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2/3/04 Interview w/ Gen Arnold

- Gen Arnold – Career
- Vietnam Combat Tour
- 1968 – entered Air Force Business
- Captain – fighter pilot
- Squadron Cmdr.
- Wing Cmdr.
- 147th Fighter Group – Texas – Wing Cmdr
- ANG Advisor
- ~~Cmdr~~
- First AF Vice-Cmdr
- Dec. 1997 Cmdr. CONUS
- Retired 10/1/02

NORAD mission over the years

- Evolution of Air Δ mission
- NORAD - established in 1958
- 1960's - In depth Air Δ system
- CMOC - Completed 1961-62
- Russians concentrated on ICBM missile and not on manned Bombers.
- Air Δ of Norad continued to draw smaller ~~ago~~ resources against Air Δ ~~[illegible]~~ manned bombers.
- 1970's - NORAD took down radars across Canadian Border
- 1980's - created JSS radar sites - (Took down military only radars).
- NORAD mission - predominately designed to meet Bomber threat.
- As Bomber threat ↓, the NORAD force structure ↓
- Late 1980's -> Cruise missile threat emerged.

- 1990's — NORAD started calling itself Air Sovereignty Alert and not Air Δ Alert.

- Air ~~Sovereignty~~ Sovereignty aspect of mission was always there but became prominent around time of fall of Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union demise.

- Hart Rudman Commission Study said biggest threat TO U.S. was from terrorists, rogues and rogue nations. (from outside the U.S.).

- Relationship b/w First AF and ANG.

- NORAD became an ANG mission.

- Arnold's predecessors wanted TO protect the NORAD mission so they decided it should be assigned TO the ANG.

- Sectors were traditional ANG Units.
  - (Title 32 Guardsmen for the most part in the sector stories)

- 1990's - down to 19 Air Δ Alert sites from over 100 sites long before 1990's.

- Gen. Kelley became first ANG officer to be appointed Commander of First A.F. at CONR.

- Norad - down from 19 TO 10 Air Δ alert sites.

- Pentagon employee Scotty Krebbs ("Cowboy Krebbs") wanted TO reduce NORAD to 4 alert Air Δ sites.

- ↓ this motion was defeated.

- General Estes prevailed to secure 7 Air Δ Alert sites.

- Gen. Arnold feared lack of coverage in South and SW of US.

- ~~"Token Air Sovereignty Sovereignty"~~

- "Token Air Sovereignty" → Arnold gives example of Terrorist threat to spray Anthrax over Houston, Texas.

- Gen. Arnold thought NORAD needed more air alert sites.

- Real World examples of deficiencies attendant to having only 4 alert sites → there were times when NORAD fighters could not reach a target in time to identify it.

- Along Southwest border — NORAD had radars designed to pick up primary Targets at low altitudes. (Paid for by Anti drug mission.

- Eastern U.S. border → NORAD radars better at reading higher altitude primary radars.

- Gen. Arnold put together the "RAN" team to help some NORAD mission.

- RAN Study: ① Is there a mission.
② If there is a mission, examine whether there is a better, more efficient

way to fulfill mission.

Pre 9-11. — Arnold says "We considered internal Δ of U.S. a ~~law~~ law enforcement issue."

— NORAD'S focus was always outward.

* — Arnold wanted to increase NORAD'S ability to detect a "low altitude" terrorist attack from outside the U.S.

— Arnold: the ability to surveil A/C in the interior U.S. is not the only issue.

↓

— You need to know the intent of the A/C. (e.g. know that the A/C has explosives and wants to smash into Fed Bldg).

— Payne Stewart incident: there was a discussion regarding the need to shoot the A/C down if it headed into heavily populated area.

— NORAD did not ask for the authority to shoot it down.

- NORAD needed SEC DEF. approval to shoot down Payne Stewart A/C.
- SEC DEF approval needed to shoot down derelict airborne object (e.g. air balloon).
- Most ANG ~~air~~ fighters fly under authority of ~~title~~ 32 and ~~not~~ title 10.

NORAD Exercises

- How does intelligence product plug into NORAD exercises.
- Post Cold War Era → Norad still looked at former USSR as a threat.
- What about intelligence ~~about~~ concerning airborne threats to U.S.?
- NORAD began to build exercises based on terrorist threats.
- (e.g. ~~threats~~ terrorists with WMD

on board and an intent to crash A/C in U.S.).

— Some scenarios did include A/C originating in U.S. with WMD on board.

— Scenarios always based on getting timely intelligence.

— Arnold says (pre 9-11) NORAD did consider terrorists' use of A/C as a WMD.

— The issue always came down to whether or not to shoot down A/C before it crashed.

— ~~NORAD~~ Assumed FAA knew how to do its job.

— More (NORAD) coordination w/ FAA was not an issue under Arnold.

— I think we did a good job of focusing on what we were tasked to do.

* — Deputy Asst. Sec. of Δ for Advanced Technology — Joe Esche (SP?). Easch? did consider a ~~t~~ terrorist threat TO U.S. Originating from within the U.S.
↳ he was more concerned with small A/C as WMD.

— Arnold told Esche that was "a law enforcement" issue.

— on 9/11 — NORAD was in a high state of "Capability" Alert because of the real World Russian Exercise.

— "We had a capability TO shoot down UAL 93 if it continued towards D.C."

The Events of 9-11

— 7 Alert sites.

— Long range tanks on F-15's at Otis and Portland.

— Langley had long range tanks.

- 7 alert sites - sufficient to protect N.E. against perceived threats. → not in the South or S.W.
- 9/11/01 → ch middle of exercise.
- Arnold finished a VTC and he received a note that ~~a~~ FAA reported a hijack in N.E.
- He went TO Dep of Battle Cab at CONR.
- Red switch phone TO connect TO NORAD HQ; NMCC.
- Sectors forward tell radar ~~the~~ info and voice info to CONR.
- NEADS could forward tell track number TO CONR.
- CONR system was good for situational awareness but was not very real time accurate.

- CONR could not see what NEADS saw on its Radars.
- CONR B.C. had two phones.
- CONR B.C. does had only 2 red phone switches.
- Arnold talked to Col. man. (not sure if he used red switch phone or not).
- Arnold told man to scramble OTIS and he would get permission later.
- Intent was to put fighters in W105 area. (no intent to put fighters over NYC b/c they did not know where AAL 11 was when otis scrambled).
- Arnold did not think at first that AAL 11 hit WTC.
- Arnold thinks he made decision to put otis fighters in W105.

Deputy Chief of NORAD today.
D.O. on 9-11

- Arnold called General Finley (Canadian) at NORAD TO Get Approval to scramble a/c.

- Canada could not make decisions regarding Cuba b/c they recognize Cuba and U.S. does not.

- 2nd hijack → Arnold saw A/C hit WTC 2.

- he had no prior knowledge of UAL 175 being hijacked. (he first thought it was a replay of first crash).

- After 2nd crash into WTC 2; he was told UAL 175 was a "possible hijack".

- He did not keep Col. Marr on the phone line.

- No open line TO FAA from CONR.

- CONR had no ability to track hijacked A/C independent of information received from NEADS.

- CHAT LOGS: they were "pretty good" on 9/11/01.

- Arnold does not recall the CHAT LOGS being real helpful to him.

- Somewhere during "this time frame" we heard AAL 77 was missing.

- they thought AAL 77 dropped off radar and crashed.

- 9:09 A.M. LFI placed on battle stations.

- Arnold says - In retrospect it would have been a good idea to scramble LFI at 9:09 A.M.

- Fuel was a consideration.

Pre 9-11 - CONR Battle Staff - 5 people on duty on a regular shift. (only 38 full time Battle Staff employees).

- on 9/11/01 MCC Masypany would have talked to Steve Hund at CONR or one of the CONR technicians.

— 9:21 A.M. NCC nosypony decides to scramble 1FI on report that AAL 11 is still airborne and headed to D.C.

— Arnold remembers hearing the report of AAL 11 being airborne after 9:20 A.M. and it causing great confusion.

— NEADS made the decision to call off the Otis tail Chase of AAL 11.

— CONR expects the sectors to make the tactical decisions because they have the "best picture" or situational awareness.

— Air Force Credo = rely on the guy with the best picture.

— Declaration of AFIO → CONR would not need to approve it but would be made aware of it by NEADS.

— Arnold: It's news to me that FAA told us about UAL 93 after it crashed.

- Arnold's memory of "Shoot Down ORDER"
- We were "thinking about UAL 93" ~~at~~ at the time.
- Strategy was to intercept UAL 93 if it continued towards ~~the~~ D.C. Wash. D.C.
- ~~He recalls~~ He recalled thinking they were tracking UAL 93 when they discussed getting "shoot down" authority if UAL 93 continued towards D.C.
- Arnold believed he had authority to shoot down UAL 93 if it continued TO D.C. absent the POTUS or VPOTUS grant of shoot down authority.
- Arnold and man talked about shooting down a/c before UAL 93 was reported "down".
- He thinks "Weapons Free" declaration Applied TO NCR.
- It means you can shoot down

Emergency

Any A/C in the NCR ~~if it~~ could not be deemed ~~friendly~~ and does not respond to direction from fighters.

Authority would not go all the way down to the pilot → ~~no need for approval from anyone below the fighter pilot level!~~

if the ROE was peacetime.

- only CONR Comdr. could ~~approve~~ grant full authority in an emergency under peacetime ROE.

Change in the DEFCon - Level 3

- Arnold recalls talking to Gen. Eberhardt several times on 9/11.
- Eberhart said he would Call Chairman of JCS or Vice-Chairman of JCS re: Change in Defcon.
- Arnold said he would Call Air Force Chief of Staff to advise

of NORAD's efforts to collect A/C assets and to protect certain U.S. regions.

↓

NORAD wanted AF TO know what they were doing with AF Airplines.

— Arnold believes he heard about change TO Defcon 3 from NORAD (probably Gen. Farley) either on phone call (red switch or STU) or over the Chat log.

— He was not involved in discussion/ decision TO employ modified version of ~~the~~ SCATANA.

— ~~NORAD~~ When NORAD says it "expresses concern" it is ~~making~~ reference TO ~~the~~ placement of missile attack warning systems.

↳ "Missile Defense Alert" essentially means on "assessment" of concern. It means NORAD thinks an ~~the~~ attack is coming their way. (a "concern" that they may be under attack).

- Arnold says the VP authority to kill commercial A/C ~~NCR~~ gave the pilots the authority to shoot A/C with no higher level approval.
  ↳ He equates this w/ a declaration of a "Weapons Free Zone".
  ↓
- This order appears to conflict with peacetime ROE.

JF reviews May Commission testimony with Arnold.

- Arnold relied on times given to him by Colonel Scott who got the information from NEADS.
  (e.g. Arnold statement that FAA was aggressively pointing out UAL 93 to NORAD → not true).

- No discussion prior to May hrg. that Langley was scrambled on report that AAL 11 was headed to Wash. D.C.

- No after action report done by CONR.

- Bob man put together some time-line and CONR accepted them as ground truth.

- Col. Scott drafted briefings from man's time lines.

* - No effort to sanitize the ~~read~~ timeline and record of events of 9-11 to make the Government look better.

- ~~No~~ He is not aware of any decision by Govt. to make the FAA look better regarding their response to events on 9-11.

single red switch phone
+ intel had one

Intel
Col
LT Glen
Maj Del Toro

Bill Childers

on 2/2/04 Staff T

2/3/04 General Arnold

Air Defense 1968
Pilot
Sqd Cdr
Wing Cdr
147th Gp Houston
ANG Advisor Air University
NG Bureau Readiness Center
IFF Vice Cdr
Dir Cdr Dec 1997
1 Aug 2002 Change of Command

1958 NORAD
60'2 Soviet Bomber Threat diminished
dwindling manned bomber fuel

Cued up
- Radar
- P.P.
- Freedom

70's put down radars
by definition anything in US
Canada was friendly - not
to be ID'd

Almost exclusive JSS early 80's
down to 4 AD Sectors

Late 80's "window of concern"
Advent of Cruise missiles

early 90's air sovereignty terminology

Hart Rudman commission
greatest threat rogue nations
again, from outside the border

1993 transition into Guard
Gen Lowe wanted to maintain
Title 10 status fm ACC to the
Shooter
early 90's 19 Alert sites down fm 100
2 Act Duty McChord & Langley
Gen Kelley - 1st ANG officer to
command IFF begin 1994
10 alert sites
Then pressure in GDR (Estes)
96-97 move to reduce

Scotty Beebe Col "Cowboy"
"four corner"

Seven envy? Concerning about South border. Thought we should have had more. "play at the plate"

Mentioned air defense forces going over seas

44 ADSA-4 designed for FH
long range
not designed for low altitude
Tethered gave low altitude

RAM Team
4 Corner — didn't think analysis was sufficient
so Q#1 "Is there a mission?"
so Gen Pachmara led the team
if no mission then how do we divest
if mission then is there a better way to do it

[illegible] ? 9th 8th & 12th AF when

Scott quote
no thought to look internal
Law Enforcement issue

FAA claims they don't have a national
security mission

(*) Turning those forces in, on request,
was, and is, the issue

ACTD advance concept technology ?display

if no sensors – these intel queueing
or protect a specific event

Surveillance alone is not the issue

Payne Stewart
Scrambled Tyndall but intercepted
w planes in the air

MAA — he was shown

Threat

His concern here we were going to be attack

Took us a long time to think the Cold War threat had gone away

Cold War Resurgence

Easdn

Joe Ish Dep ASD for Advanced Technology Previous Administration

9/11 Comfortable in NE

out of VTC w/ CINC NORAD Staff

note f Kelly Duckett

NE was reporting

Went to BC.

Red Switch DSRM (2)

NORAD

AF Leadership

NMCC

The sectors forward told & voice told Track #

Not looking at any a/c flying

Every Region had a different system — good for situational awareness — not accurate for position good at the time

STU III

red Switch used little
one w/ intel
prior to STR no red switch

Called MARR

Boston reports a flyer

Launched w/ intention to put the fighter in W105
didn't think first hit had anything to do w/ AA11

His call to put Otis in holding area
"get them airborne & hold them out over the water"
called Gen Rich Finley at NORAD, Canadian on duty

175 hit, first time he knew about it

doesn't know he was talking to Col Marr

Other people

FO talking ↑↓ to other FO types

Protocols

Different levels of Chat logs

Doesn't recall chat being real helpful

somewhere we heard AA 27 was missing, but didn't know it was a hijacking — it had crashed

IDOP7

MCC would have been talking to

Sectors are expected to make the tactical decisions

BØ32

Parallel Issues

William Kelley
~~Charles~~ Duckett

now in DO at 1 FF

Gen. Arnold 2nd "interview" not recorded

① Intro / notice of Hearing (June)
- higher level representation

- War on w/ report of AA11 airborne
- agrees w/ Langley scramble on AA11

- 89 lands. Then reports of 93 heading to DC
LA wanted to "push" F-16 towards the a/c
if it sets w/in 100 mi.

93
- told it stop squawk / off radar
- mentioned recall that 89 landed + focus
shifted to UA93.
- showed LA that 89 lands 1011.
↳ "shocking" → recalls it diff. recalls
being told UA93 headed DC.
• LA ackn. May hearing timeline incorrect
- 84 Rades reconst.
knows now 93 was in ground, but LA
didn't know it. Recalls discussing
- remembers "an airplane" (D89) meaning around.
☐ Recalls Bomar discussions on UA93
↳ could it be no FAA people telling him info?
• "only place we could have received the information
is from NEADS"

Bill Spruance

Long discussions w/ JG, not heated.

focus on "what occurred" not necessarily notifications.

Never recalls any contention w/ FAA or vice versa.

Doesn't recall how the NORAD Release was coord. or who did that.

☆ Recalls again conversation w/ BOMAR on UA93. what to do w/ Langley push out when w/in 100 mi. b/c not knowing if other threats to DC were out there.

Today:
- problematic in determining intent of A/C
- LOC still red switch / DEN
- needs to be a better system ?
  Data / video "VOIP"
  Voice

☐ DEN @ CONR?

needs to work in || not on series

A02 - has Dew

- FAA
USSS

0950 NEADS
FAA
Telcon

Gen. Arnold. outline

A.) Lock down Communications paths between ARNOLD ⟷ NEAD.

ARNOLD – NORAD (CNOC).

B.) Lock down Post 9-11 efforts TO develop a NORAD Timeline.

(1.) NORAD 9/18/01 Timeline
(2) NORAD Timeline AND Power-Point PRESENTATIONS TO The COMMISSION (all May 2003 Commission Transcripts).

(3.) The Filson Book.

C.) – mission – Pre 9-11 / Post 9-11
– Preparedness to meet mission Pre 9-11
– Threats assessed pre 9-11

☐ Mission
☐ ex
☐ QDR

Maj. Gen. Arnold 2/3/04:

- Air Defense since ≈ 1968 (Oct 2002 Ret.)
- Mission
- CNOC = $4 invested
- ICBM/SLBM ↑ 60's ; Bombers ↓
- NORAD Resources decreased - draw down against manned bombers

70's - took down Can. border radars in 70's = Cond. + US = friendly

80's - Joint. Surv. sites around perimeter kept viable = 80's

★ Bomber Threat diminished greatly late 60's → 90's

★ Late 80's "window of concern" Full USSR + proliferation of Cruise Missile tech. / Threat
↳ could not detect this threat effectively
"can't to live w/ surv. capab. of bomber detection."

- early 90's Air Sov. (not Air Def.)
= control borders, "reasonable" ability to Intere.
- Hart Rudman = terrorists + rogue nat.
↳ "I + we believed that to be true"
★ Prevent outside threats from coming in
* no knowl. from I that we should have been focused internally
- ANG Mission didn't really impact findly

- Perhaps switch to ANG had an impact
- 1997 QDR pressure to reduce # of Alert sites
  - wanted 4

X- 7 adequate?

"concerned about terrorist issues. I thought we didn't have enough resources w/ 7. Gen. Estes rolled in hand to just keep 7 not 4."

- ## limited resources force tough decisions

- Numerous events comment "phy. impossible to get true sometimes." ie. Mexico → CBP on El Paso "we'd watch it"

- Radars = high Alt., long - med. range A/c detection
- Not designed for primary targets @ low alt.
  → could if close in COS to Radar facility

- RAM Team

4 cons def didn't have sufficient analysis needed to conduct a study to answer

1. Is true a mission?
2. If no, how do we divest our f. structure
3. If yes, define it + eval. for. structure

wanted outside indep. A.o. somewhat succ. in that

- QDR presses to shut down IAF
  ≈ continually pressure to reduce f. structure AF

- Col Scott quote from RAM team work on UBL / terrorism.
  Mission to address internal threats? "No"
  "Bc we cons. it a L.E issue"

"FAA claims they don't have a Nat. Sec. mission"
↳ "I have big probs w/ that."

Adv. Concept. Tech. D.V. (ACTD) = Cruise Missile
* pretty good success
  model Intel Corp + ability to protect a certain area. (specifically)

★ "Russian Threat not really dispensed with until after 9/11."

☒ FAA critical for internal CONUS ops.
yet we see less than
visions sets of

You said w/ regard to P. Stewart that
NORAD worked very well w/ FAA

7500 squawk = always trained for

Time sensitive

↳ or when you are talking about the
whole country, prof. whole country,
but what about NCR or NYC?

(How are we going to be attacked)

Wanna key intel

☐ Joe Ish (eesh)
Dep Asst. SecDef for Adv. Tech

↳ Prob. only guy who predicted AQ
as wraps.

9/11

- "Pretty comfortable w/ NE alert posture."

- IDs Red Switch, "had 2"
- Sector Forward Tell data + Voice Tell all tracks of interest.

- Our sit. Awaess was "good"; totally inadequate for the ROE needs of today.

* up until BTTR 96, AOC had 0 Red switches.

* - offers own that OTIS was to hold in W-105, b/c didn't know where ALL was. Doesn't recall if it was his initiative or concurrence.
- Had CNN up on the monitor
- Rick Finley (DO @ CMOC on 9/11; now Dep. Cmd. NORAD)

- CHAT not directly helpful to Arnold, but kept the staff informed well.

- brings up that they heard 77 was missing. Not sure where, ALL of us

9/11

☒ Public description of OTIS scramble to NYC conveys the impression that they were headed straight to NYC @ "very high speed" and "going very fast"

JF 9:09 (pg. 13 Alderson MCC transcript)
↳ Langley B. Stations

☐ - MCC NEADS would talk to _____ @ CONR
(one of 5 or so on duty @ any given time)

☆ Langley Scramble - Tape / Trans. review
· A says his recollection was off.

roughly 9:30 ≈ "really still not sure what the hell is going on @ this point."

☆ - "Got forward / voice tell on D 1989"

100 mi we'll intercept

- 10:07 UA93 Bomb hits floor
10:10 ≈ unable to locate
10:15 - floor gets word 93 down C. David

} A remembers discussing ROE w/ MARR, but ackn. that they only see D1989 @ that time NOT 93

- W Free : A says you shoot it if its ID'd as hostile

OStory was what I thought / think

Gen E "I will call the Chairman" on DEFCON
GA "I will talk to AF C. of. Staff" on what we were doing.

Folder 13
1:27 → Poss T3 on missile wing
↳ NO

Timelines & May 4 + 9/11 story

- 9:24
- ☆ - Gen. A relying on times provided by Col. Scott
- We sure thought we were right
- ☆ - Any AAR? "NO", but yes dod recall Bog. letter
- ☆ - One person in charge: Bob Mon timelines, Scott timelines
- Not aware of efforts to transcribe Flone tapes