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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Langley Air Force Base Site Visit

Type of event: Recorded Interview

Date: Monday, December 01, 2003

Special Access Issues: None, some of the discussion was classified and the tape classified accordingly. Those discussions were technical and are available on tape.

Prepared by: Miles Kara

Team Number: 8

Location: 119th Fighter Wing, Detachment One, Headquarters

Participant – Captain Craig Borgstrom, Trail (3d Man) for the Quit scramble on 9-11

Participants - Commission: Miles Kara, Kevin Shaeffer

Observer – Colonel Pam Jefferson, USAF, Base Legal Office

Note: Please refer to the recorded interview for additional details.

Background:

Captain Borgstrom enlisted in the USAF in 1993 and in January 1997 left for pilot training. He got back to the unit in July 1999 and was hired as a full time pilot until May 2000. He then flew commercially for about a year and return to the 119th in April 2001 and assumed his then duties as the Operations Officer at the 119th Detachment at Langley.

Scramble Experience and 9/11:

Prior to 9/11 he sat alert three week-long tours. If they were scrambled it was for a drug mission or civilian traffic in distress or other military aircraft not squawking a valid code. Response requirements haven't changed. What has changed is the sense of urgency and the combat load the aircraft carry.

He was asked about the wait from battle station to scramble on 9/11. Borgstrom distinguished battle station from runway alert. Runway alert means the engines have been started. The detachment doesn't determine which condition to assume, NEADS does that. Runway alert is a little more time critical, from the Detachment's perspective. When asked again why not runway alert on 9/11 he said that was not their decision.

They have a scramble phone at the Detachment as a heads up. They have a horn which is the actual signal, accompanied by lights which distinguish battle stations from runway alert from scramble. His action as SOF would call the Sector for additional information. On 9/11 the Sector called first to ask how many aircraft they could send up. He answered "three" and was directed to do that. He also talked to the Wing Intel Officer in Fargo and learned about the first tower.

He first called the Wing Commander in Fargo to give him a heads up that three planes were scrambled, "something that had never been done on alert, ever." They got

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the horn as he was climbing up the ladder into his aircraft. He started basically about the same time as the other two. He doesn't recall exactly the heading, he wrote 020 on his check list, he recalled. His notes of that day in the cockpit were not retained.

Borgstrom was on the HUNTRESS frequency. He detailed the facts he knew in that capacity. He knows they were told to go max sub-sonic, he knows they were giving a heading of 020 at one point. He knows they were in the 20K range altitude-wise. He knows that they were told to CAP. He knows that the controller superimposed two numbers at one time. Derrig took the comms lead initially with HUNTRESS. He doesn't recall when he took over, it was at some point in the CAP. At no time did they receive any situational awareness of what was transpiring on the ground—second tower, other hijacked aircraft, an aircraft approaching DC from either the north or the west, or that UA93 was hijacked and turned around. They did know that all aircraft had been told to land immediately. Their mission was to keep airplanes away from Washington DC; he believes they got that mission from HUNTRESS.

AFIO. He believes that Derrig received that instruction and passed it to Eckmann over VHF. At the time, AFIO was something they had never used.

The CAP coordinates. Both he and Derrig heard and wrote down the coordinates, so they knew they heard what was transmitted. So they knew there had been a transposition.

Mission. As background he had heard from his wife that something had impacted the WTC. He never dreamed it was a commercial aircraft. He never thought at first that an airliner had hit the Pentagon; he thought it was a truck bomb. That was all unreal, didn't seem feasible, the humanitarian part. He thought, however, that the nation was under attack. There was no mission on take off, just a heading and an altitude.

ROE. He was asked what they were protecting against, what did Eckmann portray as the tactics of the CAP. He thought they were to keep aircraft away from Washington DC. Intercepting was not common in the CAP, as he recalled. He thought Washington Center did a decent job in making sure aircraft didn't come their way. The fighters coming up from Andrews did cause some concern. Overall they split up as a three-ship and spread out but did not communicate that to Sector. So that led to the confusion about an aircraft over the White House. It was one of the Quit flight. Derrig escorted the Attorney General's airplane in.

SoF duties. The SoF keeps track of weather, safety, and other ground-related admin and logistics duties. The SoF does not do anything with tactics in the air. When Borgstrom scrambled there was no SoF, so an F-16 pilot from First Fighter Wing came over. There is no recorded record of the flight in the air from that day. Any "cameras on" or other recording would be at the call of any one of the pilots, not the SoF. He does not recall any recordings being made. Perhaps the cameras were on at one point, but the tape would have been recycled.

Shootdown. He recalls General Arnold calling either that day or in next day or two asked for a detailed, in writing, accounting of what happened that day. He believes that ammunition records were checked as a part of the response to First Air Force. He

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does not recall anything that day conveying a shoot down order. He never heard "weapons free" terminology used that day.

He estimated it would have taken 11-12 minutes to CAP the Pentagon from the end of runway heading at max sub-sonic and with calm winds and flight level 290.

He was show the Langley scramble path as depicted by radar and the scramble order. He was asked how that is explained to the American public? "We didn't go out here because we wanted to go there." We don't have the big picture concept in the cockpit so we go where we are vectored. We could have come off the runway and headed to a vector right away. He does not recall any comms directed at changing their heading from 090 for 60. He does not recall anything about Baltimore. He does not recall going supersonic at any point.

HUNTRESS coordinator was the originator of the inaccurate coordinates for the initial CAP location.

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1 of 1

Contz Borgstrom
CB, Interview

- Full time crew chief, got pilot slot 97
- Langley April 2001 → ops officer
- pre-9/11 SAT Alert ≈ 3 wk long tours
- scrambled typ. for Drop In / Assist to A/C Scramble Proceed.
- Battle stations + Runway Alert
 - ↳ a little more time critical
 - engines started, waiting at edge of the runway
 - 2 min roughly.
- Intel Off in Fargo.
- Initial info from H did not provide intel.
- Maj. Derry → passed on AFIO 17777
- ↳ ~~did not~~ as. acting special.
- Maj. Derry took H comms initially
- was a point where all 3 of us were on 3 diff. UHF Freqs.
- ⊗ - No situational Awareness post take off
 - ↳ didn't know they were HI aircraft at all

- to 1st AP
- Secure Fax - Sent to Gen. Arnold
 - ↳ written statement from CB
 - included Ammo cart (done internally w/in 119AW)
 - DTZ Data Transfer
 - ↳ collective effort / CB wrote it.
 - Near hard S/D order.
 - No weap. Force

10/7 1192

5

NAME / BANK	ORG	TODAY POSITION	9/11 POSITION	Phone
Robert Atchisar	MSgt	1FW/HQ	USAF/HQ USAF/HQ	757-764-7237
Stephen Crawford	MSgt	119FW/Det 1 - Support Flight Chief	Weapons Load Crew Chief	757-225-2349
Stevensm, COL	ACC/JA	Chief of Law	SJA, Randolph	757 2425
SOMDAHL, David	MSgt	119FW	PA & Historian →	
Bachmann Randy	SM Sgt	119FW/Det 1	Chief Enlisted Manager	757 225 2351
Huddleston, Andrew	GS-14	AF/KOHP	JTF-CS	
BORGSTROM, CRAIG	CAPT	119FW/DET 1/DO		DSN 757 225-234

Withheld from public release
by National Archives and
Records Administration
under 36 C.F.R. § 1256.56

10/7 119th Det 1

Bachman Chief EM

Force Provider

Command & Control

AF 119th ACC

CAT

Bachman Action Team




ANG (CAT)

7 units continuous task
to do AD alert

Air Tasking Order

Unit 119th FW



16 EM

2 OFF

here over 5 years

1 Sep 98

Pruce

March

Pruce

(Kalamanch)

↓ Pargo

June 41

on alert

since 1957


Line Up Cards
not maintained

NEADS

Det 1 long term


ATO short term

DCA - Defense Counter Air Alert



Don't go thru ACC or 119th or 1st Fighter Wing

Ownership
119th FW
↓
Det 1 (Host 1FW)



When in ATC System

Heading is just
that; North
290
↓
Directions
to the field

Standard Take off
10 JABBY OAF

lot of airports
largest concentration in the US

Looking for a close out letter
re ammo

ROE then no more

They authenticate an order to use
ammo or flares
There is a second order also to
be authenticate
DoD COMSEC

always had to authenticate a bill
in practice

changes have been in streamlining the
process

Sep 11 & Prior looking out ward for
a melting threat — since terrorist
threat possibly from within

For pilot — there would have been some build-up
at least a couple of authentications

Trained for intercepting a wide variety
of things and hijacking

AD units — once of a month
rest of AF — offensive counter air
long way from home

Counter drug 1990-forward

STAN
Eval

majority of STAN EVAL prior 9/11
was counter drug
intercept stay current get ID
Prior to 1990 been bombing
to select targets of al Qaida

System takes you East
while conflicts w/ all other
atc are resolved

If go west have to "step" thru the
traffic e.g. going home to FARGO

Scramble line in his office &

- CP
 - ATC Tower
 - ATC Center
 - 117th DET 2 phones
- 090 60
based on Centers
input

Example of making to go North but go East

~~Strategic positioning~~
Speed

Center line 1 Tank
2x 9 Stra
2x 120 AIM Radar Guided
20mm Gallies

Exercise world
was why
completely
beated

Guns generally loaded on most F16s
5 min at most to take triple
safety off

Standard on 9/11 2x 9
Guns
1 Tank

now add 2x 120 & and 2 Tanks

~~soldier screen~~
Then

2 Hot Jets
no CAPS
1 Tank
2x 9
Guns

pay screen
Now

3 Hot Jets
CAPS
2 Tanks
2x 9
2x 120
Guns

1 Tank is better training profile
more streamlined

2 Tanks 12K #

1 Tank 9.4K

100% "mil" 10K #/HR Low altitude
4K # hi

If light AB 50,000 #/hr low
40K hi

Take off AB cut back at 300 mm

Worst Case

1 HR fuel in mil low 2hr 20min hi

There is a fuel strategy

mil = .9 to .98 M

<u>Then</u>	<u>Now</u>
16 EN	16 + 10 EN
2 OFF	2 OFF
4 AC + 2 Alert Pilots	6 AC but down to 4 + 2 Alert Pilots
1 week	

Strategies

Then

Now

chaff flares

Apparna to
be there
for 100%
hygiene - masked

Post 9/11 detect rapidly

Hu mission

Flexible Capability to put
a set of eyes ^{rapidly} on the scene
~~through arms~~
to provide info for command
& control

→ flexibility comes from the
authentication

STAN & EVAL

- 1st AF SAC ^{hu mission} mission
- 119th Check rules to the pilots
- IG program
- NORAD → alert force evaluation

No notice sometimes site sometimes secret
there will be a coordinated adversary
∴ no notice scramble

also program

SPADES — training exercise

<u>Then</u>	<u>Now</u>
7	15 w capability

After 9/11, anyone other than Tom Clancy

Threat Training
Fog

- Classified email
- chat line
- STU III

Even though Andrews is there we considered
DC a shared responsible
There is benefit to an approach from
afar

Training re nature capital

NOT DC-specific other than
point targets

→ transferable skills

Prior 9/11

residual Base

a/c distress

hijack

C. Drug

Recommendations

Problems & Solution will be OK

- Facilities \$5.7M 1953 Building
little work in
50 yrs - alert
was all but gone

119th reopened the site

- Unit Manning Document for 18 to 42243 Double Completed
* not nearly enough for long term
need time to train, in add to ops mission
Temp solution this spring

- a/c They are bad F-16
A model

do some
training
w/ 1st Fw

Convert w/in a year or two

- Planning horizon

BRAC & military restructuring

Where are assignments going to be

Future threats ~ the blind spots

- man-days

Cycle of 40 w/ 28

- Guard mission & A-10 a good

mix → Active Duty has to be

involved → heavy black line, no

[need F-15a]

Big mistake to assume you can
project future threats

"Center of Gravity is Public Trust"

13

Thankful Otis & Langley were there

Radar Raelios & Data links

Need sensors

" Hitch

" reliability