VOLUME IV

ANNEXES TO REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
ON
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES
RELATING TO THE CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP
(14 April through 14 October 1962)
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL

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ANNEXES - VOLUME IV

ANNEX N  Significant SIGINT Items Relating to Cuba
          14 April - 14 October 1962

ANNEX O  Correspondence Between Chairman
          President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
          Board and the Director of Central Intelligence
          Regarding the Cuban Arms Build-up (14 April
          - 14 October 1962)

ANNEX P  Request for Contributions to Intelligence
          Community Review of Activities during the
          Cuban Arms Build-up (14 April - 14 October
          1962)
ANNEX N

SIGNIFICANT SIGINT ITEMS RELATING TO CUBA

This annex consists of significant SIGINT items relating to Cuba selected from the more than 5700 SIGINT items published in the period 14 April - 14 October 1962.
## SIGNIFICANT SIGINT ITEMS RELATING TO CUBA

### 14 April - 14 October 1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NO.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>13-17 Apr 62</td>
<td>18 Apr 62</td>
<td>Reference to Radar Tracking on Russian Equip. in Cuba</td>
<td>Use of F20 and F8 radars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Nov 61-Apr 62</td>
<td>30 Apr 62</td>
<td>ELINT Surveillance of Cuba</td>
<td>ELINT surveillance of Cuba during past six months revealed steady increase in number of Soviet radars operating on the island. Report contained estimate of number of radars by type located in Cuba.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>1 Jan-31 Mar 62</td>
<td>2 May 62</td>
<td>Dry Cargo Shipments to and from Cuba in Soviet Ships</td>
<td>Reports 43 voyages carrying 228,000 tons of cargo in first quarter 62. Cargo identified when known.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>15 May 62</td>
<td>17 May 62</td>
<td>Press Reports Indicate Increased Soviet Aid to Cuba</td>
<td>Additional items include 5,150 trucks, 850 tractors, 30 refriger.trucks, one 3,600 ton tanker, 57 excavators, 42,000 tons of bars, and misc.food prod.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Withheld from public release under §6 of the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)

**ABSTRACT OF CONTENT**

- First evidence of presence of SAMs along Cuba's coast.
- First evidence of presence of SAMs in Cuba in June 62.
- Evidence of presence of SAMs in Cuba in June 62.
- Evidence of presence of SAMs in Cuba in June 62.
- Evidence of presence of SAMs in Cuba in June 62.

**TITLE**

Cuban Air Forceuse of SAMs along Cuba's coast.

**DATE OF INFORMATION**

- 30 Jun 62
- 22 Jun 62
- 5 Jun 62
- 5 Jun 62
- 29 Jun 62
- 15 May 62
- 15 May 62
- 15 May 62

**TOP SECRET DIAIR**

- 29 Jun 62
- 29 Jun 62
- 29 Jun 62
- 29 Jun 62
- 29 Jun 62
- 29 Jun 62
- 29 Jun 62
- 29 Jun 62

**DATE OF PUBLICATION**

- 15 May 62
- 15 May 62
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<td>Withheld from public release under §6 of the National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. 3605 (P.L. 86-36)</td>
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<td>11.</td>
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<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>23 Jul 62</td>
<td>24 Jul 62</td>
<td>Unusual Number of Soviet Passenger Ships Enroute to Cuba.</td>
<td>Lists five ships carrying at least 3,335 passengers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>31 Jul 62</td>
<td></td>
<td>Possible Reflections of Soviet/Cuban Trade Adjustments Noted in Merchant Shipping.</td>
<td>Indicates Soviet vessels in Cuban trade are (1) making false port declarations, (2) declaring less than known cargo carrying capacity. Also notes absence of commercial trade messages, which normally provide cargo information.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td></td>
<td>7 Aug 62</td>
<td>Further Unusual Soviet/Reports new ships Cuban Trade Relations enroute Cuba. Recently Noted.</td>
<td>This auto-crane can be missile related.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>23 Aug 62</td>
<td></td>
<td>Status of Soviet Merchant Shipping to Cuba. Notes continued increase in number of ships enroute Cuba; total 57 since mid-July. Some ships on second voyage.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>22 Aug 62</td>
<td>24 Aug 62</td>
<td>Soviets Ship Short Wave Trunk Equip to Cuba.</td>
<td>This was one of at least three consignments noted to a telecommunications center which probably has military significance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>1 Jul 62</td>
<td>31 Aug 62</td>
<td>Further Information on Soviet/Cuban Trade. Reports total of 69 voyages since 1 July and lists new ships en route; shows increase of 1962 tonnage over comparable 1961 totals.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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ITEM 26. 50X3, E.O. 13526


DATE OF PUBLICATION
30 Aug 62

ITEM 27. 50X3, E.O. 13526


DATE OF PUBLICATION
1-5 Sep 62

TITLE
Unusual Activities of Seven Outlying Public Works Regional Offices of the Cuban Ministry of Public Works and Havana Recalls Road-Building Equipment from the Provinces.

ABSTRACT OF CONTENT
Possibly Soviet Military Shipments to Cuba, as noted.

Further Information on Soviet/Cuban Trade.

The reports of T.I. and T-II recently received indicate rapid shipping to Cuba from 87 to 106 additional voyages in short time.

5 Sep 62

Suggests one ship is carrying military equipment; notes 78 voyages since July.

7 Sep 62

Possible Soviet shipment of heavy equipment to Havana. Recalls Road-Building Equipment from the provinces during the first week of September. 406 pieces of equipment (mostly for road-building) were involved.

11 Sep 62

Further Information on Soviet/Cuban Trade.
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<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>1 Apr-30 Jun 62</td>
<td>11 Sep 62</td>
<td>Dry Cargo Shipments to and from Cuba in Soviet Ships.</td>
<td>Reports 48 voyages carrying 253,300 tons of cargo; lists military cargo (COMINT and collateral).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>11 Sep 62</td>
<td>13 Sep 62</td>
<td>Brazilian Ambassador in Havana examines increased Soviet Civil and Military Aid to Cuba.</td>
<td>Not offensive in character as far as he could tell.</td>
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<td>34.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>35.</td>
<td>15 Sep 62</td>
<td>15 Sep 62</td>
<td>SPOON REST Radar in Cuba.</td>
<td>First intercept of SPOON REST missile associated radar in Cuba.</td>
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<td>36.</td>
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<td>37.</td>
<td>Sep 62</td>
<td>19 Sep 62</td>
<td>New Radar Deployment in Cuba.</td>
<td>Appearance in Cuba of BUBB signals which emanate from Soviet emitters with coastal watch or harbor surveillance function.</td>
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<td>38.</td>
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<td>39.</td>
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<td>40.</td>
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<tr>
<td>41.</td>
<td>18 Sep 62</td>
<td>21 Sep 62</td>
<td>Airborne Radar in Cuba.</td>
<td>Signals intercepted from possible Soviet airborne MUSHROOM radar, known to function as search, bombing, and navigational radar in Soviet bomber, reconnaissance, transport, and civil aircraft.</td>
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<td>42.</td>
<td>18 Sep 62</td>
<td>21 Sep 62</td>
<td>IFF Signal in Cuban Area.</td>
<td>Suspected Operation of Soviet IFF system in Cuba confirmed by intercept of signal from Soviet airborne transponder SRO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43.</td>
<td>16 Aug 62</td>
<td>22 Sep 62</td>
<td>Cuban Pilots probably training in IL-28's.</td>
<td>Soviet TAF North Caucasus Military District communications reflected probable Cuban pilots training in IL-28 bombers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45.</td>
<td>22 Sep 62</td>
<td>24 Sep 62</td>
<td>Payments of Soviet Military Supply Organ Representative in Cuba Reach High of $200,000 in Sep.</td>
<td>This is one of a series of monthly payments to cover expenses of military technicians in Cuba. In Oct he received 555,550 Cuban pesos. Other available payments were $130,000 in Feb, $128,000 in Mar, $80,000 in Apr &amp; Jul, $175,000 in Aug; all payments apparently made by order of the Soviet Chief Engineering Directorate.</td>
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<td>47.</td>
<td>26 Sep 62</td>
<td>26 Sep 62</td>
<td>SQUARE TIE in Cuban Area.</td>
<td>Intercept of SQUARE TIE radar and visual correlation with Soviet KOMAR Class KOMS.</td>
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<td>49.</td>
<td>2 Oct 62</td>
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<td>50.</td>
<td>11 Oct 62</td>
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<td>51.</td>
<td>19 Oct 62</td>
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<td>54.</td>
<td>10 Oct 62</td>
<td>5 Oct 62</td>
<td>Communications in Russian &amp; Spanish by Cuban Air Force Controllers.</td>
<td>Cuban operators apparently have a small Russian vocabulary in order to converse with Soviet counterparts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55.</td>
<td>9 Oct 62</td>
<td>10 Oct 62</td>
<td>Intercept of Probable Cuban Air Defense Grid Tracking</td>
<td>First indication that Soviet VMOS type of grid system, similar to that used by Soviet Bloc Air Defense personnel prior to Mar 62, was in use in Cuba.</td>
</tr>
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SECRET

ANNEX O

Correspondence Between Chairman,
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
and the Director of Central Intelligence
Regarding the Cuban Arms Build-up
(14 April - 14 October 1962)

This annex contains a copy of a letter from the Chairman,
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to the Director
of Central Intelligence requesting a review of the intelligence
community's activities in regard to the Cuban arms build-up
(14 April - 14 October 1962), and the DCI's reply thereto, both
dated 14 November 1962.

SECRET
Memorandum for: Dr. James Killian  
Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

This is to let you know that your letter of November 14th asking for a report on the intelligence community's activities during the 12-month period preceding 14 October 1962, specifically in regard to Cuba, has been received and will be discussed at the meeting of the United States Intelligence Board tomorrow. Additionally, I have sent copies of it to Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, and the Attorney General for their information.

I think you realize that it is a sizeable task to be fully responsive by the time of your next meeting on December 7th. Although the Central Intelligence Agency is well along toward its final report, the consolidation of this report with those from other members of the intelligence community will require some painstaking and closely-integrated effort.

I will do my best to get my final report to you prior to your next meeting.

John A. McCone  
Director

cc: J. Patrick Coyne
November 14, 1962

Dear John:

On behalf of the President's Board, I wish to express our appreciation for your submission at our November 9 meeting of the memorandum dated November 7, 1962, which had been prepared within the Central Intelligence Agency on the subject "CIA Handling of the Soviet Build-up in Cuba, 1 July - 16 October 1962."

The memorandum which you supplied, and your comments to the Board, were an instructive contribution to our current review of the intelligence collection and reporting roles performed by the United States intelligence community with respect to the vitally important subject matter involved.

In furtherance of the Board's review it would be helpful if we were supplied with information on all pertinent aspects of the total U. S. foreign intelligence effort which was brought to bear in providing advance information and assessments of the developing ballistic missile capability which was positively confirmed by means of photographic reconnaissance over Cuba on October 14, 1962. Such information will materially assist the Board in its continuing appraisal of our foreign intelligence activities and should facilitate the consideration of measures for the further strengthening of our intelligence system. Accordingly, the Board would like to request a review on an all-source, all-agency basis of the actions taken and results obtained within the intelligence community in providing intelligence coverage, reporting and estimates of the developing build-up during the twelve month period preceding October 14, 1962.

It would be appreciated if a report setting forth the results of the intelligence community's review would include: (a) an identification of the requirements levied on intelligence collection elements of the Government, (b) a resume of the intelligence information obtained from such sources as foreign diplomatic personnel, Cuban refugee interrogations, in-place agent reports, COMINT, and ELINT during the period...
referred to above, (c) the scope of distribution given such information to higher authority and laterally within the intelligence community, and (d) the extent to which such information was reflected in reports and assessments provided to policy level officials.

We understand that the Department of Defense is reviewing its own intelligence activities pertaining to the Cuban situation, and this will doubtless be helpful in this matter. If the results of the intelligence community's review could be made available to the Board in time for consideration at its next meeting on December 7, without materially interfering with substantive matters of importance, the Board would thereby be enabled to respond in timely fashion to requests which are before it.

FOR THE BOARD

[Signature]
James R. Killian, Jr.
Chairman

Mr. John McCone
Director of Central Intelligence
SECRET

ANNEX P

Request for Contributions to
Intelligence Community Review of
Activities during the Cuban Arms Build-up
(14 April - 14 October 1962)

This annex contains a copy of a memorandum dated
16 November 1962 from the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
to the Department of State, Defense Intelligence Agency, and
National Security Agency forwarding a format to be followed in
the preparation of their agency's contribution to the study of
community activities during the Cuban arms build-up (14 April -
14 October 1962). Copies of General Carter's memorandum were
also furnished the USIB representatives from AEC and FBI as
well as components of CIA participating in the review.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State 
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency 
Director, National Security Agency

REFERENCE: Memorandum for USIB Principals from the DCI, dated 14 November 1962

1. Pursuant to the discussion at the Executive Session of the United States Intelligence Board meeting on 15 November 1962, I have established a working group in the Central Intelligence Agency under the chairmanship of the Inspector General of CIA to prepare the response to the request by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board for an all-agency, all-source review of the intelligence activities relating to the Cuban situation.

2. The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; and the Director, National Security Agency have designated representatives to this group in order to provide necessary support, research, analysis, and other staffing required in the preparation of the response.

3. There is attached for the guidance of the representatives of the several agencies a format to be followed in preparation of their agency’s contribution to the study. This format has been coordinated with these representatives.

4. Copies of this letter and of the format have also been sent to Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and to Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, together with requests for any data which they may be able to supply to aid the study.
SECRET

5. Individual agencies' contributions will be submitted to the chairman of the working group not later than close of business 23 November 1962.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Attachment

cc: Director J-2 (Intelligence)
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Army
Director, Naval Intelligence
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Air Force
SECRET

FORMAT FOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP, 14 APRIL THROUGH 14 OCTOBER 1962

The main headings under which information is desired from each contributing agency are as follows:

A. COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
B. COLLECTION FACILITIES
C. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION--THE SUBSTANCE
D. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION--ITS DISSEMINATION
E. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION--PROCESSING
F. THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT
G. USE OF THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT
H. PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNITY COORDINATION

Under these general headings each agency is asked to supply the following information:
A. COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

1. At the beginning of the period under review, what were the requirements on Cuba and on Soviet Bloc activities with respect to Cuba, as levied upon the agency?

2. At the beginning of the period, what were the agency's own internal requirements for intelligence on Cuba and on Soviet Bloc activities with respect to Cuba? How were these requirements generated?

3. How long had the requirements in 1. and 2., above, been in effect? Had there been any significant recent changes? If so, what?

4. What significant changes in requirements were introduced during the period? If internally produced, how were they generated?

5. How were the requirements in 1., 2., and 4., above, transmitted to the agency's collection facilities? What, if any, requirements were referred to other collecting agencies?

6. What role did the agency play in the generation of community requirements?
B. COLLECTION FACILITIES

1. What are the nature and scope of the agency's collection facilities with respect to the Cuban situation? (For example: Cuban or third-country agents or informants in Cuba; legal travelers; Cuban or third-country diplomats; refugees; liaison services; analysis of overt press and radio; COMINT; ELINT; photography -- specify means and available targets.)

2. Please describe any new facilities which were created -- or existing facilities which were expanded or redirected during the period or shortly before -- which contributed significantly to the agency's collection effort.

3. What targets was the agency able to cover and with what frequency and continuity?

4. Within the terms of the agency's mission, what targets was it unable to cover, and why?

5. What, if any, significant changes, either positive or negative, in the agency's coverage capability, took place during the period?

6. What support for collection facilities was required from other agencies? How was it secured from them? Was it timely and effective? What, if anything, was lacking?
C. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION -- THE SUBSTANCE

Please submit the following data on all intelligence information relating to the Cuban arms build-up which was collected by the agency during the period:

1. Abstracts of all raw reports bearing significantly on the build-up.

2. For each such abstract please note:
   a. Serial number of report.
   b. Date of information.
   c. Date of dissemination.
   d. Brief source description.
   e. Source grade.
   f. Content appraisal.
   g. To whom disseminated.

3. Please make special note of any such raw reports which the agency considered to be of particular significance at the time of receipt. Also please note any which, though not specially noted at the time of receipt, the light of subsequent events has shown to be of importance.

---SECRET---
D. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION -- ITS DISSEMINATION

1. Please provide, in detail, the standard dissemination which applies to most of the agency's reports. When, how, and for what reasons is this dissemination varied?

2. How are reports originating with your agency distributed in the community?

3. How are reports originating outside your agency disseminated within the agency?

4. Please provide a narrative statement on the flow of intelligence information significantly concerned with the arms build-up in Cuba, both within your agency and from your agency to other community elements.

5. Please select a particularly significant report and trace its progress from the time the information was acquired by the ultimate source to the time it reached the hands of the customer.
E. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION -- PROCESSING

1. Please discuss the analytical process in the agency with respect to the Cuban arms build-up. Who does the analyzing? What research facilities or technical analytical tools are brought to bear? Does this involve support from other agencies? If so, to what extent? How effective? Any lacks?

2. Do analysts discuss intelligence information with analysts of other agencies? If so, do they do it regularly or only on occasion? Does such discussion facilitate rapid and effective analysis?

3. Please discuss the way the agency uses intelligence information, both its own product and that of other collecting agencies, in the preparation of internal intelligence and estimative publications.

4. To what extent do analysts and estimators discuss intelligence information with personnel engaged in directing collection operations? Do the analysts and estimators know as much about the capabilities of collection facilities as they need to in order to do their job effectively?

5. How is intelligence processed for submission to coordinated community publications? Who prepares such submissions, and what is the administrative mechanism employed? How does it work?
F. THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT

1. Please submit the following:
   a. Consecutive dated verbatim extracts, dealing with the Cuban arms build-up, from all of the agency's formal intelligence publications during the period.
   b. Two copies of each formal agency estimative publication dealing with Cuba during the period. Do not include agency contributions to NIE's or SNIE's.

2. Please describe what other channels, such as oral or written, were used during the build-up to transmit pertinent information to policy-level officials.
G. USE OF THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT

1. What unilateral operational use did the agency make of intelligence or intelligence information received on the build-up?

2. How was such information or intelligence used by the agency in participation in community meetings (USIB, Special Group, Watch Committee, NRO, others)?

3. How and to what extent did the agency contribute to coordinated action by the community or members thereof (including action by the agency alone, as directed or permitted by the community) as a result of intelligence received during the build-up?

4. Please provide specific instances in which the agency's intelligence product affected US policy or, together with the product of other agencies, contributed to it.
H. PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNITY COORDINATION

1. Other than as stated under G., above, in what community publication panels or committees does the agency participate?

2. What elements of the agency are responsible for such coordination?

3. How do they participate in this coordination?

4. Please give specific examples, including dates and contents, of any items of intelligence presented by the agency which have been withheld from publication, delayed, or significantly altered by the coordination process. If delayed, how long? If altered, in what way?