Area Closed to Ships and Aircraft - 5 August 1962 to 20 October 1962

Area Closed to Ships and Aircraft - 10 September 1961 to 15 November 1961
1. Soviet nuclear tests

We are now beginning to see flight activity indicative of impending nuclear tests in the Soviet Arctic. We expect these tests to begin on or shortly after 5 August, after which Moscow has declared that an area in the Barents and Kara Seas will be hazardous to shipping and aircraft (until 20 October). The wording of the Soviet announcement is similar to that used before beginning the 1961 Arctic test series; the first shot in that series occurred on the first day of the announced period. There may be tests elsewhere earlier as in last year's series.

E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(1)

Portion identified as non-responsive to the appeal
3. Indonesia

a. Sukarno has worked himself into a position where he must make some spectacular announcement concerning West New Guinea in his National Day (17 August) harangue. Should the talks fail to provide him with something that will enable him to say the Dutch have agreed to turnover administration of the area by 1 January, he will probably feel impelled to announce that Indonesian troops have landed in force. Preparations for the latter contingency continue apace.

b. Mikoyan, who returned to Moscow three days early, evidently got pretty short shrift from the preoccupied Indonesians.
NOTES

A. Soviet, Chinese and North Vietnamese propaganda plays up the Laos agreement as a demonstration of the value of negotiation, but both Peiping and Hanoi go beyond the Soviet line to argue, specifically with reference to South Vietnam, that further military pressure will be necessary before any peaceful consultations are productive.

D. Something besides talk of food shortages and more work will have to highlight tomorrow's ninth anniversary of Castro's revolt against Batista if the occasion is to be any less dismal than May Day. Turning the spotlight on Guantanamo is one possibility.

F. We expect the Communists in Peru will exploit the advantage they gained out of Monday's general strike failure by trying to wrest control of organized labor from Haya's followers.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

For The President Only—