10/14/03 - afternon Briefing By Col. Worcester NO. 2011-048, document no. 17 TION DATE: Soprement no. 17 State - mission - Dongoot Federal - mission - TO support national Security objectives No. 2014-048, document no. 17 NO. 20 ASSIFICATION OF THF DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY - 18 F-15 Ecilos - ain Superiority State mission - TO protect left and property and TO preserve perce, order and public safety to directed by the Governon, (& they have to not we glow of Posse tomitation rules). - march 03- deployed people To Operation drage Freedom - Operation Noble Eagle -> they support the operation, of = deland fall of 2004 - 102 FW The din Force vision -> forte 90 B Calla 90 day groups of Bets TO provide din Superiority Capalitate whereas This Force words it.

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Historian's Report for Sept. 11, 2001, By TSgt Bruce Vittner

Tuesday, September 11, 2001, started as almost every day at the 102 Fighter Wing at Otis Air National Guard Base, Massachusetts. Wing commander, Col. Donald Quenneville was holding his morning staff meeting at 8:00 a.m.

Meanwhile at the Operations Building, a phone call came in from the tower to TSgt. Margie Woody at 8:38 saying that the FAA in Boston had called for the telephone number for NEADS (North East Air Defense Sector located in Rome, New York) because there was a possible hijacking taking place. One of the alert pilots on duty that morning heard the words "possible hijacking" and said to his fellow alert pilot, Maj. Dan Nash that they should suit up immediately. This took them three minutes and then they headed for the aircraft at the alert barn, still not knowing if anything was really happening.

Sergeant Woody patched the call from the tower through to Tech. Sgt Michael Kelly, the full-time technician in the Command Post, whose job that morning was to handle all emergency calls. "I gave the NEADS number to the FAA in Boston and also called NEADS with this information about a possible hijacking," said Kelly.

At 8:41 Kelly hit the horn to alert everyone to go to his or her Battle Stations after conferring with Lt Col Jon Treacy who was the Supervisor of Flying that day.

The horn went off as Maj. Nash and the other alert pilot, Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy, were in the truck heading for the alert aircraft. Maj. Nash was scheduled to be the lead pilot on any scramble that day but Colonel Duffy, who is a <u>traditional</u> - Guardsman and a pilot for a major airline, said that he had been involved with a scramble to intercept a hijacking about seven years before. Maj. Nash told him to take the lead position as they boarded their aircraft.


At 8:46 NEADS informed the Command Post at Otis to scramble the alert aircraft for an intercept of a hijacked aircraft. The two alert pilots were fastened into their F-15 aircraft and took off at 8:52 on Runway number 5 that is closest to the alert barn. At this time they were under the control of NEADS and given a heading and altitude to fly to New York City. The lead aircraft took off and the second took off 15 seconds later, both on full after-burners, then they flew abreast at supersonic speed towards New York City.

While flying towards New York they were told by NEADS that a second plane had just hit the World Trade Towers. "We were about 60 miles away and could see the burning because the visibility was unlimited that day," said the lead pilot.

The normal training area for the pilots at Otis is "Whiskey 105," an area over the Atlantic Ocean that is south of Martha's Vineyard and extends almost all the way to New York City. NEADS told the pilots to fly a holding pattern over the southwestern end of this training area as they tried to determine the next tactic.

At 9:10 NEADS told the two pilots that they had taken over the entire airspace near New York City and to set up a combat air patrol around Manhattan. Their job was to identify and divert all aircraft from the area. "Maj. Nash and I identified





and diverted over 100 aircraft during the next four hours that we were there," said the pilot. "We would pull up next to them and tip our wings or fly across in front of them to get them to leave the area," he said. Most of the aircraft were local and state police and rescue helicopters.

"We were informed by NEADS at 9:30 that we might be told to shoot down a commercial aircraft if it was determined that it was hijacked, and were asked if we had a problem with that order," remembered the pilot. "I said 'no,' because I had seen the destruction," he said. The pilot was flying over the North Tower at about 6,000 feet when it imploded. "I could not believe it, it just made me sick knowing the extent of the damage and lives lost," he said. The plume of debris after the collapse "looked like a volcanic ash as it blew towards New Jersey."

Maj. Nash is a full-time pilot at the 102nd Fighter Wing. He has been a pilot since 1990 and joined the 102nd in May 2000. He was the scheduling officer that day and knew that the 102nd was going to have a KC-135 aircraft from Bangor, Maine available to them during their normal training day for the 6 F-15s that would be flying in Whiskey 105. He diverted that tanker to fly over the area around Kennedy Airport, and that is where the two scrambled aircraft refueled in the air during their four and one-half hours of combat patrols. "I had never been on a hijack scramble before and deferred the lead to my fellow alert pilot," said Nash. "I couldn't believe it when we got to Manhattan. I thought it was the start of a war. We couldn't fly through all the debris, we had to go around it as we intercepted all the aircraft still in the area," he commented.

There were six F-15s from Otis that were going to train at Whiskey 105 that morning. They were sitting on a nearby runway waiting to take off when this whole process of a scramble began. They idled their engines and waited while the two alert pilots were scrambled and took off. They took off after the scrambled aircraft took off and were over Martha's Vineyard when they received the call from LTC. Treacy "to return immediately to Otis."

"I wasn't too concerned when I saw the scrambled aircraft take off," said Maj. Martin Richard, a traditional Guardsman and pilot with the 102nd who flies commercially for United Airlines. "We see many scrambles during the year, and most all are just aircraft or vessels that can't be identified but are friendly. But when it came over the radio that it was a possible hijacking, it sure got our attention. When the FAA announced that the World Trade Tower had been struck by an aircraft, I asked if this was why the alert pilots had been scrambled, but got no reply," said Richard. The training aircraft had no ordinance on them, and thus were not of much use as a deterrent in that configuration. When these six aircraft landed back at Otis the pilots were told to stay near the aircraft. The planes were then loaded with 940 rounds of 20 mm. bullets and refueled.

Two of the six aircraft had mechanical problems and were not able to fly. The four remaining aircraft were refueled and armed. "Normally it takes about 45 minutes to 'turn around' an aircraft, but the guys did it in 20 minutes," said Richard. He used a few minutes of that time to run into the operations building and call his wife to tell her he was all right, but didn't know when he would be home. "My feelings were of trepidation. I didn't know what was going on and didn't know what the two scrambled aircraft were doing," Richard said. When the maintenance squadron heard the call to scramble, they immediately called for munitions flow and started to repair and generate the non-mission capable aircraft. Operations along with Maintenance did a survey of which aircraft had bullets loaded and prioritized those aircraft to be first on status. They immediately began to pre-position wing tanks to increase range for future flights. Munitions started flowing at 9:30 and the aircraft were loaded with a mix of different types of weapons. "As soon as the crisis was identified, mechanics that were on-station at the time seamlessly changed direction to do their wartime tasking of generating jets without any confusion," said Maj. Virginia Doonan, maintenance officer. Operations and Maintenance worked extremely well together so that communication was strong in both directions to maximize the effort. Our training during OREs etc. certainly helped us do the best job possible," she said.

The four aircraft were ordered to scramble and fly combat air patrols around Boston. Two of us intercepted a C-130 about 150 miles over the Atlantic that was heading for Westover Air Base. The other two intercepted four A-10s and a KC-10 tanker coming back from the Azores. NEADS told the tanker to spend the rest of the day with us for refueling and two of us were told to go to New York City to work with, and then relieve the first two scrambled pilots," Richard said.

Everything that moved had to be identified. Many of the aircraft over New York City were now there to provide relief and aid and were allowed to fly, but they still needed to be identified. It seemed like we were up in the air for about 45 minutes when it was in actuality over six hours," recalled Richard afterwards. "When we were flying to New York NEADS told us that our mission was to intercept, divert, or if unsuccessful in those to call them for authorization to shoot down. That certainly got our attention," he said. After returning to Otis at 6:00 p.m., Richard and his partner, Maj. Robert Martyn, were debriefed by intelligence and sent home. "Driving to Otis the next morning felt like it was that war-time feeling like we had in Saudi Arabia,' recalled Richard who described the fallen towers as looking like a giant pile of Lincoln Logs from the air.

The two aircraft that had maintenance problems that morning were fixed, and the pilots flew to New York City to relieve Richard and his partner, Maj. Robert Martyn, and continue the combat air patrols over the area.

When the horn went off to have everyone report to Battle Stations, Col. Quenneville rushed to the Command Post and summoned the Battle Staff. All of the group commanders were there along with the Survival Recovery Command (SRC) led by Maj. David Bascom and Capt. Bill Dyer. The SRC also included Public Affairs, Security Police, Civil Engineering, and the Fire Department.

Television played a major role in providing information. CNN was showing the first tower of the World Trade Center on fire, and many people in the Operations Building and in the Command Post were watching as the second aircraft flew into the second tower. Maj. Scott Hoyt, a pilot for the 102nd and who had previously flown as commercial pilot, told everyone that the crash was deliberate and couldn't have been done by the airline's pilot. Chief Master Sgt. John Silva, Security Forces Squadron superintendent, who had been at the staff meeting, immediately implemented the recall plan and within five hours over 40 security police officers were at Otis providing perimeter security for the military installation on a 24-hour basis. "One police officer drove from Florida and another left from Rochester, N.Y. and was here in four hours," said Chief Silva.

Lt. Col. Maggie Quenneville, community relations officer, and Cliff MacDonald, public affairs specialist, were also very busy that morning and for the next three weeks. "I saw the towers on fire and went to the Command Post. We were told by NORAD (North American Defense Command in Colorado Springs, Col.) that we couldn't give out any information, including the fact that we were the unit that was scrambled. 'Sorry we can't give out any operational information' was the line that we had to use over and over to networks and television stations and newspapers all over the world," said Lt. Col. Quenneville. This was the official line although television stations and newspapers were reporting that it was the F-15s from Otis that were scrambled even later the same day as the event happened. It was about ten days after September 11 that NORAD allowed the facts to be made public. They set up interviews and filming for CNN at Otis that was shot over a period of three days to show how the unit was flying combat patrols and that the skies were safe for the public to fly. Soon after all three major networks came to Otis for interviews, and Diane Sawyer of Good Morning America on ABC was given a flight in an F-15. "Maggie and I were taking calls from all over the world. We had the Cape Cod Times, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, a London newspaper, and a Russian newspaper all calling at the same time," said Cliff MacDonald who worked rotating 12-hour shifts with Lt. Col. Quenneville for almost a month.

Wing commander, Col. Donald Quenneville spoke to all members of the 102nd at a commander's call on September 15 and addressed the unit in his commander's column in the Oct/Nov issue of the Seagull. His comments, "I have terrible memories of that tragic day, but I also have special ones as commander of this wing. We switched from our unit's peacetime posture into the nation's first line of Homeland Defense. That morning while our aircraft were flying around Manhattan, the senior leaders were developing a comprehensive plan to ready our unit for war against an unknown assailant. Logistics personnel began the systematic transformation of our aircraft from training configuration to one fitting for combat. They provided a ramp full of mission capable, combat-configured aircraft. This effort approached the realm of the superhuman. Continuous combat air patrols were flown for the next several days in response to NORAD tasking. Security, with 90 percent of the traditional guardsmen reporting within 24 hours, quickly established the Force Generation Area and a robust force protection posture. Services personnel provided four meals a day and even brought meals to those unable to get to the dining hall. Most all personnel went on 12-hour days, and wherever it was needed, a volunteer would appear to handle the situation. Nights, weekends, scheduled days off did not matter as the dedicated members of this wing all pitched in. I will always remember the stellar manner in which the men and women of the 102d answered the call to duty. You did us proud.

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