

Kevin's NORAD HQ notes

Lieutenant General Findley (CF)  
3/1/04

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE  
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,  
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)  
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2011-048, document no. 38  
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: September 29, 2014

- 1968 Pilot, flew helicopters in CF Army
- Arrived NORAD HQ summer 2001 as Director of Operations (NJ3)
- Was the Battlestaff Director on 9/11
- Promoted to Deputy Commander of NORAD summer 2003

9/11

- Two things going on, the VG exercise + real-world operation re Russian EX (Vigilant Guardian-01 + Operation Northern Denial)
- OND = NORAD demonstration of resolve against the Russian air EX
- ALL NORAD fully manned on morning of 9/11
- Gen. F was just coming off the night shift (paired up with the daytime for the Russians. Equated to the A-list personnel being on the night watch, and the ones who inherited the situation on 9/11)
- Shift change was roughly 0700 Mountain time (0900 Eastern)
- Battlestaff and Command Center received word of real world HJ around 0640 MT, from CONR via a telephone line.
- Air Warning Center (AWC) would have received the notification also.
- The involvement of Otis fighters was "NEADS" call, though Gen. F does recall some conversations about it. He spoke frequently with CAPT Jelineck (CF) who was the
- Reports came in that the first WTC hit was from a "small aircraft."
- Just after the second WTC hit, the Battlestaff and CC were still trying to figure out if either or both hits were in fact the reported HJ a/c. The true SA was not clear at NORAD HQ level at this time.
- Gen. F and the entire battlestaff + CC did know that it was a coordinated terrorist attack after the second WTC hit.
- Battlestaff + CC communications were with CONR.
- Gen. F's role was to forward information to Gen. Eberhart (who was at the time in the old HQ building).
- Gen. F didn't recall specifically when Gen. E arrived at CMOC, though he knew Gen. E was working the National Command Authority (NCA) issues "very hard" from his office and during his transit to CMOC.
- Gen. E may have still been in route CMOC when UA93 crashed.
- Communications with NMCC: A Significant Event Conference call was initiated. Gen. F was on it very briefly, but Colonel Mike Cook (NJ33), Colonel Bob Seeton (NJ2), and CAPT Jelineck were the ones primarily on the telecon. The DDO at NMCC pulled the telecon together.
- Info received on the SEC telecon would be passed to/from the Battlecab and CC floor via "call-outs" - verbally.

FAA Involvement:

- Situational Awareness for NORAD HQ was solely provided by CONR (and indirectly by NEADS)

## Kevin's NORAD HQ notes

- Gen. F vaguely recalled a report, after the second WTC hit, of AA11 still being airborne and headed south towards Washington D.C. – though he mentioned that it was just added to the many reports coming into the BS + CC at the time. He commented that they were all definitely trying to figure out how many HJ there were and which ones went into the WTC. Gen. F added that the confusion “certainly could have resulted in the thinking that AA11 was AA77.”
- BS + CC had to rely on the FAA for SA and he doesn't recall getting much information at all forwarded via the “loop” (telecon).
- The FAA “system” was not up to the 9/11 situation, but is today. Mentions how important the DEN line is and that it fully meets the capability requirements of today (though, he said, it took three months or so to fully get air discipline incorporated into the nation's air traffic situation).
- Said that today the radars are now all tied together “so we can all see and share the information.”
- HJ is still a law enforcement issue, but with instant SA and information sharing.
- Asked about the Airline's role on 9/11 and after, Gen. F replied that they were “brilliant partners, and allow us to call into their centers and sometimes get onto the loop.” He mentions the usefulness of ACARS.
- To Gen. F, the main difference following the attacks was the change in culture. Pre-9/11 NORAD had no direct connectivity to/from the Airlines, it was always done via the FAA. Today there are direct lines of communication between NORAD and the Airlines, TSA, etc. The coordination aspects have really been worked out in the last 2.5 yrs since 9/11.
- Gen. F characterized the pre-9/11 HJ protocol (FAA > NMCC > NORAD > CONR > NEADS) as a “good call” considering the pre-9/11 culture. The effective NORAD instruction on 9/11 “makes perfect sense” with that mindset. However, “all bets were off when that second airliner hit the WTC.”
- Gen. F stressed the great initiative shown to handle a situation that had never occurred, or had been predicted previously.

## Scrambles:

- Pre-9/11 scrambles usually allotted for 10-15 minutes to get airborne, usually towards the 15 minute time. Getting airborne in 6 minutes was “outstanding.”

## Langley Scramble:

- Gen. F knew it was because of another HJ aircraft heading towards Washington D.C. Didn't get, or recall, the exact tail number, etc.
- The report of another aircraft heading toward Washington caused the Langley scramble.
- Gen. F believes that it was, or should have been conveyed on the SEC telecon.
- Didn't recall the report of a VFR 6 miles out. Commented that NORAD HQ had no SA prior to the impact of AA77.

## Kevin's NORAD HQ notes

- Asked about the impact the Langley fighters had on the situation, Gen. F responded that they decided to put them over Washington D.C. but "were still not entirely sure of exactly who was who..."

### Delta 1989:

- Was reported over the loop, heading toward Cleveland.
- Recalls that CONR was working frantically to get assets to intercept it.
- Gen. F said that they were "closely monitoring that one through the FAA" (though this doesn't fully mesh with his earlier depiction of FAA involvement, likely means that CONR/NEADS were getting that info from the FAA, not NORAD HQ).
- NORAD HQ couldn't track Delta 1989, it had to be forward-told via Granite Sentry, which was very difficult to keep up with via manual input.
- The FAA representative in the BS + CC was "Reg" (doesn't recall last name), and Gen. F thought he eventually established direct calls into the FAA (WOC of CC?).
- Reg was in very close proximity to Gen. F and they knew Delta 1989's origin and flight plan.
- Gen. F wasn't sure if they actually believed Delta 1989 was an actual HJ.

### UA93:

- Around that time, NORAD HQ did know that there were three crashes.
- Gen. F recalled repeatedly asking if all HJ were accounted for.
- He recalled receiving notification of a crash in Pennsylvania – and that no prior information on UA93 was received by NORAD HQ. (Staff comment: and therefore no prior point-outs by the FAA on UA93 prior to crash).
- Doesn't recall the "5<sup>th</sup> flight" Canadian a/c.

### ROE + Shoot Down:

- SEC transitioned into an ATCC.
- Didn't participate directly in the VP discussion of shoot down.
- Col. Cook put down the phone and conveyed that the VP gave authority to shoot down a/c. Gen. F believes he spoke to General Arnold at CONR via the Red Switch to both convey and confirm the VP guidance.
- Gen. F believes that CONR had heard the same guidance simultaneously, as Gen. Arnold probably had someone on the loop as well.
- Gen. F's recollection is that the VP guidance occurred after the reported crash of UA93.
- What did that order mean to the pilots? Gen. F believed that the order would/should have been conveyed directly to the pilots, and he believes that they in fact did get the order (Staff note: they did not).
- The time function would have been the key determinant to what a pilot would have done. Gen. F stated that time allowing, any engagement would have gone up the line (NEADS, CONR, HQ, etc.) but just how far up would have depended on timing issues.

## Kevin's NORAD HQ notes

- According to Gen. F they never exercised such situations with commercial a/c or any non-military a/c prior to 9/11.
- Emergency order to engage would/could have allowed NEADS commander to order action (applicable to the morning time only).
- On 9/11 Gen. F had no idea that Andrews fighters were airborne. Didn't get word until around 9/12.
- Changing the ROE was probably not the explicit intention of going to DEFCON 3. Gen. F saw the change as more of a decision for global posture and readiness, not for Air Defense ROE. Gen. F believes that the change didn't make it any easier for the pilots to take timely action, though he also added that "in an emergency I don't think there would have been any hesitation" (to engage an a/c demonstrating hostile intent ~ staff language)
- Gen. F stated that the VP's explicit emergency authority for Washington D.C. was "very helpful" because the transition ROE wasn't tailored for the situation they faced on 9/11.
- Wasn't aware of weapons free.
- Impact weapons free on the pilots? Not sure it would have had any real effect as he thought it unlikely that a pilot would have taken the decision to engage unto himself.

## Post-event AARs / Hotwashes / etc.:

- Immediately used RADES radar data.
- "Never had a formal after action because it is still an ongoing operation."
- Though, Gen. F then said that some efforts were instantly coordinated via Gen. E directives (RADES radar analysis, timeline reconstruction, and "who said what to whom + why")
- Any AAR on why request for assistance (and information flow) didn't work out according to protocols? Gen. F replied that they intuitively knew that it didn't work correctly or as needed, and therefore worked out solutions and fixes within a matter of hours or days following the attacks. (Staff note: implied that an after action-type effort wasn't necessary to fix what was broken).
- Any AAR on AA77? Gen. F replied that the ability to see it wasn't there, even by the FAA.
- CAPT Jelineck did lead an immediate hotwash (of the logs and timeline of events) with his watch crew.
- 9/18 press release was assisted by the Analysis "folks" – Dr. Finkleman and company. Gen. F said there "wasn't a huge focus on it at the time."
- Gen. E did task out "what happened?"
- When was it recognized that some of the key times of the 9/18 release were incorrect? "The times were given to HQ by the Sector."
- Asked about the latest HQ timeline (provided to the Commission at the end of February) Gen. F stated that Colonel Moulton was the POC and coordinated it with CONR and NEADS.
- Gen. F did state that he has read the NEADS transcripts of 9/11 communications.

## Kevin's NORAD HQ notes

## Asymmetric Threat

- Always worked HJ in training, but never with aircraft being used as a weapon.
- Examples of traditional HJ were given by the General (1. a deranged individual; 2. Terrorists with political objectives.
- Gen. F stressed that most of the "thousands" of real-world HJ since 1994 were of the traditional type.
- "Then..." according to Gen. F, WMD-type scenarios were added (WMD cargo aboard commercial a/c) – mainly in tabletop type exercises. "To reinforce the fact that ROE went beyond NORAD HQ, and required higher-up political authorities."
- Any air defense training to protect the National Capital Region (NCR) pre-9/11? "No. Not in Canada either."

## Future Recommendations:

- None specifically mentioned.
- Noted that the FAA radars are getting old. DOD and FAA are working to resolve the situation (looking at "WAS")
- Visibility is key.

NORAD HQ Visit  
LGEN Findley (CF) 3/1/04

- 1968 Pilot; helos in Army
- S. Penn 2X; multiple overseas tours
- CANR
- Summer 2001 N. HQ Dir. of OPS (N53)  
↳ 2.5 mo here on 9/11
- Battle Staff Director on 9/11
- Promoted Dep. CDR N. this Summer

9/11

- 2 things going on (1) Exercise (2) Operation
- We UG + OP. Northern Denial
- N. Denial = N only to demonstrate resolve against Russian Air exercise
- All N. fully manned
- just coming off the night shift (night ≈ daytime for Russ. = top watch on C night)
- Shift change ≈ 7:00 am Verify
- ≈ 640 CT notice of real W. HJ
- from CONR/NEADS dir. into CMOC via tele
- Air Warning Center would have received it  
↳ into NBMC
- OTIS involvement? NEADS call, did have some conv.  
↳ went to B. Stations, spoke w/ (+ freq.) w/ CAPT Telmeck

- reports 1<sup>st</sup> hit was small ALC
- 2<sup>nd</sup> hit, still trying to figure out if either were the reported HJ ALC.
  - still not clear @ N. HQ
  - \* did know it was a coord. attack after 2<sup>nd</sup> hit.

- Asym. Threat:

- always used HJ, but not as a weapon
  - ① deranged indiv > traditional HJ, ngs
  - ② political aims      most of the thousands since 1944 of these type.



- Then added WMO-type cargo onboard but no real correlation of ROE (shoot-down versus these a/c "table top" type exercises; to reinforce that it went beyond N. HQ reg. higher-political authorities

\* What drove the Δ? Intel?

- Comms
- Needs + CONR
- cmoc Battle cab info fwd'd to Gen. E who was here @ HQ bld. Gen. F's role to convey info.
- don't know exactly when he arrived cmoc
  - ↳ Gen E was working NCA calls @ 4:3 office "working sit. very hard"

- Gen E: after P., may have been enroute when 93 crashed.

- Comms w/ NMCC

① Sig. Events Conf. ; Gen. E on it briefly, but Col. Mike Cook (NJ33) +

referred local

Col. Bob Seaton (J2) were on it primarily + Mike Jelneck

↳ in the Battle Lab. + would pass out info via call-outs + verbally

- DDO @ NMCC pulls it together

- FAA involvement:

- "SA from the Sector (Needs) → CONR → CMOC"

- after 2<sup>nd</sup> hit (before 3<sup>rd</sup>) report of AAU1 airborne headed to D.C. - remember?

↳ not sure, but defin. trying to figure out how many HTs, which ones into WTCs

"certainly could have resulted into thinking it was 77"

- had to rely on FAA + doesn't recall getting much info forwarded on on the "coop" (Sig. Events call)

\* - believes the report of AAU1 Airborne + headed to D.C., but was added to the many reports coming in @ the time

- US 1991 / Can. 1972 last HJMs
- FAA system not up to 9/11 situation  
 ↳ but today Domestic Event Network (DEN)

fully takes care of it; though took 3 mo. or so to fully get air discipline (to include comm air pilots) + radars now tied together "so we can all see + share the info"



↳ H3 still a LE issue, but w/ instant SA + info sharing.

- Airlines' Role? "Brilliant partners. Allow us to call into their CCs, sometimes on the loop, ACARS."

Main diff was the change in culture  
 ↳ <sup>pre 7/11</sup> no direct info to-fan airlines, always via FAA

includes direct connectivity btw Airlines, TSA, + NORAD coord. very well worked out in last 2 1/2 yrs.

- FAA → NMCC → N.HQ → CONR → NORAD  
 ↳ was the setup on 9/11
- "a good call" w/ the pre-9/11 culture
- "NORAD inst makes perfect sense" w/ that mindset

- "All helos were off when that 2<sup>nd</sup> ALC hit WTC."
  - \* Great initiative to handle a situation that had never occurred or been predicted previously.

- Scrambles usually allot for 10-15 min usually towards 15 min. 6 min airborne was outstanding

### Langley Scramble

- knew it was b/c of motor HS a/c heading towards Washington. Didn't get exact tail #s etc. Report of ALC heading to crash caused the scramble
  - ↳ was, or should have been on STP. Event Conf.
- Report of VFR 6 mi out? Didn't know about that @ the time. No SA, no SA pre-impact of 77 @ HQ.
- Impact on Lang. Fighters? = Put fighters over D.C.
  - "still not entirely sure of exactly who was who..."

**D1989**

- Reported over the loop; headed toward Cleveland. Come working to get assets to intercept - frankly.
- "Closely monitoring that one through the FAA"
- Could HQ track it? "No." rely on Corridor Sentry had to be manually inputted very diff.



- FAA rep in Corridor for exercise
- "Reg" first name
- estab. direct calls into FAA ops center (assuming that's where)
  - callouts +
- in Battle cab; very close proximity to Gen. F.
- we knew JT's origin + flight, not sure why they believed it was JT

**UA 93**

- knew there were 3 crashes.
- kept asking if that accounted for all HTJs



- Notified of crash in PA; no prior notification here @ HQ
- no point out from FAA links!

- Canadian "5<sup>m</sup> flight"?

No, don't recall that, may have but doesn't reg. as a sig. event.

- "1000 Picture"

• CAPs over NYC + DC

• Canons difficulties? "No"

↳ talked about afterward?

More on the Radar issues but Gen. F. mentions it was both the radar + 9 Canons; especially w/in the interior of the country.

- "Cooking out" pre 9/11 = radar + canons that worked well

- "Cert. some things w/d have to direct A.A. ops w/in the interior"

- Any thoughts on radar p/c of the A/c? "Yes, #1 A/ces"

□ - "Neon had a formal AA V/c it is still an ongoing operation."

Instantly Coord by Gen. E direction



① Radar

② Timeliness

③ "who said what to who + why"

- Instant dialogue post 9/11 on Radar + comm  
ABMOS, Loops & DEN,

↳ rolling improvements  
↳ UTZ capabilities now

- 93 AAR (N. or FAA)?

• that issue, FAA's knowl / SA of SA but  
not resulting in NoRAD w/ some SA  
↳ resulted in DEN, Loops, everything

~ 9:34  
woc  
+  
H.C.C.

• AAR? on why not get into to connect  
↳ ~~more~~ believe it was more internally  
done a course level.

★

↳ intuitively knew that it didn't  
work correctly or as needed ∴  
worked out a fix w/in hours / days

- 77 AAR on lack of SA?

• ability to see it wasn't true, even  
by FAA

★ Read the transcripts from NEADS

## - ROE / S.D

- ATCC (from SE call) } Partcip. or recoll.?
- VP authority
- didn't part. in the discussion

Col. Cook put down phone + conveyed that VP gave authority; believes he spoke to Gen. A. on Red switch to confirm info / convey. Both had heard the same thing. Gen. A prob had a sim person on the loop.

- recollection is this occurred at 757 into P.; but then says
- ↳ After 1003 crash? After ↙

- what did that order mean to pilots?
- would go directly to the pilot level
- we didn't get bound / strangled by procedures. Flow and Flex.
- NEADS → Pilots is what Gen. F believes happened. To make team aware of the ROE Δ.

- ★ • Function of time key driver on what pilot would have done. Would have gone up the line Neads, come, HQ but how far up would depend on time issue, sensitivity
- Navy exercised w/ command as any non-mil a/c / re 9/11

- Could Neads have executed shoot-d. Emerg. order would have applied to the Am period as well
- we had good loop w/ NMCC
- Neads could have taken action

- Had no idea Andrews up that day; not until next day 12<sup>th</sup>

- RoE T. automatic w/ Defcon 3
- prob. not the explicit intention of ↑ Defcon, more a decis. for global readiness, not an A.D. RoE decision

only explicit - for DC

VP

- Explicitly emerg. authority was very helpful, b/c the trans. RoE was specific but not tailored for sit.

- Pilots Availability Δ w/ Defcon 3/T RoE?
- not made it easier for them, not useful RoE for that threat.

Reactive = POTUS

Trans = CINCPACAD

↳ "in an emergency, I don't think there would have been any hesitation."

- Weapons Free?

"Not aware of that."

- implication for pilot?

↳ not sure if it would have had an effect. Would have been covered by Emrg. declaration, but not likely to take decision onto himself.

- NCR exercises?

NO. Not in Canada either.

### Future Recomm

- Radars (FAA) getting old; working w/ FAA to replace ↑ Air Surveillance → looking @ "WAS"

- U.S. b. by is key

① SCATANA → "FAA made terrorist call" → facilitated grandly now by region,

② AAR? TFEL?

A/C type (ie. not need w/ 1st resp.)

③ May H. / Twelve

④ Exercises + Intell

D Jelneck Hotwash on loss / times

CONR → AWC

↓

ABMO e

→ Gen. F.

Command Center

B. Cab

9/11 ABMO not the main focal point  
too much going on

### Timelines

① 9/18 Release: → not a huge focus on:

- Analysts (AN) folks e the time

• Doc Ankerman head AN @ time  
worked w/ Rades + Sectores

• Retired + still in the Area

• Gen. E tasked out "what happened?"

~ 0843 <sup>FAA</sup> notification of UA175

~

• when was it recog. these times were wrong?

"times we were given by the sectors"

② 2/04 New Timeline

• J2 Points out Lingley scramble rationale goes

77 → ten 93

• who? "Naval ops" w/ Needs + CONR

• did <sup>Needs</sup> ask about 9:16 UA93 recently  
but it didn't do anything → not for  
the 9/18

↳ Col. Moulton as POC

# 3/1/04 NORAD INTERVIEWS<sup>18</sup>

Dr. Fredley Interview outline

I - Background military experience

II) - Mission of Norad over the years - Evolution  
- From  $\Delta$  of Symmetrical Threats  
To  $\Delta$  of Asymmetrical Threats

AWC

III) Day of 9-11 (Events)

Situational awareness re:

A.) AAL 11 - ~~Cap. Jellbeck~~

B.) UAL 175 - ~~Reach~~

C.) AAL 77

D.) UAL 93

Significant Event Conf.

7-7 Shift

Communications -

NORAD got its information on 9-11  
from who?  
Where?

NMCC  
NEA  
Eberhart

Role of NEADS?  
CONR?

NORAD - Director of operations - Battle Staff  
Director

[ - Comms between NORAD HQ and NMCC? NCA?

- Communications and Control of fighter pilots over Wash. D.C.? N.Y.C? \*

~~U.S.~~ - V.P.'s order to shoot down -

U.S. 93

- Chain of communication?

- Who received that order at NORAD?

- From whom?

- Who did NORAD pass shoot-down order to?

\* - What implications did order have for pilots over D.C.? Over N.Y.C?

- How far back up the chain of command would pilot have to go to get confirmation of authority to shoot down commercial jet?

- Change in ROE from Peacetime to transition -  
① Where is that decision made?

B) - Who makes decision?

C) - How was that decision passed to NORAD HQ?

- Passed to CONR?

- Passed to NEADS?

- What was impact of ROE change on pilots' clipping D.C. and N.Y.C.?

- How, if at all, does it change their authority to engage hostile A/C?

- Under Transition ROE - if pilot wanted to declare and engage hostile A/C, what would be the process for ~~the~~ obtaining authorization?

V - How did V.P. shoot down order differ, if at all, from ROE change to Transition in terms of authority and process to engage a hostile A/C?

Dr Fridley - Interview notes

Col. Mike Cook }  
 J-2 - Bob Seton } Dr Buttle  
 Mike Jellumch } Cab  
 } on SIEC

- FAA Awareness - TV needs -  
 to work


- FAA rep in CMOE on  
 9-11 - "brilliant fellow"

- His name is "Reg"  
 - Reg was contacting FAA  
 centers to gain information

- Reg was in the Buttle Cab.

- ~~BC and~~

- BC and Command Center are side by  
 side

Proactive NCA 

FAA Priority

- He talked TO FAA about implementing SCATANA on 9-11.

\* (1) Intelligence Community flow of info. \*

\* (2) Post 9-11 Timeline

\* (3) ~~USA~~ Ground to Air  $\Delta$  of major cities  
↳ include

- J-2 on 9-11 - Colonel Bob Seton

- TTIC - gives asymmetric threat information TO NORAD.

- "We ~~are~~ must move from a need to know to a need to share paradigm."

Issue - Ground to Air defense of  
NCA (fixed) and mobile  
ground to air defenses to  
respond to events -

- Should this area be  
made more robust?  
(e.g. should there be more  
fixed sites of ~~air to ground~~  
ground to air today of  
major cities and/or critical  
infrastructure?)



Do we discuss this with  
Gen. Furdley or Gen  
Eberhart?

\* ← Capt. Jellinick pulled together  
a post 9-11 After Action  
Report / timeline?

\* ← Primary source at NORAD HQ  
for Timeline of 9-11 events?

— CC log

— BC logs

— NORAD HQ

— Analysis people put together the 9-11  
timelines. Dr. Finkelman → head  
of the Analysis Group.

— Worked w/ 84<sup>th</sup> radar people

— Worked w/ NEADS people

— Dr. Finkelman was in Battle Lab  
on 9-11.

NORAD HQ - people to interview:

- ① Capt. <sup>Mike</sup> Jellinek (CF) (in Canada now)
- ② Col. Mike Cook (separate interview)
- ③ Col. Bob Section (sp.?) - retired and living locally
- ④ Reg - FAA guy in CMOC ~~at~~  
on 9-11
- ⑤ Dr. Finkelman - Retired - in Area

Col. Bob "Section"

- ⑥ Lt. Jeff Sawbaugh - En route to Virginia → PCS (permanent change of station) to Navy chrl. school. → He was eyes and ears connection to FAA ATC on 9-11 for NORAD HQ.

Sam Finley

Man  
Q1

Who we are  
Background  
Day of 9/11

Time Box<sup>26</sup>  
Timeline  
1. A  
Wash CAP  
TB  
Secret Service

LT GEN Rick Finley

1968 Pilot

Sinai UN

Cent Amer UN

Haiti

St Staff College London

BG

Summer 2001 NORAD DC

as MGEN

was Battle Staff Dir because of

1. Exercise

2. Operation

External ops  
AG-Mead  
Bm NORAD

Exercise of Op Both And, unusual

VG

Northern Denial

① 3-way

Stratcom

resolve against

PACCOM

Secret LRA

② Key  
People  
we should  
talk to

There was a shift change when events  
unfolded Tom

Final 6:40 local

Received FAA request for possible  
hijack

all comm by telephone

AWC was embedded in NORAD  
command <sup>battle</sup> support center

was involved in this but tactical  
decisions at NEADS

talking to CD Mike Jelinski

UA 175 about same time as it impacted  
after first one he was told commander a/c  
initially thought bound for second

not a clear understanding at moment  
of 2d - but then realized a  
could attack

~~Luphansa~~

Updated CINC on telephone before  
CINC got to CMOC - he  
couldn't extract himself right  
away

after impact of Pentagon  
maybe been en route via UA 93

~~BC  
D. Hoffman  
talker~~

SIEC commenced

every phone was ringing

Col Mike Cook

NORAD J33

in BC

+ Sector J2

listened primarily

~~repeated  
at this  
end~~

DDO sets up SIEC

Mike Gelwick monitoring

+ every BMO in Command Center

From Sector - S.A. from FAA

Clear explanation of 11/077

~~what was  
their  
display~~

Today

FAA more sensitive

since 91 US

since 72 Canada

Today DDO is right there, actionable  
took 3 mos to get pilots disciplined  
more radars are used in

Op F. Q. re written procedures  
"They make a good call"

otis fighters - tax decision  
at NERAS in consult w/ CONR  
NORAD monitor to make sure  
everyone doing & asking

no hanging up on call signs - actual  
info was "etc headed for Washington

usually allocate 10-15 min for  
scrambles  
discussed putting everyone on  
battle stations

Reach out  
to ACC

Reach out  
to 11322

new something going on near  
got 1st or 2d etc tail # lined  
up

no sit awareness on the  
track that was 77 - reported  
after the impact

intent was to get fighters over  
DC

never sure if 1st etc was  
even dealt w/ satisfactorily  
There was no sequencing

D1989

over the loop a/c headed  
for Cleveland & COMB was  
looking for a responder

Closely monitoring

Had no radar  
Rely on processing of radars  
GRANITE SENTAY was a  
manual input display

D1987

did have FAA rep in CMOC  
for exercise "Reg" library  
directly w/ FAA - assumed  
ops center

just knew FAA had some concerns

UA93

we never knew there were 3 cracks  
Does that account for all  
Ans. not sure  
Then heard of 4th crack  
after the fact

Canceled

Don't recall

Comms w/ fighters

- not aware of discussion that day
- became aware of need to see & communicate better

on 9/11 looking out ward

- peripheral radar
- good comms

"didn't look in the backyard"

"Never formal w/ a because still ongoing"  
Hot work

1. Go to RADES flight paths  
COMR level effort

Smear the time lines

COMR worked the details re

FAA BMOA were put into

FAA Centers

2. Informal discussion & dialog  
after 9/11

3. VA93 - no more waiting  
to see how situation develops

4. Did they look at VA93

Informal at COMR level

everyone interviewed, "never" if didn't  
work " on 9/11

Ability to see AA?? wasn't there  
There was no early indication

RCC  
notification

Shred down

the

didn't participate  
got receiver down

Colonel  
Cook

maybe discussed w/ Arnold  
re Red Phone

He probably heard it at some time  
or had someone on legs who did

Thinks - after  $\diamond$  crash  
- after 93 impact  
doesn't recall precisely

Q. what engaged on pilots

It would go to them

"we didn't get bound by procedure"  
we didn't have to get to next stage  
he's sure they would have been  
discussions

"It would have been a real function of time  
Pilot would ID & request  
authority to engage

~~whereby~~

let them know the authority would  
be granted

never been exercised re taking out commercial a/c

On that day Arnold ~~could~~ could have executed

Everyone understood that was an emergency order

We had good connectivity w/ NMCC Newbold & Ward  
J3 VJ3

had no idea American fighters were up "old boy met w/ SS"

ROE change was automatic w/ DEFCON change

DF3 for force protection & global response weren't in a strategic battle need to let NMCC know what they can do trans ROE not helpful in this case

Concerns at NCA level discussion - OK for DC did what asked San Diego

Doesn't think it made it easier for the pilots at all

in ~~parameters~~ - Pres  
 Xetion - little more autonomy

⊗ Went to DC 3 for a different reason  
 it dropped in Transition ROE

Emergency Order - only specific to DC

not aware of broadcast out of Andrews  
 not sure pilot would have recognized  
 that as weapons free

Correct - just don't see it happening

GCI over DC  
 how altitude comms recognized  
 & worked 9/12 & after

Data links are key to the future

can't let air surveillance wither

How much time remaining as the Q  
 distance means nothing

acknowledged there were  
 language differences

most of FAA comms were  
no SCATANA

military really wanted  
to control Navigation Aids

Got final responders back in air  
very soon thereafter

had to derive comms & surveillance

He said there was a report  
of AA 77 "lost" that NEADS did  
not pass along

Intel/Ops re N. Denial

worked very good on  
strategies

asymmetric - had no awareness it  
was coming

Col Bob Seton

was J2  
in build as a  
contractor

U.S only & Canada only issues

Shoemaker - highest person possible

US only

Canada only

Have to move from paradigm of  
need to know  
to  
need to share

### Trng & Exercises

#### After Action

- TF Endure Look
- events of day

may didn't participate  
of Canada did - didn't  
include him

Capt M Galindo  
did as necessary  
make sure log was complete



ONE Commission  
looked at what needed to be  
done

Maybe  
one or  
two  
pages  
as a report

kind of effort

- ORG
- EQUIP
- TRAINING

we should have it

There was a log kept

Time Line Dr Finklerman AN folks  
still in the area

re PA Release on 18 Sep

NEADS times were times given by  
the Sector

New timelines - NEADS } input  
- COVR }

"not excited about response times"  
when they went out concentrated  
on ~~the~~ making sure it didn't  
happen again

"only important to us historically -  
if we have to do a reply

AN + Ops ~~and~~ in conjunction w/  
NEADS & COVR

wasn't intuitive it was in error

Colonel Mather is start point