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ACCESS RECORD AND COVER SHEET

January 6, 1986

CHRONOLOGY OF PRESIDENTIAL INVOLVEMENT

June 14-July 6 (?), 1985

TWA 847 Hijacking; Iranians play role in securing release of a handful of Americans held outside Beirut. President is intimately involved in crisis handling. (documents from NSC)

July 6, 1985

McFarlane informs the President, with Regan (and maybe Bush) of his discussion with David Kimche on political contacts in Iran. (McFarlane testimony)

July 13-15, 1985

McFarlane meets with the President (and assumed, Regan) in the hospital on at least two occasions (once with at least Secretary Shultz in the room). (McFarlane testimony)

August 4, 1985

McFarlane meets with President again to discuss the Israeli channel into Iran; McFarlane proposes an NSPG meeting on the topic (Reagan agrees). (McFarlane testimony)

August 6, 1985

Informal NSPG in the residence (President still convalescing) with Reagan, Regan, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, McFarlane, and Poindexter (unclear on Bush) in attendance. McFarlane presents the Israeli proposal of arms to Iran to facilitate a U.S.-Iran political dialogue. (McFarlane testimony)

Attendees disagree on outcome. McFarlane initially testifies that President supports and declares an oral finding (later before the SSCI he appears to soften the line and says that the President reached this decision over a series of meetings that includes this NSPG). Shultz and Weinberger say no decision reached. Regan says the President opposed the idea of Israeli arms transfer at this meeting. (in testimony to board, B. McMahon, and reported testimony to SSCI)

In the April 4, 1985 document that lays out the contra diversion, the writer notes that "the Israeli Government, with the endorsement of the USG, transferred 508 basic TOW missiles to Iran." Another document titled "Background and

Chronology of Special Project" that has Poindexter's initials back to Ollie North states that "the Israelis, at NSC behest, delivered 508 TOW missiles to Iran."

Late September, 1985

According to the NSC chronology prepared after the story breaks, the President learns of the Israeli shipment after the fact and "it was decided not to expose this Israeli delivery because we wanted to retain the option of exploiting the existing Israeli channel with Tehran..."

October-November 1985

No evidence of Presidential involvement in November shipment though NSC staff and CIA are clearly involved.

December 4, 1985

President announces McFarlane resignation and Poindexter ascension.

December 7, 1985

President chairs an NSPG meeting attended by Shultz, Weinberger, John McMahon, Regan, Poindexter, Fortier, and McFarlane. Approves instructions for McFarlane that include telling Iranians "no more arms." (Oakley Testimony)

December 11, 1985

President chairs an NSPG with Regan, Bush, Weinberger, McMahon, Poindexter (Shultz is at a NATO ministerial). McFarlane recommends that the program be stopped because Ghorbanifar cannot be trusted. (McFarlane and B. McMahon)

December 23, 1985

Casey sends President a letter urging extreme caution in dealing with Ghorbanifar.

January 6, 1986

President signs first finding on Iran with Regan, Poindexter, and Fortier present.

January 7, 1986

President chairs an NSPG with Bush, Regan, Shultz, Weinberger, Meese, Casey and Poindexter to discuss the overall situation in Iran and prospects for strategic dialogue. Shultz and Weinberger object to arms transfers.

Meese and Casey support the concept of arms transfers as a means of opening the dialogue. President makes clear that a dialogue with Iran is not possible unless it uses its influences to achieve release of hostages.

January 10, 1986

NSC meeting on Central America; included in talking points (possibly for Poindexter) is an issue of the "need to resume a program of covert military assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance forces."

January 17, 1986

President signs a finding on Iran with Bush, Regan, and Fortier in attendance.

February 28, 1986

President receives a letter from Shimon Peres that urges continued efforts to achieve a strategic breakthrough with Iran, but asking consideration for the safety of recently-seized Israeli hostages and the desire to have the issue of their release raised once U.S. hostages are freed. (have letter)

April (4?), 1986

Memo prepared for Presidential approval that lays out the Iranian affair and suggests a diversion of \$12million to the FDN. No author, no recipient, no signature. (B. McMahon offers thesis that it is a North to Poindexter memo that Poindexter uses to brief the President at least on the Iran side of the equation).

May 15, 1986

President authorizes McFarlane's secret mission to Iran and the Terms of Reference for that trip.

May 16, 1986

President chairs an NSPG on aid to the contras with Bush, Shultz, Baker, Regan, Weinberger, Casey, Wickham, Poindexter, Fuller, Habib, Abrams, Ikle, Fiers, Moellering, Ball, Derejian, McDaniel, Burghardt, and North attending. Looking for funding (from other countries and private individuals) to bridge the gap forced by Congress.

Late May--Early June 1986

McFarlane briefs the President, Poindexter, Bush, and Regan on his trip to Tehran at the 9:30 National Security Brief. He tells them that "if they wanted to have political meetings that is a judgment we could make, but that there ought not be any weapons transfers." McFarlane testifies that the President did not comment.

Beginning in June 1986

McDaniel begins attending the 9:30 National Security Briefing with the President (with Bush, Regan, and Poindexter in regular attendance). McDaniel reports that the issue of Iran came up as one of five or six daily issues on a regular basis; no mention of the contra diversion. No knowledge of how often issue discussed before McDaniel starts attending. (Hadley and Krieg with McDaniel)

July 26 (?), 1986

Poindexter briefs the President over secure phone on the contents of a memo from North to Poindexter about the Jenco release (as a result of the McFarlane trip, payments, and next steps. (Have document noted by Poindexter)

July 29, 1986

President approves the immediate shipment of the remaining HAWK parts (left over from the May McFarlane trip)

October 3, 1986

White House approves passing intelligence to Iran to terminate the Iran-Iraq war (NSC Chronology -- not clear who approves) U.S. passing intelligence to Iran as early as January or February 1986.

November 24, 1986

President chairs an NSPG with Regan, Weinberger, Shultz, Casey, Poindexter (will have to check attendance) on Iran (lasts at least 2 hours); Cave briefs the group. Talking points include discussion on future steps in Iran.