Date & Monitor Validity of a Trachea

Came to work
- for the exercise
- going three spins

3rd day of the Exercise

It was Cleveland Clinic CVX
- capture lessons learned

This was a request

She called
May Don Arne

Then we
- we thought

Tanner
- Blomney
- Basheer
- Notes for Battle Cobra
Battle Staff Coordinator
Cindy Rutherford
Amy Taylor

Exercised files back to L. L. 1999

NORAD asking for a new document request

Mr. Bill Palmer J33
1/21/04

1. We were blank
2. COPU call of 34 + other topping calls
3. ACOO dates
4. Exercise
5. Anything new?
it was unusual for the HS notice to come in via WD instead of PD side

Lt-Col. Deskins

- Exercises involving NCE?
- Exercises w/ actual coord in FA? (Cantus, NCEC HQ)
- Any RAP?

"We were blind"

- Exercise Shop (CvX)
  - pre-9/11
  - 9/11- Apr 99
  - design exercises for both NCEC + NORAD
  - NCEC IS cell (Suff) supported
    - Exercises (decentral Alc or biological agents - no specific crash in 400+ olds)
    - went into to conferences rep. NCEC
    - Worked

- Don't specifically recall scenario, but sounds familiar.

- Simulation Cell
Desks can't
- crew exercise
- battle staff (CVX)

Exercise Director -
Excuse Dr. @ other gym cells (ie CONE WADS)

1. Col. Nate director of CVX Hawaii
2. Desk, Dr. Spalding/Capt. Col. Cleveland
3. Desk, Napseny/Capt. Bishop (Maj. now)
4. -card, offices

pg. 75 0201041527 Ch 3 tele\r
1527 mode 3 "93 right?" "Yes"

93 mode 3 1527 9:38/40 tele\r
89 Mode 3 1304 1977/04/93

cross way
due south
09:40 pass
39 east to
89 turn N
PT Article:

Pg. 10 claims that per 9-11 stand, was 5 min to airborne

Pg. 10: Con E: 2000: 4:25 minutes, 129 scrambling

□ How many minutes did these scrambles take?

Pg. 11: "about 8:20" BW decides 11 is prob. 145

* doesn't notify NEADS (not 145)

□ True? Why?

Pg. 11: "we have some planes": 8:24:39

• 8:25 FAA BW notifies other FAA facilities

□ True? NEADS not notified - why?

□ NEADS notified @ 8:40 (in 9/11 press release) - True?

* 15 min!
10/30/03 Dawn Dain

- Weapons Controller /
- Senior Director /
- Executive Officer /
- Instructor at Tyndall /
- SGT Air Force 1/3/55 - DJ Active
- Duty ANG - 1995
- NAADS - Weapons Director /
- Senior Director
- MCC / became an MCC EV

- 8/96 - Left to work in space
- and analytics shop (CVX)
- 1998 - Flight Commander in Operations
- 2000 - She became ADCC for the
- SOCC
- 2001 - She

Adjustable for the
On 9/11, she was the AC WO, Aircraft Control and Warning Officer.

This Battlefield position was filled on 9/11 6:15 of the exercise.

She was held surveillance (AST) on Identification Qualifications.

The Weapons Directive reports to the SD.

The SD reports to MCC.

MCC to FO in Battle Cab.

The FO to the BC.

The DO and BC coordinate with Norge and Conk (AST).

Surveillance and Identification positions coordinate with the MCC.
- The TT report to the AST.

- DQM Position = Data Quality Monitor, responsible for quality of metadata track, report to AST.

- She is not surveillant.

- CVX = Exercise shop, they designed the exercise and evaluate the response to the exercise for lessons learned.

- Chief of CVX at GLA → Maj. Col. Cleveland

- Sgt. Powell called the TD to come to ops from because he was a qualified NCO ad was available at the time.

- the 2Bw Call came in to the SD scope.

- She asked 2Bw (Cooper) fort fort position.

- She wrote it down on the inflatable loss and looked for AIC and could not find the target.
On 9/11, radar could not see the aircraft.

They did have radar coverage that N.Y. area.

She doesn't know the "2nd Point" to a Zero Velocity track that acts as a reference point on a scope.

The higher the altitude, the better the PEADS radar coverage.

PEADS did not have good low radar coverage over the N.Y.C. area and other island areas.

She briefed Maj. Fox and Maj. Reed.

She went to BC to brief Col. Mann.

The SD position locates the semblance order.
The BC man issued the assemble order.

She does not recall if man told the MCC to do this or that.

She then moved to a position hole to support Col. man.

She is at the AC & Wo scope trying to gain situational awareness for Col. man.

She monitored the MCC position.

She called the PR office at CNR & LAC. She was the alternate PR officer at meeting on 9/11.

She told Col. we're an AIC but WTC as they thought it was AAL 11.

She did not automatically post conclude AAL 11 but WTC.
she knows she spoke to my
wives before the second tower
was hit.

she was in the BC when AA177
hit the pentagon.

someone said AA177 didn't
hit because it was still airborne.

9/11 - the FO was Capt.

9/11 - the 50 St Col. Kupczyn

9/11 - the Vigilant Guardian

9/11 - they exercised Vigilant

St Col. Kupczyn is in Colorado Springs
today.

she doesn't recall doing C
stunt FAA needs myth because
pre 9-11.
The 9-11 -> they practiced
hypoch exercises.

Hypoch scenarios:
- Coming from overseas
- The were designed to a hypoch
  exercise involving a shoot down
decision.

Course Design - typical
hypoch scenarios.

Does not recall scenarios
whereby someone other than
the pilot flying the A/C

The pilots were geared
more towards simulated
exercises and not the use of
live A/C.

On 9/11 - Fuccillo designed
hypoch exercises and other
exercises.
When CONR and NORAD plan and are involved in similar exercises planning they are planning conferences held in Colorado or Florida or other locations.

There is Intel representation at the planning conferences.

Any formal exercise has an after action report.

Each Flight (e.g. Alpha, Beta, Bravo, etc) usually had at least 2-3 MCC people.

St. Col. Daniels was most likely the FO on 9-11.

The location of NEADS was not occupied after the fall of the Wall and during the Cold War era.

The Atlantic City Unit (177th) at some point for 9-11 no longer had a alert commitment.