10/27/03 Colonel Robert van Buggely

Necsa mission: Provides air sovereignty
- on 9/11/01 - 2 airliners (Qts and Buggley) under NEADS control

NEADS mission:
-iding civil authorities as.
- Hijacked - 1993 - 737
- Hijacked out of Europe (Lufthansa)
  - Concern for NEADS -> nobody
  - Flight was the main mission for NEADS

NCADS called FAA ->
It took 6 hrs. to coordinate
the Lufthansa intercept
with FAA

2. Counterdrug

3. Air Sovereignty

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2011-048, document no. 6
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: September 29, 2014
4. Search and Rescue:
   A) 84 Roads
   B) Kennedy Airport
   C) Egypt Inc- 990
   D) NBA 800
   E) Fort Lincoln
   F) Bear Island
   G) New Hampshire

5. "Homeland Defense"

6. Aerospace monitor/control

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Needs for a telephone line to Langley Search and Rescue Squad.

Relies on needs to get the reliable 84th road data for plane location.

Needs the capability to cover the WADS and SEADS areas if necessary.

Joint Surveillance System.

4) 14 Radar Sites pre 9-11
Pod Site "North Two" went down on 9/11/01 for preventative maintenance.

9/11 - NEADS does not have a unique radar system, so all NEADS radars are fed by FAA radar sites.

Today - NEADS has 19 radar scopes (17 on ops floor, 1 in Battle Cab and 1 in maintenance).

Front row of ops floor are weapons guys who control fighter planes.

ID people -> have 2 to 5 minutes to identify suspicious ACS (2 to 5 minutes standard vs identify target established by NORAD).

ID people have scopes.

SOCO - Sector Operations Control Center

NCRCC - National Capital Region Control Center (Created after 9/11/01).
TSA created the NCRCC.

- NCRCC is not a Command Center.

Col. man says he launched F-14s to help keep NYC on 9/11.

Col. man says 84th Rooks should be able to hold us in OTIS planes (puff & smoke) went Gagasan on 9/11.

- Pre 9-11 Regular Exercise
- used real aircraft
- no warning given to controller
- peads
- Atlantic City scrambled
- 1 A.C. aircraft were directed inland among F14 traffic
- 1 A.F. scrambled & got

Lessons learned - it was easier to scramble fighters over W 105 first & then than the ground
2) Direct them to island target.

- 9:40 A.M. → UAL 93

Transport off

"Man now says he scrambled Jungle first on U. I. 2d. Then immediately thoughts changed to D.C. At a lower level he feared UAL 93 would turn around and head for a target in Wash. D.C."

Q: When did UAL 93 lose radio contact?

Q: When did FAA report UAL 93 as hijacked or a bomb on board?

- Man Artling says FAA reported UAL 93 at 9:16 A.M.

- B/w 9:40 A.M. ad 9:45 A.M.→

General Arnold (C&R) told man he could secure authority for man to "take lives in the air" to save lives on the ground."
Authority to shoot down commercial 
airlines.

FAA liaison to NEDS on 9/11.

[Signature]

[Name]
1/23/04 Interview Colonel Robert MARR

- Col. Fred Davies
- G. Brown
- M. KARA
- K. Sheffer
- J. Farmer
- Col. MARR

Career in military

USAF Academy - 1975

Pilot Training - AZ

1st Assignment: Instructor Pilot T-38 - Advanced Training

Sangley AFB - T-33

Assigned to 48th Fights Interceptor Squadron (1 yr.)

1982-1985

Griffiss - He flew F-106

3 yrs.

Positions: OEF Command

Director of Standardization & Evaluation

Okinawa - 1985-1988

67th Fighter Squadron
ADO in Okinawa

- Selected as major - Went to Canadian School (Military) 1 yr.

- Exchange tour in Canadian Staff Nade Canada - (Part 1)
  NORAD - 500 miles N. of Toronto
  - Position: SOEX - Staff Officer for Exercises

- Position - Stand - Exercise program

- Flew the F-33's

- Flew F-18's - (cockpit)

- To see how the Canadians ran their part of NORAD Mission

- 1989-91 - Gulf War

  - NORAD - Still protecting for capability (Bomber, Bomber)
  (rather than intent)
1979-81 - a lot of ANG people were called to Desert Storm.

1991 - Came back to Florida to MEADS.

Good to all of MEADS wings to help them prepare for "ORF's."

1992 - Riyadh, Saudi Arabia - Assignment

Headed by Phoenix air - Eastern
Checked Det to as a Captain in the F16 35 and F16 36 (20 months)

1996 - Director of Exercise

and Analysis (DExA) position

Offered and Colonel Scott hired him to fill it.

Buld exercises from the ground up.

Role of Intelligence
Constructing the Exercises?

Intel will affect it somewhat. (See Tape for explanation).

August 1995 - Promoted to Commander of NEADS.

#0 Alert Bases when he started at NORAD = approximate 14

9/11/01 - NORAD had 7 Alert sites.
NEADS had 2 Alert Sites:

Tangleley and Otis. Lowest 3 Alert sites for NEADS in his career.

Changes in NORAD Mission over the years?

Early 1990's - NORAD was considered a Peacetime Operation. They focused on Peacetime Events at the beginning of issues.
Drug Interception was part of 
the mission (has been part of 
its mission for always and 
inaffably).

- Intercept any unknown 
  Tracks of Interest.

- Set up drug interception - 
  e.g.: Intel led us to 
  suspect ADC approaching 
  borders from South America.

- Coordination with FAA to 
  locate planes in connection 
  with drug interception missions.

- NEADS keeps regular contact w/ 
  FAA centers when trying to 
  ID aircraft approaching the ADIZ

Were there any drug interception missions 
that involved purely domestic 
flights? Yes. So, there 
weren't too many.

- No training scenarios involving
"Shooting down" civilian or commercial aircraft.

Hyjack Training/Exercises:

Real World Event - 1993

Hyjack Training.

Command heard about AC being hyjackd in Europe so they had a lot of time to react to it.

He talked to people at FAA Center Level.

He got call from WH crisis action team. They said they (WH) did not need his assistance. Then the WH person called back and said we do need your assistance.

Exercises to protect NCR?

Le "not specifically"
NEADS

1. Primary job is Identify A/C crossing the ADIZ.

2. Friendlyavy begin above military flight restrictions
in A/C engaged ADIZ, west went and came back
over.

3. Anything outside of zone
fence would have been
noted to civilian authorities.

Pagers were focused on
the perimeters of the county.

The Day of 9/11

Battle Shift 2 coordinates set
to the west of BC position.

Someone probably sat in
this position but he can not recall
who it was.
LT. Col. Corps = DO
LT. Col. Danes = FO

BC = Communicating with CONR and N.Y. State on 9/11

Man = First call to CONR was to General Arnold on 9/11

Man = Very unusual to communicate with CMOC/NORAD in general.

On 9/11/01, he does not recall any communication directly with CMOC/NORAD on 9/11.

Day of 9/11

8:00 - 8:30 am - Exercise briefing

9:00 - He noticed people flooding his unit and NORAD action
He first thought it was part of the exercise. To battle. Desk's report, possible kyoko, reported by FAA.

Man called Mr. Arnold and asked for authority to assemble OT 15 to W 105 in response to kyoko report.

Mr. Arnold said to assemble the fighters and still get the authority.