Among the most important characteristics that we should build into our strategic plans and capabilities are flexibility and endurance. These characteristics are defined in general terms in the Targeting Study. A precise definition of requirements for flexibility and endurance will be achieved only by developing specific plans and programs, and subjecting these plans and programs to review and discussion followed by subsequent decisions and action. This should be a major focus of the follow-on effort. I want to start this process at once and move forward as rapidly as possible.

(S) To this end I am asking the Under Secretary for Policy, in consultation with the Joint Staff, affected Services, the Under Secretary for R&E, and the Assistant Secretary for PA&E to develop a long-range plan for phasing in changes in both operational plans and capabilities for the implementation of a revised employment policy along the lines recommended in the Targeting Study. The purpose of this plan is to assure that

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Chief, Declassification Division, WHS

EXEMPT PER EO 12958 as amended
Date Oct 14 2005 Sec 3.3 (b)(1) 25
OSD F.S. 212 Other Agency Equity TBD
Review/Declassify On 31 Dec 2030

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Review on 24 Jan 1999
Extended by
Reason 5&6

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operational planning for nuclear forces on the one hand and development and procurement planning on the other move ahead in parallel and that both are consistent with our overall strategic policy. I intend to use this plan as a management tool to monitor the implementation of changes in employment policy. The plan should identify major milestones at which desired adjustments in operational plans (including revised plans for the SRF) and improved capabilities to support these plans can be meshed. I would like to receive an initial version of this long-range plan no later than 31 May 1979.

(S) I recognize that this is a complex task, but it is important that we have an initial plan before the next round of budget decisions is upon us. I expect the revision of our employment policy to be an evolutionary process, and involve close and more consistent interaction than heretofore between OSD and JCS. The plan will have to be adjusted as we proceed and many of the improvements in planning that are envisioned in the targeting study will have to await improvements in capabilities, particularly C^3I. However, the plan should identify what we can do with existing capabilities as well as in the longer-term. To this end, every effort should be made to identify low cost, short leadtime measures that will permit us to improve force endurance as much as possible over the next two years to incorporate greater endurance into strategic planning.

(S) ENDURANCE MEASURES: As an input to the plan mentioned above, USDR&E, in coordination with PA&E, should develop a plan for enhancing the endurance of strategic forces and supporting C^3I. This plan should include the time-phasing for introduction of new or revised capabilities and the estimated annual cost over a ten year period. The basic plan should be consistent with the FYDP. However, if USDR&E and PA&E conclude after consultation with the Under Secretary for Policy and the Chairman, JCS that the FYDP constitutes a constraint on the achievement of sufficient flexibility and endurance to implement operational plans and where technologies exist to improve capabilities, the plan may recommend deviations in the FYDP. I want a particular effort made to identify low cost, short lead-time measures that will permit us to improve force endurance as much as possible in the next two years, and permit development of modifications in target planning consistent with such improvements. In order to fit the schedule for the overall plan described above, I want the plan requested herein submitted to me by 31 March 1979.

Harold Brown

cc: USD/P
CJCS

(U) I realize that schedules may have to be altered and additional guidance required as the work progresses. I want to be informed whenever you need such guidance or when you believe major changes in the established deadlines are required. In addition I expect your staff to work closely with the Under Secretary for Policy and his staff in resolving day to day problems.

Harold Brown

Attachment
a/s

cc: USD/P
USD/RE
ASD/PA&E

IMPLEMENTATION INSTRUCTIONS (U)

(S) Our employment policy will make its maximum contribution to deterrence--our basic strategic objective--if our employment policies make a Soviet victory, as seen through Soviet eyes, as improbable as we can make it, independent of Soviet employment policy and of any particular scenario. These plans should include targeting options against Soviet military forces, command and control, and military support that would maximize the threats to the objective targets, while minimizing collateral damage. We should also have a capability to threaten escalation. To lend credibility to a US threat to escalate, we need employment options and supporting capabilities which the Soviets might perceive to be advantageous to us.

(S) Among the most important characteristics that we should build into our strategic plans and capabilities are flexibility and endurance. These characteristics are defined in general terms in the Targeting Study. A precise definition of requirements for flexibility and endurance will be achieved only by developing specific plans and programs, and subjecting these plans and programs to review and discussion followed by subsequent decisions and action. This should be a major focus of the follow-on effort. I want to start this process at once and move forward as rapidly as possible.

(S) To this end I am asking the Under Secretary for Policy, in consultation with the Joint Staff, the Services, the Under Secretary for R&E, and the Assistant Secretary for PA&E to develop a long-range plan for phasing in changes in both operational plans and capabilities for the implementation of a revised employment policy along the lines recommended in the Targeting Study. The purpose of this plan is to assure that operational planning for nuclear forces on the one hand and development and procurement planning on the other move ahead in parallel and that both are consistent with our overall strategic policy. I intend to use this plan as a management tool to monitor the implementation of changes in employment policy. The plan should identify major milestones at which desired adjustments in operational plans (including revised plans for the SRF) and improved capabilities to support these plans can be meshed. I would like to receive an initial version of this long-range plan no later than 31 May 1979.

(S) I recognize that this is a complex task, but it is important that we have an initial plan before the next round of budget decisions is upon us. I expect the revision of our employment policy to be an evolu-

tionary process, and involve close and more consistent interaction than heretofore between OSD and JCS. The plan will have to be adjusted as we proceed and many of the improvements in planning that are envisioned in the targeting study will have to await improvements in capabilities, particularly C^3I. However, the plan should identify what we can do with existing capabilities as well as in the longer-term. To this end, every effort should be made to identify low cost, short leadtime measures that will permit us to improve force endurance as much as possible over the next two years to incorporate greater endurance into strategic planning.

(TS) TARGET PLANNING: The Targeting Study describes a building block approach to targeting in general terms (see particularly Annex E). The concept involves developing packages of targets whose destruction would accomplish a specific military, political or economic objective, and being able to combine these packages in different ways to accomplish multiple objectives. Specific damage criteria will be established for each building block on the basis of JCS recommendations. The JCS should flesh out this concept, consulting as necessary with the Under Secretary for Policy and his staff. Annex E of the Targeting Study should be used as a point of departure for the development of building blocks, but the structure outlined in Annex E is intended to be illustrative rather than prescriptive. The objective of the approach is to provide the President with a broader (but still manageable) range of options if he should have to consider execution of the SIOP. I want JCS recommendations as to the best way of implementing this targeting approach, taking into account operational problems involved in developing, coordinating and executing the SIOP. While the goal of the building block approach is greater flexibility, we cannot compromise our ability to execute the full SIOP, if necessary. The first phase of this effort should be based on the existing DIA Automated Installation Intelligence File (AIF) and its Target Date Inventory (TDI) subset. As new data is developed, building blocks may be refined and modified. I hope that we can make some initial changes in plans to incorporate greater flexibility during 1980, and be in a position to make substantial changes, if this seems warranted, in 1981. At a minimum, by October of 1979, I would like to have an initial LUA option developed (see further guidance below) and there should be a restructuring of the SAOs along lines already under consideration by the JCS so that we have an additional option based on the current data base for attacking [redacted] with military capabilities that pose a threat to NATO Europe. By October of 1980, our plans should be revised to include the following objectives: a) coverage of additional [redacted] that are not covered in the current SIOP as they are identified; b) prioritize the [redacted] on the assumption that the Soviets have and use warning as discussed in the study; c) identify an initial target package of [redacted] with minimum collateral damage, [redacted] d) have an initial revision of the target list for the SRF along the lines suggested in the Targeting Study and the SRF

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study that will include (but not be limited to) targets [redacted] 25X5, E.O.13526 [redacted] I recognize that revision of this target list may depend on the availability of an improved data base as discussed below.

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(TS) I also would expect you to proceed with the planning of LNOs in support of NATO and the options for targeting [redacted] so that initial plans are in place during the next 12 months. I would like a preliminary report outlining your recommendations for revision of targeting plans by 30 April 1979, and I also desire a status report every six months thereafter.

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(TS) TARGET DATA: The modifications in targeting recommended by the Targeting Study will necessarily require changes to the target data base. I recognize that the design and maintenance of a responsive data base will be a complex but crucial task. Using the study's recommendations as a point of departure, I want the JCS to provide a plan for revising the data base. Priorities to be accorded the several elements of this task are as listed on pages 60-61 of the Targeting Study. At a minimum, we should, within the next year drawing on the latest TDI: (a) expand the data base on the [redacted] to include their identified alternate locations and supporting C^3 facilities, (b) revise the data base to facilitate [redacted] on the assumption they have warning as discussed in the study, (c) develop an initial limited set of [redacted] would have a prompt effect on the war effort and estimate collateral damage as a result of attacking this set of targets, and (d) develop an initial [redacted] The plan should provide milestones, resource requirements, and data development costs. At least two alternative data development estimates should be provided. One will assume current production capability and priorities for this requirement. The second will assume increased priority and resources. Your estimates should include information on the availability of raw data, collection efforts to be initiated for data base improvements, analysis problems related to this task, and identify any supporting research requirements. An initial plan should be submitted to me by 30 April 1979. Work on the plan should not inhibit the initiation of those improvements which can be readily accommodated.

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(TS) MODIFICATIONS TO CHINA TARGETING: The Nuclear Targeting Policy Review recommends that our employment policy with respect to China be modified to reflect current political and military realities. While major changes in policy will require Presidential approval, I would like you to initiate steps that will permit us to adjust our targeting plans with the overall aim of handling China targeting through non-SIOP options and the Secure Reserve Force should the President confirm this approach.

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(TS) These tasks should be addressed now and a report with recommendations should be submitted to me by February 1980. Planning for these recommendations should proceed so that implementation can be initiated in as timely a manner as possible depending on the outcome of NSC deliberations.

(TS) LAUNCH UNDER ATTACK (LUA): An LUA option or options utilizing ICBMs only should be developed. As noted in the targeting study, LUA cannot be a substitute for measures to reduce ICBM vulnerability. However, the President should have available to him an option or options which would permit him to launch ICBMs rapidly against a set of military targets (including defense support facilities) with minimum collateral damage to other targets, and to conserve more survivable forces for follow-on attacks or coercion. To the extent we can develop such an option or options that are militarily effective and not de-stabilizing, I see them as an interim measure designed principally to strengthen deterrence.

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The designated targets for LUA should include at a minimum those facilities noted in the recommendations of the Nuclear Targeting Policy Review. The attack should be designed to minimize fatalities while still achieving the objectives of the attack. Several variations should be developed which demonstrate the trade-off between damage expectancies and fatalities in attacks on target sets of various sizes and types.

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(TS) The LUA options should be ready for implementation during the 1981-1982 period, and should, by then, be consistent with the building blocks that are developed to support SIOP planning. An initial LUA option that would partially meet the above objectives should be completed by October 1979.

(TS) THE SECURE RESERVE FORCE: I want to initiate actions to improve our capabilities to support the Secure Reserve Force. This will require programmatic actions to improve the endurance of these forces as well as the supporting C^3I so that at any stage in a prolonged nuclear war our

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(TS) To this end, the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering is developing a long-term acquisition program for strategic forces and related C^3I with appropriate milestones to be implemented over time and incorporated into the FYDP. This program will be essential to the successful upgrading of our Secure Reserve component over the long run. In the meantime, however, even with existing C^3I and retargeting capability, we can still take measures to strengthen the concept by devoting more of the most survivable and enduring portion of the TRIAD to the SRF

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(TS) Short-term adjustments to our plans should be undertaken in two phases. In the first phase -- which should be completed by September 1979 -- alternative target sets should be developed for pre-selected options taking into account targets of likely continuing high value. During this phase some changes of the weapons mix in the SRF should be considered to acquire an optimum match of weapons to targets as well as maximum SRF endurance within existing capabilities. In the second phase, adjustments to the composition of the SRF should be undertaken which reflect emphasis on maintenance of the most survivable and enduring forces in the SRF. The implementation of this latter change must be related to the more basic modifications to targeting policy (e.g., the development of building blocks) which are being pursued concommitantly. Recommendations on the SRF composition should be available by February 1980.

(TS) It is essential that the second phase of this effort and follow-on work of the SRF study be closely coordinated with the C^3I improvement programs being conducted by the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering.

(TS) NON-SIOP OPTIONS, ESCALATION CONTROL AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT: The Targeting Study recommends that we continue a policy of escalation control to include non-SIOP options, and suggests the need to develop plans, including appropriate diplomatic actions, to complement limited and regional nuclear options and to integrate more closely the political and military aspects of an escalation control strategy. I agree with these recommendations, [redacted]

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(TS) Taking into account the general guidance above, I would like the JCS to develop a plan which incorporates the military aspects for improving our escalation control strategy along the lines suggested in the Targeting Study (see especially pp. 29-34 and 48-50). This plan should include a schedule of exercises and political-military simulations designed both to improve our understanding of non-SIOP options and to familiarize senior officials both in DoD and other key agencies with current plans and capabilities. To the extent this plan requires cooperation with and/or participation of other government agencies, the JCS should consult with the Under Secretary for Policy.

(S) One means for accomplishing the above objectives is to increase the frequency and variety of political-military simulations and CPXs specifically dedicated to considering the issues associated with various options. Such exercises could be used to familiarize interagency decision-makers with the requirements of politically and militarily useful options. Such a process would provide an opportunity to develop and evaluate escalation control concepts in simulated crisis environments.

(S) As a starting point, various techniques should be used (e.g., political-military simulations, crisis decision seminars, CPXs) to look at the following areas of concern:

-- decision-making issues and considerations associated with employment of non-SIOP options.

-- development, modification, and refinement of non-SIOP options in a particular situation.

-- CINC nuclear contingency planning capabilities, especially ad hoc planning and plan modification procedures.

The JCS should evaluate the utility of this approach in conjunction with interested OSD offices, making recommendations regarding such matters as the desired frequency and scale of such exercises, and the extent to which interagency participation is useful. This discussion of issues and requirements for considering a methodology for development of non-SIOP options is not intended to preclude other additional requirements that might be incorporated. A plan to carry out the program, including recommendations, should be developed and submitted to me by 30 June 1979.

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON D C 20301

FO-1

JAN 29 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Implementation of the Nuclear Targeting Study (U)

~~(S)~~ The purpose of this memorandum is to assign specific tasks for the implementation of selected recommendations contained in the recently completed Nuclear Targeting Policy Review. I want to move as promptly as possible to implement those recommendations of the Targeting Study that are within the purview of the Department of Defense.
In this memorandum and the accompanying ones to other DoD offices, the major tasks to be undertaken within DoD, assignments of responsibilities and establishment of a specific schedule of actions are described.

~~(S)~~ Effective implementation will require close coordination between policy levels in OSD, OJCS, affected Services and others responsible for development and procurement programs necessary to support our employment policy. I am asking the Under Secretary for Policy to assume overall responsibility for coordinating the follow-on work, not only for the nuclear targeting study, but also the closely related PD-18 study of the C^3I support requirements for the Secure Reserve Force which was addressed in my memorandum of 25 October 1978.

~~(S)~~ Under the overall direction of the Under Secretary for Policy, primary responsibility for developing more flexible targeting plans will rest with the JCS; primary responsibility for developing specific programs to enhance endurance will rest with USDRE and PA&E.

~~(TS)~~ As enumerated in the attached implementation instruction, I would like you to proceed at a deliberate pace to carry out the tasks outlined regarding the following:

- Target planning
- Data base development
- Targeting of China
- Launch Under Attack option for ICBMs
- Non-SIOP options and Crisis Management

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Chief, Declassification Division, WHS

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~~Review on 24Jan1999~~
~~Extended by~~
~~Reason 5&6~~

EC DEF CONTR No. X-00730

- Development of an integrated plan for strategic force improvements,

- Revision of NUWEP,

- Further research into major issues identified in the Targeting Study,

- An examination of crisis management procedures within DoD,

- Development of a proposal to explain changes in our employment policy in NATO.

(U) The overall schedule for implementation of actions stemming from the Targeting Study is included in the attachment. I realize we may have to adjust this schedule as planning progresses, but you should report any major changes in the schedule to me at least semi-annually.

Harold Brown

Attachments
a/s

cc: JCS
USDRE
ASD/PA&E

IMPLEMENTATION INSTRUCTIONS (U)

(TS) Our employment policy will make its maximum contribution to deterrence--our basic strategic objective--if our employment policies make a Soviet victory, as seen through Soviet eyes, as improbable as we can make it, independent of Soviet employment policy and of any particular scenario. These plans should include targeting options against Soviet military forces, command and control, and military support that would maximize the threats to the objective targets, while minimizing collateral damage. We should also have a capability to threaten escalation. To lend credibility to a US threat to escalate, we need employment options and supporting capabilities which the Soviets might perceive to be advantageous to us.

(TS) Among the most important characteristics that we should build into our strategic plans and capabilities are flexibility and endurance. These characteristics are defined in general terms in the Targeting Study. A precise definition of requirements for flexibility and endurance will be achieved only by developing specific plans and programs, and subjecting these plans and programs to review and discussion followed by subsequent decisions and action. This should be a major focus of the follow-on effort. I want to start this process at once and move forward as rapidly as possible.

(S) To this end I am asking you in consultation with the Joint Staff, the Services, the Under Secretary for R&E, and the Assistant Secretary for PA&E to develop a long-range plan for phasing in changes in both operational plans and capabilities for the implementation of a revised employment policy along the lines recommended in the Targeting Study. The purpose of this plan is to assure that operational planning for nuclear forces on the one hand and development and procurement planning on the other move ahead in parallel and that both are consistent with our overall strategic policy. I intend to use this plan as a management tool to monitor the implementation of changes in employment policy. The plan should identify major milestones at which desired adjustments in operational plans (including revised plans for the SRF) and improved capabilities to support these plans can be meshed. I would like to receive an initial version of this long-range plan no later than 31 May 1979.

(S) I recognize that this is a complex task, but it is important that we have an initial plan before the next round of budget decisions is upon us. I expect the revision of our employment policy to be an evolutionary process, and involve close and more consistent interaction than

heretofore between OSD and JCS. The plan will have to be adjusted as we proceed and many of the improvements in planning that are envisioned in the targeting study will have to await improvements in capabilities, particularly C^3I. However, the plan should identify what we can do with existing capabilities as well as in the longer-term. To this end, every effort should be made to identify low cost, short leadtime measures that will permit us to improve force endurance as much as possible in the next two years to incorporate greater endurance into strategic planning.

(TS) POLICY REVISIONS: Nuclear Employment Policy currently is set forth in NSDM-242 and PD-18. Any changes in national policy will have to await review by the NSC and decisions by the President. The actions that I am initiating now are designed to improve the way that we implement current policy, and lay the groundwork for possible changes in employment policy. In order to see more clearly how possible changes in policy suggested by the Targeting Study might be reflected in an actual policy document, I would like a first draft developed in consultation with other elements in OSD and JCS by 1 April 1979.

(U) STUDY PROGRAM: The targeting study identified a number of areas where further study and analysis is required. Develop and implement a plan in consultation with the Joint Staff, Director of DNA, and the military services, to fund and carry out the required studies and such others as you may identify on a priority basis. I would like to review your completed study program no later than 28 February 1979.

(TS) DEVELOPMENT OF NON-SIOP OPTIONS: The Targeting Study notes the need to develop political and other non-military measures that could be employed in conjunction with non-SIOP options. I want you, working in close conjunction with the Joint Staff, to develop such measures to be integrated with non-SIOP planning as well as organizational arrangements for improved crisis managment. You should examine the non-military crisis management support I currently receive within DoD and determine whether it is adequate for and consistent with the concept of escalation control as recommended in the Targeting Study. I would like a preliminary report on the status of your efforts by 30 June 1979.

(TS) CONSULTATIONS WITH NATO: By March 31st, I would also like your recommendations for proposals that we might make in NATO to both explain our employment policy more clearly to them, and to involve them in future employment planning as closely as possible. These should be submitted after consultation with the Advisor for NATO Affairs, the JCS, and the Department of State.

TOP SECRET

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON D C 20301

JAN 29 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: Implementation of the Nuclear Targeting Policy Study (U)

For your information, the attached memoranda have been sent to the CJCS, USD/P, and USDRE and PA&E.

The USDRE has formed an Endurance Steering Group to "... identify low cost short term measures that will permit us to improve force endurance as much as possible in the next two years ...". Dr. Neil Birch of ASD(C^3I) will be the chairman of the Steering Group and he will be supported by Admiral Ross Williams of USDRE(S&SS). The Steering Group will oversee an Endurance Working Group which will address these measures. I would appreciate it if you would designate a member to sit on the Steering Group and one or more members for the Working Group.

Harold Brown

Attachments
a/s

Downgraded to Secret
Date: 12 NOV 2007
Chief, Declassification Division, WHS

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~~Declassify on~~ 24Jan1985

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

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON D.C. 20301

JAN 29 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

SUBJECT: Implementation of the Nuclear Targeting Study (U)

(S) The purpose of this memorandum is to assign specific tasks for the implementation of selected recommendations contained in the recently completed Nuclear Targeting Policy Review. This memorandum deals with tasks for which your organization will have primary responsibility. I want to move as promptly as possible to implement those recommendations of the Targeting Study that are within the purview of the Department of Defense. This memorandum (and the accompanying ones to other DoD offices) describes the major tasks to be undertaken within DoD, assignments of responsibilities and a specific schedule of actions.

(S) Effective implementation will require close coordination between policy levels in OSD, OJCS, the Services and others responsible for development and procurement programs necessary to support our employment policy. I would like for you to assume overall responsibility for coordinating the follow-on work, not only for the nuclear targeting study, but also the closely related PD-18 study of the C^3I support requirements for the Secure Reserve Force which was addressed in my memorandum of 15 October 1978.

(S) Under your overall direction, primary responsibility for developing more flexible targeting plans will rest with the JCS; primary responsibility for developing specific programs to enhance endurance will rest with USDRE and PA&E. These efforts must be closely coordinated.

(U) I note and concur in your arrangements for interim organization wherein Dan Murphy, Walt Slocombe and Andy Marshall will work together in overseeing and continuing the work on this program.

(S) As outlined in the attached implementing instructions, I would like you to proceed at an expeditious but deliberate pace to carry out the following tasks:

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Date: 12 NOV 2007
Chief, Declassification Division, WHS

~~Upon removal of attachments this document becomes SECRET~~

COPY NO. 1

~~Classified by~~ USD(P)
~~Declassify on~~
~~Review on~~ ~~24 Jan 1999~~
~~Extended by~~

TOP SECRET

TOP ~~SECRET~~ INFORMATION COVER SHEET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TOP SECRET INFORMATION COVER SHEET	CONTROL NUMBER S)	INCLOSURES
	35177/79	

The attached TOP SECRET information contains data the security aspect of which is paramount, and unauthorized disclosure of which would cause EXCEPTIONAL GRAVE DANGER TO THE NATION. Special care in the handling, custody, and storage of the attached information must be exercised in accordance with the security regulations. This cover sheet is NOT A RECEIPT but a record of persons who have read all or any part of the document(s) identified by number above.

Each person receiving the attached TOP SECRET information shall sign and fill in the information required below.

	NAME	DATE RECEIVED	DATE RELEASED	REMARKS (Indicate portions and all of documents read)
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3	Jesse McNeal	19 Jan 82		Nat'l Records Center
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