

10/14/03 Otero AFB

- St. Col. Maggie Quenerville
- Col. Worcester -
- Tim Lynch - Was OSF Commander on 9-11-01
- ~~R Tony~~ Shiani -
- Andrew Huddleston

- 32 yrs. Alert Facility

- Tim Duffy - USAF pilot ->
~~may~~ may not be available for
interview - on NASTY

- Kina - Ops group commander

- Wing Operations Center - WOC ->
is where we first met to be ~~be~~ briefed

- Command Center - Command Post is behind
the Glass -> below center room.

- 9/11/01 - Tues. -> mtg generally held
on Tuesdays at main Bldg.

- They saw 2nd plane hit WTC 2

- They convened battle staff → senior people necessary to coordinate a response to the event.
- The Battle Lab → Centre Room.
- Command and Control Centre → below Battle Lab - W/T.V.¹⁵.
- Ground Operations room → a response activity is opposed to a proactive Centre. (It is a reactive room and normally manned unless there's an event).
- OTIS - one of 2 international Ground Bases ~~are~~ run by ~~the~~ air Natl. Guard → (Self judge the other).
- OTIS → 102nd Fighter Wing - The host of the faculty.
- Army Natl. Guard, Air ~~support~~ support → Another tenant on the faculty.
- Air Traffic Control Tower → manned by a K agency = the bid winner.
- They are civilian employees who run

The tower 24 hrs / 7 days - week.

- Coast Guard (air) is a facility on the 102nd F.W. installation (another threat on base like Army Natl Guard).

- Cape traction located on base under the control of 102nd F.W. → but Air Force does not manage the traction.

- Other ANG Base has military personnel on a long-term basis. (20-30 yrs).

Post 7-11 — 4 more alert shelters were built after 9-11 but are not being used b/c they don't have sufficient living quarters, etc. - no command and control link. →

* — 4 old alert boms existed pre-9-11.

- the ATC tower → old facility that is targeted and plans to replace it are in place.

- Other had a few Training sorties in the air on 9-11-01. → they had to be

re-Configured ^{and stopped} to respond to wartime mission of 9-11.

— Mike Kelly was in Command Post on 9/11/01.

— 2 Controllers in Command Post on normal day shift pre 9-11.

— 12 hr. shifts.

— Inventory Comms/Sec materials.

— Run through checklist.

— ~~clg on today~~

— 2 pilots on Alert pre 9-11 and today.

— Mike Kelly has FM Radio, Base Radio and Klosson is 3 ways to contact Alert pilots.

Pre 9-11 ~~clg~~ a training mission involved an Alert pilot on Alert Jet, the Command Post would ~~also~~ interact

with NEADS to get orders of approval.

— Command Post - Reaction type of office

— Day shift → 1 Duty Controller
1 Supervisor

~~Hot~~ Speed

~~Hot~~ Line Connected to NEADS

~~Hot~~ Hot line ^(speed dial) to MCC - in Rome, N.Y.

Speed dial to S.D. - in Rome, N.Y.
↓
Senior Director

— Events of 9/11/01

— Mike Kelly - Duty Controller

— Boston Center called him to scramble jets for possible hijack.

— They asked for Tel # to NEADS

— He switched them ^{FAA} to NEADS and gave them the tel. #.

- He called NEADS himself and ~~into~~ the scramble line went off.
- He called the SOF and asked them to come down to his station.
↳ SOF = Colonel Tracy.
- Scramble Order came down and they launched the jets.
- Further communication w/NEADS from someone else.
- Phone call came from SOF desk that 1st plane struck WTC 1.
- They put T.V. on and witnessed 2nd A/C hit WTC 2.
- They recalled aircraft on training missions.
- They generated jets to a wartime posture.
- Transform a ANG unit w/2 planes on alert to a unit w/more than 2

fighter jets.

— Colonel Guenneville - ("General")
↓
Today

— in charge of OTIS AFB on 9/11/01

— Col. man at NEADS → gave
same direction to OTIS - Guenneville

— 18 Total Assigned Aircraft →

— All but 4 ~~were~~ A/C were
made ready to respond to 9/11
(e.g., take from hangars, repaired,
etc.).

Wing Operations Center

Most Tuesdays have an early staff meetings & all wing heads / they were simultaneously made aware of the scramble, informed through the command post. Witnessed the two hits on CNN. Knew immediately on a clear day it was deliberate. Convined their battle stage. CIVIL related disaster response.

"Air War" side 24/7 C2

"Ground War" side → deployment activities, Air support for ground operations, response activity as opposed to a proactive center. Not manned unless notified of an event.

9/11 started at Command Post, then spilled into "ground War" side.

1 of 2, other in Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, that is owned by international guard. 102nd Air Wing host of those activities. 24 hr alert mission. US Coast Guard is 24/7 STR & some law enforcement. Also have Army National Guard Air Division on base. 3,000 Acres of property. Benefit is there C2 of activities.

Have a contracted ATC tower to whoever is the winning bidder. Goes to Coast Guard as well.

Contract managed

William D. Overnelli

1 NATI GUARD in DC. Also have FAA TRACON on base.

Alert PILOTS were in this building on 9/11. Can be here even though Alert facility is across ramp. Since 9/11 four more alert shelters have been built. Don't have living facilities or communication facilities. 4 Alert barns across ramp built for 1950s F89s. Unit has...


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2007 70 2004

102FW Technician Org on 9/11

*Indicates changes have been made since 9/11

102d Fighter Wing - Technician Combat Wing




Appropriately sited. ATC Tower is an old tower, would like
to replace it. some new airfield lighting. 10

Training config different than wartime config.

caused back a number of aircraft.

102FW Military Org on 9/11

* Indicates changes have been made since 9/11



DUAL HATRED STATE AFFILIATION, TRAINING IN SUPPORT¹²
OF FEDERAL MISSION NOT JUST THE AVIATION MISSION.

- 18 F-15 Eagles
- AIR Superiority / Sovereignty
- 24/7 Homeland security / defense

STATE MISSION → directed by Governor, National disaster response.

CZ, power generation, security, POSSIBLE COMBAT ROLES.

OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES:

APR 01 Unit compliance insp

4-1 GOLDWALL CANADA

9-01 UFN OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE

FEB 03 - SNOWBIRD, I
MAY 03 - UFN OIR

JUN 03 Alert Force EVAL - OUTSTANDING

DEC 03 IAF standard

~~not~~ fall '04 AEF concept - Expeditionary Force VISION.

AIR Force constructs 20 day groups of CAPABILITY. ROTATED
in & out every 15 months.

50 → 60% of NATL guardsmen qualify for immediate
retirement. Assessment of what deployment due to "Long ~~to~~ life.

Noble Eagle 1st 24 hrs.

1st BS & 2 SRC activated

Battlestaff / search rescue capability

Started moving towards 24/7 unit cases.

Major MCGRADY, Joseph P.	Boston CAP Pilot	102 FW
Major DOONAN, Dennis W.	Boston CAP Pilot	102 FW
Major ANDERSON, Hal S.	Boston CAP Pilot	102 FW
Lt Col DAVIS, Jay M.	Boston CAP Pilot	102 FW
Lt Col LEFAVOR, James M.	Boston CAP Pilot	102 FW
Lt Col DOLAN, Michael J.	Boston CAP Pilot	102 FW

Address for retired Lt Col Ramsay:
 available at this time

Address for retired Lt Col French is not

4. Point of contact the 102nd Fighter Wing is Lt Col Jim LeFavor, DSN 557-4385, or Lt Col Margaret Quenneville, DSN 557-4664.

Withheld from public release
 by National Archives and
 Records Administration
 under 36 C.F.R. § 1256.56

-signed-

JAMES M. LEFAVOR, Lt Col, MAANG
 Operations Officer, 101 FS

- ¹ Now serving as Commander Mass. Air National Guard
- ² Now serving as Operations Group Commander
- ³ Now serving as Vice Wing Commander
- ⁴ Now serving as Maintenance Group Commander
- ⁵ Now serving as Wing Commander
- ⁶ Now serving as Mission Support Group Commander
- ⁷ Now serving as Superintendent of Security Forces
- ⁸ Now serving as Air National Guard Assistant Director of Operations ACC/DOG
- ⁹ Now serving as Fighter Squadron Commander
- ¹⁰ Now serving as Mission Support Flight Commander

Began 6 MC jets, tech force fired turned & configured

Centralin only - began to preposition wing tanks

Began loading AIM-9 ^{side launchers} missiles on all MC aircraft 1st,

switched to TS and then 120s

AIM 7s

SPARROWS

AM-rangs

- 5 A/C 4x2x2x6 configuration within 4 hours

- Backstop maintenance increased temp to support the massive gen effort

- Could put 2 guns on guide (training could fly 2 in skills) \Rightarrow 1 hour for extra fuel & 2 missiles ~~at~~ minimum.

behind the scenes makes front line happen

SUPPORT GROUP SPEC

CES - 24 hr op.

SFS - 90% volume (security)

MPP - 24 hr ops c/no add'l folks (Personnel)

SVF - 90% vol: served 1100 meals w/in 48 hrs (services flight)

CF - 24 hr command Comm Center

MDS - 8 vol conduct med screening



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 102D FIGHTER WING (ACC)
MASSACHUSETTS AIR NATIONAL GUARD
OTIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE, MASSACHUSETTS 02542-5028

MEMORANDUM FOR HAF/XOHP, ANG CAT

3 September 2003

FROM: 102 FS/DO
 165 Izzea Street, Bld 165
 Otis ANGB, MA 02542

SUBJECT: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

1. This list of key personnel for the 102 Fighter Wing, Otis ANGB, Massachusetts, comes in response to a request for information from USAF/XOHP relayed through the Air National Guard Crisis Action Team senior director by e-mail dated Friday, 29 August 2003.
2. Some of participants are now retired and the current addresses are supplied where known. We will provide further address information when it becomes available.
3. Listing of personnel follows (current rank):

Rank	Name	Position on 11 Sep 01	Status
Col	QUENNEVILLE, Donald	Wing Commander ¹	HQ/MAANG
Col	WICKEL, Albert S.	Vice Wing Commander ²	102 FW
Col	SCHIABI, Anthony E.	Operations Group Commander ³	102 FW
Col	DUPUIS, Richard R.	Support Group Commander ⁴	102 FW
Col	WORCESTER, Paul G.	Logistics Group Commander ⁵	102 FW
Col	ELLIS, Mark F.	Logistics Squadron Commander ⁶	102 FW
CMSgt	SILVA, John D.	Command CMSgt ⁷	102 FW
Col	TREACY, John D.	Fighter Squadron Commander ⁸	ACC/DOG
Lt Col	RAMSAY, William M.	Operations Officer	retired
Lt Col	LYNCH, Timothy M.	Operations Support Flight Commander ⁹	102 FW
Lt Col	FRENCH, Phillip S.	Mission Support Flight Commander	retired
Major	DOONAN, Virginia I.	Aircraft Generation SQ Commander ¹⁰	102 FW
Lt Col	STEVENS, Christina G.	Maintenance Squadron Commander	102 FW
Lt Col	DUFFY, Timothy	Alert Pilot (1 st to scramble)	102 FW
Major	NASH, Daniel S.	Alert Pilot (1 st to scramble)	102 FW
Major	MARTYN, Robert S.	NYC CAP Pilot	102 FW
Major	RICHARD, Martin J.	NYC CAP Pilot	102 FW
Lt Col	RAY, Douglas L.	Boston CAP Pilot	102 FW
Capt	BECKEL, Jeffrey S.	Boston CAP Pilot	102 FW

General Quenneville 1/7/04

- John Farmer
- Geoff Brown
- Andy Huddleston H.Q. First A.F.
- Dave Frishberg
- 33 yrs. military
- 25 yrs. in the Guard
- 8 yrs. active Duty
- 1978 - joined into ANG
- Flew F-106's in NORAD mission in 1972-77 (Ft. Sigsbee AFB)
- 1978 - Tyndall AFB.
- 1972 - Height of Cold War.
- NORAD mission → its evolution over the years.
- 9/11/01 - 7 alert sites on the maritime borders.
- Over the years → declining funds → alert bases were shut down.

- Indications that Cold War threat was declining over the years → Russians flew less missions, Berlin Wall came down, etc.
- on 9/11/01 → he was looking for threats coming from outside the U.S.
- NORAD → Dr. Finklestein → performed analysis of Post Cold War threat TO U.S.
- No discussions of totally eliminating the NORAD mission pre-9-11.
- 7 ~~to~~ alert bases was the minimum for the U.S. to maintain Air Sovereignty / Air Defense Position.
- NORAD mission re: hijacked aircraft → tail, hijacked A/C from 5 mile distance, identify and shadow A/C.

— Pre 9-11 hijack procedures —

— FAA would contact NORAD through NEADS, SEADS, or WADS.

— "IFF" — Identification "Friend or Foe".

— NORAD training over the years.
↳ did not change much.

— Drug Interdiction Component of NORAD mission — (Post 1987 time frame).

— Early 1990's → deployed to Panama to conduct drug interdiction mission.

↓
— NORAD shadowed drug A/C and handed A/C off to DEA, Customs, etc.

— F-106 — Primary mission was to carry a tactical nuclear weapon. (Designed to intercept Bomber Formations).

- F-106 - very capable high altitude plane.
- Pre 9-11 relationship between FAA and NORAD? → Quenneville says this question is better posed at NEADS.
- Pre 9-11 → NORAD looked ~~at~~ outward for threats and could get airborne over the coast w/out much help from FAA because of low volume air traffic near the Coastline.
- Pre 9-11 - NORAD was looking at external threats. → The quantity of the threat post Cold War declined but not the nature of the threat.
- Pre 9-11 - Otu's planes often sat alert with 1 external tank and no missiles (but guns only).
- On 9-11 - planes were fully equipped w/ 3 tanks, radar missiles and hot guns because of the Russian Bear.

Events of 9-11

late 1988

↓

inst U.S.

JOINT

Intercept

of

Russian

Bea

by

OTIS

AFB.

- Aircraft on alert and configured to respond to Russian Bear Exercise.

~~9 AM~~ - Daily Routine →
6 aircraft go out at 9 A.M.
to fly air sovereignty
exercise.

- General was at Tuesday morning
weekly meeting. → He was
told during meeting that A/C
were placed on battle stations
to respond to a hijacking.

- He left early morning meeting
and ~~walked to his office~~ saw
people looking at T.V.

↓
Reports of commuter plane hitting WTC.

- He saw 2nd A/C hit WTC 2
on T.V.

- He was the Wing Commander
on 9-11.

~~As~~ The alert aircraft are assets

of NORAD.

- NORAD has authority to order scramble of Ots alert aircraft.
- NORAD specifies how to configure alert A/C on 9/11 to respond to Russian Exercise.
- As Wing Commander, he ~~would~~ was told that NORAD scrambled the 2 ~~F~~ F-15s on 9-11.
- After he saw 2nd A/C hit WTC 2, he grabbed his papers, went to Command Post and gathered his battle staff.
- Pentagon was not hit yet when he arrived at the Command Post.
- Main 85 tanker was in the air to support the Ots local sorties training exercise.
- He recalled training sorties in consultation with NEADS.

- They had 17 total planes on 9-11.
- 2 alert planes - airborne at 8:52 AM
- 6 training sorties, airborne at 9:00
↳ no hot guns, no missiles, no permanent A.M.
- 9 A/C on base, scheduled for repairs, etc.
- Within 17 hours, they had 14 aircraft fully configured to fly missions. (armed)
- < Otis AFB participated in Air Δ exercise in July 2001. >
- Otis AN6 ~~also~~ role was one of "A Force Provider".
- ~~at~~ Around 10:30 A.M. → 4 aircraft (F-15's) fully armed and configured were launched. (in addition to Duffly and Nash).
- NORAD sets and determines the Rules of Engagement (ROE's).

Classified -> # of alert bars changes depending on the threat ~~level~~ level.

- Changes in Air Δ Mission Post 9-11 :
 - more alert Bots
 - more assets (alert fighter aircraft).
 - NORAD still looks outward but looks inward also

(Opinion) - Quenemette sees Terrorist threat as > ~~9~~ than Russian missile threat

- Post 9-11 -> he sees better sharing of information.

- He fears that complacency will set in with the American public as time goes on.

"We are a sovereign nation and we don't leave our borders uncovered." 21

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Interviews at Otis Air National Guard Base (Otis ANGB)

Type of event: Interview with Brigadier General Donald J. Quenneville

Date: January 7, 2004

Special Access Issues: None

Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown

Team Number: 8

Location: 102nd Fighter Wing, Otis Air National Guard Base, Massachusetts Air National Guard

Participants - Non-Commission: Andrew Huddleston (Dep Ch, Plans, Integration & Transformation Div, AF/XOHP, 703 696-0024, Fax: 703 588-0636)

Participants - Commission: John Farmer, John Azzarello, Geoffrey Brown

Background:

Quenneville has been in the military for 33 years. Eight years of which was active duty. He came to the 102nd Fighter Wing in 1978, and last year became the commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard.

Please see the attached biography for further details.

Alert Site Mission:

Quenneville recalled that in 1972 NORAD's Air Defense mission included fifteen or sixteen alert sites. Between 1972 and 2001 the number of sites declined due to the perception of the Cold War threat. Most of those bases were at the maritime borders in 2001, as opposed to the northern alert sites that were active in the Cold War, and meant to respond to an attack from over the North Pole and Canadian airspace.

Quenneville explained that the alert site mission was relatively constant through its changes. He noted that the mission at Otis ANGB was mostly focused on responding to Russian Bear (a type of aircraft with the capacity to carry air-to-surface missiles) activity. When the Russians developed the Bear H model – that has the capability of launching a cruise missile – Otis had a high priority on shadowing those aircraft; but as the Russian defense capability declined with the worsening of the Russian economy, the number of alert sites declined.

Quenneville remarked that prior to 9/11 the focus of the alert bases was still an outwards-looking monitoring mission. Quenneville noted that Dr. Finklestein, a policy maker at NORAD, analyzed possible threats to national airspace. Quenneville opined that

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his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union. He believed that until those weapons were accounted for, it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission. He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed.

Hijack Mission:

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change over his career. He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft. He noted that in addition to the radio signals to indicate a hijack that a pilot uses – signals Commission staff is familiar with – there were both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter pilots (for instance, Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest).

Hijack chain of command:

According to Quenneville, ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking; but if NORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then, since both entities used joint-use radar, the coordination would be “sorted out” between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched.

Drug Interdiction Component:

Quenneville noted that the F-106 did not participate in many drug interdictions, circa 1986. He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties. They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraft, then shadow the target aircraft until it landed.

F-106 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different aircraft's ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon. This is one of the designs for the F-106 – to launch a missile referred to as the “Geanie Rocket”.

Though the F-15 was developed as an air interceptor, it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter. It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon. He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-106 to the F-15.

NORAD/FAA Cooperation:

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route, which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat, did not at all times call for

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FAA air traffic guidance. The route is designed to point out of the main air traffic, and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers, who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems, and the fighter pilots. He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time.

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hijack. He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions.

Threats:

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9/11, he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified by the 9/11 attacks. He continued, and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career, the outlook and operational approach to those threats had not. The adequacy of the air defense mission of NORAD was based on the ability to perceive a threat with enough time to respond.

Quenneville noted that as of 9/01 the fighters "sat alert" with an external tank and live guns; it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well. He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9/11 the fighters were configured as 3-2-2-1. He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would normally have been at.

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988.

9/11:

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack. The Operations Group Commander briefed him, and he continued the meeting. It ended, and he went to get paper work for the next meeting. Quenneville went into the break room, and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC). He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane. He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (UAL 175) hit the second tower. He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff, and headed to the Command Post.

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets, and controlled by NORAD. He said that as the Wing Commander on 9/11, he was considered a "force provider". He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets.

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened. He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to hit the WTC. He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

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hijacked as well. He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly.

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PANTA flight while the other aircraft were being refitted. Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 8:52 AM, very close to the time the PANTA flight was airborne. He noted that the training missions were recalled at 9:25. The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANTA was deployed in support of those fighters' training. He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well.

Rules of Engagement (ROE):

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the initial scrambled fighters. Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS, and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction of NEADS by Otis ANGB staff. Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and practiced since it was the same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat.

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on "bigger picture" inputs. On 9/11 there was a specific set of ROEs, and these were adjusted accordingly. The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to engage an airliner.

Assets at Otis:

He noted that following direction from NEADS, Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions. They recalled and refitted the training assets, and launched fighters in support of the PANTA flight. He noted that over the course of the day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament. As airplanes "recovered" they began loading heavier armament. Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes. Within seventeen hours, during continual flying operations, they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured. All this was done in coordination with NEADS.

CAPs:

Quenneville noted that the role of Otis ANGB was as a force provider for the NEADS mission. Otis ANGB would tell them their capability, and NEADS would make deployment decisions based on that. He noted that Otis flew airplanes 24/7 for six or seven weeks following 9/11.

Post 9/11:

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Quenneville noted that, as an example of the changes in personnel, Otis ANGB was a training organization. He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month. But after 9/11 it served four meals a day for months. He noted this displays the amount of recall of personnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks.

Current Status:

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001, and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002. Most of the personnel that were placed on active duty on 9/11 were stood down by a year later.

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert. He also noted that they are not restricted to "looking outward", but that this threat still exists.

Recommendations:

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important, and that by watching the country's protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information.

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up of NorthCom has assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense of the country.

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission, the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States, and that the ability to "scale up" quickly cannot be underestimated.

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