

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1 Jun 79

Memo For R&C

Advance copies were LDXed to Gompert & Thomson (NSC).

PB has their chron cy (cy 5 of 6)

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DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2011-012, document no. 1
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: December 3, 2015

08-M-0538

~~TOP SECRET~~



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

31 MAY 1979

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

In reply refer to:
I-35145/79

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DAVID GOMPERT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF POLITICO-
MILITARY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: SIOP Revision (U)

(U) Several adjustments which will become effective October 1, 1979, are being made to the Selected Attack Option (SAO) Structure of the US Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). These adjustments reflect evolutionary refinements in our targeting which will provide additional measures of flexibility and increase our ability to control escalation in the event of Warsaw Pact aggression against NATO (see attached draft message for further detail).

(U) The JCS propose to introduce these changes into NATO military channels by message to SACEUR and SACLANT. We believe it prudent that the subject be introduced simultaneously in NATO political channels. The attached draft cable to USMISSION NATO recommends that Ambassador Bennett draw on the JCS message to inform NPG PermReps of the adjustments being made in the US SIOP.

(U) Request State transmit the attached cable. We understand the last meeting of NPG PermReps planned before Fall is scheduled for June 4.

Walter Slocombe

WALTER SLOCOMBE

Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

Attachment
a/s

cc: Mr. James Thomson - NSC

~~EXEMPT PER EO 12958 as amended
Date Oct 17, 2005
OSD F.S. 212 - Other Agency Equiv. (1)(D)
Review/Declassify On 31 Dec 2040~~

Classified by Director, J-5
Review on 24 May 1999

Downgraded to Secret
Date: 2 NOV 2007
Chief, Declassification Division, WMS

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY 6 OF 6 COPIES.

PREPD BY: Col Drennon/PB/5-29-79/DIST: Orig-Addee(1), D(2), P(3), PD(4&5), REC(6)

092

~~TOP SECRET~~

FROM: SECSTATE WASH DC
TO: USMISSION NATO
INFO: US DEL MC, BE
USNMR SHAPE, BE
USLOSACLANT, NORFOLK, VA
CINCLANT, NORFOLK, VA
USCINCEUR, VAHINGEN, GE
DSTP OFFUTT AFB, NE

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: REVISION OF US SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN {U}
1. ~~(S)~~ ON APPROXIMATELY JUNE 4, 1979 THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INTEND TO TRANSMIT TO SACEUR AND SACLANT THE MESSAGE QUOTED BELOW. THE JCS MESSAGE IS INTENDED TO INTRODUCE INTO NATO MILITARY CHANNELS INFORMATION ON THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOME SELECTED ATTACK OPTIONS {SAOS} IN THE US SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN {SIOP} WHICH WILL BECOME EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 1, 1979. WE RECOMMEND THAT YOU DRAW ON THE JCS MESSAGE TO ADVISE NATO POLITICAL AUTHORITIES THROUGH THE NPG PERMREPS OF THE ADJUSTMENTS TO BE MADE IN THE SIOP. JCS MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

2. QUOTE ~~TOP SECRET~~ JCS SEND. SUBJ: SIOP REVISION {U}
1. ~~(S)~~ AT THE APRIL 79 NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP MEETING, SECRETARY BROWN RECONFIRMED THAT US NUCLEAR WEAPON EMPLOYMENT POLICY CONTINUES TO STRESS THE NEED FOR US NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES TO HAVE VARIOUS SELECTIVE OR LIMITED OPTIONS.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

02

IN THE ROUTINE PROCESS OF REVIEWING SIOP OPTIONS, WE CONTINUE TO MAKE EVOLUTIONARY REFINEMENTS IN OUR TARGETING AND FORCE PLANNING THAT WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL MEASURES OF FLEXIBILITY TO THE SIOP AND THAT RECOGNIZE ALLIED INTERESTS AND COMPLEMENT EXISTING THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES.

2. ~~(S)~~ TO THIS END, THE SELECTED ATTACK OPTION STRUCTURE WITHIN THE US SIOP IS BEING UPDATED TO INCREASE OUR ABILITY TO CONTROL ESCALATION IN THE EVENT OF WARSAW PACT AGGRESSION AGAINST NATO. THESE SELECTED ATTACK OPTIONS - WHICH FOR THE FIRST TIME COULD BE EMPLOYED AGAINST BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR THREATS FACING NATO - WILL PROVIDE A BASIS FOR CLOSER COORDINATION AND INTEGRATION OF US AND NATO PLANNING. THE REFINEMENTS WILL INCREASE THE FLEXIBILITY OF OUR NUCLEAR PLANS AND ENHANCE THE POTENTIAL FOR CONTROLLING ESCALATION IN AREAS OF PARAMOUNT INTEREST TO NATO.

3. ~~(S)~~ THE REVISED OPTIONS ARE BEING DESIGNED TO PERMIT

25X5, E.O.13526

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TOP SECRET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

OASD/ISA INTRAOFFICE CONTROL SHEET	DATE 29 May 1979	LOG NO. I 35145/79
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SUBJECT: Coordination of JCS Message to SACEUR/SACLANT: SIOP Revisions	CURRENT SUSPENSE DATE:
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SUMMARY (Describe briefly the requirement, background and action recommended):

(U) Origin: JCS

(S) BACKGROUND: As one result of the Nuclear Targeting Policy Review, the JCS are updating the SIOP Selected Attack Option (SAO) structure to increase the flexibility of our nuclear plans and enhance the potential for controlling escalation in areas of paramount interest to NATO (see proposed message at Tab A of JCS package for details).

(S) PURPOSE: The proposed message is intended to officially introduce into NATO military channels the restructuring of SIOP SAOs. To introduce the SAO restructuring in political channels, we propose the draft message next under be transmitted to USMISSION NATO.

(U) RECOMMENDATION: PDASD/ISA coordinate where indicated on the JCS form 9 and approve the draft message to USMISSION NATO.

31 MAY 1979

WALTER SLOCOMBE

Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

Lynn E. Davis
Lynn E. Davis
DASD, PP&NSCA

SEQ NO	INTERNAL COORDINATION	INITIAL	DATE	SEQ NO	INTERNAL COORDINATION	INITIAL	DATE
	ASSISTANT SECRETARY	S		2	DASD-P/PL&NSC AFF	P	
	EXECUTIVE OFFICER	XO			DIR, P/PL&NSC AFF	PD	
	RECORDS & CONTROL	RC			DEP DIR, NSC AFF	PH	
	PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT	SA			DIR, MBFR TF	PF	
	DIR, LAW OF SEA TF	LS		1	Dir, Nuclear Policy	PB	26/1/79
	DEP FOR MC&TO	TO			DASD-INT'L ECON & PW/MIA AFF B		
	SPEC ASST FOR CONG REL	DS			DIRECTOR, IEA	BD	
5	PRINCIPAL DASD	D			DIR, ST & D	IT	
4	MILITARY ASST	DM	31/5		PRINCIPAL ADV (PW/MIA)	PW	
	SPEC ASST TO PDASD	DT			DASD FOR SA	M	
	DIR, FMR AFFAIRS	IF			DIR, SA PLANS & POLICY	MD	
	ASST FOR ADMINISTRATION	AO			PLANS & PROGRAMS DIV	MP	
	DASD FOR EA & PAC AFF	A			POLICY DIV	MN	
	DIR, EA & PAC REG	AD			DEF SCTY ASST AGCY		
3	DASD EUR&NATO AFF	E	5/30		DIRECTOR	T	
	DIR, EUR&NATO AFF	ED	3/30		DEP DIR	TD	
	DIR, I-A REGION	IA			SPEC ASST	TB	
	DASD NE, AF&SA AFF	N			COMPTROLLER	TC	
	DIR, NE&SA REG	NE			DIR FOR SALES NEG	TS	
	DIR, AFRICAN REG	NA					

COORDINATION OUTSIDE ISA (Continue on reverse)

	ACTIVITY	NAME AND TITLE	INITIAL	DATE
X	DUSD(PR)	<i>Walter Slocombe</i>		5/30
X	OJCS-JS	<i>Halpern</i>		5/30

Upon removal of attachments

NAME, DIRECTORATE, EXTENSION, AND SIGNATURE OF ORIGINATING OFFICIAL:

this document becomes

COL DRENNON, PP&NSCA, X55819

Drennon **TOP SECRET**

SECRET



POLICY

~~TOP SECRET~~

R+C

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

22 JUN 1979
In reply refer to:
I-35173/79

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY TO THE DCI FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

SUBJECT: IC Staff Study on Intelligence Support to Strategic Forces

I have reviewed your recent study on "Intelligence Support to Strategic Forces" and would like to point out my general problem with the report. My basic concern is with the assumption that threads its way through the paper that our current nuclear employment policy is basically compatible with the intelligence support that backs it up. This is simply not true. To a large measure, our employment policy is a reflection of the quality of intelligence, and the inadequacies in the latter tend to be reflected in targeting plans themselves.

350.09

It is true as you assert that our current employment policy can be characterized by pre-planned attacks on fixed targets. It is a gross oversimplification, however, to conclude on the basis of this that the SIOP is "static" and that so long as it remains so only marginal improvements in intelligence support are required. The SIOP is, in fact, quite dynamic even now; it provides among other things for real-time replanning procedures which the NCA could implement prior to, during, or in the aftermath of a nuclear exchange.

[Redacted]

25X5, E.O.13526

These intelligence capabilities and resources are grossly inadequate at present and are generally recognized as such.

As noted in your study, our nuclear employment policy and the intelligence requirements for the secure Reserve Force are currently under NSC consideration. We expect certain modifications to our policy as a consequence, and this is likely to generate additional intelligence requirements. I will keep you abreast of these developments, but in the meantime, members of my staff would be pleased to discuss your study in greater detail.

SIGNED

Daniel J. Murphy
Admiral, USN (Ret.)
Deputy

Cy # 3 of 5 cys

CLASSIFIED BY DUSD(PR)
DECLASSIFY ON 21 JUNE 1988

Distribution:
Orig. to Addee.
Xerox cy: DUSD(PR) Chron, NTPR Chron,
R&C
Prepared by MRRHStivers/21Jun79/gaj

Downgraded to Secret
Date: 12 NOV 2007
Chief, Declassification Division, WIS

~~TOP SECRET~~